Introduction nts

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik me German Institute for International and Security Affairs m

Libya after Qaddafi State Formation or State Collapse?

Wolfram Lacher SWPCo

Under pressure from a rebellion, an international intervention, and comprehensive sanctions, Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime is on the verge of collapse. As of late March 2011, regime forces are focussed on retaining control of north-western , raising the prospect of protracted civil war and partition. Qaddafi’s demise is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Libya’s renewed stabilisation. The post-Qaddafi state will essentially have to be built from scratch. However, political players will likely be more focussed on the redistribution of wealth than on building state institutions. Scenarios for the post-Qaddafi era include a new deal among former regime elites that would lead to renewed instability in the medium-term, or a more protracted, but ultimately more sustainable, state-building process. Hastening Qaddafi’s fall should be the main priority of Germany and other EU member states now. External actors should also sup- port the Interim National Council as the nucleus of a post-Qaddafi government. How- ever, they should refrain from playing an active role in the state-building process that will follow Qaddafi’s demise, as this would risk discrediting the process.

The revolution of 17 February – as it is quickly sided with the rebels. The state and called by the rebels – began as an attempt security apparatus rapidly disintegrated, by mainly young Libyans to emulate the and by late February Libya was in a state of events in Egypt and Tunisia. The uprising civil war. As entire army units defected, the erupted simultaneously in north-eastern rebels became a military force, defending Libya ( and Al Bayda) and south the north-eastern part of the country and of Tripoli (Zintan); quickly, the overthrow parts of the north-west as “liberated areas”. of the regime became the rebellion’s stated While the Qaddafi regime’s power base goal. Developments in Libya took a com- and areas of control eroded dramatically in pletely different direction from those in the first two weeks of the uprising, it has Libya’s neighbouring states, largely because remained largely stable since. Forces loyal Qaddafi’s security forces attempted to to the regime are largely confined to special crush the uprising with extreme brutality. units and militias under the direct control Shocked by the actions of special units and of Qaddafi’s sons and close allies. They are, mercenaries, the majority of the population however, better equipped and organised

Wolfram Lacher is a Researcher at SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 9 March 2011

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than the regular army. Qaddaddfa, mem- established. The Council aims at steering bers of Qaddafi’s tribe, are strongly over- the transition to a post-Qaddafi govern- represented among these troops. As of late ment, and is calling for free elections and March 2011, Qaddafi forces have regained drafting a new constitution to establish control over Tripoli and the western cities a democratic state with a separation of of Zawiya and Zuwara through large-scale powers. The Council comprises a loose repression and major army offensives, and coalition of different groups, and is cur- continue to besiege rebels in Misurata and rently dominated by Libyans from the the Jebel Nafusa in the north-west. The country’s north-east. However, it should regime has also managed to coax parts of not be dismissed as an instrument of north- the urban population and some tribal con- eastern elites being used to expand their stituencies in north-western and central influence; rather, representatives of areas Libya into obedience through a combina- that remain under Qaddafi’s control are tion of cash handouts and threats. Inter- unable to join due to the ongoing civil war, national alliance airstrikes authorised un- or fear that their families will be subjected der UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to reprisal if their identities become to protect civilians and enforce a no-fly known. As of late March 2011, the names zone mean that Qaddafi’s forces are on the of 13 of its 31 members have been made defensive and have no realistic prospect of public, while the others are kept secret recapturing the north-east. The key ques- due to security concerns. The chairman tion, though, is whether external military of the Council is Mustafa Abdel Jalil from pressure – in combination with sanctions Al Bayda, who resigned as Qaddafi’s Justice and the rebellion – will lead to further Minister on 21 February. The most prom- defections in Qaddafi’s entourage, or to inent representative of the opposition efforts by security officials to topple the groups that led the rebellion in the first Qaddafi family. Failing the unravelling of weeks is Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, a lawyer from the regime’s core, Qaddafi’s forces could yet Benghazi. Another key figure is Mahmoud retain control over north-western and cen- Jebril, who is in charge of external relations tral Libya for months, possibly longer. In and has been tipped to be head of a future the meantime, however, a new political transitional government. Jebril is a US- order is emerging in rebel-held areas, spel- educated academic who between 2007 and ling the end of the Qaddafi era there. 2009 played a leading role in (unsuccessful) efforts to reform the Libyan economy. On the whole, former officials dominate the The post-Qaddafi political arena Council, although the revolutionaries – Under Qaddafi’s 42-year rule, there were lawyers like Ghoga and academics such as neither political parties nor civil society Fathi Baaja – retain significant representa- organisations. It is only now that they can tion. However, the composition of the develop. The contours of the post-Qaddafi Council is bound to evolve: the coalition political scene, therefore, remain sketchy. between regime defectors and revolution- aries would likely be affected by Qaddafi’s demise, which would require the Council The Interim National Council to accommodate representatives of other The Interim National Council that formed tribes and regions. in late February in Benghazi quickly gained the support of defecting military units, state officials, and tribal leaders, and has The tribes since been seeking international recogni- Tribal loyalties play a key role in Libyan tion as the sole legitimate representative politics. Qaddafi’s regime could be under- of Libya until a new government can be stood as essentially an alliance of the small

