From Imperial Soldier to Communist General: the Early Career of Zhu De and His Influence on the Formation of the Chinese Red Army

Home , Cai E, Cao Kun, Feng Guozhang, Green Standard Army, Hong Jun, Liu Xiang (warlord)

FROM IMPERIAL SOLDIER TO COMMUNIST GENERAL: THE EARLY CAREER OF ZHU DE AND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE FORMATION OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY

Matthew William Russell

B.A. June 1983, Northwestern University M.A. June 1991, University of California, Davis M.Phil. May 2006, The George Washington University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of

Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 17, 2009

Dissertation directed by

Edward A. McCord Associate Professor of History and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Matthew W. Russell has passed the Final Examination for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy as of March 25, 2009. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

FROM IMPERIAL SOLDIER TO COMMUNIST GENERAL: THE EARLY CAREER OF ZHU DE AND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE FORMATION OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY

Matthew William Russell

Dissertation Research Committee:

Edward A. McCord, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

Ronald H. Spector, Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member

Daqing Yang, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member

iii

Dedication

This work is dedicated to my mother Dorothy Diana Ing Russell and to my wife Julia

Lynn Painton.

iv Acknowledgements

I was extremely fortunate to have Edward McCord as my adviser, teacher, and

dissertation director, and I would not have been able to complete this program without his

sound advice, guidance, and support. He was especially instrumental in guiding me through the difficulties of preparing a dissertation and his comments and advice were invaluable. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee

Daqing Yang and Ronald Spector. In the classroom, Daqing Yang gave me insights into the development of modern Japan and the complexities of the Sino-Japanese relationship, while Ronald Spector offered deeper perspectives on military history and its interconnection with broader issues. In addition, I offer my thanks to Shawn McHale and

Bruce Dickson who also consented to be on my dissertation committee. To complement my study of the Chinese past, Harry Harding gave me insightful perspectives on contemporary Chinese politics and foreign affairs. I also offer special thanks to Beverly

Hong for her patient work with me on the Chinese language in all its intricacies and subtle nuances. My experience at GWU would have been less enjoyable and stimulating without my fellow Asian history doctoral students, especially Sharon Chamberlain,

Yufeng Mao, Lynn Sholtis, and Terrance Rucker. They provided a supportive intellectual community that helped make the long journey bearable.

Undertaking this program mid-career had its challenges and rewards. I therefore

would like to thank those individuals who first encouraged me to pursue this program so

many years ago, notably Michele Flournoy and Forrest Morgan. Initially, I would not

have been able to commence this program while continuing with my professional career

without the support of Jim Callard and Peter Faber on the Air Staff, along with Sue

v Chodakewitz. In offering me the time and flexibility to complete this program, I owe special thanks to my current employer, and most especially to the support of Jim Burke and Chris Waychoff.

Finally, I would not have been able to pursue this program without the support of my family. I owe a debt of thanks to my mother Dorothy Russell for her support throughout my time as a graduate student. Most importantly, this all would not have been possible without the unstinting love, support, and infinite patience of my wife Julia, who accompanied me every step of the way on my long journey.

vi Abstract of Dissertation

From Imperial Soldier to Communist General: The Early Career of Zhu De and His Influence on the Formation of the Chinese Red Army

This dissertation examines the early career of Zhu De (1886-1976), the

commander-in-chief of the Chinese Red Army, to provide a fuller perspective and better

understanding of the origin and development of the early Red Army and ultimately why it

was so successful. This army was a complex force that reflected an equally complex

strategic, operational, and tactical heritage derived from a wide array of sources.

Contrary to popular perceptions of the early Communist military operating mainly as

guerrillas, the Red Army was, in reality, a hybrid force made up of regular troops, full-

time guerrilla units, and local part-time self-defense forces. Its hybrid nature was also reflected in its operational style that combined conventional operations with guerrilla

warfare. The military theory and operational concepts on which the Red Army relied

were equally complex. While originating in military institutions and military theories

that stretch back to the late Qing, they were equally affected by the military transformations of the early Chinese Republic and influenced by wider military developments in the world, especially in Japan, Germany, and Russia.

By studying Zhu’s life and military background prior to 1927, this study has

identified the varied antecedents to and influences on the Red Army and its operational

concepts. The lessons and experiences Zhu derived from his service in the Yunnan Army

from 1909 to 1922, clearly showed the influence of traditional Chinese military theory

and practice, along with that of Western military models. Zhu was further influenced by

his study of the German and Russian armies while he was in Europe from 1922 to 1926.

It was Zhu who provided the bridge that spanned these different military traditions.

vii Through his wide ranging and unique military experience and education, he could draw on these different military traditions and models and apply them to the development and operations of the Red Army. In the end, the key to the Red Army’s success was its adaptability and organizational flexibility in the face of different conditions and changing circumstances, where Zhu’s background would have been a great asset.

viii Table of Contents

Dedication iv

Acknowledgments v

Abstract of Dissertation vii

Table of Contents ix

List of Figures x

List of Tables xi

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: The Early Red Army Under Zhu De 30

Chapter 2: Early Life and Education 1886-1911 106

Chapter 3: Early Military Experience 1911-1912 183

Chapter 4: Early Campaign Experience 1912-1916 233

Chapter 5: Early Campaign Experience 1917-1922 315

Chapter 6: Experience and Education in Europe 1922-1926 355

Conclusion 421

Bibliography 426

ix List of Figures

Figure 1 Lujun/xinjun Division Organization 136

Figure 2 Active Defense Tactics 147

Figure 3 Ying Deploying While Advancing Towards the Enemy 149

Figure 4 Ying Deployed for Combat 150

Figure 5 Late 19th Century Infantry Attack Concept 152

Figure 6 General Cai E 1912-1916 198

Figure 7 Map of Southern Sichuan and Northern Yunnan 236

Figure 8 Map of Central and Southeastern Yunnan 258

Figure 9 Zhu De Serving as Regimental Commander in the Huguojun 1916 276

Figure 10 Northern Army Supplies Being Transported Up the Yangzi River Rapids 280

Figure 11 Pack Horse Caravan on Mountain Path in Sichuan 1916-1917 281

Figure 12 Map of Luzhou and Naxi Area of Operations February to March 1916 296

Figure 13 Zhu De in Chengdu in Late 1916 316

Figure 14 German Offensive Infantry Tactics 1917-1918 381

Figure 15 Infantry Assault Tactics 1918: Example of Double Encirclement 382

x List of Tables

Table 1 Comparative Military Unit Terminology: lujun/xinjun, Republican, Western 137

xi Introduction

A key element of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) survival and success

during the crucial years of 1927-1931 was the establishment of military power through

the formation of the Red Army. While the importance of the Red Army’s contribution in

this period is often noted, most of the English language historiography on the early Red

Army tends to be very “Mao-centric,” with Mao Zedong given most credit for the

development of Communist military strategy and Red Army doctrinal innovation.1 In such cases few questions are raised over how Mao could have developed such an effective fighting force and an accompanying military theory without any military background or training. There are some, though, who question this conventional narrative. Historian William Wei, for example, has argued that Mao’s role in CCP military history has been greatly exaggerated. Noting that Mao initially had little knowledge of military strategy and tactics, Wei even questions the authorship of some of

Mao’s early military writings, which he suggests may actually have been the work of other military commanders. One reason why the military contributions of other Red

Army leaders have been obscured until recently was because of the personality cult that developed around Mao. According to Wei, “Mao subsumed the accomplishments of other leaders so that he became a composite figure incorporating the achievements of Zhu

De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, and other Communist military leaders.”2 Wei, therefore,

calls for a reassessment of Mao’s role in the development of the Red Army along with

studies of the contributions of other Red Army senior leaders. This dissertation is an

1 A good representative example of this Mao-centric approach can be seen in Samuel B. Griffith, II, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), 6. 2 William Wei, “”Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun”: Mao and the Red Army,” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 231.

1 effort to address this challenge through a study of one of the most important of these

leaders, Zhu De (1886-1976).

Zhu De versus Mao Zedong

In contrast to the copious studies of Mao Zedong, Zhu De has so far received very little attention in the English historiography. Indeed, the only full-length work in English

to take Zhu as its subject is an account by Agnes Smedley that only covers Zhu’s life up

to 1946.3 Zhu De was the commander in chief of the Red Army from its inception in the

late 1920s until 1954, and was considered Mao’s “closest comrade in arms” during the

Revolution and Civil War in China. Significantly, before joining the Communist cause,

Zhu, unlike Mao, had been a professional soldier with almost two decades of prior

military experience.

To the extent that attention is paid to Zhu De, many studies portray him primarily in a supporting role to Mao. Mao is seen as developing the political foundations of the

Revolution and the military strategy for how to achieve it, while Zhu De implemented and transformed Mao’s ideas into concrete military doctrine. Although joined with Mao in this revolutionary enterprise, Zhu is normally viewed as the junior or subordinate partner. Thus, despite his position as commander in chief of the Red Army, most Western language histories of the early rise of the Communists and Red Army consign Zhu De to

the background and portray Mao as the originator of Communist military theory. Thus, in his 1982 biographical pamphlet on Zhu De, Shum Kui-kwong gives Mao most of the

credit for developing ideas on strategy and tactics while Zhu is shown as Mao’s

consistent and loyal supporter. Shum concludes that Zhu was overshadowed by Mao in

3 Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956). This book had been left unfinished when Smedley died in 1950 and therefore has many gaps and

2 the realm of military strategy and thought, and that Zhu’s main contribution was as an

implementer of Mao’s ideas.4 In a recent history of the Chinese Communist military,

Xiaobing Li also gives Mao most of the credit for the development of military concepts

and strategy. Nonetheless, in discussing the development of the Red Army and guerrilla

strategy during the Jinggangshan period, Li does not distinguish clearly between Mao and

Zhu, which could imply an equal partnership.5

Jacques Guillermaz’s influential history of the Chinese Communist Party provides

a fairly good example of the conventional representation of the Mao-Zhu partnership,

assigning a dominant role to Mao but acknowledging some contributions by Zhu. Thus

Guillermaz emphasizes that Mao was the only one to develop and write on military

doctrine and theory. As such he gives Mao credit for being an original military thinker

and the one chiefly responsible for the successful development of the early Red Army.6

Nonetheless Guillermaz also qualifies some aspects of this popular view of Mao’s dominant role. He notes, “The meeting between Mao Tse-tung the peasant and Chu Teh

[Zhu De] the professional soldier was no doubt one of the main causes of the communists’ victories, yet the credit has gone almost entirely to Mao Tse-tung alone.

Whatever the circumstances may be, … the Red Army owed its organization and methods of combat mainly to him [Zhu De].”7 In a later essay on Mao, “The Soldier,”

Guillermaz again gives some credit to Zhu De while still upholding the priority of Mao’s contribution, noting that, “Undoubtedly Mao owed much of his thinking to some of his

omissions. 4 Shum Kui-kwong, Zhu De (Chu Teh) (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 22-23. 5 Xiaobing Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 45-46, 49-53. 6 Jacques Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1949 (New York: Random House, 1972), 180, 192. 7 Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1949, 247.

3 associates with a more classical military training, notably Chu Teh, … But Mao was to

have the distinction of being the first to raise his experience to the level of theory.”8

While Guillermaz probably reflects the general consensus in the historical

literature over Mao’s role in the early development of the Red Army and its military

theory, there has always been a counter-current in the historiography that is prepared to

give Zhu equal or even more credit than Mao. Some of these studies go so far as to

portray Zhu as a rival to Mao during the initial period of their partnership, where Zhu

possessed higher status in the CCP than Mao and openly disagreed with Mao on strategy

and policy.

An early example of this view can be found in Edgar O’Ballance’s 1963 history

of the Red Army, where he asserts that initially Zhu was the dominant leader and driving

force in the Communist movement while Mao had lesser stature.9 O’Ballance also raises

doubts about Mao’s authorship of the Red Army’s principles of guerilla warfare, stating

that, “the strong probability is that they originated with Chu Teh, who had wide experience of guerrilla warfare on the Yunnan borderland some twenty years before.”10

O’Ballance continues with his assessment of Mao’s early contribution to Communist military theory by stating, “At this stage Mao Tse-tung appears to have had little military knowledge, and it was not until some years later that he discovered he was a strategical genius. One more than ever suspects that all the ideas of warfare and strategy upon which today he discourses so profoundly were originally those he learnt from his friend,

8 Jacques Guillermaz, “The Soldier,” in Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales of History, ed. Dick Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 120. 9 Edgar O’Ballance, The Red Army of China: A Short History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), 39, 46-47. 10 Ibid., 47.

4 Chu Teh.”11 Along these lines, no less an authority than Stuart Schram has questioned

Mao’s authorship of several early works on military theory and concluded that the 1934 work On Guerrilla War, which first laid out the operational principles of the Red Army, was actually authored by Zhu De and other military leaders. Schram also raised doubts about Mao’s authorship of another work on guerrilla warfare, Basic Tactics, which

appeared in 1938.12

The entry for Zhu De in the Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921-

1965 provides another authoritative voice for a stronger assessment of Zhu’s role, stating that he should get most of the credit for building the Red Army into a formidable military force.13 Other important works go further to argue that at least in the early years Zhu’s

position was superior to Mao’s. In William Whitson’s The Chinese High Command, Zhu

is portrayed as initially having more prestige among military commanders and CCP leaders than Mao, with Mao occupying a subordinate position to Zhu and even tying his fortune to Zhu’s continued success. Whitson thus gives Zhu more credit for the successful development of the early Red Army and for developing some of its key principles.14 A more recent study by Stephen Averill on the Jinggangshan base area also

portrays Zhu as the dominant military leader during the period starting in 1928. Averill

even reveals that Zhu had a contentious relationship with Mao that erupted into open

conflict in 1929 over leadership practices and the Red Army’s organizational style.15

In conclusion then, underneath the conventional Mao-centric view of the

11 Ibid., 47. 12 Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 52-53. 13 Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, eds., Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921-1965 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 248. 14 William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 48, 51-52, 55. 15 Stephen C. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands: China’s Jinggangshan Base Area (Lanham: Rowman &

5 development of the Red Army, and the literature that has supported this portrayal by

showing Mao’s dominant position over other senior military leaders, there has always

been an alternate view that found reason to give priority of place in the leadership of the

Red Army to Zhu De. A major reason for the ambiguity that arose over Zhu’s role is that

Mao actively tried to obscure Zhu De’s military accomplishments after the founding of

the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Historian Dick Wilson relates that before the

Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Zhu had commissioned a writer to compose his biography, but that Mao prevented it from being published because “it might have suggested that not every single victory on the Long March and at other moments of the

Communist struggle was due to the genius of the Chairman.”16 It is not surprising then that Guillermaz, in his works published during the 1970s, would take special note of the lack of written works by Zhu and other Communist military commanders with the implication that they had nothing to contribute to military theory or strategy.17

There is good reason, then, to correct the distortions in the comparative

contributions of Mao and Zhu that were created by the cult of Mao. This rectification is

also aided by new interest in, and publications on, Zhu De by Chinese scholars who are

no longer restrained by the need to protect Mao’s hegemony.18 This new interest in Zhu

De largely tends to validate those who have fought to reveal the important role he played

Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 203-204, 206. 16 Dick Wilson, The Long March 1935: The Epic of Chinese Communism’s Survival (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), 39. 17 Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1949, 192, 247; and Guillermaz, “The Soldier,” 117-118. 18 Examples of the recent outpouring of Chinese publications on Zhu would include Liu Xuemin, Hong jun zhi fu: Zhu De zhuan (Father of the Red Army: Biography of Zhu De) (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 2000); Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shibian, Zhu De Zhuan (Biography of Zhu De) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000); Liu Xuemin, Wang Fa’an, and Xiao Sike, Zhu De Yuanshi (Marshal Zhu De) (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenshu chubanshe, 2006); and Zhu De guju jinianguan, Renmin de guangrong Zhu De (Glory of the People: Zhu De) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2006).

6 in the Red Army’s development. The goal should not, however, be to emphasize the

importance of one man over the other but to understand better their comparative

contributions. An examination of their respective backgrounds and personalities can aid

in this goal. Mao did have a proclivity toward the broader realm of politics and grand

strategy, and was more a conceptualizer. On the other hand, Zhu was a consummate

military professional who had over two decades of experience on the battlefield, as an

administrator and organizer, and who brought to bear extensive military education and

study. If Mao’s role in the development of Communist military forces and strategy was more that of a high level theoretician, Zhu’s could be seen in more practical terms, that of battlefield commander, tactician, and organizer. That is not to say that Zhu did not also contribute to military theory, especially during this early period, when Mao’s military knowledge was slight.19 To begin to differentiate Mao from Zhu in the realm of military affairs, especially in assessing their own writings, one could look at Mao as essentially occupying the strategic level of warfare. In that sense it is hard to argue with Jacques

Guillermaz’s observation that, “Mao deserves credit probably above all for having a better grasp than all the other Chinese Communists of the correct role and form which military actions should assume in the revolutionary cause as a whole.”20 Likewise, Zhu’s

sympathetic biographer Agnes Smedley observed that Mao was more an intellectual

while Zhu, “ … who, though politically intelligent, was more a man of action and a

19 For various assessments of Mao as a military leader and theorist compared to Zhu De, see Smedley, 226; Guillermaz, “The Soldier,” 120-121, 140-141; and Averill, 204-205. One of the more detailed assessments contrasting the early military theories of Mao and Zhu can be found in Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 41-57. 20 Guillermaz, “The Soldier,” 141. This view is supported by Howard and Scott Boorman’s assessment of Communist insurgent warfare from 1935-49, where they sum up Mao’s contributions to military theory by concluding that even though Mao was, “…neither field commander nor military philosopher, neither tactician nor logician, his genius lay in operational strategy: in approaching military operations from the strategic viewpoint…” Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, “Chinese Communist Insurgent

7 military organizer.”21 None of this discounts the importance of Zhu’s influence in the

development and operations of the early Red Army, especially given his strengths in

army building and organization, and the operational and tactical levels of war. In the end,

the Red Army itself would seem to bear the comparatively stronger stamp of Zhu De

since he was more intimately involved in its creation, organization, training system,

doctrine, operational planning, and tactics.

Although one side of the scholarly debate over the comparative roles and

contributions of Mao Zedong and Zhu De has attempted to give Zhu De his due, this has

largely been done without much detailed study of Zhu’s life or career. This dissertation

argues that a true understanding of Zhu’s contributions should begin with a study of his

background and military career prior to 1927 in order to show the practical experience

and theoretical knowledge he had to draw on in the creation of a Communist military

force. While filling a general gap in Western literature on Zhu De, it also focuses on a

phase of Zhu’s life that has received little attention from recent Chinese studies.22 This

focus should, however, provide both a different and fuller perspective on the origins and

development of the early Red Army and its military concepts.

The History and Character of the Red Army

The dominant popular image of the early Red Army is of poorly armed but highly

motivated peasant bands operating out of inaccessible mountain base areas. These

groups are viewed as following the innovative ideas on guerrilla warfare developed by

Warfare, 1935-49,” Political Science Quarterly 81, no. 2 (June 1966): 189-190. 21 Smedley, 226. 22 Most Zhu biographies published in China focus on his career from 1927 onward and largely ignore Zhu’s experiences in the Yunnan Army and in Europe. See for example, Liu Xuemin’s Hong jun zhi fu: Zhu De zhuan or Liu Xuemin, Wang Faan, and Xiao Sike Zhu De Yuanshi. Only a few cover his pre 1927 life and career in any detail, and even these often have important gaps. Thus the Yunnan period of Zhu’s career is not assessed in any detail in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shibian, Zhu De Zhuan.

8 Mao that emphasized reliance on a mobilized peasantry organized into highly mobile

guerrilla forces, which were able to disperse and concentrate quickly to ambush and

harass larger enemy forces. These forces were politically indoctrinated and actively

assisted peasants to revolt and seize and redistribute land.23 While this narrative has

received wide popular acceptance, it is not, in the end, an accurate picture of the Red

Army that Zhu De led. Indeed this popular image obscures rather than clarifies how the

Red Army actually developed, was organized, and operated on campaign and in battle.

Generally speaking, Chinese military history in English on the early Red Army is

both patchy and underdeveloped. Most of the major works were published in the 1960s

and 1970s, with a noticeable decline in interest in Red Army history during the early

1980s. Initial interest probably was due first to US concern with Maoist-inspired

insurgencies in the Third World, and the need for counterinsurgency doctrine during the

Vietnam War era, and second to interest in the political role of the People’s Liberation

Army (PLA) during the Cultural Revolution. The fall off in interest during the early

1980s reflected the normalization of relations between the US and the PRC in 1979 and a

refocus by the United States on the Soviet threat. Furthermore, these early Red Army

historical studies focused mainly on the political, social, institutional, or organizational

aspects of the Red Army and not in any detail on its functioning as a military force,

especially at the operational and tactical levels of warfare.24 Nonetheless, these early

works also provided the basis for a continuing debate over the nature and character of the

23 See for example, Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (1st ed. 1970, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 555-557; James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912-1949 (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 247-248; John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), 232-233; and Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 374-375. 24 An example of the tendency to focus on the political and organizational aspects of the Red Army with little information on military operations or training is seen in Peter Williams Donovan, The Red Army in

9 Red Army.

One of the first introductions to the Red Army and its military theory was Samuel

Griffith’s translation of Mao’s essay On Guerrilla Warfare, first published in the US

Marine Corps Gazette in 1940, and then reprinted in book form in 1961 during an era of heightened American interest in Third World insurgencies. The book is a summary of

Mao’s theory of people’s war and highlights Mao’s concepts for mobilizing the peasant

masses to wage guerrilla warfare. Griffith’s emphasis on the Chinese Communist

military operating as guerrilla forces, which would only be transformed into a regular

army when the guerrilla war had achieved a decisive advantage over the enemy, clearly

played an important role in the construction of the popular image of the Red Army.25

Griffith continued his analysis of the Red Army in his 1967 book, The Chinese People’s

Liberation Army. In this work, Griffith undertakes a broader assessment of the characteristics and history of the Red Army, which he views as the military extension of the Communist Party built on the support of the people where the military was subordinated to politics. For Griffith, the creation of the Red Army was something completely new for, “ … unlike the Russian Bolsheviks who absorbed more than 30,000 former Czarist officers … the Chinese Communists had to start virtually from scratch.”26

The Red Army is depicted as growing out of an ad hoc mix of poorly armed and supplied bandits, military deserters, and peasants. Griffith also shows that in the long run both

Mao and Zhu supported the transformation of the Red Army into a regular professional

Kiangsi, 1931-1934 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). 25 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. and ed. Samuel B. Griffith, II (1st ed. 1961, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1978), 5, 8, 15, 17-21. 26 Griffith, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 29.

10 military force. But this transformation is not his main focus.27

This emphasis on the innovative and revolutionary aspects of the Red Army can

also be found in more recent studies, such as an essay by Hans van de Ven that analyzes

the efforts of both the Guomindang (GMD) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to

develop new military, social, political, and economic structures from 1928 to 1934. Van

de Ven asserts that the GMD and CCP military establishments and their style of warfare

were a break from warlord warfare and the pre-World War One European

“institutionalized warfare” model that warlord armies had tried to imitate from 1916 to

1928. The CCP used ideology and an organized party to create the concept of a

“people’s war” to control and mobilize military force in order to create a revolutionary

army.28 Thus Van de Ven is heir to a tradition that has emphasized the unique character

of the Red Army, with a strong focus on guerrilla warfare.

Moving away from Griffith’s emphasis on the innovative and revolutionary

character of the Red Army, Edgar O’Ballance, in his 1963 study, characterized the Red

Army during the Jinggangshan period as a mixed force of part-time guerrillas and trained

regular units. O’Ballance saw the the Red Army as following Russian or German

military models, where regular units do the main fighting, while the primary purpose of

partisans was to act as an intelligence network and to provide supply and

communications services to support the regular units.29 Reinforcing the characterization

of the Red Army as a regular military force is William Whitson’s study of the Chinese

Communist military-political elite in The Chinese High Command published in 1973.

27 Griffith, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 25, 28-29, 30-32, 33-46. 28 Hans van de Ven, “New States of War: Communist and Nationalist Warfare and State Building (1928- 1934),” in Warfare in Chinese History, ed. Hans van de Ven (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 321-323, 343-345, 349, 372, 385-387, 390.

11 Whitson argued that the Chinese Communist officer corps saw the Red Army as a regular

military force and was mostly opposed to the guerrilla warfare ethic espoused by Mao.

The Red Army’s professional officers favored regular military forces and conventional

operations and resorted to guerrilla warfare only when circumstances forced them to do so. Whitson saw the Red Army and later the PLA as subject to frequent internal conflicts between those favoring the professional military ethic and those supporting the guerrilla warfare ethic. Nonetheless, Whitson concluded that the professional regular army ethos and conventional operations have predominated through most of the history of the

Chinese Communist military.30

Occupying more of a middle ground between Griffith and Whitson, Stephen

Averill’s 2006 study of the Jinggangshan base area viewed the Red Army as a hybrid

force that blended both guerrilla and conventional army characteristics. The Red Army

saw itself as a regular army whose main task was to engage and defeat the adversary’s

frontline combat units, while guerrilla operations were carried out by detachments

specially designated for this task, which were further down the military hierarchy of

forces within a base area.31

Currently, there is a renewed interest in PLA history, likely due to heightened US

concern with PRC military modernization beginning in the 1990s. The result, however,

has largely been works focusing on conventional operations and campaigns since 1945.

Examples of this new interest would be a recent book edited by Mark Ryan, David

Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt on Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since

1949, in which the editors comment on the need for more operational level military

29 O’Ballance, 46-48, 54, 58. 30 Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 22-23, 29-30, 31, 43, 45, 50-51, 55, 57, 68-69.

12 histories that assess how the PLA has implemented operational art at the campaign and

tactical levels of warfare.32 Gary J. Bjorge has produced a study on a specific campaign

during the Chinese Civil War in his Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese

PLA’s Huai Hai Campaign.33 In addition, there have been a number of journal articles

on campaigns during the Chinese Civil War of 1945-1949, such as Harold Tanner’s

“Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria,

1945-1947” and Victor Shiu Chiang Cheng’s “Imagining China’s Madrid in Manchuria:

The Communist Military Strategy at the Onset of the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1946.”34

Remarkably missing from this spate of new publications, however, are any studies focusing on the early period of the Red Army, which clearly set the foundations for the operational capacity of the army in its later period. A goal of this dissertation is to undertake a reassessment of the military antecedents that contributed to the origins and development of the early Red Army. By taking into particular account developments at the operational and tactical levels this dissertation will also provide important background for an area of growing interest in the study of the Chinese military.

Antecedents of the Red Army

In his China at War 1901-1949, Edward Dreyer argued that, “To understand the genesis and outcome of the Chinese Civil War that ended in 1949 we thus need to understand the wars and armies of the earlier warlord period, and to understand them we

31 Averill, 211, 213-214. 32 Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 3. 33 Gary J. Bjorge, Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA’s Huai Hai Campaign (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004). 34 Harold M. Tanner, “Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947,” The Journal of Military History 67, no. 4 (October 2003): 1177-1222; and Victor Shiu Chiang Cheng “Imagining China’s Madrid in Manchuria: The Communist Military Strategy at the Onset of the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1946,” Modern China 31, no. 1 (January 2005): 72-114.

13 need to go back to the beginning of systematic military modernization in the Manchu

reform movement that began in 1901.”35 Nonetheless, almost all historical studies of the

Red Army, both English language works as well as Chinese language studies, take 1927

as their starting date.36 Few if any of these studies look in any depth at the origins or

antecedents of the Red Army in Chinese military developments prior to 1927, other than

a nod to the long Chinese tradition of peasant rebellion. Indeed, many view the

establishment of the Red Army as a break or discontinuity in the military developments

of this period. They do not assess the possible continuities between the Red Army and

the armies of the late Qing, early Republic, or Warlord periods. In addition, most of

these histories do not really delve into the possible foreign influences on the Red Army

and Communist military theory.

One important exception to these studies is William Whitson’s The Chinese High

Command, which contends that the Red Army and later PLA were the product of three

competing military models or styles: the warlord, Russian, and peasant. These three

models, Whitson argued, provided the continuity of military theory and practice from traditional Chinese military experience centered on peasants, through more modern albeit dysfunctional warlord armies, with a leavening of Western influence through the model of the Russian Red Army. But Whitson’s study is limited because he overstates the conflict between the peasant model, which he sees as advocated by Mao, that emphasized

35 Edward L. Dreyer, China at War 1901-1949 (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1995), 5. 36 There are of course numerous Chinese language studies that specifically focus on or provide coverage of the early history of the Red Army. See for example Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun de qishinian (70 Years of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army) (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1997); Zhonguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi jianbian (A Brief History of the Chinese PLA Revolutionary War) (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 2001); Zhongguo tudi geming zhanzheng (Chinese Land Revolutionary War) (Beijing: Jiefangjun Wenyi Chubanshe, 2001); and Hong yi fangmian jun jishi (History of the Red First Front Army) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003). Nonetheless, for political and nationalist reasons little attention is given to looking for military antecedents in ill regarded late Qing or warlord armies or in foreign sources.

14 guerrilla warfare, and the warlord and Russian models, which he sees as supported by professional officers such as Zhu De that emphasized conventional operations and regular military forces.37 Looking at the actual operation of the Red Army, one might argue that

these models were more complementary than in conflict, given both the pragmatism and

adaptability of CCP and Red Army leaders and the more varied nature of warlord and

Russian military experience. Although Whitson does elaborate on the influence of the

Russian model, he is notably dismissive of the warlord military experience despite the

fact that many more officers began their careers under the warlord system before receiving any military training from the Russians. In the end, then, Whitson’s brief analysis of the military antecedents of the Red Army still seems both limited and imprecise.

Another very recent work that at least acknowledges some of the possible

antecedents for the Red Army is Xiaobing Li’s A History of the Modern Chinese Army.

First, Li makes a link between the Red Army and the Taiping Rebellion and the tradition

of peasant rebellion in China. He also takes note of GMD military developments in the

mid 1920s, viewing the GMD’s Huangpu Military Academy and the National

Revolutionary Army as providing the roots of the Red Army’s officer corps. As such he

notes that Huangpu used Japanese, German, and Russian models to train its officers,

seeing in particular the influence of the Russian Red Army system on the NRA and the

later Red Army. He does not take into account any possible linkages to the warlord

military model or other foreign influences. In the end, however, the main focus of Li’s

book is an organizational and social history of the Red Army and PLA from 1949 to

2002. His mention of the early Red Army’s antecedents prior to the 1920s does not

37 Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 7-23, 472-473, 478-479. 15 include any in-depth analysis.38

In the end, then, most of the existing studies of the Red Army that make some

effort to examine its origins do not actually explore the wide array of military systems

that could have influenced its development in any detail, and in particular ignore possible

linkages with the armies of the early Chinese Republic and foreign influences other than

Russia. A reassessment of the early Red Army and its origins from this perspective is therefore long overdue. One goal of this study, then, will be to identify the varied antecedents of the Red Army, including foreign influences that have not been closely examined, with a particular focus on those influencing operational and tactical concepts.

Zhu De’s Background and Influences on his Military Thought

In 1927, when Zhu De openly joined the Communist revolution, he was 41 years

old and had almost two decades of military experience. After receiving a traditional

education to prepare him for the imperial civil service examination, Zhu chose to pursue

a military career and became a cadet at the late Qing Yunnan Military Academy. He

participated in the 1911 Revolution, then served as an officer in the early Republican

Yunnan Army where he rose to the rank of brigade commander. Zhu participated in the campaigns fought by the Yunnan Army in Sichuan and gained experience in counterinsurgency operations in southeastern Yunnan. While studying in Europe during the early and mid 1920s he undertook a close study of the German Army and received

Soviet military training in Moscow. All along, Zhu supplemented his own experience and training with careful study of European and Chinese military theory and practice.

Given Zhu’s background, what were his contributions then to the creation and

development of the early Red Army and Communist military theory? This is an

38 Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 25, 31, 34, 35-39, 40, 42. 16 important question, given the lack of practical military experience of most of the

Communist leadership in 1927, including Mao Zedong. Current Chinese studies on

Zhu’s military thought give him equal status with Mao for developing the strategy and

tactics of revolutionary warfare. Zhu is depicted as a dedicated student of both traditional

Chinese military thought and international developments in modern warfare, particularly

with German and Russian military theory.39 Previous studies have also indicated that

Zhu was influenced by foreign models during the early development of the Red Army, and that he seemed to have favored using German military concepts and ideas that he had learned while studying in Germany, for the troops directly under his command.40 A

major goal of this dissertation, then, will be to delve into Zhu De’s life and military background prior to 1927 in greater detail to discern what lessons and experiences could

have had an influence on his later command of the Red Army.

Zhu De was probably the best and most experienced of the professional officers

who joined the CCP. These professional officers provided continuity with previous

military practice and a base of expertise that could be augmented with new methods and

innovations. The Red Army was the beneficiary of on-going military reforms in China

over the preceding three decades. Professional officers, as exemplified by Zhu De,

played a critical role in the early success and survival of the Red Army. They trained a

new Communist officer corps and passed on their knowledge to subsequent generations

of Communist military leadership.

By analyzing the era through Zhu De’s eyes, this study views the creation and

early development of the Chinese Red Army as part of a continuum in the on-going

39 See for instance Zhao Lujie, Zhu De Bingfa yu taolue (Zhu De’s Art of War and Military Strategy) (Chengdu: Sichuan chuban jituan, 2006), 2.

17 modernization of Chinese military thought and institutions, starting from the late Qing reforms through the early Republican and warlord armies, and the GMD National

Revolutionary Army, to the Communist Red Army. There was not as sharp a break as usually assumed between the Qing, Republican, and Nationalists armies and the Red

Army. Ultimately, the Red Army proved more effective than its predecessors because it was better able to implement its ideals, as well as its military strategies and tactics.

Military developments and reforms of this era derived from an on-going amalgamation and synthesis of domestic Chinese and foreign military influences. As this study will show, Zhu De in many ways embodied and personified the evolution of Chinese military institutions and thought from the late Qing through the PRC.

Most English language studies of the Chinese military of this period tend to focus on the political, social, institutional, or organizational aspects of armies, with almost no detail on the operational and tactical levels of warfare or doctrine. This is the level, however, at which Zhu De in his early military career operated and was most familiar with. This dissertation seeks to understand how armies were trained and operations and battles were conducted, to better discern what the Chinese “art of war” was like in the first three decades of the twentieth century. This will be done by analyzing Zhu De’s career in the Yunnan Army from 1909 to1922 and by putting it into the larger context of the nature of Chinese warfare during this era. This study will look at the military experience of this period not only from the top down but also from the bottom up and assess the interaction among theory, training, and practice. To a certain extent, the

Yunnan Army, at least in its heyday from 1912 to 1916, served as a model of best military practice and as such directly influenced how Zhu De would organize, train, and

40 O’Ballance, 54. 18 conduct the operations of the future Red Army.

This dissertation will assess the possible origins of Zhu De’s military ideas and

concepts, and how they were applied. In attempting to trace the lineages for these

concepts, one can sometimes determine a direct link and influence. Other times, however, there is only circumstantial evidence to connect Zhu and a variety of potential influences. Nonetheless, it is clear that a wide net has to be cast to delve into the origins of Zhu’s military thought, for in addition to his formal military education and training in

China and the Soviet Union, Zhu was a dedicated student of his profession and read widely not just in Chinese, but also in German. This allowed him to undertake a close study of the German Army and its operations during World War One. By analyzing Zhu

De’s early military career, one can discern the process by which traditional Chinese military thought and practice adapted and synthesized foreign military influences to fit

Chinese circumstances.

Rather than viewing developments in Chinese military thought and practice in

isolation, this study will attempt to link these transformations to larger global military developments. Chinese armies of this period took into account Western military developments at the beginning of the twentieth century, including the lessons of World

War One and the Russian Civil War. The potential impact of global developments is especially apparent given the significant Japanese and German influence on the Chinese military prior to 1911, when Japanese and German military officers assisted in the founding and operation of many of the new Chinese military academies. Likewise, a large number of Chinese military officers, such as Cai E, were trained in Japan and then became senior officers in various Republican era armies. Even in the absence of direct

19 links between the German and Chinese militaries, Japan acted as a conduit for German

military theory, which had shaped the Japanese army and its operations prior to World

War One. The army of the new Soviet Union also had a significant influence on the

development of Chinese military forces during the 1920s, both through the training of

Zhu De and other Chinese officers in the USSR and through the use of Soviet instructors

at the GMD’s Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou. In an interesting parallel, just as the Chinese Red Army benefited from previous Chinese military developments so did the Soviet Red Army benefit from its incorporation of a large number of Czarist officers and Czarist military theory.

By studying Zhu De’s career prior to 1927, we can attain a better understanding

of how the early Red Army developed and why it was so successful. It was Zhu De

along with other professional officers who joined the Communists, such as Peng Dehuai

and Liu Bocheng, who created and led a well trained, organized, and politically

indoctrinated military force that would eventually defeat the Nationalists and help create

the PRC. By focusing on an individual military leader, such as Zhu De, one can use this

individual’s career as a vehicle to illustrate and assess the contributions of earlier Chinese

military institutions and modernization efforts on the development and operations of the

Red Army. Such a study of individuals can provide the key to understanding these issues

as these people moved from one institution to another and from one ideology to another.

The approach of this dissertation also makes it possible to address issues and questions little explored in the current English language studies on Chinese military history of the first three decades of the twentieth century. Most of these works are political-military or war and society studies and do not analyze in any detail how armies

20 conducted campaigns or performed in battle, how they were trained, how doctrine was developed and implemented, or what strategic and tactical theories were taught and utilized.41 None analyze army building from the ground up, or look at armies as military organizations from the tactical level up to the strategic level. This study attempts to do this by viewing the military developments of this period through Zhu De’s eyes, in order

to address the origins of Communist military thought and operational concepts and gain a new perspective on the development of the early Red Army.

This dissertation emphasizes the structure and mechanics of army organization and what made one army more effective than another. It also seeks to assess the functioning of a military organization at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war during this period. 42 I have chosen to take an almost engineering-like approach in order to understand how all the component parts of an army work together as a system to determine its overall military effectiveness. Zhu being a professional soldier viewed the world in this way and paid close attention to all the details of how to build, maintain, and

41 Richard Horowitz has pointed out that there are no detailed battle accounts for the wars fought near the end of the nineteenth century and little study of the training, logistics, and military life in the late Qing armies. Richard S. Horowitz, “Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850-1911,” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 173. Edward McCord likewise notes a need for more studies on developments in strategy, logistics, and military organization in relation to actual military operations and warfare for the warlord period. Edward A. McCord, “Warlordism in Early Republican China,” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 192. To better understand the warfare between the CCP and GMD during the early 1930s, Hans van de Ven has also called for studies on how the Communist and Nationalist armies actually conducted military operations and performed in battle. See Van de Ven, “New States of War,” 390. 42 For a current definition of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war used for this dissertation, see United States Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2001), 2-2, 2-3, 2-5. According to FM 3-0, the strategic level of war is the level of war at which a nation determines national security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is defined as the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national objectives. The operational level of war is the level where campaigns and major operations are undertaken and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of operations. It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The tactical level involves the employment of units in combat, which includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the

21 command an effective fighting force. In their historical study of military effectiveness,

Millett, Murray, and Watman emphasize that an assessment of military effectiveness has

both vertical and horizontal dimensions. The vertical dimension encompasses the

preparation for and conduct of war at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical

levels. The horizontal dimension consists of a series of interdependent tasks that need to

be undertaken simultaneously by a military organization and need to be executed at each

hierarchical level with varying levels of intensity so that the organization can perform

proficiently. These interdependent tasks include planning, training, logistics, personnel

procurement, intelligence, technical adaptation, and combat. The definition of military

effectiveness must include all these activities, while a determination of military

effectiveness requires assessment across both the vertical and horizontal range of military

activities. An assessment of effectiveness must also include an analysis of barriers to

change and opportunities for reform.43 Given these criteria, the chapters on the Red

Army and the Yunnan Army include sections describing the above interdependent tasks along with discussions on the different levels of war from the strategic to the tactical.

Sources

English language sources that cover Zhu’s pre 1927 life and career are still

limited to the interviews conducted with Zhu in 1937 by Agnes Smedley and Helen

Foster Snow. The only full-length biography in English is still Agnes Smedley’s The

Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh, which was compiled from interviews that

she made with Zhu in 1937 at Yenan. At Smedley’s death in 1950, the book was still

terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. 43 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” in Military Effectiveness, Volume I: The First World War, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 2.

22 unfinished and therefore has many large gaps, especially the critical 1931-1934 period.

The book is essentially a compilation of direct quotes from her interview transcripts

along with her various notes. The information found in these interviews implies that Zhu

should be given as much credit as Mao for developing Communist guerrilla warfare

theory.44 This work, however, should be used with caution since Smedley was enamored

with her subject and her work is quite biased in Zhu’s favor.45 Helen Foster Snow, under

her pen name Nym Wales, also conducted extensive interviews with Zhu De at Yenan in

1937. These interviews, which included an autobiographical sketch as well as Zhu’s own account of the history of the Red Army up to 1937, were published as part of Nym

Wales’ book Inside Red China.46

The works based on Agnes Smedley’s and Nym Wale’s interviews with Zhu De

are considered among the main primary sources on Zhu De’s early life and career by

historians both inside and outside the PRC. Indeed, the Chinese have taken many of

these interviews, translated them into Chinese, and reprinted them, along with some other

useful information, in a putative “autobiography” of Zhu De, Zhu De zishu (Zhu De in

His Own Words).47 There is also an important and useful collection of oral histories by

people who knew Zhu De who discuss his life and career in Hua shuo Zhu De (Talks on

44 See Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956). A more dismissive view of Zhu is presented in the memoirs of Otto Braun, the Comintern representative to the CCP from 1932-1939. Braun saw Zhu as subordinate to Mao who, at least after 1929 exercised no independent or decisive role. Braun argues that Mao and Mao alone was the real leader of the Red Army from 1929 to 1932. Otto Braun, A Comintern Agent in China 1932-1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 47, 59. Braun’s memoirs were also written from memory many years after his experiences, and framed by his own politically biased (anti-Mao) agenda. Given his low view of Zhu, he provides no useful information on Zhu’s early life or career. 45 On Smedley’s attitude towards Zhu, see Ruth Price, The Lives of Agnes Smedley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 307-308. 46 Nym Wales, Inside Red China (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1939). 47 Zhu De, Zhu De zishu (Zhu De in His Own Words) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2003).

23 Zhu De).48 Especially valuable is the interview with Yang Ruxuan, a fellow cadet of

Zhu’s at the Yunnan Military Academy, who later served with Zhu in the Yunnan Army

and then ended up as a GMD divisional commander fighting and being defeated by Zhu

De in 1928. Interviews with two of Zhu’s fellow students in Germany and the Soviet

Union, Fang Shiliang and Liu Ding, are very informative on Zhu’s experience as a

student in Germany and his training in the USSR.

A collection of documents authored by Zhu De were published in Zhu De xuanji

(Selected Works of Zhu De), and includes some useful reminiscences about his life and experiences prior to 1927.49 In 1997, a collection of Zhu’s military writings was also published as Zhu De junshi wenxuan, (Selected Military Works of Zhu De).50 This

collection contains documents pertaining to the period after the 1927 Nanchang Uprising

and includes copies of operational orders and instructions for the Red Army. During the

Jinggangshan and Jiangxi Soviet periods most military documents were issued under both

Zhu De’s and Mao’s names, with Zhu De as army commander and Mao as political

commissar. Therefore, many of these documents were subsequently published as Mao’s

military writings.51 The editors of Zhu De junshi wenxuan made an effort to distinguish

which documents were actually written by Zhu and which by Mao. Therefore, some of

the instructions and orders originally attributed to Mao are now attributed to Zhu De and

are included in Zhu’s military works. Significantly, in the introduction to Zhu De junshi

wenxuan, the editors state that Zhu De’s military thought was an important component of

48 Zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shi di er bian yanbu, ed., Hua shuo Zhu De (Talks on Zhu De) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000). 49 Zhu De, Zhu De xuanji (Selected Works of Zhu De) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983). An English version was published as Selected Works of Zhu De (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986). 50 Zhu De, Zhu De junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Zhu De) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1997). 51 See for instance the documents in Mao Zedong, Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-

24 Mao’s military thought and therefore Zhu’s contributions should be made known. This

clarification of works actually authored by Zhu is one reason why a new evaluation of

Zhu’s role in the development of the Red Army is now possible.

An examination of the new secondary sources on Zhu De that have appeared in

recent years do not reveal any other major sources on Zhu’s early life. Most of these

works continue to rely heavily on the published documents and sources noted above.

Many of these biographies are derivative, relying on the same source material from Zhu

De Zishu, Zhu’s published works, the interviews found in Huashuo Zhu De, and on

Smedley’s and Wales’ works. For instance, the text of a biographical work on Zhu De

published in 2006, Renmin de guangrong Zhu De, is composed mostly of excerpts from

Zhu De Zishu and the interviews with Yang Ruxuan.52 In the end, most Chinese studies

of Zhu also continue to focus primarily on his life after 1927. This again suggests a

general paucity of materials on his earlier life. There are only a few cases where these

studies provide collateral information for sources that are not generally available.53

There are also collections of documents by Zhu De’s contemporaries that are

useful in revealing influences on Zhu or provide context for an understanding of his early

career. The most important example of this nature is Cai E, who was the leader of the

Yunnan Army from 1912 to 1916 and is also considered a major military theorist during

the early Republican period. Cai E was also Zhu’s mentor and friend, and had a

1949, ed. Stuart R. Schram (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995 and 1997), vols. 3 and 4. 52 See Renmin de guangrong Zhu De (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2006). 53 One example is a recent dual biography of Zhu De and Fan Shisheng by Guo Junning that focuses almost wholly on Zhu De’s life and career prior to 1927 to better assess his relationship with Fan Shisheng, who had been a fellow cadet with Zhu at the Yunnan Military Academy and had also served with Zhu as an officer in the Yunnan Army. Guo Junning, Zhu De yu Fan Shisheng (Zhu De and Fan Shisheng) (Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 2001). A significant portion of this work covers Zhu’s experiences in the Yunnan Army and relies not only on the above cited primary source material, but also uses published document

25 significant influence on Zhu’s career and beliefs. Cai E’s essays on military theory along

with other documents relating to the operations of the Yunnan Army and the Protect the

Nation War of 1916 can be found in Cai E Ji.54

Because there are few studies in English on the military history of the period, there are many gaps in our knowledge on the daily operations of armies and especially on how they conducted campaigns and battles. To some extent, this deficiency is redressed by Chinese sources on late Qing and Republican period armies, military operations, and tactical theory. Examples include Jin Yuguo, Zhongguo zhanshu shi (History of Chinese

Tactics) and Ping Zhiwei, Zhong xi fang shanshu bijiao yanjiu (A Comparative Study on

Tactics of China and the Western World).55 Other general works on Chinese military

history that cover these periods, include Zhongguo zhan zheng fa zhan shi (History of

Chinese Warfare), Zhongguo jin dai jun shi shi (Recent Chinese Military History), or

Tsui chin san shih nien Chung-kuo chun shih shih (History of China’s Military Affairs in

the Last Thirty Years), this last work having originally been published in 1932.56

Organization

The organization of this dissertation will be for the most part chronological

following Zhu De’s life, education, and career. The primary focus will be on his early

military career from the time he entered the Yunnan Military Academy in 1909 through his training in the USSR ending in 1926. The initial chapter, however, begins with a

collections covering the history of Yunnan province in the early twentieth century, including oral histories and documents on the Yunnan Army and its campaigns in Sichuan. 54 Cai E, Cai E Ji, ed. Mao Zhuqing (Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1983). 55 Jin Yuguo, Zhongguo zhanshu shi (History of Chinese Tactics) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2002) and Ping Zhiwei, Zhong xi fang shanshu bijiao yanjiu (A Comparative Study on Tactics of China and the Western World) (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2001). 56 Zhongguo renmin geming junshi bowuguan, Zhongguo zhanzheng fazhan shi (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2001); Zhang Yutian, Zhongguo jindai junshi shi (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe,

26 description of the evolution and characteristics of the Red Army from 1927 to 1931 in

order to provide a historical context that the reader can use to assess in subsequent

chapters the extent to which Zhu De’s military experiences prior to 1927 influenced the development and operations of the early Red Army. This first chapter will give a brief overview of the main military events of the period, followed by a summary of the main military characteristics of the Red Army from Zhu De’s point of view, covering organization, training, discipline, command, doctrine, military strategy, and tactics.

Subsequent chapters focus on pivotal periods in Zhu De’s early life and career. Each chapter is divided into sections that again present a narrative of events as related to Zhu

De along with sections assessing specific topics such as military theory, army organization, the officer corps, training, doctrine, and tactical concepts pertaining to this period.

