ADAM N. STULBERG
Nuclear Regionalism in Russia: Decentralization and Control in the Nuclear Complex
ADAM N. STULBERG
Adam N. Stulberg is Assistant Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Previously, he was as a consultant at RAND and Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies(CNS). He has written several articles and monographs on the strategic implications of Russian regionalism, as well as on energy security issues in the former Soviet Union.
ne of the dangerous casualties of Russia’s demo- Often overlooked in this assessment of the breakdown cratic and market transition has been the weak- of authority in the Russian nuclear sector is the impact of ening of centralized control over the country’s regionalism. The issues and plethora of analysis tied to O 1 nuclear complex. Amid the rubble of the Soviet collapse fiscal federalism, new forms of local governance, and emerged a fragmented and penetrated state characterized oscillations in center-periphery relations in Russia, for the by confused responsibilities for nuclear weapons, materi- most part, have not seeped into discussion or practical als, technologies, and facilities dispersed across Russia. thinking about the stability and control of the nuclear Preying on this weakness, a mélange of independent- sector. While analysts have identified the conditions that minded bureaucrats, enterprise managers, organized crimi- confront specific nuclear institutes and touched on civil- nal networks, and other “insiders” have managed on military ties at the local level, there has been a dearth of occasion to wrangle licit and illicit access to weapons- systematic inquiry into how and to what effect regional usable nuclear materials and technologies.2 Accordingly, political offices “matter” for managing Russia’s nuclear the presumption of a benign but “dysfunctional” Russian complex.4 Western assistance providers tend to gloss over state that is either unaware or unable to control the deal- sub-federal levels in policy reviews of specific programs, ings of public, quasi-public, and private actors typically and to attribute subversion of program objectives either lies at the heart of international concerns about the pro- to bureaucratic opportunism, the entrepreneurial skill of liferation, safety, and accountability of the country’s specific nuclear facility directors, or to poaching by crimi- nuclear inheritance. As summed up by a highly respected nal conspirators.5 Given the national security issues at review of U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia, the stake, the legacy of monolithic control of the Soviet vulnerability of WMD material to theft and transfer to nuclear sector, and the enduring hierarchical structure of terrorists or rogue states prompted by the loosening of the residual Russian nuclear complex, nuclear regional- Moscow’s grip constitutes the “most urgent unmet national ism in Russia strikes many as unexpected. Accordingly, security threat to the United States today.”3 regional interference is typically dismissed as an ad hoc
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 31 NUCLEAR REGIONALISM IN RUSSIA phenomenon, suggestive of the limitations of the Russian assistance programs involving Western countries. Conse- state in performing basic functions, including mainte- quently, this analysis gives pause to the pervasive pessi- nance of stable command and control of nuclear materials mism regarding the link between decentralized power and and facilities. lack of control of Russia’s nuclear complex, as well as to Nevertheless, neglect of regionalism and its blanket recent optimism that Putin’s recentralization reforms will association with “loss of control” is both outdated and insulate Russia’s nuclear policies from the rough and problematic for understanding the link between decen- tumble of regional politics.6 tralization and the risk of nuclear anarchy in Russia. As This article draws on the empirical and analytical this article will demonstrate, there is considerable evi- findings of a major study of nuclear regionalism in Russia dence of regular and multifaceted intrusion by oblast- and conducted by American and Russian specialists.7 Data was local-level political elements into the formulation and gathered from extensive field research on the regional implementation of Russia’s nuclear policies and related political and economic dynamics surrounding various cooperative assistance programs. Since the Soviet col- nuclear enterprises and closed cities; detailed study of the lapse, this involvement has ranged from threats issued by strategies, structures, and responsibilities of the Russian regional politicians to commandeer strategic nuclear Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Atomic forces; to attempts at flaunting centrally imposed nuclear Energy (Minatom); and interviews with U.S. officials safety and reform measures for purposes of rent seeking, charged with conducting cooperative assistance programs. economic relief, or regional politics; to the formation of As used in this article, “nuclear regionalism” refers to the regional-industrial lobbies at the federal level forged autonomy of sub-federal political actors to formulate and around mutual interests in expanding nuclear power gen- implement Russia’s nuclear policies.8 Accordingly, it is a eration. Moreover, this subversion of national policy by relative concept that only at an extreme encompasses the regional and local interests has persisted in the face of issue of separatism. To be clear, however, research to date Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerted campaign has not uncovered evidence of nuclear separatism, nor is to strengthen the vertical chain of command across that the focus of the analysis below. Russia. On the other hand, the effects of nuclear region- The article proceeds first with a review of the shift- alism have not been uniformly disruptive, and in some ing sands of regionalism in Russia, underscoring the scope instances have bolstered transparency and oversight of of post-Soviet center-periphery relations and the limits Russia’s nuclear complex. Regional involvement at times to Putin’s attempt at restoring federal control over has abetted implementation of cooperative assistance pro- policymaking. The second section recounts the uncertain- grams, removing political and economic barriers at both ties surrounding the ability of Russian policymaking to the federal and local levels. In short, regionalism in manage the nuclear complex. This analysis examines the Russia appears to be both more prevalent and less damag- hierarchical structure of the Russian nuclear complex and ing to the integrity and stability of the nuclear complex persistent gaps in the distribution of power and responsi- than is commonly assumed. How do we explain this mixed bility for oversight. The third section outlines how sub- record? federal politicians exploit the strategic situations in which Applying a political “principal-agent” analysis, this they have been placed, specifying the dimensions of article highlights the incentives encouraging regional regional intrusion into Russian nuclear policymaking. The autonomy and attendant managerial challenges posed by article then assesses the various implications that “region- the separation of centralized power and control over alism” has for controlling and stabilizing Russia’s nuclear Russia’s nuclear complex. This approach illuminates a sector. The conclusion offers practical guidelines for variety of dimensions to oblast- and local-level influence refining U.S. cooperative nonproliferation assistance in on nuclear policymaking in Russia, with different conse- light of these findings. quences for administrative control and nonproliferation concerns. It demonstrates that weak and vulnerable regional leadership can create conditions ripe for official PRAGMATIC REGIONALISM IN RUSSIA and unofficial elements to exploit the nuclear sector. During the first five years of the post-Soviet transition, Alternatively, strong sub-federal administrative bodies the governing capacity of the Russian Federation was enjoy considerable leeway to subvert federal policies at threatened by fragmentation. The intensity of centrifu- the local level, while constraining the opportunism of fed- gal and centripetal pressures shifted in concert with the eral agencies and expediting cooperative nonproliferation struggle for political control between the executive and
