Playing in the Margins: Collaboration Between Local Party Organizations in the Canadian Party System

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2016 Playing in the Margins: Collaboration Between Local Party Organizations in the Canadian Party System

Currie-Wood, Robin

Currie-Wood, R. (2016). Playing in the Margins: Collaboration Between Local Party Organizations in the Canadian Party System (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27370 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3172 master thesis

University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Playing in the Margins: Collaboration Between Local Party Organizations in the Canadian Party

System

Robin M. Currie-Wood

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ART

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY, ALBERTA

AUGUST, 2016

ABSTRACT

Collaboration between local party organizations is a peculiar organizational trait for Canadian political parties. It is peculiar because local party organizations were once conceived to be solely concerned with electoral activities in their own district, while central parties helped local campaigns in strategically important ridings. Collaboration also goes against the prevailing theory that political parties will centralize operations under new party finance law. Despite this some local party organizations in the Conservative Party of Canada began helping campaigns in other ridings. Financial data are assessed for the Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic Party between 2007 and 2011 in order to determine why parties at the constituency level mobilize their own resources in other constituencies. Playing in the Margins reveals that collaboration occurs in order to better utilize campaign effort made in competitive and uncompetitive ridings, and may even be a new component of intra-party contests.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

No written work is fully the product of the author. I owe a great deal of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Anthony M. Sayers. Anthony has been interested in this project since I began at the University of Calgary and he championed my education during grad school. He forced me to bolster my analytical skills by addressing my shortcomings with writing. Anthony was also very relatable outside of the classroom, which was most welcome and kept me motivated over the three-year project. I also owe special thanks to Dr. Melanee Thomas and Dr. David K. Stewart. Melanee and David introduced me to quantitative methods in social science, political processes, and remained involved during the thesis stage of grad school. Special thanks to Dr. Marc-Andre Bodet for making available his data-set that measures riding-level competition. I now know how difficult constructing a data-base can be and appreciate Dr. Bodet’s willingness to share his work. There are many other anonymous academics, political activists and party volunteers who have helped out enormously along the way. Playing in the Margins has been strengthened by the contributions of each person. Any problems in this thesis remain my own. I also wish to thank the Political Science Department administrators, Judi, Bonnie, and Ella. They provided a great deal of help navigating the university bureaucracy. Finally, I wish to thank the taxpayers of Alberta for generously funding a portion of my research through the Queen Elizabeth II Scholarship. This funding was awarded by the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary.

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DEDICATION

For my Mom and Dad, the social democrats;

For Grammy and Grandaddy Wood, the Tories; and,

For Grandma and Grandpa Currie, the agrarian populists.

Table of Contents ABSTRACT ...... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii DEDICATION ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v Chapter 1 Introduction ...... 1 Political Parties as Vote Gathering Institutions ...... 5 Renegotiating the Bargain? Reforming the Party Finance Regime ...... 6 Playing in the Margins: Local Party Organizations and Inter-association Funding ...... 9 The Institutionalist Approach, the Canadian Party System, and Case Selection ...... 12 Thesis Layout Structure ...... 16 Chapter 2 Harnessing Campaign Effort with Local Party Organizations: Continuity and Change in the Canadian Party System ...... 19 The Logic of Electoral Contests in an Single-Member District Electoral Systems ...... 21 The Canadian Party System: 2004 – 2011 ...... 27 Table 2.1: Percentage of Popular Vote Won and Seat Translation in each Province by Political Party ...... 28 Stratarchically Organized Parties: Central Party Offices and Local Party Organizations ...... 30 Local Party Organizations and Direct and Indirect Campaign Effort ...... 34 Reforming Party Finance Law, Altering Electoral Competition...... 40 Conclusion ...... 48 Chapter 3 Collaboration between Local Party Organizations: The Conservative Advantage in Election Campaigns ...... 50 Methodology: Follow the Money ...... 52 Local Party Fundraising ...... 61 Table 3.1: Election Year EDA Fundraising ...... 62 Table 3.2 : Electoral District Association Fundraising ...... 65 Table 3.3: Local Party Fundraising Averages by Province ...... 66 Local Party Savings ...... 69 Table 3.4: Electoral District Association Savings ...... 71

Table 3.5: Electoral District Association Savings Entering an Election Year ...... 73 Table 3.6: Local Party Savings Averages by Province ...... 75 Intra-Party Funding and the Importance of Inter-Association Fund-Transfers in the Conservative Party of Canada ...... 77 Table 3.7: Central vs. Local Intra-Party Fund-transfer Ratio ...... 79 Table 3.8: Inter-association Fund-Transfers ...... 82 Table 3.9: Conservative Party of Canada Riding Association Fund-Transfers ...... 82 Constituency Campaigning in 2008 and 2011 ...... 89 Table 3.12: Constituency Campaign Spending Totals by Party and Election Year ...... 91 Table 3.13: The Ratio of Campaign Spending against District Expense Limit by Party and Province ...... 93 Table 3.14: Ratio of Average Constituency Campaign Spending Against District Expense Limit Compared to District Competitiveness ...... 95 Discussion ...... 95 Chapter 4 Local Party Collaboration: Candidate Quality, Electoral Predictability, and Inter- association Funding ...... 98 Modelling Collaboration between Local Party Organizations ...... 101 Figure 4.1: Modelling Inter-association Fund-Transfers ...... 103 Case Selection ...... 105 Removing Support off the Top: Outflow Fund-transfers from Stronghold Ridings ...... 106 Figure 4.2 Campaign Stats: Calgary Southwest ...... 108 Figure 4.3 Campaign Stats: Calgary Centre-North ...... 108 Figure 4.4 Campaign Stats: Calgary Southeast ...... 109 Figure 4.5 Intra-Party Funding: Calgary Southwest ...... 111 Figure 4.6 Intra-Party Funding: Calgary Centre-North ...... 111 Figure 4.7 Intra-Party Funding: Calgary Southeast ...... 112 Table 4.1: Outflow Fund-transfers Received and Sent by Conservative Riding Associations 114 Receiving Party Support from Other Ridings: Inflow Fund-transfers to Battleground Ridings ...... 117 Figure 4.8 Campaign Stats: Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill River ...... 119 Figure 4.9 Campaign Stats: Fleewood-Port Kells ...... 119

Figure 4.10 Campaign Stats: Welland ...... 120 Figure 4.11 Intra-Party Funding: Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill River ...... 123 Figure 4.12Intra-Party Funding: Fleewood-Port Kells ...... 124 Figure 4.12Intra-Party Funding: Fleewood-Port Kells ...... 124 Table 4.2: Inter-Association Fund-transfers Received and Sent by Top Three 2008 Inflow Conservative Riding Associations ...... 126 Inter-association Funding to and from Other Party Strongholds ...... 127 Figure 4.14 Campaign Stats: Random-Burin St. George's ...... 129 Figure 4.15 Campaign Stats: Vancouver Kingsway ...... 129 Figure 4.16 Campaign Stats: Vancouver Quadra ...... 130 Figure 4.17 Intra-Party Funding: Random-Burin St. George's ...... 133 Figure 4.18 Intra-Party Funding: Vancouver Kingsway ...... 134 Figure 4.19 Intra-Party Funding: Vancouver Quadra ...... 134 Table 4.3: Inter-association Fund-transfers Received and Sent by Conservative Riding Associations in Other Party Strongholds ...... 136 Discussion ...... 139 Chapter 5 Conclusion ...... 142 Playing in the Margins ...... 143 Implications for Political Parties as Stratarchical Institutions ...... 144 Bibliography ...... 148 Appendix A: Conservative Party “Registered Association” Fund-Transfer Reports ...... 155 Appendix B: Local Party Organization Case Profiles ...... 161

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Local party organizations are vital to winning elections in Canada. As the component at the riding-level, local party organizations are the political party apparatus directly responsible for engaging citizens and mobilizing voters on election day. Political parties cannot rely solely on their leaders or even multi-million dollar advertising buys to win elections, and they cannot depend upon state subsidies alone to finance electoral operations. Campaign effort must also be made on the ground. Campaign resources – in the form of labour, money, and votes – originate with individuals in civil society who must be drawn together to direct, finance, and deliver campaigns. Generating campaign resources and making campaign effort remains the responsibility of political parties at the riding-level, the local party organization.

There is a divide among local party organizations between those that have an overage

(or surplus) of campaign resources and those that do not. Overages are a surplus above the amount necessary for winning the local contest. Overages can occur with votes or campaign resources. Those in districts where the party is relatively assured of success may have access to plentiful resources, whether resources are votes, volunteers, money or a combination of the three. They may be unable to make full use of their endowments because party support is already very high. Alternatively, local party organizations located in highly-competitive, closely contested ridings may not have the resources needed to maximize their campaign effort and chance of success. The Conservative Party of Canada has responded to this divide by shifting resources from local party organizations that have an overage of resources to those that have a shortage. The collaboration between local parties and campaigns is achieved through inter-

association funding.1 Inter-association funding is a new organizational feature made possible due to regulatory changes in the party finance regime that have exposed overages of party support at the riding-level.

This thesis analyzes the distribution of electoral support and campaign resources throughout local party organizations in Canada. I argue the Conservative Party of Canada responded to the modern party finance regime by shifting resources between riding associations in order to improve their chances of electoral success at the local-level, and through this heightened focus on grassroots campaigning, increased their electoral fortunes at the national level. A combination of national party directives and local party initiatives has evolved into a broad network of collaborating grassroots campaign teams in the Conservative

Party. When combined with the intensified campaign effort required in highly-competitive ridings, some speculate that local party organizations enhance their electoral competitiveness by depending on campaign support from central party offices (for example, Carty and Young

2012; Coletto and Eagles 2011). Until now, data on this has been limited because of the absence of evidence of collaboration between local party organizations. Evidence collected here demonstrates the importance of inter-association transfers for overcoming the disequilibrium between have and have not local party organizations.

The idea that local campaign teams collaborate came from my time as an active volunteer for a provincial campaign. A conversation occurred about whether money should be

1 Inter-association funding can also be conceived as inter-district funding. The latter terminology implicitly conceives electoral district associations as different than local campaign organizations. Although both organizations have the same purpose – to elect candidates of their party banner – the people in these organizations can differ.

given to neighbouring ridings that were currently held by opposing parties. One thought was the money should be spent locally. Even though there was more than enough money, the concern was money given away would be squandered and no new seats would be won. The other side advocated these seats could be won, if only past teams had the money to be competitive. Money was ultimately given. The party claimed both new seats on election night.

Collaboration between local campaigns was especially fascinating to me because I had not read about it as a specific trait of parties or party systems in other studies (for example,

Carty and Eagles 2005; Sayers 1999). I set out to determine whether local teams collaborated at the federal level. Elections Canada financial reports document a range of financial behaviour; however, the design of the web system prohibited scraping data with a digital program. I found myself copying and pasting thousands of pages of financial reports submitted by riding associations and candidates. The result of this task, taking me over 300 hundreds hours over ten weeks, was a robust database containing 1,848 cases of local party organizations and their finances in the Canadian party system.

The aggregate data confirmed that some local party organizations in only one federal party collaborated with each other. Playing in the Margins fills the gap about the collaboration that may occur between local party organizations during campaigns. The combination of single- district voting and the enduring variability of organizational competitiveness across ridings activated collaboration when a new party finance regime was installed. The Conservative Party of Canada enhanced its competitiveness by moving money from well-resourced associations to under-funded teams in very competitive ridings.

Political Parties as Vote Gathering Institutions

Political parties provide the organizational framework to accumulate resources and mobilize campaign effort. In single-member plurality electoral systems, resources are accumulated and consumed in order to attract a sufficient number of votes to win a district, sending a representative to parliament. Political parties hope to win enough districts to form government. The process for accumulating resources and using them for campaign effort results over time in predictable behaviour. Formal organizations are born from institutional, social, and competitive features of the party system in each district (Ware 1996). The level of institutionalization in the party organization can be measured by responsiveness (internal reorganization in the extra-parliamentary body) to change in the party system (Panebianco

1988).

One enduring feature of parties in Canada is the need to develop semi-autonomous organizations at multiple levels. Political parties must reduce support variation between ridings if they are to navigate the logic of the electoral system. The combination of the regionalized, ethnolinguistically diverse electorate and single-member plurality voting system establishes a sequence which requires parties to concentrate support at local-levels to win national contests

(Carty 2002). Unlike parties competing in proportional based systems, Canadian parties can generate support overages at the local-level that create seat shortages at the national level.

This has the effect to limit the number of seats – votes – a party has in parliament. A political party may have a large percentage of the national vote that disproportionately translates into a small percentage of parliamentary votes. Similarly, a political party may generate modest national support that translates into zero parliamentary votes because support is thinly spread

across ridings. One way political parties navigate the logic of the electoral system and mitigate regional diversity is by organizing and campaigning in each riding (for example, Sayers 1999).

Similar to a business franchise, Canadian parties deliver operations in the most suitable way through the local party organization and coordinate operations through a central party office (Carty 2002). Features at the riding-level interact with party ideology to form the narrative of the constituency campaign and from them the regional contests across the nation

(Sayers 1999). The relationship between local party organizations and the central party office evolves over time in response to changes in the party system. Identifying the extent to which party organizations balance local party responsiveness or sensitivity to local concerns with central party control or discipline over campaign machinery reveals a great deal about the structure of parties and how they enhance electoral competitiveness in Canadian elections

(Carty 1992).

Renegotiating the Bargain? Reforming the Party Finance Regime

Present scholarship suggests political parties are centralizing their organizational structure in the twenty-first century. This conclusion is drawn from institutional, social, and competitive changes to the Canadian party system. First, party finance reforms (Bill C-24, 2003;

Accountability Act 2006) increased spending power at the centre by creating state funded quarterly allowances (Coletto et. al 2011). Central party offices now have predictable incomes

(Flanagan and Jansen 2009), while local party organizations have unprecedented restrictions on allowable income sources. Second, central parties are capable of gathering individual voter information and communicating directly to voters in a way that was previously done by local

party organizations (see Carty 1992: 565; Siegfried 1966: 118-20). The adoption of computer database technology and widespread use of the Internet enable central parties to circumvent local party organizations as communication mechanisms (Flanagan 2003; Delacourt 2013).

Third, parties interact in a highly-competitive system of election contests. The creation of the

Conservative Party of Canada reduced the number of effective parties in the system in 2004.

This led to three consecutive minority parliaments between 2004 and 2011. Political instability forced parties to be in a constant state of election readiness (Flanagan 2014, Chapter 6).

Changes in the party system correspond to concentrated campaign effort made in highly- competitive ridings. These election contests are decided by very few votes. Some predict that party finance reforms empowered central party offices by endowing them with money that can be used to command and control effort made by local party organizations in strategically important ridings (Carty and Young 2012; Coletto et. al 2011; Jansen and Lambert 2013).

However, predictions that political parties will exert more control over riding-level campaign operations under new party finance law are drawn from aggregate data. The data do not account for regional variations in party support or campaign effort made at the riding-level.

This has led to an imperfect understanding of local party organizations and constituency campaigns under the modern party finance regime. Moreover, presumptions regarding party centralization rely heavily on the financial inequality produced by per-vote subsidies paid to central party offices (Carty and Young 2012; Coletto et. al 2011; Coletto and Eagles 2011;

Jansen and Lambert 2013). Subsequent amendments to the party finance regime in 2013 eliminated the quarterly allowance (Fair Elections Act 2013). If we are to understand Canadian parties and elections in the twenty-first century, we must also understand how local party

organizations accumulate campaign resources and consume campaign effort under the modern party finance regime created in 2004 and 2006.

Consider this: the Canadian Broadcast Corporation (2013) reported that (then) cabinet minister Jason Kenney’s riding association, the Calgary Southeast Conservative Electoral District

Association (EDA), earned half its income from donors outside Alberta. Elections Canada financial reports (2013) also show his riding association had the highest income of any other in

2011. Despite his large campaign war chest, Kenney spent only half of the district expense limit campaigning for re-election in the 2011. He handily won re-election with just over seventy-five percent of the district vote. How was the rest of the money spent? The Calgary Southeast

Conservative EDA transferred roughly $100,000.00 to sixteen riding associations in other districts. Kenney sent money to six Conservative campaigns in Ontario, six in British Columbia, three in Quebec, and one in Nova Scotia (Appendix A). The resources sent to other ridings had the effect of building campaign effort in other ridings. In this sense, Kenney’s local party organization transcended the riding boundaries of Calgary Southeast.

This thesis reconsiders how political parties react to recent party finance reforms by analyzing the financial behaviour of local party organizations between 2007 and 2011. It begins with two observations. The first is that most analysis suggests that the party finance regime should favour more central party focus over local campaigns. The second is that there is a pattern of substantial transfers between local party organizations, notably around election time. In general, I adopt an institutionalist approach in order to explain the impact of the party

finance regime on the role of local party organizations in the current party system. This begins by treating political parties as vote gathering organizations to answer the following questions:

1) Why do local party organizations move resources into other constituencies? This is counter-intuitive because local party organizations are assumed to be riding specific instruments for winning constituency campaigns (for example, Carty 2002). 2) Does each effective federal party exhibit collaboration between local party organizations, or do parties incorporate distinct features that derive from their own institutionalized structures? 3) To what extent is collaboration between local party organizations the product of district-level features?

Conclusions have implications for the ongoing centrality of local politics in federal elections.

Canadian parties remain indebted to the electoral innovations made by riding associations and constituency campaigns.

Playing in the Margins: Local Party Organizations and Inter-association Funding

Local party organizations retain their importance within political parties under the modern party finance regime because they have a unique ability to redirect party support overages into ridings where marginal improvements to campaign effort may translate into an electoral victory. Some local party organizations have an exceptional competency for carrying out partisan functions that shape their overall character. These organizations can be identified by the amount of money they raise, which suggests they also have the capacity to grow their membership, organize events, engage activists between elections, and prosecute successful election campaigns.

While having a receptive audience in the district may help the local organization carry out these functions, it is the well-organized network of activists inside the district that demarcates highly competent organizations in very supportive ridings from incompetent

organizations in very supportive ridings. Well-organized local party organizations in very supportive ridings are more likely to select high quality candidates who may go on to serve in important parliamentary or executive roles. Some well-organized local party organizations may also be situated in less-competitive or very uncompetitive ridings; yet, even though they cannot elect their candidate, the local party remains exceptional at raising large amounts of money.

This reveals that a very active and competent team exists on the ground. I define these highly competent partisan networks as mature local party organizations. Mature local party organizations can afford, if they choose, to move locally held resources to other party components without depleting the vitality of their own organization.

Alternatively, some local organizations face greater challenges at raising money and this suggests less capacity to carry out partisan functions, like selling memberships, organizing events, engaging activists between elections, and prosecuting successful election campaigns.

These organizations may select lower quality candidates, as indicated by their modest success at raising money which points to lower competency when compared to mature local party organizations. I define these party networks as developing local party organizations. Developing local party organizations in highly competitive or very uncompetitive ridings may still be building campaign machinery. Opposite to mature local parties, developing local party organizations may be situated in highly supportive constituencies. However, a higher chance of electoral victory may reduce incentives for the local team to carry out many partisan functions, such as membership drives, sustainer events, fundraising, or vibrant campaigns. In these cases the local organization may be less capable of carrying out the same activities found in mature organizations, even if their party is dominant in the riding.

The overage of resources at the riding-level allows mature local party organizations to shift some of their campaign effort into other ridings. This is possible because, while votes are geographically confined by district boundaries, money is a fungible commodity that can be easily transmitted to local party organizations in other districts. This method of party finance is defined as inter-association funding. Mature local party organizations may transfer party support in the form of inter-association fund-transfers to other local party organizations that require additional resources to increase campaign effort. Local teams receiving money are more likely to be developing a competent party organization. They may require inter- association funding to make capital intensive campaign effort on the ground. Parties vying to elect the most candidates to parliament rely on local party organizations as a source of flexibility and focus in distributing campaign effort to maximize effect.

The modern party finance regime born from electoral reforms in 2004 and 2006 has two critical features that make inter-association funding possible. First, local party organizations cannot hide their wealth in the party finance regime. Transparency provisions extended to riding associations revealed how much money accumulated at the riding-level. The inclusion of riding associations in election law made local parties fully transparent organizations. Riding associations are compelled to report financial holdings or face dissolution by the state (Bill C-24,

2003). Second, the new party finance regime does not restrict intra-party fund-transfers (Bill C-

24, 2003), but it does restrict financial inputs and outputs (Accountability Act 2006; Bill C-24

2003). Registered party components can transfer unlimited quantities of money to other registered components, whether central or local. When combined with income limitations and election expense limits, local party organizations with overages of non-financial resources (such

as candidate quality and volunteer labour) can transfer financial resources to other campaigns.

Local party organizations become a vital funding source for those unable to generate enough party support inside their riding. The regulatory environment that expanded transparency and limited income sources for local party organizations is the catalyst that encourages parties to employ inter-association funding.

The Conservative Party of Canada (formed out the 2003 merger between the Canadian

Alliance and Progressive Conservatives) was the only party to employ inter-association funding in any significant way between 2007 and 2011. In responding to a changed regulatory regime, elements of the Conservative Party recognized the opportunity to improve local campaign effectiveness and through this overall campaign efficiency by moving wealth between local party organizations. This is consistent with the institutionalist literature on parties and party systems (Carty 1992; Duverger 1966; Panebianco 1988). The massive amount of savings accumulated by Conservative local party organizations enabled inter-association funding. This is evident from aggregate data analyzed at the provincial level. Conservative local party organizations situated in highly-competitive ridings made more campaign effort than those in less competitive electoral areas of the country. The Conservative Party enhanced its electoral competitiveness in the Canadian party system by playing in the margins.

The Institutionalist Approach, the Canadian Party System, and Case Selection

Institutionalists attribute state institutions and rules as the primary cause of party organizations and party behaviours (for example, Duverger 1996; Panebianco 1988). The institutionalist approach to understanding party systems begins with identifying how political

organizations form around state imposed rules and institutions. Parties reorganize in idiosyncratic ways when alterations are made to election rules. Carty (1992) demonstrates this best in his analysis of three party systems defined in part from three sets of election rules.

Conclusions in my work are consistent with institutionalists because I find a change to party finance rules led to changes in party organization and party behaviour. This thesis joins the work of other institutionalists like Ken Carty (1991; 1992; 2002; 2004; 2015), Royce Koop (2010;

2011; 2012), Anthony Sayers (1999), David Smith (1981), and Lisa Young (1998).

Modifications to the electoral law produce changes to the organizational makeup of the

Conservative Party of Canada and ultimately the party system. I argue the modern party finance regime, born from amendments to the Canada Elections Act in Bill C-23 (2003) and the

Accountability Act (2006), is the primary cause of this change. The modern party finance regime banned corporate and union contributions to political parties. This lost source of income was replaced with per-vote subsidies for central parties, but local party organizations were forced to adopt new funding methods as no additional state subsidy was made directly available to them specifically. Two minor amendments became critical for encouraging collaboration between local parties. First, the modern party finance regime allows unlimited movement of financial resources inside political parties. Second, the regime requires all organizational components of the political party to publish their financial holdings annually. The recognition of riding associations in election law eliminated any possibility for candidates and campaign teams to hide money from other components of the party. Fleshing out the impact these regulatory changes have on parties may lead to new insights about the outcomes of recent federal elections.

Political parties that were effective at the national level between 2007 and 2011 have been selected for analysis. The Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats demonstrate their effectiveness by 1) fielding candidates in nearly every riding for the 2008 and 2011 federal elections; and, 2) forming either government or official opposition after the 2008 or 2011 federal elections. The Bloc Quebecois and the Green Party were also effective, to an extent, in both 2008 and 2011; however, they were not selected for analysis here because they do not meet both criteria established above. The Bloc did not field candidates outside Quebec and the

Greens did not have enough influence in parliament to manifest “coalition potential” or

“blackmail” potential against other parties (see Sartori 2005: 108-9).

The main focus is on the Conservative Party of Canada. The Conservative Party is where collaboration between local party organizations is observed most. This party had the most extensive integration of local party organizations through inter-association funding than either other party. As a remnant from the Reform Party, the new Conservative Party of Canada incorporated past ideological predispositions into its present organizational structure by building up local party organizations with non-local resources generated by other grassroots teams. It is as if stereotypical Conservative activist’s trepidation of an over-domineering, centralized authority led the modern party to build up competitive grassroots campaigns with the help of other local teams. The Conservative Party is also most suitable because it was the incumbent party in government throughout the period of analysis.

The period between 2007 and 2011 is chosen for the time of investigation because regulatory changes in 2004 and 2006 are most likely to have altered each party as vote

gathering organizations. The primary reason for analyzing parties between 2007 and 2011 is the modern party finance regime does not change over two different elections. This allows for isolating how regulatory changes made in 2004 and 2006 impact party organization and the party system during the 2008 and 2011 federal elections. After the implementation of the

Accountability Act in 2006, local party organizations could only solicit donations from individuals and contributions could not exceed $1,000. The secondary reason for analyzing parties between 2007 and 2011 is no other study presents financial data for this period.

Readers can refer to Carty and Young (2012), Coletto, Jansen, and Young (2011), and Coletto and Eagles (2011) for a discussion about parties and elections between 2004 and 2006.

Riding-level financial characteristics reveal four features of the Canadian party system between 2007 and 2011 that suggest each of the major federal political parties responded differently to party finance reforms. First, riding-level fundraising for the Conservative Party of

Canada (CPC), the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC), and the New Democratic Party of Canada

(NDP) reveal that the greatest electoral competition was primarily between the Conservatives and Liberals. Regardless of election results in 2011, fundraising shows that the Conservatives and Liberals had roughly equal capacity to mobilize activists in both election years. Thus it is less remarkable that the Liberal Party moved from third party status to a majority government in 2015, given that the party maintained competitive organizations at the grassroots.

The second distinguishing feature of the party system was the Conservatives ability to sustain election resources over time. Conservative local party organizations had demonstrably larger savings entering election years, totalling more than the Liberals and the NDP combined.

The third feature was that Conservative local party organizations redirected their resource overages to other ridings through inter-association transfers. This feature is a departure from that of the past twenty years of analysis of local party organizations (see Carty 1991; Carty and

Eagles 2005; Coletto and Eagles 2011). The final feature was that the Conservative Party had a better distribution of campaign effort than the Liberals or NDP. On average, Conservative local party organizations spent the most in highly-competitive ridings, followed by uncompetitive safe ridings and uncompetitive unsafe ridings.

The spirit of my argument is to question claims that parties centralize campaign operations under party finance laws from 2004 and 2006. The financial characteristics of local party organizations between 2007 and 2011 remain the product of candidates, campaign teams, and party activists in each constituency. Diverging characteristics indicate that inter- association funding is the result of a variety of features produced at the riding-level. There is little financial evidence at the riding-level to suggest political parties and constituency campaigns are the product of central party offices. This is not to suggest local party organizations diverge completely from central party offices during campaigns. But local party organizations retain control over money, and subsequently maintain their independence from the central party office. Political parties and election campaigns remain embedded at the grassroots under new election law.

Thesis Layout Structure

This thesis is a preliminary analysis of parties and elections in Canadian constituencies under the new party finance regime. The primary focus of this thesis is on how local party

organizations transfer money among themselves in order to increase the number of competitive local campaigns. In this way, local decisions regarding where money might best be spent improve the overall competitiveness of the party. This points to the capacity of local organizations to respond rationally to the incentives embedded in the party finance regime, creating a secondary market for financial resources that allows them to move from ridings where resources are wasted to those where they might improve electoral outcomes.

I incorporate an inductive logic to population data, isolate inter-association fund- transfers as the most notable characteristic, and analyze case studies of ridings where inter- association funding is observed. Chapter 2 explores the scholarship on the electoral system, political parties, and election law to establish incentives underlying the current party system.