The second chapter describes Zhu De’s life and education from 1886 to1911, and

assesses the roots of his military and political thought, as well as other factors that

influenced his early life and career. This chapter will include an assessment of the late

Qing military from 1901 to 1911, to show what kind of military institution Zhu De

entered in 1909. The chapter will then review Zhu De’s experiences at the Yunnan

Military Academy from 1909 to1911 and describe what kinds of military training and

education Zhu received, what late Qing military thought would have been passed on to

him and his fellow cadets, and what relationship these theories had to broader Western military practice.

The third chapter presents an overview of Zhu’s early military experience and his

1983); and Wen Kung-shih, Tsui chin san shih nien Chung-kuo chun shih shih (Shanghai: 1932), subsequently reprinted in Taipei in 1962.

27 participation in the 1911 Revolution in Yunnan, as well as assessing the characteristics, strategy, and tactics of the armies of the early Chinese Republic. This chapter acts as a bridge between the military practices of the late-Qing dynasty and the subsequent changes in military institutions and practices that occurred in the early Republic.

The fourth chapter assesses Zhu De’s participation in the initial operations of the

Yunnan Army from 1912 to 1916, and will show how Zhu and other officers were able to apply and adapt military theories and concepts they had been taught to the practical challenges of the battlefield. This chapter will focus on Zhu’s experience in counterinsurgency warfare in southeastern Yunnan from 1913 to 1915 and his participation in the 1916 Protect the Nation War. In addition, this chapter will begin to gauge the degree of influence that Zhu’s Yunnan Army service had on the development of the later Red Army.

The fifth chapter will cover Zhu’s campaign experience from 1917 to 1922, when he was a brigade commander with the Yunnan Army force that had occupied southern

Sichuan. It will describe Zhu’s participation in the Protect the Constitution War of 1917 along with the on-going conflicts between the Yunnan “guest army” and various Sichuan militarists. This chapter will also trace the decline of the Yunnan Army as a military force during its five-year occupation of southern Sichuan and gauge the degree of influence that Zhu’s Yunnan Army service had on the development of the later Red

Army. In addition, this chapter will examine the factors that led Zhu De to become disillusioned with the “warlord” paradigm and search for an alternative that would eventually lead him to Communism, and his decision by 1922 to abandon his established position in the Yunnan Army to study in Europe.

28 The sixth chapter describes Zhu’s experiences and education in Germany and the

Soviet Union from 1922 to 1926, and will attempt to gauge how much influence Zhu

De’s studies in Germany from 1922 to 1925 and in Russia from 1925 to 1926 had on his military thought. This chapter speculates on the possible German military theories and concepts that Zhu most likely learned during his time in Germany, especially from his intense study of the German Army and its campaigns during World War One. It also describes the military training Zhu De received while in the USSR, especially the Soviet military theory he may have been taught, and then examines whether he may have applied those lessons to the development and operations of the Chinese Red Army.

29 Chapter 1: The Early Red Army Under Zhu De

This chapter will describe the early development and characteristics of the Red

Army under Zhu De from 1927 to 1931. It will focus on those Communist military units

that were personally led by Zhu and would later be organized (along with Mao Zedong’s

and other forces) into the Fourth Army at Jinggangshan and then the First Front Army in

the Jiangxi Central Soviet base area. Contrary to the established Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) histories of this era, the “Red Army” of this period was not a single military force but an eclectic mix of units scattered in different rural base areas, under little centralized control, and initially developing on their own. The origins of these forces varied. Some were former units of the Guomindang’s

(GMD) National Revolutionary Army (NRA) or provincial armies that had mutinied or defected to the Communists. Others were originally peasant and worker militias, or even former bandits.57 In addition, this chapter will focus mainly on the military aspects of

Zhu’s Red Army, and not on political, social, or organizational issues, which have been

covered in other English language works on the early Communist military.58

First, a brief overview of the main military events from 1927 to 1931 will put the

development of the Red Army into historical context. August 1, 1927, when the CCP

57 Averill, 202. For the origins of various early Red Army units see William W. Whitson, ed., PLA Unit History (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1967), 125-126. Table 1 details the diverse origins of early Red Army units, from such groups as peasant bands, former bandits, former government troops who defected, and former local militia units. This work was originally published in the Republic of China and translated into English. 58 For broad surveys of the Chinese Communist military that include useful information on the military operations of 1927-31, see Griffith’s The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Whitson’s The Chinese High Command. For a more recent study focusing on the organizational and social history of the Red Army and PLA, see Li’s A History of the Modern Chinese Army. For a political and organizational history of the Red Army during the latter part of this period refer to Donovan’s The Red Army in Kiangsi, 1931- 1934. For two recent essays on the effects of warfare and military mobilization on early twentieth century China, both by Hans van de Ven, see “The Military in the Republic,” China Quarterly 150, (June, 1997):

30 launched its first military insurrection at Nanchang against the GMD, is generally seen as

initiating the period when the first units that would form the Red Army were created.

The narrative ends with the First Soviet Congress at the end of 1931, which formally

established the first centralized Soviet government at the Jiangxi base area and organized

Communist military forces scattered in different base areas into a single Red Army with

all units coming under a centralized command structure.

The main military characteristics of the Red Army organized by such topics as

organization, training, discipline, command, doctrine, military strategy, and tactics will

be described. It will be shown that rather than being an ad hoc irregular guerrilla force,

the Red Army was a hybrid military organization composed of regular units and guerrilla

detachments, and supported by local self-defense forces consisting of peasant militias.

Given this mix of forces, the Red Army, therefore, was capable of waging both

conventional and guerrilla warfare.

From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jiangxi Soviet (August 1927-December 1931)

The development of the Red Army was very closely tied to changes in the

direction of overall Communist revolutionary strategy in the face of challenging political

circumstances. Communist strategy during this period oscillated between offensive and

defensive approaches, which were determined by both changes in external circumstances

and by internal CCP politics.59 Offensive strategies emphasized more conventional

352-374 and “New States of War: Communist and Nationalist Warfare and State Building (1928-1934),” 321-397. 59 Indeed, part of the difficulty of focusing just on the military aspects of the Red Army during the 1927- 1931 period, is that, as Stuart R. Schram has pointed out, “…military history and Party history are intricately intertwined…” See Stuart R. Schram’s introduction to Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949, ed. Stuart R. Schram (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 3:xxi. For another overview of the different phases in early CCP revolutionary strategy, the complex role played by internal CCP politics, and difficulties raised by Maocentric assessments of this period, see Hans van de Ven, “New States of War: Communist and Nationalist Warfare and State Building (1928-1934),” 325.

31 military operations and urban insurrection, with a focus on seizing and occupying major cities. Defensive strategies emphasized mobile and guerrilla-style warfare and the development, expansion, and defense of rural base areas in remote mountainous regions.

Both strategies relied on mass mobilization of the populace, but whether to mobilize the urban or rural populations depended on the urban or rural focus of the revolutionary strategy being implemented.

When Zhu De returned from studying in Germany and the Soviet Union in July

1926, China was in a state of political crisis and ferment. The revolutionary Nationalist

Party (the Guomindang or GMD) and its Communist Party allies were preparing to launch a “Northern Expedition” from their base in Guangdong province to destroy warlordism and reunite the nation. Upon his return, Zhu contacted the secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, Chen Duxiu, who asked Zhu to join a military intelligence group staffed by GMD and CCP members who wanted to make use of Zhu’s contacts with various militarists. This group decided that Zhu would be the best person to send to Sichuan to persuade General Yang Sen, one of Zhu’s former friends who now controlled eastern Sichuan, to support the GMD’s Northern Expedition.60 Zhu succeeded and Yang agreed to reorganize his forces into the Twentieth Army of the National

Revolutionary Army (NRA), with Zhu as political commissar. In his reminiscences, Zhu pointed out that his was a political post and he had no military position. This cooperation, however, did not last long. Yang Sen betrayed the GMD and resumed his alliance with his former superior, the northern warlord, Wu Peifu. To escape capture by

Yang Sen, Zhu left Sichuan and rejoined the GMD at their new capital at Wuhan.61

60 Smedley, 169, 171. 61 Wales, 118-119. Smedley, 181-182.

32 Arriving in Wuhan, Zhu had hoped to be assigned as an officer in the famous 12th

Division, known as the “Ironsides,” which was part of the Fourth Army of the NRA then stationed at Wuhan, whose ranks included large numbers of Communists.62 Instead of

being assigned to the Ironsides, in January 1927, the GMD government assigned Zhu to

be the director of a new military training school in Nanchang, which had been established

by his old Yunnan Army now, redesignated as the Third Army and under the command of a fellow Yunnan Army veteran, General Zhu Peide. The new military school had

1,300 cadets, mainly squad, platoon and company commanders who were assigned to

undergo an eight-month course of study. The cadets also served as the garrison of

Nanchang, so Zhu also became the garrison commander of the city. He was also

appointed police commissioner of Nanchang, with a police force of four hundred men,

and was also put in charge of the police training school. Zhu was basically in command

of all the security institutions of Nanchang, and by virtue of all his positions, was also

made a member of the GMD central committee for the city.63

The Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings

The successes of the Northern Expedition in 1926 and early 1927 exacerbated the

tensions and suspicions between the GMD rightwing under Jiang Jieshi and the GMD

leftwing and its CCP allies. Fearing the growing power of the GMD left and the CCP,

62 Zhu De considered this army as the best military unit in the NRA. The Fourth Army had originally consisted of two divisions and one independent regiment when it left Canton (Guangzhou) in mid-1926 at the start of the Northern Expedition. Its original recruits when it was established in Guangzhou were made up of Hong Kong strikers and Guangzhou industrial workers, while the majority of its officers were Communists or Communist sympathizers, educated at the GMD Huangpu Military Academy. Most of its political department personnel were also Communists. By the time the Northern Expedition reached Wuhan, it had increased in size with new recruits, most of these being peasants and industrial workers. Zhu described the Fourth Army as being the “most class-conscious, best trained and disciplined of all the Nationalist armies.” Smedley, 183, 185. See also Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China’s National Revolution of 1926-1928 (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), 23-24, 74, 79, 195; and Dreyer, 134, 139.

33 Jiang Jieshi decided to purge the leftists and CCP from the GMD, starting in Shanghai in

April 1927. The on-going purges, which came to be known as the “White Terror,” and

the GMD left’s growing distrust of the intentions of its CCP allies, led the GMD left to

separate themselves from the CCP and begin negotiations with Jiang Jieshi. The final

split between the Communists and the GMD left occurred in mid-July 1927.64 That

month, the CCP decided to strike back by staging a series of military insurrections and peasant uprisings. Zhu participated in a secret conference of the CCP on July 18, 1927 near Nanchang, in Jiangxi province, to plan for these uprisings. This meeting included

Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Liu Bocheng, and Mao Zedong. The conference decided that the first action would be an uprising in Nanchang. The military core of the uprising was to be the units of the 20th Army under He Long and the 24th Division under Ye Ting.

The objective was for these units to launch an insurrection in Nanchang on August 1,

1927, then march to Guangzhou to help establish a new revolutionary government. In

addition, the military rebellion was to signal uprisings among the peasantry.65 CCP

historians look upon the August 1, 1927 Nanchang Uprising as marking the birth of the

Chinese Red Army and celebrate it as such.

Militarily, the uprising was successful in that the rebelling troops seized

Nanchang city and its surrounding areas.66 Zhu was ordered to form and command a

new Ninth Division composed of military cadets, members of the Nanchang police force,

63 Smedley, 185-186. 64 R. Keith Schoppa, The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 77-78. 65 Smedley, 199-201. Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 47. Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian, Zhu De Nianpu (Yearly Chronology of Zhu De) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 49. 66 Two divisions of the Twentieth Army followed their commander He Long in the uprising, while all of the Twenty-fourth Division of the Eleventh Army followed their commander Ye Ting. In addition, two regiments of the Twenty-fifth Division also followed Ye Ting’s troops in the insurrection. Ye Ting had

34 and workers and students, with a total of about one thousand armed troops. On August 5,

all the rebellious troops marched south into Guangdong, hoping to establish a new

revolutionary regime there. The troops marched in two columns, with Zhu’s new Ninth

Division forming the vanguard of the eastern column.67

Meanwhile, following the initial success of the Nanchang Uprising, the

Communist national leaders convened an August 7 Emergency Conference. They

decided to launch a coordinated number of rural-based attacks on major cities in Central

China, which came to be collectively known as the “Autumn Harvest Uprising” of

September 1927. Mao Zedong was designated to lead an uprising in his native Hunan and try to take the city of Changsha. Mao raised and organized military units from peasant associations, miners, bandits, and former warlord soldiers. Despite their initial

successes, this series of insurgencies ultimately failed. The uprising led by Mao was

quickly put down by the GMD and local forces. Mao was forced to flee with the

remnants of his forces to the Jinggangshan region on the Hunan-Jiangxi border where, in

the late autumn of 1927, he united with local revolutionary forces led by the former

bandits Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo to set up the Jinggangshan base area.68 In the

meantime, the Nanchang Uprising insurrectionary troops were defeated by GMD forces

during their march south. The remaining rebel troops experienced many desertions and

demoralization. Zhu managed to collect about two thousand survivors and retreated

westward. They reached Dayu in Jiangxi Province by the end of October 1927. Zhu

around 10,000 rebel troops under his command, while the total number of troops who joined the uprising was around 25,000. See Wales, 242. 67 Smedley, 202-203. 68 Averill, 155, 165. For an assessment of Mao’s role in the failure of the uprising and the lessons Mao derived from this defeat, see Roy Hofheinz, Jr., “The Autumn Harvest Insurrection,” The China Quarterly 32, (Oct.-Dec., 1967): 37-87. For a more detailed history of the Chinese Communist peasant movement

35 described his forces as a disorganized conglomeration of units from different commands.

He reorganized them into five detachments, each with a political commissar, and

renamed this army the “Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army” although they kept their GMD banners. In a general meeting of officers and soldiers, Zhu was elected commander in chief, Chen Yi as political commissar, and Lin Biao as commander of one of the detachments.69

After relocating to Shangbao in Jiangxi, Zhu received a message from an old

Yunnan Military Academy classmate, Fan Shisheng, who was then commander of the

GMD’s Sixteenth Army stationed in southern Hunan. Fan was sympathetic to the

Communists and had retained Communist organizations within his forces. Zhu entered

into a cooperative relationship with Fan, with Zhu’s troops being incorporated into Fan’s

army as one of its regiments, where they were protected and resupplied. In December

1927, however, the GMD pressured Fan to expel Zhu’s troops, so Fan and Zhu separated.

Meanwhile, the central CCP leadership ordered Zhu to march his force south into

Guangdong Province to assist the Guangzhou Uprising of December 11-13, 1927. But

the uprising was defeated before Zhu’s arrival, so he was instructed to return to southern

Hunan to organize peasant rebellions.70

and the potential for a rural revolutionary strategy, see Roy Hofheinz, Jr., The Broken Wave: The Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922-1928 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). 69 Zhu De, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962), in Selected Works of Zhu De (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986), 399-400 or Zhu De, “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” (June 1962), in Zhu De xuanji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), 393-394; and Smedley, 212-213. See also an account of this period from Zhu De’s second in command, Chen Yi, in Lanxin Xiang, Mao’s Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 13-14. 70 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 401-402; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 395-396.

36 Southern Hunan Revolt

Zhu marched his troops back into southern Hunan in January 1928, where local

CCP cadres were planning peasant uprisings. With newly formed peasant armies, Zhu’s force was able to capture several important administrative centers and began to form local soviets. Zhu relates a bandwagon effect that followed initial Communist military success starting from January 1928, when his forces began organizing uprisings at the local and county levels. Zhu was able to form an army of about ten thousand, and changed its name to the First Division of the Peasants’ and Workers’ Revolutionary

Army. Now, for the first time, the soldiers carried red banners instead of their old

GMD/NRA banners. After victories at Yizhang and Pingshi, local Communist

organizations went to Zhu to ask for his help in establishing military forces at the county

level. Eventually, soviet governments were established in 11 counties in southern Hunan.

This pattern of creating and expanding soviet base areas was repeated in other regions,

such as Jiangxi. By late March, however, the uprising was defeated by combined

offensives from Guangdong and Hunan warlord forces and the loss of support of urban

populations for the CCP cause. Knowing that Communist forces under Mao had

established a base at Jinggangshan in western Jiangxi, Zhu De led his troops and some of

the armed peasant units toward Jinggangshan.71 With the failures of the Nanchang and

Autumn Harvest uprisings in 1927 and the southern Hunan uprising in early 1928,

Communist strategy shifted from offensives against urban areas and the instigation of

insurrections and uprisings to a more defensive strategy, and focused on establishing and

71 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 403-404; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 397-398; Averill, 191-194; and Wales, 246.

37 defending base areas in remote mountainous regions to await better opportunities to

expand the revolution.

Jinggangshan Period

The linking of Mao and Zhu’s forces at Jinggangshan in April 1928 is considered

an important step in the development of the Red Army by both Chinese and Western

historians. But there is disagreement about the level of significance of this event. As

previously noted, traditional CCP mythology marked the origin of the Red Army with the

Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927. This event, however, really only points to the

actual dedication of some regular army forces to the Communist cause. In actual

organizational terms, it seems more appropriate to place the actual origin of the Red

Army with the joining of Mao’s and Zhu’s forces at Jinggangshan in April 1928. This

view is supported by historians such as Stephen Averill who see the critical phase in the

development of the Red Army as occurring at Jinggangshan.72

On May 4, Zhu’s and Mao’s forces were formally combined into the newly established Revolutionary Army’s Fourth Army, later renamed the Fourth Army of the

Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. It was named in honor of the old National

Revolutionary Army Fourth Army that Zhu had admired so much and whose forces still

retained some former members. Zhu was named commander and Mao as the Communist

Party representative.73 Zhu and Mao organized their military forces into four regiments

derived from four different groups of insurgents:

28th Regiment: Zhu De, Nanchang Uprising veterans

29th Regiment: Hu Shaohai, Hunan Uprising peasants

72 Averill, 197-198, 202.

38 31st Regiment: Mao Zedong, Autumn Harvest veterans

32nd Regiment: Wang Zuo/Yuan Wencai, Jinggangshan ex-bandits74

These different military units were now combined into one army, but each had developed

from different backgrounds and experiences, and had personal loyalties to different

leaders. At first, as noted by Stephen Averill, these different units were still personalistic

in nature and this created problems in command authority. Many issues had to be worked

out among these different leaders, not just military ones, but also over how the revolution should develop. During this period, also there was only sporadic contact between the various rural base areas and the CCP higher leadership in Shanghai, which required Zhu

and Mao to improvise, adopt ad hoc approaches, and enter a period of experimentation.75

The importance of the Fourth Army to the later history of the Communist

revolution cannot be understated; it not only defended the Jinggangshan base area, but

also provided the core of the force that developed and protected the later Jiangxi Soviet;

it was one of the main units on the Long March and subsequently provided many of the

leaders for the famous Eighth Route Army during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45.

This army was able to defeat successive GMD military offensives by developing a

fighting force that combined and coordinated use of regular military units and local

73 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 404, 424; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 398, 417. 74 Averill, 202-203. As of mid 1928, there still was no consistency in the organization of Communist military forces scattered in different base areas, with a mixture of unit designations and a wide variation in the number of units under different command echelons. For instance in 1928, the Fourth Army commanded by Zhu De had four regiments (tuan) under it, while the Eleventh Army commanded by Wu Guanhao had four brigades (dadui), and the Second Army commanded by He Long had one division (shi) and three detachments (zhidui). There are many inconsistencies in the designation of different Communist armies, partly the result of frequent name changes during this period. The Fourth Army (jun) under Zhu and Mao was redesignated the First Army Corps (juntuan) in June of 1930 and then was incorporated into the First Front Army (fangmianjun) in August 1930 with Zhu and Mao double hatted as commander and political commissar of both units. An effort will be made to use whatever designation a unit was known under during the time period under discussion. See Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi jianbian (A Brief History of the Chinese PLA Revolutionary War) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2003), charts after 235.

39 guerrilla bands. Contrary to the previously described popular view that the early Red

Army was solely a guerrilla force, the Red Army leadership always viewed its forces as a

regular organized army and only relied on local irregular detachments to undertake actual

guerrilla operations.76

To defend the Jinggangshan base area, a defense-in-depth strategy was developed,

popularly known as “luring the enemy in deep,” that effectively countered successive

GMD offensives. But in late 1928, GMD strategy changed to one emphasizing economic blockade. This had a significant impact on Jinggangshan base area resources, given that this region was poor and could not feed all the Red Army troops there, especially after

Peng Dehuai’s defecting Hunan army troops joined Zhu and Mao forces in December

1928. After defeating three suppression campaigns in the spring of 1928, the Red Army suffered a set-back in August 1928 when an attack on southern Hunan led by Zhu and the main force of the Red Army failed, partly due to the mutiny and desertion of Red Army units from Hunan. At the same time, the GMD forces launched another offensive against

Jinggangshan that compelled the main force under Zhu to return and retake lost base area territory.77

By January 1929, because of the Guomindang’s economic blockade and

increasing military pressure, Zhu and Mao decided to abandon the base area.

Contributing to their decision was information the GMD was planning to launch a large

scale offensive that month using the Hunan and Jiangxi armies, totaling thirty thousand soldiers, who would converge on the base area from five different routes. This was in

75 Averill, 202-203. 76 Ibid., 198, 211. 77 Ibid., 199-202, 275, 289.

40 stark contrast to fewer than six thousand Red Army troops there.78 As a consequence,

Zhu and Mao decided to evacuate Jinggangshan and ordered their Fourth Army to break

out of the area and move to the border region of eastern Jiangxi and western Fujian to set up a new base. Peng Dehuai’s forces were left behind to defend what remained of the

Jinggangshan base.79

Conflicts Between Zhu and Mao, 1928-1929

The early accepted view of the working relationship between Zhu and Mao was

that of a harmonious, complementary, and non-competitive partnership.80 In later

studies, however, a more contentious relationship between Zhu and Mao has been

revealed, especially during the first few years of their partnership. One view, represented

prominently by William Whitson, characterized the conflict between the two leaders as

mainly over competing military models and styles, with Zhu favoring the professional

military model and conventional warfare over Mao’s advocacy of the peasant model and

guerrilla warfare.81 Another variation on this view is put forth by Lanxin Xiang, who sees one cause of the conflict in the differences in outlook between Zhu and Mao, where

Zhu De and other regular officers, such as Chen Yi and Peng Dehuai, favored regular and mobile warfare and lacked Mao’s absolute faith in peasant guerrilla tactics. Xiang also points to differences concerning strategy between Zhu and Mao, which arose during the summer of 1928 over Zhu’s taking the main Red Army force on operations away from the Jinggangshan base area (responding to a request from the Hunan CCP provincial committee and following overall CCP strategy) to try to capture towns and set up a

78 Ibid., 307-308, 316. 79 Ibid., 318, 320-321. 80 See the assessments made by Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales) and Agnes Smedley when they met both men in 1937. See Wales, 112 and Smedley, 226-227.

41 southern Hunan base area. In contrast, Mao believed that the Red Army should stay in

the mountainous base area to ensure its continued survival and not risk a destructive

battle with GMD forces in the field.82 To view the roots of conflict between Zhu and

Mao as centered on strategy or over competing military models, however, is to ignore the

fact that both men were in agreement most of the time over issues of strategy and what

military models to follow. Zhu supported the use of guerrilla warfare and had extensive experience conducting guerrilla and counterinsurgency operations. He had also

participated in campaigns in 1916 and 1917 that combined both guerrilla and

conventional operations, and also received training in guerrilla and revolutionary warfare

in the USSR.83

The more apparent source of conflict seems to have been over the degree of control that the CCP should exert over the military. Indeed, Xiang sees this as the main source of conflict between Zhu and Mao during the 1928-29 period, where Zhu favored limited party authority over the troops and military strategy taking precedence over party work.84 Supporting a similar position, Stuart Schram views Zhu and Mao in agreement

on general questions over the importance of base areas and the need for military force,

while disagreements arose over the control of military operations, the nature of military

planning, and the political role of the military. Zhu accepted overall Communist Party

leadership, but thought the CCP tried to run too many things directly within the army. He

81 Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 29-30, 31, 45. 82 Xiang, 16-18. For the disastrous Red Army foray into southern Hunan during the summer of 1928, see Averill, 266, 268-269, 271-272, 274-275. From late 1927 through most of 1928, the Comintern and CCP central leadership endorsed a strategy of coordinated urban and rural uprisings. See Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 95-96. 83 See for instance Zhu’s claim that he had been an early advocate for the use of guerrilla warfare and had used guerrilla tactics in his earlier military career. Zhu, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 132-133; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,” in Zhu De xuanji, 126-127.

42 wanted to focus more on the immediate threat and thought Mao too concerned with developing overall long-range plans. Zhu believed the army’s main task was fighting,

while Mao believed the army should focus on propaganda work as well as fighting.85

Looking at the role of the Front Committee (chaired by Mao) and party involvement in

the Red Army in May 1929, Hans van de Ven puts forth an assessment that focuses more

pointedly on the issue of political control over the military as the source of conflict. He

portrays Zhu as believing CCP influence was too large within the military and feeling

that he was being dictated to by the Front Committee and Mao.86

Given that Zhu had far more military experience than Mao, it is understandable

that Zhu may have believed that he should be in overall charge of military matters and

expressed some resentment over Mao’s attempts to assert authority over him. One

should, however, not over emphasize these conflicts concerning party-army relations

because Zhu, in the end, was a dedicated Communist and in many ways better versed then Mao in Marxist-Leninist thought. By 1931, Zhu acknowledged the need for politics to dominate the military and that the Red Army must be under the unconditional leadership of the CCP. Only under the leadership of the party, Zhu believed, could the army fulfill its task of launching wide-scale revolutionary warfare in order to defeat the warlord armies, expand the Soviet movement, develop revolutionary base areas, and establish a central government. To that end, Zhu asserted that the Red Army military

84 Xiang, 18. 85 See Stuart Schram’s introduction in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:xliii-xliv. 86 Van de Ven, “New States of War,” 340.

43 command, and especially its political training and political commissar system, must be

under the undivided leadership of the CCP.87

One can also assume that there may have been conflict between Zhu and Mao due

to differences in personality and experience. Zhu was a practical, highly experienced

professional soldier, who primarily focused on military matters. Mao had a wide range of

interests, not just in military affairs; he was more intellectual and imaginative, and was

primarily a politician with an interest in exercising power in all its forms. Even though

Mao was the more politically and intellectually gifted of the two, one should not dismiss

Zhu as a military theorist and intellectual. Zhu had received a classical education to

prepare him for the imperial civil service examinations and throughout his

autobiographical works, Zhu continuously stressed his education and intellectual

curiosity. These differences were reflected in the respective military forces both men led

to Jinggangshan: Zhu’s force resembled a regular Chinese military unit with a few CCP

members; Mao’s force was far more politicized and could be characterized as a party

army. Because of their backgrounds, the two also differed in their approaches to the

exercise of power in developing a rural revolutionary movement, such as the relationship

between party and non-party institutions and leaders, between collective and individual

leadership, and between the ideal of popular democratic deliberation and centralized

authoritarian direction. In the end, though, one should not make too much of these

differences, because, as noted by Stephen Averill, ultimately Zhu and Mao did find a way

87 Zhu, “How to Forge an Invincible Red Army,” (July 1931), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 11-12; or “Zen yang chuang zao tie de hong jun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 1-2.

44 to cooperate with one another and came to recognize that their skills and personalities

were complementary.88

Jiangxi Period

After fleeing the Jinggangshan base, Zhu and Mao set up a new base area in

southwest Jiangxi province, applying the lessons from the failure of Jinggangshan. For

the rest of 1929, the Fourth Army helped expand the area under Communist control in the

Jiangxi soviet area.89 Many of the points of contention between Mao and Zhu were

raised and resolved at the Gutian Conference of the Fourth Red Army’s Communist Party

members in December 1929. Indeed, this conference also codified many practices in the

military that had been developed during the Jinggangshan period. The conference, for

example, settled conflicts over the definition of what a revolutionary army should be and

over lines of authority between party and army leaders. A revolutionary army’s duties

were not just to fight but also to carry out political tasks of the revolution. The resolution

also stipulated that the CCP have absolute control over the military and decreed that

political and military systems should be separated. In matters related to political

indoctrination and education of soldiers, mass work, and ensuring that party directives

were implemented, the political system had primacy. However, the military system

prevailed in matters related to combat and other more technical military activities (i.e.,

logistics, camp life). The Gutian resolution also supported better treatment of common

88 Averill, 204-206. Zhu had only passed the district and prefectural examinations and did not take the final qualifying exam to obtain the initial shengyuan degree that would have qualified him to take the actual civil service examination. See Zhong gong zhong yang wenxian yanjiu shi bian, Zhu De nianpu, 11. 89 For a more detailed political and organizational study of how the rural soviet and the Communist movement developed during the Jiangxi soviet period, see Ilpyong J. Kim, The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviets (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

45 soldiers in the Red Army, eliminating distinctions between officers and party workers

and the ordinary soldiers, and abolishing corporal punishment.90

In late 1929 and early 1930, the CCP central leadership in Shanghai under Li

Lisan decided to place less emphasis on agrarian revolution and the establishment and

expansion of rural base areas, and instead reemphasized the original Communist strategy

of retaking centers of the urban proletariat, for CCP leaders and the Comintern continued

to believe that only the proletariat could lead both the urban and agrarian revolution. 91

The Li Lisan policy called for expanding and concentrating Communist military forces to

go on the offensive and capture cities and provide support for urban-based insurrections.

Zhu De had reservations about this strategy because he was aware of the weaknesses of

the Red Army and doubted that the army could hold the cities it captured, but he did not

oppose it because he assumed that Li and the CCP central leadership had better

information then he did on the overall revolutionary situation within China.92 The available evidence reveals that Mao, contrary to his later assertions that he had always

been against this new strategy, initially supported it because he shared Li’s optimism at the time that a revolutionary high tide was rising in China and this opportunity should not

be lost.93

In June 1930, Li Lisan, as head of the CCP, issued a directive reorganizing

Communist military forces. All Communist forces were put under a single centralized

command, with Zhu De as commander-in-chief and Mao as political commissar. The

90 Van de Ven, “New States of War,” 343-345. For a detailed account of this resolution see, “Draft Resolution of the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in the Fourth Red Army,” (December 1929), in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:195-230. 91 Schwartz, 126-127. 92 Smedley, 274-276. 93 See for instance Stuart Schram’s assessment in his introduction to Mao’s Road to Power, 3:xlviii-xlix, li, lvii.

46 four main Communist armies were reorganized into four army corps. The First Red

Army Corps was commanded by Zhu with Mao as commissar; the Second Red Army

Corps was formed from He Long’s forces in western Hunan and Hubei; the Third Red

Army Corps was formed from Peng Dehuai’s forces in northwestern Jiangxi; and the

Fourth Red Army Corps was formed from guerrilla forces in the mountain areas north of the Yangzi River in central China with Xu Xiangjian as commander and Zhang Guotao as commissar. In addition, peasant guerrilla units became part of the regular Red Army and would move with it during attacks on the cities ordered by Li Lisan. Both Zhu and Mao disagreed with incorporating these guerrilla units into the regular army because it would leave the Soviet areas without defenders. Zhu did reorganize the guerrillas into three small armies under the First Red Army Corps, but instructed them to remain in their respective base areas to defend against GMD attacks.94 By mid-1930, Communist military forces had increased to around seventy thousand soldiers, of which half were under Zhu’s First Army Corps. In July, the offensive against the cities began. Peng

Dehuai’s Third Army Corps, numbering around twelve thousand, moved on Changsha.

After Peng was forced to relinquish Changsha in August, his forces merged with the First

Army Corps to form the First Front Army under the command of Zhu De.95 Overall, the

Red Army was forced to retreat from what gains it had made because of GMD counteroffensives and the lack of wide support from urban populations.96 After suffering defeat and incurring heavy losses during the summer campaign against the cities, the Red

94 Smedley, 274-275. 95 Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 46-47. 96 For a critique of the Red Army occupation of Changsha and why the CCP strategy for urban revolution failed see Paul Clark, “Changsha in the 1930 Red Army Occupation,” Modern China 7, no. 4 (October 1981): 413-444. For further assessments and critiques of the Li Lisan strategy, see Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 39-40, 43, 46-47; Xiang, 19-20; and also Van de Ven, “New States of War,” 345-346, 349-350.

47 Army’s various units were greatly reduced in troop strength. By the fall of 1930, the

army corps under Zhu numbered between seven thousand and eight thousand troops,

while Peng’s force was between 3,300 and 6,800 men, and He Long commanded about

5,800 troops.97

Beginning in December 1930, GMD forces began a series of five encirclement

and extermination campaigns against the Jiangxi Soviet base area. The first three

campaigns ended in defeat for the GMD, with the third ending in September 1931. The

Red Army used similar strategy and tactics to defend the Jiangxi base area as had been

used to defend the Jinggangshan area (i.e., lure the enemy in deep, identify and attack the

weakest GMD units first, use pincer and envelopment maneuvers to entrap hostile

columns, and coordinated operations between regular Red Army and guerrilla forces).

The Red Army additionally relied on superior intelligence and maneuverability, and took

advantage of the divisions, mistakes, and poor leadership within the GMD forces to

defeat successive offensives against the base area.98

After the final defeat of the third encirclement and extermination campaign in

September 1931, the Central Soviet Area underwent a period of expansion and

consolidation, and established a governmental bureaucracy and legal system. The Red

Army forces under Zhu expanded rapidly after their victories over the first three GMD

extermination campaigns and by November Red Army forces in Jiangxi numbered

97 Van de Ven, “New States of War,” 347. For a good overview of the status of Communist forces in the fall of 1930 see Table 1 in Van de Ven’s “New States of War,” 347-348. This table includes unit designations, commander/commissar names, areas of operation, and unit strength and origins. 98 See Schram’s introduction in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:xxix-xxxi, xxxiv-xxxvi, xli-xlii. See also Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 55. Whitson gives Zhu De and other professional officers credit for developing a military strategy that defeated the first extermination campaign, while viewing Mao’s contribution as mostly political in nature. For a description of each encirclement campaign, see also Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 268-281. For the GMD perspective on the suppression efforts and

48 around 40,000.99 During November 7-18, 1931, the first National Soviet Congress was

held in Ruijin. It marked in many ways the culmination of the initial phase of Red Army

development, as various guerrilla groups and regular units were officially transformed

into a single Red Army with all units coming under a centralized command structure. In his reminiscences, Zhu De also saw this event as a significant turning point in the development of the Red Army.100 Most importantly, the Congress formally established

the Chinese Soviet Republic centered in Jiangxi with its key governmental, political, and

military institutions. It created the Central Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission,

chaired by Zhu De, with Peng Dehuai and Wang Jiaxiang as vice-chairmen. The

commission served as the military high command in charge of all Red Army units with

Zhu De serving as commander-in-chief.101

Red Army Characteristics

In describing the characteristics of the Red Army of this period, one needs to keep

in mind that at first it was very much an ad hoc force organized from diverse sources that

over the years was welded into a unified military force. Initially, many of the best trained

officers and soldiers of the Communist forces were defectors from the NRA, which had been patterned after the Soviet Union’s Red Army through the assistance of Soviet

military advisers. 102 Although Zhu was not assigned to command a combat unit in the

eventual defeat of the Jiangxi Soviet, see William Wei, Counterrevolution in China: The Nationalists in Jiangxi during the Soviet Period (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1985). 99 Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 49, 51. 100 Wales, 254-255. 101 Mao’s Road to Power, 4:xlv, xlvii-xlviii. 102 Because this dissertation focuses on Zhu De’s role and influence on the early development of the Red Army, this study will not assess the significant influence of former NRA officers and Huangpu Academy graduates on the early Red Army, although this is a topic deserving its own study. NRA officers who later became senior leaders in the Red Army were men such as Ye Ting, He Long, Chen Yi, and Lin Biao. For background on the NRA see Hans J. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), which contains chapters summarizing the development of the NRA and the

49 NRA, he was closely associated with its senior commanders. Zhu, of all the Communist

military commanders, had the most extensive and varied military experience and training,

which prepared him well to deal with the diversity of forces that made up the early Red

Army. This experience was especially important during the Jinggangshan period, which

was a critical phase in the early development of the Red Army. In contrast, Mao had

little military experience prior to this period, other than the Autumn Harvest Uprising and

leading sporadic raids from Jinggangshan during late 1927 through early 1928.

The heterogeneous nature of early Communist military forces, in terms of

differences in institutional background, leadership, and personnel origins, presented

enormous challenges to Zhu De and other military and CCP leaders in organizing a

unified Communist army, and more specifically the Fourth Red Army established by Zhu

and Mao at Jinggangshan. The military force that was created exhibited some common

characteristics that reflected its diverse origins, the military and political situations it

faced, and the past military experiences of its leaders, especially that of Zhu De. The

assessment of these characteristics will be grouped into such topics as organization,

personnel, equipment, communications, training and discipline, leadership and command,

intelligence, doctrine, strategy, and tactics.

Organization

Communist forces by design and out of necessity were more organizationally flexible than their GMD adversaries. The regular forces under Zhu could be highly fluid

conduct of the Northern Expedition. In addition, see Donald Jordan’s The Northern Expedition for a more detailed account of the conduct of the Northern Expedition and the functioning of the NRA as a revolutionary army. Hans J. van de Ven’s work is also useful in describing the development of GMD military forces during this period and is one of the few historical studies in English on the Nationalist Army. An understanding of the Nationalist military is important to fully appreciate the military forces that the Red Army was fighting against. Van de Ven’s work, however, only briefly covers the GMD campaigns

50 and flexible in order to help organize and operate with local revolutionary insurgents.

Also, Zhu’s force could temporarily rejoin a GMD army, such as Fan Shisheng’s, and become a separate regiment within this organization. These forces began to be organized and consolidated during the spring of 1928 in the Jinggangshan base area after Zhu’s troops and other units arrived and joined with Mao’s forces. Initially, the four regiments that Zhu and Mao created in May 1928 retained the characteristics from the original groups that formed them. In Stephen Averill’s view, these forces initially had characteristics of “personalistic militarization,” where units were the creations and possessions of their commanders, and soldiers owed their allegiance to individual leaders rather than to an institution.103

The Red Army has often been characterized as a “guerrilla” army. The term

“guerrilla warfare” is used to describe a style of combat that emphasizes highly maneuverable units using hit and run tactics that are closely integrated with the local

civilian population. This style of warfare usually evokes the image of small armed bands

or ad hoc detachments of soldiers operating in forests or mountain areas. But from the

beginning, the leaders of the Red Army viewed themselves as a regular army, not a

guerrilla force, whose ultimate military task was to engage and defeat enemy front-line units. Regular Red Army units did occasionally engage in guerrilla-style operations, such

as ambushes and raids in the enemy’s rear, but most such activities were carried out by

units organized for this task. Mao and Zhu incorporated and reorganized the existing

against the Communist base areas, and mostly focuses on the GMD’s conflict with various regional warlords during the early 1930’s and the war with Japan from 1937-45. 103 Averill, 202-203.

51 hierarchy of forces they had at Jinggangshan, from regular troops to former bandits, into

units that had their own specific roles and functions during military operations.104

By spring 1928, Zhu and Mao began organizing the local Jinggangshan

population to create indigenous military forces, such as paramilitary and guerrilla units.

This program would result in the division of Communist forces into three groups at the

Jinggangshan base area: the regular Red Army, full-time guerrilla units (youji dui), and part-time local militia called “red guards.” Originally, the county-level CCP cadres in

1926-27 had raised “peasant self-defense armies” from members of mass movement

organizations, bandit gangs, and local militia units. The force commanded by Yuan and

Wang on Jinggangshan was one such unit. Various local cadres began in late 1927 to

reconstitute local defense forces and created a two-tier system. At the village/township

level, the local CCP created small part-time paramilitary units called “red guards” that

possessed few modern arms and were only mobilized temporarily for military action.

The function of these units was mostly defensive, to protect their own families and

communities, and they had little interest in participating in longer-range operations outside their immediate community. The local CCP cadres also created more mobile, full-time military units, called guerrilla detachments (youji dui), who were better armed and could participate in extended deployments away from their own communities. These guerrilla detachments did accompany regular Red Army units on campaigns outside the base areas to attack warlord units. But, most of the time, these guerrilla detachments and red guards focused on fighting local adversaries, the elite-led counterrevolutionary

104 Ibid., 211.

52 militia. During the spring and summer of 1928, a constant guerrilla war broke out around

the Jinggangshan base area between these militia and local revolutionary forces.105

Class Nature of the Red Army

Zhu himself laid down the ideal composition of a Communist Red Army in a

1931 article, where he stipulated that the class identity of the army must be protected and

therefore only workers and peasants would be qualified to join, while its military and

political cadres should come only from urban proletarians.106 The reality was somewhat

different. The major sources of Red Army soldiers from 1927 to 1931 were peasants and

former Goumindang soldiers, with a very small number of urban workers. Within that

period, most of the Red Army recruits came from the GMD army. These could be GMD

troops who defected as individuals or in units, with motivations ranging from regional

loyalties to CCP bounties given for arms, or even troops who just followed their officers

who defected. There were even large-scale defections that involved thousands of troops,

such as occurred at Ningdu in December 1931 when sixteen to seventeen thousand troops

of an entire GMD division defected. The CCP claimed that political propaganda and

intrigue were used to achieve this. One estimate in 1931 was that more than half the

Communist forces were composed of previously organized military units that had

defected to the Red Army, especially to the Red Fourth and Fifth Armies. During the

105 Averill, 215-217. Zhu himself described how local Communist defense forces were organized in 1929 and what roles they played in the defense of the base area. There were the organized Red Guard units of peasants, who were a people’s militia attached to local agricultural production and armed mostly with spears. There were also the full-time peasant guerrilla units made up of able-bodied young men, who were better armed than the Red Guards and who formed a reservoir of recruits for the regular Red Army. These guerrilla units only fought as auxiliaries and not as front-line troops. They operated in the rear areas of the enemy, to intercept enemy messengers and patrols, destroy enemy camps and communications, snipe at enemy troops from the forests, and carry on a propaganda campaign to demoralize enemy troops. See Smedley, 250. 106 Zhu, “How to Forge an Invincible Red Army,” (July 1931), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 11; or “Zen yang chuang zao tie de hong jun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 1.

53 Jiangxi Soviet period, the Red Army often allied itself with “bandit” groups, such as the

Three Prominents Society or with armed peasant groups such as the Small Swords or Red

Spears. But direct recruitment into the Red Army was rare, with these groups mostly

acting as auxiliaries to the regular forces. After the 1928 Southern Hunan peasant uprising, the forces under Zhu De were increasingly composed of peasant recruits, along

with a growing number of officers drawn from the ranks of rural handicraft workers.107

After 1931, most troops in the Red Army were recruited through large-scale drives in the

rural countryside with the result that peasants, not former GMD soldiers, formed the

majority of the army’s soldiers. By 1932, the composition of the recruits in the units

under Zhu’s command (the old Fourth Red Army) was sixty percent peasants, thirty

percent former GMD troops, six percent workers, and four percent former bandits or

vagrants.108

Armaments and Equipment

During this period, the Red Army’s sources of equipment reflected an improvised

and ad hoc approach. Most of the army’s weapons came from whatever arms defecting

military units brought with them, arms picked up from battlefields, or equipment seized

from captured GMD storage depots. Red Army units had mainly rifles and hand

grenades, and a few mortars and machine guns. The Red Army was basically a light

107 Donovan, 32-35. 108 Donovan, 35. Zhu himself acknowledged the heterogeneous origins of Red Army soldiers when he related that the original nucleus of the Red Army had four primary sources; troops who participated in the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927; those who participated in uprisings in Hunan, such as the Autumn Uprising led by Mao on August 15, 1927 and the South Hunan Revolt led by Zhu De on January 1, 1928; participants in the failed Canton Commune uprising of December 11, 1927; and insurrectionary troops deserting from various GMD armies. See Wales, 245. In addition, during the Jinggangshan period Zhu established a policy of winning over GMD POWs to join the Red Army along with incorporating GMD units that defected to the Communist side. See also Zhu, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 133; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,” in Zhu De xuanji, 127.

54 infantry force with few heavy weapons, such as artillery. It faced a chronic lack of ammunition and it was only with the establishment of base areas that some ammunition manufacturing could be organized. The best equipped troops were the regular Red Army units, while local guerrilla units were often short of modern arms and in many cases still used swords and spears. This recurring shortage of equipment was a constant concern for

Zhu. In several army directives he repeatedly emphasized that after combat was over, troops needed to clear the battlefield thoroughly to obtain as much vital equipment as possible.

Zhu De stated that Red Army units from the beginning had to rely on captured

GMD equipment, supplies, and arms to replenish themselves. Sometimes, the

Communists could rely on supplies given to them by sympathetic GMD commanders, such as Fan Shisheng. During the Southern Hunan uprising in January 1928, after Zhu’s victory at Pingshi, his force was able to resupply and rearm themselves from a captured enemy warehouse with machine guns, mortars, and artillery.109 When Zhu first reached the Jinggangshan base area, he inspected the bandit peasant forces of Wang Zuo and

Yuan Wencai, who used improvised weapons. Zhu was particularly impressed by cannons made from hollowed-out tree trunks. These cannons were five to six feet in length and packed with black powder, iron bits, lead and pebbles and were put in concealed places along narrow trails leading up to Jinggangshan. They seem to have been operated more like anti-personnel mines, since they would be destroyed when they were set off. In addition, Zhu noted that the bandit-peasant forces used bows and arrows

109 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 402-403; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 396-97.

55 with poisoned tips.110 It is possible that Zhu may have exaggerated the primitive nature of the weapons used by the forces at Jinggangshan to impress Smedley on how

Communist forces could improvise and defeat materially superior opponents.

Nonetheless, adaptability to a variety of armaments under difficult procurement

conditions was clearly a characteristic of the Red Army.

The Red Army continued to rely on captured arms and equipment to maintain

itself into the 1930s. In a 1933 article on the lessons to be learned after defeating the

GMD’s fourth extermination campaign, Zhu stated that troops responsible for clearing

the battlefield were negligent in collecting useful arms, ammunition, equipment, and

supplies after the battle. Zhu went to admonish them, “Thus it is seen that most of our

comrades have not yet realized that captured weapons and other equipment are the major

source of supplies for the Red Army; and that we badly need even small parts or bullet

casings.”111

Communications

Similar to the problems faced in arming itself, the Red Army was plagued by a

lack of modern communications equipment and relied on a few captured radio sets or on

ad hoc and improvised systems for both strategic and tactical-level communications.

During 1928, the runner communication system was considered by Zhu to be one of the

best departments developed in the Red Army. At that time, it consisted of a courier

network manned by peasants in southern Hunan and eastern Jiangxi. It operated like a relay system: peasant couriers would run ten to twenty li (three to six miles) to hand over

110 Smedley, 232-233. 111 Zhu, “The Great Victory and Lessons of the Huangbei and Dongbei Campaigns,” (May 28, 1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 22-23; or “Huangbei Dongbei liang ci zhanyi weida shengli de jingguo yu jiaoxun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 12-13.

56 messages to the next runners who would then take the messages on to the next station. In

addition to couriers on foot, there were relays of boatmen and riders on horses.112

At the beginning of the Jiangxi soviet period, the Red Army’s communications

capabilities were still rudimentary. During the first GMD annihilation campaign against the Jiangxi base area, the Red Army had no radio service but was able to capture two wireless sets after the battle of Tungku, so by the second annihilation campaign the army had radio communications.113 But using radio sets also had its drawbacks, which Zhu acknowledged in his after-action assessment of the 1933 Huangbei and Dongbei campaigns. In his comments on the performance of Red Army communications, Zhu highlighted the shortcomings of relying on radio communications. The high volume of messages, static, and radio breakdowns hampered the transmission of orders to units in a timely fashion. Zhu also noted that radio transmissions could be intercepted by GMD forces. He concluded that the Red Army could not rely solely on radios for communication, and that it needed to have alternatives, such as telephones, (which Zhu considered the best); flag signals (although troops needed training in their use); and couriers (although orders needed to be in writing since oral messages were unreliable).114

Training and Discipline

Despite the more ad hoc nature of the Red Army’s initial organization, equipment, and communications, Zhu was able to train and discipline the Red Army in a more

systematic fashion. One of the main distinctions between the soldiers of the Red Army

and their GMD and warlord opponents was the Communist troops’ higher level of

112 Smedley, 225. 113 Wales, 251, 252, 253.

57 motivation and superior discipline. In order to compensate for the Red Army’s lack of

material and numerical strength, Zhu focused on ensuring that the army was better trained

and disciplined than any of its opponents. In his directives to the Red Army, Zhu

consistently displayed great concern for the training and education of his troops, the

creation of a rapid lessons-learned process after every battle and campaign, and the

establishment of a modern performance-assessment system for both officers and soldiers.