32 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 ADAM N. STULBERG legislative branches of the federal government. Russian Russian government. The new leadership focused atten- federalism was tantamount to a multi-level political game tion first on “correcting” egregious contradictions between in which the 89 administrative components of Russia regional and federal laws and practices, as well as on (consisting of 21 ethnically defined republics and 68 ter- increasing the center’s control over the international ritorially defined regions) vied with each other for prefer- interactions of the regions. The government then passed ential treatment and subsidies from the center, while rival a series of laws and decrees that fundamentally reorga- branches of the federal government sought to outbid each nized the institutional relationship between the center other to garner support from the provinces.9 During times and the provinces. The most conspicuous reforms of intense constitutional and political crisis at the center, included creating seven new federal districts, each headed regional leaders succeeded in wresting greater autonomy by a presidential envoy; stripping regional leaders of to decide policies. Alternatively, during periods of con- ex officio membership to the upper chamber of Parlia- solidated executive control, regional offices remained rela- ment, the Federation Council; and introducing new norms tively in tow with the federal government. for impeaching regional authorities acting in violation of Following the outbreak of the first war in Chechnya the constitution.12 Subsequently added to this hard-nosed (1994-1996) and in the run-up to the 1996 presidential posture were political gambits explicitly aimed to induce election, center-periphery tensions entered a second deference from some of the country’s most independent- phase. In an effort to shore up his regional flank, Russian minded governors. To date, Putin has forged ahead with President Boris Yeltsin agreed to broaden the tax and fis- these policies in the name of bolstering the efficiency and cal authorities of the governors at the expense of local uniformity of federal field operations, creating an inte- and federal legislative bodies. To arrest a potential sepa- grated political and economic space across Russia, ratist contagion among some republics and the movement strengthening central monitoring of local practices, and toward sovereign status (but not full independence) by adding greater coherence to the country’s diplomacy. several other rebellious ethnic republics (and later While the reforms are ongoing, preliminary evidence oblasts), Yeltsin signed a series of asymmetrical bilateral suggests that Putin has succeeded in restricting the scope treaties that conferred variable regional rights over natu- of center-periphery relations, imposing new rules of the ral resources and foreign trade. Yeltsin also moved to pla- game that favor the federal government. This newfound cate local sensitivities by relinquishing presidential authority is manifest primarily in strengthened capacities authority to appoint regional leaders, which allowed the to rein in maverick governors and selectively induce latter to stand for election. After the March 1997 guber- local compliance with federal priorities. Yet Putin’s natorial elections were completed, regional leaders were reforms have not bolstered Moscow’s capacity to root out institutionally liberated from the Russian president for or punish regional opportunism. Ironically, the very suc- incumbency and poised to champion local interests in the cess of this recentralization campaign has accentuated political and economic transformation under way in problems with the “weakness” of the Russian govern- Russia. The crux of regionalization turned on issues of ment—problems that lie at the crux of the lingering chal- “power sharing” and competition for policymaking lenge of regionalism. Because political power and autonomy.10 The result was incessant, ad hoc deal mak- policymaking in Russia still turn on personalities and ing between Moscow and the regions. By the end of 1999, arbitrary practices, as opposed to transparent institutions this process had the cumulative effect of obfuscating and procedures, Putin’s regional reforms have perpetuated jurisdiction at all levels of government and virtually strip- administrative confusion and further blurred lines of fed- ping the center of the capacity to enforce federal eral and regional authority. Consequently, they may authority.11 potentially decrease the efficiency of the state by leaving Almost immediately upon assuming office in 2000, open windows for regions to obstruct federal policies and President Putin launched a concerted campaign to take for regional lobbies to combine with interest groups at back federal power from the regions and restore the “ver- the center to shape national policymaking.13 These trends tical dimension” of control. Buoyed by popular support are evident in the nuclear sector: The arbitrary nature of for a second crackdown on Chechnya in 1999, while federal authority has reinforced the autonomy of central saddled with the legacy of ambitious power grabs and ministries and exacerbated incentive incompatibilities conflicting de facto regional policies, the Putin team in- between federal and regional actors. These factors con- troduced a series of reforms to recentralize control of the tinue to complicate oversight of nuclear policymaking.
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 33 NUCLEAR REGIONALISM IN RUSSIA
LIMITS TO HIERARCHY WITHIN THE RUSSIAN at the expense of strictly upholding national consider- 17 NUCLEAR COMPLEX ations. In addition to dividing ownership within the nuclear Following the disintegration of the Soviet system, politi- sector, Russian law ambiguously devolved decision mak- cal power and responsibility for Russia’s nuclear complex ing and oversight responsibilities to regional and munici- remained at the federal level. Formal administrative pal governments. Reversing a 1993 presidential edict that responsibility for managing nuclear weapons, materials, stipulated exclusive federal jurisdiction over the nuclear technologies, and facilities—earlier concentrated in the complex, President Yeltsin signed a new law in 1995 that Communist Party’s Central Committee, the Ministry of delegated both “joint” and “independent” responsibilities Defense, and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building— 18 was divided primarily among the successor Ministry of to regional administrations. In particular, regional Defense and Minatom, which report directly to the presi- executive leaders could now share powers with federal dent and prime minister, respectively.14 The Twelfth Main agencies to establish the location of defense-related Directorate of the Ministry of Defense was delegated com- nuclear facilities on their territories, conduct state envi- prehensive authority over the nuclear weapons arsenal, ronmental impact studies of nuclear facilities, provide for warhead storage, and the related nuclear testing and trans- the safety and protection of citizens affected by the use of portation infrastructure.15 Beginning in 1992, control over nuclear power, remedy the consequences of nuclear acci- the bulk of Russia’s nuclear program came under the pur- dents, train specialists in the operation of nuclear facili- view of Minatom. Minatom now directs the entire chain ties and use of radioactive substances, and implement of production for nuclear weapons and coordinates environmental safety programs in the nuclear sphere. The Russia’s overall policies toward research, development, governors also were ceded broad authority to supervise testing, conversion, scientific and technical cooperation, the use of radioactive material; implement safety mea- export control, and waste management in the nuclear sec- sures at nuclear power plants and storage facilities; tor. Minatom also conducts oversight of fissile material, develop regional programs for using nuclear energy; related production and disposition facilities, and Russia’s determine the location of nuclear installations, storage 10 nuclear closed cities and guides the operation of facilities, and waste facilities; establish physical protec- Russia’s fuel cycle and commercial use of nuclear energy. tion controls and accounting measures for radioactive In addition, Minatom was ceded joint authority with the materials; and resolve other unspecified problems related Nuclear and Radiation Safety Oversight Agency (GAN) to the use of nuclear energy and materials. Moreover, to supervise licensing, regulation, and safety in both the Article 12 of the law empowered relevant municipal bod- defense and commercial sectors. The two ministries also ies to decide issues bearing on the location and construc- officially share responsibility with the Russian Federal tion of nuclear facilities, as well as to generate local Security Service (FSB) for controlling access to respec- environmental impact studies, inform the public of pre- tive nuclear facilities.16 vailing radiation levels, and adopt measures to protect In a marked break with Soviet practice, in which the citizens and their property in the case of a nuclear acci- state was the sole proprietor of the entire nuclear sector, dent. In effect, the