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Qaddadfa tribe with two of the country’s Misurata, where more than a third of the largest tribes: the based mainly in country’s six million Libyans live. The , and the from the young population that led the uprising . These three tribes were dispropor- in these and other large cities is unlikely tionately represented in government, the to feel adequately represented by tribal military, and the security apparatus. Repre- leaders. Finally, the tribes are not homo- sentatives of other tribes were also accom- geneous entities. Each of the larger tribes modated to ensure stability. The tribes also consists of numerous smaller sub-groups. functioned as networks through which the Many tribal leaders have been discredited Qaddafi regime distributed patronage. The due to the role they played under Qaddafi. continuing importance of tribal loyalties Consequently, the transition is also likely to was demonstrated during the first two see power struggles within the tribes – for weeks of the rebellion, when a number example, rivalries between opponents and of leading tribes and numerous smaller loyalists of Qaddafi among the Warfalla, groups publicly withdrew their support Magarha, and Qaddadfa. from the regime. Most prominent among them were the north-eastern tribes. Numer- ous tribes or sub-groups from other areas The former regime elite also joined the rebellion, including the Following a spate of desertions by senior Berber tribes of the Jebel Nafusa, the Tou- officials in the first two weeks of the bou minority in Libya’s south, and parts of uprising, the former ruling elite is deeply the Warfalla. Senior officials such as Justice divided. Many former officials now play a Minister Abdel Jalil, Interior Minister Abdel prominent role in the Interim National Fattah Younis, or Ambassador to Washing- Council and are positioning themselves for ton Ali Aujali – all members of north- the post-Qaddafi era. This includes former eastern tribes – followed their tribes in Justice Minister Abdel Jalil and former supporting the rebellion. Trade Minister and Ambassador to India, After Qaddafi’s demise, the tribes will Ali al-Essawi (now responsible for external be primarily interested in redistributing relations, along with Mahmoud Jebril) as influence within the state apparatus and well as the former Ambassadors to the access to state resources and services. There UN and the United States, Abderrahman is potential for major shifts in this regard, Shalgam and Ali Aujali. Omar al-Hariri given that the Qaddadfa tribe and some of (now nominally in charge of the rebel its allies would inevitably lose influence in army) and Abdel-Monem al-Houni, former a successor state. Groups that remained Ambassador to the Arab League, fall into a loyal to the regime during the insurgency slightly different category: both partici- could be politically marginalised or face pated in Qaddafi’s 1969 coup but were reprisals. Such groups could form the basis jailed or exiled after a failed coup attempt of (potentially armed) opposition to the against Qaddafi in 1975. Some defectors are new regime, unless they are politically viewed with a high degree of suspicion by accommodated. the revolutionaries, such as former Interior However, the current rebellion and post- Minister Younis, who is accused of being Qaddafi politics should not be misunder- responsible for serious human rights stood as simply a power struggle between violations. tribes. All available evidence suggests that Within the inner circle surrounding the the goal to topple the Qaddafi regime com- Qaddafi family, there have thus far been mands overwhelming support across few desertions, and confirmed information Libya’s regions and cities. Moreover, the is scarce. Qaddafi’s cousin Ahmed Qaddaf influence of tribal loyalties is limited in Eddam, who until recently was Qaddafi’s the large cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, and personal envoy to Egypt, on 24 February

