DOCSLIB.ORG

Libya After Qaddafi State Formation Or State Collapse?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Libya After Qaddafi State Formation Or State Collapse? Introduction nts Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik me German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Libya after Qaddafi State Formation or State Collapse? Wolfram Lacher SWPCo Under pressure from a rebellion, an international intervention, and comprehensive sanctions, Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime is on the verge of collapse. As of late March 2011, regime forces are focussed on retaining control of north-western Libya, raising the prospect of protracted civil war and partition. Qaddafi’s demise is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Libya’s renewed stabilisation. The post-Qaddafi state will essentially have to be built from scratch. However, political players will likely be more focussed on the redistribution of wealth than on building state institutions. Scenarios for the post-Qaddafi era include a new deal among former regime elites that would lead to renewed instability in the medium-term, or a more protracted, but ultimately more sustainable, state-building process. Hastening Qaddafi’s fall should be the main priority of Germany and other EU member states now. External actors should also sup- port the Interim National Council as the nucleus of a post-Qaddafi government. How- ever, they should refrain from playing an active role in the state-building process that will follow Qaddafi’s demise, as this would risk discrediting the process. The revolution of 17 February – as it is quickly sided with the rebels. The state and called by the rebels – began as an attempt security apparatus rapidly disintegrated, by mainly young Libyans to emulate the and by late February Libya was in a state of events in Egypt and Tunisia. The uprising civil war. As entire army units defected, the erupted simultaneously in north-eastern rebels became a military force, defending Libya (Benghazi and Al Bayda) and south the north-eastern part of the country and of Tripoli (Zintan); quickly, the overthrow parts of the north-west as “liberated areas”. of the regime became the rebellion’s stated While the Qaddafi regime’s power base goal. Developments in Libya took a com- and areas of control eroded dramatically in pletely different direction from those in the first two weeks of the uprising, it has Libya’s neighbouring states, largely because remained largely stable since. Forces loyal Qaddafi’s security forces attempted to to the regime are largely confined to special crush the uprising with extreme brutality. units and militias under the direct control Shocked by the actions of special units and of Qaddafi’s sons and close allies. They are, mercenaries, the majority of the population however, better equipped and organised Wolfram Lacher is a Researcher at SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 9 March 2011 1 than the regular army. Qaddaddfa, mem- established. The Council aims at steering bers of Qaddafi’s tribe, are strongly over- the transition to a post-Qaddafi govern- represented among these troops. As of late ment, and is calling for free elections and March 2011, Qaddafi forces have regained drafting a new constitution to establish control over Tripoli and the western cities a democratic state with a separation of of Zawiya and Zuwara through large-scale powers. The Council comprises a loose repression and major army offensives, and coalition of different groups, and is cur- continue to besiege rebels in Misurata and rently dominated by Libyans from the the Jebel Nafusa in the north-west. The country’s north-east. However, it should regime has also managed to coax parts of not be dismissed as an instrument of north- the urban population and some tribal con- eastern elites being used to expand their stituencies in north-western and central influence; rather, representatives of areas Libya into obedience through a combina- that remain under Qaddafi’s control are tion of cash handouts and threats. Inter- unable to join due to the ongoing civil war, national alliance airstrikes authorised un- or fear that their families will be subjected der UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to reprisal if their identities become to protect civilians and enforce a no-fly known. As of late March 2011, the names zone mean that Qaddafi’s forces are on the of 13 of its 31 members have been made defensive and have no realistic prospect of public, while the others are kept secret recapturing the north-east. The key ques- due to security concerns. The chairman tion, though, is whether external military of the Council is Mustafa Abdel Jalil from pressure – in combination with sanctions Al Bayda, who resigned as Qaddafi’s Justice and the rebellion – will lead to further Minister on 21 February. The most prom- defections in Qaddafi’s entourage, or to inent representative of the opposition efforts by security officials to topple the groups that led the rebellion in the first Qaddafi family. Failing the unravelling of weeks is Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, a lawyer from the regime’s core, Qaddafi’s forces could yet Benghazi. Another key figure is Mahmoud retain control over north-western and cen- Jebril, who is in charge of external relations tral Libya for months, possibly longer. In and has been tipped to be head of a future the meantime, however, a new political transitional government. Jebril is a US- order is emerging in rebel-held areas, spel- educated academic who between 2007 and ling the end of the Qaddafi era there. 