The logic of the electoral system encourages parties to have flexibility and focus at the riding- level in order to win the most seats in a highly regionalized, highly-competitive, carefully financed party system. Chapter 3 analyzes financing for the population of local party organizations between 2007 and 2011. The data show that the Conservative Party of Canada maximized the use of money by concentrating spending in highly-competitive districts, while the Liberals and NDP spent more campaigning to defend their own strongholds. Chapter 4 investigates case studies that reveal the local factors influencing collaboration between well- resourced campaigns and under-resourced campaigns located in highly-competitive ridings. The final chapter concludes with a research agenda to guide future studies of parties and elections.

The Conservative Party of Canada is used as the reference point for parties and elections in many instances throughout this thesis. This is because the Conservative Party had the most

notable organizational structure and electoral tactics during the period of analysis. But at the same time, using the Conservatives as a reference point is preferential because the party has been under-explored by scholarship (see Carty 2015: 124-29). There are two reasons for this.

First, the Conservative Party of Canada is a young party; it has only existed for thirteen years at the time of writing (2016). And second, conservative parties in Canada have historically placed second to the Liberal Party of Canada. As Koop (2011: 11-12) points out, the Liberal Party won fifty-eight percent of the elections held since Confederation and this ratio increased to sixty – seven percent after the enfranchisement of women in 1918. This pattern has produced five party systems that begin with Conservative “interludes” and finish with Liberal “dynasties”

(Leduc et. al 2010). The most recent transition from majority Conservative parliament in 2015 certainly highlights the prowess of the dynasties and interludes theory, especially given that the new majority Liberal government was elected immediately after being the third party in parliament. Understanding how the Conservative Party of Canada is organized and identifying its interactions with other parties at the constituency-level may help make sense of Canadian parties and party systems into the twenty-first century.

Chapter 2 Harnessing Campaign Effort with Local Party Organizations: Continuity and Change in the Canadian Party System

Local party organizations are vital components of political parties because they are mechanisms for resolving support variations across the Canadian electoral system (Sayers

1999). The uneven distribution of party support across ridings and regions is a longstanding feature of Canadian party systems (for example, Cairns 1968). Local party organizations enable national parties to overcome support variations at the regional level. By concentrating campaign effort in strategically important ridings, political parties can improve electoral prospects at the districts level, and from them increase overall chances at forming government.

Local party organizations that are capable of generating adequate election resources are also more likely able to generate votes (Coletto and Eagles 2011: 124). This may be problematic for political parties seeking to expand their number of parliamentary seats. Disequilibrium exists between where resources are generated and where they are most needed for campaigning. One way of resolving resource disequilibrium is by empowering local party organizations to generate support in accordance with district-level features. However, under the modern party finance regime (Bill C-24 2004; Accountability Act 2006) most local party organizations may only generate campaign resources from individuals within the riding or from other components within the political party.2

Scholarship predicts that local party organizations will become increasingly dependent and submissive to central party offices in exchange for campaign resources generated at the centre (Carty and Young 2012: 236; Coletto et. al 2011; Coletto and Eagles 2011; Jansen and

2 There are exceptions like high profile politician Jason Kenney, whose prowess enabled him to raise money from individuals in ridings other than Calgary Southeast.

Lambert 2013).3 But this theory assumes that only central party offices collaborate with local party organizations. In fact, local party organizations may also collaborate with other local party organizations (CBC 2013; Hill Times 2015). Collaboration allows local party organizations to resolve uneven support distributions by making indirect campaign effort beyond their own riding. It is likely that collaboration at the local-level will become an imperative for resolving resource scarcity, especially since subsequent party finance reforms eliminated per-vote subsidies paid to central party offices (Fair Elections Act 2013). Modifications to the party finance regime in 2004 and 2006 altered patterns of fundraising and campaigning done by local party organizations in the Conservative Party of Canada.

The Logic of Electoral Contests in an Single-Member District Electoral Systems

Political parties must incorporate the logic of the electoral system into their party organizations and campaigns if they are to be effective (see Sartori 2005). The logic of the single-member plurality (SMP) electoral system requires parties to convince voters to cast their ballot in a particular district on a particular day. Political parties must convince voters to cast ballots locally for national party brands. Parties with concentrated local and regional appeal may win office while others with thinly-spread national appeal may not. Local, regional, and national votes remain the outcome of ballots counted inside each district. This is why local campaigns continue to matter: parties need to convince voters they are the best choice locally and nationally.

3 The centralization theory is consistent with technological advancements, such as computer databases and internet communications, which may empower central party offices to override the functions of local party organizations (Flanagan 2003; Delacourt 2014).

Canadian political parties contest federal elections in a single-member plurality electoral system (SMP). In SMP systems, a single candidate wins election as the district representative by gaining more votes than any other candidate. A candidate does not need a majority of votes to win the district in a two party race. The first-place candidate only needs more votes than the second-place candidate. Political parties are elected to govern by winning the most riding-level contests. Similar to the riding-level formula, the winning party does not need to win more than fifty percent of the seats in parliament to win power. The party-in-power may govern with a minority of parliamentary seats, supplemented by the support of opposition parties during votes of confidence.4 The SMP electoral system has become known as the first-past-the-post system (FPTP) because candidates and parties win election by placing first among the plurality of contestants.

Parties may experience an overage of votes at the district-level. An overage occurs when there is a commodity surplus above a required quantity. For example, Candidate A gets 50.01% of the votes to win election against one other candidate in a two party system. After the ballots are counted, Candidate A actually receives 65% of the votes. Candidate A receives an overage of 14.99% of votes cast. The Canadian electoral system has the potential to create higher ballot overages because elections are usually contested by at least three parties in every district.

Candidate A can actually win with only 34% of the vote if all three parties are competitive. The opposite is true for Candidate B and C. Losing candidates can suffer from a ballot shortage of one percent that prevents either from winning. The zero sum contest in the constituency

4 Minority governments were formed this way in 2004, 2006, and 2008. The plurality convention has lasted 90 years. The rules of responsible government enable the opposition parties to unseat a minority government; however, such a coalition has never successfully formed inside Parliament.

means that it does not matter whether a candidate wins by one vote or ten thousand votes; winning is winning. Parties may exploit ballot overages by identifying where they exist and incorporating that into campaign strategy.

The potential for balloting overages and shortages which arise from the logic of SMP systems influences district-level voting behaviour. Cox (1999) argues that SMP inspires more local coordination among candidates and strategic voting among voters than occurs under PR systems. Candidates may enter or exit the local contest if they perceive a strategic advantage over other candidates. A candidate may enter an election race if she perceives that other candidates already running have left certain policies out of their platforms. Alternatively, a candidate may exit the contest if she perceives that her own platform overlaps with another, more competitive candidate. Strategic entry (or exit) occurs because the electorate votes for the candidate closest to their own policy preferences. Cox hypothesizes local coordination is greater in SMP systems because candidates and voters seek to achieve electoral outcomes closest to their own policy preferences. Strategic entry is intended to increase vote splitting, while strategic exit is intended to reduce vote-splitting. Candidate coordination is meant to produce district representatives closest to the policy preferences held by the plurality of voters.

SMP systems have a psychological effect on voters and parties that rationalize the logic of the election contest: only one candidate wins the district and only one party forms government.

This is the psychological logic of SMP voting.

The Green Party of Canada is a contemporary example of the logic introduced by Cox.

Green Party candidates enter riding-level contests because they believe others do not have

appropriate environmental policy proposals.5 As a group, the Green Party has received upwards of 6.8 percent of the national vote during campaigns (Elections Canada 2013). However, Green

Party voter support is spread too thinly across the Canadian electoral system for the party to be effective. The majority of voters cast their ballots for other parties at the riding-level. As of

2015, the dispersion of support across electoral districts creates an entry barrier to parliament for all but one Green Party candidate.

The logic of SMP aggregates into regional contests in the Canadian case (Cairns 1968).

Parties may have concentrated support at the district-level that translates into winning an entire region of Canada. Cairns (1968: 78) argues, “Sectionalism in the party system is unavoidable as long as there are significant differences between the distribution of party voter support in any one section and the distribution in the country as a whole.” According to Cairns, the uneven distribution of party support across the regionalized electorate shapes electoral competition between parties. Multiple parties can be effective in Canadian party systems because regionally-concentrated support and single-member plurality voting enables parties to become effective, even if it is in only one section of the electoral system. Parties may become effective by maximizing just enough voter support at the riding-level to be ranked first by voters in each electoral district of a given region. This is the mechanical logic of SMP in Canada.

The regionally and ethnolinguistically-diverse Canadian electorate potentially magnifies the variability of electoral support because parties may enjoy highly stable support in one region and volatile support in others. For example, the Liberal Party of Canada dominated

5 The Green Party (2015) campaigns to “…ensure that the planet, the biosphere and our part of it, survive and thrive for our children and theirs and theirs...”

federal politics during the 20th century by winning the plurality of votes and the majority of seats in Quebec and Ontario (Johnston 1992). The Liberals managed to straddle conflicting regional and ethnolinguistic concerns by brokering disputes internally inside an easily accessible

‘big tent’ political party (Carty 2015). Johnston (1992: 619) argues Liberal party electoral success throughout the 20th century originates from its electability – or balloting overages – in

Quebec ridings, like a ‘trump card’ against other big tent parties such as the Progressive

Conservatives (PC). Even though support stability in Quebec led to balloting shortages in

Western Canada, the Liberal Party prolonged its duration in power by benefitting from balloting overages in seat-rich regions.

In another example, the Reform Party of Canada sprang into Parliament by displacing PC candidates in western Canada. The PCs enjoyed nearly four decades of electoral predictability in Western Canada (Johnston 1992: 610). The Reform Party emerged as a western protest to policies approved by the Western Canadian PC caucus. Rather than ignoring regional conflicts,

Reforms’ electoral strategy was to articulate regional conflicts by championing Western

Canadian concerns. Reform Party candidates entered the electoral contest and gained a strategic advantage by filling position space left void by the PC party. The Reform Party initially sought to push the PCs out of Western Canada by ‘invading from the margin’ to win a plurality of votes in western ridings (Flanagan 2009). The Reform strategy worked in the 1993 federal election; with the equivalent amount of national vote, the Reform Party (19%) won fifty-two ridings while the PCs (16%) only won two (see Carty et. al 2000: 32-3).

The logic of SMP in the regional and ethnolinguistically diverse electorate produces volatility in Canadian party systems. Elections become unpredictable. Regional electorates – during even stable periods of national support – may switch party preferences which result in sweeping changes to parliamentary seat standings. The Progressive Conservatives suffered from this type of electoral volatility in 1993. Volatility transformed western electoral strongholds into a wasteland that led to the demise of the PCs (Carty et. al 2000). Yet, electoral volatility can also raise the fortune of parties. Reform and the Bloc Quebecois are examples of extra-parliamentary parties launching into major parliamentary positions. Electoral volatility becomes an added source of uncertainty for parties trying to enhance their competitive advantage (Johnston 2010).

These examples demonstrate how parties respond to electoral incentives located at the riding-level. SMP encourages local coordination among candidates that produces ‘big tent’ political parties. The Liberal party owes much of its electoral success to being capable of

(re)building large voter coalitions that balance broad national appeal with concentrated regional support and locally-desirable candidates (Carty 2015). Similarly, the Conservative Party of Canada owes its electoral success to local coordination between former Progressive

Conservatives and Reformers (Flanagan 2008). The next section examines the Canadian party system between 2004 and 2011 by the distribution of party support across provinces and how support translated into parliamentary seats.

The Canadian Party System: 2004 – 2011

The Canadian party system remained a highly regionalized contest between three main political parties between 2004 and 2011. The distribution of party support by province is presented in Table 2.1. The three effective federalist parties during this period of electoral competition were the Conservative Party of Canada, Liberal Party of Canada, and New

Democratic Party of Canada. They qualify for discussion because these parties elected enough candidates to sit either as government or official opposition between 2004 and 2011. The Bloc

Quebecois and Green Party are excluded from this table. The Bloc never sought the majority of seats in Parliament and the Green Party never won a seat until 2011. It should be noted, however, that Bloc candidates won the majority of seats (between forty-nine and fifty-four) in

Quebec in 2004, 2006, and 2008. This reinforces the regional proclivity of the Canadian party system, yet the Bloc is excluded from this discussion for remaining a regional party that did not contest elections outside Quebec.

The Conservative Party governing coalition was formed by holding support in Western

Canada and expanding support in Ontario and Atlantic Canada. The Conservatives had the greatest improvement in parliamentary seat-share as a result of vote changes between elections in the province of Ontario. The party increased the Ontario popular vote by thirteen percent between 2004 and 2011. This led to an increase of forty-nine parliamentary seats. In comparison, the Conservatives increased the Manitoba popular vote by the same amount but this only led to four additional parliamentary seats. The Conservatives also made seat gains in

Atlantic Canada. The party elected five new candidates between 2004 and 2011. Conservatives had higher seat gains in New Brunswick than in Prince Edward Island or Nova Scotia.

Table 2.1: Percentage of Popular Vote Won and Seat Translation in each Province by Political Party (Parentheses = N) BC AB SK MB ON QB NB PEI NS NFLD Terr. Total (36) (28) (14) (14) (106) (75) (10) (4) (11) (7) (3) (308) CPC04 36.3% 61.7% 41.8% 39.1% 31.5% 8.8% 31.1% 30.7% 28.0% 32.3% 17.5% 29.6% (22) (26) (13) (7) (24) (0) (2) (0) (3) (2) (0) (99) LPC04 28.6% 22.0% 27.2% 33.2% 44.7% 33.9% 44.6% 52.5% 39.7% 48.0% 45.4% 36.7% (8) (2) (1) (3) (75) (21) (7) (4) (6) (5) (0) (135) NDP04 26.6% 9.5% 23.4% 23.5% 18.1% 4.6% 20.6% 12.5% 28.4% 17.5% 26.6% 15.7% (5) (0) (0) (4) (7) (0) (1) (0) (2) (0) (0) (19) CPC06 37.3% 65.0% 49.0% 42.8% 35.1% 24.6% 35.8% 33.4% 29.7% 42.7% 24.4% 36.3% (17) (28) (12) (8) (40) (10) (3) (0) (3) (3) (2) (124) LPC06 27.6% 15.3% 22.4% 26.0% 39.9% 20.8% 39.2% 52.6% 37.2% 42.8% 40.8% 30.2% (9) (0) (2) (3) (54) (13) (6) (4) (6) (4) (2) (103) NDP06 28.6% 11.7% 24.1% 25.4% 19.4% 7.5% 21.9% 9.6% 29.9% 13.6% 27.9% 17.5% (10) (0) (0) (3) (12) (0) (1) (0) (2) (0) (1) (29) CPC08 44.5% 64.7% 53.8% 48.9% 39.2% 21.7% 39.4% 36.2% 26.1% 16.6% 35.0% 37.6% (22) (27) (13) (9) (51) (10) (6) (1) (3) (0) (1) (143) LPC08 19.3% 11.4% 14.9% 19.1% 33.8% 23.8% 32.5% 47.7% 29.8% 46.8% 29.5% 26.2% (5) (0) (1) (1) (38) (14) (3) (3) (5) (6) (1) (77) NDP08 26.1% 12.7% 25.5% 24.0% 18.2% 12.2% 21.9% 9.8% 28.9% 33.7% 25.9% 18.2% (9) (1) (0) (4) (17) (1) (1) (0) (2) (1) (1) (37) CPC11 45.6% 66.8% 56.3% 53.5% 44.4% 16.5% 43.8% 41.2% 36.7% 28.3% 36.6% 39.6% (21) (27) (13) (11) (73) (5) (8) (1) (4) (1) (2) (166) LPC11 13.4% 9.3% 8.5% 16.6% 25.3% 14.2% 22.6% 41.0% 28.9% 37.9% 26.6% 18.9% (2) (0) (1) (1) (11) (7) (1) (3) (4) (4) (0) (34) NDP11 32.5% 16.8% 32.3% 25.8% 25.6% 42.9% 29.8% 15.4% 30.3% 32.6% 26.5% 30.6% (12) (1) (0) (2) (22) (59) (1) (0) (3) (2) (1) (103) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Percentage of Valid Votes by Political Affiliation and Distribution of Seats by Political Affiliation and Sex

The Conservative Party of Canada managed to expand its regional support in Ontario and the Maritimes while maintaining electoral strength in stronghold districts located in

Western Canada. Voter predictability in Western Canada has historically benefited conservative parties, first the PCs and later Reform (for example, Carty et. al 2000; Johnson 1992). The durable, longstanding support may have led to seat gains in Ontario and the Maritimes by reducing campaign burdens in Alberta and Saskatchewan. The Conservative Party of Canada began as Official Opposition in 2003 and ultimately won a majority government in 2011 through electoral stability in Western Canada and electoral improvements in Ontario and the Maritimes.

Small changes to the overall vote of the Conservative Party produced a larger change on the number of seats the Conservative Party had in parliament. Elections results between 2004 and 2011 show that minor changes to party support by province translated into major changes to parliamentary seat distribution. The Conservatives increased their popular vote share by ten percent over four elections, which translated into sixty-five new seats. New Democrats increased their vote share by fifteen percent which translated into eighty-four new seats.

Liberals, in turn, reduced their vote share by eighteen percent which translated into one- hundred-one lost seats. Election results in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and the

Maritimes suggest that these provinces had the most competitive districts. District-level campaign effort in these provinces was evidently higher than in the prairies, where

Conservative candidates enjoyed very high voter support across time.

If the Conservative Party displaced the Liberals through incremental victories, the NDP owed its electoral success to electoral volatility in Quebec. For the first time in its history, the

NDP formed Official Opposition in 2011 after winning the majority of seats in Quebec. The NDP increased its seat share in the province from one in 2008 to fifty-nine in 2011. This unpredictable change support for the NDP is an example of electoral volatility. Quite unexpectedly, the NDP increased its party support magnitude by enough to win the majority of

Quebec ridings. Outside of Quebec, the NDP made seat gains in Ontario, British Columbia, and

Atlantic Canada. The NDP won the second highest number of seats in Ontario in 2011. They doubled the number of Liberal seats with almost exactly the same percentage of popular vote.

The NDP placed a distant second behind Conservatives in British Columbia but managed to elect twelve candidates there in 2011. Lesser party support across the prairies all but shutout

New Democratic candidates in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba districts.

The Canadian party system remained highly regional between 2004 and 2011. The examination of vote distributions and seat shares show competitive environments vary between regions in Canada. Inter-party competition at the provincial level derives from campaigning at the riding-level. The next section addresses how decentralized party organizations are more likely to enhance electoral competitiveness in a diverse system.

Stratarchically Organized Parties: Central Party Offices and Local Party Organizations

Carty (2002) argues Canadian party organizations are similar to franchise business structures because of the developmental and distributive model for branding, policy, and communication. He defines this as the stratarchical model of party organization. Stratarchy describes a single organization comprised of multiple components that are semi-independent from each other when executing operations (Carty 2004). In the case of Canadian parties, the

goal is raising enough votes to win seats in parliament. “Their franchise structure,” Carty (2002:

744) writes, “allows national parties to encompass a wide variety of distinctive communities, and cope with the pressures of a complex, pluralistic society.” Dividing power between central and local components frees central party strategists to develop nationally-appealing campaign platforms, while local party activists have the freedom to select locally-desirable candidates and campaign in locally-desirable ways. Stratarchical organization is a longstanding feature for parties trying to enhance their electoral competitiveness (for example, Koop 2011; Sayers

1999).

The central party office is the organizational component responsible for developing uniformity across ridings. Canadian parties require an organization to transcend regional and ethnolinguistic diversity if they are to successfully communicate their message to the whole electorate. The central party has centralized budgets that allow for professional staff. In many cases the central party is coupled to the Office of the Prime Minister or Opposition Leader’s

Office (for example, Davey 1986; Flanagan 2008). As an apparatus of the party leader, the central party blurs the line between party-in-parliament and party-outside-parliament.6

Branding, policy, and communications are produced by the central party office. The central party disseminates these materials to local party organizations throughout the electoral system.

The local party organization is the structural component at the riding-level. It is responsible for developing or sustaining party politics at the grassroots (Carty 1991). Candidate

6 For example, Davey (1986) recounts serving at the behest of Pearson, Trudeau, and Turner in the Liberal party central office; Delacourt (2003) and Jeffrey (2010) demonstrate how Chretien and Martin held control over the party through the central office, and by extension the local party organization; and, Flanagan (2008) details how Harper’s Team was crafted from outside the Reform Party and Conservative Party, and placed into important positions inside the party central office and Opposition Leaders Office.

nominations are one critical function carried out by the local party organization. Nominations are critical because the candidate becomes the face of the party in the constituency. The candidate imprints their social network on the constituency campaign organization and the riding association. Candidate social networks are vital factors that shape how local party organizations campaign in the constituency. Candidates ultimately determine how to present the party to riding-level voters. This leads to new volunteers, activists, and donors that are brought into the local party organization because of the candidate (Sayers 1999, Chapter 5).

Candidates who win election may even transform the local party organization into an extension of their representation (Koop 2015). Local party organizations become a product of their candidate in many instances.

The local party organizations are more than just an extension of the candidate. The majority of constituency-level parties are usually comprised of long-term party activists involved in the riding association. Riding associations (legally defined as “electoral district associations” or EDAs for short) are membership-driven organizations (Young and Cross 2002).

The membership elects executives, sustains partisan activity between elections, and in some instances, assists their Member of Parliament by fulfilling representative roles in the constituency (see Koop 2012). These activists are responsible for sustaining the local party organization between election periods, regardless of whether the nominated candidate wins election.

The separation between riding associations and candidates emerges when both components of the local party organization disagree. While such instances are rare, the

Conservative Party of Canada dissolved the executive of the Calgary West riding association after repeated attempts to replace incumbent MP, Rob Anders, with a different candidate

(National Post 2010). The association prevailed by nominating a new Conservative candidate prior to the 2015 federal election (CBC 2014). The case of Calgary West is one example of divides that may exist within local party organizations. Parties at the constituency-level have an added layer of complexity because of the endogenous relationship between the riding association and the candidate.

The distinction between riding associations, candidates and campaign teams that comprise local party organizations is important to acknowledge. The riding association, often comprised of long-time party activists, may be at odds with the local campaign team that is comprised of personnel loyal to the candidate but not necessarily loyal to the party. Riding associations are meant to support the election of party candidates; however, evidence from

Carty and Eagles (2005), Koop (2011), and Sayers (1999) shows that riding association personnel may drastically differ from campaign team personnel. While this distinction is important to note, it is not possible to determine if an organizational divide exists from data presented later in this thesis. Local party organizations are defined here as both the riding association and campaign team. The distinction will be highlighted when appropriate by referring to either the association or team, instead of the local party organization.

Candidate selection and inter-election activity is done in preparation for the next campaign because the fundamental purpose of the local party organization to win the local election contest. The SMP electoral system and Westminster model of responsible government

require parties seeking state power to field candidates in as many districts as possible. Unlike other federated SMP systems like Australia, where parties have stronger regional organizations that may exert more control over local campaign teams (see Carty 2004: 14-5), the regionally and ethnolinguistically-diverse Canadian electorate forces parties to devolve many campaign decisions to the local party organization. Candidates mobilize their own supporters and loyal partisans in order to increase their prospect for winning election. Local campaign teams have the flexibility to adopt or abandon campaign commands from the centre. Decentralized party structure allows the local party organization to campaign for federal office in ways that are desirable to idiosyncratic constituency electorates (Sayers 1999).

Sayers (1999:89) argues the ability for the central party to successfully interfere in local decisions hinges on the ‘desirability’ of the local contest and the capacity for the local party organization to resist central party commands. Local party organizations are needed for generating district-level support and concentrating campaign effort at the grassroots. Local campaigns are afforded some flexibility to accommodate different requirements across Canada.

District-level autonomy is necessary, to an extent, if parties are to improve and maintain their electoral competitiveness. The next section explores the direct and indirect effects that local party organizations make on election results during campaigns.

Local Party Organizations and Direct and Indirect Campaign Effort

Given their fundamental purpose for contesting elections, local party organizations have varying operational demands in preparation for Election day. Local party organizations must

select candidates, mobilize campaign teams, employ labour and money to communicate with voters, identify supporters and ultimately get supporters to vote. Campaign effort made in the riding has direct and indirect effects on voting behaviour. The amount of campaign effort made by the local party organization can be decisive in narrowly decided riding contests.

Local party organizations have been classified in the literature using Duverger’s (1966)

“cadre-versus-mass party” continuum. These terms describe attributes of campaign teams and their level of activity over time (Carty 1991; Coletto and Eagles 2011; Sayers 1999). Sayers

(1999: 35) argues the distinction is useful for determining the ‘permeability’ of effective parties at the riding-level. Cadre parties are easier to access by outsiders which makes them more permeable organizations. On the other hand, mass parties tend to be less accessible to outsiders. Mass parties are more likely to be staffed by long-time party activists and tend to be more bureaucratic as a result (Sayers 1999: 35). While both cadre parties and mass parties are organizationally weaker outside of election periods, cadre parties are more likely to completely cease operations (Carty 1991; Coletto and Eagles 2011; Sayers 1999).

The cadre-mass party distinction is applicable, to an extent, to local party organizations in Canada. Carty (1991) presents survey responses that suggest Liberal and PC local party organizations fit the “cadre” party classification. Both parties recruited more campaign personnel from outside the party and had fewer inter-election activities than did either the NDP or Reform Party. The NDP and Reform had local party organizations that best resembled “mass” parties. NDP and Reform local party organizations relied heavily on long-time activists both as volunteers and income sources. A subsequent study (after Reform and the PCs merged into the

Conservative Party of Canada) found the Conservatives and Liberals remained cadre parties at the grassroots, while the NDP remained a mass party (Coletto and Eagles 2011). However, studies also demonstrate that there is considerable intra-party variation not captured by the cadre-mass party distinction. These terms lose their conceptual power necessary for communicating the specific development of local party organization in a given constituency.

Local party organizations differ in shape and size as a result of varying competitive demands within constituencies. The inequitable dispersion of party support across the electoral system causes local party organizations to generate differing amounts of campaign resources

(Carty 1991). Money has been used as a measure for determining the extent of constituency- level organization within each party (Carty and Eagles 2005: 119-20). Carty and Eagles (2000) measure local party organization strength by analyzing income and spending. Fundraising revenue is a proxy measure for constituency-level party support. Higher income signifies greater constituency-level electoral support for the party because more engagement and effort is required to get a donation than a vote. Money can also be used to purchase goods and services that advance the electoral goal of the local party organization. Studies over the past twenty years demonstrate that the main Canadian political parties have varying amounts of income, savings, and spending between riding associations in the same way they have a varying amount of electoral support between ridings (Carty 1991; Carty and Eagles 2005; Coletto and

Eagles 2011; Koop 2011; Sayers 1999).

There is a non-linear relationship between riding campaign spending and candidate vote share. As competition increases, so too does campaign spending. Carty and Eagles (2005: 46)

analyze the 2000 federal election and show campaign spending increases as the margin of victory/loss narrows. Liberal candidate spending rises toward the district expense limit until the margin of victory exceeds about twenty percent. Candidate spending lowers afterward because competition from other candidates is so low (ibid.). While similar patterns held for Reform and the Bloc Quebecois, a different non-linear pattern held for the PCs and NDP. The PCs and NDP had spending coefficients cluster around high margins of loss. The authors (47) attribute this to

“…essentially different strategies aimed at protecting the few established bases [the PCs and

NDP] had.” The non-linear relationship indicates that competition influences campaign effort.

Highly-competitive parties seek to penetrate marginal ridings by maximizing campaign effort, while effective but uncompetitive parties try to repel effort made by others.

In a similar study, Carty and Young (2012) assess candidate spending and vote share from 1979 to 2008. They find the relationship between constituency campaign spending and marginal election results increases over time. Variability – measured by the range between candidates spending the maximum district expense and those spending the minimum – increased over time, too. This strengthening relationship is demonstrated by increasing spending variability between ridings. Increasing variation suggests parties are getting better at maximizing campaign effort in ridings that are determined by few votes. Parties are more likely to concentrate campaign effort in constituencies where campaign effort has a greater impact on election results. In less competitive constituency races, parties campaign less. Carty and

Young (2012) confirm this relationship exists and that its strength increased over time. Local campaign effort has a distinguishable influence on election results.