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announced his resignation and fled to access to resources and positions. Its social Syria, though opposition media allege he justice platform targets the urban middle continues to support Qaddafi. Qaddafi in classes and therefore transcends tribal con- late February reportedly dismissed his stituencies. While the group’s leadership brother-in-law, Abdallah Senoussi, head had long been exiled and lacks prominent of the secret service and one of the most figures, the Muslim Brotherhood played an important representatives of the Magarha important role in initiating the uprising by tribe surrounding Qaddafi. The head of the calling for protests from early February army, Abu Bakr Younis Jabr, has apparently onwards. The Brotherhood has pledged its been under house arrest since the start of support to the Interim National Council, the rebellion. Qaddafi himself and his sons provided the Council incorporates all forces have no real prospect of being offered a involved in the revolution and excludes dignified exit or playing a role in a political deserters from Qaddafi’s inner circle. The transition. However, key players in the secu- group therefore opposes a mere restoration rity apparatus and the tribes that continue of the ruling elite without Qaddafi. to support Qaddafi would need guarantees, Islamist extremists associated with the such as non-prosecution or political accom- former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group modation, in order to change sides. (LIFG) represent a marginal phenomenon. They are mainly based in the north-east, where armed groups were active in the Opposition groups 1990s. Even after the dismantling of the Prior to the uprising, opposition to the LIFG, the vast majority of Libyan jihadists Qaddafi regime consisted primarily of fighting in Iraq originated from the north- exiled political parties with a narrow east, suggesting that extremist groups support base and armed Islamists who retain some support in the region. The waged a rebellion in the north-east in majority of former LIFG fighters were the late 1990s. Reflecting the absence of released from prison in recent years after organised opposition, the main driving renouncing violence; some have since forces behind the uprising were sponta- integrated the Islamist mainstream and neous and unorganised. Unemployed or now support the rebellion. Although underemployed young men without polit- former fighters will not necessarily return i cal affiliation took the lead in setting fire to armed struggle, extremist groups could to police stations and government build- reorganise during the transition and seek ings in cities across the north-east and in to expand their influence. the Jebel Nafusa in the north-west, thereby The monarchists surrounding Moham- escalating the uprising. Particularly in med al-Sanussi, great-nephew of King Idriss, Benghazi, however, representatives of the who was overthrown in 1969, are unlikely liberal professions played a prominent role to play any significant role. The fact that in the uprising and are now represented the monarchy’s flag has become the symbol in the communal and national interim of the rebellion does not express a desire to councils. bring back the monarchy, but simply refers Among the opposition, the Muslim to a Libya before and without Qaddafi; Brotherhood stands out with organisational its tricolour also symbolises the unity of structures and significant support, primari- Libya’s historic three regions. There is no ly based in the country’s north-eastern sign of efforts to re-establish the monarchy. cities. Representing a moderate strand of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood distinguishes itself by an ideologically State collapse or state-building? defined programme in a political context The key challenge after Qaddafi’s demise that is likely to be defined by rivalries over will be to create a new state from the