law granted regional and local politi- the Minatom complex is characterized by variable own- cians considerable but ambiguous jurisdiction over ership and managerial profiles. Ownership of Russia’s formulating and implementing federal nuclear policies. nuclear facilities, bifurcated by presidential decree in 1993, Bureaucratic Opportunism consists of state unitary facilities and research centers on the one hand, and quasi-private entities on the other. Adding to the confusion, institutional uncertainties con- Facilities designated in the former category are exclusively founded longstanding informal mechanisms for manag- government owned. In the case of the latter, which com- ing federal nuclear agencies. Previously, the Soviet prises open joint stock and limited liability companies, leadership maintained formal control through the nuclear the government is obligated only to retain at least a 49 sector’s priority status at the highest political level, strict percent share and membership on the corporate govern- and intrusive oversight by the Communist Party and secu- ing board for a specified period. This reorganization com- rity police, preferential budgetary allocations, and the plicates management of the industry, as nearly 50 percent personal accountability of nuclear institute and enterprise of the enterprises have been partially privatized and are directors. These controls were replaced in the “new Rus- increasingly preoccupied with commercial survivability sia” by a combination of benign neglect among the
34 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 ADAM N. STULBERG national leadership, budgetary austerity, and a push to as to adjust priorities, coordination, and allocations of fed- make industry search for new ways to maintain economic eral financing and foreign assistance for the nuclear viability. Ambiguities associated with “joint jurisdiction” industry. In usurping power to request or deny privileges among federal agencies complicated oversight and pro- for subordinate nuclear facilities, the ministry has capi- vided occasion for bureaucratic entrepreneurship. Amid talized on the residual corporate culture of centralization the administrative disorder, for example, Minatom seized that pervades the nuclear complex, its own strong repre- opportunities to advance an ambitious strategy for increas- sentation within interdepartmental government commis- ing nuclear power generation at the expense of rival gov- sions, and regular access to senior echelons of the ernment agencies. This commercially oriented approach executive branch.23 included a plan for consolidating the ministry’s control Yet, the confusion associated with Russia’s transition over profit-generating civilian nuclear research and has had a deleterious effect on Minatom’s hierarchical defense-related nuclear production.19 The absence of control. The precipitous drop in state defense orders and clearly delineated regulatory responsibility also paved the protracted federal budgetary shortfalls during the first way for Minatom to redefine its jurisdiction. By appeal- decade of transition called into question the effective- ing directly to legislative allies, the ministry succeeded in ness of Minatom’s financial mechanisms. Throughout the usurping full licensing authority over defense-related decade, the ministry faced regular difficulties covering nuclear production and in eviscerating GAN’s supervi- operating expenses and salaries in the plutonium com- sory role in the civilian sector which, in turn, relaxed plex, and, at times, received less than 50 percent of the safety standards to accommodate the ministry’s narrow annual federal outlays necessary to support defense financial and technological means.20 Similarly, overlap- activities. Even as federal financing for the sector began ping mandates between the Ministry of Defense, to pick up in 2000, Minatom’s fiscal control had clearly Minatom, and the FSB complicated access to otherwise slipped, as salary payments remained delayed and unad- “open” nuclear facilities in the defense and commercial justed for inflation, and unpaid leaves, reduced work sched- sectors. This arrangement exacerbates managerial diffi- ules, downsized production, and difficult social conditions culties by adding multiple layers of bureaucracy for issu- remained the norm. Accordingly, institute directors ac- ing clearances to nuclear facilities and closed cities that quired strong incentives and de facto discretion to look are governed by different sets of interests and criteria for beyond traditional vertical channels for extra-budgetary “preserving secrecy.”21 relief.24 Minatom’s overzealous plan for reducing by half both the number of nuclear weapons design-and-produc- Grasping at Straws? tion facilities and the overall size of the nuclear workforce At the same time, the deinstitutionalized policymaking by 2005 has reinforced the impetus for regional auto- landscape has complicated vertical control within the nomy.25 At the same time, political infighting within the Minatom apparatus. On the one hand, the Soviet legacy ministry has compromised its capacity to guide responses of hierarchy in the nuclear industry was passed on to to the social and economic crisis afflicting the nuclear Minatom. In particular, the ministry inherited several complex. Conflicts over funding priorities for civilian direct and indirect instruments for coercing and induc- power generation, defense production, and reorganization ing compliance from nuclear facilities across Russia. For- and control of profit-making activities in the nuclear mal control mechanisms include delegating the authority industry have sent mixed signals throughout the bureau- to supervise sales of nuclear material from the national cracy. For instance, attempts by former Minister of Atomic stockpile, certifying nuclear operators, setting standards Energy Yevgeniy Adamov to enlist regional support in his for monitoring and enforcing quality control at nuclear campaign to commercialize the civilian branch of the facilities, providing technical approval for nuclear exports, industry and compete for a 40-45 percent market share in monitoring internal compliance with national export the domestic energy sector emboldened local authorities control laws, and approving the (de)classification of to subordinate the ministry’s defense conversion agenda nuclear information and travel clearances for top-level to parochial entrepreneurial interests.26 This combina- managers in the nuclear complex.22 In addition, Minatom tion of budgetary shortfalls and conflicting signals has has the authority to supervise the management and cor- created conditions conducive for regional leaders, envi- porate governance practices of both state-owned and ronmental groups, and enterprise directors to behave open joint stock companies in the nuclear sector, as well more opportunistically than in the past. As a result,
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 35 NUCLEAR REGIONALISM IN RUSSIA
Minatom’s control over the nuclear complex has varied at the expense of national strategic priorities, it simulta- across Russia’s regions. neously constrains the capacity of the ministry’s leader- ship to dictate the incentives for subordinate facilities. DIMENSIONS OF NUCLEAR REGIONALISM These gaps in administrative control at the federal level and within the Minatom hierarchy create a variety of The administrative confusion at the federal level in Russia openings for regional involvement at both the front and suggests that the hierarchical relationships, both between back ends of nuclear policymaking. President Putin and Minatom and between the execu- tive leadership and nuclear facilities within the Minatom The Federal Face structure, are marred by gaps between principals and agents. In this case, the principals—the president and the The creation of the Federation Council in the 1993 leadership of Minatom—enjoy formal and informal Russian Constitution provided regional leaders with authority to control and oversee the activities of respec- formal but limited power to shape the country’s nuclear tive subordinated offices. At the executive level, the legislation. The Federation Council contains two repre- Russian president is interested in promoting the nuclear sentatives of each of the 89 constituent regions and sector for the country’s international prestige and devel- republics of Russia. The powers of the Federation Council opment, while maintaining checks and balances over the include authority to approve the national budget, as well sector to ensure stable control and consistency among as to make proposals and amendments to federal laws national security and industrial policies. At the bureau- pertaining to the nuclear sector. Notwithstanding cratic level, the leadership of Minatom generally seeks to Putin’s reform that ended their ex officio membership in redress the inherited