Sayers (1999) argues candidates are the intervening variable between competition and campaign effort. He shows that candidates are extensions of the relationship between riding association, the central party, and the constituency electorate for a given riding. District-level competition influences how aligned the riding association is with the central party and how accessible it is to party outsiders in the constituency. Sayers argues uncompetitive districts are more likely to favour long-time party activists – “party insiders” – because they control the nomination process. These candidates rely on the riding association for money and volunteers.

Competitive districts are more likely to favour contestants with little or no partisan history – party outsiders – because higher quality candidates are drawn to contest nominations. Higher quality candidates bring with them new people and money. The central party may interfere with the nomination to guarantee incredibly high profile candidates carry the party banner during the upcoming election. Sayers (1999: 87) concludes that “the nomination experiences of candidates determine the character of campaign teams, and in particular, the core group of workers that control local campaigns.”

Empirical studies confirm Sayers’ (1999) theory about the central role of candidates in generating resources and consuming campaign effort. Cross and Young (2011; 2014) use survey results from Liberal and NDP candidates to reinforce claims about district-level campaign intensity and resource concentration. Responses show higher quality candidates won contested nominations. They also ran ‘vigorous’ campaigns benefiting from more volunteers and money.

The authors point out that visits from party notables invigorate volunteers and motivate them to improve their performance. Competitive campaigns are more likely to ‘personalize’ themes around the candidate, rather than communicate the party or leadership brand (Cross and

Young 2014). Belanger et. al (2003: 448) advance similar points about the importance of leadership campaign visits, but demonstrate ‘strategic deployment’ of party leaders is not perfectly correlated to winning certain constituencies. Sayers (1999: 180-1) notes leader visits may be unwelcome by campaigns where the local candidate is more appealing than the national party brand or leader. Quantitative studies confirm qualitative insights about how campaign effort varies between candidates and constituencies.

Canadian local party organizations canvass voters (either in person or by phone), distribute lawn signs displaying their name and party brand, deliver pamphlets and leaflets to constituents, attend candidate forums, communicate to local media, raise money, and spend money in an effort to win election from the riding polite. All this effort is made by local party organizations in Canada.

Local campaigns matter. Campaign effort made by local party organizations has direct and indirect influences on electoral behaviour. Local party organizations emerged because parties needed to campaign in locally-desirable ways (Carty 2002). Surveys, ethnographic studies, and financial audits performed in Canada show that campaign effort increases when district results become very close. Candidates are more likely to increase their campaign effort in the constituency as electoral competition increases between two or more candidates.

Campaign effort is tied to available resources, whether that is central party aid, volunteer labour, or money. Even though not every riding can be swayed by campaign tactics, as regional support variations constrain electoral behaviour, enough districts can be influenced by local campaigns to impact which party forms government, or whether the winning party has a

minority or majority of parliamentary seats (Coletto 2010). As a result, parties have an incentive to increase campaign effort in highly-competitive districts. The next section outlines changes to election law that shift underlying incentives for party organizations.

Reforming Party Finance Law, Altering Electoral Competition

The Liberal controlled parliament first moved to reform party finance law in 2003. The regime, enacted in 2004 with the passage of Bill C-24 (2003), prohibited large corporate and union donations to the central parties. It limited corporate and union donations made to local party organizations to $5,000, and limited individual donations to any party component to

$5,000. The new regime replaced corporate and union donations to central parties with public funding paid in the form of a quarterly allowance. The actual subsidy was calculated by the number of votes won in the previous election and was paid directly to the central party office.

The regulatory changes initiated by the Liberals modified the stratarchical relationship in each party by increasing the financial resources of central parties while reducing income sources available to local party organizations.

The Conservatives entrenched the party finance regime in 2006. With the passage of the

Accountability Act (2006), the party finance regime further restricted individual donations to no more than $1,000 to each party component and completely banned corporate and union donations to any party component by expanding contribution restrictions to riding associations and candidates. The state subsidy that replaced corporate and union income to central party offices was not made available to local party organizations. For the first time in Canadian history, the entrenchment of the modern party finance regime in 2006 produced stable and

predictable incomes for central party offices, while local party organizations had unprecedented restrictions as to where they could receive campaign and general resources.

Party finance reforms did more to make the pre-existing Conservative Party organizational model the dominant in the system than they did to cause reorganization.

Conservative legacy parties had been pushed to develop individual fundraising methods during their periods in opposition. The Progressive Conservatives could not rely on large corporate donations, as commercial enterprise and industry gave the lion’s share of their contributions to the Liberal Party (Paltiel 1970; Stanbury 1991). The Reform Party also failed to attract corporate donations. They too relied heavily on their membership and other individual supporters for election money.7 The grassroots focus of fundraising from individuals, rather than corporations, was also a feature of Reforms populist ideology. When the two parties merged in 2003, the

Conservative Party of Canada inherited the Reform practice for maintaining a single centrally controlled database listing tens of thousands of conservative donors. The new Conservative

Party also inherited more professionalized operating procedures from the PCs. The

Conservative Party organizational model arose from its legacy parties. Generating individual donations proved highly effective and essential for enhancing electoral competitiveness of the

Conservative Party under the 2006 party finance regime (Flanagan 2008; Flanagan 2014,

Chapter 6; Flanagan and Jansen 2009).

7 Flanagan (1995: 86-7) wrote corporate fundraising projects were disastrous for Reform. The Save Canada project failed, and ultimately compelled Reform’s national office to tax riding associations for revenue. Stanbury (1991) and Carty (1991) reaffirm that Reform had a mass party structure through its funding sources. Reform depended on small, consistent membership contributions and membership fees for revenue. Carty et. al (2000: 145) show this trend continued through 1997 because individual contributions account for over sixty percent of party income.

Despite being the architect for the modern party finance regime, the Liberal Party failed to build a fundraising system that maximized electoral performance under new election law

(Bill C-24, 2003). Historically, the Liberal Party disproportionately benefitted from large corporate donations because it was more likely to gain power (for example, Paltiel 1970;

Stanbury 1991). This produced a positive feedback loop which reinforced the dependence of the Liberal Party on corporate funding. Expense limits, individual donor tax incentives, and transparency requirements created in 1974 (Canada Elections Act) did little to break the Liberal

Party reliance on corporate donations. The party finance regime initiated by the Liberals appears counter intuitive because it severed the relationship to corporate funding. However, examining rules imposed on local party organizations offers one possible explanation why the

Liberal Party structured the party finance regime this way.

Bill C-24 extended law to both components of the local party organization (campaign team and riding association) by creating regulations for riding associations. Riding associations had not been included in the Canada Elections Act, 1974, even though candidate campaign teams were made accountable for income and spending. Riding associations continued to operate in secrecy because they were not required to report income sources to the public.

Continued secrecy allowed local party organizations to hide income even from central party officials. Liberal Party campaign manager Keith Davey (1986: 197) recounted his frustration with this fact: “The net result [to the party finance regime created in the Canada Elections Act,

1974] is that the Liberal Party of Canada is millions of dollars in debt at the national level but has a number of riding [associations] across the country which could finance the next four or

five elections.” This ended in 2004 when riding associations became subject to the same legal requirements assigned to candidates and their campaigns.

Regulating both components of local party organizations created full transparency at the riding-level that may have helped central parties tax EDAs and campaign teams. Taxation has occurred to some extent in all effective parties (see Carty 1991; Coletto and Eagles 2011).

Prior to 2004, central party incomes were cyclically tied to election years. This limited the operational potential of central party offices between election years. Central parties tried increasing revenue by forcing local party organizations to transfer money. However, local resources were also cyclical. Efforts were made to resolve resource scarcity by modifying the party finance regime. The 1974 party finance regime introduced candidate expense reimbursements, central party expense reimbursements, and tax incentives for individual donors, yet cyclical incomes persisted. Local party organizations were capable of avoiding taxation by hiding money in riding association bank accounts (Stanbury 1991: 405). The lack of local transparency limited ability for central party offices to appropriate resources accumulated by local party organizations.

The ability for local party organizations to hide money ended with the transparency and accountability regulations included in Bill C-24 (2003). Riding associations were required to register with Elections Canada, name the president and financial agent as individuals accountable for the association, and report income sources and spending to ensure compliance with the law. Those failing to do so could not accept donations and spend money on behalf of

the party, and could even be dissolved by Elections Canada. Remaining registered became imperative for local party organizations to fulfill election duties.

The new party finance regime limited external income sources by replacing private funding with public funding, but it did not limit financial transfers within parties. The law (Bill C-

24, 2004 Section 404.2(2)) states “A provision of goods or services or a transfer of funds is permitted and not considered a contribution” if it originates from the central party office or the local party organization. The exclusion of intra-party fund-transfers from income restrictions allows local parties to be a potential source of funding for other ridings. One cannot help but speculate, with this provision in mind, whether expanded transparency requirements for local party organizations and quarterly allowances paid to central party offices were meant to address historical funding shortages in the central party office. Perhaps this was the motivation for the Liberal Party revisions to the Canada Elections Act in 2003. It is as if the Liberal Party intended to replace corporate donations with subsidies paid by the state and taxes levied on local party organizations, given that the party did not immediately build its individual donor fundraising capacity.

The 2004 party finance regime created a quarterly allowance paid directly to central party offices. Paid in the form of a per vote subsidy, the quarterly allowance introduced financial stability to party organizations that historically depended on funding raised during election years. The new state subsidy created financial predictability between election periods.

This especially benefitted the Conservative Party of Canada because of its growing share of votes. Financial predictability enabled the Conservatives to campaign outside official election

periods. The Conservative Party of Canada extended its campaign efforts, mostly substantially in the form of paid commercial advertising (Flanagan and Jansen 2009). The quarterly allowance resolved cyclical central party incomes and reduced the need to appropriate money from local party organizations.

Coletto, Jansen, and Young (2011) argue the injection of public money centralized intra- party power by enhancing disproportionately the financial influence of the central party office.

The authors measure financial inputs from public and private sources to candidates, riding associations, and national party offices. They find national party offices receive far more money than the local party organizations. Even though Coletto et. at (2011: 135) present evidence that the Liberals and Conservatives are stratarchically organized, they conclude “…the new election finance regime… has potentially contributed to a centralization of… Canadian parties and a gradual erosion of stratarchical relationships between the national and local faces of the parties.” Coletto and colleagues predict that intra-party fund-transfers will erode the stratarchical relationship because it makes local party components financially dependent on central parties.

Coletto and Eagles (2011) isolate riding associations to explore whether these entities reduce attachments with civil society following the injection of public money. The authors (ibid.

126) found ‘continued vitality’ in major party riding associations because they still generated large amounts of money, spent money outside writ-periods in election items, and contributed money to other party branches. The taxation trend – central parties absorbing candidate campaign surpluses – reversed after central party public subsidies were introduced. This is likely

because central parties began receiving large, stable incomes from the per-vote subsidy. Most importantly, the study demonstrates modest resource concentration in competitive electoral districts. Coletto and Eagles (2011: 120) correlate central party fund-transfers into competitive ridings with candidates’ 2006 margin of victory/loss. This data is consistent with other studies that measure higher campaign effort in marginally decided ridings (for example, Carty and

Young 2012), but Coletto and Eagles do not continue to follow the money by linking riding association financing with constituency campaign spending.

As a prerequisite for electoral success, centralization might make sense financially, but it does not make sense politically or legally. Decentralized parties may reduce electoral volatility by campaigning in locally-desirable ways (Sayers 1999). Parties unable to navigate the logic of the SMP electoral system suffer electoral defeat. The 1993 election is a reminder that voters can punish parties perceived to be ignoring local concerns. Even though the PCs spent $10.3 million campaigning in 1993, they only won two seats in Parliament (Carty et. al 2000: 147). The

Progressive Conservatives lost activists and voter support to the Reform Party and the Bloc

Quebecois.

Intra-party centralization may not be legally possible under the 2006 party finance regime. The Conservative Party “In-and-Out Scandal” comes to mind. In 2006, the Conservative

Party devised a way to circumvent national campaign expense limits by transferring money to local party organizations. The local campaign would then spend money, bypassing central party expense ceilings, but the purchased product was in fact central party campaign advertising. The

Conservative Party plead guilty to violating the Canada Elections Act and paid a $52,000 fine to

avoid jail time for central party strategists directly implicated (CBC 2011). This precedent makes it legally challenging for central party offices to command and control local party organizations or their campaigns.

Other media reports provide information not identified in the academic literature. This further suggests a misunderstanding about local party organizations since 2006. High profile politician Jason Kenney, Member of Parliament for Calgary Southeast, received many donations from individuals outside his riding. Donors from Ontario gave his riding association roughly half the total sum of money received since 2007 (Elections Canada 2013). This suggests that we do not fully understand the flow of party revenues, particularly with respect to riding associations and constituency campaigns. Media reports also identified Conservatives concentrating riding association funding into one district for a by-election in 2014 (Hill Times 2015). The report notes

“A number of [riding associations] in Calgary and elsewhere in the province sent money to the

[Fort McMurray] electoral district association to help fund the [by-election] campaign.” This suggests local party organizations transcend their district boundaries in the twenty-first century. Media reports contradict assumptions in the academic literature that suggest local party organizations are only concerned with campaigning in single constituencies.

The CBC article about Jason Kenney and the Hill Times article about inter-association funding reveal that parties continue to change at the riding-level under the 2006 party finance regime. An earlier study (Carty 1991: 212) found some inter-association funding, but reported inconsequential funding transfers. Meanwhile, Calgary Southeast Conservative Party EDA (Jason

Kenney’s riding association) financial reports show large sums of money flowing into, and out

of, other Conservative Party riding associations (Elections Canada 2013). Why local party organizations collaborate, and the extent of inter-district funding in effective parties, is not yet known. Accumulating local party financial reports and candidate expense reports after these financial regime changes have taken effect may provide new insights to how political parties enhance their electoral prospects under new election law.

Conclusion

Media reports reveal that local party organizations act as a non-local resource source for constituency campaign in other ridings. This raises questions about the widely held view that local party organizations are riding specific campaign organizations. When combined with variation in the size and strength of local party organizations, the existence of collaboration between local parties warrants modifying the cadre-mass party distinction. Jason Kenney generated financial support in Ontario for his Conservative local party organization in Calgary,

AB. The Conservative campaign in the Fort McMurray by-election used campaign resources generated by local party organizations in other parts of the province. The Reform Party and its ideological predisposition for local autonomy over the central party appear to manifest in the new Conservative Party of Canada as collaboration between grassroots campaign teams. The modern party finance regime alters how parties generate income and spend money campaigning. Analyzing the financial behaviour of local party organizations from 2007 to 2011 is the most appropriate way to determine how parties are campaigning under new election law.

The next two chapters search for factors that are likely to cause or predict collaboration between local party organizations. Central to this exploration will be determining how parties

resolve the disequilibrium between the uneven distributions of party support across ridings and where campaign effort is actually made. The discussion from this chapter establishes that political parties can generate an overage of resources in the form of votes and money at the district-level. This can become problematic when district-level overages only translate into one parliamentary seat. Overages in some ridings may lead to shortages in others. In order to successfully navigate the logic of the electoral system, parties develop decentralized organizations that allow political entrepreneurs, their teams, and long-term party activists to campaign in locally-desirable ways. Local campaigns matter, especially in highly competitive ridings, so much so that local teams in highly-competitive ridings may attract non-local campaign resources. These resources may be used to maximize the amount of effort made during the election period. Identifying where resources are generated, accumulated, and consumed following election law reforms is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 3 Collaboration between Local Party Organizations: The Conservative Advantage in Election Campaigns

“Until the legislation is changed to require candidates and their consistency associations to share the wealth and to assist their central parties, the parties will grow weak, more ineffectual, and less able to function as national institutions in the life of the country.”

– John Laschinger, former National Director of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, and Geoffrey Stevens (1992: 175).

Local party organizations and their position within parties and campaigns changed under the modern party finance regime. At the constituency-level, parties were assumed to be constituency specific organizations meant to sustain party life between elections and campaign in the riding (Carty 2002). This models assumes a two way link between semi-autonomous local party organizations and semi-autonomous central party offices (for other examples, see Carty and Eagles 2005; Coletto and Eagles 2011; Coletto et. al 2011). However, media reports expose how some local party organizations in the Conservative Party derived support from, or made campaign effort to, ridings beyond their own electoral district boundaries (CBC 2013; Hill Times

2015). Collaboration occurred across large geographic distances in many instances (Appendix

A). Collaboration demonstrates that local party organizations – as semi-autonomous components from the central party – can develop linkages to other ridings. This chapter explores financial characteristics for parties-in-the-constituency from 2007 until 2011 to determine that, contrary to organizational outcomes advocated by Laschinger and Stevens

(1992: 175) and Davey (1986: 197), the 2004 and 2006 party finance reforms made constituency associations and candidates vital instruments for assisting local party organizations in other districts.

The electoral success of the Conservative Party of Canada developed from organizational vitality at the riding-level. This is evident in a financial analysis of Conservative,

Liberal, and New Democratic Party riding associations and campaign teams. The analysis reveals four distinct features that impacted electoral competition during the 2008 and 2011 federal elections. First, the Conservative Party and Liberal Party remained close competitors, despite the electoral achievements of the New Democratic Party in 2011 (see Table 2.1). However,

according to indirect measures, the Conservative Party sustained electoral activity between elections. Second, sustained activity enabled Conservative local party organizations to enter election years with substantially more financial resources than the Liberal Party or the New

Democratic Party. For example, the Conservative Party had 159 riding associations with more than $50,000 of savings in 2011; the Liberal Party had 67 and the NDP had 16. This is a substantial overage of resources that favoured the Conservatives over the Liberals.

Third, the overage of party support was moved between ridings through inter- association funding transfers. Two hypotheses are tested to determine whether electoral competition at the riding-level drives inter-association funding. Finally, campaign spending averages show that Conservative candidates made on average a higher effort in marginally decided ridings, while Liberal and NDP candidates maximized campaign effort in their own safer seats. The flatter distribution of campaign spending in the Conservative Party indicates closer equilibrium between riding competition and campaign effort. The Conservative Party derived its competitive advantage by outmaneuvering other parties in ridings across Canada.

Methodology: Follow the Money

The financial accounts of local party organizations are reliable data sources for district- level party operations across Canada (Carty and Eagles 2005, Chapter 8). Party operatives are legally compelled to report accurate information to Elections Canada, or risk severe penalties when failing to comply (Elections Canada 2014, Part 19).8 Elite interviews or activist surveys may be unattainable to academic researchers, given the competitive environment in which

8 For example, in June 2015 former Member of Parliament Dean Del Mastro was sentenced to one month in prison for exceeding election expense limits, then falsifying his Elections Canada financial report (National Post 2015).

political operatives work. Operatives do not want to risk revealing campaign strategy to their opponents because the cost of losing their competitive advantage is too great. As a result of the secretive nature of electoral politics, students of parties and elections have only glimpses of how parties organize when contesting power. Recent changes to the Canada Elections Act (Bill

C-24, 2004) expand financial reporting requirements to riding associations. The entire local party organization – the riding association and the constituency campaign – must report their income sources and spending for public scrutiny.9 Financial data presented here casts new light on political operations by analyzing how major electoral institutions wage their campaigns for power through the democratic process. The primary goal for completing research about constituency-level party organization and campaigning is to gain a new glimpse at the behaviour of major political parties contending to govern the state.

More importantly, financial figures are more valid indicators of district-level party support and campaign operations than vote distributions, survey responses, or elite interviews.

Party supporters require more commitment to write a cheque than to cast a ballot or respond to a pollster. Financial data are also valid measures of political party organizational structure and campaign vitality. Fundraising indicates the ability to engage supporters and mobilize resources during elections; savings indicate the operational activity between elections; intra- party fund-transfers indicate relationships of dependence between the central party office and local party organization, and may also reveal perceived competition in each constituency; candidate fundraising indicates a combination of candidate popularity and supporter

9 Some riding associations may report inaccurate information due to human error. After all, financial reports are completed and submitted by volunteers.

mobilization during election periods; and, campaign spending indicates the amount of campaign effort made at the constituency-level. Systematically analyzing the population of local party organization financing produces the most realistic appraisal of party penetration into each constituency and the amount of party competition across the Canadian electoral system.

Local party organizations are defined here as the party apparatus in the constituency that is comprised of the riding association and the candidate’s campaign team. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, riding associations and campaign teams are separate entities. The

Canada Elections Act requires both components to publish financial reports and appoint individuals to stand accountable for party operations. Riding associations elect presidents and appoint financial agents to be legally accountable. Candidates and their appointed official agent are accountable for the campaign team. Riding associations, or electoral district associations

(EDAs), are the mechanism through which inter-association fund-transfers take place, even though resources are ultimately used by campaign teams. This distinction is important to re- iterate because the separation can be unclear when assessing riding association financial reports and candidate election campaign returns for the local party organization in one constituency.

The data-set presented in this thesis was compiled from Elections Canada (2013,a,b)

“Registered Association Financial Reports” and “Candidate Expense Reports” for Conservative

Party, Liberal Party, and New Democratic Party electoral district associations (also termed riding associations) between 2007 and 2011. Electoral districts are the basic case unit. Each case includes variables for election year, district expense limit, incumbency, elected party candidate,

vote total by party, Bodet’s (2013) riding-level competition measure, region, and province.

Bodet’s measure is recoded into strongholds (safe and uncompetitive), battlegrounds (highly- competitive), and other party strongholds (uncompetitive). Financing measures are party specific and include: savings, EDA fundraising, candidate fund-transfers, inter-association fund- transfers, central-to-local party inflow and outflow fund-transfers, candidate fundraising, and candidate election spending. The complete data-set has 1,848 cases (308 local party organizations for 3 political parties over 2 elections) and 29,568 variables, producing a comprehensive portrait of effective political parties under new electoral law.

The scope of analysis is limited to the Conservative Party of Canada, the Liberal Party of

Canada, and the New Democratic Party of Canada. Each has established itself as an effective party by contesting elections (if only on paper) in nearly every constituency and returning candidates to parliament. The Conservative Party of Canada (2003 – present) in its current form has only existed for short period of time but has also demonstrated its competitiveness by quickly forming government and by out-fundraising every other political party during its entire existence. The Liberal Party of Canada remains a formidable competitor today and one of the most successful democratic political organizations of the twentieth century. The New

Democratic Party has been the third party for most of its existence, but formed Official

Opposition for the first time after the Election 2011.

Other effective parties are excluded from this analysis. The Bloc Quebecois, an anti- system party, does not contest ridings outside Quebec. Their impact on electoral competition is significant in Quebec. The Green Party of Canada is also effective, but it is excluded here

because it fails to realize “coalition potential” or “blackmail potential” in the Canadian party system (see Sartori 2005: 108-9). Although the Bloc Quebecois and Green Party are important to the Canadian party system between 2007 and 2011, this study is concerned with parties and elections that transcend any single district, province or region.

The independent variables used throughout this chapter capture two distinct aspects of electoral competition. The first variable is province, a crude measure capturing wide ranging characteristics of social demographics, language and ethnicity, economic occupations, and political culture. Party competition alters by region (Cairns 1968; Carty 1991), which make provincial boundaries appropriate independent variables for identifying financial patterns and comparing party competition. More importantly, we do not know the regional penetration of major parties following changes to the political party finance regime (for this exclusion, see

Carty and Young 2012; Coletto and Eagles 2011; Cross and Young 2011; Flanagan and Jansen

2009). The dependent variables are distributed by province to determine each grassroots operations and campaign vitality for effective parties across Canada.

The second independent variable is district-level competition. District competition is influenced by many things, including electoral boundary lines, geographic boundaries

(mountains or rivers), geographic location (region), local economy, district type (rural, suburban, urban), presence of incumbent, profile of other candidates, and public policy, to name just a few (for example, Carty and Eagles 2005). District features intertwine with the partisan character of the local party to produce the competitive environment for each political party in the constituency (Sayers 1999). District competition is measured using Bodet’s (2013)

stronghold and battleground variable. Strongholds and battlegrounds are another basic measurement that captures all aspects of district competitiveness in a simple and accessible variable. Bodet’s measure estimates district competition which can be comparted to the financial characteristics of local party organizations.

Bodet (2013) and Thomas and Bodet (2013) develop useful terminology for capturing riding-level competitiveness that is adopted throughout the remainder of this thesis. Ridings can be competitive or uncompetitive.10 A competitive riding is one in which more than one party has a reasonable chance of winning. These districts are termed battleground ridings. An uncompetitive riding means only one party has a reasonable chance for winning. Bodet defines uncompetitive ridings as strongholds. However, an uncompetitive riding may be safe (likely guaranteed) for one party. Thomas and Bodet (2013) address this logic by taking the terminology one step further. They term uncompetitive ridings as own party strongholds when it is in reference to the political organization that is all but guaranteed victory. Thomas and

Bodet define uncompetitive ridings that are not safe (guaranteed for a different party) as other party strongholds when in reference to the political organization that is all but guaranteed defeat. The stronghold, battleground, or other party strong distinction is adopted here for added precision of transmitting whether of riding is competitive or uncompetitive, and whether the uncompetitive classification means all but guaranteed victory or defeat for the party in question.

10 This simplistic view of competition is not always the reality. However, competition is fluid but election results are static. Determining a measurement of competition requires doing damage to reality, but damage is limited in the hopes of explaining political phenomena.

Bodet’s stronghold and battleground measurement uses past and present election results for measuring present levels of district competitiveness. Strongholds are electoral districts where (1) the winning party maintains its vote share from the previous election; (2) earns an equal to or greater than the candidate with the smallest margin of victory in any riding; (3) and, no other political party satisfies the first and second criteria in the district (Bodet

2013: 584). Battlegrounds are districts that do not satisfy these three criteria. Bodet (578) argues party support stability (votes won in the previous election) should be included in static measures of district competition because it captures district context in accessible ways.

Measuring relationships between campaign spending and campaign competitiveness risks producing circular causal theories: does campaign spending increase campaign competitiveness, or is campaign competitiveness the reason campaigns increase spending? A stronghold/battleground indicator reduces time-sequence error by incorporating previous election results into present measures of competition. Bodet’s measure introduces time series, resulting in an accessible and stable indicator for electoral competition.

Bodet’s measure remains imperfect, as do all measures of electoral competition.

Battleground ridings do not indicate which parties are competitive. Highly-competitive battleground ridings may be two party races between Liberals and Conservatives, Liberals and

New Democrats, or New Democrats and Conservatives. Or, battleground ridings may be multi- party races where three or more parties may win election. Identifying which party is competitive is a local nuance excluded by Bodet’s measure. Bodet’s measure also omits important district variables, such as incumbency, candidate type, and city/urban/rural, which may have greater (and possibly disproportionate) influence on competition. Finally, political

competition changes between elections. Including previous election results does not account for party support fluidity that may influence party strategy between election periods. District boundaries are also redrawn every decade, which alters the competitiveness of each riding.

Bodet’s measure is only applicable to analyzing elections in 2008 and 2011 because a decade of parliamentary instability produced several elections inside one single representation order.

Despite these measurement problems, Bodet produces a reliable and accessible measurement for district-level political competition that advances scientific investigation of constituency campaigns.