Training

From 1928 to 1931, Zhu placed great importance on the training and educational

benefits of after-battle conferences in which all commanders and soldiers could participate. At these conferences, recent battles and campaigns were analyzed. Any of

the participants could discuss and criticize battle or campaign plans. Likewise, they

could criticize the conduct of individual commanders or soldiers and question and

critique plans for future battles and campaigns. Zhu would address these mass meetings

in person to explain the broader political and military situation so that all soldiers and

officers could understand the overall situation in order, in Zhu’s mind, to keep the army

“democratic.” Thus, information was shared and exchanged on an equal basis among senior leaders, officers, and soldiers.115

By 1931, the Red Army’s post-battle conference system had evolved from what

had been initially an informal meeting after the action to a more institutionalized and

formal process. There were now two conferences: the first for commanders, the second

for commanders and their men, where together they could analyze and critique the

114 Zhu, “The Great Victory and Lessons of the Huangbei and Dongbei Campaigns,” (May 28, 1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 22; or “Huangbei Dongbei liang ci zhanyi weida shengli de jingguo yu jiaoxun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 12.

58 conduct of recent battles and campaigns or the planning for future operations. The army used these sessions to correct mistakes, remove incompetent commanders, or promote others on merit. Zhu considered these conferences of high educational and technical value to the army and their results were published as pamphlets and turned into study materials for soldiers.116 In an example of an after-action critique from March 1930, Zhu

De analyzed the failings of the first attempt to take the city of Ganzhou using a surprise

raid. Zhu listed the shortcomings and lessons to be learned, and such as inaccurate

assessment of the enemy situation (intelligence failures), failure to reconnoiter the terrain

in advance, lack of thorough advanced preparation, absence of unanimous resolve at

higher and lower levels (referring to officers as well as soldiers), inaccurate battlefield

reporting, failure to launch the general assault on time, and misjudgments in command.117

In March 1931, Zhu issued a general order to the First Front Army that set out a more comprehensive critique and assessment of not only the shortcomings of previous operations but also what needed to be done prior to the next campaign. This order was

115 Smedley, 240-241. William Whitson gives Zhu the credit for initiating the post-battle critique system. See Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 52. 116 Smedley, 292. In addition to using the after action conferences as training material for the army, Zhu also related that the Red Army relied on captured GMD training manuals, especially after the first extermination campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet, where large numbers of books on military strategy and tactics were captured from retreating GMD forces and subsequently were reused by the Red Army. 117 Zhu De, “Guanyu di yi ci gong Ganzhou de jingyan jiaoxun de xunling,” in Zhu De junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Zhu De) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1997), 8-9; or “Directive on Lessons to Be Derived from the First Attack on Ganzhou,” (March 19, 1930), in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:280-282. This document was originally included in Mao’s military writings, but with the 1997 publication of Zhu De junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Zhu De), it is now attributed to Zhu De. Several documents used in this chapter were originally included in the works of Mao but are now attributed to Zhu De, especially military commands and instructions. During the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi Soviet periods most of these military documents were issued under both Zhu De’s and Mao’s names, Zhu De as army commander and Mao as political commissar. Therefore, many of these documents were subsequently published as Mao’s military writings. Compare for instance selected documents in volumes 3 and 4 of Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949 with those in Zhu De junshi wenxuan. With the publication of Zhu De’s military works in 1997 some these instructions and orders originally attributed to Mao are now attributed to Zhu De. Indeed, in the introduction to Zhu De junshi wenxuan, the editors consider Zhu De’s military thought as comprising a major component of Mao’s military thought and an attempt has been made to separate the two.

59 issued to prepare Red Army forces to resist the GMD’s second encirclement and

suppression campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet that month. Zhu’s directive was divided

into three sections: Section one highlighted the general shortcomings of previous combat experiences, including failures in planning, command, deployment, and provisioning before and during combat. It also described post-combat failings in pursuing the enemy,

battlefield cleanup, and how to deal with POWs and the wounded. Section two dealt with

preparatory work for the next battle, to include carrying out political agitation among Red

Army soldiers, convening meetings to undertake pre-battle preparations, discussing

points for attention during battle, and after-battle clean-up work. These meetings were to be held at army, divisional, regimental, and company levels. Section three focused on what training was needed from drilling and maneuvers to exercises for stretcher-bearers and training for cooks.118 This critique system illustrates Zhu’s increasingly systematic

approach to combat training that emphasized the use of lessons from actual battlefield

and campaign experience to better prepare his forces for future battles. The post-battle

critique system that Zhu created acted very much like an institutionalized feedback loop to ensure rapid organizational adaptation to changing military and political circumstances.

In emphasizing the systematic training and instruction of his officers and soldiers,

Zhu often advocated the use of recently developed Western theories or systems. His

methodical and detail-oriented approach to military training and teaching is evident in the

directives he issued to the army on how to evaluate officers and soldiers, how to select

118 “The Military Preparatory Work That Must Be Done to Achieve Victory in the Second Phase of Operations: Red Letter Order No. 1 of the First Front Army of the Red Army,” (March 17, 1931), in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:28-33. See the same document, “Wei zheng qu di er qi zuozhan shengli junshi shang ying zhunbei de gongzuo,” in Zhu De junshi wenxuan, 43-47.

60 and educate new recruits, and how to improve physical training and marksmanship in the

army.

On March 29, 1930, Zhu issued an order to rectify the absence of a system to test

and evaluate officers and men for promotions, determine appointments, and approve

transfers of officers and soldiers. It also created a systematic education plan for army

personnel that had not existed before. Therefore, Zhu’s order established a formal

education system for officers and men and designated organizations for carrying it out.

In implementing a system of testing for all ranks, Zhu specified the use of the Dalton

system in testing that had been developed recently in the United States and was just being

introduced to Chinese schools.119 His order also stipulated the development of

assessment forms for officers and men and the establishment of an education system for

specialized Army departments and sections, such as supply units, medical officers, or

aides-de-camp.120

On March 29, 1930, Zhu issued a “Directive on Enlisting and Educating New

Recruits,” to address the serious problem facing the Red Army in acquiring new recruits.

Units were inducting recruits who were too young, or diseased, or had physical disabilities and therefore were unable to fight. This directive set forth the following

standards for new recruits: they must be over sixteen but under thirty years of age, in

good health, and at least five feet tall. All new recruits in regular battalions were required

to be examined by the unit’s medical officer, while those recruits operating in guerrilla

119 This educational system was developed in 1920 by Helen Huss Parkhurst at Dalton High School in Dalton, Massachusetts. The system eliminates lectures and requires students to learn independently from books or experiments, while teachers act as advisers. The students work at their own pace, those who progress faster graduate earlier. By 1930 some primary and middle schools in China began to use this system. See footnote 2 in: Mao’s Road to Power, 3:286. 120 See “Order on the Testing of Officers and Soldiers,” (March 29, 1930), in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:285- 288; or “Guanyu guan bing kaoji de xunling,” in Zhu De junshi wenxuan, 12-15.

61 units were to be examined by their detachment commander or political commissar to

ensure that they met the standards set forth in the directive. The education and training of

new recruits was to be done collectively. Newcomers would be organized and trained in

new recruit battalions or platoons, and only after their education and training had reached

a certain level would they be added to front-line military units. To ensure the directives’

implementation, Zhu laid down strict punishments for recruits or officers who violated

this directive with no leniency granted.121

In April 1930, Zhu issued a “Directive on Building up Physical Strength and

Improving Shooting Skills” to address the need for officers and soldiers to develop high

standards of physical fitness and marksmanship to make up for the Red Army’s deficiencies in firepower and ammunition. In order to survive and be able to defeat the

Guomindang, Zhu De knew that Red Army soldiers needed to out-march and outmaneuver any GMD unit in mountainous terrain. Zhu stated that physical exercise and target practice were the most important focus of current Red Army training. He set out an exercise regime for all units that included calisthenics and gymnastics. The directive also laid out a system of shooting instruction and intra-army marksmanship competitions.122

Discipline

Zhu was very concerned with governing the behavior of Red Army troops and

recognized the need for strict regulation of interactions between soldiers and civilians.

121 See “Directive on Enlisting and Educating New Recruits,” (March 29, 1930), in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:289-290; or “Zhengmu he jiaoyu xin bing wenti de xunling,” in Zhu De junshi wenxuan, 16-17. 122 See “Directive on Building up Physical Strength and Improving Shooting Skills” (April 1930), in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:291-292; or “Jia qiang ti li yu tigao sheji jishu de xunling,” in Zhu De junshi wenxuan, 18-19. This emphasis on maintaining physical fitness was informed by Zhu De’s previous education as a physical education teacher and his interest in physical training while attending the Yunnan Military Academy.

62 Ideally, soldiers who treated the civilian population well would gain and maintain popular support. This was critical to Red Army success, which depended on the populous for supplies, intelligence, and recruits. As part of the CCP effort to garner

popular support, Communist cadres would explicitly contrast the good behavior of Red

Army troops with the GMD and warlord armies abusive treatment of the local population.

The better discipline of the Red Army became a tool used by military and CCP leaders to

generate popular support and recruits for the Communist cause.123

This new code of behavior and discipline, however, needed to be instilled in new

recruits and officers, because initially many of them came from warlord armies, local

secret society groups, and bandit units. The Red Army was constantly being augmented

with new units and individual recruits from diverse backgrounds. They in turn carried

over old habits and modes of behavior from their former experience, and were prone to

poor discipline, theft, vice, and desertion. In addition, many former regular army officers

retained the attitude that there was a wide gap between officers and soldiers, and they

expected to have absolute obedience from and power over their men. For these reasons,

Zhu and Mao needed to establish a code of conduct for the Red Army to govern the

relationship between officers and men and between the army and the civilian

population.124

One of the key regulations that governed the behavior of Red Army soldiers was

the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,” developed during the 1928-29 period at Jinggangshan. Their formulation is generally credited to

123 Averill, 209. 124 Ibid., 206-207.

63 Mao, while Zhu is given credit for their institutionalization and enforcement.125

Nonetheless, rules governing soldier behavior were not an innovation of the Red Army

since the NRA had developed requirements and standards to govern its soldiers’

behavior, especially toward the civilian population, during the Northern Expedition.126

In 1929, “The Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention” were:

Three Main Rules of Discipline:

1.) Obey orders in your actions

2.) Don’t take anything from the workers and peasants

3.) Turn in all things from local bullies

Eight Points for Attention:

1.) Put back the doors you have taken down for bed-boards

2.) Put back the straw you have used for bedding

3.) Speak politely

4.) Pay fairly for what you buy

5.) Return everything you borrow

6.) Pay for anything you damage

7.) Don’t bathe within sight of women

8.) Don’t search the pockets of captives127

125 In 1928, there were only “Six Points for Attention,” but in 1929 the last two points were added to make eight. The contents of the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,” varied over time, and a standard version was not issued by the PLA until 1947. See Zhu De, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 133, 418; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,” in Zhu De xuanji, 127, 412. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 52. 126 Jordan, 235-236, 239-241. 127 Zhu, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 133, 418; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,” in Zhu De xuanji, 127, 412.

64 These regulations formed the fundamental principles for Red Army discipline and

behavior, and remained in force until 1949. Zhu’s concern with enforcing them is

reflected in an order he issued on March 21, 1930. In this order, Zhu stated that he had

repeatedly issued orders to convince officers and soldiers to follow the stipulated rules because the support of the populous for the revolution depended on the Red Army’s adherence to these regulations. To address another persistent problem affecting the discipline and physical health of the troops, Zhu forbade soldiers from visiting prostitutes to avoid contracting venereal disease that could adversely affect the army’s performance.

Zhu’s wording is urgent and forceful, and he concluded by stipulating that those who violated this order would be arrested and punished.128 In 1931, Zhu reiterated the

importance of discipline within the army, though pointing out the voluntary nature of

observing strict discipline, which applied equally to officers and men. He emphasized

that discipline was not maintained by beating or swearing as in the GMD armies, where

discipline was meant to oppress the soldiers.129 In 1937, however, Zhu acknowledged

that efforts to enforce new forms of behavior and discipline within the Red Army faced

steep challenges:

“After the Soviet movement began, in some parts of the Red Army the militarist tradition was still partially retained, and because of this our work tended to become isolated from the mass. On the opposite side, we also made errors of permitting wide partisan fighting without strict army discipline. This tended toward individual action not in the broad interest of the mass. It permitted some of the peasant ideology of an inclination toward revenge to remain. The mass is always more radical than the Red Army and wants more killing than we permit.

128 This order was originally included in the collected military works of Mao, but is now attributed to Zhu De. See “Zheng dun jun feng ji de xunling,” in Zhu De junshi wenxuan, 10. For an English translation see “Order on Rectifying Military Bearing and Discipline,” (March 21, 1930), in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:283- 284. 129 Zhu, “How to Forge an Invincible Red Army,” (July 1931), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 15; or “Zen yang chuang zao tie de hong jun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 5.

65 Although the Red Army comes from the mass, it does not reflect this peasant tendency toward revenge because of the strict education it receives.”130

Morale and Motivation

One of the salient characteristics that the Red Army was known for was its

superior level of motivation and esprit de corps compared to its opponents. Of those who

joined the Red Army, some were already committed Communists, but most were not, and

Communist ideology and dedication to the cause of the revolution had to be instilled in

them. The Red Army developed a system that emphasized mass meetings to explain the

overall military and political situation, political education and indoctrination, regulations

that promoted fair treatment of soldiers, and a high level of military training. All these

factors helped generate better unit cohesiveness and esprit de corps among its soldiers.

Red Army’s officers were especially known to have higher abilities and

motivation then their GMD or warlord army officer counterparts. Officers with previous

military experience who had chosen to join the Communist cause were a self-selecting

group. They were willing to abandon a career in the GMD military or a warlord army

and take an enormous risk. These officers were, on the whole, more adventurous,

dynamic, and imaginative than many of the commanders fighting the Communists. The

former also possessed a high level of commitment to an ideological cause that was often

lacking in their adversaries.131

Nonetheless, the origin of different Communist units could affect their morale and

level of motivation. During the Jinggangshan period, the combat effectiveness of

different Red Army units was not the same. Even after extensive training, the 32nd

Regiment, formed from Wang and Yuan’s peasant bandit forces, was not able to join the

130 Wales, 260-261.

66 army’s main strike force and was often relegated to garrison duty or dealing with local

counterrevolutionary militia. The 29th Regiment, composed mostly of Hunan peasants who suffered low-morale from homesickness, eventually staged a mutiny during the

summer of 1928. The units with high morale and combat effectiveness were the 28th and

31st Regiments formed from veterans of Zhu and Mao’s forces, which would become the

core of the Red Army.132 These regiments had higher morale and unit cohesion due to

more thorough political indoctrination under Mao and regular military training under

Zhu.133

One of the more effective ways to raise troop morale and increase confidence,

Zhu De found, was to hold mass meetings of officers and men to explain the current

military and political situation and the tasks of the revolution that needed to be

accomplished. Zhu did this with his fleeing forces in October 1927.134 Both Zhu and

Mao continued to use regular mass meetings to explain the overall situation to their

soldiers, why they were fighting, the purpose of an impending operation, and to ensure

that everyone knew the overall plan and their roles in it. This, Zhu found, would give

everyone a sense of purpose and increase their motivation in battle.135

The Red Army was more effective in developing and sustaining a sense of unit

cohesiveness and esprit de corps. These were derived from technical pride of performance acquired through training and success in combat, a high degree of

131 Averill, 208. 132 Averill, 207. 133 Indeed, according to Stephen Averill’s assessment, Zhu’s forces resembled more a regular GMD unit, with less ten percent of the personnel being members of the CCP prior to their joining Mao’s forces at Jinggangshan. Mao, on the other hand, had actively politicized his soldiers by setting up a network of party branches within his forces that focused on recruiting soldiers into the CCP. See Averill, 205. 134 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 400; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 394. 135 Smedley, 240-241.

67 ideological motivation developed and reinforced by political education programs

throughout the army, and the influence of army policies enforcing fair treatment of

soldiers and an egalitarian relationship between officers and men.136 In a 1931 article,

Zhu highlighted the importance of political training for officers and soldiers, and the role

of political commissars and Communist party representatives in the army. The purpose

of political training was to raise class consciousness among soldiers, engender belief in

the necessity of CCP leadership, and understand the cause they were fighting for.137 As for promoting egalitarianism between officers and soldiers, Zhu stated that during the

Jinggangshan period an “economic democracy” system was established that gave all ranks the same pay.138

In 1937, Zhu related to Nym Wales on what was possible if the populace and

soldiers had the proper motivation:

“… the greatest lesson we have learned is that a people can fight victoriously with what resources it happens to have. The masses can get their guns if they have determination. It is easy to capture arms from the enemy by sudden attack and night battles. The people can fight with bad arms, or even without formal arms at all. Any kind of weapons, if utilized correctly, can defeat the enemy, if the revolutionary spirit is there.”139

Zhu continued to emphasize that with the right revolutionary spirit and determination,

Communist forces could overcome a numerically and materially superior adversary. The

136 Averill, 208. 137 Zhu, “How to Forge an Invincible Red Army,” (July 1931), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 13; or “Zen yang chuang zao tie de hong jun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 3-4. 138 Zhu, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 133; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,” in Zhu De xuanji, 127. 139 Wales, 261.

68 emphasis on spirit as the key factor in war would become a lasting feature of modern

Chinese military thought.140

Leadership, Command and Control

It is one thing to have a highly trained and motivated force, but without an

effective command structure and leadership an army will not be able to achieve victory

on the battlefield. On January 1, 1931, the Ninth Conference of Red Army Delegates was

held at Gutian to correct problems in higher level command and control that had plagued

the early operations of the Red Army. At this conference, Mao proposed a set of military

reforms with Zhu’s approval. Mao advocated more centralized control and a top-down

system of military decision making to correct the more ad hoc and decentralized

command structure of Communist forces and to end the problems inherent in a democratic military decision-making system. Under the first reform, the higher leadership echelons of the party and army first would reach decisions, and only then would the rank and file discuss them to ensure they understood the decisions and consented to them. The second reform ended the army’s “absolute equalitarianism” because it had led to disunity and defeats. Zhu believed that these reforms led to a strengthening of the Red Army that allowed it to expand the central Soviet area.141

This transition from a decentralized to a more centralized command structure

allowed for better organizational control over Red Army units and responded to the needs

of defending the Jiangxi Soviet against GMD offensives in 1931. Zhu publicly supported

140 This focus on spirit was part of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary war theory that emphasized human spirit as the primary determinant factor in war, and that with superior revolutionary spirit one could overcome superior odds. For a description of Sun Yat-sen’s theories on military strategy and building a revolutionary army, see Chen-ya Tien, Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1992), 141-142. 141 Smedley, 269.

69 these reforms in a July 1931 article and stated that “the Red Army must, therefore,

greatly improve its own organizational structure so as to adapt itself to the new

circumstances under which it has to fight. We must institute unified training and

centralized command. All actions taken by the Red Army should be as concentrated as

possible in order to wipe out the armed forces of its class enemy.”142

At an operational and tactical level, however, these reforms point to a larger issue

within the army over centralized versus decentralized decision making. There was a

tension between ensuring that units would obey directives from higher-level leaders

while still allowing lower-level commanders to exercise individual initiative and

flexibility at operational and tactical levels. In its operations, the Red Army seems to have used a concept of centralized planning but decentralized execution. Zhu

emphasized lower-level officer initiative and independence. Before an operation, the

higher-level commander’s intent and overall objectives for the battle would be

communicated to lower-level officers; they in turn would be given flexibility in how to

achieve those objectives. Surveying the operational orders issued to the Red Army by

Zhu De, one can see his emphasis on careful preparation and his methodical approach to

planning operations and battles. The organization of Red Army orders was standardized.

They were short and to the point (most were no longer then two pages in length) and did

not burden subordinate commanders with detailed instructions on how to achieve their

battle or campaign objectives. First, would be an assessment of the enemy’s situation;

then Zhu would set out the overall objectives for Red Army forces (the commander’s

intent); then very concise orders for each unit would be enumerated that set forth their

142 Zhu, “How to Forge an Invincible Red Army,” (July 1931), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 16; or “Zen yang chuang zao tie de hong jun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 6.

70 objectives and the chain of command to be followed. The order would conclude with

other points for attention, such as signals to be used and identification to be worn during

night attacks.143 As part of the operations planning system, Zhu instituted a lessons-

learned process that centered on holding meetings involving officers and men at all levels

of the army to critique past operations, criticize the conduct of commanders, discuss what

could be improved and how to best plan for the next operation.144

In order to develop lower-level commanders with initiative and independence, a

high quality officer corps was needed, from senior leaders down to platoon commanders.

Zhu was concerned with maintaining a high standard of leadership and developed an

exacting system to test and evaluate officers and noncommissioned officers. Some of the

thoroughness with which Zhu carried out this system can be gleaned from the assessment

criteria applied to junior through mid-level army leaders. Besides a general background

check, noncommissioned officers were tested for their knowledge of regulations, orders,

and guerrilla tactics, while they also had to display skills on the drill ground and in field

operations. Their personalities and proclivities were assessed, along with their squad

management skills, leadership in battle, and their abilities in teaching and training.

Cadres and mid-level officers were tested on their knowledge of the science of tactics, the

science of firing weapons, topography, and major aspects of battle formations. They

were judged on their views of Red Army policy and how they would react in unexpected

situations. In addition, their abilities in management and training methods were assessed

along with their guerrilla work, command capability and decisiveness, relations with

143 See for example “Order for the First Army Group of the Red Army to Launch a General Assault on Ji’an,” (October 3, 1930) in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:546-547; or “Zong gong Jian de mingling,” (October 3, 1930, 1400), in Zhu De Junshi wenxuan, 22-23. 144 For a discussion of Zhu’s after action conference system, see the above Instruction and Training section.

71 colleagues, implementation of orders, and the degree of faith that their soldiers had in

them.145

The system that Zhu envisioned had not been fully achieved by 1933. In an after-

action critique of the Huangbei and Dongbei campaigns of May 1933, he laid out the

shortcomings of the army leadership and the lack of independent initiative. Zhu stressed

that commanders at lower levels needed to show individual initiative to achieve the

mission: “The lesson in this campaign is that, though we have recently made progress in

faithfully executing orders, our commanders at different levels failed to make the best use

of their own initiative and undertake independent actions as expected by higher levels.

Hence they did not completely fulfill their mission.”146 Zhu continued by stating that:

“Obeying orders and displaying independent initiative are not contradictory. Functioning independently should never be mistaken for disobeying orders. It is also inadvisable to execute orders mechanically without exercising any independent initiative. Our combat manuals and field service regulations stress time and again that the Red Army must obey orders, but that it must also cultivate initiative and independently cope with specific situations. We must master this lesson if we are to achieve complete victory.”147

Given that Red Army units had to operate over large geographic areas while relying on

poor or slow communications, it was crucial for Zhu to foster individual initiative and responsibility among his subordinate commanders, even down to individual unit leaders.

By encouraging lower-level initiative, Zhu began to build a military force that could respond more quickly than its enemies to rapidly changing situations and battlefield opportunities.

145 “Order on the Testing of Officers and Soldiers,” (March 29, 1930), in Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1949, 3:287; or “Guanyu guan bing kaoji de xunling,” in Zhu De Junshi wenxuan, 14. 146 Zhu, “The Great Victory and Lessons of the Huangbei and Dongbei Campaigns,” (May 28, 1933) in Selected Works of Zhu De, 21; or “Huangbei Dongbei liang ci zhanyi weida shengli de jingguo yu jiaoxun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 11. 147 Ibid., 21 or Ibid., 11.

72 Intelligence

To plan and conduct military operations effectively, commanders need relevant

and up-to-date information on enemy units, their intentions, and their movements. One

of the capabilities that the Red Army possessed that allowed it to overcome superior

numbers of hostile forces was its intelligence system. In discussing military operations,

Zhu continuously stressed the importance of gathering information about enemy troops

and plans, and the superior intelligence capabilities of the Red Army. One of the critical

advantages of securing the support of local people for the Communists was that they

became a prime source of intelligence on GMD forces and military operations, thus

allowing a numerically inferior Red Army to out-maneuver and surprise numerically

superior GMD units.

By 1931, Zhu claimed that the Red Army’s espionage network was well

established in the Jiangxi Soviet as well as in GMD-controlled areas. The Red Army had set up special schools to train intelligence operatives, many of whom were women and

boys, while others were peddlers and itinerant handicraft workers who could easily move

through GMD territory. The Communist intelligence service also had a section devoted

to the study of GMD codes, documents, and publications, and the debriefing of GMD

POWs. Other sections gathered information on recently occupied territory and carried out detailed historical studies of each GMD army, which described the commanders and their men, their provincial origin, organization, and combat ability. Zhu would then use these studies to determine the best method to deal with each particular GMD army.148

The care and effort that went into developing this intelligence capability demonstrated the systematic approach by the Red Army and Zhu De to intelligence collection and analysis.

73 The information gathered by the Red Army’s intelligence organization would provide the

Communists with a critical military advantage during the initial defense of the Jiangxi

Soviet.

In the early spring of 1931, before the beginning of the Guomindang’s second extermination campaign, Zhu De established a new Red Army radio school utilizing captured GMD wireless sets. The radio school developed a signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability to intercept and read GMD radio traffic. From this, Zhu learned about the establishment of supply bases behind the GMD’s fortified frontline that indicated their preparations for the second extermination campaign.149 By May 1931, just before the campaign began, the Red Army’s intelligence system had gathered detailed information on GMD defense works from peasants who had been forced to build them. The reports gave Zhu the date when the GMD offensive was to begin and gave him the opportunity to develop plans to counter the attack. Three nights before the GMD offensive was to begin, Zhu ordered the Red Army’s main forces to make forced night marches into the enemy’s rear and preemptively attack them.150

Doctrine

In addition to obtaining the right information about the enemy to inform their planning, army leaders require a military force that can operate in a consistent and unified fashion by being able to follow a commonly agreed upon set of principles or guidelines, called doctrine.151 The doctrine that the early Red Army developed to guide its

148 Smedley, 302. 149 Ibid., 295. 150 Ibid., 296. 151 According to the U.S. Army, “Doctrine is the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements.” “Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations.” Doctrine is rooted in time tested principles but also forward-looking and adaptable to new situations (new technologies,

74 operations has become quite well known and is considered to be a key factor in the

military effectiveness of that army. A foremost analyst of the People’s Liberation Army

and the Chinese military, Samuel B. Griffith, described Red Army doctrine as:

“… based essentially on precise and carefully evaluated information, meticulous planning, rapid secret movement, retention of the initiative, creation of favorable tactical situations by simulation and dissimulation; sudden, short-range surprise attacks, rapid disengagement, and speedy withdrawal. The pattern was dynamic: concentrate, disperse, and concentrate again. The Communists rarely engaged unless victory was certain; if a situation developed to their disadvantage, they broke off the action. They always sought surprise, …”152

In order to disseminate these military principles easily and quickly to its recruits, the Red

Army leadership distilled these concepts into simple, easily remembered sayings. The

most famous articulation of Communist guerrilla warfare doctrine was the sixteen-

character formula developed during a May 1928 conference at Jinggangshan after the

merger of Zhu’s and Mao’s forces. Zhu is now given credit for developing this set of

sixteen characters that summarized the principles of guerrilla warfare.153 These famous

principles were:

“When the enemy advances, we retreat When the enemy halts and encamps, we harass them. When the enemy seeks to avoid battle (becomes tired), we attack. When the enemy retreats, we pursue.”154

This sixteen-character formula, in Chinese “di jin wo tui, di zhu wo rao, di pi wo da, di

tui wo zhui,” is structured like a Chinese poem for ease of memorization. Another

popular principle of guerrilla warfare was summarized in another formula: “Divide the

threats, and missions). “Army doctrine is detailed enough to guide operations, yet flexible enough to allow commanders to exercise initiative when dealing with specific tactical and operational situations. To be useful, doctrine must be well known and commonly understood.” See United States Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2001) 1-14. 152 Griffith, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 32. 153 Marcia R. Ristaino, China’s Art of Revolution: The Mobilization of Discontent, 1927 and 1928 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 195. 154 Smedley, 229.

75 troops to stir up the masses, concentrate the troops to deal with the enemy” (“fen bing yi fadong qunzhong, jizhong yi yingfu diren”).155

Zhu’s own succinct summary of Red Army strategic and tactical doctrine can be seen in a telegram he sent to the Fourth Front Army, the Red Army force defending the

Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area, suggesting how it should conduct the defense of its base area in mid-September 1932. In the telegram, Zhu begins by stating that these concepts were based on the experiences of the First Front Army, which he commanded, when it defended the Jiangxi Central Soviet against the first three GMD Encirclement and

Suppression campaigns of 1931.156 The telegram goes on to suggest:

“… the Fourth Front Army should adopt appropriate tactics for luring the enemy deep into places where we have a foundation in mass work and where the topography will favor us and conceal the target of our main forces. It should carry out rigorously the tactic of having the masses strengthen the walls and clear the fields [jianbi qingye],157 and make widespread use of our guerrilla detachments for actions such as harassing the enemy from all directions, checking the enemy, carrying out surprise attacks, and cutting the enemy’s communication lines. In this way we can wear out and disperse the enemy’s strength; it is not advantageous to hold a certain strong point obstinately, for this will facilitate the enemy’s concerted attacks by converging columns. Thus, in the course of mobile warfare, we should single out the enemy’s weak units and, after striking a fierce

155 Jin, 303. Jin Yuguo in his Zhongguo zhanshu shi (History of Chinese Military Tactics) also points out that in the 1927-1930 period, Red Army units scattered among different base areas; such as the E Yu (Hubei-Henan border), Gan dongbei (Northeast Jiangxi), or Xiang E Gan (Hunan Hubei Jiangxi) base areas; all developed their own versions of these guerrilla warfare principles and rendered them into easily understood sayings. For examples of these other sayings, also see Jin, 303. 156 This telegram was signed by four members of the Central Bureau (Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang) and was originally considered part of Mao’s military works, but now is attributed to Zhu De’s authorship. See “Dui hong si fang mian jun fensui di si ci “wei jiao” de jianyi,” in Zhu, Zhu De Junshi wenxuan, 92. 157 The term “strengthen the walls and clear the fields” [jianbi qingye] refers to a Ming dynasty local defense system. It was designed to prepare communities to resist rural rebel incursions by fortifying and strengthening town walls within which the grain supply from the surrounding countryside would be gathered, and when threatened, the local populace could seek refuge. This was done to deny rebels sources of recruits and food. Under this system, the villagers were also organized into local self-defense militia units. Historian Philip Kuhn likens this system to a Vietnam War era strategic hamlet approach to counter rural rebels. This system became a standard technique for Ming authorities. See Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure 1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) 41-42. It seems that this was a common enough saying, that Zhu De and other Communist leaders could use this term to describe their own strategy for local defense. Instead of controlling rebels, however, Zhu used this term to refer to how to resist incursions by government troops.

76 blow at a small part of the enemy’s forces and wiping it out, immediately move in another direction. By means of speed, daring, secrecy, and mobility, defeat the enemy one by one, in order to shatter completely the Fourth “Encirclement and Suppression.”158

Zhu should be given most of the credit for developing and codifying the Red Army’s military doctrine that gave this force its flexibility, dynamism, and combat effectiveness.

These principles provided the Red Army with an effective model for waging both

guerrilla and more conventional forms of warfare against its more numerically and

materially superior Guomindang opponents. Adhering to this doctrine gave the Red

Army, in turn, the ability to fulfill its role as an instrument for implementing Communist military and revolutionary strategy.

Military Strategy

As stated earlier, strategy is the art and science of developing and employing

armed forces and other instruments of power in a synchronized fashion to secure national

level objectives.159 The Jinggangshan period was critical in the early development of

Communist military strategy. In the spring of 1928, there were heated debates within the

CCP over the correct political and military strategy to pursue. These debates were not

fundamentally or simply over whether to support an urban or a rural-based revolution.

The majority of the Communist leadership saw the utility of rural base areas for

furthering the revolution. Debates within the CCP over strategy centered on whether the

primary focus should be on peasants and the development of rural base areas and their

defense, or on the urban working class and cities, in which case rural bases would still be

used as staging areas to launch offensives to capture large urban areas and to foster

158 “Proposal as to How the Fourth Front Army Can Smash the Fourth “Encirclement and Suppression,”” (September 1932), in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:259-260; or “Dui hong si fang mian jun fensui di si ci “wei jiao” de jianyi,” in Zhu, Zhu De Junshi wenxuan, 92.

77 insurrection there. These debates continued through the Jiangxi Soviet period, and

reflected fundamental differences within the CCP over political policy and what was the best overall strategy to spread revolution in China.160

A major component of the Communist’s military strategy disputes between 1928

and 1930 was over the role and main mission of the Red Army and the concept of the

rural base area. Some questioned whether the best strategic use of the army was as a

massed force to launch attacks on large cities or as dispersed/semi-autonomous units to

defend and expand various rural base areas. These arguments were linked to intra-party

politics and rivalries, ideology, and relations with the Comintern.161 The outcome of

these debates was reflected in how the Red Army was used during this period: there was

a shift in emphasis from using Red Army forces to take urban centers in 1927, and with

the failure of this approach, to a focus on developing rural base areas and guerrilla

operations in 1928-1930. This policy changed back to a focus on attacking cities and

urban insurrection in 1930, and then after the failure of this strategy, a return to a focus on defending and developing rural base areas in 1931. Closely linked to questions over the proper role of the military in the revolutionary struggle were debates over the concept and role of rural base areas. Were base areas to serve as temporary refuges and staging areas from which Red Army troops could launch conventional offensives, and use them for for rest and resupply? If this were the case, base areas would act as interchangeable pieces of territory that would allow Red Army units to concentrate and maneuver wherever they were needed, and military units would not be tied down to any one base

159 FM 3-0, 2-2. 160 See Averill, 222-223, 407-408. For a more detailed discussion of the strategic debates within the CCP see Schram’s introductory essays in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:xxi-xxii, xlviii-xlix, lxiii; and also in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:xxx-xxxi, xxxv-xxxvi, xlvii, lii.

78 area. Or were base areas, instead, to serve as long-term miniature states with a broad

socio-political role that required Red Army forces to defend and expand them, with

specific army units becoming associated with specific base areas? In practice, both

concepts co-existed and blended within the minds of the CCP leadership.162

The shift in emphasis from an urban-oriented strategy to a rural strategy was reflected in a May 1928 directive from the central party leadership that supported a defensive strategy and the development of rural base areas. The directive reorganized the

Communist military forces into a more formal and professional force. The role of the

Red Army was not only military but also socio-political: It was to protect the development of soviet governments by suppressing counterrevolutionary forces, and by supporting land division and the election of soviet officials. Also, the army’s mission was to protect the soviet base areas from Guomindang attacks and ensure that the soviets continued their consolidation. It was stressed that Red Army units should not be wasted against local counterrevolutionary militias, but preserved, expanded, and trained to fight regular GMD forces.163 Zhu himself acknowledged that the Red Army had a wide range

of roles outside of combat: “It was explicitly stipulated that the Red Army’s mission was

not confined to fighting. It also had to carry out propaganda among the masses and

organize and arm them, establish political power and raise funds for the revolution.”164

Three important strategic choices were made that have elicited much debate: the

adoption of guerrilla warfare during the shift in emphasis to a more defensive and rural-

161 Averill, 407-408. 162 Averill, 408-409. 163 Ristaino, 139, 141. 164 Zhu, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 133; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,”in Zhu De xuanji, 127.

79 oriented strategy at the end of 1927; the development of a defense-in-depth strategy

known as “luring the enemy in deep” to defend both the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi base areas; and the shift in 1930 back to a more offensive and urban-focused strategy known as the Li Lisan Line.

Issues Over the Adoption of Guerrilla Warfare Strategy

In his description of the early Red Army of 1927-1931, William Whitson argued

that its strategy and operations were a blend of warlord, Russian, and Chinese peasant

military traditions and styles; and he emphasized the conflict between professional

officers, like Zhu De, who favored the Russian and warlord conventional military ethic

and those who supported Mao’s peasant and guerrilla warfare ethic.165 A closer assessment reveals that Red Army professional officers regarded guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare as complementary. The army was a hybrid force composed of

regular troops and guerrilla forces who could operate together and were complementary

in nature. This was especially apparent in the Red Army’s organization and doctrine

described above. The conflict between the professional officers and Mao was more over

the extent of control that the Communist Party could exert over the army.

In his own account of the development of Communist guerrilla warfare principles,

Zhu De relates that initially Communist forces adopted that mode of warfare out of

necessity and not from choice. After the Nanchang Uprising failed, Zhu believed that the insurrectionary military forces had lost because, “… we had only the experience of the

Northern Expedition to go by in directing military operations. We had no experience with guerrilla warfare, and no idea of the need to disperse our troops to win over and arm

165 Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 29-30, 31, 45.

80 the masses.”166 It was only after his troops were forced to retreat into the mountains that

they began to use guerrilla warfare, which was the right approach according to Zhu,

because: “Instead of trying to occupy big cities as we had in the past, we became realistic

and integrated ourselves with the masses, arousing them to take part in uprisings and

establishing revolutionary base areas. Our tactics also changed: Fight only when we were sure of victory and move about to avoid any battle in which we were not sure we would win.”167 During 1927-28, Zhu also pointed out that most of the Communist officers

under him had military experience only in conventional operations from participating in

the Northern Expedition and not in guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, Zhu makes a

point of stating that he himself already had experience in guerrilla warfare both in

practice and in theory prior to 1927, and actually was an early advocate for guerrilla

warfare.168

Ultimately, the incorporation of guerrilla warfare into overall Chinese Communist

Party revolutionary strategy was more for social and political ends than for military use.

Guerrilla warfare had a long tradition in rural Chinese rebellions and with bandits. The

CCP innovation was to recognize the usefulness of this indigenous rural warfare style and

integrate it with the Party’s modern organizational concepts and stress on politicization,

which in turn would comprise the primary part of the Communist approach to the rural

masses. For the CCP, the main function of guerrilla warfare was as a tool to mobilize the

rural population to help extend the revolutionary mass movement and expand the

166 Zhu, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 130; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,” in Zhu De xuanji, 124. This assessment by Zhu was from the vantage point of 1944, so one can suspect a certain amount of Party orthodoxy in the retelling of the history of this earlier period. 167 Ibid., 131 or Ibid., 125. 168 Ibid., 132-133 or Ibid., 126.

81 revolutionary base areas. The CCP considered guerrilla warfare as closely linked with

the mass movement, but it never was to become an independent military movement that

could end up resembling banditry.169

Development and Adoption of the “Luring the Enemy in Deep” Strategy

In order to defend Communist base areas, a defense in depth or “luring the enemy

in deep” (youdi shenru) strategy was developed that is often credited to Mao Zedong.

William Whitson states this strategy was articulated by Mao in October 1930 at a

conference at Lofang. He supposedly put forward this idea in opposition to the Red

Army’s professional officers who had proposed a strategy of launching attacks against such cities as Nanchang.170 The “luring the enemy in deep” strategy, however, had been

used previously to defend the Jinggangshan base area and the concept was well known in

Chinese military thought as a way to defend against a stronger adversary by trading space

for time until an opportune moment arose to launch a counterattack. Luring the enemy in

deep was used as both a strategic concept and also at the operational and tactical levels.

This strategic concept was based on the Communist leadership’s belief that the

Red Army’s speed and mobility were its greatest assets and it should avoid combat with

stronger enemy units until conditions were favorable to launch an attack. Communist

leaders realized that Red Army units were high priority targets for GMD forces and

therefore would openly concentrate Red Army units in difficult terrain deep within base

area territory to entice GMD forces to advance. Separate GMD armies would usually

advance in an uncoordinated fashion, along separate routes, over difficult terrain, and in

unfamiliar territory. This provided an opportunity for Red Army units to concentrate

169 Ristaino, 194-195. 170 Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 49.

82 their forces to successively surprise, attack and defeat isolated enemy troops. This strategy at the tactical level involved local deployments of red guards and guerrilla units around various villages to defend them; while at the strategic and operational level, regular Red Army units (using mobile warfare) would maneuver over large areas that could encompass several provinces, and would move and fight within the base area itself, where they had the advantage of familiar terrain and a supportive population. Opposition to this strategy often came from local cadres, who saw enemy incursions deep within the base area inflicting significant damage on the local population, the economy, and political institutions. They preferred a strategy where fighting took place outside the borders of the base area.171

The Red Army continued to use and refine this strategy during the early Jiangxi

Soviet period of 1930-31. The “luring the enemy in deep” strategy entailed first provoking Guomindang troops to pursue Red Army units, then allowing the enemy to advance unopposed into the base area. Then smaller Red Army groups could choose a favorable opportunity to concentrate their forces to isolate and defeat individual adversary forces in succession.172 An example of planning a campaign using this strategy can be seen in Zhu De’s order to the First Front Army in November 1930 prior to the start of the GMD’s first encirclement campaign. Zhu instructed his forces to lure enemy units deep into Communist territory by first advancing into Nationalist territory to seize towns, raise funds, and mobilize the masses there. After one month, Red Army forces would pull back and concentrate their forces at predesignated locations in the rear,

171 Averill, 409-410. 172 See introductory essay by Schram in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:xxx.

83 and presumably draw GMD troops after them.173 The success of the “luring the enemy in

deep” strategy to defeat the first GMD encirclement campaign against the Jiangxi base

area ensured that this strategy would be again used in succeeding campaigns to defend the Jiangxi Soviet.174 The rural-based defensive, counter attacking style of this plan was

in marked contrast to Li Lisan’s expansionist strategy that emphasized attacking and

occupying urban centers.

Issues Over the Li Lisan Strategy

In December 1929, the Communist Party Central Committee under the leadership of Li Lisan and Zhou Enlai issued a directive reversing the defensive strategy used by the

Red Army since the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising that had focused on

expanding rural base areas rather than capturing major cities. The new directive

advocated an offensive strategy that called for the concentration instead of dispersal of

Communist forces and linked the armed struggle of the rural population to the urban

masses. The central CCP leadership ordered attacks to be launched against major cities,

such as Changsha and Wuhan, in the hope of coordinating these assaults with uprisings

staged by urban workers to create a general revolutionary tide that would spread

throughout China. Li Lisan viewed Red Army operations from the countryside as

complementary and a useful auxiliary force to the city workers’ movement that would

foment urban revolution.175

173 See “Order to Lure the Enemy Deep into the Red Area, Wait Until They Are Exhausted, and Annihilate Them,” (November 1, 1930) in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:656-657; or “You di shenru chise qu yu dai di pibei er jianmie zhi de mingling,” in Zhu De Junshi wenxuan, 24-25. 174 See Schram’s introductory essay in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:xxx-xxxi. 175 See Schram’s introductory essay in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:xlviii-xlix; and Schwartz, 141-142. The Comintern line at this time supported guerrilla operations in rural areas that could merge with the larger national revolution. Comintern support was also given to the development of the Red Army and rural Soviet base areas as long as the urban proletariat was in the lead. By July 1930, the Comintern had also

84 Zhu related that in June 1930 he and Mao received two directives from Li Lisan.

The first directive reorganized all Red Army forces into a single centralized command with Zhu as the commander-in-chief and Mao as the political commissar. The other directive ordered a change in strategic plan that shifted the weight of the revolution from rural to urban areas and viewed the urban proletariat as leaders of both the agrarian and national revolutionary movements. The forces under Zhu and Mao were ordered to capture cities in coordination with insurrections and general strikes staged by industrial workers. In 1937, Zhu would criticize Li and his supporters as having little faith in or understanding of the agrarian revolution or the rural Soviet system, and for their lack of trust in Mao’s policies to achieve successful revolution in China. Despite Zhu’s and

Mao’s skepticism of the Li plan, they implemented the new strategy because at the time they had only incomplete information on the progress of the Chinese revolution and had to trust the Central Committee’s analysis of the national situation. In Zhu’s view, the

Communist armies at the time were weak and poorly armed, with only light weapons compared to the Nationalist forces, and were unlikely to hold onto a city even if they were able to capture one.176

Zhu claimed that he had always supported the building of rural base areas and the continuation of guerrilla warfare, and was opposed to fomenting urban insurrections and

come to endorse the use of the Chinese Red Army to attack and occupy urban centers. See Schwartz, 137, 143. 176 Smedley, 274-276. The original campaign plan to implement the Li Lisan strategy would begin in June 1930. Red Army forces would advance out of their respective base areas to launch offensives to capture major urban centers. The First Army under Zhu would proceed from Jiangxi to capture Nanchang then continue on to the Yangzi River and then advance westward towards Wuhan. At the same time, the Third Army under Peng Dehuai would advance westward from northwestern Jiangxi to capture Changsha, then advance north towards Wuhan. The Second Army under He Long and Fourth Army under Xu Xiangjian would advance on Wuhan from the north, while industrial workers in Wuhan would revolt in a general strike. The First and Third Armies once they had reached the vicinity of Wuhan would link up with He

85 attacks on cities. The evidence, however, shows that before the Li Lisan strategy was implemented, both Zhu and Mao genuinely supported it and were optimistic that it would succeed. This was especially the case with Mao, who in early 1930 believed that a revolutionary high tide was at hand and that attacks on major cities could tip the balance and spread revolution throughout China. The only strategic disagreement between Li and

Mao was over the relative weight to be given urban versus rural areas in the Chinese revolution.177

Tactics

Tactics is the employment of military units in combat that includes the arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to achieve victory in battle.178 Less contentious than the differing approaches to military strategy, the development of Red Army tactics progressed in a more accretionary way that sought to synthesize and adapt existing tactical styles to address changing circumstances on the battlefield. One of Zhu De’s early tactical principles was to move away from traditional linear tactical thinking. In the fall of 1927 after the failure of the

Nanchang Uprising, Zhu’s earliest instructions to his troops focused on training them to convert from linear to non-linear tactical formations. He also emphasized operational flexibility that would allow his troops to shift between conventional warfare and guerrilla style warfare. One of the keys to the Red Army’s success on the battlefield was its focus on gaining the support of the local population that gave Communist forces access to superior intelligence, better sources of supply, and a source of recruits. This operational

Long’s forces. See Smedley, 276. For another description of the campaign plan refer to Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 46. 177 See Schram’s introductory essay in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:xlix, l-li; and Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 46.

86 and tactical-level intelligence about the enemy allowed Zhu’s outnumbered troops to out maneuver and surprise larger and slower Guomindang forces. Communist operations also emphasized the use of deception and political subversion. A common plan was first to identify the weakest GMD unit in a force (the weakness could be either military or political), then attack and defeat this unit first. This action would then start the collapse of the rest of the GMD force. Red Army operations emphasized gaining local superiority over enemy forces, making full use of its superior maneuverability, and using non-linear, envelopment, and circular maneuvers to attack the enemy’s flanks and rear in order to inflict maximum psychological shock on the enemy and annihilate its forces. Other factors assisted Communist forces in the defense of their base areas. In addition to the mountainous terrain, Zhu admitted that Red Army successes were also due to the incompetence of GMD commanders and the political divisions and suspicions among them, which the Communists could readily exploit.

In assessing Red Army operations of this period, the question over whether the army was a guerrilla or a conventional force should be clarified. One needs to keep in mind certain general concepts about the nature of guerrilla warfare, for: “What defines guerrillas is not why they fight, nor when, nor where, but how: guerrilla war is a set of tactics. Guerrilla tactics are an effort to answer the question: How can the weak make war against the strong?”179 Strategically, guerrillas are weaker than their enemy in numbers, arms, and training. Tactically, at a chosen place where they can launch an attack they can be more numerous than their enemy and gain local superiority. To maintain tactical superiority, guerrilla forces need to be able to concentrate and disperse

178 FM 3-0, 2-5.

87 quickly to avoid enemy reinforcements. They need to rely on secrecy and deception.