problems confronting the sector and the council, Russia’s regional executive and legislative to increase the ministry’s political autonomy and com- leaders continue to wield influence in molding the legal mercial stature, both at home and abroad. Such parochial context for Minatom’s policies. While no longer having a interests include consolidating and converting nuclear direct vote in parliament or parliamentary immunity from assets in the defense sector, as well as expanding nuclear federal prosecution, regional leaders gained rights to send power generation, technology exports, and earnings from and recall full-time, professional representatives to the the storage and reprocessing of foreign spent nuclear fuel.27 Federation Council. Regional leaders now have the dis- Alternatively, the agents—Minatom within the federal cretion to determine the nature of control over represen- bureaucracy and respective nuclear facilities across tatives and to instruct delegates to devote substantially Russia—are formally obligated to comply with directives more time to specific pieces of federal legislation than they for carrying out nuclear operations in return for financial themselves could have in the past. In practice, the sig- and political remuneration. The rub, however, is that the nificance of the reform in terms of making inter-regional agents enjoy advantages of information and expertise that coordination more difficult and susceptible to counter- are critical for conducting complex technical policies in pressure from the State Duma has been partially offset by the geographically dispersed nuclear complex. Because the influence of professional lobbyists who pursue pet principals cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the regional issues with Minatom. This situation has created behavior and information of agents, they must expend a new type of Russian official whose effectiveness depends scarce resources inducing and enforcing compliance—in on both establishing a constructive rapport with federal other words, incur agency costs. Thus, the challenge con- officers and upholding regional interests. According to fronting both the Russian president and the leadership of one newly appointed representative, the incentive to com- Minatom is how to mitigate these asymmetries to render promise with Minatom is complemented by the credible agents accountable for their actions in a manner consis- threat that regional leaders can instruct representatives tent with respective national and bureaucratic objectives. to selectively vote down legislation proposed by the What distinguishes this principal-agent feature of executive branch. Consequently, regional interests are Russian nuclear politics is the extent to which power and taken seriously by government officials at the early stages responsibility are separated simultaneously at both the fed- of drafting and negotiating federal proposals in order to eral and regional levels, creating significant agency costs avert a public showdown.28 at the executive and bureaucratic levels of federal gover- In addition, regional governors can use their position nance. While institutional ambiguity creates conditions to lobby executive branch officials directly. In April 2001, ripe for Minatom to pursue narrow bureaucratic interests for example, Governor Eduard Rossel of Sverdlovsk Oblast
36 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 ADAM N. STULBERG petitioned Prime Minister Kasyanov to restructure the fed- to allow the closed cities to retain other taxes collected eral tax debt of a nuclear facility located within the region’s on their territory. This campaign occurred at a time when closed nuclear city, Novouralsk. In this case, the Urals federal subsidies remained unreliable. It aimed largely to Electrochemical Plant, which is responsible for blending promote defense conversion and to diversify the region’s down weapons-grade uranium into low-enriched uranium commercial profile. Alternatively, executive and legisla- as part of the “Megatons to Megawatts” agreement, failed tive officials in Chelyabinsk pressured the federal govern- to meet tax obligations from 1994-1999, primarily because ment to rescind the law establishing the ZATO tax the Ministry of Defense did not pay for state defense privileges. According to the governor, the ZATO tax shel- orders. The problem was compounded by Minatom’s ters created perverse incentives for tax evasion and signifi- hoarding of 200 million rubles in foreign assistance other- cantly reduced the tax base across the region. In an effort wise earmarked for municipal and facility coffers.29 to compensate the ZATO for lost revenues associated with the disbanding of off-shore zones, the governor and regional Fiscal “ZATOism” parliament created a special extra-budgetary fund to reim- Another avenue for sub-federal intervention is related to burse the outlying territories for improvements in the public financing of Russia’s nuclear enterprises. On the transportation infrastructure used by the ZATO.35 one hand, oblast governments have been marginalized in Furthermore, oblast governments have stepped into the fiscal transactions pertaining to the nuclear complex. By breach by taking it upon themselves to restructure the law, the federal government has exclusive authority to local debts of Minatom facilities. The Sverdlovsk admin- “budget” revenues for the “closed administrative territo- istration, for example, concluded a separate agreement rial formations” (ZATO) or “closed cities,” including the with Minatom to revise the repayment schedules to local ten nuclear ZATO, or closed nuclear cities.30 These rev- contractors for the construction of the Beloyarsk nuclear enues are raised through federal tax transfers (profit, per- power station and a cancer center in the capital city, sonal income, property, and value-added) and grants that Ekaterinburg.36 are supplemented by the independent “non-tax” income Municipal authorities play an even greater role in of the ZATO. Unlike typical Russian cities, the nuclear keeping the ZATO financially afloat. Unlike regional ZATO do not interact directly with regional governments governments, city officials retain authority to levy inde- on public finance issues, except those regarding collec- pendent taxes, including small education and licensing tions of road and environmental funds. In some cases, such fees and occasional “wildcat” taxes to generate short-term as Chelyabinsk Oblast (home to four closed cities, revenue to support local infrastructure.37 In some cities, three of which are nuclear: Ozersk, Snezhinsk, and such as Trekhgornyy, the mayor assumed the lead in mar- Trekhgornyy), fiscal separation is magnified by the fact keting the city’s nuclear conversion projects and updat- that federal remittances for the closed cities approximate ing the local infrastructure to attract commercial the entire oblast budget.31 This dependency on federal investment. His success contributed directly to Trekh- transfers and grants noticeably increased immediately fol- gornyy’s distinction in 2001 as the only nuclear closed lowing the dramatic devaluation of the ruble in 1998.32 city to become self-sufficient without help from the fed- That said, it is possible for regional leaders to provide eral budget or foreign assistance. By the end of the year, critical supplementary and non-budgetary allocations for the city tripled its federal tax payments and became the the nuclear ZATO. In 1997, for example, the governor of model for ZATO prosperity.38 At the same time, local Nizhniy Novgorod took great interest in promoting trans- officials have been authorized to designate line-item formation at Russia’s largest federal nuclear weapons expenditures for housing and “other” infrastructure con- design center in Sarov, creating an oblast-level conver- struction within the ZATO budgets. The consequent sion fund to guide commercial and personnel incentives fiscal imbalance between federal revenue-generating at the institute.33 More significantly, regional authorities authority and municipal discretion over expenditures weighed in decisively to influence the perpetuation of fed- perpetuates financial shortfalls for the ZATO.39 eral tax shelters in the ZATO from 1997 to 1999. They On the defense side of the ledger, municipal authorities also played a major role in the subsequent elimination of provide critical financial relief—via the “sponsorship” of these privileges.34 In particular, the governor of Sverdlovsk military units—that circumvents federal channels. The spearheaded the campaign to pass legislation in Moscow city of Orenburg, for example, extended supplementary to permit the creation of tax-free zones in the ZATO and credits and assumed the burdens of financing the support-