Money is the dependent variable that signifies the extent of party organization, campaign effort, or riding-level competition.11 Money in the form of fundraising and saving indicates the organizational development of the local party organization. High income indicates stronger local party organization than those with less and saving indicates organizational stability over time. Money can also be moved into ridings by other party components. Intra- party fund-transfers signify how each party perceives their own electoral prospects in that riding. Spending reveals how much effort is made campaigning. While spending itself does not measure the number volunteers or candidate quality, it does point to the extent of party organization, campaign effort, and riding-level competition when assessed in relation to income, savings, and intra-party fund-transfers. The financial characteristics for local party

11 Party financing has been used by Carty (1991), Carty and Eagles (2005), Flanagan (2008; 2014), Flanagan and Jansen (2009), Jansen and Young (2009), Coletto (2010), Coletto et al (2011), Coletto and Eagles (2011), and Carty and Young (2012) to identify party linkage strength between civil society and the state, intra-party relationships, voter mobilization, inter-election activity and enduring electoral support, party competition and election campaign vitality or vigour. The culmination of these seven characteristics produces appropriate, stable, and valid snapshots of political organization.

organizations in every constituency reflect an accurate portrait of parties and party systems in

Canada.

Monetary values are grouped into categories of fundraising, saving, intra-party fund- transfers, and campaign spending. Data grouping makes intra-party comparison possible and helps classify inter-party competition. Categories also allow for comparing groups containing similar financial characteristics that indicate the state of riding associations or constituency campaigns. Some detail is lost by grouping data because outliers are placed into categories that they may not properly fit; however, this is necessary for analyzing the population of riding associations and constituency campaigns. Provincial funding is displayed and compared using financing averages, calculated by dividing provincial sums by the number of provincial electoral districts. Important characteristics may not be identified using comparative means. For example, monetary averages can inflate or deflate local party financing when standard deviations are high within each province. Mean absolute deviations for each province, indicating intra-party financial discrepancies in each province, are included beneath provincial averages to reduce error from inflated or deflated means. The discussion about local party financing remains focused on averages, while the mean absolute deviations are included for the reader’s scrutiny.

Comparing real data and descriptive statistics is appropriate because this study is the first population analysis of political party financing at the constituency-level since 2007. Studies about local party organizations have not fully appraised the impacts that 2004/06 finance reforms have had on grassroots political parties or election campaigns. Coletto and Eagles

(2011: 127) acknowledge their study assessed riding associations during a transitional period immediately following the 2004 and 2006 reforms. Subsequent analysis is required to determine the extent of change in the party system.

Population data are used in this study. No inferential measures are presented here.

There is no need to generalize characteristics from a sample onto a larger group. Measures of association are included when presenting the relationship between riding-level competition and inter-association funding. Tau-C is used because competition is measured with ordinal variables and inter-association funding is measured with scale categories. Also, there are three categories of the independent variable and two categories of the dependent variable.

Population data are mainly presented by financial averages, which is acceptable for understanding the current composition of political parties and their competitive environment.

Local Party Fundraising

Riding associations maintain their day-to-day operations through fundraising income, but riding association fundraising is also the primary source of money that candidates may access to mount upcoming election campaigns. Election year fundraising also serves as an indirect measurement for support mobilization during election years.12 Election years are selected because political parties mobilize their support in these years more than any other

(Carty and Eagles 2004). Donations are made to the local apparatus of the federal party and are disclosed in Part 4 of the Elections Canada Registered Association Financial Reports:

“Association’s Financial Statements: Total Contributions.” Table 3.1 displays fundraising totals

12 Carty and Eagles (2004) use fundraising reports for political parties in Ontario as indicators for voter mobilization during election years. As they predict, fundraising peaks during election years when political parties mobilize their supporters and voters.

for the population of each political party’s electoral district associations. Conservative and

Liberal riding associations raised similar amounts of money during election years following changes to party finance law, implying both parties were able to mobilize their activists during election campaigns. This section demonstrates support mobilization correlated with election results (see Table 2.1) to an extent. The provinces where regional fundraising is inconsistent with regional vote share suggest non-local resources were a component of constituency campaigns.

Table 3.1: Election Year EDA Fundraising (N = 1,848) Year CPC LPC NDP 2008 $ 6,464,709.17 $ 6,379,049.17 $ 1,637,601.27 (308) (308) (308) 2011 $ 6,375,095.17 $ 5,993,196.28 $ 1,732,020.86 (308) (308) (308) Total $ 12,839,804.34 $ 12,372,245.45 $ 3,369,622.13

Local party branches remain important organizational components for extracting sizeable sums of money under new finance rules, as shown by sum total fundraising.13

Conservative and Liberal riding associations earned comparable incomes during both elections years. Conservative associations received 1.4% more income than Liberals did in 2008 and the income gap marginally grew to 6.0% in the following election year. Negligible election year income differences suggest Liberal organizations remained able to mobilize party activists during election years. The major parties similarity in income suggests Liberal Party grassroots organizations remained intact by election day, contrary to others claiming the Liberal party ground organization splintered following the Sponsorship Scandal (Carty 2015; Gidengil et. al

13 Coletto and Eagles (2011) make the same claim in their analysis for the period 2004 to 2007.

2012; Jeffrey 2010; Koop 2011). This data suggest the Liberal party remained competitive at the constituency-level, despite its superficial collapse after ballots were counted. Similarities between Conservative and Liberal Party field organization mean both share common election year characteristics. Other factors must therefore account for differences in the electoral success of the Conservative Party.

Local parties do not possess equal capacities for developing or sustaining grassroots organizations capable of fundraising. Riding styles – the local population, economic drivers, political culture, party corporate structure14 and the riding association’s openness to party outsiders – impact the local party’s supporter appeal in the electoral district. Riding style and association permeability intertwine with other institutional factors, mainly district competitiveness, incumbency, and single-member plurality electoral system, to produce local party organizations exhibiting their own unique characteristics (Sayers 1999: 35).

Categorizing income into ordinal groups allows for identifying the extent of grassroots organizational development within each political party (see Carty 1991 and Coletto and Eagles

2011). Local party fundraising is compartmentalized into poor, modest, high, and extraordinary income associations in Table 3.2. This study departs from Carty (1991) and Coletto and Eagles

(2011) by including extraordinarily high income associations receiving more than $50,000 in contributions. Adding high income associations as a measure of local party development improves our understanding by classifying associations uniquely situated to raise far more

14 Political party structure is the organizational model by which the political party operates across Canada. Party constitutions define the organizational model, which also signify corporate structure. For example, the NDP (2013) institutionalizes representation from traditionally under-represented populations by guaranteeing their inclusion to party committees and subcommittees. By contrast, the CPC (2013) has no such policy. They mostly incorporate geographical representation into their party committees, similar to the federal electoral system.

money than needed by their own local campaign. High and extraordinary income associations are likely situated in ridings very favourable to the organizational development of the local party. Consequently, high and extraordinary income associations may not need to use their vast wealth on electing their candidate. Categorizing local party fundraising allows for identifying the number of mature or immature local party branches within each established political organization.

Variation in the capacity for riding association fundraising are evidence that local party organizations are not uniform structures, but products of their respective electoral districts.

The number of riding associations in each category indicates each political party can thrive or languish, depending on the particular district in which the local branch is situated. The number of modest and high income Conservative associations shrank between 2008 and 2011, while the number of riding associations classified as poor and extraordinary increased. Similarly, the number of poor and high income Liberal party riding associations decreased between 2008 and

2011, while their modest and extraordinary income associations increased. The change over time means both established major parties maintained their ability to extract money at the local-level in more than half the electoral districts. However, there was an increase in the gap between local parties capable of raising money and those that were not. Fundraising data suggests major parties sustain local branches capable of mobilizing supporters in the majority of constituencies, but it is also clear the Liberals and Conservatives faced increasing challenges establishing a contestable presence in slightly less than half of the total districts between 2008 and 2011.

Table 3.2 : Electoral District Association Fundraising (Parenthesis = N)

CPC LPC NDP Range 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 $0-999.99 11.40% 18.50% 20.50% 17.50% 47.70% 45.10% (Poor) (35) (57) (63) (54) (147) (139) $1,000-9,999.99 34.41% 29.22% 24.10% 29.87% 36.03% 37.01% (Modest) (106) (90) (74) (92) (111) (114) $10,000-49,999.99 42.50% 38.60% 45.90% 41.60% 15.30% 16.20% (High) (131) (119) (141) (128) (47) (50) $50,000 < 11.70% 13.60% 9.40% 11.00% 1.00% 1.60% (Extraordinary) (36) (42) (29) (34) (3) (5) Total ($ millions) 6.46 6.37 6.37 5.99 1.63 1.73 (308) (308) (308) (308) (308) (308) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Registered Association Financial Reports, Association’s Financial Statements

The New Democratic Party remained a resilient and effective party but its income at the constituency-level suggests it is still a third party. Fundraising reports reinforce this claim as

NDP riding associations trailed in comparison to the Conservative and Liberal parties. Nearly eight in ten EDAs received less than $10,000 during both election years, and roughly 1 in 2 associations earned less $1,000. The large number of poor associations signifies that the NDP was not able mount credible constituency campaigns in most electoral districts. The figures for

NDP income are consistent with findings by Carty (1991: 79) and Coletto and Eagles (2011: 112), who also point out very high proportion of NDP riding associations only existed on paper.

Despite comparatively lower incomes, the NDP managed to win the second largest amount of seats in 2011 and more than half were located in Quebec. These local party organizations were successful in ridings where one might expect them to do poorly. This suggests non-local factors had a greater impact on the electoral success of the NDP, especially during the 2011 election.

Table 3.3: Local Party Fundraising Averages by Province ($) Year BC AB SK MB ON QB NB PEI NS NFLD Terr.

CPC08 32,233.84 28,232.38 19,009.85 17,342.19 25,334.30 11,941.95 12,317.73 11,230.50 10,974.42 8,387.92 25,413.48

(22,106.74) (28,389.61) (16,260.53) (13,137.24) (17,695.33) (12,250.89) (8,284.20) (11,085.75) (10,336.41) (10,396.90) (25,584.64)

CPC11 33,844.19 27,124.69 23,054.59 30,921.56 24,244.36 7,169.63 21,076.40 9,471.24 11,296.57 16,250.75 15,751.83

(24,891.13) (24,069.14) (16,741.84) (22,549.11) (18,535.02) (9,969.48) (16,894.86) (8,014.38) (6,480.80) (17,779.50) (11,592.11)

LPC08 16,461.68 5,257.21 15,588.70 9,753.64 31,561.88 16,782.12 31,174.49 21,519.49 15,635.20 10,198.54 13,005.33

(16,627.74) (5,312.32) (13,432.05) (11,424.46) (19,380.34) (20,481.92) (23,682.39) (5,326.26) (12,276.00) (8,114.41) (4,930.22)

LPC11 15,938.16 7,825.99 12,948.32 13,792.21 31,001.66 10,338.34 25,721.17 13,261.47 27,582.88 16,536.58 11,650.23

(13,673.26) (8,535.60) (14,712.48) (10,544.62) (19,284.66) (11,047.15) (18,748.16) (8,334.97) (20,453.07) (16,278.24) (7,766.82)

NDP08 14,074.28 3,585.43 13,916.83 5,262.62 5,866.78 815.24 912.00 909.46 4,542.82 241.00 4,861.67

(11,076.01) (4,747.03) (11,405.31) (4,402.37) (6,427.30) (924.51) (730.00) (649.46) (4,450.19) (330.00) (4,862.22)

NDP11 11,440.10 3,502.84 13,975.96 7,312.98 6,660.96 1,317.19 2,195.93 464.37 4,013.77 6,014.00 3,045.00

(7,534.25) (5,020.83) (9,900.36) (8,576.96) (8,143.75) (1,405.54) (1,597.93) (245.82) (2,746.63) (10,099.71) (2,030.00) Source: Elections Canada Registered Association Financial Reports for Yearly Fundraising Totals (Parentheses = Mean Absolute Deviation)

Beyond district-level factors, riding association income variation is also the product of regional forces (Carty 1991). Provincial fundraising data are essential for identifying where parties have strong or weak electoral support. Koop (2011) raises the important point that federal and provincial parties may share resources, especially when volunteer linkages exist between federal and provincial parties. It is reasonable to expect that in some cases the organizational work done by provincial party riding associations’ benefits the federal counterpart, such as providing a base of donors. Figures are calculated by dividing the provincial total of riding association fundraising by the total number of electoral districts in that province. For example, British Columbia has thirty six electoral districts; the Conservatives’

2008 EDA fundraising averages are calculated by taking the provincial total $1,160,418.07 and dividing it by 36, producing a comparable mean of $32,233.84. Mean absolute deviations for each province are also presented beneath the average to provide a measure for intra-party variation not captured by the average. The same calculation is performed for each party in each province and is presented in Table 3.3. Calculating provincial means produces comparable measures indicating typical spatial support for each party. Regional riding association incomes further demonstrate how party competition changes by province.

The two larger political parties have their own specific regions of organizational strength and weakness, while generating comparable incomes in central Canada. Conservative party riding associations significantly outperformed Liberal fundraising in the provinces west of

Ontario, while Liberals outdid Conservatives east of Manitoba. The highest contribution averages come from Western Canadians and went to Conservative riding associations.

Conservative associations typically received twice as much as Liberals in British Columbia and

Manitoba. In the province of Alberta, the income gap was five times more than contributions made to the Liberals. Party field organization income patterns resemble historical voting patterns. For instance the Conservatives and their legacy parties (Reform and PCs) have dominated Western Canada since Diefenbaker swept the Prairies in 1958 (Johnston 1992: 608).

Yet, it is reasonable to assume, given their long-term strength in the region, that they need not expend many resources maintaining their hold on the majority of electoral districts where much of their money was generated. The correlation between financial support and electoral support also holds true for the Liberal Party. The Liberals held government throughout the

1990s because of their hold on districts in Ontario and Atlantic Canada (Carty et. al 2000). The regional patterns reveal incentives major parties have for moving support from constituencies with strong ground organizations to those with weak ground organizations.

The third party studied, the NDP, also has ridings of strength but they are too few to make it possible to move support between constituencies. New Democratic Party EDAs reported their strongest support in British Columbia and Saskatchewan, although fundraising was typically poor in all provinces. Local parties only placed second for average fundraising in

Saskatchewan, where they edged past Liberals by slightly more than $1,000 in 2011. Provincial electorates in BC and Saskatchewan have voted in NDP provincial governments in the past, so comparatively higher fundraising was consistent with traditional support bases (Carty 1991).

Newfoundland riding associations substantially increased average fundraising between 2008 and 2011. New Democratic Party riding association income remained low across all provinces, but the party sustained two important financial support bases in Western Canada. The most surprising figure was their low average contributions in Quebec. NDP associations trailed

substantially behind the Liberals and Conservatives in Quebec. Poor NDP Quebec fundraising was noteworthy because the party elected fifty-nine candidates in this province during the 41st

General Election (see Table 2.1). The rise of the NDP in Quebec was not foreshadowed by their fundraising success in early periods, which shows that as with all measures, fundraising captures only part of the complex electoral effects unfolding on the ground.

Fundraising shows that inter-party competition between the Conservatives and Liberals remained high in 2008 and 2011. The apparent collapse of the Liberal Party in 2011 is questioned by the comparatively higher income earned in Ontario and Atlantic Canada.

Fundraising also shows the NDP electoral breakthrough was not built on a stable foundation.

The comparatively high number of “paper branches” indicates that the NDP had serious organizational challenges at the riding-level. This suggests non-local factors at the regional level contributed to campaign effort made at the local-level. Before examining how parties target campaign effort through intra-party fund-transfers, there must be an analysis of local party savings as an indirect measurement of activity between elections.

Local Party Savings

Accumulated savings across multiple electoral cycles are a broad measure of long-term

EDA strength and voter support. Savings capture a combination of inter-election year fundraising, net intra-party fund-transfers, and Elections Canada candidate rebates retained by the riding association.15 Savings are a more enduring measure of constituency-level party

15 The exact ratio is unknown because this money is returned directly to the candidate. They may retain a portion for themselves, send some directly to the central party, or send it entirely to their EDA. Future studies may calculate the returned portion by comparing the ratio of spending to the amount transferred from the candidate to the EDA after an election.

support because they incorporate inter-election year fundraising. Savings also identify associations with durable field organizations versus those that lack the capacity to generate money between elections. Local parties saving large quantities of money may begin campaigning well in advance of the pre-writ period at a time when candidates begin mobilizing activists and identifying supporters. Early campaigning means responding to pre-writ demands before they arise: this translates into hiring staff, renting campaign office space, hiring professional campaign services (such as polling companies or fundraisers), and printing advertising. These pre-writ preparations have the added benefit of being regulated or limited by election period expense limits. Local party savings expose substantively more information regarding the penetration of each political party into each electoral district across Canada.

This section establishes three important features about party organization and electoral competition under the new party finance regime. First, the Conservatives have distinguishably higher levels of saving that indicate substantive inter-election operations and enduring party support. Second, local party savings for all parties reflect the regional support patterns revealed by local party fundraising. The similarity between savings and fundraising suggests the regional influence on party organization transcends election law. Finally, all parties increase their savings over time, but this increase continues to reflect regional and local support patterns. The new party finance regime likely increases the amount of wealth held by local party organizations.

Local party savings are reported to Elections Canada (2013a) on the “Ending Balance =

Accumulated Surplus” line of the “Association’s Financial Statements” in the Registered

Associations Financial Returns. Ending balance figures from 2007 and 2010 are variables used

for measuring EDA vitality between elections. The years 2007 and 2010 are selected because they include money local parties had going into election years.16

Table 3.4: Electoral District Association Savings (N = 1,848) Year CPC LPC NDP 2007 $ 15,864,988.29 $ 6,882,788.38 $ 2,260,708.80 (308) (308) (308)

2010 $ 19,803,551.01 $ 9,347,366.90 $ 3,344,587.60 (308) (308) (308)

Total $ 35,668,539.30 $ 16,230,155.28 $ 5,605,296.40 Source: Elections Canada (2013) Registered Association Financial Reports

The disparity in levels of inter-election savings between the Conservative and Liberals is evident in Table 3.4. Inter-election savings differences indicate the Conservatives were more active, whether in fundraising or intra-party fund-transfers, between elections. Conservative riding associations entered both election years with ten million dollars more than the Liberals.

Conservatives would have $51,509.70 in foundational support for every district contest in 2008 and $64,297.24 in 2011 if savings were equally distributed between every electoral district association. On the other hand, the Liberals could only manage less than half of that:

$22,346.71 for 2008 and $30,348.59 for 2011. The NDP would not even muster $10,000 for each local campaign in 2008 and only slightly exceed that in 2011. Sustained engagement at the local-level is consistent with the permanent campaigning carried out by the central party during this period (see Flanagan 2013). The data also confirms the Conservative Party accumulated

16 Using figures for 2006 is inappropriate because that year had an election; using figures for 2009 is inappropriate because money was spent during 2010. Future studies may wish to include all annual financial inputs and outputs, such as spending items, fundraising, and transfers, as well as electoral district association spending (pre-election spending) for complete models.

greater wealth than other parties-in-the-constituency, marking a substantive contrast to election year fundraising and riding association vitality.

Local party savings are categorized by monetary groupings in a similar manner to fundraising categories; however, there is an additional category capturing indebted riding associations. Riding association savings are presented in these categories in Table 3.5.

Categories are consistent with data presented by Carty (1991) and Coletto and Eagles (2011) for maintaining comparability over time. Savings are grouped into five categories: indebted associations reporting deficits; poor associations reporting less than $1,000; modest associations reporting less than $10,000; high associations reporting less than $50,000; and extraordinary associations reporting more than $50,000. One new category is included here for identifying higher saving EDAs expected under the new party finance regime. The new category for associations accumulating more than $50,000 allows for appraising super-wealthy riding associations in each political party.

Conservatives held extraordinary amounts of cash between elections in the majority of their riding associations. In the lead up to the 2011 federal election, more than half of the

Conservative local party organizations held above $50,000. In contrast the Liberals had sixty- seven and the New Democrats had sixteen local parties holding this amount of money. Riding association savings suggest that Conservative EDAs had integrated themselves into their constituencies better than other political parties. One may expect high savings to be a product of party organization and incumbency. Conservatives had more incumbents and it is reasonable to assume the incumbency effect increased inter-election activities. The large amount of money

held in Conservative EDAs meant they had a significant pre-election advantage over other parties. Conservative constituency campaigns could afford to reserve office space, employ staff, or arrange advertising before the election was officially called.

Table 3.5: Electoral District Association Savings Entering an Election Year (N)

CPC LPC NDP

2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 < $0 2.90% 5.50% 10.40% 3.90% 11.00% 8.44% (Indebted) (9) (17) (32) (12) (34) (26) $0.01-999.99 2.90% 1.90% 4.20% 4.90% 23.70% 18.90% (Poor) (9) (6) (13) (15) (73) (58) $1,000-9,999.99 18.20% 11.00% 29.90% 26.00% 42.50% 44.30% (Modest) (56) (34) (92) (80) (131) (136) $10,000-49,999.99 33.40% 29.90% 43.20% 43.50% 21.10% 23.50% (High) (103) (92) (133) (134) (65) (72) $50,000 < 42.50% 51.60% 12.30% 21.80% 1.60% 5.20% (Extraordinary) (131) (159) (38) (67) (5) (16) Total 15.86 19.80 6.88 9.34 2.26 3.34 ($ millions) (308) (308) (308) (308) (308) (308) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Registered Association Financial Reports, Association’s Financial Statements

Liberal and NDP riding associations also held a significant amount of money, although there is considerably less for both parties than the Conservatives. More than half of the Liberal party riding associations started election years with more than $10,000. The same ratio was much lower for the NDP. About twenty percent of NDP riding associations held more than

$10,000. NDP saving was high enough to remain strategically competitive in more districts than they held prior to 2011. The increase of extraordinary saving EDAs between 2008 and 2011 suggests both the Liberals and New Democrats continued adapting local operations to new institutional realities. Party finance reform correlates with savings growth over time. The changes occurring within both opposition parties suggest they were adjusting to compete

under new regulations in these two election periods, just at a slower pace than the

Conservative Party. Compared to the Conservatives, the Liberals and the NDP had not optimized local party organization activity between elections.

Riding association financial inequality continues to resemble regional party support. The average savings accumulated by riding associations by each political party in each province are presented in Table 3.6. The same formula used for calculating provincial fundraising is applied to savings. Conservative riding associations accumulated more wealth west of Quebec. In

Western Canada, Conservative riding associations held enough money to mount highly- competitive constituency campaigns even though longstanding party support suggests

Conservative candidates did not require the same campaign effort to win. Liberal associations accumulated most wealth in Ontario, followed by those in Atlantic Canada. This is consistent with electoral patterns for Liberal party during the 1990s. NDP riding associations saved more money in Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Provincial savings variations indicate parties generate the most financial support in regions where they are already electorally successful.

Stronger organizations are more likely to emerge in ridings where the party has higher amounts of existing voter support.

Table 3.6: Local Party Savings Averages by Province ($) (N) Year BC AB SK MB ON QB NB PEI NS NFLD Terr.

CPC08 72,754.81 108,481.31 58,098.09 47,174.43 59,305.39 21,076.71 28,980.25 23,690.25 27,691.80 15,331.30 23,635.53

(36,383.65) (50,934.56) (15,727.13) (30,471.27) (34,557.01) (24,179.57) (16,836.97) (11,630.25) (11,874.53) (11,454.16) (17,393.72) (36) (28) (14) (14) (106) (75) (10) (4) (11) (7) (3) CPC11 87,441.14 134,390.81 80,107.87 81,011.85 73,085.54 22,894.42 36,125.00 59,120.12 32,357.62 12,189.11 44,638.10

(39,774.25) (59,721.08) (22,895.13) (42,738.09) (43,231.37) (23,431.98) (26,129.64) (13,955.58) (23,257.97) (12,418.32) (32,433.89) (36) (28) (14) (14) (106) (75) (10) (4) (11) (7) (3) LPC08 18,678.49 10,679.07 12,188.71 20,965.33 35,654.83 10,580.14 25,658.80 33,016.08 30,669.57 11,406.31 22,802.67

(18,070.35) (11,340.50) (9,793.35) (15,089.47) (22,240.37) (12,234.72) (27,390.93) (17,894.31) (20,155.65) (13,057.32) (16,611.65) (36) (28) (14) (14) (106) (75) (10) (4) (11) (7) (3) LPC11 18,340.95 15,449.53 16,671.53 24,877.03 47,551.80 18,129.26 27,938.62 55,201.66 43,051.71 27,293.19 35,942.25

(17,733.91) (15,094.33) (12,796.92) (21,813.64) (28,941.33) (18,457.60) (20,013.50) (24,765.26) (23,444.84) (13,671.94) (3,390.38) (36) (28) (14) (14) (106) (75) (10) (4) (11) (7) (3) NDP08 15,732.21 6,792.89 17,382.97 9,724.60 8,458.18 1,328.87 2,335.65 1,543.22 7,643.04 1,492.86 1,452.54

(15,540.81) (7,642.64) (10,935.03) (10,005.97) (8,085.79) (1,370.11) (1,462.23) (644.32) (4,877.10) (1,961.35) (2,755.60) (36) (28) (14) (14) (106) (75) (10) (4) (11) (7) (3) NDP11 22,116.81 7,985.27 27,923.55 14,597.33 12,871.48 1,569.20 3,052.24 1,798.28 14,060.24 4,494.61 7,865.20

(21,825.14) (8,437.66) (17,959.85) (13,064.37) (11,874.92) (1,369.61) (2,045.71) (1,049.57) (10,144.13) (5,040.36) (5,243.47) (36) (28) (14) (14) (106) (75) (10) (4) (11) (7) (3) Source: Elections Canada Registered Association Financial Reports for prior year End Balance (Parentheses = Mean Absolute Deviation)

The resources available to local party organizations are dependent on riding features, such as the presence of a competent activist network, quality candidate or incumbent, whether the riding is an urban/suburban/rural districts, the structure of the economy, and the affluence of voters. These factors determine the amount of party support in the constituency and the level of inter-party competition. Even though Conservatives were more likely to have more resources than other parties, local party organizations in western provinces had more support than any other region. Conservative campaign teams in Western Canada likely faced the weakest challengers because other parties were unable to fundraise or save in advance of the election. Liberal teams were strongest in Ontario and Atlantic Canada. However, the Liberals faced well-resourced challengers in districts of where they had higher support, while the

Conservatives faced weaker challengers in already highly supportive western ridings. New

Democrats faced higher obstacles because party support remained low throughout the electoral system. They increased savings in every province during the period of analysis, but not enough to accumulate the most money anywhere in Canada. District-level savings strongly indicate that each political party has differing capacity to organize at the constituency-level.

The distribution of party savings hints that electoral success bolsters organizational strength for many local party organizations, but is not necessary for creating highly competent activist networks. Inter-election activity and support as measured by riding association savings is unequal for the Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats. The Conservative party had a competitive advantage over the opposition parties in its developed ability to accumulate extraordinarily large quantities of money between election periods at the riding-level. The

Conservatives out-saved the Liberals by a ratio of 2:1 and the NDP by a ratio of 6:1 under the

party finance regime. While all three parties benefitted from savings growth over time, the

Liberals and the NDP could not match the Conservatives financial capacity to ramp up grassroots operations during pre-election periods. The regional distribution of riding association saving reflect areas of traditional party support that might be expected from an indirect measure of party support durability. The distribution of party savings reveal an additional layer of inter-party competition because variation to accumulated wealth demonstrates previous party support enjoyed by one, two, or multiple parties in a given province. The next section reveals inter-association fund-transfers between local party organizations.

Intra-Party Funding and the Importance of Inter-Association Fund-Transfers in the Conservative Party of Canada

Intra-party funding has been used for measuring the amount of separation between local and central party organizations (for example, Coletto et. al 2011). The level of independence enjoyed by local party organizations can be measured by examining the funding received from the central party office. Rather than relying solely on non-local campaign resources from the central party office, Conservative local party organizations exchanged sizeable sums of money. Conservative local party organizations exchanged roughly one million dollars in 2008 and two million dollars in 2011. This accounts for half of the intra-party funding in the Conservative Party of Canada. Recent works (Carty and Young 2012; Coletto and Eagles

2011; Jansen and Young 2013; Koop 2011) make no mention of inter-association fund-transfers, while past work (Carty 1991: 212) identifies inconsequential amounts. It is reasonable to claim that local party collaboration through inter-association funding is a drastic departure from previous parties and party systems.