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ground up. Libya currently does not have a Scenarios constitution, and the 1951 constitution of Civil war is likely to continue for at least the Senoussi monarchy cannot be easily as long as the Qaddafi family can retain resurrected. Due to Qaddafi’s insistence, control over its security apparatus, and Libya does not even have a formal head of would probably result in a drawn-out state. The institutions of the old regime – stalemate and a temporary partition of the including the General People’s Congress country. Violent conflict could persist after (Parliament) and the local Basic People’s Qaddafi’s demise if key constituencies are Congresses – play a purely symbolic role not accommodated in a future government. and will not survive Qaddafi’s fall. As a Two alternative scenarios for the post- consequence, the foundations of the state Qaddafi era are: a new deal by old regime and the political system will have to be elites that would likely fail to produce built entirely from scratch, such as the stability, or a protracted, but ultimately form of government, the separation of more sustainable, state-building process. powers, the role of the regions, and the electoral system. There are virtually no institutions that will be able to maintain Civil war and temporary partition continuity. Government institutions and The ongoing conflict is unlikely to come to the military were deliberately weakened by a quick end unless Qaddafi loses the loyalty Qaddafi and have disintegrated during the of key tribal constituencies and security uprising. Instead, a new body – the Interim officials, who would then topple the National Council – is set to play the leading Qaddafi family or lead another large-scale role in the transition. uprising in the north-west. If Qaddafi’s In addition, the rebels do not appear security apparatus remains intact in its to be promoting any clear vision of post- current state, a military solution to the Qaddafi Libya, focussing instead on conflict is highly unlikely. Rebel forces are Qaddafi’s demise and voicing general too weak to wrest control of Tripolitania demands for democracy, freedom, and an away from loyalist troops. Attempts to that end to corruption. This is understandable, effect would trigger protracted urban war- as debates on the nature of the political fare. On the other hand, Qaddafi forces are system had, to date, been impossible in unable to lead large-scale offensives on Libya, and because the rebels’ efforts are rebel-held areas as long as the international necessarily focussed on Qaddafi’s defeat as coalition continues to enforce UN Security long as he continues to rule. However, the Council resolution 1973. As a result, a lack of concrete ideas about the future protracted stalemate looms that would system is also telling, insofar as – during effectively divide the country into a western the transitional phase – most players are part controlled by Qaddafi – with some likely to be focussed on the redistribution pockets of resistance – and a rebel-held east. of resources: positions in the state appara- An internationally mediated ceasefire could tus and government; sectoral and provin- further cement such a stalemate. Although cial budgets; public services and infrastruc- it has so far shown no interest, the regime ture. Virtually the entire Libyan economy is could agree to a ceasefire once Qaddafi’s directly or indirectly dependent on the dis- forces have sufficiently weakened the tribution of state revenues from the oil pockets of resistance in the north-west to sector. Disagreements over the structures of retain control by repression, rather than the new state will primarily be distributive large-scale military offensives. The ceasefire conflicts, or are likely to conceal such con- would then allow the regime to quietly flicts. This will pose additional obstacles to cement its hold on western Libya through state-building. widespread repression. Before long, such a stalemate would necessitate the agreement