2009 played a leading role in (unsuccessful) efforts to reform the Libyan economy. On the whole, former officials dominate the The post-Qaddafi political arena Council, although the revolutionaries – Under Qaddafi’s 42-year rule, there were lawyers like Ghoga and academics such as neither political parties nor civil society Fathi Baaja – retain significant representa- organisations. It is only now that they can tion. However, the composition of the develop. The contours of the post-Qaddafi Council is bound to evolve: the coalition political scene, therefore, remain sketchy. between regime defectors and revolution- aries would likely be affected by Qaddafi’s demise, which would require the Council The Interim National Council to accommodate representatives of other The Interim National Council that formed tribes and regions. in late February in Benghazi quickly gained the support of defecting military units, state officials, and tribal leaders, and has The tribes since been seeking international recogni- Tribal loyalties play a key role in Libyan tion as the sole legitimate representative politics. Qaddafi’s regime could be under- of Libya until a new government can be stood as essentially an alliance of the small SWP Comments 9 March 2011 2 Qaddadfa tribe with two of the country’s Misurata, where more than a third of the largest tribes: the Warfalla based mainly in country’s six million Libyans live. The Tripolitania, and the Magarha from the young population that led the uprising Fezzan. These three tribes were dispropor- in these and other large cities is unlikely tionately represented in government, the to feel adequately represented by tribal military, and the security apparatus. Repre- leaders. Finally, the tribes are not homo- sentatives of other tribes were also accom- geneous entities. Each of the larger tribes modated to ensure stability. The tribes also consists of numerous smaller sub-groups. functioned as networks through which the Many tribal leaders have been discredited Qaddafi regime distributed patronage. The due to the role they played under Qaddafi. continuing importance of tribal loyalties Consequently, the transition is also likely to was demonstrated during the first two see power struggles within the tribes – for weeks of the rebellion, when a number example, rivalries between opponents and of leading tribes and numerous smaller loyalists of Qaddafi among the Warfalla, groups publicly withdrew their support Magarha, and Qaddadfa. from the regime. Most prominent among them were the north-eastern tribes. Numer- ous tribes or sub-groups from other areas The former regime elite also joined the rebellion, including the Following a spate of desertions by senior Berber tribes of the Jebel Nafusa, the Tou- officials in the first two weeks of the bou minority in Libya’s south, and parts of uprising, the former ruling elite is deeply the Warfalla. Senior officials such as Justice divided. Many former officials now play a Minister Abdel Jalil, Interior Minister Abdel prominent role in the Interim National Fattah Younis, or Ambassador to Washing- Council and are positioning themselves for ton Ali Aujali – all members of north- the post-Qaddafi era. This includes former eastern tribes – followed their tribes in Justice Minister Abdel Jalil and former supporting the rebellion. Trade Minister and Ambassador to India, After Qaddafi’s demise, the tribes will Ali al-Essawi (now responsible for external be primarily interested in redistributing relations, along with Mahmoud Jebril) as influence within the state apparatus and well as the former Ambassadors to the access to state resources and services. There UN and the United States, Abderrahman is potential for major shifts in this regard, Shalgam and Ali Aujali. Omar al-Hariri given that the Qaddadfa tribe and some of (now nominally in charge of the rebel its allies would inevitably lose influence in army) and Abdel-Monem al-Houni, former a successor state. Groups that remained Ambassador to the Arab League, fall into a loyal to the regime during the insurgency slightly different category: both partici- could be politically marginalised or face pated in Qaddafi’s 1969 coup but were reprisals. Such groups could form the basis jailed or exiled after a failed coup attempt of (potentially armed) opposition to the against Qaddafi in 1975. Some defectors are new regime, unless they are politically viewed with a high degree of suspicion by accommodated. the revolutionaries, such as former Interior However, the current rebellion and post- Minister Younis, who is accused of being Qaddafi politics should not be misunder- responsible for serious human rights stood as simply a power struggle between violations.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Download File