Local party organizations were assumed to be solely concerned with riding specific campaign operations. This is contradicted by transfers of money by local party organizations between ridings. The term used here to describe transfers is inter-association funding. Inter- association funding is a distinct feature of the Conservative Party of Canada. Two hypotheses are tested in this section to demonstrate inter-association funding is a component of riding- level electoral competitiveness. The first hypothesis tests whether associations in highly supportive safe ridings are more likely to send money. The second hypothesis tests whether associations in highly competitive unsafe ridings are more likely to receive money. Results determine which cases are explored in Chapter 4 to reveal additional factors influencing local party collaboration.

Inter-association fund-transfers are money transfers sent or received from one local party organization to another. Inter-association funding is a distinct feature of the Conservative

Party of Canada. It demonstrates the important contribution parties-in-the-constituency make beyond riding boundaries. The ratio between central-to-local funding and inter-association funding reinforces this point. Table 3.7 presents the ratio of money sent to local campaigns by the central party office against the amount exchanged by local party organizations.

Conservative local party organizations depended on inter-association funding as much as central party funding in 2008 and 2011. Alternatively, the Liberal Party and New Democratic

Party depended disproportionately on the central party office to supplement local campaigns.

The ratio reveals that the cadre-mass party distinction has a somewhat enduring effect in the Canadian case. The Conservatives were closest to the cadre side of the spectrum, even

though the Reform Party was identified as holding mass party characteristics. The new

Conservative Party has a lower level of association between local organizations and the central party which are consistent with Reforms ideological predisposition for local autonomy. This reveals a new balance for managing long-time activists within a disciplined campaign machine.

The Liberal Party has a higher level of association between local associations and the central organization. This too is consistent with the Liberals lower preference for grassroots autonomy over national competitiveness. The NDP were on the mass party side, as their organization historically preferred long-time activists over new comers. The ratio between centrally sourced resources and locally sourced resources suggests that local party organizations had an elevated role in Conservative Party campaigns.

Table 3.7: Central vs. Local Intra-Party Fund-transfer Ratio CPC Ratio LPC Ratio NDP Ratio 2008 1.4954 5.1724 20.2010 2011 0.9434 22.5116 59.1648 Source: Elections Canada (2013) Registered Associations Financial Reports, Statement of Transfers Received and Statement of Transfers to Another Registered Association

Riding associations are the party component where transfers take place, but given that local campaign organizations and candidates are likely the beneficiaries of these transfers they are a structural component of the local party organization. From here on the distinction between riding association and campaign team is unimportant for the analysis. Both local components are treated as one entity, the local party organization. The Conservative Party of

Canada had substantially larger fund-transfers taking place between local party organizations.

Table 3.8 presents total transfers for all parties during both elections. Conservative organizations transferred slightly less than $790,000 more than the Liberals in 2008. This

increased to $1,960,000 in 2011. The real number of local party organizations did not increase dramatically, yet the magnitude of inter-association fund-transfers – the sum total transferred between all local party organizations – doubled in the Conservative party from 2008 to 2011.

Conservative inter-association fund-transfers rose from $1,000,000 in 2008 to $2,000,000 in

2011, while Liberal transfers dramatically declined from $325,000 to $38,400 and NDP transfers remained around $20,000.17 Inter-association transfers are substantially different between the three parties. This suggests collaboration between local party organizations is an organizational feature unique to the Conservative Party of Canada.

Furthermore, the ratio between well-resourced local party organizations that sent money and those that did not suggests local activists determined whether they wished to collaborate with other campaigns. Recall from Table 3.5 that the Conservatives had 131 associations with more than $50,000 in savings in 2008 and 159 in 2011. However, of the associations with more than $90,000 in savings (58 in 2008 and 91 in 2011), only 25 sent more than $10,000 in 2008 and only 38 sent more $10,000 in 2011. It is reasonable to assume that an association with more than $90,000 at its disposal has more than enough money to maximize campaign spending in their district. It is also reasonable to set transfers above $10,000 as the dividing line between inter-association funding meant to impact other local campaigns against those that were not. Less than half of Conservative local party organizations with an extreme overage of resources collaborated with other campaign teams. This suggests the Conservative

17 There is a discrepancy between the gross amount of money sent and the gross amount of money received within each party during each election year. These figures were calculated using the sent column.

central party did not force highly competent local party organization to move local resources into other districts.

The financial movement between local party organizations suggests money generated by highly competent activist networks moved into networks that were less competent. Table

3.9 displays the inter-association funding provincial inflow and outflow totals, as well as the number of participating local party organizations. The Conservative Party had amassed a great deal of wealth in its local party organizations, but the amount of campaign effort needed to enhance electoral competitiveness varies between districts. Local party organizations may transfer money left over from campaign budgets to others requiring more campaign effort. The situation in Alberta raises this point. Alberta is the only province where the total amount of inter-association fund-transfers resulted in a net outflow of money. That is, the total amount of funding sent from every Conservative association in Alberta is more than the total amount received. Alberta is also the province where the Conservative Party had the largest overage of votes during the 2008 and 2011 federal elections (see Table 2.1).

Table 3.8: Inter-association Fund-Transfers (Parentheses = N cases where transfers > $0.01) CPC LPC NDP Year Received Sent Received Sent Received Sent 2008 $1,050,218.93 $1,113,523.46 $197,347.74 $325,083.21 $19,798.76 $7,100.00 (95) (88) (52) (32) (18) (8) 2011 $1,990,364.14 $1,998,206.13 $39,611.29 $38,399.18 $17,475.47 $22,158.00 (95) (106) (31) (17) (6) (23) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Registered Associations Financial Reports, Statement of Transfers Received and Statement of Transfers to Another Registered Association

Table 3.9: Conservative Party of Canada Riding Association Fund-Transfers (Parentheses = N reporting transfers > $0.01) Year BC AB SK MB ON QB NB PEI NS NFLD Terr. Inflow 212,346.00 83,165.53 98,922.75 89,728.46 143,709.82 182,674.01 12,924.20 19,000.00 15,112.34 97,135.82 45,500.00 Totals (13) (9) (3) (6) (21) (29) (2) (2) (4) (4) (2) Outflow 175,723.70 646,740.00 51,074.50 43,000.00 102,550.41 67,549.78 4,873.44 3,130.55 745.26 9,135.82 9,000.00 2008 Totals (18) (18) (7) (4) (16) (15) (4) (2) (2) (1) (1) Net 36,622.30 -563,574.47 47,848.25 46,728.46 41,159.41 115,124.23 8,050.76 15,869.45 14,367.08 88,000.00 36,500.00 Inflow Inflow 365,177.20 147,530.00 114,632.57 162,090.00 576,200.00 101,316.11 49,800.00 27,500.00 202,384.69 180,000.00 63,733.57 Totals (13) (10) (6) (8) (27) (12) (4) (2) (5) (6) (2) Outflow 341,760.00 761,177.22 61,921.94 168,857.18 404,360.25 148,859.55 9,800.00 15,500.00 50,969.99 25,000.00 10,000.00 2011 Totals (18) (17) (9) (8) (32) (10) (2) (2) (4) (3) (1) Net 23,417.20 -613,647.22 52,710.63 -6,767.18 171,839.75 -47,543.44 40,000.00 12,000.00 151,414.70 155,000.00 53,733.57 Inflow Source: Elections Canada (2013) Registered Associations Financial Reports, Statement of Transfers Received and Statement of Transfers to Another Registered Association

Inter-association funding outflows from Conservatives in Alberta suggest that riding associations capable of producing excessive amounts of campaign resources supplement those that do not. Local party organizations in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba also reported considerable inter-association fund-transfers. Averages poorly reflect underlying reality because less than one third of all 308 Conservative Party organizations employed inter- association funding. A measurement of net contributions going to each province is calculated by subtracting total money sent from the total money received. This indicates which provinces and the number of districts in that province were perceived as competitive by Conservative

Party strategists prior to the federal election. It is consistent with other studies to assume inter- association fund-transfers were sent from CPC local party organizations in safe constituencies and received by those in highly-competitive constituencies.18 The Conservative Party is the focus of analysis for this section because their riding association network integration is demonstrably established compared to other established parties and is sizeable enough to have discernible impacts on federal elections.19

Two hypotheses about inter-association fund-transfers are tested using Bodet’s (2013) measure of district competitiveness. The provincial distribution of Conservative Party riding association fundraising, saving, and fund-transfers point to relationships between district competition and resource inputs consistent with previous studies (for example, Carty 1991;

Carty and Eagles 2005; Coletto and Eagles 2011). Local party organizations that generate higher

18 Carty and Eagles (2005) and Coletto and Eagles (2011) employ the same causal model for central-local fund- transfer before 2007. 19 Readers should be aware that some Liberal EDAs may share their wealth. The Liberal Party Electoral District Association of Chamblay-Borduas (2008) collaborated with other campaigns in 2008. However, collaboration was not repeated in 2011. The size and magnitude Liberal Party inter-association fund-transfers are too small to make it an organizational component of the party between 2007 and 2011.

financial resources are more likely comprised of activists that are very competent at prosecuting successful campaigns (for example, Carty 1991). The competency of these organizations is also reflected by the quality of their candidate and the higher percentage of votes raised in their given district. Local party branches in stronghold ridings are thought to expend fewer resources electing their candidates because district competition is comparably lower (for example, Carty and Eagles 2005; Carty and Young 2012).

Alternatively, local organizations that generate fewer resources are less likely to have a very competent activist team. This is results in selecting lower quality candidates and fewer votes on election day. Campaigns in competitive ridings escalate their operations (compared to those operating in uncompetitive districts) in order to increase persuasion, supporter identification, and voter turnout in the riding. The expectation for narrow margins between the winning candidate and second place candidate create an incentive for increasing campaign effort (for example, Sayers 1999; Cross and Young 2011). However, local party organizations in these competitive ridings may be unable to generate enough resources in the district to ramp up campaign effort. Non-local resources move into the riding as a result (Carty and Eagles 2005,

Chapter 5). The Conservative Party may be moving resources in the field to enable local parties in highly-competitive ridings to increase campaign effort.

H1: Conservative organizations in stronghold ridings are more likely to transfer funds to other local associations than those in battleground ridings or other party stronghold ridings.

Inter-association funding is more than a strategic calculation for moving financial resources from highly supportive and safe ridings to highly-competitive and unsafe ridings.

Riding associations in every competitive category sent money to other constituencies in 2008

and 2011. Conservative organizations in stronghold districts account for over half the local party branches distributing financial resources in 2008 and 2011. Of those sending more than

$10,000, organizations in stronghold districts were most likely to collaborate with others in

2008 but not 2011. This reveals plausible support for the hypothesis that transfers are tied to riding competitiveness; however, other factors likely also determine which local teams send money.

Table 3.10: Conservative Associations Giving Inter-association Transfers by Riding Competition (N) Transfer Other Party Year Battleground CPC Stronghold Total Range ($) Stronghold 0 - 9,999.99 88.00% 78.60% 49.00% 64.80% (22) (11) (24) (57) 10,000 < 12.00% 21.40% 51.00% 35.20% 2008 (3) (3) (25) (31) Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% (25) (14) (49) (88) 0 - 9,999.99 61.50% 32.00% 32.70% 39.60% (16) (8) (18) (42) 10,000 < 38.50% 68.00% 67.30% 60.40% 2011 (10) (17) (37) (64) Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% (26) (25) (55) (106) 2008 - Tau C = 0.369 2011 - Tau C = 0.211

Conservative local party organizations located in other party strongholds and battleground ridings sent transfers that were over $10,000, especially in 2011. One possible explanation for the sizeable number of Conservative organizations in uncompetitive ridings transferring money to others is they already had enough money to reach district spending limits. Money has two obvious uses: spending in the home riding during subsequent elections,

or deposit them in another riding where they might help elect another Conservative. The latter use may be chosen by activists located in uncompetitive unsafe ridings. Another possible explanation may be that inter-association fund-transfers may be capital flight in instances where local party organizations moved money out of uncompetitive and unsafe districts.

Hopeless campaigns may have unloaded their money into more competitive races.

The same cannot be concluded about inter-association outflow transfers from local party organizations in highly competitive and unsafe districts. It is counter-intuitive move money out of organizations in highly competitive districts. This is why it is peculiar to observe the highest percentage of 2011 outflows above $10,000 originating in battleground ridings.

Money may be going back to initial lending associations after the election or money may be moving for other considerations that will be explored in Chapter 4. The strong measures of association between competition and outflows provide more certainty that a pattern exists between riding competitiveness and outflow transfers, even if the pattern is not the hypothesized relationship.

H2: Conservative associations in battleground ridings are more likely to receive funds than riding associations in less competitive stronghold districts.

The relationship between district competitions of inter-association funding is more complicated for local party organizations receiving money. The most common transfers were made to highly-competitive battleground ridings in 2011. More than half of the Conservative associations receiving funding were located in battleground ridings. This is consistent with the hypothesis. Yet, local party organizations in uncompetitive ridings also received outside assistance. During both elections, at least one third of the associations receiving more than

$10,000 were situated in uncompetitive districts. Local party organizations located in other party strongholds accounted for two thirds of the deposits made in 2011. The weaker relationship between district competition and inter-association funding indicates that more factors influence funding deposits.

Table 3.11: Conservative Associations Receiving Inter-association Transfers by Riding Competition (N) Transfer Other Party Year Battleground CPC Stronghold Total Range ($) Stronghold 0 - 9,999.99 64.70% 47.80% 71.40% 62.10% (33) (11) (15) (59) 10,000 < 35.30% 52.20% 28.60% 37.90% 2008 (18) (12) (6) (36) Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% (51) (23) (21) (95) 0 - 9,999.99 34.50% 31.60% 46.40% 36.80% (10) (12) (13) (35) 10,000 < 65.50% 68.40% 53.60% 63.20% 2011 (19) (26) (15) (60) Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% (29) (38) (28) (95) 2008 - Tau C = 0.005 2011 - Tau C = -0.099

The transfer of resources into uncompetitive districts may have occurred for a number of reasons. One possible explanation is that the fluidity of competitiveness limits the predictive power of party strategists. Rather than depositing large amounts of resources in few ridings, it is more advantageous to deposit smaller amounts of resources in many ridings. This tactic mitigates some risk from the fluidity of competition. Transferring surplus money to campaign teams in other ridings allows different campaigns to increase their campaign spending.

Increasing spending in other ridings also increases the total reimbursement paid by Elections

Canada, which has the added effect of improving the starting point for future campaigns.

Another explanation is that inter-association transfers are a component of locally made decisions. The variability between riding-level competition and inflow funding indicates that some inter-association resource movement is not centrally controlled, but locally initiated. The local dimension may explain the weaker measure of association between competition and receiving organizations when compared to the stronger measure of association between district competitiveness and giving organizations.

The relationship between competition and inter-association transfers is more complicated than hypothesized. There is a stronger relationship between district competition and inter-association outflows than district competitive and inter-association inflows. District competitiveness is more likely associated with giving associations than it is with receiving associations. Inter-association transfers may be locally initiated, given that there does not appear to be an overarching strategy. But at the same time, inter-association funding appears to be the product of something beyond any single district because it is a specific trait of the

Conservative Party. If inter-associations transfers were fully initiated locally, we might expect to observe more instances of it in other cadre-style parties, like the Liberal Party.

The Conservatives uniquely adapted to the new institutional framework and guided electoral behaviour by making surplus money held in local party organizations available to those in other districts. Money may leave or enter ridings for reasons beyond targeting campaign effort. Recall the case of Jason Kenney and the Calgary Southeast Conservative local party organization. Kenney was a high quality candidate who had an extra-ordinarily large

campaign war chest in a very supportive riding. This allowed the Calgary Southeast

Conservative EDA to send nearly $100,000 to sixteen other campaigns in British Columbia,

Ontario, Quebec, and Nova Scotia. While money may have flowed into competitive districts, it is possible that Kenney sent money for personal reasons that did not relate to the election at hand. Case studies may offer addition insights are to why local party organizations share their wealth and will be analyzed in the next chapter. The next section of this chapter concludes the discussion about accumulated party financing by investigating the consumption of campaign effort through candidate spending.

Constituency Campaigning in 2008 and 2011

Campaign spending is one measure of the level of effort made in an electoral district.20

Money can be spent at any point in time, but it is during official election periods that campaign spending is monitored, restricted, and reimbursable. Campaign spending measures the level of effort made in the electoral district. Higher spending signifies more voter contact, persuasion, and mobilization activities.21 Spending is a useful means of identifying the campaign effort at the riding-level. Transferring money to a local EDA may allow a local campaign to spend more on these activities and improve its chances of maximizing its vote share. This section examines how local campaigns spend against district specific limits in order to better understand resource accumulation and dispersion in the Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic parties.

20 Riding associations also spend money outside elections, perhaps more now than before party finance reforms because of increased electoral instability (see Coletto and Eagles 2011). Others may wish to incorporate pre-writ local party spending (riding association expense) into future models to assess permanent campaigning at the riding-level. 21 See Sayers (1999, Chapter 5) for a more detailed account. Constituency campaigns can be more labour intensive than cost intensive. Candidate quality and electoral competitiveness may render campaign more reliant on volunteers for the local campaign.

This section makes four important observations about parties and the party system in

2008 and 2011. First, the Conservative Party of Canada spent considerably more money – at minimum six million dollars more – campaigning in electoral districts than the Liberals or NDP.

Second, the total amount spent by Conservative candidates remained static between election periods while Liberal and NDP campaign spending marginally increased in 2011. Third, the regional penetration of each party affects the amount of campaign effort made in each province. Fourth, inter-association transfers helped the Conservatives maintain the lowest variability in candidate spending among the three major parties. This may have helped the

Conservative Party build the most efficient set of local campaign organizations, and through, this, the most effective overall campaign. As the financial data show, on average Conservative campaign teams had so much money to spend that they could afford to fund increased campaign effort in most ridings.

The Conservatives were able to greatly outspend their opponents during the 2008 and

2011 federal elections. Table 3.12 displays total district campaign spending and the sum total of available funding to local party organizations.22 Conservative campaign teams had access to much more money than other parties, which allowed them to increase campaign effort in the form of capital intense campaigning. Conservative campaign teams spent six million dollars more than the Liberal Party in 2008 and five million more in 2011. Even though Liberal Party and New Democratic Party candidates had less money to spend campaigning, the gross amount of their constituency spending increased in 2011 while Conservative spending remained the

22 This table also includes the sum total of all financial resources held in local party branches for the upcoming election and the ratio of total constituency campaign spending to total available funding.

same. Liberal Party local campaigns increased spending by roughly $2,000,000 and NDP spending increased by about $350,000. Although the Conservatives were already spending as much as the Liberals and NDP combined, they did so without depleting financial resource held at the local-level.

Although they easily outspent their opponents, Conservative EDAs finished the 2011 election with a third of their funds still intact. About ten million dollars went unspent by

Conservative local party organizations in both 2008 and 2011. The ratio of money spent within the party is noteworthy because election periods are when a portion of spending is reimbursed by Elections Canada. This suggests that riding campaign spending is a function of local activists matching spending to district circumstances. As a result of less total funding, Liberals and NDP campaign teams consumed a larger portion of the total amount of money held at the riding- level.

Table 3.12: Constituency Campaign Spending Totals by Party and Election Year 2008 2011

CPC Total Spending $ 19,700,937.15 $ 19,601,259.88 CPC Available Funding $ 29,963,712.40 $ 32,801,440.93 Consumption Ratio 0.6574 0.5975 LPC Total Spending $ 13,538,929.90 $ 14,756,048.62 LPC Available Funding $ 16,693,230.19 $ 18,828,723.92 Consumption Ratio 0.8110 0.7836 NDP Total Spending $ 6,949,212.91 $ 7,308,786.95 NDP Available Funding $ 6,688,839.75 $ 8,370,578.76 Consumption Ratio 1.0389 0.8731 Elections Canada District Expense Limit $ 27,133,913.25 $ 28,244,498.50 Total Source: Elections Canada (2013) Candidate’s Electoral Campaign Return “Election Expenses Grand Total” (Parenthesis = Universe of local party funding; sum total of EDA fundraising, saving, net inflow from central party, and candidate fundraising)

The ability of local party organizations to develop in each riding has a direct impact on campaign effort. Table 3.13 displays the provincial distributions of campaign spending against district expense limits. The provincial distribution of local campaign spending averages reveals parties made the most effort campaigning in regions where at least two parties had better developed local party organizations. The most intense campaigning occurred in British

Columbia, Ontario, and Atlantic Canada. All parties spent on average a higher proportion of the district expense limit in these three regions. These regions stand out because they were not dominated by any single party. All parties have had access to financial resources, which allowed them to increase campaign activities. Local competitiveness drives spending.

Spending gaps widened in provinces that were dominated by only one federal party.

This held particularly true in the Prairies. Conservatives candidates nearly double the average spending of Liberal and NDP teams in the Prairie Provinces. This is consistent with the

Conservative Party advantage over fundraising and saving in the Prairies. Party support (in the form of votes, income, and saving) predominately went to Conservative local party organizations in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. When combined with the historical party support for conservative parties that extend back to the 1950s, the Conservative Party of

Canada benefitted from an overage of electoral and financial resources that enabled comparably lower campaign effort in Alberta than in other provinces.

Table 3.13: The Ratio of Campaign Spending against District Expense Limit by Party and Province Year BC AB SK MB ON QB NB PEI NS NFLD Terr. CPC 08 0.7825 0.6924 0.7725 0.6623 0.7799 0.6443 0.8135 0.7042 0.6534 0.6129 0.8561 CPC 11 0.8394 0.6093 0.7708 0.7123 0.8034 0.4454 0.7536 0.8348 0.7676 0.7850 0.8974 LPC08 0.4874 0.2583 0.3543 0.4511 0.7114 0.3235 0.5464 0.7280 0.5480 0.5141 0.6046 LPC 11 0.4832 0.2425 0.3265 0.4872 0.7302 0.3696 0.5504 0.6599 0.6885 0.5612 0.8032 NDP 08 0.4484 0.1188 0.3707 0.3268 0.3065 0.1097 0.1648 0.0527 0.5102 0.2141 0.2929 NDP 11 0.4669 0.1292 0.5175 0.3380 0.2868 0.1056 0.1789 0.1806 0.4438 0.2819 0.3450 Source: Elections Canada Candidate’s Expense Reports “Election Expenses Grand Total” and District Expense Limits

District-level campaign spending also reveals that increasing campaign effort in other party strongholds may be one way to force opponents unnecessarily escalate their own campaign. Table 3.14 displays the average ratio of local spending to the district expense limit and the level of competition in the riding. The relationship between candidate campaign spending and district-level competition reveals three important features of Conservative Party local campaigns. First, the Conservative party has a flatter distribution of campaign effort throughout the electoral system. Unlike the Liberal and NDP campaign teams, whose average constituency spending ranged from lows of eighteen percent to highs of eighty percent of the expense limit, Conservative campaign teams typically spent between lows of fifty-eight and highs of seventy-nine percent the district limit. The distribution of campaign spending by district competition shows on average the Conservatives spent their more money in electoral districts where they were uncompetitive.

Second, Conservative candidates in highly-competitive districts typically spent a higher portion of the district expense limit than opposing candidates. This is evident in the higher average spending ratio for all districts (Table 3.14). Increasing campaign effort in competitive districts is more likely to result in district wins because marginal changes in voter support can have a significant impact on election results (Coletto 2010). Spending more than an opponent does not directly translate into victory; yet, spending more does increase the amount of advertising, voter identification, and getting out the vote activity. Higher spending does not guarantee victory, but it may be decisive when the contest is won by very few votes. The

Conservatives were able to increase their electoral prospects in highly-competitive districts by spending comparatively higher portions of the district expense limit.

Table 3.14: Ratio of Average Constituency Campaign Spending Against District Expense Limit Compared to District Competitiveness (N) Other Party Stronghold Battleground Own Stronghold (Uncompetitive, Unsafe) (Competitive, Unsafe) (Uncompetitive, Safe) CPC08 0.6807 0.7900 0.7445 (136) (66) (106) CPC11 0.5857 0.7090 0.7646 (90) (95) (123) LPC08 0.3725 0.6577 0.7007 (175) (66) (67) LPC11 0.4478 0.5742 0.7461 (170) (95) (43) NDP08 0.4538 0.2932 0.8044 (215) (66) (27) NDP11 0.1839 0.2653 0.7849 (185) (95) (28) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Candidate’s Electoral Campaign Return “Election Expenses Grand Total;” “Permitted Limit of Election Expenses;” and Bodet’s (2013) data-set provided by the author

Finally, Conservative candidates made a higher campaign effort attacking other party strongholds that might have prevented other parties from moving overages of support.

Opposition candidates expended more campaign effort to hold safe seats for the party. For instance, NDP candidates spent on average the most money campaigning in their own safe districts. Local party organizations with excess resources would be less likely to share financial resources with other NDP local party organizations because they faced stronger challengers in their district. The Conservative Party of Canada was capable of taking the fight to their opponents, requiring their opponents to campaign more to holding on to seats that were already safely held.

Discussion

The modern party finance regime put in place a set of rules that afford local party organizations more opportunities to influence national election contests. The 2004 and 2006

changes to election law reduced funding inputs available to local party organizations by banning corporate and union contributions, but did not restrict intra-party transfers. The money lost from the private sector was to an extent replaced with state funding; however, the regime did not directly pay this replacement to local parties. In a system where financial resources are limited to small donations made by individuals and state subsidies (mostly expense reimbursements), and where local party organizations cannot hide their true wealth, central parties can encourage parties-in-the-consistency to share their support with other ridings. The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates disequilibrium between ridings where resources are accumulated and where resources are consumed. In the case of the

Conservative Party, local party organizations that could not generate enough support within their own riding received help from other organizations across the country.

Inter-association funding is combination of directives from central party offices and initiatives from local party organizations. The Hill Times (2015) article exposes the central party calling on local organizations to make inter-association transfers. At the same time, inter-association funding patterns reflect local decision making, since no overarching pattern emerges from aggregate data. The hypotheses tested in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show that money is not just redistributed between uncompetitive and competitive ridings. It is plausible that inter-association funding can be locally initiated or locally controlled after observing stronger measures of association between riding competition and local party organizations giving money than competition and those receiving money. When combined with the fact that less than half of the extremely well-resourced Conservative organizations collaborated with others, inter-association transfers are also likely to come from personal calls for aid from one

activist to another or relationships between one candidate and another. The next chapter analyzes “most similar cases” to determine additional factors influencing inter-association collaboration, as well as why only Conservative local party organizations utilized it.

Local party organizations remain vital components of political parties under the modern party finance regime. The enduring variability of votes challenges Canadian political parties to balance local responsiveness (or sensitivity to district characteristics) with central control of local campaigns. The Conservatives and the Liberals exhibited greater sensitivity to local dimensions as observed by local fundraising and central vs. local intra-party transfers.

Both parties also had higher numbers of highly competent activist networks that were more likely to carry out the duties necessary for electing their candidate. In a sense these local organizations acted as shock absorbers to volatility in the electoral system. The Conservatives were most likely predisposed to having the loosest organizational linkages between the local and the central because of their Reform Party heritage. Alternatively, parties with fewer highly competent activist networks produce unbalanced party organizations. Election results vary greatly between districts in these parties. The NDP had a more unbalanced network of local party organizations across Canada which helped produce their disproportionate electoral success in 2011. The ability for parties to develop loose organizational linkages between party components remains valuable for winning national campaigns.

Chapter 4 Local Party Collaboration: Candidate Quality, Electoral Predictability, and Inter-association Funding

“The style and content of a local campaign have their genesis in the riding community (or style) and partisan organizational ethos of the association.”