Guerrilla war is characterized by constant fighting, not large battles. Guerrilla forces rely on ambushes and attacks on the enemy’s rear to have a psychological impact and to disrupt the enemy’s food and water supply, and in general, wear their opponents down to undermine their physical and moral strength. The most effective guerrillas are those who operate in cooperation with regular units.180

Before Zhu Met Mao – Early Developments in Tactics

Around November 1927, when Zhu De and his fleeing soldiers could briefly rest at Shangbao, Zhu undertook the retraining and consolidation of his forces. He conducted daily military training classes, where new tactical questions were explored, such as how to switch between large and small scale warfare (i.e., guerrilla warfare), and how to change from fighting in linear formations in combat to an inverted “V” formation (“ren” zi in the Chinese text).181 A “V” like tactical formation was more effective in enveloping an enemy unit’s flanks and rear. Obviously, Zhu believed that the tactical training his units had received under the National Revolutionary Army was inadequate, and more modern advanced tactical principles needed to be taught.182 Beginning with the southern

179 Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), 4. 180 Joes, 4-5. 181 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 400; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 394-395. 182 The inadequate training and tactics of NRA units was commented upon by the Russian advisers sent to train the GMD’s military forces in 1925-26. A Russian adviser wrote in a report on the state of the NRA that the most important arm of the NRA was the infantry, but because of inadequate arms and equipment (lack of adequate numbers of artillery and machine guns) that, “Field training and firing exercises are being carried out on approximately the same principles as in the Russian Army before the great war.” See Document 28, “General Characteristics of the Armed Forces of the National Government,” prepared sometime between November 1925 and March 1926, in C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 1920-1927 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 621. In another assessment of the NRA, a Soviet adviser commented on the neglect of training for service in the field. He stated that, “The task of improving the training for war will be the most difficult one, for it will be necessary to replace some of the tactics to which the commanders

88 Hunan uprising in early 1928, the general pattern of military operations adopted by the

Red Army as related by Zhu was as follows: “We based ourselves on the people, …

Choosing our own battlefield and keeping the mountains to our back, we drew the enemy

where we wanted him, then cut off his transport columns, attacked his flanks, and

surrounded and destroyed him.”183 During the southern Hunan uprising at the battle of

Pingshi, Zhu was dismissive of the older linear tactical style used by the Guomindang commander. This commander deployed his six regiments in a single-line battle

formation, which allowed Zhu’s force to defeat them easily in a piecemeal fashion.184

In contrast to Zhu’s more military-oriented operations, Mao’s forces sought to

gain more political and social objectives in their attacks on GMD territory. Mao’s forces

launched a series of quick raids from Jinggangshan to attack nearby enemy military

forces and county administrative centers. The tactics Mao used were mainly to create

psychological and symbolic effects. These raids were very public challenges to the

existing political and social power structure that would create a perception of change in

the local balance of power, winning the revolutionaries more credibility and support. For

example, a typical raid would target government buildings for destruction, open jails,

confiscate cash and grain from government yamens (government compounds housing

provincial and sub-provincial offices and officials), with some of the grain and cash

redistributed to the local population. Communist forces would also publicly execute

selected local elites. CCP cadres and army units would disperse among the local

are accustomed and to have them adopt modern tactics, which conform to modern warfare.” See Document 29, “The Training of the National Revolutionary Army for War,” in C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, 626. 183 Smedley, 220. 184 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 403; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 397.

89 population to proselytize and interact with the people, and they would stage public rallies

announcing the creation of Communist-run local governments.185

Zhu brought both new tactical concepts and combat experience to the military

forces that he and Mao would develop at Jinggangshan. The extent to which Zhu took

credit for Red Army military innovations reflects the evolving relationship between him

and Mao. In his 1962 reminiscences of this period, Zhu commented on his own

innovative ideas about tactics before he met Mao, but he also stated that he should not be

given too much credit for these innovations. Zhu made sure to say that this was just a

beginning and that Mao would later provide the systematic and satisfactory solution to

the question of overall strategy and guerrilla warfare tactics. This seems to indicate that

Zhu wanted to demonstrate his contribution to early Communist military theory, but given the period (1962), he had to assert this with caution so as not to offend Mao.186

When Zhu Met Mao – Jinggangshan Period Tactics

After Zhu and Mao linked up in April 1928, a set of tactical principles began to be

developed that would create a formidable fighting force. What made the Red Army so

effective, as ably shown by historian Stephen Averill, was that it was able to retain the

best attributes of guerrilla warfare and combine them with features characteristic of

professional armies, such as the possession of a strategic vision and an ability to

coordinate the movements of large units across large expanses of space and time. The

hybrid nature of the Red Army was demonstrated in its successful defense of the

Jinaggangshan base area during the spring of 1928 against three Guomindang offensives,

where the Communists used the advantages of decentralized command, superior

185 Averill, 170.

90 knowledge of the local terrain, and interior lines for defense. The main tactic used was to maneuver two or more Red Army regiments separately and then bring them together to launch surprise attacks on one isolated and unsupported enemy unit after another.

Because enemy troops remained confined to a few predictable approach routes, the Red

Army could easily block their advance with one regiment along with support from local guerrillas. While this enemy unit was blocked from advancing, the Red Army’s main forces could be maneuvered either to attack another more vulnerable enemy unit or to outflank the blocked force and launch an assault on its unprotected rear. Another common tactic from this period was for Red Army forces to launch a feint or a secondary attack on one front, this was often into Hunan, in order to mislead or distract enemy forces about the Communist troops’ activities on another front.187

The effectiveness of these tactics owed much to the psychological shock and fear

they generated among the GMD forces. The Red Army refused to fight in ways familiar

to warlord armies. Instead of a slow mobilization of a conventional army or an attempt to

avoid combat by bandit forces, Red Army attacks were characterized by surprise and a ferocity that shocked the often tired and demoralized GMD troops, and frequently created panic and then a rout. These victories helped perpetuate the reputation of the Red Army

and eroded the confidence of their opponents. The continued success of these tactics

would lead to the adoption of mobile and guerrilla tactics as the standard method for Red

Army combat operations from Jinggangshan through the Jiangxi Soviet period.188

186 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962) in Selected Works of Zhu De, 400; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 394-395. 187 Averill, 213. 188 Ibid., 213-214.

91 The usual version of how these tactical principles were first learned is related by

Zhu, who stated that when he first arrived at the Jingganshan base area, he spoke with the bandit leaders Wang and Yuan. They told Zhu what their tactical principles were (the so- called “tactics of Old Deaf Chu”) and how they survived so long in the mountains: “You don’t have to know how to fight; all you have to know is how to encircle the enemy.”189

Zhu stated that he learned much from these tactics and they became the tactical principles guiding the Red Army’s operations against the GMD, although he did imply that these tactics were not a revelation to him:

“Kuomintang armies all fought by the usual Japanese military tactics, always advancing in one column, with front and flank guards. Beyond this they knew nothing. But we split up into small, swift combat units which got in their rear and on their flanks, and attacked, cutting them into segments. There’s nothing secret about such tactics. Anyone can learn them, and the militarists later tried to use them against us. They failed because such guerrilla warfare requires not only a thorough knowledge of the terrain of the battle area but also the support of the common people. The people hated and spied on the Kuomintang militarists, waylaid and destroyed small units and stragglers, and captured their transport columns.”190

In Zhu’s own account of the defense of the Jinggangshan base area against the three GMD offensives of 1928, he often credited the poor morale or political divisions within the GMD forces to their defeat rather than to purely Red Army tactical skill. In the first offensive, the enemy’s forces were organized from the warlord and provincial troops of Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangdong. Each province sent two armies against the

Communist base area. Zhu stated that the defenders of Jinggangshan were in a good strategic position, with a small perimeter to defend (about 120 li in diameter) and in

189 Smedley, 232. 190 Ibid., 233.

92 between the borders of all three provinces.191 Zhu De’s plan was first to attack the

Jiangxi forces commanded by Zhu Peide, because they still had CCP members in those

units, who could subvert them and persuade the Jiangxi troops to desert to the

Communists. When the Jiangxi forces were defeated, the Hunan and Guangdong forces chose to retreat. The second GMD campaign was defeated because the Hunan forces did not cooperate with Zhu Peide’s Jiangxi forces, while the third offensive failed because

Peng Dehuai’s troops defected from the Hunan army to the Communists.192

In the face of the early Communist successes in defending the Jinggangshan base

area, Zhu related that the GMD then developed more effective methods to defeat its

enemy by setting up a long-term blockade and following a policy of unceasingly pursuing

and following Red Army forces. The GMD deployed ten divisions to surround

Jinggangshan and implemented an economic blockade. Zhu stated that this blockade

combined with the needs of the new troops that Peng Dehuai had brought over to the

Communists, made their “… material position very difficult because of lack of

resources.”193 A tight blockade of the base area in the end would prove to be the most

effective method for countering the Communists forces and would eventually lead to the

abandonment of the Jinggangshan base area.

Another factor in the Red Army’s success was Zhu’s willingness to use deception

to gain tactical and operational advantages. During the 1927-1928 period, Zhu’s troops kept their GMD uniforms and banners, and on several occasions passed themselves off as

191 A li is equivalent to half a kilometer or about one third of a mile. Operating at the intersection of several provincial borders presented military advantages to the Communists, for it created jurisdictional issues and exacerbated rivalries between the different provincial armies. 192 Wales, 247. 193 Ibid., 247.

93 GMD soldiers to enter and capture towns without any force being used.194 During the second GMD offensive against Jinggangshan, Zhu’s troops at Yongxin overran the headquarters of Yang Ruxuan, a GMD general, whose forces had been sent to attack

Jinggangshan. Yang had to flee for his life, and in his haste left behind his official seal and documents. Zhu took advantage of this opportunity to plan a deception. He sent a letter under Yang’s name to another Hunan army general, Wu Shang, claiming that Red

Army forces had been defeated at Yongxin and were fleeing back to Hunan, and calling on Wu to pursue and annihilate them. Taken in by this ruse, Wu led his entire division into an ambush and was annihilated.195

The use of deception and misdirection continued during the military operations

around the Jiangxi base area. In the summer of 1929, during the Red Army offensive

from the “Tungku” plateau against numerically superior GMD forces, Zhu first took

advantage of the conflicts between different GMD regional and local forces. Zhu then

used small detachments of troops to march in opposite directions from the main Red

Army force to make feints at large towns in order to draw enemy forces after them; these

forces would fade away then reappear again. At the battle of “Tingchow,” a walled city

in south Fujian, the Red Army lured enemy forces outside of the city by sending agents

into Tingchow to spread false reports that a weak Red Army force was encamped near

the city and could be easily attacked. As a single enemy column confidently advanced

into the mountains along a single footpath, Red Army outposts put up token resistance,

then fled farther into the mountains to give the impression that they were fleeing in panic

194 Smedley, 215, 218. 195 Yang Ruxuan, “Wo suo zhidao de zao nian Zhu De,” in Huoshuo Zhu De (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000), 8-9. Yang Ruxuan had been a fellow classmate of Zhu De at the Yunnan Military

94 in order to entice the enemy to advance more boldly into a Red Army ambush. Zhu

considered this operation an exemplary illustration of the tactic of “luring the enemy in

deep.”196

Jiangxi Soviet Period Tactics

In defending the Jiangxi Soviet, the Red Army continued to use and refine the tactical principles it had developed during the Jinggangshan period. In 1929, the Fujian,

Jiangxi, and Guangdong armies launched an offensive against the Jiangxi base area. Zhu identified the Fujian army as the weakest, so the Red Army chose to attack it first, illustrating its tactic of first isolating and defeating the weakest enemy unit in order to precipitate a general rout of the larger enemy force: “Our tactics were to defeat the

weakest forces first, then after they retreated the other two lines were in an exposed

position, so they were forced to retreat, too.”197

In order to defeat the first Guomindang extermination campaign (December 1930-

January 1931), Zhu credited his success first to having better intelligence than the GMD.

He could accurately estimate the enemy’s positions and intentions, largely due to GMD carelessness in publishing its troop movements and plans in local newspapers. Second,

Zhu effectively used the “luring the enemy in deep” concept where “… our strategy was to decoy and ambush the enemy. We coaxed them into moving forward, then surrounded and annihilated them.”198 As an example of luring an enemy unit into Communist territory, isolating it, then creating a local superiority in troop strength, Zhu described a

battle near his base at Donggu:

Academy and had also served under Zhu in the Yunnan Army. This account is from an oral interview that Yang gave in 1977 recounting his past experiences with Zhu De. 196 Smedley, 248-249. 197 Wales, 249.

95 “The Red Army annihilated these forces easily, because they had invaded the heart of the Soviet districts and our information about them was exact while they moved forward blindly. They were surrounded by high mountains, so it was easy for us to cut off their rear. We concentrated all our forces to attack Chang’s [one of the GMD army commanders] troops, so we had fifty thousand men to Chang’s ten thousand troops and it was a simple matter to defeat them.”199

In May 1931, Zhu defeated the second extermination campaign in much the same way:

“We planned to use the same tactics as in the first campaign. That meant to draw the

enemy out from behind their defenses, entice them into Soviet territory where they would be at the mercy of our troops and the people, and in big sweeping flank movements attack their rear and destroy them.”200

In the third extermination campaign (July-September 1931), Jiang Jieshi himself

was in command and moved his forces forward in four parallel lines (columns) to attack

the Jiangxi base area. Red Army soldiers moved in to occupy the spaces between these

parallel lines and harassed the GMD forces. The enemy troops’ discomfort was

exacerbated by the hot weather that wore them down even further. Zhu had ascertained that the GMD army making up the second line was the weakest, so the Red Army attacked this force first and destroyed it, then moved on to attack the other divisions. In addition, Zhu implemented a strategy to deny GMD forces supplies by removing all food and leaving villages empty when GMD troops came through, thus making it difficult for them to keep their large forces supplied with food.201 As for the mutually supporting

operations of guerrilla and regular army units during this campaign, Zhu went on to say:

“We then concentrated all our own forces at Tungku, leaving the partisans everywhere to trouble and harass the White army, so they had no idea where our exact strength was concentrated and missed direction. Surrounded on all sides by

198 Ibid., 251. 199 Wales, 252. 200 Smedley, 296. 201 Wales, 253-254.

96 partisans, the White troops were panicky and worried to desperation. We easily destroyed many units of the enemy in this way.”202

By May 1933, the coordination between guerrilla units and regular Red Army units had

reached a high level. In commenting on the results of the Huangbei and Dongbei

operations during the fourth annihilation campaign against the Jiangxi Soviet, Zhu

praised the Red Army for focusing on guerrilla warfare, with independent and smaller

guerrilla units doing, “… a good job of destroying the enemy’s transport lines, bridges

and supplies, and in confusing the enemy and striking terror into his heart …. there has been much better co-ordination between .… guerrilla warfare and the operations of the

Red Army’s main force.”203 Zhu continued his praise, “The guerrilla units played an

important role both before and after the Dongbei and Huangbei campaigns. Many small

guerrilla units harassed the enemy’s 52nd and 59th Divisions from the front, rear and

flanks, as the two divisions moved out of Le’an. When our main force launched an

attack, these enemy units, which thought our operation was simply another guerrilla

harassment, were wiped out.”204

As noted by historian Stephen Averill, the Red Army was a hybrid force of

regular units and guerrilla detachments whose tactics combined conventional and

guerrilla warfare principles. In defending its base areas, the Red Army displayed a

mixture of both guerrilla and conventional army characteristics.205 Regular Red Army

units could adopt guerrilla tactics at times, but for the most part was left it up to

detachments designated for this task. The Red Army’s regular forces saw their primary

202 Ibid., 254. 203 Zhu, “The Great Victory and Lessons of the Huangbei and Dongbei Campaigns,” (May 28, 1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 19-20; or “Huangbei Dongbei liang ci zhanyi weida shengli de jingguo yu jiaoxun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 10. 204 Ibid., 20; or Ibid., 10.

97 mission as seeking out the adversary’s main forces and destroying them in a battle of

annihilation (jianmie zhan).206 But given the material and manpower disparity between

the Communist and Guomindang military forces, the Red Army had to develop tactics

that would give it local superiority over its more numerous adversaries, which placed a

premium on superior intelligence, maneuverability, stealth, surprise, and psychological

shock effects. Guerrilla units working in coordination with the regular forces would

harass, confuse, and isolate enemy units. The mountainous terrain was also in the Red

Army’s favor. Here GMD forces could advance only up narrow mountain paths which

hampered communication and support between different advancing columns and negated

the Guomindang’s numerical strength. Their enemy forces could then be attacked and destroyed piecemeal.207 In the end, these tactics took advantage of the weaknesses of the

GMD’s own tactics used to attack Communist base areas. When on the offensive, the

GMD relied on several converging columns from different directions to trap and destroy

Red Army units. Communist tactics were least effective when the GMD was on the

defensive and implemented a strategy of surrounding and blockading the base areas with

military forces and imposing an economic blockade to starve out Communist forces and

the civilian population that supported them. These Nationalist methods were also not

new, for military search and destroy operations combined with blockades had long been

used by Chinese government armies to counter bandits in mountainous areas.208

205 Averill, 211, 213. 206 Averill, 211. For more details on Red Army concepts of mobile warfare, the battle of annihilation, and positional warfare, see Jin, 305-306. 207 Averill, 202. 208 Ibid., 307-308.

98 Zhu De’s Lessons Learned and Tactical Principles

In Zhu’s general approach to military operations and training, he stressed the need

for experience and theory to inform one another, and constant alertness to changes in the

military situation or the nature of warfare, and the need to adapt appropriately and not be

wedded to outmoded concepts or ideas. In a July 1931 article, Zhu, in listing the key

characteristics of the Red Army, highlighted the necessity for advanced military

techniques. He recognized that the nature of warfare in China had been rapidly evolving for some time, especially with the incorporation of Western military methods. He also acknowledged that advances in technology were becoming more important in warfare and as a result would require more sophisticated training and changes in tactics. Zhu stated that, “China, although it is technologically backward, began employing advanced military techniques more than half a century ago. Tactics learned from the Japanese and

Germans have been applied for almost as long.”209 Zhu believed that warfare in China

was being modernized through foreign assistance to various warlords and the

introduction of increasingly advanced weapons: “It is, therefore, imperative for the Red

Army to develop tactics superior to the enemy’s and to learn to use new weapons so that

we can wield them as soon as they are captured from the enemy.”210 Despite Zhu’s acknowledgment that the Red Army had gained much tactical experience from protracted guerrilla warfare and mountain combat, and had developed a strong offensive spirit, he noted, “As the scale of the modern revolutionary war grows, it is no longer enough to charge forward bravely, and the current level of our fighting experience is inadequate to meet objective needs. We must, therefore, make a special effort to speed up the

209 Zhu, “How to Forge an Invincible Red Army,” (July 1931), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 14; or “Zen yang chuang zao tie de hong jun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 4.

99 development of tactics.”211 To respond to the changes in GMD tactics during the fourth annihilation campaign, which emphasized the construction of blockhouses and field fortifications, Zhu revised the Red Army’s tactical regulations: “In the new edition of the

Red Army manual, all formalistic contents have been removed and emphasis has been put on attacks on field fortifications.”212

Zhu De summarized his basic tactical principles in a June 1933 article, Writings of the Red Battlefield, published by the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army School.

He began his short article by quoting a slogan from the Soviet Union’s military academies: “Practice divorced from theory is like groping in the dark; theory divorced from practice is purposeless theory.”213 According to Zhu, even though the Red Army had much practical experience it lacked in general a theoretical study of tactics. The Red

Army needed to improve its military capabilities through practice and theoretical studies to better defend against the GMD extermination campaigns being launched against the

Jiangxi Soviet. Therefore, Zhu set out six basic tactical principles derived from practical experience and his knowledge of military theory:

• First, one should be aware that things and situations change, so set rules are

impossible in commanding troops. Battlefield decisions depend on the specific task

at hand, the enemy’s situation, and the terrain. Because all of these can often change

one must be able to change one’s decisions and tactics to accommodate these

changes.214

210 Ibid., 14; or Ibid., 4. 211 Ibid., 14-15; or Ibid., 4-5. 212 Ibid., 15; or Ibid., 5. 213 Zhu, “Some Basic Principles Concerning Tactics,” (1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 24; or “Tan ji ge zhanshu de jiben yuanze,” in Zhu De xuanji, 14. 214 Ibid., 24-25; or Ibid., 14-15.

100 • Second, in commanding large armies or small units, in your maneuvers, “ … you

should choose the principal direction of assault and concentrate your maximum

strength to engage the enemy in a decisive battle. It will be sufficient to deploy

containing forces in the other directions, but you must actively attract the enemy’s

attention to yourselves to facilitate an assault in the principal direction.”215

• Third, in general, “ … strategy involves discovering the enemy’s main strength,

whereas tactics involves discovering his weak points.”216 If one uses tactics to attack

only the enemy’s strong points, then the enemy’s weak points become strong; if this

then prevents one from winning tactical victories, then it becomes difficult to achieve

strategic objectives. “It should be understood that total victory is the aggregation of

numerous small victories.”217

• Fourth, in coordinating the actions of large troop formations, Zhu said that it was

essential “ … that each and every unit understand, when accepting an assignment, the

essence of the superior’s decision and what role its own task plays in carrying out that

order …. If the situation has changed and communications have been severed, they

should function independently according to the superior’s order and local conditions,

which should not be interpreted as disobeying the superior’s order.”218

• Fifth, the main goals of reconnaissance were to determine the enemy’s situation and

terrain, and provide relevant information to the commander so he can issue

appropriate orders. But Zhu also pointed out the limitations of reconnaissance and

the need for a commander to deal with incomplete information but still make a

215 Ibid., 25; or Ibid., 15. 216 Ibid., 25; or Ibid., 15. 217 Ibid., 25; or Ibid., 15. 218 Ibid., 25; or Ibid., 15. See also the previous discussion of Red Army command and control.

101 decision. Zhu stressed that, “ … only a limited amount of information can be

gathered, and even less during battle. A commander must not hesitate or give up a

good opportunity because of inadequate reconnaissance.”219

• Sixth, in fighting an enemy in mountainous terrain when their forces have to advance

in several parallel columns through narrow paths that make it difficult to undertake

mutual support and to change the direction of their march, then, “If an inferior army

engaging a superior one on such mountainous terrain is well aware of the above

features and operates secretly and quickly to wipe out the enemy forces piecemeal,

and if it concentrates a superior force in a proper place and time for a decisive,

lightning assault against the enemy columns – if it can do all this, the enemy forces

will surely find it difficult to maneuver or get effective reinforcements.”220 Zhu goes

on to describe what to do if an enemy tries to envelope a unit: “If our forces are

caught in a pincer attack or encircled by several enemy columns and want to launch

an assault against one of these columns, they should seek a wide interior arc where

they can maneuver easily, and take advantage of [] strategically important terrain to

pin down the other columns. Otherwise it would be more advantageous to attack the

exposed wing and rear of a single enemy column.”221

Conclusion

The conventional narrative of the founding of the Chinese Red Army places considerable attention on the development of guerilla and mobile warfare concepts as a unique characteristic that contributed greatly to its survival, and ultimate victory, under adverse circumstances. Historian Stephen Averill and others have suggested that Red

219 Ibid., 25-26; or Ibid., 15-16. 220 Ibid., 26; or Ibid., 16.

102 Army leaders drew these concepts from a combination of common cultural memories,

such as the martial traditions found in popular literary works like the Romance of the

Three Kingdoms or the Water Margin, the time-honored methods used by rebels to resist

government authority, and the tactics used by bandits and sworn brotherhoods against

government suppression efforts. If such sources provided the “theory” for guerilla and

mobile warfare, the immediate circumstances in the Communist base areas are seen as

providing the practical context for the adoption of these concepts. The mountainous

terrain combined with the small number of Communist soldiers with limited armaments

compared to their stronger, better-equipped opponents, dictated that the best option was

to use hit-and-run tactics.222 While there is a certain degree of truth in this conventional narrative, in the end it overlooks the actual complexity of the Red Army, which made it more than a guerrilla force, and misses the broader influences of the professional officers who brought extensive military expertise and experience to the army’s development.

As shown in this chapter, the Communist military of this period was a hybrid

force made up of regular troops, full-time guerrilla units, and local part-time self-defense

forces. Its hybrid nature was also reflected in its operational style that combined

conventional operations with guerrilla warfare. For the most part, its units were well

trained and highly motivated, and could utilize its flexibility, speed, and maneuverability

to surprise and outmaneuver their more numerous but slower opponents. This style of

warfare was well suited to fighting domestic adversaries, whose military characteristics

and officers were well known to the Communist leaders who could readily exploit their

adversary’s weaknesses while trying to avoid their strengths.

221 Ibid., 26; or Ibid., 16. 222 Averill, 212.

103 Any attempt to understand the “origins” of the Red Army must take into account

both its complex character and the varied influences on its operational and tactical concepts. In terms of its initial constituent elements, the Red Army grew out of and evolved from units of the National Revolutionary Army, provincial “warlord” armies,

local peasant defense forces, partisans, and bandits. Each of these forces brought their

own experiences into the Red Army. At the same time, the core of the Communist

military was the Red Army that saw itself not, in fact, as a guerrilla force but as a regular

army. As such, the Red Army owed much of its early character, not to Mao Zedong, who

had little military training or knowledge, but to the professionally trained officers who

joined the Communist cause, men such as Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Liu Bocheng.

Through these units and these men, the roots of the Red Army go back, on a theoretical

as well as institutional level, to the military reform efforts of the late Qing Dynasty in the

first decade of the 20th century and to the armies of the early Chinese Republic. These

earlier military developments did not occur in isolation. Foreign influences can also be

found from the military theories of European powers, notably Germany and Russia, along

with that from Japan, and even from the Boer Republic in South Africa. All these

complex sources must be considered in an evaluation of the ultimate development of the

Red Army.

Many of these threads can be found combined in the experience of one man, Zhu

De, the commander-in-chief of the Red Army and the man most credited with its military

development. Zhu himself, in his autobiographical sketch given to author Nym Wales in

1937, credited many influences on his military thought, ranging from his days in the

Yunnan Army under Cai E to his study of German and Russian military science while in

104 Europe.223 It becomes important then to explore the wide range of both Chinese and foreign military influences on Zhu De and the extent to which they shaped his military thought.

The following chapters will trace the different influences, both foreign and domestic, that shaped the development of Chinese military institutions during this period, using Zhu De’s life and experience as the lens through which to assess all these influences. Insofar as Zhu De, and many of his fellow officers, can be shown to have had wide knowledge and experience in contemporary military theory and practice, this analysis will demonstrate that Chinese military developments during the first few decades of the 20th century reflected the increasing sophistication in military affairs in the industrialized world. Thus despite lacking in material resources, some Chinese armies, notably the early Yunnan Army and the Red Army, reflected modern military practices.

At the same time, these armies combined these modern influences with Chinese military traditions and adaptations to contemporary circumstances. The Red Army, then, will be shown to be less a break with previous Chinese military developments than a continuity with the past. Nym Wales had this to say about Zhu De and his relationship to the Red

Army: “The Red Army is an army of extreme youth, entirely new to the background of old China. For this army Chu Teh (sic) is a symbol of stability and a link with tradition and past history, for he has experienced the whole revolutionary movement since the

Manchu Dynasty…”224 While Wales is correct in characterizing Zhu as providing continuity with past Chinese traditions, Zhu was also equally important for introducing new ideas and adapting them to Chinese circumstances.

223 Wales, 113, 115-116, 117, 121. 224 Ibid., 111.

105 Chapter 2: Early Life and Education 1886-1911

This study uses Zhu De’s experiences and early military career as a means to examine the military transformation that China was undergoing in the first three decades of the twentieth century and to assess what continuities or breaks existed between the late-Qing Dynasty military and the Communist Red Army. Unlike other studies of the military developments of this period, this one will attempt to assess this military transformation from the viewpoint of a participant who progressed from a late-Qing military cadet to commander-in-chief of the Red Army. This chapter will examine the influences on Zhu De’s early life and career for insights into the early roots of his military and political thought. The chapter begins by asking to what extent Zhu’s birth into a poor, peasant, and Hakka family may have influenced his beliefs, motivations and career choices. Certainly early educational opportunities gave him better career prospects than most peasant youths. But it also gave him entry to the political and revolutionary ferment that caught up the educated elite of his time. In the end, like many educated young men of his age, both nationalism and social aspirations influenced Zhu’s decision to embark on a military career.

The Qing military establishment that Zhu De entered in 1909 was in the midst of an extensive modernization and reform movement that was creating a “New Army” based on Western military models. To gain a better understanding of the initial military influences on Zhu, this chapter reviews his experiences at the Yunnan Military Academy from 1909 to 1911 and seeks to determine what kind of military training and education he would have received. The chapter then assesses late-Qing military reforms and developments from 1901 to 1911. In the context of the broad military modernization

106 taking place in this period, particular attention is paid to what late-Qing military thought

would have been passed on to Zhu and his fellow cadets and how what they received was

related to broader Western military practice. Late-Qing military theory and training

becomes important because the New Army units that were created under this system

became the nucleus of the regional armies of the early Republic, which carried over many

of the military practices of the former regime. While it is impossible to generalize from

the life of any one man, Zhu’s experience in the Yunnan Military Academy was in fact

typical in many ways of the generation that entered the late Qing New Armies with their

accompanying educational system.

While attending the Yunnan Military Academy, Zhu also came under the

influence of Cai E, a brigade commander in the New Army division established in

Yunnan and a prominent military theorist of the period. He would become both Zhu’s

mentor and friend. Zhu was also a follower of Sun Yat-sen and secretly became a

member of the Tongmenghui, Sun’s revolutionary organization, when he entered the

Academy. Each of these men would have an influence in their own way on Zhu De’s

subsequent career and military thought. Zhu’s covert revolutionary activities and

experience in subversion of military units against the Qing government clearly also had

an influence on his ultimate revolutionary career.

Early Life 1886 – 1908

Family Background

Zhu De was born in 1886, in Ma’an zhuang (village), Yilong County, Sichuan

Province. His family originally came from Guangdong province and had migrated to

Sichuan, probably sometime in the 18th century. Zhu claimed his ancestors were

107 impoverished tenant farmers who rented approximately twenty mu of land. One of his

parents’ eight surviving children, Zhu De lived together with about twenty members of

his extended family.225 Zhu’s family was Hakka, a poor stigmatized Han subgroup,

whose identity rested on ancestry and culture, not place of birth. The Hakka used a

common dialect and written vernacular only understood by other Hakka that allowed

them to communicate in secret with each other. This became especially useful when

Hakka joined rebellions, such as the Taiping, or the later Communist revolution. The

Hakka dialect also acted as a unifier that helped to solidify their ethnic bonds across

regions.226 Hakka people can be found across Southern China, and were generally late migrants in areas where they settled (most accounts believe the Hakka were Northern

Chinese who migrated south to avoid northern conflicts during the tenth and twelfth centuries). As late arrivals, Hakka were often forced to settle on less fertile land, and thus were often poor but also self-reliant, with a tradition of scholarship and openness to innovation. As migrants, Hakka often came into conflict with other ethnic groups. As a result, military heroism was central to Hakka tradition, and paramilitary fraternal organizations were common among poor Hakka. As a marginal ethnic group, many

Hakka peasants were receptive to revolutionary movements, such as the nineteenth

225Zhu De, Zhu De zishu (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 2003), 1; or from Wales, 113. Zhu, “Memories of My Mother,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 116; or “Huiyi wo de muqin,” in Zhu De xuanji, 110. It should be noted again that Zhu De zishu is not an autobiography but an edited compilation of documents, interviews, and speeches given by Zhu De over his lifetime. Biographical information from these sources has been pasted together to create chapters covering Zhu De’s life and career from 1886 to 1976. This work also contains excerpts of interviews Zhu De gave to American journalists Agnes Smedley and Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales) in 1937 that have been translated into Chinese. Trying to separate the different original source materials becomes problematic because of the inconsistent use of footnotes and citations in the text. Where the original source is identified in the text of Zhu De zishu, I will note this in the citation of this work. 226 Mary S. Erbaugh, “The Secret History of the Hakkas: The Chinese Revolution as a Hakka Enterprise,” The China Quarterly, no. 132, (1992): 937, 948, 952-953, 967. The prevalence of Hakka among Red Army commanders and troops was also noted by American journalist Agnes Smedley. See Smedley, 23.

108 century Taiping Rebellion (led by Hong Xiuquan, who was a Hakka) and later the

Communist revolution. Zhu De himself was a member of the anti-Manchu Elder Brother

Society (Gelaohui) and used this network in his revolutionary activities prior to the 1911

Yunnan Uprising and into the 1920s. Not surprisingly then, many other CCP and Red

Army leaders besides Zhu De were Hakka, such as Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Zhang

Guotao, and Ye Ting.227

Youthful Experiences and Influences

At age six Zhu was sent to a family school established by a local landlord. He

attended this school for three years, but felt treated badly by the landlord who kept

demanding tuition money. According to Zhu, because of the oppression of the landlords

and the poverty of his family, the family decided to split up. Zhu was adopted by his

father’s elder brother and went to live in the village of Dawan. Luckily for Zhu, he was

treated as his uncle’s own child, whereas Zhu’s own father had treated him badly. His

uncle/adoptive father sent Zhu to a village school where he studied classical Chinese for

six or seven years. Zhu was the only one in his family to receive an education.228

While growing up, Zhu was greatly influenced by stories of the Taiping Rebellion

handed down by Hakka Taiping veterans. He admired their resistance to the Qing and

foreigners, their overthrow of landlord oppression, and redistribution of land to the

peasants. Zhu De related that common people were receptive to folk tales and

underground folk literature that portrayed the Taiping rebels as heroes, who saved the

poor and oppressed but were put down by the hated Qing and foreigners. The Taiping

seem to have had a long lasting influence on Zhu, since as an adult he also studied the

227 Erbaugh, 948-952, 953, 957. 228 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 1; or from Wales, 113.

109 Taiping Rebellion to learn from its mistakes when he set about creating the Red Army,

and even adopted Taiping army rules and tactics.229 The Taiping movement was noted for its religiously based ideology that served to reinforce the Taiping army’s cohesion, unity, and sense of purpose. The military indoctrination of the Taiping army focused on civic virtue and puritanical discipline. The strict regulations on governing soldiers’ behavior, found in the “Taiping Rules and Regulations” (Taiping tiaogui), bear a significant resemblance to the Red Army’s later “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the

Eight Points for Attention.”230 Taiping military effectiveness was enhanced by this strict

discipline that fostered a high level of cohesion and unity within Taiping armies and

allowed them to move with more agility and flexibility than their Qing opponents. The

Taiping were also noted for their use of women in combat units. The organizational

system of the Taiping army was based on the soldier-peasant model, where all Taiping

regime citizens were required to serve as soldiers and society was organized according to

the military command hierarchy. They were also noted for the extensive use of war

propaganda to generate hatred of the Qing regime. One of the prime factors for the

Taiping early success was a cohesive high-level command structure. At the operational

and tactical level in the early period of the rebellion, Taiping forces avoided positional

warfare and instead relied on guerrilla and mobile warfare to launch hit-and-run attacks

against Qing troops in order to wear them down, and then, when the opportunity

presented itself, to attack and destroy them.231 Many of these practices have certain

229 Smedley, 23-24, 29, 32. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 2; or from Wales, 113-114. 230 Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), 1:61-62, 2:139-141. 231 Maochun Yu, “The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution,” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 136- 137, 142-143. Chen-Ya Tien, Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1992), 90. Taiping commanders prepared extensive regulations governing the training and operations of

110 similarities to the operation of the Red Army and its tactical doctrine, especially the ideological indoctrination of soldiers, the avoidance of positional warfare, and the emphasis on mobile and guerrilla tactics.232

Besides the influence of the Taiping Rebellion, Zhu’s patriotism and sympathy was aroused by the Boxer Uprising in 1900. An anti-foreign and anti-Christian popular uprising in northern China, the Boxers garnered the patronage of the imperial court in

Beijing, which hoped to use the Boxers to expel foreigners from China and redirect popular hostility away from the Manchus and toward the Europeans. Zhu related that at that time there was increased fear of foreigners and contempt and hatred for the Qing government. Eight foreign nations invaded China to put down the uprising. The failure of the Boxers made a deep impression on Zhu.233

Early Educational Background

In his reminiscences of his childhood, Zhu De makes a point of detailing his early educational background down to the types of schools, the dates he attended them, and the

Taiping forces that can be found in their “The Elements of Military Tactics for Troop Operations” (Xing jun zong yao), in Michael, 2:415-439. 232 Another interesting similarity in tactical concepts can be seen in Zhu training his Red Army soldiers to use an inverted “V” formation in 1927, which bore a resemblance to the battle formations of the Taiping rebels designed to threaten an adversary’s flanks and rear. See the illustration from a Taiping tactical manual depicting a “V” like tactical formation in Joseph Needham and Robin D. S. Yates, Science and Civilization in China, vol. V, part 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 62. Zhu was not alone in his admiration for the Taiping for many Chinese Communists were interested in the lessons that could be derived from the Taiping revolution and held up the Taiping military’s rules and tactics as models to emulate. See Smedley, 29. An example of this was guidance issued by the central party leadership in May 1928 for the organization of Communist military forces. It directed various base areas to experiment with an organizational model based on the Taiping 3-5 system, which was considered by some CCP leaders as the best organization to accommodate guerrilla warfare. The 3-5 system was based on three squads of twelve men each, with three squads forming a platoon, five platoons forming a company, five companies forming a regiment, and five regiments forming a division of 4,500 soldiers. See Ristaino, 141. The Red Army ultimately did not, however, implement this organizational system and instead continued with a more ad hoc system using a mixture of unit organizations and designations, which would later be changed to conform more to a Western military system. 233 Smedley, 57-58, 65. For a brief summary of the Boxer Uprising, see Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 (London: Routledge, 2001), 121-122.

111 books he read.234 According to Zhu, he was chosen by his family to receive an education so he could eventually become an official and protect his family from soldiers and tax collectors. From the age of six, Zhu studied at a series of private village schools where he was taught the Chinese classical texts to prepare him for the state civil service examination system. But one of his teachers in the mid-to-late 1890s was also a progressive thinker who supported the reform movement of Kang Youwei, a Chinese intellectual who advocated major institutional changes in China, and he urged his students to study Western learning. In 1898, Zhu was first introduced to Western science and mathematics, and learned enough mathematics to keep accounts. During this period,

Zhu related how he began to admire Western science and felt that China required an industrial revolution.235

In 1905, Zhu sat for and passed the school entrance examinations at the district

(xianshi) and prefectural (fushi) levels but did not take the final qualifying exam

(yuanshi) to obtain the initial shengyuan degree that would have qualified him to take the actual civil service examination. Circumstances, however, would thwart any hopes Zhu or his family might have had about pursuing an official career through the examination system, for the Qing government abolished the civil service examination system in

1905.236 It is possible that Zhu himself had already become disillusioned with the examination system. Looking back from 1937, Zhu recalled the exams with a certain amount of contempt. As part of the old system, the exams had not been reformed and were still based on topics from the classics. Thus for Zhu, the exams and the traditional

234 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 15-39. 235 Smedley, 36, 46, 49-50. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 1-2; or from Wales, 113.

112 knowledge they embodied seemed to be irrelevant to the needs of modern China at that

time. Zhu even expressed some disdain for the classic military strategist, Sun Zi. As he

noted in a sarcastic tone, “One of the essays was a theme taken from a military treatise by

old Sun Tze, from before the time of Christ.”237 Despite the contempt he expressed at

this time, he may have in fact found some use for these old texts. As described in a later

chapter, Zhu De relied on Sun Zi when he was fighting a guerrilla war in southern

Yunnan in 1913-1915.238

For many young men like Zhu, who had pursued a classical education to attain

social status and possibly enter the civil service, a new avenue of advancement had been

opened with the Qing establishment of a nation-wide modern school system in 1904.

Closely modeled on the Japanese school system, the new Chinese educational system consisted of nine years of primary education, five years of middle education, and six to seven years of higher education. The system also included normal and vocational education. Japan assisted China in these reforms by training Chinese teachers in Japan

and by sending Japanese teachers and educational advisors to China. Wanting to take

advantage of the new Qing government reforms in education, in 1906 Zhu traveled to

Shunqing to attend modern schools being set up by the government following the

Japanese model. For six months he studied in a higher elementary school and then six

more months in a middle school. Zhu found that many of the teachers at these schools

236 Zhu De nianpu, 11. For information on the Qing dynasty examination system see Ichisada Miyazaki, China’s Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 18, 33. 237 Zhu, “Memories of My Mother,” (April 5, 1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 118; or “Huiyi wo de muqin,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 112. Smedley, 68. 238 See Zhu’s experience in counterinsurgency described in Guo Junning, Zhu De yu Fan Shisheng (Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 2001), 105.

113 were reformers and some were even secret members of the revolutionary Tongmenghui.

In these schools, Zhu learned rudimentary physics, chemistry, and Japanese language.239

In 1907, Zhu decided to enter the physical education department at a new

government higher normal college in Chengdu, where he would study athletics, intending

to pursue a teaching career. At the normal college he learned modern subjects, such as

mathematics, geography, and military drill. Zhu admired the teachers who had studied in

Japan and espoused revolutionary ideas. Some teachers even cut their queues, the

officially mandated hairstyle for men denoting submission to the Qing Dynasty (though

they hid this rebellion publically by wearing false queues).240 The pursuit of a physical

education degree at a modern school reflected both Zhu’s desire for a modern education

as well as his sense of nationalism. By the first decade of the twentieth century, social

Darwinian thought was being popularized in China and ideas linking the cultivation of

the body and physical fitness with the health of the nation were being introduced.

Reformers, such as Liang Qichao, advocated the need for a new physical culture and

martial spirit in China to change what Liang saw as the legacy of a weak Chinese body

that was at the root of a lack of progress and public morality. Only through physical

competition, Liang believed, could an individual or nation survive, which could only be

done by staying physically strong and which, in turn would lead to moral and intellectual

strength. For China to keep up with this Darwinian competition and protect itself from

other aggressive nations, it would need to develop a physically fit population through

239 Smedley, 65-66, 67, 68-69. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 1; or from Wales, 113. For information on late Qing educational reforms and the establishment of a modern school system based on the Japanese model, see Hiroshi Abe, “Borrowing from Japan: China’s First Modern Educational System,” in China’s Education and the Industrialized World: Studies in Cultural Transfer, eds. Ruth Hayhoe and Marianne Bastid (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 61-63, 65-67. 240 Smedley, 68-69, 70-71, 76. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 1; or from Wales, 113. Zhu, “Memories of My Mother,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 118; or “Huiyi wo de muqin,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 112-113.

114 organized Western-style sports and physical education. Gymnastics and calisthenics

became part of the Chinese national school curriculum during the first decade of the

twentieth century. The particular forms of physical training and exercises adopted by the

Chinese educational system were borrowed from Japan and were meant to inculcate

physical discipline and constant mental awareness in the individual.241 Given Zhu’s background in physical education and its connection in his mind to martial and nationalistic virtues, one gains a better understanding of why Zhu issued directives emphasizing the development of high standards of physical fitness in the early Red

Army. In these directives, Zhu specified a detailed exercise regime for all Red Army units that included gymnastics and calisthenics.

After one year of study at the physical education school, Zhu returned with some

friends to his hometown of Yilong in 1908 to establish a modern higher elementary

school, where Zhu would teach physical education. Zhu and his friends were motivated

by new ideas of science and democracy and wanted to improve their hometown.

However, their efforts were opposed by the local gentry. Frustrated in his efforts to modernize education in his hometown, Zhu left Sichuan in 1909 and journeyed to

Yunnan where he eventually entered the Yunnan Military Academy in Yunnanfu

(modern Kunming).242

241 Andrew Morris, “”To Make the Four Hundred Million Move”: The Late Qing Dynasty Origins of Modern Chinese Sport and Physical Culture,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, no. 4 (October 2000): 877-878, 881-882, 889-890. The creation of a new Chinese physical culture was also linked to a militarization of Chinese society and the cultivation of a martial spirit within the population. Two future military theorists of the Republican period, Cai E and Jiang Baili, both wrote articles in the first decade of the twentieth century linking the creation of a militarized citizen with the promotion of physical fitness. See Morris, 881-882. 242 Smedley, 68-69, 70-71, 76. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 1; or from Wales, 113. Zhu, “Memories of My Mother,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 118; or “Huiyi wo de muqin,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 112-113.

115 Motivation to Seek A Military Career

In seeking to enter the Yunnan Military Academy and become an officer in the

Qing military, Zhu De was following a common alternative career path chosen by many young educated men who could no longer gain social mobility through the now abolished examination system and who sought access to a modern Westernized education. This career path had become an attractive alternative not only because of nationalist sentiment but also because of deliberate government policy. Beginning in 1901, one important goal of the Qing military reform movement was the establishment of a professional officer corps trained in Western military science and technology. Qing military reformers realized that a new type of officer was needed which the traditional system could not provide. Therefore Qing military reformers set up a new military school system that changed the priorities of the traditional Chinese one. The emphasis for military officers became intelligence and literacy over physical skills. The Qing reformers realized that the best candidates for the new military schools would come from the educated classes, whose sons traditionally pursued advancement through the civil service exam system.

Qing military reformers deliberately established a policy of recruiting the better-educated social elite as students for the new military schools. In order to make military careers attractive to the elites, the Qing government set up material and status incentives to attract candidates to the provincial New Armies. The officers of the New Army were better paid, given higher official rank compared to civilian officials, and increased prestige upon graduation from the new military schools. The higher educational criteria

116 required to enter the schools and a Western course of study taught at schools also helped

raise the prestige of new officers closer to that of the traditional civilian literati.243

The motivation of the recruits was also important in raising the prestige of the

military. Increasing nationalism and nationalist feelings and a general consensus on the

need for a strong military helped determine the decision of many recruits to pursue a

military career over a civilian post. The 1905 abolition of the civil service exam system

also influenced educated young men to seek a military education, especially when they

were forced to consider alternatives for social advancement. A military career now was

an attractive alternative. There were two routes open to potential officer candidates: one

could go through the military school system or graduate from a lower-level military

school that had shorter military training programs but which still qualified the graduate to

get a commission in the provincial New Armies. Compared to the civilian school system,

the military path was a relatively fast and less expensive way to attain a prestigious

position. Another route for recruits to enter the officer corps was first enlisting as a

common soldier, and then working for a promotion and a chance to enter a military

school.244 Thus, when he was first rejected by the Yunnan Military Academy, Zhu De chose to serve a couple of months as an enlisted soldier in a Sichuan regiment stationed in Yunnanfu, and was then eventually promoted to enter the military academy.245

Many of the influences leading other educated young men into the military were

evident in Zhu’s case. After entering the higher normal college in Chengdu in 1907, Zhu

243 Edmund S. K. Fung, “Military Subversion in the Chinese Revolution of 1911” Modern Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (1975): 104-105. Anita M. O’Brien, “Military Academies in China, 1885-1915,” in Perspectives on a Changing China, ed. Joshua A. Fogel and William T. Rowe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 169-171. Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 48-51. 244 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 51-53. Fung, 106-108. O’Brien, 163. 245 For Zhu De’s experience as an enlisted soldier see Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 41 and Smedley, 84.

117 had thought about transferring to the new military academy that had been established in the city to train officers for the New Army along with a branch to train NCOs. But he hesitated because of family opposition to his becoming a soldier. Nonetheless, as Zhu recalled, he was attracted to the “new militarism” and admired the proud uniformed army officers walking the streets of Chengdu, who saw themselves and the normal school students as having a role in creating a new China. At this time, Zhu also became more interested in national developments, probably influenced by his studies under reformist teachers, some of whom were either constitutional monarchists or republicans, or even secret members of the Tongmenghui. Zhu later related that at that time he became more contemptuous of the Manchu officials in Chengdu and increasingly angry at the landlord gentry who opposed progress and oppressed peasants with taxes.246 The conflict he and his friends had with the local gentry over the new school they tried to establish in Yilong in 1908 also made him see the inability of China to transform itself.247 According to

Zhu, it was at this point that he determined to become a soldier in order to save the nation from perishing.

According to Zhu, his decision to embark on a military career was also motivated by a strong sense of nationalism. Zhu cited his opposition to the Manchu rulers and foreign powers, the calls for democracy, and the perceived danger of the French in

Indochina and Russian control over the Chinese Eastern Railroad as factors that influenced his decision. From his vantage point in southwest China, a particular concern was the French Yunnan-Vietnam railroad that was being pushed into Yunnan in 1909.

This caused a surge in nationalist feelings throughout China because it was feared that

246 Smedley, 72-74.

118 this rail link would be a conduit for the extension of French control over southwestern

China.248

Thus, Zhu recalled, in 1909 he was determined to go to Yunnan and enter the

Yunnan Military Academy. He deliberately kept this a secret from his family, for if they

knew his plans they would have tried to stop him. Zhu believed that China needed to develop in a new direction in order to save itself and that a national solution was the only

option. To be part of the solution, Zhu decided to pursue a military career. According to

Zhu, he chose to go to Yunnan because the province had been designated by the Qing

government as an important national defense region on China’s southern border that needed to be controlled, and therefore a New Army unit was being established there.

Therefore, Zhu went with some companions to the provincial capital of Yunnanfu

(modern Kunming) where a New Army mixed brigade was being organized and was recruiting soldiers. Another major incentive for Zhu to go to Yunnan was that there already was a large flow of Sichuanese migrating there to take up work as businessmen, officials, soldiers, and workers. (Zhu estimated that in 1909, 30 to 40 percent of

Yunnan’s population was from Sichuan.) This influx of Sichuanese into Yunnan was also seen in the New Army unit being formed there, and many of the unit’s personnel were drawn from Sichuan. One example of this was the dispatch of Chen E’ran/Er’an, commander of the Sichuan military preparatory school for junior officers, and some of

247 Zhu, “Memories of My Mother,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 118-119; or “Huiyi wo de muqin,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 112-113. 248 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 382- 383; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 378. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 38-39, 40.

119 his men to Yunnan.249 Thus Zhu could expect to find welcoming company among his fellow provincials in the Yunnan capital.

While Zhu’s own account of his move to Yunnan and his entry into the military academy there emphasizes mainly nationalist motivations, the account of one of his classmates at the Academy, Yang Ruxuan, puts this story into a somewhat different light.