    Italy and the Sanusiyya: Negotiating Authority in Colonial Libya, 1911-1931 Eileen Ryan Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2012 ©2012 Eileen Ryan All rights reserved ABSTRACT Italy and the Sanusiyya: Negotiating Authority in Colonial Libya, 1911-1931 By Eileen Ryan In the first decade of their occupation of the former Ottoman territories of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in current-day Libya, the Italian colonial administration established a system of indirect rule in the Cyrenaican town of Ajedabiya under the leadership of Idris al-Sanusi, a leading member of the Sufi order of the Sanusiyya and later the first monarch of the independent Kingdom of Libya after the Second World War. Post-colonial historiography of modern Libya depicted the Sanusiyya as nationalist leaders of an anti-colonial rebellion as a source of legitimacy for the Sanusi monarchy. Since Qaddafi’s revolutionary coup in 1969, the Sanusiyya all but disappeared from Libyan historiography as a generation of scholars, eager to fill in the gaps left by the previous myopic focus on Sanusi elites, looked for alternative narratives of resistance to the Italian occupation and alternative origins for the Libyan nation in its colonial and pre-colonial past. Their work contributed to a wider variety of perspectives in our understanding of Libya’s modern history, but the persistent focus on histories of resistance to the Italian occupation has missed an opportunity to explore the ways in which the Italian colonial framework shaped the development of a religious and political authority in Cyrenaica with lasting implications for the Libyan nation.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya
    SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Wolfram Lacher Fault Lines of the Revolution Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya RP 4 May 2013 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2013 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They express exclusively the personal views of the author(s). SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Meredith Dale (English version of SWP-Studie 5/2013) The English translation of this study has been realised in the context of the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world”. The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant programme of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. Table of Contents 5 Problems and Conclusions 7 Parameters of the Transition 9 Political Forces in the New Libya 9 Camps and Interests in Congress and Government 10 Ideological Camps and Tactical Alliances 12 Fault Lines of the Revolution 14 The Zeidan Government 14 Parliamentary and Extra-Parliamentary Islamists 14 The Grand Mufti’s Network and Influence 16 The Influence of Islamist Currents
    [Show full text]
  • After Gaddafi 01 0 0.Pdf
    Benghazi in an individual capacity and the group it- ures such as Zahi Mogherbi and Amal al-Obeidi. They self does not seem to be reforming. Al-Qaeda in the found an echo in the administrative elites, which, al- Islamic Maghreb has also been cited as a potential though they may have served the regime for years, spoiler in Libya. In fact, an early attempt to infiltrate did not necessarily accept its values or projects. Both the country was foiled and since then the group has groups represent an essential resource for the future, been taking arms and weapons out of Libya instead. and will certainly take part in a future government. It is unlikely to play any role at all. Scenarios for the future The position of the Union of Free Officers is unknown and, although they may form a pressure group, their membership is elderly and many of them – such as the Three scenarios have been proposed for Libya in the rijal al-khima (‘the men of the tent’ – Colonel Gaddafi’s future: (1) the Gaddafi regime is restored to power; closest confidants) – too compromised by their as- (2) Libya becomes a failing state; and (3) some kind sociation with the Gaddafi regime. The exiled groups of pluralistic government emerges in a reunified state. will undoubtedly seek roles in any new regime but The possibility that Libya remains, as at present, a they suffer from the fact that they have been abroad divided state between East and West has been ex- for up to thirty years or more.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya Conflict Insight | Feb 2018 | Vol
    ABOUT THE REPORT The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and Libya Conflict recommendations to assist the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Member States and Development Partners in decision making and in the implementation of peace and security- related instruments. Insight CONTRIBUTORS Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael (Editor in Chief) Mr. Alagaw Ababu Kifle Ms. Alem Kidane Mr. Hervé Wendyam Ms. Mahlet Fitiwi Ms. Zaharau S. Shariff Situation analysis EDITING, DESIGN & LAYOUT Libya achieved independence from United Nations (UN) trusteeship in 1951 Michelle Mendi Muita (Editor) as an amalgamation of three former Ottoman provinces, Tripolitania, Mikias Yitbarek (Design & Layout) Cyrenaica and Fezzan under the rule of King Mohammed Idris. In 1969, King Idris was deposed in a coup staged by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. He promptly abolished the monarchy, revoked the constitution, and © 2018 Institute for Peace and Security Studies, established the Libya Arab Republic. By 1977, the Republic was transformed Addis Ababa University. All rights reserved. into the leftist-leaning Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. In the 1970s and 1980s, Libya pursued a “deviant foreign policy”, epitomized February 2018 | Vol. 1 by its radical belligerence towards the West and its endorsement of anti- imperialism. In the late 1990s, Libya began to re-normalize its relations with the West, a development that gradually led to its rehabilitation from the CONTENTS status of a pariah, or a “rogue state.” As part of its rapprochement with the Situation analysis 1 West, Libya abandoned its nuclear weapons programme in 2003, resulting Causes of the conflict 2 in the lifting of UN sanctions.