– Anthony Sayers (1999: 133)

Collaboration between local party organizations derives from electoral predictability in the riding and the affluence of riding associations and campaign teams. Regulatory limitations impose resource scarcity on parties in the constituency. The modern party finance regime

(Accountability Act 2006) eliminated corporations and unions as lawful contributors to riding associations and candidates. This limits where parties can generate election resources.

However, election law (Bill C-24 2003) implemented in 2004 allows for unlimited resource transfers within political parties. Once money is deposited into the party, it can flow freely between each legal entity: the central party office, riding associations, and candidates (Bill C-

24, 2004 Section 404.2(2)).

Mature local party organizations are not burdened with the same amount of resource scarcity facing developing local party organizations. The amount of resources mature organizations generate likely exceeds what is necessary to campaign. Mature local party organizations have an overage of money. This indicates they likely have a very competent network of activists that can also recruit higher quality candidates and volunteers needed to prosecute the constituency campaign. Mature local party organizations can afford to reduce their campaign effort and even potentially compromise their vote share without altering election outcomes. This results in the election of their party candidate in very supportive ridings or the election of another party candidate that was previously expected in less supportive ridings. The combination of electoral predictability and affluence enables mature local party organizations to collaborate with others.

As the cases presented in this chapter reveal, local party collaboration occurs for a variety of other reasons that derive from riding-level features of local party organizations. It is easy to imagine that the central party can determine which ridings are competitive based on previous election results but require additional resources to maximize campaign effort during the next election. Improving the electoral competitiveness of these under-resourced local campaigns through inter-association transfers helps win more seats, but it also enhances the intra-party prominence of high quality politicians sending money.

Local teams with an abundance of resources may be asked by the central party to aid other local party organizations with money. The mature local party organization ultimately determines whether they make inter-association funding transfers, given that less than half of the organizations capable of collaborating actually help other campaigns. It follows that the decision-making authority that rests at the riding-level allows mature organizations to pick and choose who receives money. The calculation made by local teams may factor in whether the fund-transfer will earn favours from central party leadership, improve their own competitiveness, whether it will elect other candidates who share their vision for the party, or simply enhance the prospects of electing the party to government. Inter-association funding, like organizational features of local party organizations observed in the past, “have their genesis in the riding community and partisan organizational ethos of the [local party organization]” (Sayers 1999: 133).

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Modelling Collaboration between Local Party Organizations

Suppose that local party organizations exist on a continuum within each political party.

The local party is a function of the activists that comprise the organization. The competency of these activists determines the resources available to the riding association and campaign team. The competency of the local team impacts the amount of money available, the quality of candidate selected, and the number of volunteers ready to campaign. These factors shape the level of campaign effort required during elections to achieve a winning threshold of votes.

Mature local party organizations at the well-resourced end of the continuum are likely to require less campaign effort. In cases where the mature organization is situated in a highly supportive riding, their candidate wins, and in cases where it is situated in less supportive ridings, it is a forgone conclusion that another candidate will win. The expectation of electoral outcomes frees local teams to allocate excess resources to local campaigns in other ridings.

Developing local parties are situated toward the opposite end of the continuum. They are less-likely to have highly capable or experienced people volunteering in the organization.

This translates into less money raised, which suggests the local team has a lower quality candidate and fewer volunteers. Developing local parties require outside help in order to increase campaign effort and enhance their chance for electoral success. The developing local parties located in the middle of the continuum – in the highly competitive districts that are decided by very few votes, the marginal ridings – have the greatest likelihood for reaching the winning threshold. This discrepancy creates an electoral incentive to deposit resources into developing organizations in highly-competitive ridings so they can maximize campaign effort and potentially win.

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The process driving collaboration between local party organizations in the

Conservative Party is modelled in Figure 4.1. Collaboration may extend beyond the movement of financial resources, but it is observed here by inter-association transfers. This model assumes lower vote instability in the party system. The distribution of district-level resources against campaign effort (Campaign1) intersects the winning threshold (W) to determine the number of seats won in parliament. Resources moved from one riding association (T1) reduces the amount of campaign effort available to the campaign team, but does not compromise winning. The local party organization experiences a reduction in district-level resources in order to increase the amount available to other campaign teams in more competitive ridings

(T2). The product of inter-association fund-transfers is a higher portion of campaign teams

(Campaign2) with enough resources to maximize campaign effort necessary for exceeding the victory threshold in the riding. The party wins more seats as a result (Seats 2 > Seats 1).

While the real distribution of resources, campaign effort, and votes may not fit on this graph,

Figure 4.1 remains a useful mechanism for visualizing the logic underlying the local collaboration observed by inter-association transfers. Parties-in-the-constituency can develop overages of resources in the form of money, volunteers, candidate quality, or votes. The overage of resources exceeds the required amount for winning the constituency campaign.

Votes cannot move between ridings under the single-member plurality voting system, but other resources can. The most fungible resource is money. Money is easily exchangeable for beneficial campaign resources, such as paid staff, advertising, or professional voter contact.

Volunteers and candidates may also move between ridings; however, collaboration is observed here through money transfers.

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Figure 4.1: Modelling Inter-association Fund-Transfers23

1 2 Seats Seats

Campaign2 District Resources District

2 T

Campaign1

Campaign Effort

Campaign1 = Distribution of Campaign Resources before inter-association fund-transfers; T1 = Outflow Fund-transfers; T2 = Inflow Fund-Transfers; Campaign2 = Distribution of Campaign Resources for Election; W = Winning threshold, translation of party support (votes) into parliamentary seats; Seats2 > Seats1.

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Not just any riding receives money. Resource scarcity compels parties to maximize utility by consuming resources in the way most likely to result in seats won. In every campaign there are bound to be local party organizations that could win but lack the resources needed for achieving the victory threshold. It is plausible to assume that central party strategists are aware of which local party organizations are likely to win in the next election, and of those which need more resources to enhance electoral prospects. They could rank each organization on a priority basis and request help from well-resourced associations unable to hide wealth under the modern party finance regime. The giving association can then determine which other teams are worthy of collaborating with during the upcoming campaign.

The criteria for sending money are enough electoral stability in the riding to be confident of electoral outcomes, regardless of whether that results in the election of their party candidate or another party candidate, and enough resources to share with other teams. Giving associations may be prompted by the central party to collaborate, but the decision is ultimately made by the local organization. The local team determines whether to collaborate and where excess resources are deposited. Local party organizations may give resources to neighbouring ridings in order to shore up support at home. Personal connections between activists or candidates in two associations may also determine whether money is given. Money might even be given because the sending and receiving local party organizations share common visions for the future of the party. But at the end of the day, money is given because it enhances the prospects for the party to form government. The giving association can determine how much excess money is available and divide it accordingly among others in need. The next three

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sections review cases studies of local party organizations collaborating with others to highlight instances where these criteria emerge.

Case Selection

This chapter incorporates the most similar cases of local party organizations engaging in inter-association funding in order to induce additional factors that drive collaboration. The

Conservative Party has the largest network of collaborating local party organizations which makes them the first choice for selection. Second, cases are selected to identify why local party organizations give money. The ridings containing the top three Conservative local party organizations giving money to other campaigns in 2008 are chosen for analysis between 2007 and 2011. Third, Conservative local party organizations in highly competitive battleground ridings received the most money from other local party organizations. The ridings containing the top three Conservative local party organizations receiving money in 2008 are chosen.

Fourth, local party organizations in uncompetitive other party strongholds were also observed giving and receiving money. Three cases of local party organizations ridings giving or receiving more than $10,000 of inter-association funding that were also situated in other party stronghold are included. The selection criteria produce nine cases of Conservative local party organizations collaborating with other local teams. The riding cases also have varying competitive features, such as whether the riding is rural or suburban; CPC, LPC and NDP incumbency; and, one, two, or three party competitions that influence the competitive environment in each riding case.

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Removing Support off the Top: Outflow Fund-transfers from Stronghold Ridings

Collaboration amongst party field organizations has not been the subject of research projects on parties and campaigns at the riding-level (Carty 1991; 2002; Carty and Eagles 2005;

Coletto and Eagles 2011; Cross 2004; Koop 2011; Sayers 1999). Addressing this gap in the literature is critical for understanding how parties enhance their electoral competitiveness during campaigns. Some local party organizations made campaign effort in other ridings through inter-association funding. Thirty-one Conservative Party riding associations sent more than $10,000 to other districts in 2008. The number of associations collaborating with transfers exceeding $10,000 doubled to sixty-four in 2011. The Conservative Party riding associations reporting the top three highest amounts of outflow fund-transfers in 2008 were located in suburban ridings in Calgary, Alberta, the bastion of present-day Canadian conservatism. Two of these made the list of top three again in 2011. In descending order for 2008, they are the

Conservative Party of Canada Electoral District Association for Calgary Southwest, Calgary

Centre-North, and Calgary Southeast.

Local party organizations with inter-association outflows were represented by incumbents Stephen Harper (then party leader), Jim Prentice, and Jason Kenney (both once high profile caucus members). These three riding associations transferred $338,000 to forty- two other ridings during the 2008 election year and a combined total of $797,316.72 to one- hundred-four ridings between 2007 and 2011 (Appendix A). The size and magnitude of the outflow fund-transfers reveals that local party organizations can become more than riding specific campaign organizations for the local candidate, their supporters, and long-term party members.

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The Conservative Party dominated politics in the outflow case ridings, both financially and electorally. Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 demonstrate that Conservative local party organizations had substantially more financial resources, made substantially more campaign effort, and received substantially more votes than other parties in the districts.24 Conservative constituency campaigns outspent opponents while remaining well beneath the Elections

Canada district expense limits. Underspending in the Calgary stronghold districts was possible in part because Liberal and New Democratic Party spending was even lower, so much lower that the Liberal candidate running against Mr. Kenney did not report any campaign expenses in

2008. To add insult to injury, Mr. Kenney spent the duration of the 2008 campaign as the

Conservative Party campaign spokesperson in Ottawa (Ellis and Woolstencroft 2009: 39). He secured the highest margin of victory for the three cases and did not even step foot in the province! NDP candidate John Chan in Calgary Centre-North, running against incumbent Jim

Prentice, spent the highest amount of second place finishers in 2008, totalling just twenty-eight percent of the district limit. Conservative candidates handily secured re-election in these

Conservative Party stronghold ridings and did so while making less campaign effort than other teams.

24 Data tables for local party organizations in each electoral district may be found in Appendix B.

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Figure 4.2: Calgary Southwest

500,000.00 1.00 450,000.00 0.90 400,000.00 0.80

350,000.00 0.70 300,000.00 0.60 250,000.00 0.50 200,000.00 0.40

150,000.00 0.30 Percentage Ratio 100,000.00 0.20 50,000.00 0.10

0.00 0.00 SpendingExpenseto Ratio Limit Voteand

LocalParty OrganizationIncome andSaving CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11 Political Party and Election Year

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

Figure 4.3: Calgary Centre-North

500,000.00 1.00 450,000.00 0.90 400,000.00 0.80

350,000.00 0.70

300,000.00 0.60 250,000.00 0.50 200,000.00 0.40 150,000.00 0.30

100,000.00 0.20 Percentage Ratio 50,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11

Political Party and Election Year SpendingExpenseto Ratio Limit Voteand LocalParty OrganizationIncome andSaving

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

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Figure 4.4: Calgary Southeast

500,000.00 1.00 450,000.00 0.90 400,000.00 0.80

350,000.00 0.70 300,000.00 0.60 250,000.00 0.50

200,000.00 0.40 150,000.00 0.30 Percentage Ratio 100,000.00 0.20 50,000.00 0.10

0.00 0.00 SpendingExpenseto Ratio Limit Voteand

LocalParty OrganizationIncome andSaving CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11 Political Party and Election Year

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

Incumbency creates a definite effect on the capacity for local party organizations to transfer money to parties in other constituencies. Financial and electoral data reported in figures 4.2 and 4.4 show Calgary Southwest and Calgary Southeast Conservative local party organizations increased riding association fundraising and savings from 2008 levels. Incremental financial growth correlates with increased electoral success in the 2011 federal election. The combined improvement to organizational vitality as measured by fundraising and the increased vote share suggests Conservative incumbents in both ridings strengthened their riding-level support between both elections.

It is also possible that incumbency increased candidate quality over time. Candidate quality also has a definite impact on the quality of the riding association and campaign teams

(Coletto and Eagles 2011; Koop 2010; Sayers 1999). Harper led the national party organization

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and Jason Kenney increased his public profile as a newly appointed member of cabinet.25 When combined with the fact that Kenney’s local party organization received more than half its donations from outside Alberta (CBC 2013), candidate profile and incumbency may attract financial support from donors situated in other ridings with less competitive teams. It is possible that the popularity of both incumbents, inside and outside their electoral districts, translated into greater electoral stability within their ridings.

Comparing intra-party fund-transfers for constituency campaigns in safe Conservative ridings further demonstrates the important contribution that local party organizations make during campaigns. Intra-party fund-transfers during election years are presented in Figures 4.5,

4.6, and 4.7. The Conservative Party uses inter-association funding as the dominant mechanism for moving support to other ridings, as compared by inter-association transfers to centre-to- local transfers. This is also true for local party organizations that were highly unlikely to impact election results. Liberal and NDP central party offices did not transfer much money to local campaigns in these cases. The Liberal campaign team in Calgary Southwest (contested by

Conservative incumbent Stephen Harper) moved $16,411 to neighbouring constituencies

(Appendix B). This reinforces claims that some collaboration is locally initiated. The uncompetitive nature of the safe Conservative ridings enabled the one Liberal riding association and three Conservative local party organizations to move resources into other constituencies.

25 Kenney was appointed Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on October 30, 2008.

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Figure 4.5: Intra-Party Fund-Transfers in Calgary Southwest

300,000.00 1.00

0.90

250,000.00 0.80 0.70 200,000.00

0.60

Transfers($) - 150,000.00 0.50 0.40 100,000.00

PartyFund 0.30 - 0.20

50,000.00 Intra 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11

Political Parties and Election Year Campaign Spending to District Spending to Campaign District Limit Expense Ratio EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending

Figure 4.6: Intra-Party Fund-Transfers in Calgary Centre-North

300,000.00 1.00

0.90

250,000.00 0.80 0.70 200,000.00

0.60

Transfers($) - 150,000.00 0.50 0.40 100,000.00

PartyFund 0.30 - 0.20

50,000.00 Intra 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11

Political Parties and Election Year Campaign Spending to District Spending to Campaign District Limit Expense Ratio EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending

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Figure 4.7: Intra-Party Funding in Calgary Southeast

300,000.00 1.00 0.90 250,000.00 0.80 0.70 200,000.00

0.60

Transfers($) - 150,000.00 0.50 0.40 100,000.00

PartyFund 0.30 - 0.20

Intra 50,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11

Political Parties and Election Year CampaignSpending to District Expense Limit Ratio

EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending

The Calgary Centre-North Conservative local party organization is the only case where inter-association fund-transfers declined in 2011 from 2008. The reduction of outflows occurred after the retirement of high profile incumbent Jim Prentice. The party insider nominated to replace Prentice, Michelle Rempel,26 did not sustain the high income previously afforded to the Calgary Centre-North Conservative Party riding association (Postmedia 2011).

The local party branch earned just $5,490 in contributions during 2011 (Appendix B). The lost income suggests the new Conservative candidate brought a less competent or less experienced team into the Conservative local party organization. This changed the electoral competitiveness of Calgary Centre-North.

The amount of campaign effort made in Calgary Centre-North increased 2011 from

2008. Ms. Rempel’s campaign team spent nearly $15,000 more to secure the same proportion

26 Rempel sat on the Conservative Party of Canada’s National Policy Committee (Calgary Herald 2010).

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of votes won by Prentice. The Liberal candidate also increased campaign spending as their local party organization received a financial boost from donors before and during the official election period. The spike in campaign spending indicates the Conservative and Liberal constituency campaigns applied more effort in 2011 than 2008. Without the power of high profile incumbency, the Calgary-Centre North Conservative party lost their primary tool for generating financial and electoral support. Prentice’s departure from federal politics changed the competitive nature of federal electoral politics in Calgary Centre-North. The Conservative local party organization in Calgary Centre-North lost its competitive position in the riding, as indicated by fundraising and campaign spending.

The overage of resources and past overage of votes enabled Harper, Prentice, and

Kenney to campaign elsewhere. Table 4.1 documents that inter-association funding occurs annually in their riding associations.27 The financial reports highlight three additional features of inter-association funding not identifiable by system level trends. First, date stamps establish that the vast majority of outflows occurred prior to election day.28 Second, all three riding associations gave more to others than they received to others outside Alberta. This suggests outflow transfers are more than loans, but gifts to other teams that may be strategically relevant to the present campaign or future contests. Third, sizable amounts of money (just shy of $125,000) were transferred to multiple riding associations between election years. The highest outflows took place during election years, but the Calgary associations were active collaborating with other local party branches during non-election years. The Calgary cases

27 The complete list of collaborating EDAs are presented in Appendix A. 28 Elections Canada does not report dates for financial inflows, which is why they are absent in Appendix A.

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suggest that local party organizations make contributions to others as a result of higher quality

candidates. The combination of candidate quality and electoral predictability are riding-level

features that influence the movement of support from one riding to another.

Table 4.1: Outflow Fund-transfers Received and Sent by Conservative Riding Associations Calgary Southwest Conservative Electoral District Association 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ 30,000.00 $ 15,000.00 $ 39,000.00 $ 15,270.00 $ 39,000.00 $ 138,270.00 # Sending 3 2 7 3 7 22 Money Sent $ - $ 165,000.00 $ 50,000.00 $ 15,839.50 $ 200,000.00 $ 430,839.50 # Receiving 0 18 5 3 21 47 Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a

Calgary Centre-North Electoral District Association 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ 6,000.00 $ 10,800.00 $ 21,000.00 $ 15,000.00 $ - $ 52,800.00 # Sending (1) (4) (3) (2) (0) (10) Money Sent $ 20,000.00 $ 132,000.00 $ 10,000.00 $ - $ 15,000.00 $ 177,000.00 # Receiving (4) (13) (1) (0) (3) (21) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a

Calgary Southeast Conservative Electoral District Association 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ 4,000.00 $ 1,500.00 $ 10,000.00 $ - $ - $ 15,500.00 # Sending (1) (1) (2) (0) (0) (4) Money Sent $ - $ 51,000.00 $ 8,000.00 $ 21,000.00 $ 99,177.22 $ 189,477.22 # Receiving (0) (11) (1) (6) (16) (36) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a

The importance of candidate quality and support predictability is exemplified by the

Conservative Party experience in Calgary Centre-North. Michelle Rempel was an untested

politician. She raised less money than Jim Prentice, campaigned more than the party had in

previous years, yet managed to secure the same portion of votes. Part of this is because

Rempel faced a stronger opponent under the Liberal party banner. Liberal candidate Stephen

Randall spent sixty two percent the expense limit in 2011, a $43,000 increase from 2008. It is

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reasonable to conclude, based on newspaper reports, financial and electoral data, that all parties in Calgary Centre-North perceived new electoral competitiveness without the presence of high profile incumbent Jim Prentice, a politician proven to be a winner.

Local actors likely place a premium on predictability when determining whether the riding association can afford to transfer resources to other campaigns. Well known incumbents like Stephen Harper, Jason Kenney, and Jim Prentice were likely expected to win their seats.

Each maintained astonishingly large war-chests, and based on other party campaign spending and income, faced less competitive campaign teams. It is reasonable to assume the local

Conservative teams were very competent. The teams might have been brought together by high quality politicians or recruited high quality politicians as the local candidate. The candidate profile led to positive reputations that went outside their riding. This makes quality candidates more attractive for potential donors and increases the income for the local party organization.

Higher quality candidates may send money to campaigns in other ridings because they require less effort to win their seat. Inter-association financing may even bolster the giving candidate’s reputation within the party.

High quality candidates have two non-electoral incentives for distributing their support to candidates in other ridings. First, moving resources to other local campaigns could be used for altruistic intra-party coalition building. Political parties are comprised of multiple distinct ideologies or “parts” that group together to advance common goals (see Campbell and

Christian 1974; Sartori 2005, Chapter 1). The Conservative Party of Canada is a coalition between Progressive Conservatives and Reformer Party conservatives who were unable to

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achieve their goals outside of power (Flanagan 2008; Sayers and Denemark 2014).

Coincidentally, former PC leadership contender Jim Prentice and Reform Party cadre Jason

Kenney sent the second and third highest amount of inter-association outflows in 2008.

Prentice was a leadership figure from the PC wing that played a significant role in the new

Conservative Party of Canada (Flanagan 2008: 277). Kenney was a leadership figure from the

Reform/Canadian Alliance camp, having chaired Stockwell Day’s leadership campaign in 2000

(Flanagan 2009: 204). Perhaps Prentice and Kenney contributed their support to help the election of candidates who shared their vision for the future of the Conservative Party of

Canada.

Second, moving resources could be used for self-interested intra-party coalition building.

The best way for Prentice or Kenney to implement their future vision of the Conservative Party of Canada would be to succeed Stephen Harper as the party leader. However, winning the party leadership requires new methods for generating internal support. The 2004/2006 party finance reforms limit the financial resources available to leadership contestants (Accountability Act

2006: Section 405.1c), but do not restrict inter-association funding or favours owed by grateful local party organizations. Inter-association funding may have enhanced Prentice’s and Kenney’s prominence in the party. The favour garnered by supporting other candidates and local campaigns may become invaluable to the success of future leadership aspirants. While nothing presented here is conclusive, it is certainly interesting to consider two possible non-electoral incentives that may drive inter-association funding, especially if Prentice and Kenney saw themselves as potential successors to Mr. Harper.

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Inter-association funding patterns from these three cases appear to be bids on winnable ridings. The total sum of money leaving each case is substantial, but the actual amount of money sent to each riding association is modest. Inter-association funding sent out to other riding associations ranges between $5,000 and $10,000 (see Appendix A). This investigation indicates that candidate quality and electoral predictability are prerequisites for moving resources to other campaign teams. Local party organizations that have an overage of resources and votes can transplant campaign effort in to other ridings. The next section analyzes cases where CPC associations receive inter-association financing to determine incentives for accepting outside resources from other local associations.

Receiving Party Support from Other Ridings: Inflow Fund-transfers to Battleground Ridings

Local party organizations in highly-competitive ridings can receive non-local resources from components other than the central party office. Thirty-six Conservative riding associations received $10,000 or more in 2008. Fifty-nine riding associations received the same range of inter-association funding in 2011. The top three 2008 inflow ridings were Desnethé-Missinippi-

Churchill River, a rural riding comprising the north half of Saskatchewan; Fleetwood-Port Kells, a suburban riding located in Surrey, part of the Greater Vancouver Area in British Columbia; and, Welland, a rural riding bordering Lake Ontario, Lake Erie, and Buffalo, New York in southeastern Ontario. These local branches received $92,600, $61,000, and $50,000 from other

Conservative riding associations for the 2008 federal election. Only Desnethé-Missinippi-

Churchill River Conservative riding association remained in the top three inflow category in

2011. The victorious candidates for each 2008 campaign were Conservatives Rob Clarke and

Nina Grewal, and New Democrat Malcolm Allen, respectively. Even though all three

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constituencies appeared highly-competitive in 2008, the outcome from that election altered party competition in each district in 2011.

Two or more parties had competitive organizations in the ridings where Conservative electoral district associations depended on inter-association campaign funding. Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 show financial and election data that suggest voters were less attached to any single party in these ridings. Party vote distributions changed from the 2008 and 2011 General

Elections. This demonstrates segments of the district electorate switched party preferences over time. For example, NDP candidates competing in all three districts increased their proportion of the district vote by at least ten percent, while the LPC vote dropped by at least the same amount. Conservative candidates marginally improved their vote share in all three ridings, but only won two of the races.

Local party financing also indicates higher competition in these districts. In Fleetwood-

Port Kells and Welland, all three parties generated enough local money to mount credible electoral bids during both elections. If fundraising was insufficient or non-existent, as was the case for the Liberal party EDA in Desnethé-Missinippi-Churchill River in 2011, other party branches provided aid to local teams with outside resources. The electoral outcomes from 2008 appear to entrench new inter-party dynamics that produced a new competitive environment for the 2011 federal election. Higher party competition in these three districts suggests at least two political parties could have potentially won the election.

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Figure 4.8: Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill River 50,000.00 1.00 45,000.00 0.90

40,000.00 0.80

35,000.00 0.70 30,000.00 0.60 25,000.00 0.50

20,000.00 0.40 Percentage Ratio 15,000.00 0.30

Income andSavings ($) 10,000.00 0.20

5,000.00 0.10 SpendingExpenseto Ratio Limit Voteand 0.00 0.00 CPC08* CPC11* LPC08 LPC11 NDP 08 NDP11 Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party)

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

Figure 4.9: Fleetwood-Port Kells 80,000.00 1.00

70,000.00 0.90

0.80 60,000.00

0.70 50,000.00 0.60 40,000.00 0.50

30,000.00 0.40

0.30 Percentage Ratio

Income andSavings ($) 20,000.00 0.20 10,000.00 0.10

0.00 0.00 SpendingExpenseto Ratio Limit Voteand CPC08* CPC11* LPC08 LPC11 NDP 08 NDP11 Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party)

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

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Figure 4.10: Welland 80,000.00 1.00

70,000.00 0.90

0.80 60,000.00 0.70 50,000.00 0.60

40,000.00 0.50

30,000.00 0.40

0.30 Ratio

Incomeand Sacings ($) 20,000.00 0.20 10,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08* NDP11* Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party)

SpendingExpenseto Ratio Limit VoteandPercentage

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

Similar to the outflow cases, incumbency is a non-monetary resource that can be transformed into campaign effort. Voters in Desnethé-Missinippi-Churchill River elected a

Liberal MP in 2006, but his resignation from parliament in 2007 resulted in a by-election in

March 2008 (Star Pheonix 2008). The Conservative party seized upon this opportunity by selecting local notable Rob Clarke as the district candidate. Clarke, a former police officer who had been stationed throughout the rural riding (Leaders Post 2008), handily beat the Liberal candidate by a margin of sixteen percent (Elections Canada 2008). The local Liberal association managed to retain a sizeable amount of resources in the riding in 2008, as observed by their

$46,000 fundraising income, but this support all but vanished by 2011. Financial reports indicate Clarke was unable to develop enough organizational capacity to autonomously contest the federal election in 2011 even with his power of incumbency. Riding association fundraising, saving, and candidate fundraising, all of which depend upon a local organization capable of

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mobilizing supporters to donation, remained insufficient for mounting a credible campaign in the competitive riding. The Conservative MP may have benefited from his incumbent status, but not enough to generate sufficient local support to eliminate the need for inter-association funding.

The power of incumbency may also decline when two or more parties forge durable connections to voters in the riding. I defined support durability as predictable and reliable district-level party support that enables more activity over time and protects the local party organization from volatility in the electoral cycle. Financial data indicates party support durability because money represents the ability for the local party organization to generate income from individual supporters. Local party organizations can remain vital between elections, even without the presence of an incumbent. Party support is likely durable in

Fleetwood-Port Kells and Welland because multiple local party branches were extracting money from supporters over time. In both ridings, each party generated enough resources (through the combination of EDA fundraising, saving, and candidate fundraising) to increase the amount of campaign activity in the riding. Conservative and Liberal total campaign spending in

Fleetwood-Port Kells suggests two parties mounted large campaign efforts in 2008 and 2011, and all three parties did so in Welland.

Incumbency does not translate into electoral stability in ridings where minor vote changes alter election outcomes. For example, Conservative candidate Nina Grewal narrowly retained her incumbency status when she was re-elected in Fleetwood-Port Kells in 2006 by a victory margin of 1.9 percent. The Fleetwood-Port Kells CPC riding association demonstrated

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reasonably durable party support in the district following that election. High local party saving and candidate fundraising were enough to increase campaign effort in 2008, yet Grewal’s riding association received the second highest inflow fund-transfers that year. It is probable that high expectations for a narrowly decided race and moderate local income pressed the local

Conservative team to collaborate with others for resources. Grewal ultimately received high candidate contributions after the writ-period began and decisively won in 2008. Similar events appear to have unfolded in 2011; however, Grewal’s team did not rely on inter-association funding to the same extent they did during the previous election.