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 37 NUCLEAR REGIONALISM IN RUSSIA ing social infrastructure for the strategic missile unit Less dramatic, but more intimate forms of influence deployed on its territory. In other cities, such as Kozelsk turn on efforts to co-opt military assets to further regional in Kaluga Oblast, municipal authorities subsidized social economic development. In September 2001, for example, and educational expenses for a strategic missile division the governor of Saratov Oblast succeeded in pressuring in exchange for employment opportunities for local the Russian Air Force to permit the dual use of the Engels civilian constituents.40 The limits of nuclear “sponsorship” Air Force Base, which is home to a strategic bomber divi- were extended in the case of the Rabachiy submarine base sion. By gaining the right to use the base for commercial located in Vilyuchinsk, Kamchatka. In an effort to redress flights, the governor both improved the local infrastruc- funding shortfalls, a group of nine cities—Vilyuchinsk, ture and acquired a de facto voice in base operations.43 Petropavlovsk, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Chelyabinsk, Omsk, Similarly, several regional authorities have reclaimed Tomsk, Podolsk, and Zelenograd—provided clothing, food, deactivated nuclear weapons bases and insisted that elimi- travel, and other benefits for specific Oscar II-class SSGN nated silo sites undergo strict environmental remediation crews. In October 2000, the municipal sponsors convened before being turned over to the private sector. On occa- to coordinate their efforts and discuss potential conditions sion, these efforts have garnered support from local civic for continuing their assistance. Under the terms of the and environmental groups, which together have final agreement, sponsoring authorities obtained rights to strengthened the voice of regional interests in mili- 44 recommend personnel for service and to ensure that local tary policymaking. constituents would serve on recipient submarines, thus Another low-cost avenue for regional intrusion into preempting formal military recruitment and assignment nuclear policymaking rests with control over the local processes. Representatives of the Omsk administration infrastructure. Shortfalls and delays in federal subsidies, attempted to take the issue further, stipulating that spon- combined with imbalances between local and federal fis- sored submarines procure locally manufactured equip- cal responsibilities, have rendered military installations ment. In practice, the sponsorship agreement tied solvency and Minatom facilities dependent on regional discretion of the nuclear submarine base to the vicissitudes of respec- for access to energy, transportation, public health, mili- tive regional budgets.41 tary housing, and other local benefits and services. Regional officials have seized on this predicament to settle Local Motion local debts and to collect tribute from vulnerable nuclear facilities. A third category of sub-federal involvement in nuclear Similarly, regional officials share power with various politics derives from the impact that regional leaders have federal agencies to monitor and enforce safe operations on the daily operations of military units and nuclear at nuclear facilities via oversight of local emergency facilities. The most conspicuous attempts to influence response teams, law enforcement, export control, and cus- nuclear facilities occurred when sub-federal officials endeavored to commandeer nuclear weapons deployed on toms offices. Some regions, for example, have created the territory under their jurisdiction. In March 2000, the security councils to expedite coordination among federal, Volgograd regional assembly nearly passed legislation that oblast, and local branches of law enforcement and nuclear would have extended regional control over Russia’s larg- regulatory officials. Others, such as Chelyabinsk and est missile testing range. This maneuver followed a dra- Sverdlovsk Oblasts, have assumed direct responsibility for matic incident in 1998 in which Alexander Lebed, the providing supplemental financial and technical support governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, sent a letter to the Russian to local internal security troops, as well as housing and federal government castigating Moscow for the poor con- social benefits for military personnel, in an effort to ditions faced by local strategic missile units and alluded upgrade safety and security at local nuclear facilities.45 to the governor’s interest in placing the division under Moreover, regional assemblies and municipal courts offer his regional jurisdiction. While the legislation proposed venues for local interest groups and environmental lob- in Volgograd failed by one vote, and Lebed’s threat was bies to petition Minatom’s policies, as well as for local issued mainly to pry additional funding from federal cof- military commanders and nuclear institute directors to fers and as a political gambit to boost his own presidential seek legal remedies for shortfalls in federal obligations. pretensions, both incidents reveal the extent to which The power to approve oblast or local referenda and to local politics intrude upon nuclear policymaking.42 excite popular debate over nuclear and environmental
38 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 ADAM N. STULBERG issues also affords regional leaders with conspicuous, de consolidated political authority and possess clear policy facto influence over the implementation of federal nuclear interests are in a good position to subvert or complicate policies. the implementation of Minatom’s policies within their regions. This situation can either improve or mar the STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS effectiveness of nuclear stability and cooperative assis- tance, depending on the specific interests and resources What are the consequences of gaps in hierarchical con- wielded by respective regional authorities. At the federal trol of the Russian nuclear complex? Does regional intru- level, however, the activism of entrenched regional lead- sion into the policymaking process help or hinder nuclear ers can curtail Minatom’s bureaucratic opportunism and safety and security in Russia? Does it advance or confound contribute to greater transparency and oversight of the Minatom’s parochial bureaucratic interests and the suc- national policymaking process. Acting with independent cess of cooperative assistance programs? interests and authority, regional assertiveness here can Answers to these questions lie in the dynamic bur- sound fire alarms about ministerial shirking. Alternatively, dens of responsibility in principal-agent relationships. an embattled or vulnerable regional leadership is more First, both principals and agents can manipulate asym- apt to be exploited by Minatom to advance favored poli- metries of information and incentives in the relationship. cies in the region or to contribute to a general loss of con- Because agents know more about the details of the work trol over nuclear assets in the affected territory. Similarly, assigned to them, they can tailor responses to principals regional weakness at the federal level loosens parliamen- in keeping with their own interests. The ability to do so, tary checks and balances on Minatom’s federal activities. however, depends on the extent to which agents possess Figure 1 depicts the alternative consequences for stabil- stable interests and resources that are not directly subor- ity of the nuclear complex and effectiveness of coopera- 46 dinate to a principal. However, principals too can take tive assistance produced by the interplay of political advantage of information asymmetries. They can set goals activism by different types of regional leaders at the fed- for agents that are excessively difficult to achieve. They eral and regional levels. also can hide behind information asymmetries to off-load blame for policy failures onto agents who bear primary Strong Regions (Soft Subversion) responsibility for implementing specific policies and are The two left-hand cells in Figure 1 reveal that regional- directly accountable to affected local constituencies. ism can affect Russian nuclear policymaking, at both the Moreover, principals can exploit vulnerabilities and dif- regional and federal levels, in cases where sub-federal ferences among contending agents to further their own authorities enjoy independent political and economic 47 policy ends. Second, policymaking autonomy can simul- bases of local power. The upper left-hand box reflects those taneously increase agency costs in one relationship, while scenarios where regional leaders can purposefully under- decreasing them in another. An agent can manipulate mine or expedite implementation of federal nuclear poli- information asymmetries to shirk responsibility vis-à-vis cies, depending on their particular policy concerns and a direct principal, while taking action that effectively resource endowments. On