According to Yang, Zhu told him that because of his family’s poverty, Zhu had to leave home at 15 to seek his livelihood. Zhu first went to Chengdu and then to Chongqing but nothing seemed to work out for him. Finally, Zhu’s paternal uncle got him a job as a secretary and accountant for a sedan chair company in Chongqing. This sedan chair company had many government officials as customers. Zhu worked one year at this company. When the county magistrate in Chengdu was transferred to Yunnan and requested several sedan chairs and bearers to transport him there, Zhu accompanied the party to keep track of the food expenditures. In Yunnanfu, Zhu stayed at a guesthouse run by a fellow Sichuanese, where he worked as an accountant. In 1909, Zhu heard that the Yunnan Military Academy was enrolling students, and he wanted to take the entrance exam. His landlord encouraged Zhu to take the exam and offered him financial support.250 This version does not necessarily challenge Zhu’s own account of his motivations in seeking a military career, but it does suggest that his decision to embark on this career was more serendipitous than the version he told to Agnes Smedley or in his

249 Ibid., 382-383 or Ibid., 377-378. Ibid., 38-39, 40. 250 Yang, 1-2. Yang Ruxuan was a friend and classmate of Zhu De’s at the Yunnan Military Academy. He later served under Zhu in the Yunnan Army and stayed in contact with Zhu until 1927. Yang continued to serve as an officer in the GMD army and even fought against Zhu during the campaign against Jinggangshan. These are transcripts of a set of oral interviews conducted with Yang in 1977 and 1978 in Yunnan.

120 own biographical works.251 Nonetheless, it also highlights the extent to which entering

the military was for Zhu, as for many educated young men in his time, as much a

pragmatic consideration as it was an ideological commitment.

Late Qing Military Education and the New Armies 1909 – 1911

The Yunnan Army that Zhu De entered in 1909 was the product of a long period

of Chinese military modernization that stretched back to the mid-nineteenth century. In

1895, after China was defeated by Japan’s Westernized army in the Sino-Japanese War,

the Qing court recognized the need for a new direction in military reform. Up to this

point, military reforms had mostly focused on providing modern Western arms to

existing Chinese forces. In 1895 the first Chinese units were formed based on Western

models, and followed the German organization system using German advisers.252 The defeat of the Boxers in 1900 spurred more military reorganization, such as the creation of new forces like Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang Army, which would become known as the “New

Armies” (xinjun). In 1901, the Qing court began planning for the establishment of

Western-style armies in every province and the reorganization and disbandment of older military forces, like the Manchu Banner forces and the Chinese-manned Army of the

Green Standard (the original military forces created early in the dynasty), and the yongying (regional forces created to combat rebellions in the mid-nineteenth century).

The best troops from the older forces were reorganized into Western-style provincial

251 It should be noted that Zhu’s personal accounts of his life prior to 1927 have been shaped to fit an accepted Communist revolutionary narrative on the historical development of the Chinese revolution; described as “ideological memories” by Arif Dirlik. Zhu’s personal accounts of this period are still useful, as long as they are used with caution, for they provide insight into the experiences and careers of professional military officers who supported the Revolution of 1911 and subsequently served in various provincial armies during the early Republic. See Arif Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 4. 252 Wang Jianhua, “Military Reforms, 1895-1908,” Chinese Studies in History 28, no. 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1995): 68-71. McCord, The Power of the Gun, 31-33. O’Brien, 158-159, 160.

121 standing armies (changbeijun), the second best into reserve or constabulary forces, and

the worst were disbanded. The provincial standing armies, augmented with new recruits,

became the basis for the provincial New Armies. In 1906, the Commission for Army

Reorganization set a goal to create thirty-six new Western-style divisions within ten

years. By 1911, seventeen New Army divisions and twenty independent brigades had

been created.253

Qing reformers had also committed to the development of a Western-trained

officer corps. The Qing had abolished the traditional military exam system in 1901 and

issued instructions for the establishment of military academies in each province. Chinese

students were also sent abroad, especially to Japan, for military education. By the turn of

the century, Japan had come to supplant Germany as the primary influence on the

modernization of Chinese military forces and military education. The 1904 Commission

for Army Reorganization plan laid out a national system of military education that was

based on the Japanese model, with military primary schools set up in each province,

secondary schools in four major cities, and a staff college in Beijing. By 1911, large

parts of this system were in place. 254 The curriculum at these new schools also followed the Japanese military education system, using Chinese translations of Japanese textbooks and military manuals for instruction and training.255 The Yunnan Army and its military

academy were products of this reform effort.

253 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 34. 254 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 35. O’Brien, 159-162. Wang, 76-78. 255 Wang, 78.

122 Late Qing Military Education

Creation of Chinese Military Academies

In 1904, the Commission for Army Reorganization set up a hierarchy of military

schools to create a professionally trained officer corps for the lujun. The military school

system consisted of numerous basic military schools, an officers’ school, a general staff

college, specialist schools for individual service branches, and schools and instruction

battalions to train NCOs. To give modern training to current officers, military instruction

programs (jiang wu tang) would be established at provincial capitals. This system was

similar to the Japanese army education plan, except in China it was more decentralized

and mostly under provincial control. Chinese cadets began their military education in

provincial schools run by local officials. Upon graduation, the cadets would receive

advanced training at regional intermediate schools, then complete their training in Beijing

at the officer school and staff college. The major problem with the new military

education system was that the schools were provincial institutions, established by

governors-general or governors, with little uniformity in the quality of teaching staff or

curricula. This was symptomatic of China’s continuing problem with decentralized

control over the military.256

The military primary schools in the provinces would take graduates of civilian

primary schools for a three-year course of study. The curriculum at the military primary

schools consisted of a three year course of instruction. Most schools focused on general

education courses and paid less attention to military subjects. Classes included Chinese

classics, languages, history, geography, physics, chemistry, and mathematics, while

256 Ralph L. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 180-182, 184.

123 military training courses consisted of outdoor exercises, target practice, and rifle drill.

Once the cadet graduated he could be selected to proceed to one of four military middle schools located in Zhili, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi, where he would undertake a two- year course of study and receive practical training in the ranks. The next higher level of training would occur in Beijing at an officer’s course of one and a half years, followed by two years at the staff college to complete the military education for the best officers. The graduates of the military primary schools who did not go on to higher levels were assigned to be platoon or company commanders. The main function of the military primary schools, then, was to produce a minimally educated lower-level officer corps. In contrast, those officers designated for higher education would come under the control of the central government. By 1909, most provinces had a military primary school. The next step for the Qing government was to set up the four middle schools by the fall of

1909, and then establish the officers academy in Beijing by 1911.257

Yunnan Military Academy Background

When Zhu De arrived in Yunnanfu in 1909, the nationalist movement in Yunnan was largely limited to the educated elite made up of upper degree holders, merchants, returned students from Japan, and students in modern schools, most of whom were in the provincial capital. Basic to this nationalism was a pro-military ethic that extolled military values such as solidarity, courage, and self sacrifice. The Yunnan nationalists viewed militarism as a way to save China, and Yunnan, from foreign domination. They advocated making military skills a part of education, introducing universal conscription, and developing a “battlefield spirit” among the populace. Anti-Manchu feelings were also part of this nationalist ethos. Chinese military students returning to Yunnan from

257 O’Brien, 162-164. 124 Japan had a sense of their own mission as future saviors of China. They in turn instilled

these ideals into their students at the new Yunnan Military Academy and their

subordinates in the Yunnan army.258

The recruits undergoing officer training in Yunnan from 1909 to 1911 entered a

school that differed from other Chinese military primary schools in that it deemphasized

general education courses and favored military preparation and physical fitness.259

Instructors were mostly from Yunnan along with some non-Yunnanese graduates of the

Japanese Shikan Gakko. The faculty of the Yunnan Military Academy had the largest concentration of Shikan Gakko graduates in China (a total of thirty-three), along with three from the Japanese Academy of Surveying. Although originally designated as a military instruction program and not a formal military school, Yunnan provincial officials converted it into a regular military college without the authorization of Beijing. The original military instruction program had been divided into three classes: Class A for existing active-duty officers of the rank of major or below seconded from the 19th

Division; Class B for provincial defense force officers in Yunnan; and Class C

(containing the largest number of students) for aspiring officers recruited from civilian middle and higher schools and from among those who had failed the official examinations. In addition, a Supplementary Class was added for candidates drawn from the graduates of the better teachers’ schools. In 1910, one hundred Class C students were selected for a further eighteen months of specialized training in topography, armaments, military law, first aid, and cavalry skills. The course of study was modeled on Japanese schools that the instructors had attended, and used Japanese texts for classes. Class

258 Donald S. Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905-25 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980), 40, 43, 51. Fung, 116.

125 subjects included Chinese literature, ethics, mechanical drawing, mathematics,

geography, history, infantry drill, target shooting, battle discipline, practice teaching, and

some instruction in French or English. Also similar to the Japanese system, discipline

was very strict, with arms drill and physical training alternating with lessons in military

theory and practice.260 Academy Commandant Li Genyuan intended to instill in the

cadets the ability to “endure hardship, in which resides the basis of reform.”261 The

course of study at the Yunnan Academy gained a high reputation amongst other Chinese

military schools. In his history of the Yunnan Army, Donald Sutton has credited the

Yunnan Academy’s high standards for creating one of the best provincial officer corps in

the early Republic.262

Zhu De at the Yunnan Military Academy 1909-1911

In 1909, the entering class of cadets originated from three different groups. The

class was divided into first (jia), second (yi), third (bing) classes. The first (jia) class students were selected from officers in the 19th Division. The second class (yi) students

were selected from officers serving in the Qing provincial troops (xunfangying). The third class (bing) students were admitted through examination, which was how Zhu De initially sought admission.263 In addition, candidates for the school either had to be a native of Yunnan or sponsored by a Yunnan resident. Thus, when Zhu took the entrance

examination he was rejected because he was not from Yunnan. Zhu later related that he

then sought another way to enter the Academy through the sponsorship of a group of

Sichuan army officers stationed in Yunnan. He therefore enlisted as a private in the

259 O’Brien, 172. 260 Sutton, 62-65. 261 Cited in Sutton, 65. 262 Sutton, 65-66.

126 Sichuan regiment, whose commander agreed to help Zhu enter the Academy. Zhu at this

time began using the name Zhu De and registered as a Yunnan native. He served as an

enlisted soldier for one to two months, completed basic training, and was promoted to

company clerk. Then the company commander recommended Zhu for officer training at

the Academy, where Zhu joined five hundred other cadets.264 Zhu’s classmate there,

Yang Ruxuan, related a somewhat different story about how Zhu De entered the

Academy. As noted previously, Yang reported that the Sichuanese landlord of the

guesthouse where Zhu found work as an accountant provided Zhu with financial support

to help him take the Academy’s entrance exam. In order to get around the provincial

residency requirement, Zhu claimed that his grandfather was actually from Yunnan but

had served as an official in Sichuan, which accounted for Zhu De’s Sichuan accent. The

officials believed Zhu and allowed him to take the exam. He then passed the exam and

entered the Academy.265 This account makes no mention of Zhu’s short enlistment as a

private in the Yunnan Army prior to entering the Academy. Both stories, however, show

the importance of provincial connections in the formation of the Yunnan Army, not only

in the rule for provincial exclusivity but in the way, ironically, that Zhu’s connections

with other Sichuanese helped him to get around this rule.

In his own reminiscences, Zhu De stated that the Yunnan Military Academy’s regulations were the same as the Japanese officers’ schools, with the cadet’s daily life as hard as the rank-and-file soldiers. Food and drill were just like the Japanese system’s, with the only difference being in the type of classes. Zhu remembers that the control over the cadets was very strict and immersed them into a new military life. According to

263 Yang, 10-11. 264 Smedley, 83-85. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 41.

127 the original Military Academy regulations, upon entering the school, the first year would

be spent studying basic subjects, called general studies. Every day, the cadets would

have six hours of classes, then two hours of exercise and drill. The Academy emphasized shooting, singing military songs, and open country exercises, all part of modern military training. After one year of general subjects, the students would then take a year and a

half of specialized courses in military subjects, such as tactics, weaponry, building

entrenchments, topography, communications and transportation, military organization,

and hygiene. At the Academy during this period, Zhu De found that revolutionary

thinking and agitation colored all the courses, whether general studies or military

subjects. The progressive students seem to have banded together, while the rest of the

students did not oppose them. In his second year starting in 1910, he concentrated on

military subjects. His class studied to be infantry officers and did this until their graduation in 1911. Zhu seemed to be especially proud that the Yunnan Academy was like a foreign school and that cadets cut off their Manchu-mandated queues as a sign of protest against the Qing regime. Zhu believed that his school was the only one to allow this. In an interview in 1937, Zhu looked back fondly at his two years at the Yunnan

Military Academy and thought that it was harder than the Red Army’s War Resistance

University (Kangda) at that time.266

Yang Ruxuan observed that Zhu studied very conscientiously and was classified

as superior not only in the core subjects but also in technical skills. In 1910, eighty

students of outstanding achievement were selected from the third class to form a special

class that would graduate before the others. Zhu De was selected for this class, studying

265 Yang, 1-2. 266 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 41, 44.

128 military subjects for only eight months instead of the normal year and a half. Frequently,

Zhu along with Zhu Pei De, another outstanding cadet, would be chosen by the Academy supervisor to command the cadets when dignitaries visited. The two of them together were known as the “two Zhu model.”267

Cai E: Instructor and Mentor to Zhu De

While at the Yunnan Military Academy, Zhu De was befriended by one of his

instructors, Cai E, who played a major role in Zhu’s early life and military career, and

became Zhu’s friend and mentor. Even looking back from 1937 or from 1961, Zhu still

spoke of him with admiration and identified him as one of modern China’s greatest

military theorists. While direct evidence of the influence of Cai E’s military thought on

Zhu De’s later career may be difficult to show, it is clear that in his early life Zhu De

tried to emulate and model himself after his early mentor. This suggests that this

influence probably had a lasting impact on Zhu’s military career.

Cai E (December 18, 1882 - November 8, 1916) was originally from Hunan,

where he received a classical education in preparation for the civil service examinations.

In 1895 he passed the exams for a shengyuan (district-level) degree, but failed the exams

for the juren (provincial-level) degree two years later. Cai was a student of reformer

Liang Qichao and followed Liang to Japan in 1899 after the failure of the One Hundred

Days’ Reform. There Cai studied under Liang at the Great Harmony Secondary School

set up by Liang in Tokyo. In 1900, Cai returned to China to help organize an aborted

uprising in Hankou. Cai escaped, returned to Japan and enrolled in the Seijo Military

Preparatory School, shifting to military studies because of his concern over national

power during this period of unrest in China. At this time, two ideas dominated Cai’s

267 Yang, 2-3, 10-11. 129 thought: one was a sense of China’s backwardness and weakness, the other was the need for China to develop national power. Japan was Cai’s model to change China into a military power. In a 1902 article, “Jun guo min bian” (National Militarism or A Militant

Citizenry), Cai called for the need to develop a martial spirit in China.268

In 1904 after graduating from the Japanese Shikan Gakko (military academy), Cai returned to China and spent the years from 1904 to 1910 directing military activities and schools, mostly in Guangxi. In 1910, facing increased hostility from Guangxi natives who saw him as an outsider, Cai left his post to accept an appointment from the governor-general of Yunnan, Li Jingxi, to be commander of the 37th Brigade in the New

Army division being formed at that time and an instructor at the Yunnan Military

Academy. Cai arrived in Yunnan in the spring of 1911. On his arrival, Cai was ordered to prepare a compilation of inspiring and instructive maxims for the command of military forces derived from the works of Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi, 19th century Qing officials who successfully put down the Taiping Rebellion. This was the Zeng Hu zhibing yulu

(Quotations of Zeng (Guofan) and Hu (Linyi) Regarding the Administration of the

Armed Forces) completed by Cai in 1911. Cai also included his own commentaries on the various quotations from Zeng and Hu.269

While teaching at the Yunnan Military Academy, Cai became one of Zhu De’s instructors. Zhu admired Cai’s intellect and his brilliant abilities in organization and administration. Often visiting Cai E in his office, Zhu was allowed to borrow books and read the works of Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei, and Montesquieu. He also read a biography of George Washington, whom Zhu greatly admired, and other books on the

268 “Ts’ai O,” in Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, eds. Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 3:286-287. Tien, 130.

130 reform movements in Russia and Meiji Japan. Cai also secretly received copies of

republican newspapers and periodicals, which he let Zhu read. In his later reminiscences

of Cai E to Agnes Smedley, Zhu conveyed to Smedley the impression that he “adored the

man, worshipping his brilliant mind and his capacity for work. Tsai [Cai] seemed to

represent all that he wished to be but was not and never could be.”270

Looking back from 1937, Zhu stated that Cai E, noted for his command of tactics,

“had had considerable influence over me.” When Zhu listed the people he most

admired, he considered Cai E as the most outstanding specialist in modern military

science in China.271 In Zhu De’s view, even though Cai E was not a member of the

Tongmenghui, he was still a true patriot who believed in democratic ideals. Indeed, Cai

maintained secret contacts with the Tongmenghui and did much to protect and cover up

revolutionary activities at the Academy, when the Qing government was actively trying

to suppress it.272 Finally on October 30, 1911, following the outbreak of the 1911

Revolution in central China, Cai E would lead his 37th Brigade in revolt against the Qing

authorities in Yunnan. Earlier in 1911, Zhu had graduated from the Academy and had

been assigned to the 37th Brigade’s 74th regiment as a platoon commander.

Late Qing New Armies

One of the biggest differences between the older military forces of the Qing and

the New Armies was the changing social composition of the officers and enlisted men.

The officer corps was better educated, with many graduates from the new military schools, and there were more literate enlisted personnel. Many officer candidates were

269 Boorman and Howard, 3:287-288. Tien, 131. 270 Smedley, 84-86. 271 Zhu, Zhu de zishu, 3, 8; or from Wales, 114-115, 121.

131 even drawn from the lower gentry. One of the unforeseen consequences of elite

recruitment, and thus the change in the social background of the troops in the provincial

New Armies, was to facilitate their participation in radical elite politics, leading to New

Army support for the 1911 Revolution. The politicization of the New Army resulted from having educated young men entering the army who shared the same nationalistic beliefs and political activism of the wider civilian elite. This was first manifested in the new schools, where politicization of many of the cadets preceded their entrance into these

military schools. Many of them were motivated to take up a military career by their

nationalist beliefs, with Zhu De being a primary example. The students who became

especially politicized were those sent to Japan. Chinese military students in Japan became radicalized by seeing a Qing government unable to defend China from imperialist aggression. These military students would play an important role in the politicization of

the New Army, because many of them were assigned to important posts in the Chinese

military on their return, and continued their political and revolutionary activism in secret.

Many returned students from Japan, such as Cai E, were assigned as instructors to the

new military academies, and proceeded to spread their new political ideas amongst the

students who were already receptive to nationalistic and revolutionary ideas. Thus, the

unintended consequence of Qing military reform was the politicization of the New Army

and receptivity to revolutionary thought that would be a major factor in the overthrow of

the Qing regime.273

The general characteristics of recruitment into the New Army were reflected in

the composition of the recruits in the first of the new divisions established in Yunnan. It

272 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 384; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu de xuanji, 379.

132 was designated as the 19th Division and activated in 1909. Most of its enlisted personnel

were recruited in 1908-1909 from higher quality peasant volunteers, who were attracted

by the new prestige of a military career and the higher pay. Yunnan followed the common pattern of recruiting peasants to fill the enlisted ranks and the literati for officers.274 For the most part, Zhu De fit the profile of a typical officer candidate. Even

though Zhu was not from the lower gentry, for he had not received the shengyuan degree,

his original aspiration to join the lower gentry through extensive education and passing

the civil service examinations had given him almost a similar background. Like most

officer recruits, Zhu was also already politicized from his earlier modern education when

he decided to pursue a military career.

Analyzing in some detail how the New Army of the late Qing was organized, the

military theory and doctrine it developed, and how it was trained will provide historical

context to better assess Zhu De’s initial military education and training. In looking at the

late Qing military from the bottom up, one needs to look at not just the institutional,

political, and educational aspects, which already have been covered by several good

studies in English, but also the operational and tactical thought that has not been as well

studied. The Qing experience in these areas takes on particular importance because so

much of it was carried over into the early Republican era and therefore had a lasting

impact. This was also a time of rapid military development in the West. Aware of these

developments, Qing military reformers sought to follow operational and tactical concepts

in line with Western and European military thought of this period in their organization of

273 Fung, 108-109, 110-111, 116. McCord, The Power of the Gun, 45, 46-47, 56-58. 274 Sutton, 66, 68-69.

133 the New Armies. As a corollary, Zhu De was also exposed not only to Chinese but also to contemporary Western military theory and organization during his time as a cadet.

1904 Creation of the New Armies

The Yunnan Army that Zhu entered in 1909 owed its establishment to the 1904

Commission for Army Reorganization plan. This reorganization had its roots in the modernized forces created by Yuan Shikai and other early reformers in the late 1890s. In its earliest experiments in the development of modern forces in the late 1890s, such as the army controlled by Yuan Shikai, the Qing government favored following German army organization, training, and tactics. After 1901, the Qing government began to favor

Japanese concepts and advisers. This did not mean a dramatic change, though, since the

Japanese military was heavily influenced by the German military system.275 This organizational scheme, based on German-Japanese models, was what was adopted for all

New Army units in the 1904 Commission for Army Reorganization report, probably because Yuan Shikai dominated the commission, and its reforms followed Yuan’s efforts in Zhili.276

The 1904 plan not only established a new military school system, as noted above, but also called for the creation of a modern army, the lujun (literally “land army,” the official name given to new modern forces, more popularly known as the New Army or xinjun), across the nation. The plan’s recommendations were influenced by the Japanese military and the study of other foreign militaries, and displayed a better grasp than

275 Wang, 77. Meirion and Susie Harries, Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army (New York: Random House, 1991), 48-49. In 1885, Major Jacob Meckel of the German Army arrived at the Japanese Army Staff College to take up his post as lecturer and to be an adviser to the Japanese Army General Staff. Meckel had a great influence on Japanese army reform, and the Japanese army adopted the German army’s organization, mobilization system, logistics, and tactical doctrine. 276 Powell, 59, 131, 167. Tien, 106.

134 previous plans of the fundamentals of Western military concepts. The plan, however, was a compromise that preserved the balance of power between the central government and provinces. The new military forces would be established by individual provinces that would be responsible for recruiting, training, and financing these new armies.

Attempting to address the past weaknesses of the Chinese military, especially the poor officer education and corruption, the plan set out requirements for the training and education of a modernized officer corps, where academy-trained officers would receive preference for appointments and increased officer pay. It also laid out regulations for getting higher quality enlisted personnel through conscription, though this was never implemented. In addition, the plan proposed increased incentives for youths seeking a military career by providing economic security, along with promotion and rewards for meritorious service. It also set out to standardize equipment within the military. The lack of such standardization had been a recurring problem.277

The 1904 plan also laid out classes of troops for the lujun that followed European models. The lujun was divided into a standing army of regular forces (changbeijun), first-class reserves (xubeijun), and second-class reserves (houbeijun). Lujun organization during peacetime was based, as seen in Figure 1, on an army corps of two divisions, with each division having two infantry brigades, one regiment of cavalry, one regiment of artillery, one battalion of engineers, and one transport battalion. Each infantry brigade consisted of two regiments, each regiment contained three battalions, each battalion had four companies, and each company had three platoons, while each platoon had three squads. In wartime, several corps would be organized into an army.278

277 Powell, 172-173, 174-177. 278 Powell, 178-179. Tien, 106-107.

135

In essence, then, the lujun divisional system followed the pre-1914 German and

French “square” division model, where four infantry regiments form a “square” division, and the regiments were paired to form two brigades. The infantry regiments were composed of three battalions, and there were twelve battalions in total for the division.279

(Note that the terms for units within the lujun differed somewhat from the terms used

279 John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 9-10.

136 during the Republic; see Table 1 for a comparison of unit terminology between the

periods.) At full strength, a division would total 12,512 personnel, while a corps would

total 25,355 men, and include 108 artillery pieces. Divisional personnel were broken

down into 748 officers and clerks, 10,436 combat soldiers, and 1,328 non-combat

workers.280 In contrast to a division, a mixed brigade would have two infantry regiments,

a cavalry and an artillery battalion, and one engineer and one transport company.281 This

army organizational system would have been the first one that Zhu De would have to

have studied.

Table 1 - Comparative Military Unit Terminology: lujun/xinjun, Republican, Western282 Lujun/xinjun Republican Western Dajun - Army Jun Jun Corps Zhen Shi Division Xie Lu Brigade Biao Tuan Regiment Ying Ying Battalion/Cavalry Squadron Dui Lian Company/Battery/Troop Pai Pai Platoon Peng Ban Squad Huncheng Xie Huncheng Lu Mixed Brigade

Most provincial New Armies followed this organization with some exceptions

(see for instance the organizational differences of the Yunnan Army’s 19th Division described below). This organizational system for the most part was followed into the early Republican period, except for the change in unit terminology. The system was not really altered until the 1920s, when the Guomindang’s National Revolutionary Army and

280 Powell, 178-179. Tien, 106-107. At least on paper, the approximate number of soldiers for units below division would be: infantry brigade 3,024 soldiers, regiment 1,512, battalion 504, company 126, platoon 42, and a squad 14 (4 first class privates, 8 second class privates, 1 leader, 1 vice leader). 281 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 317.

137 the Beiyang warlord armies adopted the “three, three” organization system, whereby a

corps (jun) consisted of three divisions (shi), a division consisted of three regiments

(tuan), and so forth.283

Further regulations issued in 1905 planned for the lujun to reach an eventual

strength of thirty-six divisions by 1922. Establishment of the New Army division in

Yunnan stemmed from a 1907 memorial that reaffirmed the goal to create thirty-six lujun

divisions and outlined their distribution by province. This distribution depended on

strategic factors, the wealth of the area, and the degree of internal order, with each

province being allotted one to three divisions. The central government’s Ministry of War

only retained direct control over four Beiyang army divisions in the north and one

division in Sichuan. The remaining divisions were under the de facto control of

provincial authorities, which were also assigned responsibility to finance them. Yunnan

was assigned two divisions.284

As part of the 1907 memorial, the older non-Banner forces were reduced and

reorganized. The best of these troops were organized into provincial Patrol and Defense

Forces (xunfangying), which were to act as a constabulary in peacetime and as a reserve for the New Armies in wartime. They were equipped and trained with modern arms, but their standards were below that of New Army units, which received priority. By 1911, xunfangying were organized in most provinces, and were a semi-modern military force in between the New Army units and the old provincial units and Manchu Banner forces.285

282 Powell, 179-180. Tien, 106-107. McCord, The Power of the Gun, 317. Jin Yuguo, Zhongguo zhanshu shi (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2002), 288. Ping Zhiwei, Zhong xi fang zhanshu bijiao yanjiu (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2001), 132. 283 Tien, 106-107. Jin, 296. 284 Powell, 180, 249. 285 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 38. At least in Yunnan, most of the xunfangying forces remained loyal to the Qing authorities and opposed the New Army units in the 1911 uprising. Zhu mentions fighting these

138 Yunnan Army Organizational Background

In March 1909, the first New Army division was activated in Yunnan and

designated the 19th Division. By 1910, this unit had grown from 9,000 to 11,000 men,

very close to its authorized strength of 12,500. The 19th Division mostly followed the

official organizational system, but with some differences. The division (zhen) had two

brigades (xie), the 37th and 38th, each with two infantry regiments (biao), for a total of

four (the 73rd, 74th, 75th and 76th) regiments. The 37th Brigade, stationed at Yunnanfu,

was commanded by Cai E and Zhu De was assigned to the 74th Regiment under this

brigade upon his graduation in 1911. (The 38th Brigade, consisting of the 75th and 76th regiments, was stationed in southwestern Yunnan at Dali and Linan.) The twelve infantry battalions (ying) under these four regiments, however, were each a little larger than the usual five hundred men. The division had two or three cavalry squadrons, which was short of its authorized strength, and only one artillery regiment consisting of mountain batteries. The division did have its authorized one battalion of engineers and one transport battalion, but it also had one machine-gun battalion, which was not usually part of a division. Finally it had one military police company (dui) and a military band.

Next to Sichuan with its 16,096 modern-trained troops, Yunnan had the second largest body of modern-trained troops in Southern China.286

The 19th Division was also better armed when compared to other New Army

units. The infantry and cavalry were equipped with the 1908 model of the German

Mauser rifle; the artillery had fifty-four new Krupp 75mm mountain guns; and the

forces during the 1911 uprising in Yunnan. See Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 385; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 380. 286 Sutton, 66. Guo, 73. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 384; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 379.

139 machine-gun unit had twenty-four Maxim 8mm machine guns and twelve Colt machine

guns. The 19th Division also possessed enough rifles in reserve to equip Yunnan’s

second new division, scheduled to be activated in 1911. In addition, the barracks and parade ground were designed along Western models. The only shortfall was that the

arsenal had outmoded equipment incapable of producing cartridges for the Mauser rifles.287

Another way that the Yunnan Army differed from most other provincial armies

was in the financial realm. Yunnan received an initial grant and annual subsidy from the central government to establish its New Army divisions and for their continued upkeep.

The amount allocated by the central government in 1909 totaled 1,860,000 taels. The central government agreed to this arrangement both because of Yunnan’s relative poverty and because of the growing fear for the province’s security, given French incursions from

Vietnam and internal unrest.288

Late Qing Military Theory, Doctrine, and Training

The Qing regime was overthrown before its New Army forces could be used in

battle, however the units that were created went on to fight in numerous conflicts during

the first few years of the Republic. How these units initially performed on campaign and

in combat was largely determined by the training they received and by the military theory

and tactical doctrine they followed during the last years of the Qing Dynasty. In addition,

because the New Army was based on European and Japanese models, its approach to

military operations and combat was similar to the prevailing military theories of the time,

287 Sutton, 66-67. 288 Sutton, 60-61.

140 although these foreign practices and theories were often modified and adapted to Chinese

circumstances and combined with Chinese military traditions.

Assessment of Late Qing Military Writings

In reaction to the mid-nineteenth century defeats inflicted on China by the

Western powers, especially the Opium War with Britain of 1839-1842 and Sino-French

War of 1882-1885, several works on how China could counter Western military methods were written by Qing military thinkers. These included works such as Haiguo Tuzhi published in 1843 and Yangfang Shuolue published in the mid-1880s. Two other notable works published in the late nineteenth century were Bingjing Leibian and Pinghai

Xinchou. What they all had in common was a conviction that China should learn from its foreign foes in order to control and defeat them, and should avoid the Western military forces’ areas of superiority, especially in naval warfare, and focus instead on their weaknesses, which were perceived to be on land. They likewise argued that China should focus on its strengths. Specifically, then, they argued that China should lure the enemy into China’s interior, along its inner rivers and onto the land, where its foes could be attacked and trapped when they were least prepared. All the Qing writers essentially advocated “luring the enemy in deep,” to use a formulation often advocated by later

Communist military strategy. They also proposed organizing the Chinese population in critical areas for self-defense and combining them with regular Chinese troops, which

also was a system used later by Communist forces. To compensate for China’s

inferiority in firepower, more fortifications and entrenchments would need to be built,

while Chinese forces would engage the enemy in close hand-to-hand combat; once the

enemy was trapped the Chinese could annihilate them completely. All the Qing writers

141 advocated the tactical method of using bigger numbers to defeat smaller numbers, in

other words, use masses of people to attack fewer numbers of Western troops, surround

them “like bees and ants” and attack them from all sides.289 Many of these thinkers

alluded to the example of the Sanyuanli incident of May 1841 during the Opium War,

where 15,000 peasants supposedly joined with local military forces to surround and

attack a British battalion that had been pillaging the local area.290 While the historical

accuracy of this popular triumph has been called into question by modern historians, there is no question of its impact as a model for Chinese military strategists.291

Unlike the previously described works on military theory, the 1898 Bingxue

Xinshu was considered one of the first works to analyze modern Western military

thought, and to analyze systematically combat methods and methods of organizing and

training rifle-armed troops. This work advocated that among the various types of troops

used in combination in combat, the infantry should be the main force, while the cavalry

and artillery should play supporting roles. It advocated combined arms tactics in combat,

with the artillery first bombarding the enemy front-line positions, then under this protection, the infantry would attack, while the cavalry was stationed in the rear as a reserve force. In general outline, this doctrine followed European practice of the late nineteenth century.292

289 Jin, 293-295. Jin Yuguo is an officer in the PLA and is a researcher with a doctorate in military affairs (junshixue boshi). He displays a certain admiration toward late Qing military theory, and throughout his assessment he notes the applicability of Qing military concepts to current military issues. This may be an interesting indication of contemporary PLA views of pre-1911 Chinese military tradition. 290 Tien, 76-77. 291 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 16-21. For the effect this event had on Qing military theory, see James M. Polachek, The Inner Opium War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 171-172, 180, 194. 292 Jin, 295. Ping, 133.

142 Beginning in 1898, the first comprehensive Western-style army-training manuals, rules, and regulations were introduced by Yuan Shikai, such as the Xinjian lujun binglue lucun (Record of Military Scheme of the Newly Established Army) published that year, to be followed the next year by the Xunlian caofa xiangxi tushuo (Minute Description and

Illustration of Training Manuals). Both works contained rules and regulations for the army as well as regulations for military drills. The latter manual lays out methods for marching and reconnaissance, offensive and defensive operations in different types of terrain, and how to use cavalry, artillery, and engineering units in military operations.

These publications reflected Western military training manuals, especially German methods.293 Any understanding of the later development of the Red Army must take into

consideration the widespread diffusion of Western military models through such means

dating back to the late Qing, to which young military officers such as Zhu De were

clearly exposed.

Late Qing Combat Regulations, Theory, and Doctrine: 1905-1911

The 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War introduced changes in tactical thinking,

particularly in the use of machine guns, the role of battlefield entrenchments, the use of cover and topography by infantry to prepare for close combat, and the positioning of heavy artillery in concealed and protected positions. These changes in tactics made a significant impression on Qing military officials. Applying the lessons of this war, the

Qing central government in 1906 issued the Bubing zanxing caofa (Infantry Provisional

Drill Regulations). After testing it for three years, they formally issued it in 1910 as the

Xinding bubing caofa (New Infantry Drill Regulations), hereafter referred to as the

293 Tien, 109.

143 Caofa. The Caofa served as the late Qing military’s combat instructions and was based

on the new organizational system for the lujun described above.294

The Caofa can be considered as the culmination of Qing tactical theory developed

under the dynasty’s military reform efforts. Because the Caofa was only finalized and

issued in 1910, it was not implemented before the Qing dynasty fell in 1911.

Nonetheless, the Infantry Provisional Drill Regulations on which it was based had been

circulating since 1906.295 Thus despite its 1910 issue date, the principles of the Caofa

were no doubt used to train the units of the New Army and the cadets at the Yunnan

Military Academy. These would have been the combat regulations that Zhu De learned in his military course work and drills during 1909-1911. It is also likely that some form

of the Caofa continued to be used into the early Republic to train the various regional

armies. Therefore, an analysis of the Caofa gives the best indication of how, at least in theory, the armies of the early Republic conducted combat operations.

The Caofa acknowledged that current Chinese infantry organizations still lacked

machine guns, mortars, and other heavy equipment. Therefore, the Caofa stipulated that the infantry should use their rifles and bayonets as their main weapons, and coordinate their actions with other types of troops.296 The Caofa was divided into three main

sections: general principles, combat principles, and training. In the general principles

section, the focus was on the unification and coordination in combat of each type of

soldier. The infantry was to be the mainstay of combat no matter the topography or

climate. The infantry had the main responsibility for fighting on the battlefield and for

concluding the battle. Other types of troops were to coordinate their actions with the

294 Jin, 287-288. 295 Ibid., 293.

144 infantry and support the infantry in achieving its objective. Even with no other types of

troops to support them, the infantry was to fight the battle alone, endeavor to engage the

enemy with fire, and then charge forward to defeat the enemy in order to fulfill their

mission.297

The combat principles section was divided into three parts: offense, defense, and

fighting in particular topography and special combat situations. In conducting battles, the commander was advised first to send out scouts and security troops in order to conceal and protect his own forces. The senior commanding officer along with other commanders were also to investigate the enemy’s situation and the positions they occupied, and then-according to the enemy’s situation, topographical position, and their mission-make a decision and issue orders for the advance. The Caofa also stipulated that the commander must use sufficient military force in combat, warning that it would be a costly mistake and leave him in an inferior position if insufficient numbers of troops were used or if they were deployed in piecemeal fashion.298

In its discussion of the principles of offensive battles, the Caofa emphasized the

offensive, with attack as the main tactic to obtain victory. The commanding officer was

advised to select the weakest point of the enemy’s battle line and to use his best troops

and equipment to attack that point. He was also advised to use superior force in the

attack and was encouraged to deploy one or both wings of his attacking force to envelope the enemy. The Caofa subdivided offensive attacks into “encounter engagements” and

“attacks on an enemy in defensive positions on the battlefield.” In an encounter engagement, the first priority was to maintain the initiative over the enemy, to occupy

296 Ibid., 287-288. 297 Ibid., 288.

145 advantageous terrain, and to fire one’s artillery before the enemy did. In attacking an

enemy in a defensive position, the commander first should study the enemy position and

then, after his troops had arrived at their pre-planned positions, coordinate the actions of

the artillery and infantry and concentrate the various types of forces under his command

in the attack on the enemy’s position. The Caofa also highlighted two more tactical

points when attacking an enemy in a defensive position: first, to use heavy artillery to

destroy his defensive works, and second, to build up one’s own offensive entrenchments

to force the enemy to retreat. These last two points in particular were derived from the

lessons of the Russo-Japanese War.299

In regard to the principles for defensive combat, the Caofa stated that when on the

defensive it is easy for a force to fall into a passive position that will restrict freedom of

action. Therefore, at any opportunity one must turn it into a decisive attack, for attack

and defense are mutually complementary. (In discussing the close link between offense

and defense, the Qing military seemed to have understood the need for a doctrine of

active defense that was much used a few years later during World War One.) In

managing the defense, the commander was advised to divide the defense area into several

zones in accordance with his force’s objectives, topography, and for ease of command.

Each zone was to be manned so that it could sustain itself individually. Each zone’s support troops (reserves) were to make use of the topography so they would be near enough to the frontline to support it quickly. The support troops in each zone were to be mainly used to counterattack within their area. Their position was to be chosen carefully to allow for offensive action. This position would usually be at the battlefield’s rear and

298 Ibid., 288-289. 299 Ibid., 289-290.

146 on the wings to enable the support forces to envelope an attacker’s outside wings and rear easily. The main support troops were chiefly used as an offensive force, attacking from the flanks to envelope the approaching attacking enemy force. (See Figure 2 below).

(Note: this is an arrangement for offensive defense and bears some similarities to Red

Army tactics used to defend against GMD forces that had penetrated into the interior of a base area.) The Caofa further emphasized the need to pursue a retreating enemy continuously and seek the total annihilation of the foe.300

In the section on special combat, principles were laid out to govern combat under special circumstances and in difficult terrain. It highlighted the advantages of night attacks to achieve surprise and reduce casualties, although noting that such operations were hard to coordinate and difficult to command. In attacking or defending in mountainous areas, it was advantageous to occupy high ground overlooking the enemy’s position. If on the offensive in mountainous terrain, it was advised to use roads and valleys that lead to the enemy, to march forward secretly, and to envelope the enemy’s

300 Ibid., 290.

147 forces. If, on the other hand, one’s forces were far from the enemy, it was recommended

to march them in a circular pattern to threaten the enemy’s flanks and rear in order to cut

off the foes’ retreat. This last recommendation is also very similar to the tactics used by

the Red Army to defeat GMD forces in mountainous terrain, which supposedly were first

used to defend the Jinggangshan base area.301

Under training principles, the Caofa laid out individual training for the pai, dui,

ying, biao, and xie. The Caofa stipulated that the dui (company) was the unit of combat.

The commander of the dui was responsible for its morale and the main focus in training the dui was to ensure that its soldiers could carry out its required actions. In combat, on the commander’s orders, the dui was to divide into skirmishers and support troops, with the support troops moving behind the skirmishers. Under the dui, the pai (platoon)

skirmishers were to be commanded by the pai commander alone, while all support troops

were to be commanded by the dui commander. The support troops were to stay in close

order and follow the skirmish line’s movements in order to reinforce that line. The Caofa

stipulated that skirmish formation was the infantry’s main system of combat, not only as

the basis for the firefight but also as the attack formation used to charge the enemy. The

regulations also stipulated that troops needed to be able to use topography to protect

themselves during combat.302

The Caofa regarded the ying (battalion) as the main tactical unit, with the achievement of its mission dependent on the appropriate use of its four dui (companies).

The ying was regarded as an independent unit, capable of performing independent tactical

missions on the battlefield. Therefore, the ying had to have sufficient troop strength and

301 Ibid., 290-291. 302 Ibid., 291-292.

148 an ability to maintain its own supplies and existence. Therefore, besides its four dui, the

ying also was to have a small supply unit. During an attack, the ying commander was

responsible for ensuring that the various dui on the frontline were coordinated and could

mutually assist one another. According to circumstances, individual dui could set their

own goals for the attack. The Caofa stipulated that when the ying advanced toward the

enemy position, it must make use of the topography and as much as possible maintain the

dui’s close formation. Only when the ying was within the effective range of the enemy’s

fire could the distance between each dui be increased like a ladder formation. (See

Figure 3 below).

This was stipulated in consideration of the problem of losing control over troops

that were too dispersed while advancing toward the enemy. Therefore, the commander

was advised to try to maintain close formation as long as possible in the face of the enemy. By using the ladder formation, each dui would increase their spacing one at a time, which also helped prevent desertions. The Caofa stipulated that when the ying was deployed it must divide into frontline troops and support troops, with three dui in the

149 frontline and one dui behind acting as support. The standard frontage for a deployed dui

in a battle-line was 150 meters in length, with the deployed ying battleline at 450 meters.

The distance from the battleline of the one dui acting as support troops was not

specified.303 (See Figure 4 below). For biao (regiment) training, the Caofa stipulated

that the biao commander must divide specific missions among his various ying and

clearly show each ying commander his attack objective or area to be defended. The biao

was also organized with one machine gun dui. The Caofa stipulated that machine guns

must not be used separately. Even if they have to be split up, at least two machine guns

should be used together because they provide the main firepower on the battlefield.

Overall, the main principles of the Caofa emphasized combined arms and the effective use of firepower.304

Consistency with European Practice

One of the significant features of the Caofa in relation to its possible impact on

late Qing and Republican armies, was that it clearly reflected contemporary European

military theory and combat regulations, and in particular the lessons learned from the

Russo-Japanese War. All Western armies in the decades prior to 1914 were struggling

with how to adapt to the revolution in infantry tactics brought about by the introduction

303 Ibid., 292-293.

150 of rapid-fire rifles. To European military theorists, traditional close-order combat now

seemed suicidal and the only option seemed to be the increased dispersal of infantry.

There was a consensus among most late nineteenth-century European military

thinkers that infantry could no longer fight in close formations but had to fight in open

skirmish lines. In combat, the function of support columns changed to feed the skirmish

line rather than directly undertake the final assault on the enemy position. The final

attack would be undertaken with the bayonet, while the firefight (a prolonged exchange

of fire between two rival skirmish lines) would not be allowed to dominate combat

because a charge would always be the decisive factor to determine the outcome of a

battle. In the fifty years prior to World War One, every nation adopted the same basic

tactical doctrine. The concept “was to build up a heavy skirmish line which could wear

down the enemy and finally make a bayonet charge. The line would be held together by

the training and individual determination of each soldier, who would have been

indoctrinated in the need to keep moving forward.”305 (See Figure 5 below). The

maintenance of morale and the fostering of individual soldiers’ self-reliance and initiative

would be critical for this concept to succeed. To many of these theorists, the increasingly

urbanized population of nineteenth century Europe and North American societies seemed

to produce a docile and self-absorbed male population not suited for this type of warfare.

This led to calls for the restoration of a martial spirit among the population and a

militarization of Western society prior to 1914.306 Another factor that became linked to these concerns was the late nineteenth-century European debates over racial

304 Ibid., 293. 305 Paddy Griffith, Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future (Novato: Presidio Press, 1991), 66-67. 306 English and Gudmundsson, 4.

151 characteristics and which nationality possessed the requisite martial values to implement

these tactics effectively.307

In the decades before World War One, European militaries debated over whether increasing firepower, notably demonstrated during the Boer War in South Africa, had rendered frontal attacks untenable. Most military thinkers believed that frontal assaults could still be undertaken with proper preparation and more dispersion of the skirmish line, with a bayonet charge still deciding the outcome. The only alternatives were outflanking movements or trench warfare. The concept of encirclement was widely

307 Griffith, 64.

152 favored, and the Prussians, British, and Japanese used it extensively in their conflicts.

But an encirclement maneuver had drawbacks since it took time, which could lead to the

encircling force losing contact with its main body; it required superior numbers of troops;

and it depended on the enemy remaining passive. The quicker and more certain solution

was a frontal assault. The underlying assumption was that once the assault started, troops

would want to close the distance between themselves and the enemy as quickly as

possible to reduce casualties, with this action being dubbed the “flight to the front”

phenomenon.308

Military thinkers, however, identified a main problem with deploying forces into

skirmish formations, which had been advocated as a solution to the increased firepower

of infantry firearms. The problem was psychological. Most troops when deployed as

skirmishers would avoid moving forward against enemy fire and also try to avoid direct

involvement in the battle. There was a need to develop a tactical system to counter this

tendency. The solution offered by military thinkers, such as the German Jakob Meckel,

was a return to close-order tactics as a means to keep the infantry line moving forward.

In this new close-order tactical doctrine, the basic tactical unit was no longer the battalion

but a smaller unit, either the company or platoon. These new close-order tactics were

more flexible than the traditional close-order formations, with one to two ranks of

soldiers either walking or running on the battlefield. The close-order school was

temporarily eclipsed in favor of a return to skirmish tactics by the experience of the 1899-

1902 Boer War.309

308 Griffith, 70, 73-74. 309 English and Gudmundsson, 4-7.

153 The Boer tactics school supported the view that individual marksmen armed with

modern rifles could defeat close-order infantry. The Boers were independent farmers of

deeply religious Dutch Calvinist stock, who possessed an intimate knowledge of their

environment. They operated as highly mobile mounted infantry and were required to

carry their own ammunition and rations, thus eliminating the need for supply lines. The

Boers were all marksmen who armed themselves with modern magazine rifles that used

smokeless powder. They were proficient in using terrain for cover and also dug

entrenchments. There were two phases to the Boer War, a conventional phase and a guerrilla phase. In the conventional phase lasting from 1899 to 1900, British forces invaded the Boer Republic. The Boer field army usually took up entrenched defensive

positions on high ground and waited for British forces to attack in close-order. The Boer

troops would then devastate the British with intense, accurate rifle fire at long range.

(The Mauser rifles they used had a range out to 2,200 meters.) Usually small Boer forces

would inflict defeats on much larger British forces. The second phase of the war began

in 1900 after the Boer Republic’s defeat. At this point, several thousand Boers commenced a guerrilla war of raids and ambushes that lasted for two years, eventually requiring the British to deploy over 450,000 troops to end the war. The perceived lessons of the war were that Boer firepower had rendered infantry assaults difficult if not suicidal. As a result, most European armies adopted “Boer tactics,” whereby lines and columns were replaced by lines of skirmishers. The lessons from the guerrilla war phase were that, despite the fact that the British army could go anywhere, the objectives were no longer cities or population centers but small and mobile groups of Boers. The British army was forced to disperse its forces to search for these Boer groups, but then became

154 vulnerable to the Boers’ ability to concentrate their forces and launch ambushes and surprise attacks on isolated British columns.310 The Boer tactics school’s popularity

peaked in 1904-05.

In contrast to the Boer War, the experience of the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War

seemed to renew support for the close-order school. During this war, the Japanese army

successfully practiced close-order tactics. Most European observers viewed this war as

more analogous to a future European war because the Japanese were trained in European

(German) methods. Specifically, Jakob Meckel, the major advocate of the close-order

school, had trained the Japanese army officer corps, and the Japanese infantry trained

according to the 1888 German drill regulations that had been translated into Japanese.311

Meckel drew upon his experience in the Franco-Prussian War to advocate that close- order infantry should advance into enemy fire in order to deliver the maximum shock to

the enemy in the assault. This was an offensive doctrine that would maintain the fighting

spirit of the troops. Meckel did not agree with the other school of tactics that favored use of columns that fanned out as they approached the enemy to form and support the firing line and make use of cover. Meckel felt that this tactic would dilute the assault and

310 Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 32-33, 34, 43, 54, 57. 311 English and Gudmundsson, 4-7. The German 1888 regulations laid out the following instructions on how to carry out an infantry assault, “When the fighting line has arrived to within short range of the enemy, and, having been sufficiently reinforced, has paved the way for the assault by the highest attainable fire action, the bodies of troops echeloned in rear should be brought up to the foremost line without a halt, and together with it should deliver the fatal blow. The drums of all closed bodies commence beating from the moment that the advance to the assault can no longer be concealed from view…In this most decisive moment of the attack there is only one watchword for a fighting line, and that is ‘Forward! Forward! straight for the goal!’” Cited in Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), xix.