The campaign tactics employed by each political party inside the inflow ridings culminate into substantially higher campaign intensity. Campaign intensity is the total amount of campaign effort made by all political parties in a single district (Sayers 1999: 109-10).

Campaign intensity was lower in ridings where Conservative local party organizations sent resources away, but not where resources were received. Campaign spending displayed in

Figures 4.2, and 4.4 show only Conservative candidates made any moderate effort during the official election period (Figure 4.3 shows the Liberal Party campaigned more in 2011). However, campaign intensity was much higher in the ridings where Conservatives received support from other local party organizations. Figures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 show at least two campaigns made higher campaign efforts by exceeding seventy-five percent of the district expense limit. Only two campaigns spent less than seventy percent of the limit in the outflow cases (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4). In the competitive constituency cases, fifteen of the seventeen campaigns spent more than seventy percent of the district expense limit. Higher campaign intensity compels parties to

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mobilize as many available resources as possible, regardless of whether those resources were accumulated in the riding.

High campaign intensity in these cases is partially the product of non-local campaign resources. Half of the constituency campaigns in these cases received non-local campaign resources, as shown in figures 4.13, 4.13, 4.15. The source of non-local campaign resources in these cases differed between parties. The Conservative campaigns received non-local support from other local party organizations, whereas the Liberal and NDP campaigns received support from the central party office. Non-local attention to highly-competitive campaigns is consistent with previous studies (for example, Sayers 1999, Chapter 7). The presence of local party collaboration, however, is a departure from other investigations. Conservative campaigns were empowered to increase campaign effort with party support generated in other ridings.

Figure 4.11: Intra-Party Fund-Transfers in Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill River

100,000.00 1.00

90,000.00 0.90 80,000.00 0.80 70,000.00 0.70

60,000.00 0.60

Transfers($) - 50,000.00 0.50 40,000.00 0.40

30,000.00 0.30

PartyFund - 20,000.00 0.20

Intra 10,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08* CPC11* LPC08 LPC11 NDP 08 NDP11 Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party)

EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending CampaignSpending to District Expense Limit Ratio

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Figure 4.12: Intra-Party Fund-Transfers in Fleetwood-Port Kells

100,000.00 1.00

90,000.00 0.90

80,000.00 0.80 70,000.00 0.70

60,000.00 0.60

Transfers($) - 50,000.00 0.50 40,000.00 0.40

PartyFund 30,000.00 0.30 -

20,000.00 0.20 Intra 10,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08* CPC11* LPC08 LPC11 NDP 08 NDP11

Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party) CampaignSpending to District Expense Limit Ratio

EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending

Figure 4.13: Intra-Party Funding in Welland 100,000.00 1.00

90,000.00 0.90 80,000.00 0.80 70,000.00 0.70

60,000.00 0.60

Transfers($) - 50,000.00 0.50 40,000.00 0.40

30,000.00 0.30 Ratio PartyFund - 20,000.00 0.20

Intra 10,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08* NDP11*

Title CampaiagnSpending to District Expense Limit EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending

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Local party organizations receiving money report inflows and outflows from multiple sources during election and non-election years (Appendix A). Annual inflows for the three highest recipient Conservative associations are presented in Table 4.2. Inter-association funding patterns show that inflow associations are net-beneficiaries within the Conservative Party, since they take in more money than they send out. Transfer reports also show half the funding originated from EDAs inside the same province as the recipient. Unlike the cases in Alberta where local parties sent most money to teams outside the province, financial resources were being redirected to other teams within the same province (Appendix A). Patterns of resource accumulation from few associations in close proximity suggest inter-association transfers can also be initiated and coordinated between local activists, instead of possible instances when the central party office (Hill Times 2015) calls on local teams to share their wealth.

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Table 4.2: Inter-Association Fund-transfers Received and Sent by Top Three 2008 Inflow Conservative Riding Associations Desnethé–Missinippi–Churchill River 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ - $ 92,600.00 $ - $ 5,000.00 $ 89,500.00 $ 187,100.00 # Sending (0) (21) (0) (1) (14) (36) Money Sent $ 9,000.00 $ - $ - $ - $ - $ 9,000.00 # Receiving (4) (0) (0) (0) (0) (4) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a Fleetwood - Port Kells 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ - $ 61,000.00 $ - $ - $ 10,000.00 $ 71,000.00 # Sending (0) (8) (0) (0) (1) (9) Money Sent $ - $ 2,500.00 $ 51,500.00 $ - $ - $ 54,000.00 # Receiving (0) (1) (10) (0) (0) (11) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a Welland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ - $ 50,000.00 $ - $ - $ - $ 50,000.00 # Sending (0) (6) (0) (0) (0) (6) Money Sent $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - $ - # Receiving (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a

Resource inflow patterns reaffirm that riding-level competitiveness and organizational

vitality drive local party collaboration though inter-association funding transfers. The case of

Desnethé – Mississippi – Churchill River indicates that Conservative Party strategists felt very

confident the party could win the seat in 2008 and 2011 if the local team had sufficient

campaign resources. The same was likely true for Fleetwood – Port Kells in 2008, however the

Conservative local party organization had developed enough over the next three years to

reduce the need for substantial inter-association funding. Fleet-wood Port Kells might be an

instance where the central party called for collaboration in 2008 but not 2011. The same could

also be true for Welland. The Conservatives moved campaign resources into Welland in 2008 as

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a prudent use of overaged resources, but not in 2011. The Conservative team received essentially zero campaign resources from outside the riding in 2011. In each case, riding-level features shaped the amount of competition that led to the concentration of campaign resources.

Inter-association Funding to and from Other Party Strongholds

The following three case studies provide insights into the behaviour of Conservative campaigns in uncompetitive ridings. By extension, they also allow us to contrast competitive

Liberal and NDP teams with the successful Conservative local party organizations already discussed. Regardless of how much effort was made campaigning in these ridings, the

Conservatives could not win the local election, as shown by the resource accumulation, campaign effort, and voting results shown Figures 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16. Despite relatively non- existent chance for winning, data from chapter 3 show Conservative local party organizations situated in unwinnable electoral districts sent and received inter-association transfers. Three

CPC riding associations in uncompetitive districts sent more than $10,000 in 2008 and ten sent more than $10,000 in 2011. Eighteen Conservative riding associations received more $10,000 in

2008 and nineteen received the same range in 2011. These cases reveal that inter-association funding can be more than electoral strategy for the present campaign.

The three cases explored here are located in Liberal Party and New Democratic Party stronghold ridings. The first is Random-Burin-St. George’s, a Liberal stronghold in rural

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Newfoundland.29 The second case is Vancouver Kingsway, a New Democratic Party stronghold in suburban Vancouver. Voters in this riding have elected New Democrat and Liberal candidates in the past; however, the last Liberal candidate to win election immediately crossed the floor to sit in the newly elected Conservative Government (Flanagan 2008: 194). The final case is

Vancouver Quadra, a Liberal Party stronghold located at the heart of suburban Vancouver.

Conservative riding associations in all three districts collaborate financially with other EDAs, even though each local branch is situated in a constituency where voters are highly supportive of another established political party.30 Intra-party fund-transfers for these districts will be discussed later in figures 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19.

29 Conservative candidates running in Newfoundland faced unprecedented resistance from Newfoundland Premier Danny Williams, who led an “Anyone But Conservative” campaign during the 2008 general election after disagreements with the Conservative Government about natural resource taxation (Daily Gleaner 2008).

30 Despite their spatial proximity, the two Vancouver ridings are valid cases because of their unique competitive features and observation of inter-association funding. Vancouver Kingsway is a net-recipient of inter-association funding and Vancouver Quadra is a net-donor of inter-association funding, while both are less competitive ridings for the Conservative Party. Both ridings were held by two different political parties and the Conservative riding associations in these districts employed inter-association financing. Both constituencies possessed competitive environments that appear unfavourable to the development of well-resourced Conservative local party branches, yet inter-association transfers are observed. Campaigns in all three ridings are notably distinct from uncompetitive Conservative party stronghold districts and highly-competitive battle ground districts. Each candidate’s campaign effort and the overall campaign intensity in each district may allude to other factors driving grassroots collaboration in the Conservative Party of Canada. The complexity of inter-association campaign funding is evident when contrasting parties and elections in the Newfoundland and Vancouver ridings.

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Figure 4.14: Random-Burin-St. George's 50,000.00 1.00 45,000.00 0.90

40,000.00 0.80

35,000.00 0.70 30,000.00 0.60

25,000.00 0.50

20,000.00 0.40 Ratio

15,000.00 0.30 Income andSavings ($) 10,000.00 0.20 5,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08* LPC11* NDP08 NDP11

Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party) SpendingDistrict to Limit Ratio VoteandPercentage

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

Figure 4.15: Vancouver Kingsway 140,000.00 1.00 0.90 120,000.00

0.80

100,000.00 0.70 0.60 80,000.00

0.50

60,000.00

0.40 Ratio

40,000.00 0.30 Income andSavings ($) 0.20 20,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08* NDP11*

Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party) SpendingDistrict to Limit Ratio VoteandPercentage

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

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Figure 4.16: Vancouver Quadra

250,000.00 1.00

0.90

200,000.00 0.80

0.70

150,000.00 0.60

0.50

100,000.00 0.40

IncomeandSaving 0.30

50,000.00 0.20

0.10

0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08* LPC11* NDP08 NDP11

Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party) Spending to District SpendingDistrict to Limit Ratio VoteandPercentage Ratio

EDA Fundraising Candidate Fundraising EDA Savings Campaign Spending Vote Percentage

Inter-association financing may be a component of a long-term plan to generate vital local campaign teams in targeted ridings safely held by an opposing party. The Random-Burin-

St. George’s Conservative local party organization generated the majority of its income from other Conservative riding associations in 2008. Empowered with resources generated in other ridings, the Conservative candidate spent three times more than first time Liberal candidate

Judy Foote. This campaign intensity did not help the Conservative candidate’s fortune. The

Conservatives lost to Ms. Foote by thirty-three percent of the district vote. Similar events unfolded in 2011, although this time Foote was the incumbent candidate.

Collaboration with the Random-Burin-St. George’s Conservative local party organization demonstrates that inter-association funding may be a function of party building over the long-

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term. Conservative local party organizations located in uncompetitive ridings may receive inter- association funding in order to maintain a resilient presence that might serve as a foundation for future electoral bids. As noted in Chapter 2, Elections Canada reimburses candidates sixty percent of their campaign spending if they receive at least fifteen percent of the district-vote

(Bill C-24 2003). In Random-Burin-St. George’s, the Conservative team began the 2011 federal election with over double the amount savings they had in 2008 (likely from a larger Elections

Canada reimbursement from 2008 campaign spending) and they increased the Conservative vote share by twelve percent.

Long-term planning is also the likely explanation for inter-association inflows to

Vancouver Kingsway. High quality candidate David Emerson crossed the floor to the

Conservative Party after being elected as a Liberal MP for Vancouver Kingsway in 2006

(Flanagan 2008: 194). Emerson did not seek re-election in 2008. The Vancouver Kingsway

Conservative local party organization already had high fundraising and saving in 2008, but still received inter-association funding from other riding associations. Inter-association funding boosted the financial capacity for the Conservative team to compete against well financed

Liberal and NDP local party organizations. Campaign spending and election results suggest all three candidates had well organized teams. The NDP managed to win the riding by a narrow margin of six percent in 2008. Conservative party fundraising and savings remained high in

2011, indicating a highly competent team remained intact in the constituency. The

Conservatives appeared to double down on the riding by increasing inter-association inflows to bolster district-level campaign activity. District spending by all parties shows high campaign intensity in the riding, but the NDP prevailed. Constituency context clearly points to higher

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amounts of district competition that were not captured by static measurements of district competition: all parties perceived Vancouver Kingsway to be winnable at the time they implemented their 2008 and 2011 election strategy.

Inter-association fund-transfers into uncompetitive ridings may also be one way to utilize resources that might otherwise go unused during an election campaign. Outflow fund- transfers from uncompetitive ridings reveal that well-resourced local party organizations in unwinnable ridings may still contribute to the electoral success of the party elsewhere.

Conservatives in Vancouver Quadra had very high incomes and extra-ordinarily high savings, but were situated in a riding held by the Liberal party for three decades (Parliament of Canada

2014).31 In 2008, the Vancouver Quadra Conservative local party organization had enough to money to spend twice the district expense limit. Rather than let the overage of support go unutilized, the local association sent $32,000 to four other campaign teams in the Greater

Vancouver Area. Two of the ridings receiving money (the Fleetwood-Port Kells Conservative local party organization and the Vancouver Kingsway Conservative local party organization) have also been investigated in this chapter. The amount of money flowing through the

Conservative association in Vancouver Quadra shows that local party organizations can thrive in districts with seemingly low voter support, and their contribution to national campaigns may extend beyond their own district boundaries.

For the most part, the source of non-local resources in the uncompetitive cases is consistent with data presented throughout this thesis. The amount of intra-party fund-transfers

31 Former Liberal Party Leader John Turner was elected the Member of Parliament for Vancouver Quadra in 1984. Voters in the riding have returned Liberal MPs in the subsequent nine federal elections.

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to and from local party organizations in these constituencies is presented in Tables 4.20, 4.21, and 4.22. First, the Conservative Party made more effort campaigning in uncompetitive ridings than the Liberals or NDP. This is evident by the resources moving into Random-Burin-St.

George’s and Vancouver Kingsway. Second, the consequential non-local resources may come from other Conservative local party organizations. And finally, as shown by the Conservative local party organization in Vancouver Quadra, central-to-local fund-transfers do occur; but,

Conservative local party organizations collaborate with other riding-level teams as the primary mechanism for moving party support into and out of strategically important constituency campaigns.

Figure 4.17: Intra-Party Fund-transfers in Random-Burin-St. George's

45,000.00 1.00

40,000.00 0.90

35,000.00 0.80 0.70

30,000.00 Transfers

- 0.60 25,000.00 0.50 20,000.00 0.40

PartyFund 15,000.00 - 0.30 10,000.00 Intra 0.20 5,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08* LPC11* NDP08 NDP11

Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party) CampaignSpending to District Expense Limit Ratio

EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending

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Figure 4.18: Intra-Party Fund-transfers in Vancouver Kingsway

1.00 100,000.00 0.90 0.80 80,000.00 0.70 0.60 60,000.00 0.50 0.40 40,000.00

0.30 Income andSavings ($) 20,000.00 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.00

CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08* NDP11* CampaignSpending to District Expense Limit Ratio Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party)

EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending

Figure 4.19: Intra-Party Fund-Transfers in Vancouver Quadra

45,000.00 1.00 0.90 40,000.00 35,000.00 0.80 0.70 30,000.00

0.60 Transfers($)

- 25,000.00 0.50 20,000.00 0.40 15,000.00

PartyFund 0.30 -

10,000.00 0.20 Intra 5,000.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 CPC08 CPC11 LPC08* LPC11* NDP08 NDP11

Political Party and Election Year (* = winning party) CampaignSpending to District Expense Limit Ratio EDA Inflow EDA Outflow Central Inflow Central Outflow Campaign Spending

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Inter-association funding in uncompetitive ridings supports the hypothesized relationship between district competitiveness and campaign effort. Table 4.3 presents the number of collaborating riding associations and the total amount transferred between 2007 and 2011. Riding associations were either net-contributors or net-beneficiaries within the entire political party. They either receive party support (in the form of financial resource) for increasing their constituency campaign effort or sent party support to needy campaigns. Riding associations participating in inter-association funding were either net-benefactors or net- beneficiaries, like those in ridings with other competitive types. The either/or distinction demonstrates that inter-association funding are not just loans. Local Conservative teams move fungible resources – money – to improve the effectiveness of campaigns in other ridings.

Inter-association funding in uncompetitive ridings exposes four intervening variables that may lead local party organizations to make campaign efforts in other ridings. Appendix A documents these reasons. First, it is likely that the central party office plays a role in inter- association funding. The Conservative local party organization in Random-Burin-St. George’s received the majority of its financial assistance from Western Canada. Of the total $65,000 received, $50,000 came from Conservative riding associations in Alberta and Saskatchewan. It is more plausible that central party strategists knew the competitive obstacles in Newfoundland and called upon the benevolence of associations in the west, rather than activists in Western

Canada identifying ways they might contribute to others in Newfoundland. The Conservative

Party probably called upon local Conservative associations in the west to repurpose some of their more than ample financial resources to help under-funded local organizations in

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Newfoundland (refer back to tables 2.1, 3.3, and 3.6). The pattern of inter-association inflows

into Random – Burin – St. George’s is more than coincidence; it is strategy.

Table 4.3: Inter-association Fund-transfers Received and Sent by Conservative Riding Associations in Other Party Strongholds Random–Burin–St. George's Conservative Electoral District Association Inter-association Fund-Transfers 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ - $ 40,000.00 $ - $ - $ 25,000.00 $ 65,000.00 # Sending (0) (5) (0) (0) (3) (8) Money Sent $ - $ - $ - $ 15,000.00 $ 12,000.00 $ 27,000.00 # Receiving (0) (0) (0) (2) (2) (4) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a

Vancouver Kingsway Conservative Electoral District Association Inter -association Fund-Transfers 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ - $ 39,375.63 $ 1,450.00 $ 3,435.75 $ 67,500.00 $ 111,761.38 # Sending (0) (4) (14) (4) (4) (26) Money Sent $ - $ - $ - $ 18,240.00 $ 38,160.00 $ 56,400.00 # Receiving (0) (0) (0) (4) (3) (7) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a

Vancouver Quadra Conservative Elect oral District Association Inter -association Fund-Transfers 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Money Received $ - $ - $ - $ 476.72 $ - $ 476.72 # Sending (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (1) Money Sent $ - $ 32,000.00 $ 10,000.00 $ - $ - $ 42,000.00 # Receiving (0) (3) (1) (0) (0) (4) Source: Elections Canada (2013) Register Association Financial Report: Parts 2d and 3a

Second, inter-association funding may be used to enhance the electoral competitiveness

of the local party organization sending resources away. Sayers (1999: 114) observed during the

1988 federal election that “suburban voters are more mobile… [and] many of them work

outside the riding in the downtown core,” making it challenging for suburban campaigns to

appeal to their voting population. Voter mobility may compel campaign teams in suburban

ridings to assist their neighbours. Otherwise, the party may appear weaker to voters seamlessly

crossing campaign zones.

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For example, the Vancouver Kingsway Conservative local party organization received inter-association funding from other Vancouver riding associations, including $10,000 from the

Abbotsford Conservative Party Electoral District Association in 2008. The suburban voting population in Abbotsford commutes through Vancouver Kingsway via a major transportation corridor that connects the Greater Vancouver Area to Vancouver’s downtown core. It is possible that inter-association funding was made to help improve the competitive appearance of the Conservative Party in Vancouver Kingsway. Inter-association financing can potentially be a “suburban effect” where competitive suburban campaigns fund uncompetitive urban or city campaigns.

Third, inter-association funding may be campaign loans to maximize Elections Canada candidate reimbursements. One feature of the 2006 party finance regime was the 60% expense reimbursement for candidates receiving at least ten percent of the district vote (Bill C-24

Section 49). The Vancouver Kingsway team sent $6,000 back to the Abbotsford Conservative riding association in 2009 (Appendix A). This is the same portion gained from the Elections

Canada candidate reimbursement. Like Vancouver Quadra, the Abbotsford Conservative local party organization made inter-association fund-transfers because it had resources going unused in the district. However, it is possible that the transfer from Abbotsford was made to maximize the state reimbursement for election expenses incurred, even if those expenses were made in other ridings.

Finally, inter-association funding may be a method for removing resources from unwinnable ridings. Sayers (1999: 116) observed volunteers moving between suburban and city

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ridings for a variety of reasons, including “… [preference] to work on a campaign that looks like it will win.” The case of the Vancouver Quadra Conservative local party organization exemplifies desertion from losing campaigns in 2008 and 2011 in an imperfect way. Despite very high writ- period spending, the Vancouver Quadra Conservative team sent $42,000 to other ridings in

2008 and 2009. And the Vancouver Kingsway Conservative riding association reported gaining

$20,000 from the Vancouver Quadra team in 2011, so actual outflows may be substantially higher (Appendix A).32 Rather than consuming campaign resources that will not improve the electoral competitiveness of the local campaign, it is possible that inter-association funding is a

“suicide effect” for local campaigns that have no hope of winning the constituency election in their district.

Despite being situated in uncompetitive ridings, local party organizations can make campaign contributions that extend beyond district boundaries. The cases of inter-association funding in uncompetitive ridings demonstrate that, even if the party is uncompetitive electorally, the local party organization remains a central component of local, regional and national campaigns. The concentration of money in Random – Burin – St. George’s demonstrates that the national party could not abandon the regional campaign in

Newfoundland, even though the local team was unlikely to win. Across the country, inter- association funding was used to increase the campaign effort made in the strategically important riding of Vancouver Kingsway. Not only was it important that the Conservatives hold the riding after retirement of David Emerson, but increasing the Conservative presence in the

32 As noted in Chapter 3 financial data are ultimately reported by volunteers and may include error. For instance, an inter-association fund-transfer could be reported mistakenly as a central-local transfer, or in this case not reported all together.

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riding may have helped campaigns in neighbouring districts. Finally, local parties may benefit from strong local organizations when situated in electorally uncompetitive districts. The case of

Vancouver Quadra reveals that resources may be accumulated by competitive associations in uncompetitive ridings only to be consumed by less competitive organizations in more competitive districts.

Discussion

District-level features determine which local party organizations collaborate during election campaigns. Local party organizations may collaborate with other constituency campaigns in order to improve inter-party competiveness or enhance intra-party prominence.

Collaboration is presented in this chapter as financial transfers between riding associations.

However, it is possible that collaboration may exist for non-financial resources. For example, volunteers may move between ridings and high profile candidates may attend events with other teams (Sayers 1999: 117). The collaboration observed through the movement of financial resources indicates four motivations for reducing campaign effort in the district where resources accumulate.

The first motivation for collaborating is helping to elect more candidates in the party.

Mature local party organizations have an overage of party support in their riding. With more votes and resources than are required to win election, mature local party organizations can move their support to developing local party organizations in other constituencies. The developing local party organization transforms this support into more campaign effort to enhance their electoral competitiveness. Developing local party organizations receive ranging

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amounts of small contributions from several other local party organizations. The amount of resources sent from mature local party organizations to developing local party organizations indicates the perceived likelihood for winning the riding.

The second motivation for collaborating is it may help improve electoral competitiveness in the riding of the local party organization transferring money away. The “suburban effect” created by varying party support between proximate ridings may require one campaign to help another. Inter-association funding becomes a mechanism for making the political party appear competitive, even when riding-level competition drastically changes across riding boundaries.

This method of inter-association funding enhances the competitive advantage of the local party organization sending resources to neighbouring campaigns.

Third, organizations sending resources to others may be situated in unwinnable ridings and thus transfer their resources to campaigns in more competitive districts. The nearly-mature

Conservative organization in Vancouver Quadra had an overage of resources that were moved to neighbouring campaigns in more competitive ridings. The immature Liberal organization in

Calgary Southwest did the same. Even though the former spent the district limit campaigning, both cases demonstrate that local party organizations in unwinnable ridings may sacrifice their campaign in order to help the electoral prospects of their more competitive neighbours.

Finally, helping other local party organizations has the potential to enhance the intra- party prominence of high profile politicians. It is more than coincidence that Stephen Harper,

Jason Kenney, and Jim Prentice were the candidates for local party organizations sending the most money to other constituency campaigns. Collaborating with other candidates through

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inter-association funding may become crucial for mobilizing support during leadership selection. The modern party finance regime not only limits inter-party competition, but also limits intra-party competition. Leadership contestants must secure campaign resources from fewer inputs than in the past. Local party collaboration has the potential to reshape strategies required for broadening a potential leader’s influence within political parties.

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Chapter 5 Conclusion

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Local party organizations influence electoral results beyond their own ridings by transferring money to under-funded campaigns in very competitive districts. This highlights the continuing role of riding associations and constituency campaigns in shaping the character of national elections in Canada. The 2004 and 2006 party finance reforms made local party organizations essential instruments for resolving support disequilibrium in Canadian party systems. Resource limitations imposed by these reforms render collaboration between local party organizations as vital to winning influence and power in parliament. Votes may be limited to district boundaries, but money is not. Money generated by local party organizations is a fungible commodity that can replace resource shortages experienced by riding associations and campaign teams in electorally desirable ridings.

Local party organizations are empowered to enhance their electoral competitiveness in locally-desirable ways through inter-association fund-transfers. The data reviewed here suggest a combination of central and local factors for sharing money, but financial resources are ultimately controlled by the local party organization. This is evident because, as discussed in

Chapter 3, less than half of the local party organizations with more than enough money to share actually did so in 2008 and 2011. There would likely be a higher participation rate if the central party had the ability to command local resources. Control over resources means local party organizations can continue operating with relative independence from the central office.

Playing in the Margins

The Conservative Party of Canada managed to increase its parliamentary influence by encouraging collaboration between mature and developing local party organizations.

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Collaboration had the effect of minimizing resource overages in ridings with predictable outcomes, while increasing the campaign effort made by constituency campaigns in ridings with higher electoral instability. The movement of support helped improve the Conservative Party’s electoral results in 2008 and 2011. It was one mechanism through which the party could shift campaign effort from regions with many strongholds, such as Alberta, to competitive districts in

British Columbia, Ontario, and Atlantic Canada. Evidence from the Conservative Party demonstrates the profound impact local party organizations have within and beyond riding boundaries.

Local party organizations remain vibrant and critically important mechanisms of electoral politics that will continue to adapt to changing circumstances. The elimination of the per-vote subsidy paid to central party offices (Fair Elections Act 2013) will likely increase resource scarcity within parties. Parties will come to rely more on well-resourced local organizations in uncompetitive districts for resolving resource disequilibrium in the party system. It remains to be seen whether resolving disequilibrium will manifest as local-to-central transfers or inter-association fund-transfers. However, the current party finance regime places a premium on generating financial support locally. Building grassroots associations capable of generating an overage of resources and sharing them with others will reward political parties into the future. Parties and party systems will become further attached to the grassroots.

Implications for Political Parties as Stratarchical Institutions

Collaboration between local party organizations has implications for party organization.

Riding associations and constituency campaigns play an irreducible role in Canadian politics.

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While central party offices are concerned with funding media campaigns, touring party leaders, and to an extent coordinating operations on the ground, local party organizations are busy finding competent activists, generating volunteers, and raising money necessary for prosecuting the upcoming election campaign. The collaboration explored in this thesis adds one additional task carried out by local party organizations: assisting under-resourced campaigns in more competitive ridings.

How local party organizations contribute to campaign effort in other ridings will differ between political parties. Cadre-style parties may be better capable of fostering local collaboration because of looser associations between party components. Mature and developing local party organizations in cadre-style parties are more likely to have the flexibility for collaboration because of fewer bureaucratized operations. Cadre-style parties are more likely to be comprised of local party organizations that assemble highly competent activists who can successfully balance sensitivity to local concerns with central party focus.

The Conservative Party had the most consequential amounts of collaboration. Their unique mechanism for funding under-resourced campaigns may be an ideological remnant from the Reform Party. The new Conservative Party of Canada kept close is activist base by not empowering local teams from a domineering central body, but from grassroots activists located in other ridings. Nevertheless, collaboration is only possible with excess resources. The

Conservatives had 159 riding associations that amassed more than $50,000 in 2011, compared to the 67 in the Liberal Party (see Table 3.5). Some Liberal Party associations (like the Calgary

Southwest Liberal Party riding association) also made inter-district fund-transfers, but they

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were so few that it had little impact on the party structure or campaign operation. This may change for the Liberals following the rebuild of the party which culminated in their election victory in 2015. Students of parties and elections may wish to monitor collaboration inside cadre-style parties into the future.