    [Show full text]
  • Fragile Stability and Future Opportunities in Libya's Sirte
    Issue 2019/21 December 2019 The City in the Middle: Fragile Stability and Future Opportunities in Libya’s Sirte Omar Al-Hawari1 Since 4 April, Libya has been witnessing its third civil conflict in eight years. The conflict was sparked when the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF),2 a diverse coalition headquartered in eastern Libya, launched a military operation to wrest control of the capital from actors loosely affiliated to the internationally- recognised Government of National Accord (GNA).3 While fighting has continued in and around Tripoli, with neither side able to gain a decisive victory, there have been concerns that the conflict over the capital could precipitate violence in other areas across the country. The coastal city of Sirte4 appeared particularly exposed, with its proximity to forces allied to the two main warring camps indicating it could become a new frontline. In addition to its strategic location in the centre of Libya’s northern coast, Sirte has a particular symbolism in Libya’s recent history. Having been the stronghold of the Qadhadhfa tribe and of the Jamahiriyya regime between 1969 and 2011, it then 1. Omar Al-Hawari is a communications engineer and researcher from the Sirte region. He has been cooperating with the Middle East Directions Programme since 2018. This paper was written as part of Middle East Directions’ Libya Initiative, which includes a project mentoring junior Libyan analysts. This paper was origi- nally written in Arabic. BRIEF 2. The LAAF is an alliance of armed military and civilian groups led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.
    [Show full text]
  • Considerazioni Politiche E Militari Sulla Crisi in Libia
    Considerazioni politiche e militari sulla crisi in Libia n. 34 - maggio 2011 A cura del CeSI (Centro Studi Internazionali) Considerazioni politiche e militari sulla crisi in Libia di Gabriele Iacovino Maggio 2011 Indice 1. Introduzione al conflitto 1 2. Forze alleate nell’Operazione Unified Protector 5 3. Le risorse militari a disposizione di Gheddafi 9 4. Il campo degli insorti 12 5. Conclusioni 22 Per la stesura del lavoro sono state utilizzate fonti della NATO, del Ministero della Difesa italiano, britannico e francese, del Dipartimento della Difesa americano e fonti CeSI. 1. Introduzione al conflitto Le rivolte popolari che hanno colpito l’intero arco nordafricano e mediorientale hanno avuto effetti diversi nei vari Paesi. Si è infatti visto come le manifestazioni abbiano portato in Tunisia ed Egitto alla cacciata dal potere, rispettivamente, di Ben Ali e Mubarak, mentre in Algeria e Marocco le autorità siano riuscite a trovare, per adesso, un compromesso tra istanze riformatrici e mantenimento del potere. Per quanto riguarda la Libia, invece, la situazione si è sviluppata fin da subito lungo direttrici differenti, delineandosi come una vera e propria guerra civile che vede scontrarsi da una parte le forze fedeli al Colonnello Gheddafi e dall’altra gli insorti. Tutto è cominciato il 17 febbraio, quando, in occasione di quello che era stato definito “il giorno della rabbia”, molti movimenti di opposizione avevano organizzato manifestazione contro il regime. Tuttavia, una protesta che sembrava circoscritta solo ad alcune zone del Paese, in particolare quelle orientali, e in grado di essere mantenuta sotto controllo dalle Forze di Sicurezza libiche, si è via via trasformata in un vero e proprio conflitto.