155 reduce the fighting spirit. Despite these debates, most Western armies practiced a

mixture of both close-order and skirmish tactical styles.312

There was general consensus among the advocates of both schools on certain

main points:

• The importance of rifle fire, given the high fire volume and accuracy of modern

magazine rifles.

• The relative importance of infantry. Infantry was seen as the arm of decision in

battle. All other arms existed to support the infantry. Infantry had to act decisively,

and in order to achieve a decision, European armies stressed the use of the bayonet to

force an enemy to retreat, surrender, or die.

• The organization of infantry units. Infantry was now formed into battalions of 1,000

men, divided into four companies of 250 men. Companies were divided into three or

four smaller units, either sections or platoons. Emphasis was placed on lower-level

units in combat, either the platoon or section, which meant that junior officers and

NCOs would need to make more tactical decisions in battle. Infantry battalions in

turn were formed mostly by threes into regiments with a small number of machine

guns, with four infantry regiments forming a division. (This was the organizational

structure followed in France and Germany, and by the Chinese New Armies.)313

The combat regulations laid out in the Caofa seem to mirror much of the prevailing European military theories on the transformation of infantry combat in the decades prior to 1914, especially on the primacy of infantry, the emphasis on the offensive, the use of smaller units in combat, the need for dispersal despite its

312 Harries and Harries, 50. 313 English and Gudmundsson, 8-10.

156 accompanying problems with command and control, and the increased responsibilities of junior officers.

Yunnan Army Training and Tactical Regulations

Many of these contemporary European military theories were transmitted in a variety of ways to the units of the New Army in China. As described previously, the

Qing New Army was heavily influenced by the Japanese army that had in turn closely followed German military methods. In addition to Japanese advisers and instructors assigned to various New Army units and military schools, a large number of Chinese students had been sent to Japan for military training. When these students returned to

China many were assigned as instructors to train New Army units, with a significant number of these returned students later occupying prominent positions in Chinese armies after 1911, such as Cai E and Tang Jiyao. Even though they were trained in Japanese military schools, not all Chinese students wholly accepted the Japanese system. Many of the students did not fully agree with Japanese military values, and some like Tang Jiyao who joined the Yunnan Army, thought that the Japanese spiritual education of recruits was superficial. There were also differences of opinion concerning Japanese tactical thought, with many Chinese cadets rejecting the Japanese Army dogma that the offensive was the best tactic in all circumstances. Not all Chinese students who went to Japan for military training were taught by the Japanese Army or inculcated in the official Japanese military system. In addition to the Chinese cadets sponsored by the Qing government, some Chinese students went to Japan without official scholarships to attend private military schools. One such school was Aoyama, where in 1903-04, at Sun Yat-sen’s initiative, courses were taught by retired Japanese army officers who specialized in Boer

157 War guerrilla tactics in contrast to the German army tactics being taught in Japanese

army academies.314

In 1909, returning Japanese educated officers who staffed the Yunnan provincial

Training Office set up the new 19th Division and trained it. By 1910-11, these officers

increasingly assumed command of units within the division.315 Foreign observers in

Yunnan who saw the training, drilling and maneuvers of the 19th Division, thought that it was comparable to a modern military force, and far better than older Chinese forces they had seen. The French consular officer Delegue Wilden observed the 1910-11 winter maneuvers in Yunnan, and was impressed with the performance of the division. He remarked on the troops’ “solid appearance, the speed of marching and running, their perfect discipline … Attacks followed the rules of modern war, each soldier using the slightest variations in terrain to hide himself … Cannon were so well placed as to be invisible.”316 Another foreign observer commented that given this, “ … modern–drilled

and well equipped army … a forward and even aggressive policy may be expected along

the Burma frontier.”317

The 19th Division’s system of training was to keep recruits constantly drilling or

in classroom lectures and exercises all day. Otherwise, the recruits were kept in their

barracks or only allowed out in groups. Thus their lives were very circumscribed and

under military authority twenty-four hours per day, isolated from family and civilian

society. Junior officers were especially active in training their men and put into effect

training programs developed by their superiors and the central government. This system

314 Sutton, 21, 22-23. 315 Ibid., 70. 316 French consular report, January 10, 1911, France, Ministere de la Guerre, Chine, Etat Major de L’Armee. Cited in Sutton, 67.

158 forced recruits to adopt new organizational values: obedience to higher command,

cooperation and speed in completing tasks, following a fixed routine, and dependable

performance. It also built esprit de corps and unit cohesion. The relationship of officers

to enlisted men also differed from the late Qing regional armies, in that they were not

personal in nature. By 1911, the 19th Division began to resemble its Japanese or

European counterparts.318

By then, the division had succeeded in emulating a European military

organization, not only in equipment, but also in training, recruitment systems, and a

centralized command structure. The reasons for this success were that many of its

leaders were trained overseas and they were able to isolate the unit from civilian life and

traditional society in order to achieve a high level of training and integrity of command.

This followed a Western military institutional model. In 1911, Yunnan’s modernized

military was the largest and best of the New Army units in Southern China. The officer

corps was very homogeneous and the Yunnan Military Academy helped forge close

bonds between its Japanese-trained instructors and their future subordinates.319

The Military Thought of Cai E and Sun Yat-sen to 1911

Cai E’s Military Thought

Prior to the 1911 Revolution, Cai E’s military thought was summarized in two works, an article titled “National Militarism” and an instructional pamphlet Quotations of

Zeng and Hu Regarding the Administration of the Armed Forces. Written in Japan in

1902, “Jun guo min bian” (“National Militarism” sometimes translated as “A Militant

Citizenry”) put forth Cai’s view that the Han Chinese had lost their martial spirit and had

317 British consular report, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Annual Report, 1910-China. Cited in Sutton, 68. 318 Sutton, 69-70.

159 become cowardly and weak. The only way to save China from foreign occupation was

for the Chinese to restore their martial spirit. The root cause of the loss of Chinese

martial spirit, Cai believed, was the Chinese education system, that suppressed the

initiative of Chinese youth, ignored physical education, and taught Confucian principles that de-emphasized military values. As a solution, Cai advocated physical education for children and the teaching of national spirit, national history, and heroic models to inspire

national pride.320 Cai believed that China needed to emulate the Japanese education

system and Japanese arts and literature, which gave high status to the military and

contributed to the development of a martial spirit. He was also concerned with reform of

Chinese political institutions. The imperative to develop national power in his mind

served as a rationale to support republicanism, as he believed that only in a republic

would all the populace have the duties and obligations that would mobilize all human resources to defend the nation.321 These thoughts were reminiscent of nineteenth century

European debates over national and racial characteristics and martial values, and could

have contributed to the widespread attention to physical education that no doubt led Zhu

De to become a physical education teacher in 1907-08.

When Cai E arrived in Yunnanfu in 1911, his first task was to edit and comment

upon the military maxims of Zeng Guofan and Hu Linyi, who had helped suppress the

Taiping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century. Cai E prepared the manual Zeng Hu

zhibing yulu (Quotations of Zeng and Hu Regarding the Administration of the Armed

Forces) for the instruction of his officers in the 19th Division, and in his commentaries

reflected his and Qing army superiors’ concern with promoting military virtues. Cai

319 Ibid., 71-73. 320 Tien, 130.

160 summarized the Chinese traditional military virtues as wisdom, faith, benevolence,

righteousness, courage, and strictness, which became part of the common creed in many

modern Chinese military regulations and handbooks.

In dealing with strategy and tactics, the Quotations of Zeng and Hu described

Zeng Guofan’s strategic and tactical principle of zhu (master) and ke (guest). Zhu is defense and ke is the offense. Cai agreed with Zeng Guofan’s preference to be the master and be on the defensive. Being familiar with both the Franco-Prussian and Russo-

Japanese wars, Cai also acknowledged that a defensive strategy was not always appropriate, and that there were advantages to the offensive. But Cai did not agree with unconditionally following the offensive theories of his time. Cai thought that the defensive should be used when one’s own forces were weak or the overall situation favored the defensive. In Cai’s view, “ … in choosing strategy and tactics, one should consider the realistic circumstance and not be bound by any theory. If one does not understand the basic principle behind the theory but blindly applies it, one will inevitably

fall like the lame man who tries to run.”322 This maxim is very similar to one of Zhu

De’s tactical principles for the Red Army which admonished commanders to adapt to

current circumstances and not to blindly follow set rules and theories for conducting

military operations.

Cai examined China’s strategic situation and the state of its military forces in

1911, and he believed that a defensive strategy was best. Cai wrote, “If China is

militarily confronted by another country in the near future, it would be better for it to

adopt the Boer tactic … China should primarily take a delaying resistance and retrograde

321 Boorman and Howard, 287. Tien, 130. 322 From Quotations of Zeng and Hu cited in Tien, 134.

161 defensive strategy to preserve its own forces while luring the enemy in deep. When the

enemy is exhausted and does not have enough force to support itself, China can wipe it

out with one strike.”323 As an example of an effective defensive strategy, Cai cited the

Russian strategy to defeat Napoleon in 1812. The Quotations of Zeng and Hu were later republished with an introduction by Jiang Jieshi and used as a textbook for officers and cadets at the GMD’s Huangpu Military Academy in 1924.324

The Zeng Hu zhibing yulu was divided into twelve chapters citing quotations from

Zeng and Hu with commentaries by Cai E. Facilitating the book’s use as a handbook on

how to train and lead an army, Cai’s commentaries essentially sought to link the

quotations to contemporary military problems facing China. The twelve chapters were:

Qualities for Generals, Utilizing People, Promoting Respect for People’s Aspirations,

Honesty, Persistent Bravery, Justice and Impartiality, Equality, Benevolence, Diligence,

Respect for Harmony, Maneuvering Troops, and Defense.325 An examination of this

document provides a good picture of Cai’s views on generalship, strategy, and tactics.

They also may give some indication of the source of some of Zhu’s early ideas about

developing military forces and conducting operations.

Under “Qualities for Generals,” Cai E described the four qualities a general must

have to lead troops effectively. First, the general needed to know how to manage people

so they perform well; second, he should not be afraid of death; third, he should not want

to seek a quick name and profit; and fourth, he should be able to bear suffering. With

these qualities a general’s troops would be obedient and would follow him into battle.

Cai noted that for Zeng and Hu, a good general needed both intellect and courage, as well

323 Ibid., 134. 324 Tien, 131-134. Sutton, 83, 86.

162 as conscience and compassion. In his commentary, Cai compared Western and Chinese

views on generalship and asserted that Westerners believed that great generals were born

with genius, “they are endowed by heaven with intellect and courage.” In contrast, Cai

stated that Chinese believed that great generals can be cultivated, Zeng and Hu being

examples of this.326

In “Utilizing People,” the imperative for Cai E was to cultivate and nurture

people’s talents. In Cai E’s view, current Chinese social trends were very bad. These

negative trends had infected the military and therefore there were very few talented

officers and corruption was everywhere. Cai E believed, however, that this situation could be changed if people with virtue and dedicated to saving the nation could band together and support each other. These people would set an example for other good people to follow and influence those who were currently part of the problem.327

In the chapter on “Benevolence,” Cai advocated the use of benevolence to lead an

army. To get the best out of his soldiers a commander should treat them as his disciples

or like his own sons and brothers.328 Under “Diligence,” Cai warned against being lazy

or lax in training troops, and advocated a commander’s constant involvement. In his

comments, Cai E emphasized the need to prepare soldiers both mentally and physically

so they would not be afraid of hardships during war. Indeed, for Cai, the first priority in

army training was to teach soldiers how to bear hardship. Cai believed that training was

needed to frame a soldier’s mental and physical abilities for war, and his training should

325 Cai E, Zeng Hu zhibing yulu, in Cai E ji, ed. Mao Zhuqing (Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1983), 55-84. 326 Ibid., 55-58. 327 Ibid., 58-60. 328 Ibid., 72.

163 not allow too much idle time that could lead to ill discipline.329 With the chapter on

“Respectful Harmony,” Cai focused on the need for cooperation among military leaders to counter the problem of disharmony and jealousy that could lead to disunity and defeat.

Cai cited the examples of the Sino-French and Sino-Japanese wars where China’s defeats were caused by disunity among the Chinese commanders.330

In “Maneuvering Troops” or “how to run a campaign,” Cai described two kinds of military actions that lead to victory: one is to strike first, win in battle, and then occupy territory; the other is to wait for the enemy to move first, then respond. Under types of offensive actions, he cited three ways of attacking the enemy: to attack from behind, to attack the flanks, and to strangle the tail of the enemy (i.e., disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication and supply in its rear). Interestingly enough, Cai did not mention frontal attacks, only emphasizing indirect attacks. In his commentary, Cai E praised Zeng and

Hu’s concept of master and guest. The defenders are the masters/host (zhu), while the attackers are the guest (ke). When the master is at ease the guest is laborious, in that way the master is victorious and the guest fails. Therefore, a commander should avoid attacking strongly defended cities. Cai E pointed out that this idea was similar to French military theory prior to the Franco-Prussian war and also resembled Russian and Turkish thinking during the same period. (Cai E was probably referring to the large-scale fortress building programs that these nations undertook during the mid-nineteenth century.) On the whole, Cai E, like Zeng, supported a defensive strategy and saw the defense as more powerful than the offense. (During his campaigns against the Taiping rebels, Zeng took a very cautious approach to warfare and favored the defensive even when conducting an

329 Ibid., 74, 76. 330 Ibid., 77.

164 offensive campaign. For some, Zeng’s emphasis on the defensive was controversial for it

allowed the enemy to take the initiative, but Zeng may have developed a defensive approach to counter the mobile warfare of his Taiping opponents.331) Cai emphasized

careful prewar planning and using military force only after it was well prepared. He applied these criteria to China’s mobilization efforts, which he saw as still incomplete.

Cai continued on to note that the objective of China’s entire military force was to disrupt enemy forces in the field and not to take their cities, a view that he saw as coinciding

with contemporary French theorists. According to Cai, when advancing in war, the

commander should first disperse his forces on the march for greater mobility and then

combine and concentrate them for battle. For Cai, these two statements on dispersal and

concentration summed up the essence of military strategy and tactics, and bears some

similarities to the future Red Army’s later approach of dispersing or concentrating its forces to counter larger GMD armies. In deploying military forces, Cai advised that the commander should divide his forces into a main attack force, a supporting attack force, logistics troops, skirmishers, and a reserve force. Cai E basically contended that Chinese military theories, such as Zeng’s and Hu’s, should not be considered as inferior to those of the West.332

In the chapter on “Defense,” Cai reiterated Zeng’s master and guest theory, that

defense is better than the offense. Cai advocated the strategy of the master waiting for

the guest when a commander chooses to wait for the enemy to act first and come to seek

him out. Cai noted that even though there was a current abundance of theories about

tactics, all their key points were similar, and that modern theories of warfare could not

331 Tien, 92. 332 Cai E, 79, 81. See Tien, 91-93, for Zeng’s military principles.

165 compare to older Chinese theories of war, such as the wisdom of Zeng and Hu seen in

their emphasis on the advantages of the defense over the offense. Commenting on

contemporary military issues, Cai cited the examples of the Franco-Prussian and Russo-

Japanese wars that influenced Western military professionals to emphasize offense over

defense. Cai’s response was that strategy and tactics have to be appropriate to the times.

The commander has to judge the situation and determine what is appropriate, and cannot

be constrained by one strategy or blindly imitate others. He noted that adopting an

offensive strategy has many benefits, but its success depends on four factors: possessing

superior manpower, well trained troops, adequate material, and efficient transportation.

If a nation lacked any of these factors, then an offensive strategy would fail. Using the examples of France in the Franco-Prussian War and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War,

Cai described how they both took the offensive but failed because they lacked some of the four factors. France did not adequately concentrate its forces and its material was

lacking, while Russia lacked good transportation. In assessing China’s military situation,

Cai believed that the country lacked adequate military manpower and had an inadequate

reserve system. Its military forces were not well trained and material and transportation

capabilities were inferior to those of other countries. Therefore, since China lacked these

capabilities, Cai believed that adopting offensive strategy and tactics would be

inappropriate for his country. Thus, in Cai’s opinion, if China went to war with another

nation under these circumstances, China would do better to adopt Boer War like strategy

and tactics than to invest in offensive warfare. Under such a strategy, Chinese forces

would occupy critical areas and stay on the defensive; they would rely on a layered

defense utilizing the whole army and learn from the enemy. Chinese forces would wait

166 until the enemy had advanced deeply (shenru wuji) into Chinese territory, then would

surprise and destroy them. Cai concluded his thoughts on defense by comparing this

concept to the successful Russian strategy that destroyed Napoleon’s invading army in

1812, which he thought should serve as a lesson for China.333

There is at least one account that shows that Cai E actually shared the views he

developed while writing Quotations of Zeng and Hu directly with Zhu De, and that Cai’s

views made a deep impression on him. According to historian Guo Junning, on one of

Zhu De’s frequent visits to Cai E’s home in 1911, Cai told Zhu how he had been

entrusted by the divisional commander, Zhong Lintong, to write lecture notes on how to

train troops. Cai told Zhu that even though Zeng and Hu were not originally military

commanders, their views on the military were nonetheless quite profound and that current

officers could learn a lot from their explanations on how to govern soldiers. Cai therefore

told Zhu about his collection of and commentaries on Zeng and Hu’s thoughts, and gave

Zhu a draft of the lectures. Carefully reading over the lectures, Zhu De reportedly was

deeply moved and admired Cai E’s profound and broad analysis of military affairs. Zhu

thought that Zeng’s and Hu’s quotations contained very good points and that they were certainly useful in commanding soldiers in combat.334 Significantly, much of what Cai E

advocated in terms of strategy and tactics foreshadowed later Red Army tactics, such as

the “lure the enemy in deep” (you di shenru) strategy adopted by Zhu De and Mao

Zedong to defend the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi soviets. At the same time, the origin of

333 Cai E, 81, 83-84. 334 Guo, 68-69. Given the high regard that Zeng Guofan was held in by the Yunnan Military Academy, Zhu may also have been exposed to the songs sung by Zeng’s troops during the war to suppress the Taiping rebels. One of the songs, Ai min ge has many elements similar to the Red Army’s “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention.” The song lists how troops should behave towards the civilian population and how to garner the support of the populace. See Jordan, 239-241.

167 this strategy cannot be simply traced to Cai E, for Cai himself based his views on similar strategies discussed in late nineteenth-century Qing military works, including Zeng and

Hu.

At the same time, Cai E’s writings were not just rooted in previous Chinese

military thought. His commentaries also demonstrated his knowledge of contemporary

Western military debates over the relative dominance of the offense versus the defense as

reflected in the conduct of the Russo-Japanese and Boer wars, along with his own realistic assessment of China’s military situation. It also reflected his knowledge of both

Chinese and European military history. Cai E disagreed with the dominant European and

Japanese thinking of the time that emphasized the offensive in both strategy and tactics.

Interestingly, for what was supposed to serve as an official training manual, Cai E’s views in the Quotations of Zeng and Hu on the superiority of the defense did not seem to fully support the official 1910 Qing military regulations found in the Caofa, which

adopted the offensive theories supported by the lessons learned from the recent Russo-

Japanese War. A review of Cai E’s military thought shows him to be quite a realistic

thinker, who understood the weaknesses of the Chinese military situation at the time. Cai

realized that Chinese armies were not yet capable of Western-style offensive warfare,

therefore, he looked to the lessons of the Boer War and a defensive strategy as more

appropriate for China.

Sun Yat-sen’s Military Thought

Another important, if more distant, influence on Zhu De and his military thought

in these years was Sun Yat-sen. Clearly Zhu De was knowledgeable about the

revolutionary ideas of Sun Yat-sen prior to the 1911 Revolution. Indeed, many of the

168 faculty at the Yunnan Military Academy taught Sun’s ideas to the cadets, and the

Academy itself became a center of radicalism. In a conversation with an academy

classmate, Zhu De stated that he had been exposed to Sun Yat-sen’s progressive ideas while at the Yunnan Military Academy from 1909 onward, and he became a supporter of

Sun’s national democratic revolution.335 Zhu also stated that he joined the Tongmenghui

in 1909 under the influence of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary ideas. In assessing the

military aspects of Sun’s revolutionary ideas, Zhu praised Sun because he “attached

importance to the role of armed forces and to work within the enemy army. This was of

vital importance in the 1911 Revolution.”336 Thus, for Zhu, what was noteworthy was

that from the very beginning the Tongmenghui had advocated an armed struggle and the

use of revolutionary military forces to defeat Qing troops.337 Zhu’s familiarity with

Sun’s thought, and his particular focus on Sun’s military ideas, suggest that this was

another source in the early development of Zhu’s own understanding of military strategy

and tactics.

Prior to 1911, Sun made a distinction between a revolutionary force and a regular

military force. According to Sun, what distinguished a revolutionary force was its spirit,

tactics, and loyalty to the cause. Sun viewed a revolutionary army as a military force that

emphasized the “spirit of struggle,” and with this special spirit a revolutionary group

could defeat a numerically superior force. Sun placed an emphasis on the internal quality

335 Sutton, 86-87. Yang, 11. 336 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 383; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 378. 337 Ibid., 383 or Ibid., 378. Zhu, “In Commemoration of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Great Teacher of China’s Democratic Revolution,” (Nov. 11, 1956), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 349; or “Jinian Zhongguo weida de minzhu geming daoshi Sun Zhongshan xiansheng,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 345-346. Given that these statements by Zhu were made many decades after these events in 1961, Zhu may have been making a subtle critique of the CCP’s failure in not having its own military forces prior to 1927.

169 of dedicated individual revolutionary soldiers.338 According to Sun, a revolutionary army

composed of such ideal soldiers could “with bravery subdue the enemy, with few

overcome the many.”339 This can be seen in 1895, when Sun organized the first

Guangzhou uprising. At that time he advocated “valuing the essence not the many. If

there are one hundred people who are willing to die, then the enterprise will be

feasible.”340 In 1911, Sun still had faith that a few hundred dedicated revolutionaries

could successfully carry out an uprising. However, he never really developed a method

for implementing this strategy other then emphasizing revolutionary spirit and the use of

guerrilla warfare tactics.341

Sun Yat-sen was an early advocate of using guerrilla warfare to defend China.342

After the failure of the 1900 Huizhou uprising, he studied the lessons of this defeat and began to study Western military works, paying particular attention to the ongoing Boer

War and the skirmish tactics being developed there. Sun’s military thought was consistent with the ongoing debate between Western military theorists over the relative merits of the Boer War skirmish school and the close-order school. Seeing parallels between his band of revolutionaries and the Boers, Sun saw the utility of the lessons that could be drawn from the Boer War, especially the defense put up by the outnumbered but highly skilled and motivated Boer soldiers, who used skirmish tactics, modern firepower, and guerrilla warfare to counter the numerically superior British army. In the summer of

1903, Sun met with a Japanese military expert who had also researched Boer skirmish

338 Jin, 296. Tien, 139-141. 339 Jin, 296. 340 Ibid., 296. 341 Jin, 296-297. Tien, 139-141. 342 Sun Yat-sen’s term for guerrilla warfare tactics was “Youyong zhanshu” (literally “mobile brave war tactics) that was equivalent to the more common term “Youji zhanshu.”

170 tactics. Sun appointed him the head of the Revolutionary Military School in Tokyo, to

teach small arms and artillery methods, ammunition manufacturing, and Boer skirmish

tactics to Chinese military students studying in Japan. Sun believed that in order to stage an uprising with a Chinese revolutionary army, it should adopt Boer-like guerrilla warfare tactics. These revolutionary soldiers should learn the five tenets of these tactics: target shooting, ambushing, bearing hardship, walking long distances, and eating coarse food. Sun saw the importance of ambushing techniques, first where a soldier seeks shelter from enemy fire by using the cover of terrain, and second as a tactic in surprise attacks. Sun considered bearing hardship, walking, and eating rough food as important physical training that would assist guerrilla fighters overcome their inferiority in equipment and weapons. In his writing he also stated that one of the principles of guerrilla warfare should be obtaining supplies and ammunition from the enemy. Later in

1917, Sun expanded his advocacy of guerrilla warfare, arguing that even regular military forces should be able to use these tactics. Given the lessons of previous guerrilla wars in

Vietnam and South Africa, Sun continued to believe that the use of guerrilla warfare tactics was suitable for China.343

Political and Revolutionary Activities

Zhu De was a devoted follower of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary philosophy, and at

heart, Zhu was a political activist and revolutionary. Nationalism, for Zhu, was the prime

motivation for him to change his career from teacher to military officer, because Zhu

viewed new military men as key actors in the transformation of China. Indeed, Zhu also

saw military force as an extension of the revolutionary movement and as a means to

effect change. Zhu never really separated political from military affairs, and the two

343 Jin, 297. Sutton, 21. Tien, 141. 171 were interlinked. The political radicalism within the Yunnan Military Academy offered

Zhu the opportunity to become an active revolutionary and gave him his initial

experience at covert revolutionary organization and subversion.

The political situation in Yunnanfu when Zhu De entered the Academy in 1909 was quite volatile. For Yunnanese nationalists, anti-Manchuism and anti-imperialism were linked. To be a patriot meant to be committed to overthrowing the Qing regime.

From 1909 to 1911, several incidents particularly inflamed Yunnanese nationalism. The main incident was the completion of the French railway from Vietnam into Yunnan soon after Zhu entered the Yunnan Military Academy. Many Yunnan nationalists, including

Zhu, feared that this rail link would be used by the French to expand their control of

IndoChina into the province. Later incidents included the granting in 1910 of Anglo-

French mining concessions in the province and the British occupation by force of a strategic town on the border between Burma and Yunnan. Zhu remembered that at that time, the school leaned toward revolutionary tendencies and the Yunnan governor- general, Li Jingxi, actually wanted to disband it. The school superintendent, Li Genyuan, however, sympathized with the Tongmenghui and managed to keep the school open.344

The Shikan graduates who were instructors at the Academy subtly spread revolutionary

anti-Qing ideas amongst the cadets, and turned the school into a center of radicalism.345

A Tongmenghui branch was also set up in the Academy and began to secretly

circulate revolutionary books and periodicals. Most of the instructors at the Academy, in

Zhu’s estimate, were members of the Tongmenghui, while others who were not members came under the influence of its revolutionary propaganda. Zhu himself joined the

344 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 43-44. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 383; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 378-379.

172 Tongmenghui in 1909 during his first semester at the Academy.346 His classmate, Yang

Ruxuan, noted that when Zhu entered the Academy, he had already been exposed to Sun

Yat-sen’s ideas of “Expel the leather boots (Manchus), restore China, establish a

republic, and equalize land ownership,” though Yang related that at that time no one

dared say this in public. Zhu and Yang became sworn brothers, and with seven others

organized a “Five Chinese Principles Society,” with Zhu as its leader. This group’s main

principles were to advocate exerting oneself, offering mutual support, helping enrich the

nation, developing a strong military, and rescuing the Chinese people from extinction.

But they did not advocate any specific political objectives, and spoke only about the

nation being in extreme danger. They believed that the rise or fall of China depended on

individual men of courage, and that all those who had ideals ought to support and inspire

each other.347 Similar sentiments were of course expressed by Cai E in his comments on the Quotations of Zeng and Hu.

Zhu’s conversion to active revolutionary was also derived from the intellectual influence of Cai E, who allowed Zhu to read revolutionary periodicals secretly in his library. Magazines such as Minbao or Yunnan were published by the Tongmenghui and influenced Zhu’s revolutionary thoughts. The more Zhu read, the more he came to believe that reform was not sufficient and that the overthrow of the Qing government was the only way to save China, and to achieve independence and wealth for the country.348

Thus joining the Tongmenghui was a natural step. In Zhu’s view, most of the five hundred students within the school also joined the revolutionary movement, with very

345 Sutton, 84-85, 86-88. 346 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 43-44. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 383; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 378-379. 347 Yang, 2, 3, 11.

173 few in opposition. The Academy itself, therefore, became an important center of

revolutionary activity within Yunnan province. Zhu remembered that participation in

revolutionary activities was very dangerous and had to be kept secret. If one were found

out, the penalty would be arrest and execution. Nonetheless, Zhu was very active

politically during this period and had some dealings with most of the revolutionary

activists at the Academy.349 As Zhu related to Agnes Smedley years later, there were two

Tongmenghui branches at the Academy, one for instructors and one for cadets. The

Tongmenghui members were divided into isolated cells of seven to eight members, with only one man in each cell having contact with the center; cell members knew only members within their own cell. This system was used as a way to limit betrayal. In

Zhu’s view, this cell system was borrowed from traditional Chinese secret societies such as the Gelaohui (Older Brother Society). Looking back at this period, however, Zhu also voiced criticism of the Tongmenghui for being only focused on military uprisings with no

thought to political education or forming alliances with the peasants.350

The Tongmenghui’s emphasis on military recruiting was evident in Zhu’s own

revolutionary activities while still a cadet. The Tongmenghui instructed members in the

New Armies to begin secret political work amongst the troops. Given his Sichuan origins, Zhu De was assigned to subvert the Sichuan regiment. One of the standard methods for gaining support among soldiers was to use personal connections and friends.

So Zhu looked up some soldiers he knew when he served briefly in the enlisted ranks of the Sichuan Regiment. He talked with them about their personal and economic problems,

348 Guo, 68. 349 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 43-44. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 383; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 378-379. 350 Smedley, 86-87.

174 wrote letters home for them, and then after gaining their trust he began to discuss national

issues with them. Zhu De used current events, such as the encroachment of foreign railways into Sichuan and Yunnan and foreign currency loans to Beijing to spread anti-

Manchu ideas among the regiment. In turn, Zhu was invited to take the blood oath of brotherhood to join the Gelaohui secret society, which had many members among the enlisted ranks. This membership provided Zhu with protection and a useful secret network of contacts that made Zhu’s political work within the Sichuan Regiment

easier.351

When the first one hundred cadets graduated ahead of schedule in 1911, eighteen

were assigned as junior officers under Cai E. Among the military units in Yunnanfu, the

19th Division’s 37th Brigade under Cai E was particularly riddled with officers with

revolutionary sympathies. Although Cai himself was not a Tongmenghui member, he

sympathized with them and protected them. Other officers were either active revolutionaries or actual Tongmenghui members, and were mostly mid-level officers

(i.e., battalion level commanders, particularly the Shikan graduates) and junior officers.

As the graduating cadets received their assignments, these new officers also promptly undertook revolutionary subversion amongst their men. Zhu was assigned to serve as a platoon commander in the left company (detachment) of the second battalion of the 74th

Regiment. The soldiers in this unit were mainly of peasant origin who, according to Zhu, resented the tyranny and corruption of the Qing regime, the exploitation by landlords, the physical abuse of soldiers, and the stealing of soldiers’ pay by officers in the old army.

351 Ibid., 88, 90.

175 Taking advantage of this discontent, Zhu spread revolutionary propaganda among the

troops.352

When talking about his first assignment upon being commissioned an officer, Zhu

recalled that some senior officers in the garrison did not trust the new Academy

graduates, given the revolutionary ideas circulating within the Academy at that time.

These senior officers thought the new graduates were hard to control and feared, given

revolutionary influences, that they would try to replace their seniors. So the graduates

were divided up and each regiment accepted only nine graduates each. Zhu stated that at

that time graduates of the Academy were considered the best new officers, and he

implied, with no attempt at modesty and no small amount of self promotion, that the new

graduates were superior to the existing officers in the 19th division.353

Zhu was initially assigned as a company quartermaster before assuming the duties

of a platoon commander. The second battalion commander was a Tongmenghui member

who was also from Sichuan, and therefore was willing to protect Zhu and his

revolutionary activities. Zhu, however, was contemptuous of this battalion commander,

despite his revolutionary affiliation, and considered him a coward. In Zhu’s own

assessment, most of his regiment was supportive of the revolution, the exception being

the first battalion commander. Zhu used his position as company quartermaster to

undertake mobilization work amongst the troops. In order to win over the soldiers, Zhu

often exploited hometown relationships, native place associations, Gelaohui

relationships, and used the soldiers’ opposition to abusive officers as starting points to

bring the troops over to the side of the revolutionaries. Even though higher-level Qing

352 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 384; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 379. Sutton, 84-85, 86-88.

176 officials distrusted the new graduates and did not want them near the common soldiers, they needed these new officers to train the troops. During these few months Zhu became skilled at subversion and revolutionary agitators within the army developed a tacit understanding with the rank-and-file soldiers. When revolutionaries encountered an incident where an officer was hitting a common soldier, they would express sympathy for the soldier. The agitators would also help the soldiers write letters home and teach them lessons, with the result that the relationship between the two groups improved and made the soldiers more obedient to the revolutionaries.354

As noted above, an important factor that made many common soldiers susceptible to subversion was the abuse they suffered at the hands of their superiors. Indeed, Zhu readily used the enlisted soldiers’ opposition to physical abuse as one way to mobilize their support for the 1911 uprising. As the Qing New Armies improved the training standards and requirements for officers, these officers were increasingly drawn from higher social strata. As a consequence, the social status of the officer corps improved in

Chinese society, but not for the enlisted personnel. Most officers in the armies of the late

Qing or early Republic possessed an elitist and aloof cast of mind, where officers did not mix with enlisted troops. The social distance widened between officers and men as the officer corps’ status rose, but the common soldier’s status remained low. The social gap in turn encouraged the maltreatment of soldiers. The common belief was that maltreatment toughened soldiers up for combat. Physical punishment of enlisted men was common, with troops being slapped and punched by officers or at their orders.

Flogging and severe beatings were looked upon as a way to discipline troops. In

353 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 45. 354 Ibid., 45-46.

177 addition, the troops’ physical welfare was often neglected, with officers paying little attention to soldiers living conditions. The maltreatment of soldiers was seen as an expression of officers’ contempt for their men; they commonly saw their soldiers as

expendable and replaceable.355 Zhu De mentioned that the cadets opposed the physical

and verbal abuse of soldiers, which was practiced at that time in the Yunnan Army. Zhu

was one of the leaders in the effort by Yunnan Academy cadets to change the treatment

of common soldiers. For Zhu, ending the corporal punishment of soldiers was a way to

change the minds of the enlisted troops. The cadets’ opposition did succeed in stopping

this practice.356 Zhu may have cared genuinely about the well-being of the rank-and-file

soldiers, but in the cause of revolution, he was willing to use whatever means to undermine the loyalty of Yunnan-based military units to the Qing regime.

Slowly then, junior officers and cadets spread revolutionary ideas throughout the

19th Division. Near the end of the summer of 1911, every battalion of the 74th infantry regiment, the 19th artillery regiment, and parts of the 73rd infantry regiment were

infiltrated by revolutionaries.357 Support for the revolution was not universal in the

military though. Zhu observed that while most of the troops in the New Army were

inclined toward revolution, the local provincial patrol units (xunfangjun) were generally

opposed. In general, Zhu related the old and new armies did not mix, and the old army

remained isolated from the Academy and New Army units.358 Nonetheless, with such

strong support for the revolution within the New Army, the only units that sided with the

355 Diana Lary, Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 52-53, 54-55, 56, 58. Lary’s book is a social history of warlord soldiers and does not focus on their experiences on campaign or in combat. 356 Smedley, 87-88. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 44-45. 357 Sutton, 88. 358 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 43-44. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 383; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 378-379.

178 Qing officials during the October 30, 1911 Yunnan uprising were the guard units

(weidui), xunfangying, and very new soldiers who had not been indoctrinated yet.359

Although Zhu technically served only a short period in the Qing military from

1909 to 1911, he nonetheless joined a military organization, the Yunnan Army, which carried over much of its organization, doctrine, and personnel into the early Republican period and became one of the most effective regional armies of that era. Zhu De spent his entire early military career from 1909 to 1922 serving in the Yunnan Army, rising from cadet to brigade commander. Given the high regard Zhu had for the Yunnan Army, at least through 1916 under the command of Cai E, it no doubt served as an important model for Zhu of what a modern Chinese military force should be and a military institution to emulate later in his career.

Conclusion

Assessing Zhu De’s early life, educational background, and military cadet experience offers insights into how individuals experienced the development of the late-

Qing New Armies and the revolutionary movement within the Qing military during the first decade of the twentieth century. In many ways, Zhu was similar to many educated young Chinese elites of this period, whose growing political awareness was manifested through militant nationalism and anti-Qing activism. The imperative to save the Chinese nation led Zhu De from a supporter of reformism to revolutionary activism. The one difference in Zhu’s background from the majority of his peers was his Hakka ethnicity, which could have inclined him toward more militancy and military heroism. Zhu was like many other men of his generation, though, who initially received a traditional education in order to pass the official civil service examinations to gain entry into the

359 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 45-46. 179 gentry class and officialdom. But with the abolition of the examination system in 1905,

these young educated men began to see the New Army and new military educational

system as both an opportunity to gain a Western style-education and increased social

status, and as a way to effect the transformation of China.

Zhu was one of these young men who entered one of the new provincially based

military schools of the period. To enter the Yunnan Military Academy, Zhu took the

examination route, but faced problems presented by the severe regionalism prevalent within the Qing military. Not being from Yunnan, Zhu was initially rejected by the

Academy even though he had passed the examination, but eventually gained admittance by lying about his family’s place of origin, probably like many other students. The majority of officers within the New Army division in Yunnan, it seems, were not in fact native Yunnanese. Zhu was also part of a larger migration during this period of

Sichuanese moving to Yunnan in search of work and opportunities.

As a military cadet during this period, Zhu was also fairly typical, becoming more

radicalized politically and secretly joining the Tongmenghui, where he became an active

revolutionary and a clandestine operative, and quite adept at subversion. The course of

instruction and training Zhu received at the Academy was in general similar to that in

other provincial military primary schools set up under the Qing regime. One of the major

differences was that Zhu happened to be attending one of the best of these academies,

with a high-caliber faculty that boasted the largest concentration of Shikan Gakko

graduates in China, and that emphasized military training more than the other provincial

schools.

180 The military ideas and concepts that Zhu De was exposed to were a mixture of

Chinese and Western concepts, blended together to form a hybrid Westernized military

model with Chinese characteristics. Zhu formally studied China’s military tradition, in

works such as Sun Zi, but from his childhood was also influenced by stories of Taiping

mobile and guerrilla warfare, military institutions and organization, and ideological

commitment. As a cadet, Zhu would have been taught late-Qing military theory, that was

a blend of European practice, with a strong emphasis on lessons derived from the Russo-

Japanese War. He would have read about China’s nineteenth-century military experiences suppressing the Taiping and fighting various Western imperialist powers. At the tactical level, the late-Qing military for the most part followed contemporary Western military theories that incorporated the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War into their combat doctrine, as illustrated by the Caofa combat regulations. Official Qing military concepts, doctrine, and practice were very much in the mainstream and followed the dominant European military theories of the period. During this time, Zhu’s exposure to

European military theory and practice would have been indirect through late-Qing military regulations, doctrine, and training; and through the Westernized military culture found in the Academy and the 19th Division.

Probably one of the most important and lasting influences on Zhu while at the

Yunnan Military Academy was his relationship with Cai E. Indeed, Zhu seems to have

begun to model himself on his teacher. For Zhu, Cai E represented the ideal patriotic officer dedicated to saving the nation, who was selfless and courageous, and whose whole being was dedicated to a cause. Cai E was also one of the most prominent Chinese military theorists of the period. His military ideas encompassed the need to cultivate a

181 martial spirit in Chinese society, a comparison and critique of traditional Chinese military

thought and modern European theory, and a realistic assessment of China’s current

military situation. In general, Cai E’s military ideas ran counter to the official Qing

doctrine of the period that emphasized the offensive, which was also popular among

European theorists. Cai concluded that a defensive strategy was more appropriate for

China. It would allow China to emulate both the Boer strategy against the British and the

Russian strategy against Napoleon and “lure the enemy in deep.” In addition to Cai E,

Zhu would have been familiar with Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary military theories that

emphasized the power of the revolutionary spirit and the use of the Boer War and Boer

soldiers as models. Both Cai’s and Sun Yat-sen’s military ideas were in many ways

critiques of current Qing military practice and provided Zhu with alternative perspectives

on the Chinese military system that Zhu would draw on later in his career.

By the fall of 1911, Zhu was part of a highly politicized Yunnan military force that included both the 19th Division and the Yunnan Military Academy. The next chapter

will assess how Zhu De put his training into practice, in both military and political fields,

during the outbreak of the October 1911 Yunnan military uprising.

182 Chapter 3: Early Military Experience 1911-1912

Zhu De was typical of other officers in provincial armies of the early Republican

period and his experience provides a means to assess the military campaigns and armies

of the early Republican Era. This chapter will describe his participation in the 1911

Revolution in Yunnan and assess the characteristics, strategy, and tactics of the armies of the early Chinese Republic. The military uprising in Yunnan on October 30, 1911 was

Zhu De’s initial baptism of fire where he distinguished himself as a junior officer and

where his leadership abilities under fire came to the notice of the revolt’s leader, General

Cai E. An assessment of the general characteristics of the Yunnan Army and other

provincial armies in this chapter will provide a bridge between the state of military institutions and practices of the late Qing dynasty, described in the previous chapter, and

subsequent changes in the early Republic. Qing military institutions and theory certainly

informed the behavior and operations of early Republican armies, but their officers also

had to adapt military theory to the realities of the battlefield in numerous operations

during the first decade of the Chinese Republic. In the realm of strategy, campaign plans

had to reflect the constraints of geography, especially when conducting military

operations in the interior of China, such as in Sichuan or Yunnan, where most of the

topography was mountainous, interspersed by deep river valleys, and with few if any

modern roads. Tactically, armies of the period implemented the tactical training they had

inherited from the late Qing military reform period, but also had to adapt these tactics to

the realities of the operational environment, evolving military institutions, weapons

technology, and manpower. Zhu’s military experience during this period was formative

and would influence his later approach to military command, training, discipline,

183 strategy, and tactics, as well as his overall views on what an effective military force

should look like and what values it should embody.

During this period, Zhu could readily compare and contrast other regional armies

with the Yunnan Army. At least through 1917, the Yunnan Army was exceptional when

compared to other provincial ones. It was more professional, better disciplined,

possessed higher esprit de corps, and had better leadership. The Yunnan Army was as

close as this period would come to a prototype of a national army, one that was politically

committed to a cause and professional in outlook. In Zhu De’s eyes, the Yunnan Army

prior to 1917 had not yet succumbed to the corrupt practices of warlord armies. What

made the Yunnan Army of this period so exceptional could be found in the character of its officer corps, the quality of its enlisted personnel, and its training and discipline. Zhu could contrast the conduct of the Yunnan Army with that of other provincial armies and he could identify what factors led to success and what were detrimental in the operation of an army and its conduct on campaign. Given his intelligence and perceptive abilities,

Zhu could readily gather the lessons that would help him later to create and lead the

Communist Red Army.

The 1911 Revolution

State of Chinese Military Forces on the Eve of 1911 Revolution

The Qing military establishment that Zhu De entered upon his graduation from

the Yunnan Military Academy was a chaotic mixture of traditional and modernized

forces operating under the authority of national, provincial, or local governments. In

1911, the modern and semi-modern military forces under the Qing consisted of the New

Army (xinjun) and the Patrol and Defense troops (xunfangying). The main mission of the

184 New Army was national defense, while the function of the xunfangying, which had been

created from more traditional forces, was to maintain internal order and quell local

revolts, and to act as a reserve for the New Armies during wartime. By October 1911,

only fourteen divisions and twenty brigades of the New Army had been organized, with

seven of those divisions and three mixed brigades assigned to the Beiyang Army in the

northeast. All the divisions were at approximately two-thirds strength and the brigades

varied from 2,000 to 6,000 troops each. The actual combatant strength of the New Army

in October 1911 was estimated at 190,000 to 266,000. The estimates for the number of

personnel in the xunfangying for 1911 vary, from approximately 277,000 to 334,000.

The xunfangying were provincially organized and controlled units that served as garrison

troops. They were composed mostly of infantry and cavalry units armed with older rifles

(the model 1888 Mauser) compared to the more modern armaments of the New Army.

The remainder of the forces in the Qing military consisted of remnants of the traditional

Eight Banners, the Army of the Green Standard, and various other provincial forces. By

1911, the Banner troops and the Army of the Green Standard were, however, of little

military value, had little or no training, and were considered unreliable.360

After graduating from the Yunnan Military Academy in July 1911, Zhu De

assumed the rank equivalent to a second lieutenant, but was not given command of any

troops because Qing officials distrusted the new graduates and doubted their loyalty to the Qing regime. Instead, the new graduates were separated into small groups and scattered throughout the units of the New Army in Yunnan, and assigned as trainees or as aides to do odd jobs for senior officers. In his first weeks as a junior officer, Zhu was

360 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 38-39. Powell, 287-289, 296-297.

185 assigned as an adjutant to a company commander to act, in essence, as his personal

servant. Zhu was then transferred to Cai E’s 37th Brigade, where he first served as a

company quartermaster and then was assigned to the second battalion of the 74th regiment to serve as a platoon commander.361 Both Zhu’s regimental commander, Luo Peijin, and

his battalion commander, Liu Cunhou, were active revolutionaries, with Luo also being a

Tongmenghui member. Given his superior officers’ complicity in revolutionary activity,

Zhu could continue his own revolutionary agitation and mobilization of the troops undisturbed.362

The 1911 Revolution in Yunnan

The October 30, 1911 Yunnan Army revolted in response to the successful

military uprising in the Hubei provincial capital of Wuchang on October 10, 1911. As

noted in the previous chapter, many New Army units had been infiltrated by

revolutionaries and were ripe for revolt against the Qing regime. Revolutionary

infiltration was particularly strong in the Hubei New Army and this contributed to the

success of the Wuchang uprising. But the uprising itself started prematurely as an act of

desperation when revolutionary activities within the Hubei New Army were exposed by

Qing authorities. Because of the lack of resolve of the Qing governor-general and his

senior military commanders, who fled their posts, the revolt spread, with most of the New

Army units in the area joined the uprising. The result was that the Wuhan area came

under Republican revolutionary control. Part of the xunfangying forces remained loyal,

361 Smedley, 93. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 384; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 379. 362 Sutton, 84-85.

186 but they were quickly defeated by the rebels.363 With the success of the uprising in

Wuchang, military revolts allied with various provincial revolutionary groups spread to other provinces, including the uprising by the Yunnan New Army on October 30. Within one month, thirteen provinces had declared independence from the Qing regime. In these provinces, most all the New Army units went over to the revolutionaries.364

The October 30, 1911 Yunnan Army uprising was the first time that Zhu De saw actual military action. During the uprising, Zhu was able to see first-hand the application of the dual strategy of subversion and coercion to defeat an adversary. The revolutionaries first used political subversion within an army unit to persuade soldiers to oppose the Qing regime and join the revolutionary cause. If this failed and the units remained loyal to the Qing, the revolutionaries had to organize sufficient military force to defeat them. During his time as a cadet, Zhu had gained experience infiltrating and subverting various military units in Yunnanfu to convince them to support the revolution.

Zhu continued these activities after his graduation when he became a junior officer in the

Yunnan New Army. The political and military experience Zhu gained while participating in the uprising certainly illustrated that there were different ways to overcome an adversary besides the direct use of military force. Undermining an adversary’s morale and convincing him to join the other side was certainly more cost effective than engaging him in battle. This was a lesson that Zhu De later applied during the early operations of the Red Army.

363 For a description of the Wuchang uprising, see Joseph W. Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 178-182. 364 Powell, 306-308. For a more detailed analysis of the role of the New Army in the revolution see Edmund S. K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980). Also see Fung’s earlier article ,“Military Subversion in the Chinese Revolution of 1911.” Modern Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (Feb. 1975): 103-123.

187 According to Zhu De, as soon as Yunnan Governor-General Li Jingxi was informed of the Wuchang uprising of October 10, he canceled the annual fall maneuvers of the New Army in Yunnan and took all its ammunition away, fearing it would also mutiny. Li fortified his yamen, transferred units of the old army to Yunnanfu, and assigned a guard battalion, an army service battalion, and two machine-gun companies to

defend the yamen. Li also removed Luo Peijin from command of the 74th regiment

because Li doubted his loyalty, though Li still believed that Cai E was trustworthy.

Finally Li issued directives to arrest revolutionaries, planning to execute them. Li’s units, however, were too deeply infiltrated with revolutionaries for these measures to succeed.