the one hand, they can prac- bolsters the oversight of another principal. Agency tice “soft subversion,” exploiting control over the local opportunism in one relationship, therefore, can provide infrastructure to extract side payments from Minatom or independent, third-party “fire alarms” for another princi- to co-opt the use of specific facilities, with adverse con- pal. Because third parties are affected by the shirking of sequences for nuclear safety.49 This tactic was demon- an agent in another relationship, they have independent strated by the independent-minded governors of Ivanovo incentives to observe and influence the behavior of that and Primorskiy Kray, who took it upon themselves to agent, thus reducing the respective direct costs of over- unplug strategic military units (including an early- sight in that relationship.48 warning radar in the case of the latter) from the local In the context of Russian nuclear regionalism, the energy grid in an effort to unlock delivery of federal sub- policy consequences of these principal-agent relationships sidies. City officials in Votkinsk took the issue further by depend not only on the stability and consolidation of both sponsoring a referendum to build a solid rocket fuel regional interests, but also on the level (federal or regional) incineration plant on their territory, and preventing on which they are asserted. Regional leaders who have access to the federal facility, once built, until the city was
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 39 NUCLEAR REGIONALISM IN RUSSIA fully compensated for the loss of real estate incurred as a construction of nuclear power plants on his territory. He result. While the referendum was subsequently invali- also encouraged a local shipyard to sell or lease an Akula dated by the regional supreme court, the president of the II-class nuclear attack submarine to India. Neither territory concerned, Udmurtiya, continued to block con- dependent on Minatom for energy supplies nor beholden struction of the plant until Moscow agreed to provide to the Ministry of Defense for dismantlement assistance, additional state defense orders in the republic.50 the Khabarovsk governor has consistently charted an Similar bargaining tactics have obstructed commer- independent course to maximize local economic gains on cial nuclear activities as well. For example, on several nuclear issues in his region.53 occasions in 2001, the local energy provider in Chelyabinsk, Regional “soft subversion” also characterized the poli- Chelyabenergo, significantly reduced the power supply to tics surrounding the construction of a Japanese-financed major defense-related nuclear facilities in Chelyabinsk, floating liquid radioactive waste (LRW) treatment plant including the warhead assembly/disassembly facility in in Primorskiy Kray. The plant was needed to process con- Trekhgornyy, the nuclear warhead design center in taminated coolants resulting from the dismantlement of Snezinsk, and the Mayak storage facility in Ozersk.51 The nuclear attack submarines in the region. Confronting a governor of the same province, emboldened by an upturn critical situation with leaky LRW tankers in the region, in the region’s economic outlook in 2001, exaggerated the the kray administration threatened in 1994 to usurp fed- risks of an accidental overflow of radioactive waste along eral jurisdiction by authorizing LRW dumping in the Sea the Techa River drainage basin in order to pressure of Japan unless Moscow accepted the Japanese offer for Minatom to resume construction of a nuclear power support. This move precipitated a protracted dispute plant in Ozersk. The governor evinced little regard for between the kray and federal governments over the tech- local environmental concerns, proposing instead that the nical specifications of the storage facility, criteria for polluted water be used to cool the plant.52 Moreover, the awarding tenders, distribution of financing, and environ- popular governor of the Khabarovsk region repeatedly mental risks. This dispute effectively imposed bottlenecks confounded Minatom by taking a strong stand against the and raised the expense of the treatment plant. The politi-
FIGURE 1 REGIONAL STRENGTH AND THE DOMINIONS OF INFLUENCE ON NUCLEAR STABILITY IN RUSSIA
Strength of Regional Leadership Strong/Independent Weak/Vulnerable
• Soft Subversion • Loss of Control Regional • Constructive Engagement • Criminal Penetration Dominion of Influence
Federal • Third-Party Oversight • Pro-Minatom
40 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 ADAM N. STULBERG cal battle escalated in mid-1996 with the intervention of rules” to expedite specific projects funded by the municipal authorities from Bolshoi Kamen, who unilat- Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.57 erally banned construction of the floating plant, citing Regional Fire Alarms environmental safety concerns and distrust of federal motives. Subsequently excluded as a contracting agent in The lower left cell of Figure 1 captures the influence of Minatom’s revised plan, the kray administration reversed strong regional leaders at the federal level. Such regional course and even came out against the project. Regional leaders can use their parliamentary authority to constrain resistance intensified through the summer of 1997, capped Minatom’s bureaucratic entrepreneurship consistent with by a city referendum that postponed the delivery of the their own interests. This tactic holds mixed consequences LRW plant. Finally, in 2000, the new LRW facility was for the stability of Russia’s nuclear industry and the pros- delivered to the Zvezda Shipyard in Bolshoi Kamen. This pects for cooperative assistance. On issues in which development occurred, however, only after evidence of regional interests conflict with national security objec- leakage from one of the shore-based LRW tanks caused tives and Minatom’s commercial interests, regional inter- local residents and officials to drop initial protests and ventions can subvert cooperative nonproliferation Minatom agreed to delegate oversight responsibility to assistance. In 2000, for example, regional leaders exercised the municipal administration. Notwithstanding the ful- authority in the Federation Council to express reserva- fillment of Japan’s funding obligation in November 2001, tions about the U.S.-Russian “Megatons to Megawatts” local politicians continue to run on platforms against the deal, drafting a resolution that revised the agreement and project that raise questions about the future of the facil- jeopardized a major funding source for the ministry.58 ity, and by extension, the safety and pace of submarine Conversely, independent regional leaders have capi- 54 dismantlement in the Russian Far East. talized on their federal powers to improve the effective- On other occasions, strong regional leaders have ness of national nuclear policies. The maverick former intervened to expedite implementation of conversion and governor of Primorskiy Krai, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, col- cooperative assistance at local nuclear facilities. Tomsk laborated with officials in Bolshoi Kamen and represen- officials, for example, who have tied the region’s welfare tatives of the Zvezda Shipyard to lobby Moscow in support to development of the hydrocarbon sector, have assumed of the CTR submarine dismantlement program.59 Simi- an active role in promoting diversification of the large larly, the governor and Duma representatives of Chelyabinsk Siberian Chemical Combine located in the closed nuclear appealed directly to President Yeltsin and the Federation city of Seversk. The governor reached a modus vivendi Council in 1999 to pressure Minatom to fulfill financial with local nuclear directors, whereby his office promised obligations to the three closed nuclear cities in the re- to cultivate favorable socio-economic conditions for the gion. In 2001, the Chelyabinsk governor again used his combine and to lobby on behalf of Minatom’s strategy for clout in Moscow to draw attention to the fiscal laxity increasing nuclear power generation. In return, the local exhibited by Minatom and the Ministry of Defense and nuclear industry committed to remedying short-term to negotiate the rescheduling of the 1994-1999 federal energy deficits and contributing to the economic resur- tax debt for the Urals Electrochemical Plant.60 gence of the region. The governor also championed the The political battle over Minatom’s proposed legisla- Tomsk Regional Initiative, which entails direct coopera- tive amendments permitting Russia to store and repro- tion with U.S. government agencies to attract foreign cess foreign spent nuclear fuel illustrates the role of investment to the region.55 Other regional leaders have regional offices in promoting accountability and trans- exploited their autonomy and resources to facilitate local parency at the federal level. Initially, Minatom seized upon conversion initiatives. Leaders in Sverdlovsk, for example, the prospects for earning $20 billion over ten years in this held Minatom accountable for meeting international potential global market by proposing amendments to the safety standards in constructing a new warhead storage 1992 federal environmental protection law that prohib- facility in the closed city of Lesnoy.56 Furthermore, U.S. ited the import of radioactive waste.61 Under the original officials have noted that on numerous occasions regional proposal, Minatom was designated exclusive oversight and local administrators, eager to woo foreign assistance both to conclude specific contracts and to allocate rev- and to demonstrate autonomy from Moscow, have taken enues for the development of the nuclear industry and the initiative to relieve local bottlenecks and “bend the environmental remediation. This proposal met strong