Local collaboration is less likely to develop in mass-style parties, like the New

Democratic Party of Canada. The bureaucratic operations of the NDP suggest that the central party office will “tax” local organizations, instead of encourage local coordination. The NDP had the highest degree of centralization. Recall from Chapter 3 that the central party versus local fund-transfer ratio for the NDP was three times more than the Liberal Party and nearly sixty times more than the Conservative Party in 2011 (see table 3.7). This is consistent with previous studies that determined NDP campaigns are more bureaucratic and more dependent on long- time activists, similar to mass parties (Carty 1991; Coletto and Eagles 2011; Sayers 1999). NDP local party organizations are more homogenous, bureaucratic, and consequently less able to deviate from the central party office. For these reasons, it is more likely that the NDP will continue to organize in different ways than the cadre-style Conservative and Liberal Party.

The transformation in how local party organizations overcome resource disequilibrium signifies the evolution of new organizational features, specifically in the Conservative Party of

Canada. Evidence from the Conservative Party demonstrates that linkages can form between local party organizations in enough size and magnitude to limit the domineering influence of central party offices. Local party organizations – candidates, campaign teams, and long-term party activists – may be able to assert their operational independence by relying on other local

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party organizations for support. While it is unlikely this will reduce party cohesion, local party collaboration offers an alternative mechanism for exercising influence within party organizations.

The influence once held by high profile candidates Jim Prentice and Jason Kenney in the

Conservative Party was likely bolstered by the contributions made by their local party organizations during federal elections. Future studies may wish to test the hypotheses about inter-district funding raised in Chapter 4. The most notable is determining whether inter-district funding is used a method for intra-party coalition building. One way to test this is to compare inter-district funding networks with parliamentary voting blocs inside one party caucus. For example, free votes in Parliament may reveal the social conservative and red tory “parts” of the

Conservative Party of Canada. These divisions can be compared to the origin and destination of inter-district fund-transfers. The comparison may expose inter-district funding to be a component intra-party coalition building. If so, local party collaboration has implications for leadership selection in future party systems.

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Appendix A: Conservative Party “Registered Association” Fund- Transfer Reports (*) equates election year fund transfers occurring after Election day.

Calgary Centre-North Conservative Party Electoral District Association Year District Inflows Outflows Date Conservative Party Surrey North $ 6,000.00 Conservative Party Outremont $ 3,000.00 13-Dec-07 2007 Conservative Party Outremont $ 7,000.00 13-Dec-07 Conservative Party Roberval Lac $ 5,000.00 13-Dec-07 Conservative Party St Hyacinthe $ 5,000.00 13-Dec-07 Edmonton Centre Conservative Assoc $ 1,000.00 London North Centre Conservative Assoc $ 3,000.00 Repentigny Conservative Assoc $ 1,800.00 St Hyacinthe Conservative Assoc $ 5,000.00 Ajax Pickering Conservative Assoc $ 10,000.00 24-Sep-08 Avalon Conservative Assoc $ 10,000.00 15-Sep-08 Charleswood St James Conservative Assoc $ 2,000.00 13-Nov-08 Gaspesie Conservative Assoc $ 10,000.00 24-Sep-08 2008 Guelph Conservative Assoc $ 20,000.00 04-Sep-08 Kenora Conservative Assoc $ 10,000.00 24-Sep-08 *Kitchener Waterloo Conservative Assoc $ 5,000.00 15-Nov-08 Leona, Aglukkaq $ 10,000.00 06-Sep-08 Newmarket Aurora Conservative Assoc $ 10,000.00 24-Sep-08 Pickering Scarborough Conservative Assoc $ 10,000.00 24-Sep-08 St. Lambert Conservative Assoc $ 15,000.00 04-Sep-08 Thornhill Conservative Assoc $ 10,000.00 24-Sep-08 Western Arctic Conservative Assoc $ 10,000.00 24-Sep-08 Kenora Conservative Association $ 6,000.00 St. Lambert Conservative Assocation $ 9,000.00 2009 Thornhill Conservative Association $ 6,000.00 Montmagny Conservative Association $ 10,000.00 27-Oct-09 Kitchener - Gaspesie Les Iles EDA $ 6,000.00 2010 Kitchener - Waterloo EDA Association $ 3,000.00 Montmagny - EDA $ 6,000.00 Brampton West - EDA $ 5,000.00 21-Apr-11 2011 Oak Ridges - Markham EDA $ 5,000.00 21-Apr-11 Winnipeg South Centre EDA $ 5,000.00 21-Apr-11 Total $52,800.00 $ 177,000.00

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Calgary Southeast Conservative Party Electoral District Association Year District Inflows Outflows Date 2007 Conservative Fund Canada York North Constituency A $ 4,000.00 Repentigny Conservative Association $ 1,500.00 Association du Parti Conservative Brome Missisquoi $ 5,000.00 2008-09-05 Bonavista-Gander-Grand Falls-Windsor Conservative $ 5,000.00 2008-09-05 Desnethe Missinippi Churchill River Conservative E $ 5,000.00 2008-01-16 Mississauga East-Cooksville Conservative Associati $ 5,000.00 2008-09-05 New Westminister-Coquitlam Conservative EDA $ 5,000.00 2008-01-16 2008 Ottawa-Vanier Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2008-09-05 Parkdale-High Park Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2008-09-05 Random-Burin-St. George's Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2008-09-05 Richmond Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2008-01-16 Saint Boniface Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2008-09-05 *St John's East Conservative Association $ 1,000.00 2008-11-08 Association du Parti Conservative Brome Missisquoi $ 5,000.00 2009 Saint Boniface Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 Association du Parti Conservatuer Hachelaga $ 8,000.00 2010-09-24 Cape Breton Canso $ 2,500.00 2010-10-22 Cape Breton Canso $ 2,500.00 2010-06-23 Esquaimalt Juan de Fuca $ 5,000.00 2010-10-06 2010 Sydney Victoria $ 1,000.00 2010-10-29 Vaughn Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2010-10-22 Winnipeg North Conservative Assoc $ 5,000.00 2011-04-13 Brampton West Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2011-04-13 Burnaby Douglas Conservative Association $ 12,500.00 2011-04-14 Cape Breton Canso $ 700.00 2011-03-11 Esquimalt Douglas Conservative Association $ 7,500.00 2011-04-14 Etobicoke Centre Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2011-04-12 Guelph Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2011-04-12 Malpeque Conservative Association $ 7,500.00 2011-04-20 Mississauga East Conservative Association $ 10,000.00 2011-04-12 2011 Peirrefonds Conservative Association $ 7,500.00 2011-04-11 Shefford Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2011-04-18 Sydney Victoria Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2011-04-18 *Vancouver Centre Conservative Association $ 977.22 2011-12-28 Vancouver East Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2011-04-19 Vancouver Kingsway Conservative Association $ 12,500.00 2011-04-21 Welland Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2011-04-11 York West Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2011-04-15 Total $ 15,500.00 $ 179,177.22

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Calgary Southwest Conservative Party Electoral District Association Year District Inflows Outflows Date Conservative Outremont 24047 $ 12,000.00 20-Dec-07 2007 Conservative Roberval-Lac Saint-Jean 24060 $ 9,000.00 20-Dec-07 Conservative Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot 24063 $ 9,000.00 20-Dec-07 Conservative Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot $ 9,000.00 Montmorency-Charlevoix-Haute $ 6,000.00 Avalon $ 10,000.00 07-Sep-08 Compton-Stanstead $ 5,000.00 06-Oct-08 Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill River $ 10,000.00 23-Sep-08 Fleetwood Port Kells $ 10,000.00 01-Oct-08 Guelph $ 10,000.00 28-Aug-08 Guelph $ 10,000.00 23-Sep-08 Kamloops-Thompson-Cariboo $ 10,000.00 07-Oct-08 Miramichi $ 10,000.00 03-Oct-08 2008 Mississauga-Brampton South $ 10,000.00 02-Oct-08 Montmorency-Charlevoix-Haute $ 10,000.00 12-Sep-08 Nunavut $ 10,000.00 28-Sep-08 Quebec $ 10,000.00 27-Sep-08 Random-Burin-St. George $ 10,000.00 27-Sep-08 Saint-Lambert $ 10,000.00 28-Aug-08 St. John's East $ 10,000.00 23-Sep-08 Surrey North $ 10,000.00 01-Oct-08 Yukon $ 5,000.00 10-Oct-08 Yukon $ 5,000.00 09-Oct-08 Compton-Stanstead $ 3,000.00 Fleetwood-Port Kells EDA $ 6,000.00 Kamloops-Thompson-Cariboo EDA $ 6,000.00 Mississauga-Brampton South EDA $ 6,000.00 Quebec EDA $ 6,000.00 Surrey North EDA $ 6,000.00 2009 Yukon EDA $ 6,000.00 Cumberland-Colchester-Musquadoboit EDA $ 10,000.00 19-Oct-09 New West-Coquitlam EDA $ 10,000.00 12-Nov-09 Parti Conservateur Hochelaga EDA $ 10,000.00 12-Oct-09 Parti Conservateur Montmagny-L'Islet EDA $ 10,000.00 15-Oct-09 Vancouver South $ 10,000.00 05-Nov-09 Calgary East $ 270.00 Miramichi $ 6,000.00 Roberval Lac St Jean $ 9,000.00 2010 Cape Breton-Canso $ 10,000.00 13-Oct-10 Haldimand-Norfolk $ 3,839.50 14-May-10 Sydney-Victoria $ 2,000.00 28-Jul-10 Cumberland-Colchester-Musquadoboit EDA $ 6,000.00 Hochelaga $ 6,000.00 Kings-Hants $ 3,000.00 Montmagny-L'Islet $ 6,000.00 New West-Coquitlam EDA $ 6,000.00 Wascana $ 6,000.00 Winnipeg South Centre $ 6,000.00 Avalon $ 10,000.00 13-Apr-11 Bonavista-Gander-Grand Falls-Windsor $ 5,000.00 29-Apr-11 Brampton West $ 10,000.00 15-Apr-11 Brossard-La Prairie $ 10,000.00 12-Apr-11 Cape Breton-Canso $ 5,000.00 21-Apr-11 Cumberland-Colchester-Musquadoboit EDA $ 5,000.00 29-Apr-11 Elmwood-Transcona $ 10,000.00 07-Apr-11 2011 Humber-St. Barbe-Baie Verte $ 10,000.00 14-Apr-11 Kings-Hants $ 5,000.00 29-Apr-11 Labrador $ 10,000.00 18-Apr-11 Markham-Unionville $ 10,000.00 07-Apr-11 Mississauga-Brampton South EDA $ 10,000.00 04-Apr-11 Newton-North Delta $ 10,000.00 21-Apr-11 Oak Ridges - Markham $ 10,000.00 04-Apr-11 Richmond Hill $ 10,000.00 04-Apr-11 St. John's East $ 10,000.00 07-Apr-11 St. John's South - Mount Pearl $ 10,000.00 18-Apr-11 Wascana $ 10,000.00 19-Apr-11 West Nova $ 20,000.00 18-Apr-11 Winnipeg North $ 10,000.00 21-Apr-11 Winnipeg South Centre $ 10,000.00 18-Apr-11 Total $ 108,270.00 $ 460,839.50

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Desnethé–Missinippi–Churchill River Conservative Party Electoral District Association Year District Inflows Outflows Date Nepean Carleton $ 3,500.00 31-Dec-07 Okanagan Coquihalla Conservative Association $ 2,000.00 31-Dec-07 2007 Saskatoon Rosetown Biggar $ 500.00 31-Dec-07 Vegreville Wainwright Conservative Association $ 3,000.00 31-Dec-07 Battleford-Lloydminster $ 5,000.00 Battlefords-Lloydminister Conservative $ 5,000.00 Blackstrap Conservative Association $ 1,000.00 Blackstrap Conservative Association $ 2,000.00 Calgary Southeast Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 Calgary Southwest $ 10,000.00 Crowfoot EDA $ 20,000.00 Kings-Hant Conservative Association $ 100.00 Kootnay-Columbia Conservative Association $ 2,000.00 Lethbridge Conservative Association $ 10,000.00 2008 Okanagan Shuswap Conservative Association $ 1,000.00 Okanagan-Coquihalla $ 1,000.00 Palliser Conservative Association $ 3,000.00 Prince Albert Conservative Associaiton $ 5,000.00 Saskatoon Humboldt $ 2,000.00 Saskatoon Humboldt $ 2,500.00 Saskatoon Rosetown Bigger Conservative $ 5,000.00 Souris Moose Mountain Conservative $ 2,000.00 Souris Moose Mountain Conservative $ 5,000.00 Yorkton-Melville Conservative Association $ 1,000.00 Yorkton-Melville Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 2010 Palliser $ 5,000.00 Battlefords/Lloydminster $ 7,000.00 Battlefords/Lloydminster $ 10,000.00 Calgary Nosehill $ 10,000.00 Cypress Hills/ Grasslands $ 5,000.00 Edmonton LeDuc $ 10,000.00 Palliser $ 5,000.00 Prince Albert $ 5,000.00 2011 Saskatoon / Wanuskewin $ 5,000.00 Saskatoon Biggar Rosetown $ 5,000.00 Saskatoon /Humboldt $ 5,000.00 Souris Moose Mountain $ 2,500.00 St. Catherines $ 5,000.00 Yellowhead $ 10,000.00 Yorkton $ 5,000.00 Total $ 187,100.00 $ 9,000.00

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Fleetwood - Port Kells Conservative Party Electoral District Association Year District Inflows Outflows Date Calgary Centre Conservative EDA $ 2,500.00 11-Dec-08 Calgary Southwest Conservative $ 10,000.00 Kootenay - Columbia Conservative $ 10,000.00 Okanagan - Coquihalla Conservative $ 1,000.00 2008 Port Moody - Westwood - PoCo Conservative $ 5,000.00 Prince George - Peace River Conservative $ 5,000.00 South Surrey - WR - Cloverdale Conservative $ 10,000.00 Vancouver Quadra Conservative $ 10,000.00 Wild Rose Conservative $ 10,000.00 Calgary Southwest Conservative $ 6,000.00 19-Jun-09 Esquimalt Juan De Fuca Conservative $ 500.00 13-Oct-09 Kootenay - Columbia Conservative $ 6,000.00 19-Jun-09 Langley Conservative $ 1,000.00 13-Oct-09 New Westminister-Coquitlam Conservative $ 500.00 13-Oct-09 2009 Port Moody - Westwood - PoCo Conservative $ 5,000.00 19-Jun-09 Prince George - Peace River Conservative $ 2,500.00 19-Jun-09 South Surrey - WR - Cloverdale Conservative $ 10,000.00 19-Jun-09 Vancouver Quadra Conservative $ 10,000.00 19-Jun-09 Wild Rose Conservative $ 10,000.00 19-Jun-09 2011 CPC Kelowna Lake Country EDA $ 10,000.00 Totals $ 71,000.00 $ 54,000.00

Welland Conservative Party Electoral District Association Year District Inflows Outflows Date Edmonton Mills Woods EDA $ 12,000.00 Edmonton Strathcona EDA $ 5,000.00 Lambton Kent Middlesex EDA $ 5,000.00 2008 Lanark Frontenac EDA $ 10,000.00 Oxford EDA $ 5,000.00 Perth Wellington EDA $ 13,000.00 Totals $ 50,000.00

Random–Burin–St. George's Conservative Party Electoral District Association Year District Inflows Outflows Date Calgary South East Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 Calgary South West Conservative Association $ 10,000.00 2008 Nepean Carleton Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 Red Deer Conservative Association $ 10,000.00 Wetaskiwin Conservative Association $ 10,000.00 BRUCE-GREY-OWENSOUND $ 10,000.00 31-Aug-10 2010 NEPEAN-CARLETON ASS $ 5,000.00 31-Jul-10 Brandon-Souris Cons Ass $ 5,000.00 St.John's East Cons Ass $ 10,000.00 2011 Wetaskiwin Cons.Ass $ 10,000.00 Red Deer Cons Ass $ 6,000.00 31-May-11 *Wetaskiwin Cons Ass $ 6,000.00 13-Apr-11 Totals $ 65,000.00 $ 27,000.00

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Vancouver Kingsway Conservative Party Electoral District Association Year District Inflows Outflows Date CPC Abbotsford $ 10,000.00 CPC Okanagan-Coquihalla $ 10,000.00 2008 CPC Vancouver East $ 9,375.63 CPC Vancouver Quadra $ 10,000.00 Burnaby - New West $ 100.00 Burnaby Douglas $ 100.00 Chilliwack $ 100.00 Fleetwood - Port Kells $ 100.00 Langley $ 50.00 New West - Coquitlam $ 100.00 Newton - North Delta $ 100.00 2009 North Vancouver $ 100.00 Port Moody $ 100.00 South Surrey $ 100.00 Surrey North $ 100.00 Vancouver Quadra $ 200.00 Vancouver South $ 100.00 West Vancouver $ 100.00 North Vancouver Conservative Association $ 350.00 North Vancouver Conservative Association $ 2,635.75 North Vancouver Conservative Association $ 150.00 North Vancouver Conservative Association $ 300.00 2010 Abbotsford Conservative EDA $ 6,000.00 09-Nov-10 North Vancouver Conservative Association $ 240.00 05-Mar-10 Okanagan-Coquihalla Conservative Association $ 6,000.00 09-Nov-10 Vancouver Quadra CPC EDA $ 6,000.00 10-Apr-10 Calgary Southeast CPC EDA $ 12,500.00 North Vancouver Conservative Association $ 5,000.00 Okanagan-Coquihalla Conservative Association $ 30,000.00 2011 Vancouver Quadra CPC EDA $ 20,000.00 Abbotsford Conservative EDA $ 160.00 05-Mar-11 *Okanagan-Coquihalla Conservative Association $ 18,000.00 16-Nov-11 *Vancouver Quadra CPC EDA $ 20,000.00 16-Nov-11 Totals $111,761.38 $ 56,400.00

Vancouver Quadra Year District Inflows Outflows Date Fleetwood-Port Kells Conservative EDA $ 10,000.00 21-Sep-08 Surrey North Conservative EDA $ 10,000.00 21-Sep-08 2008 Vancouver East Conservative EDA $ 2,000.00 21-Sep-08 Vancouver Kingsway Conservative EDA $ 10,000.00 21-Sep-08 2009 New West-Coquitlam EDA $ 10,000.00 25-Aug-09 2010 Vancouver Centre EDA $ 476.72 Totals $ 476.72 $ 42,000.00

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Appendix B: Local Party Organization Case Profiles Inter-district Outflow Stronghold Case: Calgary Southwest Constituency Campaigns CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11

Vote Percentage 0.7296 0.7512 0.0931 0.0720 0.0776 0.1192 EDA Fundraising 61,574.25 80,507.50 13,590.64 2,743.95 130.00 150.00 Candidate Fundraising 20,840.00 11,088.34 2,797.77 3,419.33 200.00 850.00 EDA Savings 241,826.30 255,700.84 6,486.03 16,411.06 2,630.87 812.80 EDA Inflow 15,000.00 39,000.00 0.00 752.00 0.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 165,000.00 200,000.00 0.00 16,174.08 0.00 0.00 Central Inflow 0.00 26,420.79 271.13 625.00 0.00 0.00 Central Outflow 10,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 30,000.00 68,000.00 11,895.00 22,075.00 2,650.00 800.00 Campaign Spending 61,102.30 62,435.90 14,070.55 14,171.18 1,719.41 1,112.70 District Expense Limit 92,155.66 97,126.16 92,155.66 97,126.16 92,155.66 97,126.16 Inter-district Outflow Stronghold Case: Calgary Centre-North Constituency Campaigns CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11 Vote Percentage 0.5654 0.5653 0.1178 0.1400 0.1532 0.1599 EDA Fundraising 196,340.00 5,490.00 3,350.60 27,306.39 2,575.00 3,600.00 Candidate Fundraising 19,970.00 9,811.01 1,797.77 13,515.00 9,915.00 715.00 EDA Savings 186,542.49 277,270.80 5,896.61 20,613.52 17,087.84 21,729.31 EDA Inflow 10,800.00 6,000.00 629.06 983.60 0.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 122,000.00 15,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Central Inflow 9,916.50 5,629.70 1,117.50 1,537.50 0.00 90.00 Central Outflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 65,000.00 0.00 10,340.00 30,200.00 12,506.76 15,250.00 Campaign Spending 67,125.62 82,363.77 12,025.64 55,742.32 24,956.64 15,914.50 District Expense Limit 88,581.95 90,413.51 88,581.95 90,413.51 88,581.95 90,413.51 Inter-district Outflow Stronghold Case: Calgary Southeast Constituency Campaigns CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08 NDP11 Vote Percentage 0.7389 0.7626 0.0870 0.0636 0.0718 0.1026 EDA Fundraising 36,913.54 144,432.50 400.00 1,252.00 200.00 0.00 Candidate Fundraising 43,124.03 36,650.00 0.00 6,625.00 120.00 0.00 EDA Savings 211,028.59 291,578.94 15,404.61 10,136.65 1,489.63 886.87 EDA Inflow 1,500.00 12,300.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 51,000.00 99,177.22 0.00 346.00 0.00 0.00 Central Inflow 10,959.85 22,349.43 0.00 279.00 0.00 67.50 Central Outflow 0.00 130,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 20,000.00 47,500.00 5,000.00 3,000.00 1,400.00 100.00 Campaign Spending 40,321.62 54,157.92 0.00 11,237.41 5,081.59 4.95 District Expense Limit 96,650.13 104,090.70 96,650.13 104,090.70 96,650.13 104,090.70

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Inter-district Inflow Battleground Case: Desnethé–Missinippi–Churchill River Constituency Campaigns CPC08* CPC11* LPC08 LPC11 NDP 08 NDP11 Vote Percentage 0.4667 0.4793 0.3028 0.0522 0.1777 0.4430 EDA Fundraising 7,960.00 7,690.00 46,020.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Candidate Fundraising 10,514.28 1,165.07 0.00 2,350.00 300.00 2,280.00 EDA Savings 17,365.59 17,000.53 1,033.64 -1,445.09 5,375.11 5,887.25 EDA Inflow 92,600.00 89,500.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Central Inflow 3,071.50 2,025.50 0.00 17,794.03 0.00 52,183.88 Central Outflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 98,000.00 93,282.27 48,300.00 6,678.54 0.00 50,200.00 Campaign Spending 81,065.93 74,870.83 88,313.65 57,456.55 1,459.38 74,655.24 District Expense Limit 90,390.18 93,282.27 90,390.18 93,282.27 90,390.18 93,282.27 Inter-district Inflow Battleground Case: Fleetwood - Port Kells Constituency Campaigns CPC08* CPC11* LPC08 LPC11 NDP 08 NDP11 Vote Percentage 0.4470 0.4755 0.2613 0.1596 0.2281 0.3282 EDA Fundraising 4,672.84 2,625.00 8,327.00 5,715.00 2,120.00 1,600.00 Candidate Fundraising 34,325.00 18,050.00 29,279.00 35,070.00 19,736.00 9,300.36 EDA Savings 19,997.72 48,872.45 12,386.02 1,762.09 20,809.90 6,542.96 EDA Inflow 61,000.00 10,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 2,500.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Central Inflow 6,699.50 4,094.00 720.00 0.00 0.00 4,009.23 Central Outflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 150.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 67,650.00 49,475.56 8,800.00 5,350.00 31,359.78 36,649.00 Campaign Spending 79,909.07 88,284.75 75,331.48 75,689.78 65,022.16 38,178.41 District Expense Limit 88,578.77 97,178.36 88,578.77 97,178.36 88,578.77 97,178.36 Inter-district Inflow Battleground Case: Welland Constituency Campaigns CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08* NDP11* Vote Percentage 0.3232 0.4024 0.2793 0.1401 0.3291 0.4221 EDA Fundraising 11,915.00 13,889.10 14,179.00 5,835.00 19,323.00 5,180.00 Candidate Fundraising 5,580.68 10,400.00 17,389.00 16,582.64 21,755.00 29,395.00 EDA Savings 25,360.19 19,371.00 40,092.00 55,549.00 1,816.07 30,859.02 EDA Inflow 50,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Central Inflow 0.00 1,325.50 538.14 18,726.00 0.00 90.00 Central Outflow 0.00 0.00 165.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 83,414.00 76,000.00 0.00 51,000.00 9,679.77 27,391.94 Campaign Spending 84,413.78 90,692.59 84,267.14 63,780.98 67,118.52 79,924.37 District Expense Limit 88,894.59 90,793.98 88,894.59 90,793.98 88,894.59 90,793.98

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Inter-district Inflow Other Party Stronghold Case: Random–Burin–St. George's Constituency Campaigns CPC08 CPC11 LPC08* LPC11* NDP08 NDP11 Vote Percentage 0.2050 0.3200 0.5372 0.4965 0.2380 0.1717 EDA Fundraising 8,825.00 0.00 10,930.00 4,964.00 50.00 0.00 Candidate Fundraising 0.00 19,150.00 8,300.00 18,595.00 4,132.00 0.00 EDA Savings 9,808.53 23,236.61 4,640.85 18,018.23 406.72 2,151.96 EDA Inflow 40,000.00 25,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 0.00 12,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Central Inflow 0.00 0.00 194.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 Central Outflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 0.00 31,000.00 18,494.46 17,069.00 390.00 200.00 Campaign Spending 86,684.21 59,520.12 28,495.04 33,687.32 5,574.70 9.13 District Expense Limit 91,603.70 94,623.02 91,603.70 94,623.02 91,603.70 94,623.02 Inter-district Inflow Other Party Stronghold Case: Vancouver Kingsway Constituency Campaigns CPC08 CPC11 LPC08 LPC11 NDP08* NDP11* Vote Percentage 0.2742 0.2810 0.2906 0.1665 0.3518 0.5008 EDA Fundraising 11,645.00 13,185.00 47,668.08 35,230.00 33,090.39 34,377.84 Candidate Fundraising 4,850.00 540.00 4,052.00 0.00 33,102.30 18,892.08 EDA Savings 16,442.62 39,282.46 70,892.59 66,485.04 14,620.41 50,060.36 EDA Inflow 39,375.63 67,500.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 0.00 38,160.00 0.00 0.00 125.00 0.00 Central Inflow 1,607.00 1,828.30 925.36 285.00 0.00 5,596.20 Central Outflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 30,424.35 87,000.00 63,000.00 95,236.00 56,420.00 47,155.00 Campaign Spending 70,829.58 81,870.26 79,758.46 83,368.33 81,501.16 76,881.67 District Expense Limit 84,757.87 88,454.41 84,757.87 88,454.41 84,757.87 88,454.41 Inter-district Outflow Other Party Stronghold Case: Vancouver Quadra Constituency Campaigns CPC08 CPC11 LPC08* LPC11* NDP08 NDP11 Vote Percentage 0.3692 0.3864 0.4559 0.4217 0.0807 0.1381 EDA Fundraising 85,860.00 43,589.10 88,919.86 75,765.94 37,165.00 10,970.00 Candidate Fundraising 64,960.00 24,175.00 0.00 3,352.00 0.00 2,430.00 EDA Savings 96,186.57 166,957.48 58,999.47 107,797.34 25,364.76 14,332.93 EDA Inflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,750.00 0.00 EDA Outflow 32,000.00 0.00 1,227.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 Central Inflow 11,450.89 18,108.80 5,776.22 2,695.00 1,245.60 247.50 Central Outflow 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,500.00 80.00 0.00 Candidate Transfer 98,000.00 71,000.00 135,000.00 90,000.00 53,880.47 20,000.00 Campaign Spending 83,516.36 88,267.03 79,096.95 76,330.98 19,537.01 14,179.96 District Expense Limit 89,045.82 91,721.98 89,045.82 91,721.98 89,045.82 91,721.98

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