For instance, the commander of the machine-gun battalion, Li Fenglou, was sympathetic

to the revolutionaries and warned the Tongmenghui of the governor-general’s plans. Cai

E also managed to convince Li Jingxi to go on with the fall maneuvers and to issue ammunition to the New Army units to avoid the impression that the Qing government was afraid. This, of course, played right into revolutionary hands. Revolutionaries advised the troops to put aside some of their ammunition for a possible uprising. Zhu confirmed this by relating that the soldiers had each secretly saved four to five cartridges.365 Meanwhile political subversion of potentially loyalist forces intensified.

Thus, right after the Wuchang uprising, the leaders of the local Tongmenghui assigned

Zhu to undertake political agitation among the bodyguards of an old Yunnan army

divisional commander, located in a village outside Yunnanfu. Zhu again made contact

365 Smedley, 93-94. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 384-385; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 379-380.

188 through Gelaohui secret society members within this unit, and his efforts apparently met

with success as these troops later joined the revolutionaries and shot their officers.366

After the October 10 Wuchang revolt there was increased agitation from junior officers (lieutenants and cadets) to stage an uprising in support of the Wuchang mutineers. Most middle-ranking officers along with the Shikan Academy graduates and

Cai E, however, were more cautious because of the uncertainty over the fate of revolts in other provinces. On October 22, this group of middle-ranking revolutionaries did take a secret blood oath to cooperate with each other, but they still made no plans to stage an uprising. It was only on October 28, under the threat that Qing officials would find out about their revolutionary affiliations and move against them, that a majority of the officers were convinced to stage a revolt.367

The uprising was set to begin on the evening of October 30. Because New Army

units were stationed in the suburbs of Yunnanfu, the revolutionaries needed to capture the

walled city itself, where the governor-general’s yamen, other government offices, and the

armory were all located. Cai E’s 37th Brigade consisting of the 73rd and 74th infantry

regiments would lead the assault on the city. The plan was for the 74th regiment and the

19th artillery regiment to act in concert with the 73rd regiment to enter the city from the

west and the north. Meanwhile military school cadets along with other students inside

the city were tasked with opening the city gates for the revolutionary units. If everything

went according to plan, by dawn the revolutionary forces would occupy strategic

positions around the city. The main attack could then begin with forces led by the

military school commandant, Li Genyuan, capturing government offices in the northern

366 Smedley, 94. 367 Sutton, 91.

189 part of Yunnanfu, which included the armory. Meanwhile Cai E’s forces would capture the governor-general’s yamen and other strategic points in the southern part of the city.368

These plans depended, of course, on the ability of the revolutionaries to bring most of the

New Army over to the revolutionary cause. Their success would indicate how disaffected junior officers and enlisted personnel were with the Qing regime.369

At that time, the 73rd regiment was stationed in a suburb north of the city at the army’s northern drill grounds, while Zhu’s 74th regiment was stationed in a southern suburb at Wujiaba near the southern drill grounds. The uprising was originally set to begin at midnight October 30. But at 8:00 p.m., the Tongmenghui leadership heard that they had been betrayed and that Governor-General Li Jingxi was planning to arrest them all. This precipitated a premature start of the uprising at 9:00 p.m.370 Zhu related that

Cai E arrived at the southern drill ground, took direct charge of the 74th regiment, and declared that the Yunnan uprising had begun. By 9:00 p.m., according to Zhu, all troops had cut off their queues and raised a red banner with the character for Han in the center

(defining the uprising as a revolt of the Han Chinese people against their Manchu rulers).

Cai E, accompanied by Tongmenghui leaders, made a speech announcing that he had been elected commander in chief, and that the New Army would overthrow Qing rule in

Yunnan. They would then join with the other thirteen provinces that had already declared independence and establish a Republican military government. Zhu was appointed a company commander by Cai E because Zhu’s own company commander, a

368 Ibid., 91-92. 369 Ibid., 92. 370 Smedley, 94-95.

190 loyalist, had fled.371 The rebel units on the south drill grounds then began their march north toward the city. En route the 19th artillery regiment joined the insurrection, while

most of the cavalry regiment also joined.372

As the 74th regiment began to march north, Zhu’s unit heard gunfire coming from

north of the city, indicating a premature and uncoordinated attack on the city had

begun.373 Li Genyuan and most of the 73rd regiment had prematurely started the attack

on the city. They had hoped to capture the north and west gates of the city, burn the

regimental headquarters at the north parade ground to keep it from loyalist troops, and

seize the provincial armory without the help of Cai E’s forces. After successfully

entering the city, the 73rd regiment’s units attacked the armory but met with strong

resistance. While most of the New Army had gone over to the Revolution, Qing officials

in the city could still rely on loyalist support of guard units, the transport battalion, some military police units, one machine gun company, and some xunfangying units. Once revolutionary forces had entered the city’s gates, the Qing loyalist forces, only recourse was to hole up in government buildings and other strategic points in the city, focusing mainly on the governor-general’s yamen and the armory. These loyalist forces initially put up a stiff defense and inflicted numerous casualties on the insurgents. 374

At this point, Cai E’s force, consisting of the 74th regiment and the 19th artillery regiment, were still south of the city and hurried to the fighting, not arriving at the east gate of the city until 2:00 a.m. On the way they were also joined by a portion of the

371 Smedley, 95. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 385; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 379-380. 372 Smedley, 95-96. 373 Ibid., 96. 374 Sutton, 93.

191 machine-gun battalion.375 After their own successful entry into the city through the south

gate, Zhu’s unit was ordered to attack the governor-general’s yamen, where Qing

loyalists were preparing to make a last stand. But as soon as they started the assault the

Qing security battalion and machine gun units defending the yamen surrendered.

According to Zhu’s account, this was because of the subversion work previously

undertaken by revolutionaries within these units that had compromised their loyalty and convinced them not to fight.376 Yang Ruxuan, a fellow junior officer serving with Zhu

De, confirmed that Zhu himself had previously cultivated a relationship with the

personnel in the governor-general’s security battalion. 377 Zhu’s account of the capture of

the yamen also noted, however, that the loyalist troops were surprised on the morning of

October 31 that the revolutionary forces had already occupied the city walls, set up

artillery on them, and had began to open fire on the yamen as the assault began. Zhu

related that his unit even suffered three killed from friendly artillery fire as his unit

entered the yamen. So military factors may have also played a role in the yamen’s quick

surrender. Indeed Yang Ruxian noted that the revolutionaries were able to convince the

security battalion to surrender quickly as a result of a combination of political strategy

and military force.378

The fiercest and most prolonged military action focused on the loyalist defense of

Wuhuashan and the arsenal (armory) in the northern section of the city. Zhu commented

that the artillery bombardment of the arsenal forced it to surrender by 12 noon, while the

bombardment of Wuhuashan, which also killed the loyalist 19th Division commander

375 Ibid., 92-93. 376 Smedley, 96-97. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 385; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 380-381. 377 Yang, 3.

192 Zhong Lintong, lasted into the evening of October 31.379 While New Army forces had initiated the uprising, it was in fact resistance from within the New Army that also marked the end of the battle for Yunnanfu. Some parts of the 73rd regiment remained under the control of officers, especially those from the Beiyang Army, who remained loyal to the Qing government.380 On the evening of October 31, these loyalist elements

of the 73rd regiment, along with some xunfangying forces, launched a counterattack.

When this attack was defeated, revolutionary control of the provincial capital was secured.381

It is clear that the triumph of the Yunnan uprising was due to both successful

political subversion and military action. In recalling the uprising later to Smedley,

though, Zhu seemed to downplay the intensity of the fighting by claiming that the

revolutionaries only suffered 40 killed and 100 wounded. According to Zhu’s account,

Qing resistance crumbled quickly and easily, and he stated, “The dynasty was so rotten

that when we blew on it, it collapsed.”382 In contrast, according to historian Donald

Sutton, the fighting was considered very fierce, with official casualty figures for the

fighting of October 30-31 at 200 killed and 100 injured for the Qing loyalists, and 150

killed and 300 injured for the insurgents.383 A possible reason for Zhu to minimize the

severity of the resistance to the revolution was to imply that the revolutionaries’ cause

was just and that the fall of the Qing was inevitable. By suggesting that most everyone

378 Ibid., 3. 379 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 48. Zhu gave different accounts of the actual timing of the fall of the arsenal. Contrary to his comment that artillery bombardment had breached the arsenal walls by 12 noon on October 31, he told Agnes Smedley that the arsenal’s walls were actually breached in the early morning hours before dawn on October 31. See Smedley, 96. 380 Sutton, 92. 381 Ibid., 93. 382 Smedley, 97. 383 Sutton, 94.

193 would have supported the uprising, Zhu downplayed the reality that there were many who

still supported the Qing regime. By the time that Zhu gave his account to Smedley, he

was no doubt long accustomed to putting the priority on political ideals and motivations.

Nonetheless, from the actual circumstances of the Yunnan uprising, there is little doubt

that the lessons Zhu learned from this event was the importance of both political indoctrination and a strong military foundation.

A special feature of the uprising was the strict discipline maintained by the New

Army, which resulted in very few civilian casualties. After the insurgents had taken over

Yunnanfu, strict order was maintained and the death penalty was stipulated for any officer or soldier who engaged in looting, pillaging, rape, spreading false rumors, or abusing or refusing to pay merchants. In Donald Sutton’s view, the disciplined 19th

Division troops were unlike other New Army units that revolted in Southern China. For example, Sutton characterizes the Wuchang troops as “undisciplined and poorly trained insurgent forces.” In contrast, Sutton views the 19th Division as equivalent to the best

units in the Beiyang Army in North China.384 This view is supported by Zhu De’s

observation that throughout the uprising New Army units were very well disciplined and

kept good order inside the city.385

What were the factors then that accounted for the 19th Division’s superior order

and discipline? Despite the ascendancy of radical junior officers within the army during

the uprising, and the very active role they played in combat, mid-level officers and

academy instructors were able to maintain command of 19th Division units throughout the

insurrection. In Sutton’s view, mid-level officers in the Yunnan New Army were more

384 Ibid., 94. 385 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 48.

194 successful in keeping control over radical junior officers than other New Army units in

other provinces because in Yunnan a “triple bond” linked mid-level officers to their

radical subordinates. These bonds centered on the teacher-pupil relationship, a shared

nationalist-republican commitment, and military obedience to superior officers in the

chain of command.386 These bonds not only contributed to the success of the uprising, but to the ability of the military to establish its dominance over Yunnan society and

government in the aftermath of the uprising.

The Yunnan Military Government

On November 1, 1911, the New Army insurgents set up a military government to

govern Yunnan. This government was authoritarian in nature, with army officers

monopolizing all important posts in the new government structure with little civilian

involvement. Most of these officers had been battalion or regimental commanders in the

19th Division stationed in Yunnanfu, while Cai E was designated as military governor of

Yunnan.387 Meanwhile, immediately after the uprising in Yunnanfu, Zhu, in command

of a company, was assigned to patrol the streets of Yunnanfu in order to be “vigilant

against reactionaries and protecting revolutionaries.”388

Despite the calm in Yunnanfu after the uprising, Zhu De observed that it was a

more chaotic situation outside the city and that it would take some time for the new

government to complete the pacification of the rest of the province.389 One concern for

the insurgents was the potential for loyalist resistance from xunfangying (provincial

army) units garrisoned at various points around the province. Yang Ruxuan estimated that

386 Sutton, 95-96. 387 Ibid., 96-97. 388 Smedley, 97. 389 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 49.

195 there were around forty xunfangying battalions, totaling more than 10,000 soldiers. Most

of these units did not resist and turned in their weapons to the revolutionaries.390 But the new military government in Yunnanfu had to dispatch troops to other parts of Yunnan to

deal with those xunfangying units that did remain loyal to the Qing, most of whom were

quickly defeated.391 Meanwhile, the military government also had to disperse people’s

militia (minjun) composed of peasant bands allied with secret societies and Revolutionary

Alliances groups, suppress bandits, and reestablish control over the local gentry who had

taken over local district governments.392 It took the new military government from

November 1911 to February 1912 to gain full control over Yunnan.

A different kind of problem for the new government arose in regard to the New

Army 38th Brigade stationed outside of Yunnanfu: the 76th infantry regiment was

garrisoned at Dali, Yongchang, and Tengyue in western Yunnan, and the 75th regiment at

Linan south of Yunnanfu. Both of these regiments had mutinied on November 1 in

support of the revolution.393 But both of them quickly descended into chaos due to poor

discipline, with some troops deserting their units and others looting in their garrison

areas.394 Both units soon became involved in various internal conflicts and conflicts with

other military groups, and as their control broke down the local gentry seized the

opportunity to assert its authority over local governance.395

Both of these New Army units also suffered the consequences of uncontrolled

recruitment, seen in the rapid expansion of provincial armies in many areas during the

390 Yang, 3. 391 Smedley, 96-97. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 385; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 380-381. Zhu De, Zhu De Zishu, 49. 392 Sutton, 101. 393 Smedley, 96-97. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 385; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 380-381. 394 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 49; Sutton, 102.

196 Revolution. Such unrestrained recruitment could have dire effects on the discipline and

cohesion of a unit, especially when it came time to pay these new troops. The expansion

of the 75th regiment stationed at Linan provides a good example of such problems. In

the month after the October 30 Yunnan uprising, the regiment’s commander added another battalion to the regiment without the new Yunnan government’s authorization.

The recruits for this new battalion were ill disciplined local volunteers of questionable origin, including some veterans from disbanded xunfangying units. This led to a

December 3, 1911 mutiny among these new 75th regiment troops who were angered by

the lack of bounty payments for the newly raised recruits.396 The mutineers stole arms

from the arsenal and raided the treasury. Order collapsed in Linan and part of the city

was looted and burned. Military forces from Yunnanfu had to be dispatched to Linan to

end the disorder.397 Zhu De was the officer actually assigned the task of quelling the

army revolt in Linan. This assignment showed Cai E’s confidence in Zhu’s political and military abilities, which was confirmed by Zhu’s successful resolution of the problem.398

The reason why New Army troops of the 38th Brigade stationed outside Yunnanfu

did not behave as well the 37th Brigade in Yunnanfu during the uprising was because of

the different composition of the officer corps in the outlying garrisons. Within the 38th

Brigade, there were only two Shikan Academy graduates and a very small number of military course graduates in the junior officer ranks. Revolutionary penetration of these military units was also more uneven.399 The 38th Brigade therefore lacked the “triple

395 Sutton, 102. 396 Sutton, 106. Withholding bounty payments or enlistment bonuses to new recruits was a very serious matter for the sum of money could be substantial, sometimes equivalent to a year’s wages for a laborer. For more information on the financial motivations to enlist, see Lary, 18-19. 397 Sutton, 106. 398 Yang, 3. 399 Sutton, 106-107.

197 bond” that linked its officer corps and resulted in a less cohesive and disciplined force.

The lesson Zhu De may have learned from the disintegration of the units of the 38th

Brigade was the need for a cohesive officer corps to maintain order and discipline within a military force.

Cai E’s policies as Yunnan’s military governor toward administration, finance, foreign and defense policy, governance, politics, and nationalism all may have influenced

Zhu De’s own views on these issues, both positively and negatively. (See Figure 6, for a portrait of Cai E during this period.) Under the governorship (dudu) of first Cai E (1911-

13) and then Tang Jiyao (1914-15) life in Yunnan province, with a population of

approximately twenty million in 1911, did not change much during the first years of the

Republic. The military government in Yunnanfu took a pragmatic approach to

governance and formed an alliance with the local gentry and merchants. The gentry had

an incentive to collaborate with the new regime in Yunnanfu as long as their local

198 authority was left intact and the military protected them from bandits and rioters. The

new military government, in turn, needed a quick restoration of order and uninterrupted

inflow of tax revenues. A functioning tax system was required to pay for the upkeep of

the Yunnan Army and allow the military government to exert influence outside of

Yunnan. The result was the restoration of the traditional social order that left the local

gentry and local elites in control.400 Restoring Yunnan finances and administration was

critical to maintaining order and keeping the soldiers of the Yunnan Army paid on a

regular basis. Unpaid soldiers were apt to become a danger to the community and prone

to looting and banditry.401 An early example of this danger was the December 1911 mutiny of the 75th regiment at Linan over unpaid enlistment bounties.

Under the new regime, rural poverty continued, but Yunnan was also mostly free

of rural banditry, unlike the neighboring provinces of Guizhou and Guangxi. Despite its

compromise with local elites, Cai E’s administration was still reform oriented. The main

focus of this reform effort was primary education, although even this was hampered by

funding shortages and opposition from conservative elites. Donald Sutton notes an

overall decline in the reform movement after 1913 that occurred not just in Yunnan but

also in other provinces, due to a decline in central direction from Beijing, as well as

financial constraints that lowered the quality of the civil administration. Nonetheless,

from 1912 to 1915, neither the poverty of Yunnan nor the decline of the civil

administration adversely affected the functioning of the Yunnan Army. The military

continued to consume seventy percent of the Yunnan provincial budget. Because it

maintained a modern professional military culture, the Yunnan Army could insulate itself

400 Sutton, 111-113. 401 Lary, 43.

199 from the problems affecting Chinese society. In addition, because its personnel

continued to have a sense of patriotic purpose and the bonds within the officer corps and

toward enlisted ranks remained strong, the army could maintain itself as an effective and

coherent organization.402

Zhu De’s retrospective assessment of Cai E’s governance of Yunnan, however,

was fairly critical. The limitations of the 1911 Revolution, according to Zhu, were that

the “radical bourgeois revolutionaries” did not see the need to abolish the existing

economic system and carry out agrarian reform. This, in Zhu’s opinion, allowed the old

order to continue to exist. Zhu’s direct criticism of his mentor Cai E, though, was more

blunted. According to Zhu, even if only acting within the existing structure of state

power, Cai did carry out some reforms. For example, Cai did try to reform the army and

government by replacing some county magistrates and officers from the old army with

younger, more reform-minded individuals. In the financial realm, Zhu characterized Cai

E as an advocate of thrift.403 In order to ensure that soldiers were paid, Cai made all

officers economize and set a cap on the monthly salaries of battalion commanders and

above at sixty yuan. This resulted in a substantial amount of money being saved that

could be used to support more troops and to balance the provincial budget. Overall, then,

Zhu characterized Cai E’s governorship as very successful, because Cai had established a

fairly clean and honest government and Yunnan Army soldiers genuinely saw themselves

as a national army.404 To the extent that Cai had some success with his reformist

402 Sutton, 141-142. 403 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 386; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 381. 404 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 53.

200 policies, he no doubt had some influence on Zhu’s continued progressive approach to politics.

Cai E’s governorship also had to overcome Yunnanese provincialism. Since he was originally from Hunan, he faced suspicion from the native Yunnan elite. Certainly

Cai E’s actions only fed this nativist suspicion. He had a personal guard unit composed of five hundred Hunanese troops. In addition, he favored non-Yunnanese officers and fellow Shikan Academy graduates (some of whom were from Yunnan, but who did not have close ties to the Yunnan elite or the rest of the Yunnan Army) to serve in his government. This preference could be one reason why Cai favored and promoted Zhu

De, who was from Sichuan. Cai was able to govern successfully despite being non-

Yunnanese, because he could rely on his fellow Shikan Academy graduates and fellow revolutionaries to help run the province.405 One might imagine that Cai’s various

strategies, good and bad, for dealing with the problem of provincialism prepared Zhu for

his later role in the Red Army where he would also have to deal with officers and men

from many provinces.

In foreign policy, Cai E desired a more assertive approach toward the British and

the French, but acknowledged Yunnan’s weakness. He did work to strengthen the border

with British Burma and asserted Chinese rights and the Yunnan government’s control

over native tribes along the frontier. In regard to French Indochina, Cai E made sure the railroad line from Indochina to Yunnanfu was well patrolled and defended against bandits to ensure that the French would have no excuse to intervene. At the same time, Cai E made plans to blow up the rail line if war ever broke out with the French in Indochina.406

405 Sutton, 143-144, 146. 406 Ibid., 147.

201 As part of this policy, Zhu De was sent by Cai E in 1913 to conduct counterinsurgency

operations against tribes and bandits in southeastern Yunnan, in order to reassert

Yunnanfu’s authority over this area. In national defense policy, Cai E was well aware of

China’s weaknesses. Therefore he advocated a mostly defensive strategy that would use

Boer guerrilla tactics and the Russian strategy used against Napoleon to defend China

against foreign aggression. Thus Cai E actually put into practice the defensive strategy

he had advocated in his 1911 Quotations of Zeng and Hu Regarding the Administration

of the Armed Forces. However, he also supported an occasional show of force when he

sent Yunnan troops to help pacify Tibet in July 1912. This was partly done to bolster Cai

E’s and the Yunnan Army’s reputation among Chinese nationalists.407 Cai’s strong

nationalist motivation and aspiration may also have been an important influence in

directing Zhu De’s future political orientation toward broader national goals, in contrast

to other Republican military officers who became caught up in more narrow personal and

interest politics.

In governance, Cai E believed in a strong centralized state and that federalism was unsuitable for China. A central government in Beijing should have control over all military, diplomatic, and financial matters, and appoint all senior provincial officials. Cai

believed the main reason why China continued to have problems was because the government lacked legal authority to enhance the power of the state. Thus, during the

first years of the Republic, Cai E supported Yuan Shikai, and opposed the “Second

Revolution” led by Sun Yat-sen against Yuan’s growing power, even though Cai also

407 Ibid., 148.

202 ultimately lost faith in Yuan because of the continued instability of the central

government. 408

Cai E also distrusted political parties and he withheld his support of the newly

formed GMD in 1912 because he saw parties as a source of partisanship and instability.

Cai’s dislike of political parties stemmed from his view of the military’s role in society,

which was influenced by the Japanese concept that military officers should act as a moral

and patriotic example for the rest of society. The idealization of the military and the

denigration of political parties led Cai to propose that military personnel should not hold

political party membership. Cai believed that army organization and its command and

control would be undermined if its personnel were allowed to become members of

political parties. He believed that officers and the army should be above politics and lead

the nation to “unity, strength, and progress.”409 Cai E’s ideas may have influenced Zhu

De’s later beliefs on the role of the military in Chinese society and the military’s relations

with civilian authority. This potential influence is perhaps most evident in Zhu De’s dispute with Mao during the Jinggangshan period (1928-29) concerning the extent of

Communist Party control over the military and whether political or military imperatives

should take precedence. At least in this early period, Zhu took a position opposed to

strong party control of the army. Even if Mao ultimately won this battle in demanding that the party control the gun, a residual influence might be seen in the way in which army commanders, represented by men like Zhu De, were accepted as full partners rather

than subordinates of civilian leaders in the party’s top hierarchy.

408 Ibid., 148-150. 409 Sutton, 151-152. See also Tien, 131-133.

203 The Chinese Military of the Early Republic and Warlord Period

An assessment of the general characteristics of the Yunnan Army and other

provincial armies of the early Republic can help provide a better understanding of the

military operations that Zhu De participated in from 1912 to 1920 and put his military

experiences into a broader context. This assessment presents only a very broad sketch of

what typical Chinese armies were like during this period and compares them with the

Yunnan Army.

Organization

During the 1911 Revolution, provincial military establishments swelled with new

recruits. Because of dire fiscal constraints, however, these forces subsequently had to

disband large numbers of soldiers. It was particularly the policy of the central

government under Yuan Shikai to reduce the overall size of provincial military forces

(though not necessarily the Beiyang Army that he controlled) to ease the enormous drain

on national finances. This was especially true of New Army units, which were the most

expensive to maintain, and therefore experienced periods of rapid growth followed by

reductions in personnel.410 From 1911 to 1915, the Yunnan Army went through major expansion and contraction phases. At the time of the 1911 Revolution, the Yunnan Army numbered 12,000, but grew to over 18,000 by August 1912. In 1912, the Yunnan Army had 3,000 troops in Guizhou, 3,000 on the frontier with Tibet, and 12,700 within Yunnan itself. During this period, the old 19th division was redesignated as the First Division of

the Yunnan Army. In 1913, the Yunnan Army created a Second Division, but it existed

at no more than half strength, while a smaller Third Division existed mostly on paper.

During the 1915 budget cuts, the Yunnan Army was reduced to 13,500, with 7,500 in the

204 First Division and 6,000 in the Second Division. Within a few months the whole force

was further reduced to a total of 6,700. Yunnan also had a force of 1,200 modern

gendarmerie, along with older defense troops (xunfangying), which numbered around

7,000. The xunfangying units continued to remain separate and distinct from the New

Army units.411

Officer Corps

One of the common characteristics of the early Republican-era army officer corps

was the formation of military cliques and factions. Three main factors account for the

cohesion of military factions during this period: personal associations, ideological ties, and calculations of self-interest.412 Personal associations could include family ties,

marriage ties, teacher-student ties, school ties, institutional relationships, or similar

geographical origins. The most important non-family tie in military faction building in

the early Republican era was that between teacher and student. Institutional ties would

include superior-subordinate relationships, which could also include patronage ties. In

general, geographical ties were also strong among the militarists, with senior officers

showing a preference for recruiting people from their own provinces and districts.413

Attendance at the same military school, membership in the same graduating class, and friendships formed at school held special meaning for most officers, and could also form the basis for factions. For example, the graduates of Baoding, the Shikan Gakko, and eventually the Huangpu Academy, maintained close ties with one another after

410 Young, 100-102. 411 Sutton, 169-170. 412 Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 36. Even though Chi begins his assessment of military factions in 1916, some of the factors that characterized these factions manifested themselves before 1916. 413 Ch’i, 36, 39-41, 44-45.

205 graduation that frequently formed the basis of various militarist factions.414 During the

1912-15 period, the senior and mid-level officers of the Yunnan Army were dominated by Shikan Academy graduates, such as Cai E and Tang Jiyao; while junior officers, like

Zhu De, were mostly Yunnan Military Academy graduates.415

The majority of militarists of this period had only implicit or unarticulated

ideologies. On the whole, they did not attempt to articulate their political or moral

principles or raise them to conscious level. Therefore, they could not use ideology to win

over followers to their faction. A smaller group of militarists had explicit ideologies and

articulated them. There were two possible forms of indoctrination; one was where there

was no organized attempt at indoctrination of the soldiers, but the ideology was

determined by the unit’s commander; the other was a formal and systematic

indoctrination of the rank-and-file that would enhance the unit’s internal solidarity.416

During the early Republican period of 1911-1916, there were instances where ideology

became a major factor in group cohesion, such as the revolutionary groups within the

military in 1911, which possessed a strong ideological commitment to the overthrow of

the Qing regime. In 1916, the National Protection (huguo) movement developed an anti-

monarchist ideology that was a powerful motivating force against the policies of Yuan

Shikai. While ideology did help generate group cohesion in certain instances, it did so by

working in conjunction with traditional ties and relationships. Indeed, personal

relationships where militarists owed loyalty to a particular leader were probably the most

414 Ch’i, 41-43. The continuing importance of school ties into the later Republican era can be seen in the composition of the faculty of the GMD founded Huangpu Military Academy in 1924. Baoding Military Academy graduates occupied most intermediate level faculty posts, comprising about twenty percent of faculty; while lower level faculty were mostly Yunnan Military Academy graduates, who comprised about sixty percent of the faculty. See Ch’i, 43. 415 Sutton, 84-85, 174-175. 416 Ch’i, 54-56.

206 important factor in shaping militarist factions, leading to the characterization of many armies of this period as personal armies.417

Zhu De of course had a strong student-teacher and subordinate-superior relationship with Cai E, who acted as Zhu’s mentor and patron. Zhu’s rapid promotion from lieutenant to brigade commander from 1911 to 1916 was due to Cai E’s patronage.

Zhu also benefited from being a graduate of the Yunnan Military Academy, which created close ties with fellow officers who had graduated from the same school and in his class year. These relationships became especially important later on when Zhu sought the assistance of fellow classmate Fan Shisheng after the failure of the Communist uprisings in 1927. Also assisting Zhu during his early career were his ties to sworn brotherhoods and secret societies, such as the Gelaohui, members of which were scattered throughout the Yunnan Army. As a Sichuan native, Zhu did not have strong geographical ties to most of his fellow junior officers, most of whom were from Yunnan.

At the same time, many of the senior leaders of the Yunnan Army were not from Yunnan

(including Cai E who was from Hunan), which weakened the political force of provincialism in the Yunnan Army.

The muting of provincialism in the Yunnan Army was also facilitated by a more professional and non-personalistic organization compared to other provincial armies in

China. This also helped mitigate the creation of hostile factions, and enabled officers to display more unity and cohesion than the officer corps of other armies. In this sense,

Zhu’s experience in the Yunnan Army of 1911-1917 was atypical of most officers in other provincial armies. The professionalism of the Yunnan officer corps was maintained due to a number of factors. One factor was the continued emphasis on military education

417 Ibid., 57-59, 61. 207 for serving officers and officer cadets at the Yunnan Military Academy. Both Cai E and

Tang Jiyao supported continuing military study for officers. The high standard of professionalism was also maintained by the prestige attached to staff positions, where staff and troop command positions were equally stressed for the ranks of major and below. Yunnan Army officers would alternate staff and command assignments, as was also common in Western armies.418 Most Chinese armies of this era, however, heavily

favored command positions over staff assignments, with little prestige attached to staff

work. In addition, the Yunnan Army avoided the development of personalized units

through frequent disbandment of units and the frequent rotation of officers to staff

positions or to other units. By this method, the early Yunnan Army was able to maintain

a system of impersonal military control, where officers were routinely given a new

command with new troops, which avoided the problems associated with officers

developing a proprietary attitude toward the unit they commanded.419

From 1911 to 1916, Zhu De’s career path reflected this pattern of frequent

transfers. He was often transferred to command different units and routinely assigned

back to the Yunnan Military Academy to supervise cadet training and officer education.

It was only later on with the extended occupation of southern Sichuan, that the Yunnan

Army began to lose its professionalism. Zhu’s own career reflected this change. From

1916 to 1920, Zhu had an extended command of Yunnan occupation forces around

Luzhou in Sichuan. His career then began to resemble that of more typical warlord

officers as he began to create a more personalized military force, including support for

418 Sutton 175-176. 419 Ibid., 178.

208 his many relatives, such as the appointment of his two brothers as officers in his

brigade.420

Another characteristic of the Yunnan officer corps was its political activism,

especially among middle-and lower-level officers. These officers believed that they had

a say in major decisions affecting the future of the Yunnan Army and they formed an

internal constituency with a sense of collective responsibility. Senior army leaders found that they had to listen to these lower-ranking officers before making any major decisions affecting the army.421

Enlisted Men

If there was a marked difference between the officer corps of the Yunnan Army

compared to other provincial armies, the same could be said for the Yunnan Army’s enlisted personnel. Such differences could be found in the relations between officers and

men, the soldiers’ treatment of the civilian population, and the quality of recruits.

Generally, relations between officers and men in typical armies of this period

were based on traditional social hierarchies and origins. Usually a contractual

relationship existed between the commander and his men, resembling an employer and

employee relationship that allowed soldiers to exploit civilians for their own benefit.

This relationship could also be exploitive of the soldiers themselves, where troops were

treated with indifference and neglect and where officers would use the soldier’s payroll to

enrich themselves. Instead of working to inspire loyalty among their men, officers often

maintained the loyalty of their troops by relying on regional ties for recruitment.422

420 See Zhu’s own assessment of his life during this period in Smedley, 98, 105-106, 120-121, 127, 129-130 and Nym Wales, 114. 421 Sutton, 182-183. 422 Lary, 49-51.

209 Despite the rise in the social status of officers during the late Qing and early Republic,

the status of the common soldier remained low, and many officers held an aloof and

elitist view toward soldiers under their command. Officers avoided direct contact with

their men in garrison or on the march, where they would ride either in sedan chairs or on horses.423 Maltreatment of soldiers was common and physical abuse was used as a form

of discipline. The common assumption at the time was that soldiers needed this physical

abuse to prepare them for combat. In addition, officers paid little attention to their

soldiers’ physical welfare or living conditions.424

In marked contrast to most other officer corps in China, Yunnan officers strove to

set an example for their men. For instance, during the 1916 National Protection

movement, Yunnan officers instilled a sense of determination and commitment to the

anti-monarchist cause in their soldiers and were able to maintain high morale in their

troops, which accounted for the Yunnan Army’s stubborn resistance against superior

numbers of enemy forces. The Yunnan Army officer corps distinguished itself from its adversaries in the level of personal commitment and rapport with its men.425 Indeed, the

Yunnan Army was more successful in maintaining its soldiers’ motivation and

commitment to a cause than other provincial armies in the post-1911 period, with most

Yunnan soldiers believing they were part of a national army, at least through 1917.

Later, as commander of the Red Army, Zhu De also consistently stressed the need for

officers to educate and inspire their men politically and maintain their motivation for a

national cause.

423 Ibid., 52-53. 424 Ibid., 54-55, 56. 425 Sutton, 206.

210 The motivation of most common soldiers for enlisting during this period could be

characterized as mercenary. They were in essence wage or hired soldiers (guyong bing).

Any commitment to a cause was for the most part instilled in them by their junior officers

after they joined an army. Still some who enlisted could be classified as principled

soldiers (zhuyi bing). Thus, some soldiers who joined armies to support the 1911

Revolution or later on to fight for the Guomindang or Chinese Communist Party were

politically motivated.426 But the main reason for the majority of young men who joined the army during the early Republican era was to escape rural poverty and seek economic security. This inducement to join the military could be made even stronger if enlistment bonuses were offered. Many also wanted to escape the hard life and boredom of rural areas or, in some cases, escape the law or family trouble (enlistment in the army gave a man immunity from prosecution and protected him from his enemies).427 The recruits of

the Yunnan Army during the early Republic were often of higher quality than recruits in

other armies. The average Yunnan recruit was a peasant volunteer who served for

approximately three years. Most were around 21 years of age, in good physical

condition, and many were able to read and write. One reason for the quality of Yunnan

recruits was that prior to 1914, the Yunnan Army was able to pay privates three times

what a common laborer would receive. A decline in the quality recruits set in by mid-

1914, though, as financial constraints made it increasingly difficult to maintain this level

of pay.428

Another common characteristic of most provincial armies was the prevalence of

exploitation and violence perpetrated by soldiers against the civilian population. Military

426 Lary, 13-15. 427 Ibid., 17-19.

211 violence against civilians was of two types: that inflicted by an army and that inflicted by individual soldiers. Armies could requisition goods, conscript coolies, destroy property during combat or occupation, disrupt transport and trade, and impose special taxation on civilians to support the army.429 Actions by individual soldiers could include routine

looting, rape, and theft; and often soldiers would engage in vandalism of property and

casual violence to humiliate and degrade civilians. The effect of military violence on

Chinese society was to create a persistent state of tension and insecurity within the

civilian population when faced with the unpredictable nature of soldiers. If a community

was garrisoned by well disciplined troops or by local troops whom they knew, then the

community was less likely to be subject to violence. Communities had the most to fear

when troops were in the process of occupying or evacuating a location.430 The Yunnan

Army was exceptional in regard to treatment of the civilian population and this, in turn, gave it certain advantages over its adversaries. During the Yunnan Army’s campaigns in

Sichuan, its soldiers’ high morale and good discipline translated into good treatment of the Sichuan civilians. In contrast, northern forces were known for mistreating the local population, characterized by much looting and rape, which eventually turned the Sichuan populace against the Northern armies.431

Discipline

In general, the discipline and training of soldiers was poor in most armies of this

period. Most recruits were put directly into combat units upon joining and were expected

to learn military skills while on active service. There were frequent problems with opium

428 Sutton, 170-171. 429 Lary, 72-73. 430 Ibid., 74, 76-80. 431 Sutton, 206-208.

212 addiction among officers and men, which led to a decline in morale and combat effectiveness. Soldiers’ morale was also degraded by the frequent embezzlement of their

pay by their officers. Indeed, corruption within units was common, with many officers

inflating reports on the size of their forces to deceive their superiors in order to draw pay for nonexistent troops.432

The general lack of disciplinary training and the lack of an ideological

commitment to a cause reinforced the mercenary attitude of soldiers. Most soldiers were

committed to personal profit, seeking rewards from their commanders or opportunities to

loot and victimize the civilian population. The result of this poor discipline among most

armies was a lack of control over soldiers by their commanders and alienation from the

local population. In several cases, such as in Sichuan or Hunan, smaller local forces with

inferior resources but with mass support could defeat and drive out larger ill-disciplined

non-local forces. The mercenary attitude of soldiers also affected their combat

effectiveness, with most unwilling to accept high risk in battle, which would make units

prone to defection or surrender to avoid destruction with the hope of receiving better

treatment or rewards from their adversaries. Therefore, most units were unreliable, with

little trust between commanders and their men.433

Typical soldiers of this period were often subject to harsh discipline on duty but

given a free hand while off duty. Military leaders condoned soldiers’ vices, whether

opium smoking, visiting prostitutes, raping, gambling, or drinking. They would also allow soldiers to take what they wanted by force from civilians.434 Some armies,

however, made attempts to instill discipline and good behavior in their soldiers. Lists of

432 Ch’i, 91-93. 433 Ibid., 93-95.

213 “do’s and don’ts” were issued to recruits as part of their indoctrination into the Yunnan

Army that were very similar to the later Red Army’s “Three Main Rules of Discipline

and the Eight Points for Attention.”435 The high standard of behavior by Yunnan troops

on campaign was reinforced by issuing written rules of conduct and laws of hygiene to all

soldiers. Orders were issued to troops on proper behavior to be followed during marches,

when encamped, and during battle; and officers and NCOs were held responsible to

ensure that these rules were followed.436 In such areas, the Yunnan Army remained

exceptional in comparison to the armies of other provinces, at least for the period

immediately following the 1911 Revolution.

Training

During the early Republic, an attempt was made to keep the Qing military

education system intact. But Republican-era governments lacked the administrative

capabilities, technical expertise, or funding to maintain this military education system.

The difficulty of controlling the quality of entering students and the low quality of

instruction combined with political instability to compel many military schools to close or shorten the duration of their training. According to Hsi-sheng Ch’i, the basic cause of

the neglect of the military education system was the military culture of the period,

whereby senior commanders and officers in most armies favored troop command

assignments over staff work.437 In most units, the more educated officers filled the

senior-level posts, while mid and lower-level officers often had no formal military

training. This lack of competent lower-level officers made training soldiers more

434 Lary, 39-41. 435 Ibid., 38-39. 436 Sutton, 206-208. 437 Ch’i, 102, 105-107.

214 difficult. This was further compounded by the high illiteracy among soldiers that

required a higher junior officer-to-soldier ratio.438

There was also a general lack of specialized and technical military training for

officers even though the technical sophistication of weapons had increased. In most

armies there were no specialized schools for artillery, signals, engineering, quartermaster,

or ordnance. This created a mismatch, where a presumably modern military organization

was, in fact, geared for a more primitive system of warfare. In battle, problems arose in

middle and lower levels of command, which suffered from a lack of trained staff officers.

This shortage of competent staff officers and lack of technical training led to strategic and

tactical mistakes, as many officers were unprepared for warfare that required a higher

level of technical knowledge.439 In contrast, the Yunnan Army emphasized continuing

officer education, gave staff work equal status with the command of troops, and routinely

alternated officers between staff and command assignments.440

From 1911 to1915, the Yunnan Army maintained a high standard of training in

drill and maneuvers. The training regime lasted three months, with eight hours of

practical and theoretical training a day. Both artillerymen and infantry were given

individual and unit instruction. Field maneuvers that frequently included night maneuvers continued to be held. At the time, foreign observers commented on the army’s good order and discipline. It was observed that both artillery and infantry units performed to a high standard and coordinated their activities during field maneuvers. On

438 Ibid., 108-109. 439 Ibid., 109-110. 440 Sutton, 174-176.

215 the whole, the Yunnan Army seemed to have maintained its pre-1911 standards during the early Republic.441

Arms and Equipment

The weaponry of the armies that Zhu De fought in and against varied widely. The main armaments of the armies of this period were for the most part limited to rifles, artillery, and machine guns. In most provincial armies, the number of rifles was usually insufficient and most were obsolete and poorly maintained, with little standardization within an army and often lacking interchangeable ammunition and parts. Diverse types of artillery pieces were also used, with most pieces of modern artillery being of the smaller type and only a limited number classified as heavy pieces. A 1918 survey counted only 1,480 small and 46 heavy pieces of artillery in the whole of China. Given the limited number of artillery pieces available, an army that possessed a good number of artillery pieces had an advantage over those that did not. Machine guns were not used in great numbers until they had proven their worth during World War One, and once again in any one army there was a diverse number of models and calibers with little standardization. In addition, the high cost of machine guns limited the number that a militarist could procure. Over this time period, however, the quantity and quality of modern arms improved for all armies.442

Chinese armies of this period relied heavily on foreign armaments because indigenous arms manufacturing capability, in both production capacity and quality, was

441 Ibid., 171-172. 442 Ch’i, 116-118.

216 inadequate to meet demand.443 During 1911 to 1915, the arms and equipment of the

Yunnan Army was of high quality and sufficient to equip all army units largely due to the

efforts of the last Qing governor-generals. Most of the arms used to equip units were of

German origin, with some British and American weapons. In 1911, Yunnan Army

infantry and cavalry units were equipped with German-made Mauser rifles, while its

artillery consisted of fifty-four modern Krupp 75mm mountain guns. There were also

twenty-four Maxim and twelve Colt machine guns in the army’s inventory.444 Arms

were standardized by regiment and an attempt was made to increase Yunnan’s armaments

self-sufficiency. Plans were devised to build a new arsenal to supply the First Division’s

Mauser rifles with indigenously manufactured ammunition, but this project was left unfinished due to a lack of funding. The Yunnan Army as a whole used Japanese style kit (mess tins, water bottles, packs, etc.), while leather or cotton uniforms and equipment were manufactured in Yunnan.445

The Yunnan Army also made some adaptations to local conditions during this

period, given its isolation from eastern and northern China, and the mountainous and

semi-tropical environment of Yunnan. The standard heavy modern leather shoes issued

to soldiers during this period were replaced with local cloth shoes or straw sandals to

better adapt to the local climate. The army’s cavalry units decreased because most

cavalry officers had been northerners and because Yunnan had neither a local source of

good horses nor a local tradition of horsemanship. In order to better adapt to the

443 Ch’i, 122. For further information on the use of foreign armaments by armies of the early Republic see Anthony B. Chan, Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China 1920-1928 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982). 444 Sutton, 66. 445 Ibid., 170.

217 mountain warfare of the region, machine guns and artillery pieces were distributed among smaller units in violation of Western military practice.446

The differences between the Yunnan Army and other armies of the early Republic were often commented upon by Zhu De in his reminiscences of this period, and seem to have made a significant impression on him as to how a superior fighting force should function and behave in marked contrast to more typical Chinese armies of the era. He especially focused on the behavior and conduct of officers and men, and the proper treatment of civilian populations.

Strategic and Tactical Thought of the Early Republic

An understanding of the military world Zhu De operated in also requires knowledge of the state of military theory in China, and Yunnan, at this time that influenced how military forces were used on campaign and in battle. This period was when both strategic and tactical theory developed under the late Qing regime was put into practice and adaptations were made to suit geographic, material, and political circumstances.

Strategic Thought

Cai E was not only considered an important military theorist in the early Republic but he was also seen as one of the best military commanders of the period until his death in 1916. The previous chapter reviewed Cai E’s military thought as found in his 1902 article “Jun guomin pian” (“National Militarism”) and the 1911 Zeng Hu zhibing yulu

(Quotations of Zeng and Hu Regarding the Administration of the Armed Forces).

Despite Cai E’s praise for Zeng and Hu’s advocacy of a defensive strategy, in his own campaigns in 1912 and 1916, Cai E adopted bold strategies that involved rapid offensives

446 Ibid., 173.

218 into Sichuan. This seeming contradiction can be explained by Cai E’s advocacy of a

defensive strategy to defend China against a foreign invasion by a militarily superior

imperialist power versus fighting other Chinese forces in a civil war. Cai also combined

conventional and guerrilla warfare during the 1916 war in Sichuan, where he

incorporated many irregular forces into his army, which were used to harass and interdict his adversaries.

Despite Cai E’s strong support for the defensive in his Zeng Hu zhibing yulu, his

views on offensive operations can also be discerned in the same work. Under his section

on conducting campaigns, Cai E pointed out that a general could achieve victory in two

ways. One was to strike first to win in battle and then occupy enemy territory; the other

method was to wait for the enemy to move first then respond.447 He stated that there were three types of offensive actions that could be taken against an enemy: attack them from behind, attack them on their flanks, and “strangle the tail of the enemy” (attack their lines of communication and supply). Interestingly, when discussing offensive operations, he did not mention frontal attacks and instead emphasized indirect attacks. In commenting on envelopment strategies, Cai stated that attacking from both sides was a superior strategy. For it to succeed, however, he emphasized that a general needed to keep this maneuver secret, maintain unified command over his forces, and ensure that both arms of the pincer/envelopment attack were equally strong. Cai cautioned that the general must have this strategy laid out beforehand, wait for an opportunity to take action, and then attack simultaneously from both flanks.448 This emphasis on

envelopment operations foreshadow the later Red Army’s preference for envelopment

447 Cai E, Zeng Hu zhibing yulu, in Cai E ji, ed. Mao Zhuqing (Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 79. 448 Ibid., 79-80.

219 and flank attacks, avoidance of frontal assaults, and harassment of the enemy’s rear. In

warfare, Cai E also emphasized that strategy and tactics have to be appropriate to the times and that a commander has to adapt to the realities and circumstances of the war at hand. The commander also had to judge the situation to determine what is appropriate, and cannot be constrained by one strategy or blindly imitate others.449 Later during the

Red Army period Zhu De stressed similar views on adapting to current circumstances

instead of following inappropriate strategic or tactical theories.

The only major essay on military thought that Cai E wrote between 1911 and

1916 was his 1913 Junshi jihua (Military Plan). This document laid out a national

defense plan for China and a prescription to reform the military system of the early

Republic, covering both army building and military education. To build an effective

Chinese army, according to Cai E, one needed high quality recruits that would be

achieved through conscription and universal military service. This system would be

combined with a reserve system with periodic retraining that would ensure China would

have a high quality standing army. At the time, the Chinese military relied on a volunteer

service system that continued well into the 1930s. He also called for a new military

education system, in which the goal was to achieve both moral harmony and the unity of

military forces. This was to be achieved not in the classroom but in combat units, for

under the proposed conscription system, the armed forces themselves would act as the

military training schools for all citizens during peacetime. His goal was to militarize the

Chinese civilian population to correct what he saw as the historical weakness of Chinese

society. The military education system would instill technical skills and cooperation

among soldiers, promote discipline based on commonly shared confidence, and promote

449 Ibid., 84. 220 patriotism to motivate soldiers in combat. His ultimate goal was to develop a political identity within the armed forces that would unify all troops under a central government in order to end the political fragmentation then prevalent in China.450

In addition to Cai E’s military thought, the theories of Sun Yat-sen also played a role in the military concepts of the revolutionaries during this period. The previous chapter assessed Sun’s theories of guerrilla and revolutionary warfare that focused on how a smaller force could defeat a larger force. This could be achieved if the smaller force had superior morale compared to its adversary, and with even greater effect if the smaller force could also diminish the morale of the larger force. For Sun, the best way to accomplish this was through political propaganda, which could increase the motivation of the forces of the revolution as well as subvert the enemy forces or even turn them into friends. For historian Chen-Ya Tien, the emphasis on the use of propaganda in warfare was a key component of Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary strategy that eventually became the foundation of the political work system in the modern Chinese military.451

450 Tien, Chinese Military Theory, 131-133. For the full text of the Junshi jihua, see Cai E, Cai E ji, 300- 342. Cai E’s call for the militarization of the Chinese civilian population reflects a similar trend to militarize European society prior to 1914. Especially in Germany, universal military conscription was seen as an opportunity to indoctrinate the population, where they would undergo not just military training, but also would be trained for political and social service. The German army was seen as a school for patriotism that would counteract the negative influences of industrial society and socialism, and act as a means to unify a less then cohesive new German state that still contained numerous special interest groups and minorities. Another similarity between Cai E’s military thought and European militarization prior to 1914, was the admiration shown to Japan, especially after its defeat of Russia in 1905. For both Cai E and European militarists and nationalists, Japan was seen as the epitome of warrior virtue and military efficiency. Japan was held up as a model of national service and self sacrifice that should be emulated by the youth of Europe, and in Cai E’s view, by the youth of China as well. See Geoffrey Best, “The Militarization of European Society, 1870-1914” in The Militarization of the Western World, ed. John R. Gillis (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), , 15-16, 22. For Cai E’s views on Japan and the militarization of China, see “Ts’ai O” in Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, ed. Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 3:286-287. 451 Tien, 142.

221 Strategic Environment

In formulating an effective war-winning strategy, commanders had to integrate

the strategic theory they had been taught with the military, political, and economic realities of China. From the first decade of the Republic, two patterns of warfare began to develop in China: one for those wars fought in the interior and another for those fought in the eastern and northern coastal provinces. The two styles of warfare were determined by differences in geography, logistics, degree of access to modern arms, and communication networks. In general, the common strategic objective of most military campaigns during this era was the capture of key communications hubs, such as towns and cities that controlled key rivers, mountain passes, and railroad and road networks.

