Introduction nts Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik me German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Libya after Qaddafi State Formation or State Collapse? Wolfram Lacher SWPCo Under pressure from a rebellion, an international intervention, and comprehensive sanctions, Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime is on the verge of collapse. As of late March 2011, regime forces are focussed on retaining control of north-western Libya, raising the prospect of protracted civil war and partition. Qaddafi’s demise is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Libya’s renewed stabilisation. The post-Qaddafi state will essentially have to be built from scratch. However, political players will likely be more focussed on the redistribution of wealth than on building state institutions. Scenarios for the post-Qaddafi era include a new deal among former regime elites that would lead to renewed instability in the medium-term, or a more protracted, but ultimately more sustainable, state-building process. Hastening Qaddafi’s fall should be the main priority of Germany and other EU member states now. External actors should also sup- port the Interim National Council as the nucleus of a post-Qaddafi government. How- ever, they should refrain from playing an active role in the state-building process that will follow Qaddafi’s demise, as this would risk discrediting the process. The revolution of 17 February – as it is quickly sided with the rebels. The state and called by the rebels – began as an attempt security apparatus rapidly disintegrated, by mainly young Libyans to emulate the and by late February Libya was in a state of events in Egypt and Tunisia. The uprising civil war. As entire army units defected, the erupted simultaneously in north-eastern rebels became a military force, defending Libya (Benghazi and Al Bayda) and south the north-eastern part of the country and of Tripoli (Zintan); quickly, the overthrow parts of the north-west as “liberated areas”. of the regime became the rebellion’s stated While the Qaddafi regime’s power base goal. Developments in Libya took a com- and areas of control eroded dramatically in pletely different direction from those in the first two weeks of the uprising, it has Libya’s neighbouring states, largely because remained largely stable since. Forces loyal Qaddafi’s security forces attempted to to the regime are largely confined to special crush the uprising with extreme brutality. units and militias under the direct control Shocked by the actions of special units and of Qaddafi’s sons and close allies. They are, mercenaries, the majority of the population however, better equipped and organised Wolfram Lacher is a Researcher at SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 9 March 2011 1 than the regular army. Qaddaddfa, mem- established. The Council aims at steering bers of Qaddafi’s tribe, are strongly over- the transition to a post-Qaddafi govern- represented among these troops. As of late ment, and is calling for free elections and March 2011, Qaddafi forces have regained drafting a new constitution to establish control over Tripoli and the western cities a democratic state with a separation of of Zawiya and Zuwara through large-scale powers. The Council comprises a loose repression and major army offensives, and coalition of different groups, and is cur- continue to besiege rebels in Misurata and rently dominated by Libyans from the the Jebel Nafusa in the north-west. The country’s north-east. However, it should regime has also managed to coax parts of not be dismissed as an instrument of north- the urban population and some tribal con- eastern elites being used to expand their stituencies in north-western and central influence; rather, representatives of areas Libya into obedience through a combina- that remain under Qaddafi’s control are tion of cash handouts and threats. Inter- unable to join due to the ongoing civil war, national alliance airstrikes authorised un- or fear that their families will be subjected der UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to reprisal if their identities become to protect civilians and enforce a no-fly known. As of late March 2011, the names zone mean that Qaddafi’s forces are on the of 13 of its 31 members have been made defensive and have no realistic prospect of public, while the others are kept secret recapturing the north-east. The key ques- due to security concerns. The chairman tion, though, is whether external military of the Council is Mustafa Abdel Jalil from pressure – in combination with sanctions Al Bayda, who resigned as Qaddafi’s Justice and the rebellion – will lead to further Minister on 21 February. The most prom- defections in Qaddafi’s entourage, or to inent representative of the opposition efforts by security officials to topple the groups that led the rebellion in the first Qaddafi family. Failing the unravelling of weeks is Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, a lawyer from the regime’s core, Qaddafi’s forces could yet Benghazi. Another key figure is Mahmoud retain control over north-western and cen- Jebril, who is in charge of external relations tral Libya for months, possibly longer. In and has been tipped to be head of a future the meantime, however, a new political transitional government. Jebril is a US- order is emerging in rebel-held areas, spel- educated academic who between 2007 and ling the end of the Qaddafi era there. 