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of an oil-for-food deal to alleviate the im- Old elites, new deal pact of sanctions for civilians, since inter- As outlined above, former members of the national sanctions would trigger the econ- ruling elite under Qaddafi play a promi- omy’s collapse before drying up Qaddafi’s nent role in the Interim National Council. funds. Such a situation would be costly for If they succeed in toppling Qaddafi and international allies, since it would require ending the civil war by accommodating a continued military operation to police the senior players from the Warfalla or ceasefire, and effectively sustain a highly Magarha, the old elites could form an unstable and repressive state in western alliance that would dominate the post- Libya. Qaddafi political scene. This would effec- Alternatively, as Libya slides deeper tively amount to a restoration of the old into civil war, parties to the conflict could regime without Qaddafi – not in terms of splinter and militias could form, raising its institutional structure (which would be the possibility that violence could continue obsolete in any case) but its social basis. even after Qaddafi’s demise – for example, The latter would continue to consist of a previously privileged tribal constituencies coalition of large tribes linked to the that are excluded from a post-Qaddafi central government through patronage political deal could continue to wage an networks. While this scenario would also insurgency against a new government. entail considerable power struggles over However, there is little danger of the the redistribution of wealth, the ruling power struggles that would follow elite would remain largely identical, aside Qaddafi’s demise unleashing centrifugal from internal power shifts and the exclu- forces; partition would be unlikely to sur- sion of smaller groups like the Qaddadfa. vive Qaddafi. Observers correctly point out Ethnic minorities, liberals, and Islamists that Libya’s territorial unity is relatively would be largely excluded. Fundamental recent. Until colonisation, Libya consisted questions relating to the form of govern- of three largely separate political structures ment or the electoral system would still (Tripolitania, , Fezzan), and under have to be addressed, but debate on these the monarchy, these three regions were issues would be cut short and reformist autonomous entities with their own parlia- interests excluded. As a result, fundamental ments until 1963. However, there are no changes to the state and governance struc- regional identities today. The Interim ture – for example, strengthening the National Council understands itself as the powers of the regions and provinces – or basis for a transitional government for all far-reaching reforms in education, social, of Libya, with Tripoli as its capital. Most or industrial policy would be unlikely. The importantly, Libya has become a central- seemingly rapid stabilisation would there- ised state under Qaddafi’s rule because the fore probably soon give way to renewed central government controls oil revenues. instability in the form of rioting in the As soon as a transitional government takes major cities or armed resistance in certain control of oil revenues – or even just part tribal areas. of these revenues, as is conceivable in the north-east – it will be able to establish it- self as the new centre of power. While the Protracted state-building Tripoli government is in any case unlikely While any post-Qaddafi government would to survive Qaddafi’s fall, the emergence of need a certain degree of buy-in from former two permanent entities will be prevented as regime heavyweights to be stable, a coali- long as one of these entities is targeted by tion incorporating a broader spectrum the comprehensive international sanctions of political forces would provide a more in place under resolution 1973. promising avenue for stabilisation in the medium term. In this scenario, the interest

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groups from Tripolitania and central and disqualifies them as a negotiating party. southern Libya pushing into a post-Qaddafi For both reasons, the rebel leadership is un- government would include not only repre- likely to agree to negotiating with Qaddafi, sentatives of key tribes, but also moderate and such negotiations have little prospect Islamist groups and liberals from the urban of leading to an agreement that would be middle classes, the younger generation, honoured by both parties. In fact, there is and ethnic minorities like the Toubou and much to suggest that the Qaddafi family Berber. Such a coalition would not content sees holding onto power as its only option itself with quickly restoring stability, but for survival, given that it faces prosecution push for wider changes. This would likely both domestically and internationally, and provoke protracted power struggles, not has next to no allies left who would be only over the distribution of access to willing to grant asylum. Under these resources and positions, but also over fun- circumstances, Qaddafi and his sons will damental policy questions. Smaller groups only enter into negotiations to gain time. looking to boost their influence – such as Political solutions to end the conflict, tribes controlling certain oil-producing therefore, necessarily begin with Qaddafi’s regions – could act as spoilers and block departure. There are broadly two possible progress. Over the long term, however, the ways to achieve this: first, external actors prospects for a stable political entity would could facilitate the Qaddafi family’s move be greater under this scenario. to exile. This would represent a highly problematic trade-off between justice and conflict resolution, and could easily fail if Policy options for Germany and Qaddafi refuses to leave Libya alive, or if no the EU state can be found that would grant the Ending the conflict: Given the military family sanctuary. Second, and more realis- balance on the ground, there is no purely tically, Qaddafi could be toppled by his own military solution to the conflict. Even with allies, or by another major uprising in the external assistance in the form of arms Tripoli area that would cause the rump deliveries and aerial support for their offen- state to unravel. To achieve this goal, sive – both of which would violate UN maintaining the military pressure exerted Security Council resolution 1973 – the through the international coalition is rebels would be unlikely to conquer Tripoli indispensable to ward off any attempts by solely through military means. Diplomatic Qaddafi forces to recapture rebel-held options are also limited. Any mediation territory and to raise the risks for remain- effort aimed at a deal between the Qaddafi ing loyalists. The comprehensive sanctions regime and the rebel leadership – as the and arms embargo in place are equally panel formed by the African Union (AU) is important as a signal to loyalist decision- seeking – is highly unlikely to end the con- makers that the Qaddafi regime has no flict. As discussed above, a ceasefire would prospects of long-term survival. But further merely cement the country’s partition, thus efforts are needed to encourage defections allowing Qaddafi to crush the remaining or a palace coup, including providing guar- opponents in the north-west and encourag- antees and assistance to potential defectors. ing the emergence of two highly unstable The financial and arms embargoes should political entities. A power-sharing deal be tightened to close off clandestine chan- between the rebels and the old regime that nels, which requires intensified intelligence involves Qaddafi or his sons is out of the and diplomacy focussed on Libya’s neigh- question, not only due to the crimes for bours. Finally, external actors seeking to which they are responsible; Qaddafi and his mediate in the conflict should focus on son Saif al-Islam have also shown a degree facilitating a deal between the rebel leader- of intransigence and disingenuousness that ship and senior officials but exclude