    [Show full text]
  • Uprising and Post-Qadhafi Tribal Clashes, Displacement in a Fragmenting Libya
    30 March 2015 LIBYA Uprising and post-Qadhafi tribal clashes, displacement in a fragmenting Libya The political instability and crimes against humanity that accompanied and followed the uprising which overthrew President Muammar Qadhafi in October 2011 drove tens of thou- sands into displacement. Those perceived to have supported Qadhafi or to have benefited from privileges he dispensed through tribal patronage networks were attacked in retalia- tion. They were often driven out of their cities, unable to return. Some 60,000 IDPs who had fled during the uprising were still living in pro- tracted displacement by February 2015. Civilians walk along Tripoli Street in Misrata. Photo: UNHCR/ H. Caux / June 2011 Following the failure of political processes, Libya’s situation became increasingly anarchic, culminating in the collapse of a fragile central authority and the emergence of two rival centres of power in mid-2014. Against this backdrop, and ensuing infight- ing among myriads of militias, violence increased. There was more than a six-fold rise in the number of IDPs, reaching at least 400,000 by December 2014, some eight per cent of the population. Precise figures are not available given lack of access and on-going pervasive chaos. IDPs’ basic needs for shelter, food and medical services remain grossly unmet. Their physical security has been seriously threatened by indiscriminate shelling, attacks on IDP camps and sieges that have pre- vented them from seeking security. The situation of tens of thousands of displaced migrants who remain trapped in Libya and are particularly vulnerable is a cause for serious concern. State collapse and fragmentation of Libya’s essentially tribal society have hampered an effective national response to displacement and coordination of policies to address IDPs’ needs.
    [Show full text]
  • The Libyan Power and Social Network: Qadhafi, Family, Friends, Tribes and Business Partners (Copyright Issandr El Amrani
    THE LIBYAN POWER AND SOCIAL NETWORK: QADHAFI, FAMILY, FRIENDS, TRIBES AND BUSINESS PARTNERS (COPYRIGHT ISSANDR EL AMRANI / WWW.ARABIST.NET) Musa Kusa Foreign Minister, former External Services Org (Intel) chief OLD GUARD ✩ TECHNOCRATS ✩ FAMILY Mustapha Kharrub Revolutionary Committee member al-Hweildi al-Hmeidi Revolutionary Committee member Libyana Omar Suleiman Telecommunication Committee Hussein Salem, property deals, etc Hosni Mubarak Muhammad Qadhafi Eldest son and the only child of Gaddafi's Al Madar al Jadid first wife Fathia Khaled. Property portfolio Egypt Ahmed Qadhaf ad-Dam Libyan Olympic Committee 40% of Libyan Beverage Company Cousin, security and Fayoum Bedouins intelligence advisor DEFECTED? London School of Economics and Political Gaddafi International Charity and Development Science Foundation Minister of Defense Abu Bakr al-Yunis A brigadier general and de facto chairman of the Abdulhakim el-Ghami joint chiefs of staff Saif al-Islam, second son and first child of his second wife Safia Farkash. Long presumed heir-apparent. (Key fixer for Seif, Munich-based) Abdessalam Jalloud Former prime minister, aide Abdullah Sanussi al Megrahi Married to a sister of Gaddafi's wife, said to be behind 1970s and 1980s terrorist acts and attempt on Saudi King Abdullah's life Juventus (Through LAFICO) Italian League Colonel Gaddafi's third son, Al-Saadi, is known for his Perugina FC love of football. The WikiLeaks diplomatic cables claimed (former player) Abuzeid Dorda that Al-Saadi was briefly an officer in a Special Forces unit Di r e cto r o f Exte r nal Se r vi ce s and heads a military battalion; he has a turbulent past, Organization (Intelligence), former PM, including clashes with police in Italy.