2009 played a leading role in (unsuccessful) efforts to reform the Libyan economy. On the whole, former officials dominate the The post-Qaddafi political arena Council, although the revolutionaries – Under Qaddafi’s 42-year rule, there were lawyers like Ghoga and academics such as neither political parties nor civil society Fathi Baaja – retain significant representa- organisations. It is only now that they can tion. However, the composition of the develop. The contours of the post-Qaddafi Council is bound to evolve: the coalition political scene, therefore, remain sketchy. between regime defectors and revolution- aries would likely be affected by Qaddafi’s demise, which would require the Council The Interim National Council to accommodate representatives of other The Interim National Council that formed tribes and regions. in late February in Benghazi quickly gained the support of defecting military units, state officials, and tribal leaders, and has The tribes since been seeking international recogni- Tribal loyalties play a key role in Libyan tion as the sole legitimate representative politics. Qaddafi’s regime could be under- of Libya until a new government can be stood as essentially an alliance of the small SWP Comments 9 March 2011 2 Qaddadfa tribe with two of the country’s Misurata, where more than a third of the largest tribes: the Warfalla based mainly in country’s six million Libyans live. The Tripolitania, and the Magarha from the young population that led the uprising Fezzan. These three tribes were dispropor- in these and other large cities is unlikely tionately represented in government, the to feel adequately represented by tribal military, and the security apparatus. Repre- leaders. Finally, the tribes are not homo- sentatives of other tribes were also accom- geneous entities. Each of the larger tribes modated to ensure stability. The tribes also consists of numerous smaller sub-groups. functioned as networks through which the Many tribal leaders have been discredited Qaddafi regime distributed patronage. The due to the role they played under Qaddafi. continuing importance of tribal loyalties Consequently, the transition is also likely to was demonstrated during the first two see power struggles within the tribes – for weeks of the rebellion, when a number example, rivalries between opponents and of leading tribes and numerous smaller loyalists of Qaddafi among the Warfalla, groups publicly withdrew their support Magarha, and Qaddadfa. from the regime. Most prominent among them were the north-eastern tribes. Numer- ous tribes or sub-groups from other areas The former regime elite also joined the rebellion, including the Following a spate of desertions by senior Berber tribes of the Jebel Nafusa, the Tou- officials in the first two weeks of the bou minority in Libya’s south, and parts of uprising, the former ruling elite is deeply the Warfalla. Senior officials such as Justice divided. Many former officials now play a Minister Abdel Jalil, Interior Minister Abdel prominent role in the Interim National Fattah Younis, or Ambassador to Washing- Council and are positioning themselves for ton Ali Aujali – all members of north- the post-Qaddafi era. This includes former eastern tribes – followed their tribes in Justice Minister Abdel Jalil and former supporting the rebellion. Trade Minister and Ambassador to India, After Qaddafi’s demise, the tribes will Ali al-Essawi (now responsible for external be primarily interested in redistributing relations, along with Mahmoud Jebril) as influence within the state apparatus and well as the former Ambassadors to the access to state resources and services. There UN and the United States, Abderrahman is potential for major shifts in this regard, Shalgam and Ali Aujali. Omar al-Hariri given that the Qaddadfa tribe and some of (now nominally in charge of the rebel its allies would inevitably lose influence in army) and Abdel-Monem al-Houni, former a successor state. Groups that remained Ambassador to the Arab League, fall into a loyal to the regime during the insurgency slightly different category: both partici- could be politically marginalised or face pated in Qaddafi’s 1969 coup but were reprisals. Such groups could form the basis jailed or exiled after a failed coup attempt of (potentially armed) opposition to the against Qaddafi in 1975. Some defectors are new regime, unless they are politically viewed with a high degree of suspicion by accommodated. the revolutionaries, such as former Interior However, the current rebellion and post- Minister Younis, who is accused of being Qaddafi politics should not be misunder- responsible for serious human rights stood as simply a power struggle between violations.