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Qaddafi. Such mediation may be needed vital commodities). But steps should also both before and after Qaddafi’s demise. be taken to enable the Council to begin While the international coalition has exporting oil in order to gain access to been weakened by internal squabbles over financing. This would mean amending its command and doubts over its political the sanctions imposed by the UN Security goals, the intervention remains crucial to Council and the EU, which freeze the assets stop attacks by Qaddafi’s forces on rebel- of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), to held cities, particularly in the north-east. exclude entities controlled by the Interim NATO member states should build con- National Council – such as Agoco, a former sensus by ensuring that the coalition stops NOC subsidiary that has also been specifi- short of backing rebel offensives with air cally designated by US sanctions – that may power, as opposed to thwarting attacks by be able to export oil once the security situa- Qaddafi’s forces on rebel-held areas. The tion permits and ownership issues have coalition should also rule out any use of been clarified. Although external actors

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und ground troops, which would dramatically will lose much of their leverage over the Politik, 2011 erode support for the intervention in Libya Council once the latter is financially in- All rights reserved and the region, and exacerbate interna- dependent, these steps are necessary to These Comments reflect tional controversy. Finally, the arms em- bolster the Council’s position until and solely the author’s views. bargo should also be enforced for the rebel- beyond Qaddafi’s demise.

SWP held north-east. Supplying the rebels with External mediation may be needed to Stiftung Wissenschaft und weapons would only fuel the conflict and facilitate the accommodation of former pro- Politik German Institute for heighten the post-conflict proliferation of Qaddafi forces; regional powers viewed as International and arms, without rendering the defeat of neutral brokers, such as Turkey, would be Security Affairs Qaddafi’s forces in Tripoli any more likely. best placed to mediate. However, external Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 actors should avoid getting involved in the 10719 Berlin Supporting the transition of power: Since its power struggles that are likely to surround Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 creation in late February, the Interim the formation of a new government and www.swp-berlin.org National Council has established itself as the establishment of a post-Qaddafi state – [email protected] the undisputed leadership of the rebellion, provided these power struggles do not pro- ISSN 1861-1761 and the diversity of its members suggests voke large-scale conflict. While the military

Translation by Robert Blasiak it is as representative as circumstances intervention against Qaddafi’s forces ap- permit. That said, major changes to its pears to command broad support in Libya (Revised and updated English version of composition, or that of a transitional and the region, external interference SWP-Aktuell 12/2011) government, are inevitable as the Council beyond Qaddafi’s fall would likely be broadens its regional and tribal base. In viewed with great suspicion. Distrust of view of this, EU member states should offer external interests is deep-seated in Libyan the Council a clear roadmap for the estab- political culture; overt external attempts lishment of formal diplomatic relations to influence the state-building process tied to the establishment a government would risk being viewed in terms of foreign representative of all groups and regions. interest in Libya’s oil. Even if rapid dis- To enable the Council to establish itself as engagement may be difficult following the a legitimate and viable alternative to the military intervention, NATO and EU mem- Qaddafi regime, and increase its attractive- ber states, as well as the international Con- ness for defectors, EU member states should tact Group on Libya formed in late March, support the Council as the nucleus of a should take a back seat in negotiations over post-Qaddafi government. Support should Libya’s future. begin with expanding relations and provid- ing humanitarian assistance to conflict- affected areas, as well as urgent economic assistance (such as fuel exports or other

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