    [Show full text]
  • Key Actors, Dynamics and Issues of Libyan Political Economy
    www.gsdrc.org [email protected] Helpdesk Research Report Key actors, dynamics and issues of Libyan political economy Emilie Combaz 27.04.2014 Question Identify the key actors, power dynamics and issues of Libyan political economy after the Qadhafi regime. Contents 1. Overview 2. Significant actors 3. Major dynamics and issues 4. References 1. Overview With the 2011 uprisings and the fall of the Qadhafi regime, Libya has experienced significant social and economic changes, with a shift from a centralised and personalised rule to a multitude of actors, both armed and non-armed. Identifying the major actors, dynamics and issues of the new Libyan political economy remains fraught with difficulty and uncertainty1. Who are the key players? What are they contesting? What is driving the contestation? The scene of actors in Libya since 2011 is highly fragmented, localised and fluid, with connections and overlap between localities, regions, tribes, ethnicity, interests and ideology. Overall, the main division seems to have been between forces that support continued changes (‘pro-revolution’) and others that do not (‘anti-revolution’), although this may be changing. Key actors have been as follows. 1 The characterisation of events taking place in Libya since 2011 remains debated. In this report, ‘uprisings’ refers to the civilian and armed mobilisation in 2011 that protested and put an end to the Qadhafi regime. The changes produced by the uprisings and the developments since are described as ‘the revolution’. Community actors: - Geographic communities. Beyond general differences between the three main regions (Cyrenaica, Tripolitana, Fezzan), local communities have been the fundamental actors since 2011.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic State's Re-Organization in Libya and Potential Connections
    ISLAMIC STATE’S RE-ORGANIZATION IN LIBYA AND POTENTIAL CONNECTIONS WITH ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING ARTURO VARVELLI NOVEMBER 2017 About the Program on Extremism About the Author The Program on Extremism at George Washington Arturo Varvelli is Senior Research Fellow at ISPI University provides analysis on issues related to and Co-Head of ISPI's Middle East and North violent and non-violent extremism. The Program Africa Centre, in charge of North Africa Studies. spearheads innovative and thoughtful academic He also works as a scholar on topics such as inquiry, producing empirical work that Italian-Libyan relations, Libyan domestic and strengthens extremism research as a distinct field foreign politics, Italian foreign policy in the Middle of study. The Program aims to develop pragmatic East and Mediterranean region, Jihadist groups in policy solutions that resonate with policymakers, North Africa, having published both books and civic leaders, and the general public. articles on these subjects. Dr. Varvelli is also a lecturer of History and Institutions of the Middle East at IULM University in Milan and Visiting Fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy (EFD) in Brussels. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the Program on Extremism or the George Washington University. 1 Introduction statement from Cyrenaica inciting attacks against the United States and Italy, demonstrating a renewed ability to sow propaganda. While security The expulsion of the Islamic State (IS) from Sirte conditions in Libya remain unstable and the and Benghazi during the past year does not entail government does not have a monopoly on the use either the end of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s terrorist of force, the baseline conditions for a presence of organization in Libya, nor the end of jihadist jihadist groups in the country will remain.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
    Order Code RL33142 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Libya: Background and U.S. Relations November 4, 2005 Christopher M. Blanchard Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Libya: Background and U.S. Relations Summary The relationship between the United States and Libya has been strained and hostile for much of the last 35 years, but has recently shown signs of improvement. Following the Libyan government’s December 2003 decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long range missile programs, a number of bilateral diplomatic exchanges have taken place, and the termination of U.S. economic sanctions on Libya has paved the way for a renewal of investment by U.S. oil, gas, and energy service firms in Libya’s under-capitalized energy sector. Several visits to Libya by Bush Administration officials and Members of Congress in 2004 and 2005 have raised expectations of a formal reestablishment of normal relations between the U.S. and Libya in the near future, including the removal of the last remaining sanctions associated with Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Bilateral intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation has contributed to a gradual U.S.-Libyan re-engagement on security matters since late 2001. Continuing U.S. concerns about Libya’s relationship with some Palestinian terrorist groups and an alleged Libyan-sponsored assassination plot targeting Saudi monarch King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud thus far have delayed the recision of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • A Way Forward for Positive Migration Governance in Libya
    OCTOBER 2019 From abuse to cohabitation: A way forward for positive migration governance in Libya Floor El Kamouni- Janssen, Nancy Ezzeddine and Jalel Harchaoui DISCLAIMER This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Clingendael Institute and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. Contents ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION: THE COMPLEXITY OF SUPPORTING LOCAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 1. STATE AND NON-STATE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE .......................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]