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 41 NUCLEAR REGIONALISM IN RUSSIA resistance inside Russia, with regional leaders across the the other. 64 The situation in Kamchatka clearly illustrates country threatening to vote down the legislation in the this thesis, as nuclear issues have been at the center of Federation Council and polls suggesting that more than several hotly contested regional political races, and the 90 percent of the population did not support the amend- region’s economic woes have given rise to systematic ments. In an effort to avert a public showdown, Minatom criminal activities involving theft and diversion of nuclear conspicuously offered policy inducements to regions that materials. Different political leaders—including the State stood to be directly affected by the program. In particular, Duma representative, members of the Kamchatka Oblast Minatom revised the proposal by explicitly committing Duma, and the Communist Party governor—have staked to distribute 70 percent of the profits via direct outlays out contending positions regarding the safety and utility and taxes to fund related regional nuclear infrastructure of increasing the region’s reliance on nuclear power. While and environmental remediation. This concession, com- the governor has tended to side with Minatom’s attempts bined with Minatom’s extensive lobbying campaigns to to increase the profile of nuclear power in the region, his trumpet the regional commercial benefits of the program, political rival in the State Duma has stymied progress on succeeded in co-opting support from several critical other fronts. The latter, in particular, has stoked public regions, such as Chelyabinsk and Krasnoyarsk. The final apprehension by condemning U.S. assistance for subma- consideration of the proposal in the Federation Council rine defueling and dismantlement in the region and pro- thus became a conspicuous “non-event,” as the upper testing the import of spent nuclear fuel. Amidst the chamber passed the legislation directly to the president political turmoil, Minatom, which assumed formal respon- for approval without conducting an extensive review.62 sibility for defueling nuclear submarines in 1998, has Moreover, as a concession to regional and popular agita- adopted secretive practices and fallen behind in financial tion over the legislative amendments, President Putin support for managing the cleanup of radioactive waste in personally intervened to create an interagency oversight the region, allowing local politicians to bear the brunt of body, headed by a Nobel laureate, with executive author- public criticism.65 ity to review specific contracts and supervise the alloca- At the same time, the criminal situation in Kamchatka tion of revenues for environmental cleanup. The has become so serious that a local naval commander consequent costs of policy success for Minatom were sig- equated smuggling of military-related materials to an nificant, as the ministry was formally obligated to share actual “regional conflict,” given the possible adverse profits and to allow greater transparency in crafting and effects on military readiness. In January 2000, for example, administering specific deals involving the import of spent two sailors bribed their way onto the Rybachiy Naval Base nuclear fuel. The increased transparency, in particular, and succeeded in removing radioactive calibrating plates strengthened the legal grounds for regional authorities and from a decommissioned nuclear submarine. A subsequent local environmental lobbies to sound the alarm in the February 2001 trial of eleven indicted sailors also revealed future regarding any questionable activities by Minatom that platinum catalysts had been systematically stolen in this field, which will increase the chances of holding from most of the decommissioned nuclear submarines at the ministry publicly accountable for Russia’s foreign spent the base.66 Moreover, it has been reported that local mafia fuel transactions.63 organs typically disseminate to naval recruits flyers list- ing black market prices and instructions for stealing Weak Regions (Weak Control) precious metals from the Rybachiy base.67 As depicted by the right-hand cells of Figure 1, politically Minatom’s Discretion divided and economically strapped regional leaderships also impact Russian nuclear policymaking. Here, however, Similarly, as reflected in the lower right-hand cell, weak the influence is primarily by omission, as weak governing and nuclear energy dependent regions have been enlisted capacities foster local conditions ripe for corruption and to support Minatom’s campaigns to take on other federal graft to penetrate nuclear activities. The regional conse- bureaucracies. While many regional and local govern- quences are depicted in the upper right-hand cell. These ments have acquired authority to regulate polluters in problems have been especially conspicuous in Russia’s Far their territories, business pressures, corruption, and close Eastern Federal District, given the relative economic hard- ties to Minatom do not augur well for most of them tak- ships and prominence of criminal networks on the one ing definitive stands in support of independent regula- hand, and the high concentration of nuclear materials on tory authority or championing local environmental
42 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 ADAM N. STULBERG concerns.68 Moreover, leaders from some of Russia’s most The effects of regional intrusion on specific issues troubled regions have tended to endorse Minatom’s long- related to nuclear stability and cooperative assistance also term strategy for increasing nuclear power generation, are mixed. One the one hand, a central finding of the notwithstanding local suspicions about the ministry’s research reported in this article is that regional activism managerial practices and protests by grassroots environ- is correlated neither with democratic oversight nor improved mental groups. For example, a group of nuclear energy safety concerns in the nuclear sector. Strong and autono- dependent regional leaders formed the Union of Territo- mous regional leaders typically weigh in on nuclear issues ries and Enterprises of the Nuclear Energy Complex spe- to further parochial economic or political objectives, with cifically for lobbying the federal government to expand little regard for environmental safety or stability of the construction of nuclear power stations and to endorse complex. Local public opinion and grassroots environmen- Minatom’s efforts to import spent nuclear fuel.69 Gover- tal movements tend to be ignored, unless regional politi- nor Roman Abramovich of Chukotka Oblast, for example, cians can co-opt respective issues for political or has used his position to weigh in on these political debates. commercial profit. Similarly, regions that have experi- Abramovich, who is one of Russia’s leading financial oli- enced the fewest problems in nuclear control have tended garchs, applied his political and commercial muscle to to be those where Minatom has been stronger and where lobby on behalf of strengthening Minatom’s financial specific nuclear facilities have remained relatively insu- control over federal conversion credits. In Moscow, lated from intra-regional politics and the local economy. Abramovich also actively promoted former Minister of On the other hand, independent-minded regional lead- Atomic Energy Adamov’s campaigns to expand nuclear ers have tended to promote conversion and downsizing power generation and to contract with other states for of the nuclear complex. Motivated primarily by material reprocessing and indefinitely storing spent nuclear fuel interest, strong regional leaderships have prodded both in Russia.70 Minatom and local facilities to expedite commercial transformation and have served as creative allies in bol- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS stering the effectiveness of cooperative assistance. These twin pressures suggest that regionalism by itself does not The above analysis demonstrates not only that regional offer a panacea for averting the difficult commercial, political actors do indeed matter in the formulation and security, and environmental trade-offs attendant to reform implementation of Russia’s nuclear policies, but that both of Russia’s civilian and military nuclear complex. the direction and scope of their influence vary systemati- cally across regions and levels of policymaking. In brief, What do these conclusions mean for the West and different types of regions exercise different forms of influ- how might they influence the future of cooperative non- ence at the federal and regional levels, with different con- proliferation assistance to Russia? First, they demonstrate sequences for nuclear stability and nonproliferation. Those the limits of issue linkage as a diplomatic tactic for induc- regions that possess available resources and strong leader- ing or pressuring compliance with nonproliferation norms. ship can significantly impede or expedite local implemen- The separation of power and accountability in the nuclear tation of federal nuclear policies, depending on respective complex creates alternative incentives among poorly instrumental concerns. Similarly, they can serve as coordinated federal- and regional-level political actors. important “fire alarms” to shore up monitoring of federal As a result, rewarding or punishing a federal agency for offices and ministries, thus improving national control the behavior of a region that as a practical matter is not over the nuclear sector. Conversely, weak and economi- under its control does not work. Rather, Western partners cally strapped regions tend to exacerbate problems of should target assistance directly to specific regional “nuclear opportunism,” contributing to the general “loss authorities and firms, ensuring that Russian recipients of control” over the nuclear complex. These regions are shoulder both the costs and benefits of cooperation. especially susceptible to corruption and criminal practices Accordingly, assistance providers should build on the spirit that increase risks of theft, diversion, and proliferation of of the Nuclear Cities Initiative by working with Russian fissile material from local facilities. Politicians from weak federal and regional authorities to fund projects directly and dependent regions also tend not to exercise respec- related to retraining personnel and transforming the tive federal authority with the aim of checking or chal- local nuclear infrastructure.71 lenging the bureaucratic strategies championed by Second, Western assistance providers should under- Minatom or the Ministry of Defense. stand the specific political, economic, environmental, and
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 43 NUCLEAR REGIONALISM IN RUSSIA
social dynamics in targeted regions and develop an under way in Russia will degrade control of the nuclear appreciation for the relative strength and instrumental complex. interests of respective regional leaders. Strong and inde- pendent-minded sub-federal-level officials should be 1 The author wishes to thank the members (listed below) of the two-year project included (together with federal officials and facility lead- on “Nuclear Regionalism in Russia” that was initiated by the Center for Nonpro- ers) in negotiations and given discrete responsibilities for liferation Studies (CNS) and conducted in cooperation with the Center for supervising specific projects. Excluding such regional con- Policy Studies in Russia (PIR) for sharing their research findings. 2 William C. Potter and Elena Sokova, “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: cerns, inadvertently or otherwise, risks unnecessary project What’s New? What’s True?” The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2002), pp. delays and costs overruns. In addition, neglect of regional 1-9; and Rennsselaer Lee, Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Blackmarket in the actors by Western assistance providers can lead to miss- Former Soviet Union and Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 3 Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, co-chairs, U.S. Secretary of Energy Advisory ing opportunities to enlist important allies in removing Board Report, “A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation local obstacles and containing bureaucratic opportunism Programs with Russia,” January 10, 2000,
44 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 ADAM N. STULBERG ism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-Periphery relations in Post-Communist Cities,” p. 132. See also discussion in Igor Khripunov and Maria Katsva, “Russia’s Russia,” in Gail W. Lapidus, ed., The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boul- Nuclear Industry: The Next Generation,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 58:2 (March/ der: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 79-114. April 2002), pp. 51-57. 10 In contrast to the Soviet experience, disintegration is bounded by a constella- 25 Khripunov, “MINATOM: Time for Crucial Decisions,” p. 55; Oleg Bukharin, tion of centripetal forces linked to Russia’s overwhelming ethnic homogeneity, “Downsizing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure,” Nonprolif- the institutional legacy of Soviet paternalism, inter- and intra-regional differ- eration Review 8 (Spring 2001), pp. 125-126. ences in political and economic profiles, personal rivalries between and among 26 This point is made in Sonia Ben Ouagrham and Igor Khripunov, “Minatom’s federal and local politicians, and Moscow’s lingering authorities to control the Regional Strategy,” unpublished paper prepared for the workshop on “Russian national purse to reel in egregious violations of federal norms. ‘Nuclear Regionalism’ and Challenges for US Nonproliferation Assistance Pro- 11 See especially discussion in Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Central Weakness and grams,” sponsored by CNS, April 5, 2002. Provincial Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia,” Post- 27 Bukharin, “Downsizing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure,” Soviet Affairs 15 (1999), pp. 87-106; and Gary N. Nelson, “‘Matryoshka Federal- pp. 116-130; Khripunov, “MINATOM: Time for Crucial Decisions,” pp. 49-57. ism’ and the Case of Khanty Manisysk Autonomous Okrug,” Post-Soviet Affairs 28 Member of the Russian Federation Council (name withheld by request), inter- 17 (2001), pp. 167-194. view by author, Washington, DC, December 5, 2001. The issue here is that the 12 For a summary of Putin’s federal reforms, see especially Matthew Hyde, “Putin’s risk of encountering a public showdown provides an indirect deterrent on execu- Federal Reforms and their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia,” Europe- tive branch policymaking. While the formal playing field favors federal govern- Asia Studies 53:5 (2001), pp. 719-743. ment officials, the potential costs of waging a public battle over controversial 13 Ibid; Eugene Huskey, “Political Leadership and the Center-Periphery Struggle: legislation diminishes the practical benefits of legislative victory. Consequently, Putin’s Administrative Reforms,” in Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova, eds., there is an incentive for executive offices to compromise on policy before submit- Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition (Washing- ting proposals for a final vote. ton, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001); and Robert Orttung 29 “Gubernator Sverdlovskoy oblasti posetil predpriyatiya Novouralska,” Biznes- and Peter Reddaway, “The Russia Initiative: Russian State-Building: The Re- Novosti Urala, January 15, 2001, in Integrum Techno,
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permitted a closed city administration to retain all taxes and revenues collected Assistance: Building the Landysh in the Russian Far East.” on its territory, and to grant tax breaks to enterprises to stimulate local investment. 55 Kovchegin, “Nuclear Regionalism in the Siberian Federal Okrug: Krasnoyarsk By 1997, this law had come under attack for creating unregulated tax havens Kray and Tomsk Oblast.” During the same period, the Tomsk Oblast Duma and for depriving the federal government of significant revenue. In 1998, the passed legislation to regulate Minatom’s shipments of fissile material from dis- Duma authorized the Ministry of Finance to review the privileges granted to the mantled warheads to the Siberian Chemical Combine. ZATO, and amended the original law by specifying criteria for business registra- 56 Stanislav Lavrov, “Kogda otkayvayut tormoza,” Oblastnaya gazeta, March 14, tion in the ZATO. The law was officially rescinded in 2000. 2000, in Integrum Techno,
46 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002