But the plains of eastern China allowed the development of warfare quite different from the wars fought in the mountainous terrain of Yunnan and Sichuan in the interior of

China.

In contrast to the interior, eastern China was blessed with a more sophisticated

communications network and superior logistics based on access to better railway and

roadway systems and port facilities. The existence of a network of railroads and roads in

particular enabled better mobilization and transport of troops and equipment. This in turn

increased the importance of communications networks, and made them strategic objectives that needed to be controlled. A pattern of warfare thus developed in eastern

China where communications networks, especially railroads, become contested military objectives, which also came to determine the location and size of battlefields. These factors in turn, enabled the rapid development of large-scale modern warfare by allowing access to larger quantities of modern military technology and supporting the more

222 effective mobilization of armies. Wars in eastern China became more intense, with ever-

larger armies being fielded to fight battles over larger areas, which also resulted over time

in higher casualties. Greater logistics capabilities also facilitated the acquisition of more

sophisticated weapons, which in turn affected the character of military organizations.

The incorporation of greater quantities of more sophisticated weapons systems into

armies (such as machine guns, light/heavy artillery, armored vehicles, and airplanes)

required more specialized skills and coordination for their maintenance and use. The use of more complex weapons contributed to the development and integration of larger armies that in turn led to a greater concentration of political and military power.452

While geographic conditions were a factor in the uneven distribution of railroad and road mileage between the plains of eastern China compared to the mountainous terrain of the interior, this uneven distribution of transportation and communications networks influenced in turn differences in warfare. In 1928, Sichuan possessed only 735 miles of modern roadway, while Yunnan had only 267 miles; compared to Guangdong with 2,440 miles, and Zhili with 1,742 miles. As for railway mileage, in 1930, most government-owned railways were concentrated in northern China, Manchuria having

1,100 miles and Zhili with 790 miles, with the entire country having only a total of a little

over 5,000 miles. The high concentration of roadway and railroad mileage in eastern

China allowed warlords in this region to concentrate large numbers of troops and

equipment for war.453 In comparison, Yunnan in 1917 had only the French-owned

452 Ch’i, 128-129, 135-137, 141-142. By the early 1920’s, this qualitative and quantitative transformation of warfare in eastern China has been likened to a military revolution by Arthur Waldron in his study of the 1924 wars fought between major warlord factions in eastern China, see Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924-1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 57-58, 70-71. 453 Ch’i, 129-130.

223 railroad that went from the coast of French Indochina northwestward and ended in

Yunnanfu, for a total railway mileage within Yunnan of only 296 miles. There was no

railroad going north from Yunnanfu.454 Sichuan meanwhile had no railroads at all.455

In the absence of major road or railway systems, rivers were the main means of

communication in the interior mountainous regions. But even here river transportation

was difficult as a result of variations in water levels between seasons and with travel

upriver constrained by swift currents and rapids. The utility of water transport was also limited by the fact that most rivers flowed in one direction, from the northwest to the southeast. Therefore much transportation continued to rely on traditional footpaths. Of course mountainous conditions also made travel by this means difficult. Travel through

Yunnan was particularly troublesome, because the province was divided by mountain ranges running in parallel from north to south, and cut with deep valleys. Entering

Sichuan from Yunnan was also difficult, as the border areas and the western region of the province were dominated by mountains.

These differences in communications produced different patterns of warfare. In

the interior, because of inadequate modern communication, warfare was characterized by

small armies fighting in concentrated areas. Because of the inadequate railways, roads,

and motor vehicle transport, armies had to travel by rivers or on foot. The result was

relatively small armies numbering from a few hundred to a few thousand, with little

heavy equipment. On campaigns, the terrain made coordination between units difficult

454 For a contemporary assessment of Yunnan’s transportation network, see E.C. Wilton, “Yun-Nan and the West River of China” The Geographical Journal, vol. 49, no. 6 (June 1917): 427. E.C. Wilton was a British diplomat and explorer who had made several trips through Yunnan starting in 1907 through at least 1916. This article was a geographical and ethnographic assessment of Yunnan presented to a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society on January 22, 1917. It is useful for information on the conditions found in Yunnan, which are contemporary with Zhu De’s own activities in the province. 455 Ch’i, 130-131.

224 and restricted reconnaissance perimeters. Geography also reduced the places where

combat could take place to a small number of level areas at lower altitudes, because

transport routes were restricted to rivers or footpaths that limited the points of military contact between armies to river valleys or mountain passes. It was also more common in the interior to focus on the attack and defense of cities that were communications centers that controlled passage along rivers, such as Chongqing on the Yangzi River, or access through mountain passes.456

There were also economic and political reasons to emphasize the taking and

holding of urban areas. During the Yunnan Army occupation of Sichuan, its garrisons

were concentrated in larger urban centers that provided the funding needed to sustain the

army and facilitated the maintenance of alliances with local political and commercial

elites.457 This urban-focused strategy could be seen as following a wider Chinese

strategic tradition, where military campaigns aimed at taking major towns and cities,

especially provincial capitals.458 The necessity for taking urban areas in order to sustain

the financial and material needs of an army was a common imperative followed by many

Chinese armies.

Another influence on strategic decision making was that many provincial

militarists’ territories lacked strategic depth, and therefore for political and military

reasons they needed to halt an enemy offensive at the frontier to avoid exposing their

core area to attack. Because of this strategic imperative, it was often a better policy to go

on the offensive into enemy territory, and launch a surprise strike-first attack. Military

and political leaders of the period also needed to be sensitive to their relationships with

456 Ibid., 131-132. 457 Sutton, 231.

225 other political factions, where hesitation could be disastrous, so aggressive and decisive

actions became preferable.459 Commanders were acutely aware of the role of politics in

warfare and understood that politics is the true nature of war and is also the essence of

campaigns and battles. Military leaders of this period believed that in war the

commander of a smaller force could, with a superior political strategy and position,

defeat a militarily stronger enemy who only relied on military strength to achieve

victory.460 This explanation could be applied to Cai E’s strategic decisions in 1912 and

1916 to launch offensives into Sichuan and neighboring provinces against numerically superior adversaries rather than adopt a defensive strategy to protect Yunnan. Cai E devised a political strategy to rally widely scattered revolutionary factions along the

Yangzi by maintaining the military and political initiative and forcing the hand of other revolutionary factions in other provinces. Adopting a defensive strategy (like Zeng and

Hu) would have been politically and militarily disastrous. For Cai E, the best strategy was always to maintain the initiative against more numerous and better armed adversaries.

There were also biological constraints on strategy. The prevalence of malaria in

certain regions of Yunnan limited the extent of military operations that could be

undertaken in these areas. The topography of Yunnan combined with a semi-tropical

climate created malarial zones in river basins, forests, and foothills, especially in southern

Yunnan near the frontier with Burma and Indochina. During the Qing Dynasty, the

presence of malaria in Yunnan restricted Qing military operations into these areas and

prevented the Green Standard Army from manning inner frontier garrisons. In the view

458 Ibid., 235. 459 Ch’i, 143-144.

226 of Qing officials, malaria-infested areas were not suitable for long-term habitation by

Han Chinese or the garrisoning of these areas with ethnic Han troops. Since only

indigenous peoples, who showed higher immunity to this sickness, could live in these

areas, the Qing often relied on native tribal chieftains to govern in these designated

regions—a practice that continued into the early twentieth century. Thus, malaria

determined the ethnic composition and deployment of Chinese frontier garrisons in the

southern frontier regions of Yunnan. The areas under local tribal control, however, were

politically unstable, with a high prevalence of banditry and raids across the borders with

Burma and Indochina.461 In the first years of the Republic, Chinese authorities still had

problems controlling these border regions. This concern was heightened by the fear of

foreign intervention along Yunnan’s frontier by the British from Burma or the French from Indochina. It was for this reason that Cai E assigned Zhu De from 1913 to 1915 to conduct counterinsurgency operations in southern Yunnan to pacify the frontier tribes and stabilize the border with Indochina. Zhu De had to develop an effective political- military strategy to deal with the unstable political situation along the frontier and the harsh terrain in order to defeat bandit groups and pacify this area. The strategy that Zhu eventually developed combined measures to gain the support of the local population and

reconfigure his own forces to imitate the guerrilla warfare methods of his opponents.462

In the end, the strategy followed by the Yunnan Army was shaped by a

combination of circumstances--political, military, economic, and geographic. In order to

conduct military operations within Yunnan or into Sichuan, a Yunnan Army commander

460 Jin, 300-301. 461 David A. Bello, “To Go Where No Han Could Go for Long: Malaria and the Qing Construction of Ethnic Administrative Space in Frontier Yunnan,” Modern China, no. 3, (2005): 285, 289, 295-296, 301. 462 Guo, 105-106.

227 would need to take into account that most of the province was mountainous and heavily forested, with a poor road system, and no railway line north of Yunnanfu. An army had to rely on footpaths and rivers for transport and communication; therefore towns that controlled these communication hubs became key military objectives. Southern Sichuan had a similar strategic geography, which required contending military forces to focus on capturing key river towns and cities that controlled the passage along the Yangzi River.

A commander would also need to deal with political fragmentation, not only of various revolutionary forces and governments in different provinces, but also political fragmentation within provinces themselves, such as Sichuan. In addition, economic imperatives played a role in strategy, whereby a high priority was placed on ensuring the financial and material needs of the Yunnan Army on campaign and during occupation of territory outside of Yunnan.

Later in his career, Zhu De was involved in military operations farther to the east

(particularly in Hunan and Jiangxi). As such, he no doubt was familiar with the pattern of warfare conducted in the east, and as a military professional he also clearly paid attention to the great transformations going on in Chinese warfare, especially the increasing scope, scale, and technological sophistication of war as waged in eastern

China. Nonetheless it might also be argued that his experience in the mountainous conditions of Yunnan and Sichuan also prepared him for the similar type of warfare necessitated by the Red Army’s later concentration in mountainous inter-provincial regions.

228 Tactical Theory

Despite the differences in the overall patterns of warfare between the eastern and interior regions of China, most armies were aware of and executed very similar battle tactics. The reason for this was that most mid-level and senior officers had received their initial military training during the last years of the Qing regime and therefore had been taught a common set of combat regulations and tactical theory. For the most part, military leaders employed tactical concepts consistent with the late Qing combat instructions outlined in the 1910 Xin ding bubing caofa (New Infantry Drill Regulations) and similar to contemporary Western tactical theories prevalent at the beginning of World

War One. Chinese armies, however, especially those in the interior, lacked the quantity and variety of armaments available to European armies, and this affected their tactical choices. Thus because airplanes were few, if they were available at all, their use was largely limited to reconnaissance rather than having any direct role in combat. The limited availability of machine guns also meant that they did not have a major impact on the battlefield as they had during World War One in Europe. At best these weapons were used to supplement the firepower of the rifle-armed infantry. The use of artillery had a more significant impact on Chinese warfare, with the widespread use of artillery negating the defense of walled cities. Artillery was also used extensively to support the infantry in both offensive and defensive actions. On the whole then, the dominant weapons in

Chinese armies were rifles and artillery, with the small-scale use of machine guns.463

463 Ch’i, 126-127. Ch’i argues that the lack of machine guns was a major factor in why Chinese conflicts did not develop into large-scale World War One style trench warfare. A more important factor, however, was the geography of China. Chinese territory was large compared to the size of the armies employed and armies could always find space to maneuver in order to out-flank one another unlike the large armies employed in the restricted space of the Western Front in Europe. Warfare in China resembled more the mobile warfare found on the Eastern Front during World War One.

229 In the interior, as mentioned previously, difficulties with communications and

logistics restricted the size of armies to a few thousand soldiers, while the harsh terrain

restricted battlefields to mostly river valleys and mountain passes. Battles themselves

usually involved small units of rifle-armed infantry supported by a few artillery pieces

and machine guns. Often battles were inconclusive, with the victor frequently unable to

effectively pursue a defeated foe who could easily retreat to secluded areas to regroup and replenish. In addition, the capture and defense of cities was more common in the interior because they controlled lines of communication, such as passage along rivers.464

Ultimately, to reach their objectives and engage the enemy in combat, these armies had to

traverse difficult terrain and overcome logistical challenges to maintain themselves on

campaign.

In offensive field operations, a tactical concept universally employed during this

period was to “pin down the front, attack the wings and flanks” (zheng mian qian zhi, yi

ce gong ji) of an adversary force. A commander would first send out a large number of

scouts to identify the enemy’s weak points. Then with a portion of his troops he would pin down the enemy’s front with an assault, while his main strength under the support of artillery fire would attack the enemy flanks. Both National Protection First Army generals Cai E and Liu Yunfeng were known for using this tactical concept. Other offensive tactics extensively used during this period included “move forward separately, combine to attack” (fen jin he ji) and raids (xi ji).465 These tactics were similar to the

464 Ch’i, 132-133. 465 Jin, 298. The extent to which Chinese armies still followed German and Japanese army methods can be seen in how similar these tactical principles were with German Army field regulations issued during the first decade of the 20th century. The German 1905 “Infantry Training Regulations” stated that, “The combination of frontal with enveloping attack best ensures success. A preliminary condition for the envelopment is the tying down of the enemy’s front. Hence rough handling is the most effective.” Cited in Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen

230 ones advocated in the Caofa and in the Quotations of Zeng and Hu. In conducting

defensive field operations, a prominent tactic was the “defensive counterattack” (fang

shou fan ji). General Wu Peifu was known to have used this tactic in the 1920 Zhili-

Anhui war. When the Anhui army launched a frontal assault against Wu’s Zhili army,

Wu ordered his troops to avoid the frontal attack and retreat back slightly. When the

Anhui army had captured the first line of defenses, the Zhili army then suddenly counterattacked and compelled the Anhui army to retreat. Later on during this war, Wu used the tactic of “luring the enemy in deep” (you di shen ru) by placing his elite troops on the left and right wings of his army and lured the Anhui army to advance forward. Using this tactic, Wu succeeded in enveloping the Anhui army’s First and Fifteenth divisions.466

The emphasis on envelopment and active defense tactics, such as “luring the enemy in deep,” were emphasized in the Xin ding bubing caofa and practiced extensively by the

Red Army under Zhu De.

In this period, the main tactic used to attack cities was the “forceful attack” (qiang gong). After an initial artillery bombardment, a specially picked unit of soldiers would rush the walls and attempt to scale it with ladders. If the forceful attack failed, then a commander would employ siege tactics to exhaust the garrison’s food and ammunition, and compel them to surrender. If the garrison still refused to surrender an attacker would again have to use the forceful attack.467 In defending a city, two methods were used, one

was to rely on the city’s high walls and emplaced heavy artillery, while the other was to

and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986.) 79. In regard to the dispersal and concentration of troops, the German Army’s 1910 regulations “Principles of Higher Troop Conduct” stated that, “…he who wants to be the first to approach the enemy should not confine his advance to one or a few roads. The art of conducting great masses consists in keeping them separated for as long as possible, while operating, but to concentrate them for the decision at the right time.” Also cited in Wallach, 78. 466 Jin, 298.

231 prepare a system of defensive trenches and tunnels inside the city in advance so that if the enemy broke into the city, they could be trapped and annihilated.468

Amphibious tactics used during the early Republic involved the navy transporting

and then screening the disembarkation of an army as it carried out an assault on a coastal

position or on a river. The navy could also blockade coastal regions and cooperate with

army operations ashore. A nighttime amphibious landing across a river to launch a

surprise attack was successfully used by Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang Army in the 1913

Revolution to defeat anti-Yuan forces at Hukou on July 25.469

Conclusion

This chapter provides background on how the military institutions and strategic

and tactical thought laid down at the end of the Qing Dynasty and soon after the 1911

Revolution provided the foundation for the conduct of the campaigns fought during the

early Republic. In addition, it assesses the political, military, geographic, and material

challenges that Chinese commanders faced in conducting military operations during this

period, especially in the mountainous interior of China. The following chapters will

assess Zhu De’s campaign experience from 1912 to 1922, to show how Zhu and his

fellow officers were able to apply and adapt the military theory and concepts they had

been taught to the practical challenges of the battlefield in both conventional and

counterinsurgency operations. Finally, the following chapters will begin to make more

explicit the links between the Yunnan Army as a military organization and the strategic

and tactical concepts used during this period to the later development and operations of

the Red Army, as previously described in Chapter 1.

467 Ibid., 299. 468 Ibid., 299.

232 Chapter 4: Early Campaign Experience 1912-1916

The last chapter provided background on how military institutions and strategic

and tactical thought laid down at the end of the Qing Dynasty and soon after the 1911

Revolution provided the foundation for the conduct of the campaigns fought during the

early Republic. With this context in mind, this chapter will assess Zhu De’s participation

in the initial operations of the Yunnan Army from 1912 to 1916, and will show how Zhu and other officers were able to apply and adapt the military theories and concepts they had been taught to the practical challenges of the battlefield. Special attention will be

paid to Zhu’s experience in counterinsurgency warfare in southeastern Yunnan from

1913 to 1915 and his participation in the 1916 National Protection War launched in

opposition to Yuan Shikai’s attempt to reestablish a monarchy. This war was doubly

significant, for it propelled Zhu De to prominence as a battlefield commander and was a

major turning point for the Yunnan Army itself. This chapter will also begin to gauge the

degree of influence that Zhu’s Yunnan Army service had on the development of the later

Red Army in such areas as military command, organization, training, planning, doctrine,

strategy, and tactics; and his overall views on what an effective military force should look

like and what values it should embody.

1912 Sichuan Campaign

Reasons for the Yunnan Army Campaign and Occupation

As the revolutionary regime was being consolidated in Yunnan in early

November 1911, the situation in neighboring Sichuan was becoming unstable due to not

only conflicts between revolutionary and loyalist groups, but also between different

revolutionary factions. Sichuan was already in political turmoil before the Wuchang

469 Ibid., 300. 233 uprising in October 1911. Armed conflicts had broken out between provincial elite

interests (merchants and gentry) and the Qing government over the building of the Hubei-

Sichuan railroad. Secret Societies and the Railway Protection Movement began to form

armed bands throughout the province.470 By September 1911, these armed bands became

known as Comrades Armies. These formations were populist in nature, with no central

direction, and would roam rural areas and capture small towns. The membership of

Comrades Armies included not just revolutionary groups but also Gelaohui and former

bandits. These units were largely untrained and poorly armed, usually with just spears

and old muskets. Consequently there developed a stalemate between them and loyalist

xunfangying units that were better organized and armed, and could hold the larger district

capitals. As for the New Army units in Sichuan, most at this time remained loyal to the

Qing.471

With the October 1911 Wuchang Uprising, the political fragmentation of Sichuan worsened, with the province descending into political chaos. On November 27, 1911,

Sichuan declared independence from the central government. The leaders of the Railway

Protection Movement and Provincial Assembly established a new provincial

revolutionary government in Chengdu. By December 1911, this government collapsed

due to a military mutiny in Chengdu, caused by the new government’s inability to pay the

large number of unpaid soldiers flocking to the provincial capital. These unpaid soldiers

looted the city on December 7, 1911. The collapse of the revolutionary government and the departure of Qing officials from the province left a political and administrative

470 Robert A. Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and Central Power, 1911- 1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 8-9. 471 Sutton, 116, 118.

234 vacuum in Sichuan.472 Political authority devolved to local military leaders of various

armed forces in the province and established a pattern of decentralized military

control.473

After the 1911 Revolution, the geographical and political fragmentation of

Sichuan persisted well into the early 1930s. In 1911, not only was there a declaration of

provincial independence but individual districts within the province also declared their

independence. Different political regimes were set up not only in Chengdu, but also in

Chongqing and Luzhou. The two main centers of power in the province were Chengdu and Chongqing. A merger agreement in March 1912 failed to reestablish a unified

provincial government, and military authority continued to be centered in Chongqing

while administrative authority centered in Chengdu. After the fall of President Yuan

Shikai in 1916, any semblance of provincial-wide government ceased to exist and

provincial government functions were completely in the hands local military

commanders.474 Given this chaotic political situation, many Sichuanese elites welcomed

Yunnan “guest” army intervention and occupation.475 Southern Sichuan became the

principal battleground for the Yunnan Army over the next nine years. For an overview of

the area where the Yunnan Army conducted its campaigns in Sichuan from 1912 through

1920, see Figure 7.

472 Kapp, 9. 473 Kapp, 10. The growth of militarist power in Sichuan is indicated by the rapid growth after 1911 of formally designated military forces in the province. In 1911, there were a total of 53,000 imperial forces stationed in Sichuan that included 16,000 in the units of the New Army and 10,500 Banner and Army of the Green Standard troops. By 1919, the estimated number of troops in Sichuan was over 300,000. In addition, there was large scale growth after 1911 of locally supported militia units that by the early 1930’s was estimated at more than a half million. See Kapp, 10-11. 474 Ibid., 13-14. 475 Sutton, 118.

235 According to Zhu De, Yunnan revolutionary leaders had planned to send an expeditionary force to assist the Sichuanese revolutionaries. Yunnan Military Academy cadets from Sichuan had left ahead of the expedition to report to the Sichuan

Tongmenghui in Chengdu and Chongqing to help prepare the ground for the Yunnan

Army expedition. It was planned that when the Yunnan Army reached Xufu/Xuzhou

(modern Yibin) in southern Sichuan, it would be the signal for revolutionaries in

Chengdu and Chongqing to stage an insurrection and establish a Revolutionary Military

236 Government like other provinces already in revolt.476 Zhu also related that there were

military objectives for the Yunnan expedition, centered on indirectly supporting the

Wuhan uprising and defending Yunnan itself. Yunnan leaders viewed Guizhou and

Sichuan as the primary battlegrounds for revolutionary forces against the Qing

government and Zhu implies that the Yunnan offensive into Sichuan was a preemptive

move to forestall Qing forces under General Duan Fang, who currently was advancing up

the Yangzi River from Hubei to enter Sichuan, from using Sichuan as a base to prepare

an attack on Yunnan.477 To counter the Qing offensive to suppress the revolutionaries in

Sichuan, Cai E sent two brigades (dituan), totaling eight battalions, on the Sichuan

expedition in November 1911. Zhu was a company commander at the time and his unit

was part of this expeditionary force.478

The official reason given by Cai E for the expedition was to indirectly help the

revolutionary regime in Wuhan by first securing Sichuan for the revolution by

overthrowing the government of the Qing Governor-General Zhao Erfeng and

suppressing the chaos caused by bandits. Once this was accomplished, Yunnan could

then join in with other anti-Qing forces. Cai E’s unstated reasons, however, for the

Yunnan army’s invasion and occupation of southern Sichuan was first to keep Yunnan

solvent. Cai E hoped to use Sichuan revenues to feed and pay for the Yunnan Army. He

wanted to remove units and officers of questionable loyalty, such as the old 73rd regiment, who posed a threat to the new Yunnan regime if they remained in Yunnan. The sending of military forces into neighboring provinces to secure the resources needed to

476 Smedley, 97-98. 477 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 50. 478 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 385- 386; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 381.

237 maintain themselves, initiated a process that historian Donald Sutton has termed “export

militarism.”479

Sichuan was considered such a prize by Yunnan leaders because it was known for

its wealth and economic self-sufficiency, and since the third century AD had been called

the “Treasure Vault” of China. The province was well known for its agricultural

products and produced large quantities of sugar, silk, and salt. During the nineteenth

century, Sichuan also became the principal opium-growing region of China. In addition,

the province possessed a large population that numbered an estimated 50 million by the

mid-1930s. For these reasons, Sichuan’s neighbors continuously interfered in Sichuanese

affairs and tried to gain control over the province for its wealth and population. This

resulted in numerous attempts to occupy it by its neighbors and Sichuan became an

economic prize often fought over by outside interests and forces.480

The Yunnan Army was reorganized for the 1912 campaign into Sichuan. The

New Army units in Yunnan were renumbered, the old 19th Division became the First

Division and its brigades renumbered consecutively. On campaign, a more informal

organizational system was used by armies of the early Republic, where volunteers or

small units were taken from various regiments and organized into temporary columns

(zhidui). A zhidui was equivalent to a regiment (tuan) and composed of several

battalions (ying). Several zhidui, in turn, were formed into an echelon (dituan), which

was equivalent to a brigade. New recruits were used to fill the gaps left in the regiments.

Most of the troops who went on campaign would be disbanded when they returned. For

479 Sutton, 115-116. 480 Kapp, 4, 15.

238 example, of the 7,000 Yunnan troops who returned from the 1912 Sichuan campaign only

1,000 were retained and these were then dispersed among various units.481

Cai E planned for the Yunnan Army first to take the river towns of Xufu/Xuzhou

(modern Yibin) and Luzhou in southern Sichuan, then advance north to Chengdu and

clear away the Comrades Armies that Yunnan leaders considered as bandits. In this way,

Cai E hoped to restore order to Sichuan and secure the border with Yunnan.482 Yunnan forces were divided into two routes: one dituan was sent in the direction of Xuzhou via

Zhaotong, the other dituan to Luzhou via Bijie in Guizhou Province.483 On November

16, 1911, the first dituan started for Sichuan, while the second dituan followed two weeks later near the end of November. The Yunnan expeditionary force was composed of three quarters of the old 19th Division, now redesignated as the First Division, led by

the best of the younger revolutionary officers.484 Zhu was a captain and led an infantry company that was part of the dituan sent to take Xufu/Xuzhou.

481 Sutton, 170. These informal organizational schemes persisted in later Chinese armies including the early Red Army under Zhu De. The Red Army continued to use ad hoc unit designations, including the term zhidui for some units. See organizational charts in Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi jianbian (A Brief History of the Chinese PLA Revolutionary War) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2003), 235. 482 Sutton, 118. Both Xufu/Xuzhou and Luzhou were key strategic towns on the Yangzi River in southern Sichuan. They were located at the points of intersection between major tributary rivers flowing south into the Yangzi, in this case the Min and Tuo Rivers. By occupying these towns, the Yunnan army could effectively control the river traffic along the Yangzi and thus the commercial links between the interior of Sichuan and eastern China. These two towns became crucial strategic objectives during the various campaigns that the Yunnan army waged in southern Sichuan and were key garrisons during the five year Yunnan army occupation. It should also be noted that certain towns will have multiple names, some of this is due to towns being given new names later in the 20th century, such as Xufu/Xuzhou now being called Yibin or Yunnanfu being renamed Kunming. If a town has a different modern name, I have indicated the modern name in parentheses. In other cases, two names have been used for a town and both used interchangeable in primary sources. For these cases, I have used both names, such as Xufu/Xuzhou. A third case, are geographic place names mentioned in primary sources that I have not been able to match to a modern place name. In these cases, I have left the name as is in quote marks. 483 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 386; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 381. 484 Sutton, 115.

239 Conduct of 1912 Sichuan Campaign

The Yunnan force that entered Sichuan was small but thought sufficient to

accomplish its mission of assisting the Sichuan revolutionaries in defeating Qing loyalist

forces. The expeditionary force included two battalions from the Sichuan regiment of the

Yunnan Army.485 These Sichuan units were probably included in the hopes of more

easily gaining the support of the Sichuan population, and indeed Zhu related that the

expeditionary force was welcomed by the local populace.486 Three weeks after leaving

Yunnanfu in November 1911, the column with Zhu’s unit arrived at the walled town of

Xufu/Xuzhou. It is at this point, however, that Zhu’s remembrance of this campaign

differs sharply with conventional accounts based on other contemporary sources.

According to Zhu, Xufu/Xuzhou was defended by two battalions of loyalist xunfangying.

The main focus of his retelling of the encounter at Xufu/Xuzhou is to highlight the

differences between these forces and the Yunnan Army. Zhu described these

xunfangying units as armed only with old muzzle-loaders, while the Yunnan forces were armed with modern rifles. The Yunnan units also showed superior discipline as they

advanced on the town walls and returned the enemy’s fire. Zhu’s account of the assault held these xunfangying units in contempt and their behavior epitomized for him the ineffectiveness and impotence of traditional China. In the end, Zhu noted that these ill- disciplined xunfangying battalions put up only token resistance before they fled to the hills and joined various bandit groups. The population of Xufu then welcomed the

485 Smedley, 98. 486 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 386; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 381.

240 Yunnan Army. They then proceeded to establish a Republican Military Government,

composed of local merchants, Tongmenghui, and Yunnan Army representatives.487

Other accounts, however, offer a more complicated picture of the events at

Xufu/Xuzhou than Zhu’s story of the triumph of superior Yunnan forces over inferior

“loyalist” units. According to the more common account, before the Yunnan Army had

arrived at Xufu/Xuzhou, the local elites and leaders of the Comrades Armies had actually

convinced the commander of the xunfangying forces garrisoning Xufu to declare for the

revolution. Yunnan Army leaders were nonetheless skeptical of the Xufu declaration of

support for the revolution and considered the Comrades Armies as nothing more than

bandits. Therefore, despite the welcome that Xufu showed to Yunnan Army forces, the

local Yunnan commander, Xie Ruyi, staged a coup against the Sichuanese forces

controlling Xufu on December 26, 1911. Xie Ruyi used Yunnan army units supported by

artillery and machine guns to attack strong points around the city, defeated superior numbers of Sichuan irregular forces, and took over control of Xufu. The Yunnan Army

then claimed it had dispersed “bandits” and that it had restored order to the city.488

Whether the Yunnan Army’s suspicions about the forces they attacked were valid or not,

Zhu’s account, as seen above, simply ignores any suggestion that they were anything but loyalist forces.489 Nonetheless, what is not open to question is the superiority of the

Yunnan Army, as described by Zhu, over the Sichuanese forces at Xufu.

487 Smedley, 98. 488 Sutton, 118-119. 489 This is an example of a continuing issue over the reliability of Zhu De’s reminiscences of this period. Zhu’s account of these incidents was derived from interviews, articles, and speeches Zhu had produced from 1937 onward. Zhu paints a mostly positive picture of the actions of the Yunnan army under Cai E, and portrays them as motivated by the revolutionary cause and their actions justified because they were furthering the revolution and protecting the new Republic. More complex political circumstances of the period are glossed over or reduced to simply a conflict between revolutionaries and reactionaries. As pointed out in earlier chapters, Zhu’s personal accounts of his life prior to 1927 have been shaped to fit an

241 With the capture of Xufu/Xuzhou, the campaign was going as planned, but the

Yunnan expeditionary force still had not heard if the planned uprisings in Chengdu and

Chongqing had taken place. The Yunnan force therefore advanced toward Chengdu, via

the Ziliujing salt well region, and continued north to get astride all the communication

routes along which the Qing forces under Duan Fang could advance into Sichuan. While

in the Ziliujing region, the Yunnanese heard that Duan Fang had been killed at Zizhou by

his own troops, who had revolted against the Qing regime.490

Another reason for Yunnan forces to advance on the Ziliujing region was because

Sichuan elites there had requested Yunnan military assistance in suppressing local

Comrades Armies units threatening this area. Xie Ruyi, the Yunnan commander at Xufu, sent Yunnan forces to occupy the Ziliujing salt-producing area.491 Yunnan forces easily

occupied Ziliujing, because it was only defended by one battalion of xunfangying, while

the only other loyalist forces in the region were farther north at Zizhou, which was

defended by a regiment from Duan Fang’s army.492 With this action, Yunnan forces

gained de facto control over the lucrative Ziliujing salt production area and the revenue it

generated.493

The importance to Yunnan of gaining control over Sichuan salt revenues cannot

be overstated. Before 1911, Sichuan, out of the profit from the sale of its salt, had paid a

accepted Communist revolutionary narrative on the historical development of the Chinese revolution; described as “ideological memories” by Arif Dirlik. Zhu’s personal accounts of this period are still useful, as long as they are used with caution, for they provide insight into the experiences and careers of professional military officers who supported the Revolution of 1911 and subsequently served in various provincial armies during the early Republic. 490 Smedley, 98-99. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 386; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 381. 491 Sutton, 119-120. 492 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 386; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 381. 493 Sutton, 119-120.

242 yearly subsidy to both Yunnan and Guizhou that was one of the major sources of funding

for their modernized military forces. An attempt to insure the continuation of this

funding may have been part of the motivation for intervention by Yunnan and Guizhou

troops in Sichuan in late 1911.494 In subsequent Yunnan Army campaigns and during the

occupation of southern Sichuan, maintaining access to Sichuan salt revenues and

controlling commerce along the Yangzi River remained important objectives for Yunnan

leaders.

With the revolt of loyalist troops, the killing of General Duan Fang, and the advance of Yunnan forces, Governor-General Zhao Erfeng surrendered Sichuan to a

Chengdu committee of businessmen. The Yunnan Army continued to advance until it heard that the expected uprisings had taken place in Chengdu and Chongqing led by the

Tongmenghui and Gelaohui, and that a Republican Military Government had been established. With this, the Yunnan army advance was halted and they held their positions in southern Sichuan.495

Occupation of Sichuan by the Yunnan Army

At Yunnanfu, Cai E agreed with the occupation of the Ziliujing salt well region

but restrained his officers from further expansion into Sichuan. Cai E set out two

directives for the occupation of southern Sichuan by the Yunnan Army. The first

directive addressed his military concerns that Yunnan Army units would become too

dispersed and would then be unable to provide mutual support to one another if attacked.

494 S. A. M. Adshead, “Salt and Warlordism in Szechwan 1914-1922” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 24, no. 4 (October 1990): 730, 742-743. This article is a study in the relationship between the Chinese Central Salt Administration and salt revenues with warlordism in Sichuan between 1914 and 1922. Adshead found that Sichuan salt revenues became a major source of financing for various warlords and guest armies in Sichuan during this period. 495 Smedley, 98-99.

243 The directive stipulated that each Yunnan Army echelon (dituan) was to keep its

detachments (zhidui) within a thirty-mile radius. In addition, areas of responsibility for

each dituan were delineated. The first dituan at Xufu/Xuzhou was to control the area

westward to the foothills of Emeishan and northward to beyond the Ziliujing salt wells.

The second dituan, based at Luzhou, would control the area south of the Yangzi River

toward the Yunnan and Guizhou borders. The second directive addressed the political

situation within Sichuan and directed Yunnan occupation forces to work with what

appeared to be the main Sichuan regime in Chongqing.496

The Yunnan army’s successful expedition and brief occupation of Sichuan was

due in many ways to the support the army received from the Sichuan populace. Yunnan

forces garnered popular support because they were well behaved and maintained good

discipline throughout the campaign. As a result, the Sichuan elite and populace not only

tolerated but welcomed Yunnan occupation, seeing the Yunnan Army as the only force

that could restore order to Sichuanese society.497 Zhu De in his reminiscences made a

point of highlighting the good discipline shown by Yunnan soldiers in Sichuan. The

civilian population was well treated by Yunnan forces, which reassured civilians of their

good intentions and paid money for all food purchased for the troops. In this way, Zhu

related, the Sichuan population was won over and the Yunnan Army had the common

people of Sichuan on its side.498

For the first three months of 1912, Zhu and his company patrolled the Ziliujing salt wells and engaged in brief campaigns to counter bandit raids. In March 1912, most

of the Yunnan Army left Sichuan and returned to Yunnan, except for a small force

496 Sutton, 120-121. 497 Ibid., 121-122.

244 composed of the two Sichuan battalions. Leaving the Yunnan Army’s Sichuan battalions

behind as a residual occupation force probably indicates that Cai E was sensitive to the

potential hostility of the Sichuan populace to occupation by non-Sichuanese forces.

During this period, Zhu remembered becoming disillusioned with the events that had

taken place over the last three months. Sun Yat-sen had given up the presidency of the

new Republic to Yuan Shikai, and the elites who had taken over power in Sichuan, in

Zhu’s view, had betrayed the ideals of the revolution. Zhu consoled himself with the

thought that Yuan Shikai would at least maintain the Republic and that Yunnan under Cai

E could become a model for other provincial revolutionary regimes.499

The Yunnan Army occupation of southern Sichuan lasted four months and

produced a net benefit to the finances of Yunnan. The Sichuan government paid the

Yunnan Army the equivalent of $300,000. This sum along with revenues from salt and

other tax monies financed the entire cost of the occupation of Sichuan. When the Yunnan army returned to Yunnanfu, it still had a surplus that was put in the Yunnan government treasury and enabled the founding of the Fudian Bank.500 The expedition and occupation

of Sichuan addressed the major immediate concerns facing the new revolutionary

leadership in Yunnan. In the end, however, Sichuan eventually did cut off its regular

subsidy to Yunnan, which forced the new regime in Yunnanfu to find other means to

fund its army. The choices were between either territorial expansion or disbandment of

the army, with the potential for political and social disorder in Yunnan. The course of

action to be followed was obvious, with the result that the Yunnan Army became the

most effective and well organized military force in southwest China, and made Yunnan a

498 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 50. 499 Smedley, 99, 105.

245 key regional political power. The Sichuan campaign provided valuable training for the

Yunnan Army’s officers and men, with the officer corps gaining important political and administrative experience, as well as a strengthened sense of solidarity as a military organization.501

For Zhu, one of the most important lessons he learned from the Sichuan campaign

was to keep on good terms with the local population. Zhu was initially surprised that the

Sichuan populace welcomed the Yunnan Army and that there was popular support for the

revolution.502 Overall, Zhu stated that his experience in the 1911-12 Sichuan campaign

had a profound impact, especially the need for the development of an overall plan for

revolution. Zhu believed that the Yunnan revolutionaries lacked such an overall plan and

on reflection Zhu identified several lost opportunities. The Yunnan Army, Zhu believed,

should have first taken control of the military forces of Sichuan and then launched a military expedition down the Yangzi River to assist the revolutionaries in Wuhan and

Jiangxi. Because Yunnan did not take these actions, Zhu thought that it had lost the opportunity to control the development of revolutionary forces in Jiangxi, Anhui and other areas in southern China.503 After his return from Sichuan in March 1912, Zhu’s

military career flourished. In May 1912, Cai E decorated Zhu for his service in the

Sichuan campaign and promoted him to the rank of major.504

Yunnan Army Reorganization 1912-13

The Yunnan Army that Zhu served in, along with other provincial armies, was undergoing changes initiated by the new central government in Beijing. After the

500 Sutton, 126. 501 Sutton, 137-138. 502 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 50-51. 503 Ibid., 51-52.

246 military struggles of the 1911 Revolution had subsided, Yuan Shikai implemented a

nationwide policy of military reorganization and reduction from 1912 through 1913.

Yuan’s policy combined recruitment and disbandment of military forces. Large military

forces were a drain on the central government and provincial treasuries, with the

maintenance of modern-style units costing the most. One estimate has put the number of

troops in various armies in China at over one million during the 1911 Revolution period.

Under Yuan’s reorganization and reduction policy, this number was down to about

850,000 by early 1913. It was estimated that there were the equivalent of 73 modern

divisions throughout China in February 1912. This had been reduced to the equivalent of

56 divisions by March 1913. In the interim, the equivalent of 17 divisions had been

disbanded. As part of this process, Yuan also changed the unit terminology from Qing

New Army unit designations to modern military organizational terms (see Table 1 in

Chapter 2 on Zhu’s Early Life and Education).505 Meanwhile, it was also estimated that

600 battalions of “old-style” troops still existed scattered throughout China in 1913.506

Estimates of the troop strength of the Yunnan Army in this period vary widely.

One account, based on Japanese intelligence, sources gives a figure of between 25,000 to

31,000 for 1912 and 1913.507 In contrast, Donald Sutton estimated that the Yunnan

Army was approximately 12,000 at the 1911 Revolution and grew to a peak strength of

504 Smedley, 105. 505 Jin, 296. 506 Ernest P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977), 100-102. The source that Young used for these figures was a Japanese military intelligence report from March 1913, which tabulated the number of modern-style divisions by province in February 1912 and March 1913. The largest number of disbanded divisions occurred in Jiangsu, which went from 15 to eight divisions, followed by Hunan going from five to one division, and Sichuan going from five to two. The Japanese intelligence report that Young relied on, used the following as the basis for comparison between modern military forces in different provinces: a full strength unit organized as a Western style division with between 12,500 to 10,000 men was counted as one

247 18,000 troops by August 1912. As elsewhere in China, though, Sutton also finds that the

Yunnan Army underwent some reduction in strength after 1912.508

Officer Corps 1912

After the return of the army from Sichuan, Zhu observed that some Yunnan

officers left the army and were quickly replaced with new officers but that there were

very few private appointments outside of the formal process for the commissioning of

officers.509 Zhu highlighted that few private appointments were made to show that the

Yunnan Army at this time was not like other warlord armies that were highly

personalized. In addition, Zhu stressed that Yunnan officers genuinely cared about the

welfare of their soldiers. Zhu told a self-promoting story to show how much he cared

about the welfare of his men, although this story does embody Zhu De’s ideal for how an

officer should behave toward the soldiers under his command. Near the end of the

Sichuan campaign, Zhu stressed his honesty and related that he had only 180 kuai at the

time and used it to buy a horse. Even though Zhu’s salary was only 48 yuan at the time

(he was a company commander) he would not dare charge a tax unlawfully or accept

gifts from people. When he and his unit were returning to Yunnan, he gave his horse to a

sick soldier to ride and he walked all the way back. This story became a key element in

the legend that eventually grew up around Zhu.510

Zhu also stressed the openness of Yunnan to outsiders, especially in the Yunnan

Army officer corps that included a notable number of non-Yunnanese officers, himself

division; under strength divisions or brigades were counted as fractions. See Young, 100-101, especially Table 4 on page 101. 507 Ibid., 100-102. 508 Sutton, 169-170. 509 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 53. 510 Ibid., 54.

248 included. Zhu commented that in 1912, Yunnan became a refuge for revolutionaries

from other provinces. Some of these refugees became military cadets or instructors at the

Yunnan Military Academy. In the fall of 1912, Zhu was reassigned to the Military

Academy as an instructor and became acquainted with many cadets from other

provinces.511 Zhu had a very positive view of these extra-provincial refugees, and stated that “They enriched the life of Yunnan by becoming teachers, officials, army officers, and workers on the two newspapers which we now published in Yunnanfu.”512 The

Yunnan Army’s openness to non-Yunnanese members during this period may have

served as a model for Zhu when he organized the Red Army, which was composed of

officers and men from many different provinces. The early Red Army seems to have had

more trouble with more homogenous provincially based units, notably when units from

Hunan mutinied and deserted during the unsuccessful August 1928 offensive launched

from the Jinggangshan base area into southern Hunan (see previous chapter on the Early

Red Army from 1927 to 1931).

Enlisted Men 1912

A challenge that the Yunnan Army along with other armies of the period had to

face was how to demobilize and replace its soldiers after a campaign was finished.

Disbanding and replacement of troops coming back from campaign was common practice

and served the purpose of getting rid of long service soldiers who tended to be hard to control if they remained in the same units. This policy seems to have operated smoothly in the Yunnan Army in contrast to other provincial armies where disbandment sometimes

511 Smedley, 106-107. 512 Ibid., 107.

249 led to mutiny.513 Another reason for troops to mutiny was not being paid. After the 1912

return of the Yunnan Army from Sichuan, Zhu related that the new revolutionary regime under Cai E faced financial difficulties. In May 1912, Cai E announced economizing measures because the troops had not been paid for two months. The Yunnan Army needed to be reduced in size and its costs cut. Older soldiers were retired and younger

soldiers allowed to leave the army, while all officers and officials regardless of rank

would only receive a maintenance allowance. Cai E did agree to pensions for maimed

soldiers and for families of soldiers killed in battle.514 One can only speculate on what

happened to the surplus revenue that the Yunnan Army returned with from Sichuan.

Possibly, the surplus revenues were depleted between March and May 1912, and may

have been used to satisfy the unpaid wages of the troops and for pensions.

Training and Military Education 1912

After being promoted to major in May 1912, Zhu spent the rest of the spring and

summer of that year training troops. He then was assigned to the Yunnan Military

Academy as an instructor and placed in charge of one of the five companies of cadets.515

Zhu was at the Academy for about one year and taught the cadets tactics, field maneuvers, administration, and marksmanship.516 Zhu’s rapid reassignment to various positions within the Yunnan Army demonstrates the routine rotation of Yunnan officers from troop command to instructional and training assignments back in Yunnanfu and at the Yunnan Military Academy. This system helped to avoid the creation of personalized

513 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 143-144, 160. Sutton, 170-171. 514 Smedley, 105-106. 515 Ibid., 105-106. 516 Wales, 114. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 54.

250 units and maintained a professional and non-personalized organizational culture, unlike many other provincial armies of the period.

1913 Revolution

The 1913 Revolution against Yuan Shikai’s government was caused by Yuan’s initial policies to reassert central government control over the provinces and neutralize the power of representative government bodies and political parties, especially the new

GMD. In the spring of 1913, the armed revolt was precipitated by Yuan’s attempt to neuter the Chinese National Assembly, deploy Northern troops to strategic points along the Yangzi, and the acquisition of a foreign loan to finance implementation of Yuan’s centralization policies. On July 11, 1913, the armed revolt began with the Jiangxi provincial assembly declaring its independence from the central government supported by the province’s military forces; this action was followed by troop revolts in Anhui and in the cities of Shanghai and Nanjing. From the beginning, Yuan enjoyed significant advantages over the rebels. He had a larger number of troops at his disposal, he was better financed, and he had the loyalty of most of the provincial governors. By the beginning of September 1913, the revolution against Yuan had been defeated with the fall of Nanjing to Northern forces. In the end, the revolutionaries only received distant or tepid support from seven other provinces.517 Yuan was successful for a number of key factors. He had received foreign support from the Western powers in China, mostly in the form of financial assistance. But by far the most important factor was that domestic support for the revolution was weak, for the Chinese elite was divided, with a significant number supporting Yuan, which was enough to weaken the revolutionary movement. In

517 Young, 120, 130-132.

251 the end, Yuan was able to portray the rebellion as an assault on national unity, a view that

at that time was widely accepted.518

There was no Yunnan support for the 1913 uprising. Both Cai E and Tang Jiyao

supported Yuan Shikai against the rebel provinces and GMD, and even sent Yunnan troops into Sichuan to help put down revolts there. In Donald Sutton’s view, there is no

evidence that the Yunnan Army or Cai E and Tang Jiyao offered any support to the

rebels. In practical terms, the central government was too strong and in 1913 most

Chinese, including Cai E, had not yet lost faith in Yuan Shikai.519

Before a consensus could be reached for the Yunnan Army to give its support to

Yuan Shikai during the 1913 Revolution, there were divisions within the Yunnan officer

corps that first needed to be resolved. Most officers believed that China required a strong leader who could replace chaotic party politics with a strong and unified national government, and they still saw Yuan Shikai as that leader, as did Cai E. But other members of the officer corps supported the revolutionaries and were suspicious of Yuan

Shikai’s ultimate objectives. After a two week debate within the officer corps in July

1913, they came to a consensus to support Yuan Shikai. This was again an example of the corporate decision-making process prevalent within the Yunnan Army officer corps that both Cai E and Tang Jiyao had to take into account when major decisions were made that would affect the entire army. This was especially true with the decision to support

Yuan Shikai in 1913.520 During this period, Zhu De stated that he was aware of Sun

Yatsen’s call for revolutionaries to rise up against Yuan Shikai to protect the Republic

and the provisional constitution. Zhu remembered that there was some response to Sun’s

518 Ibid., 134, 136. 519 Sutton, 155-157, 161.

252 call, with troops from Jiangxi and Nanjing, and a few other provinces.521 In Zhu’s opinion, “because of a lack of firm unity within the revolutionary ranks as well as inadequate mental preparation and insufficient armed forces, the anti-Yuan campaign ended in defeat.”522

In the aftermath of the 1913 Revolution, Yuan Shikai undertook centralization policies towards the provinces, whose aim was to tighten central government control over them and end provincial autonomy. Yuan used both traditional and new methods to increase his government’s dominance over the provinces, such as the suppression of local self government, the manipulation of official appointments, government surveillance of personnel by both censorial officials and a new secret police force, overlapping administrative responsibilities, a new examination system, press censorship, and the extension of railroad trunk lines into the lower and middle Yangzi River region that would facilitate more rapid deployment of central government troops into central China.

Using these methods, Yuan Shikai’s government in Beijing increased its control over

China’s provinces. By the end of 1914, Yuan’s government was able to integrate most provinces in central and eastern China into a centralized system of control. Only the more remote provinces such as Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and Guangdong remained largely outside direct central government control, although they still had to comply with Beijing’s administrative and official appointments system.523

In December 1913, as part of the policy of using official appointments to exert control over the provinces, Yuan Shikai transferred Cai E to a post in the Beijing

520 Ibid., 159. 521 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 387; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 383. 522 Ibid., 387 or Ibid., 383.

253 government. This was undertaken because Yuan was unsure of Cai E’s loyalty and

viewed him as a potential foe. Yuan removed Cai E as governor of Yunnan by ostensibly

promoting him to a more prestigious post with the central government as chief of the

Land Demarcation Bureau and as one of Yuan’s military advisers. For Yuan, this was

the best way to keep an eye on him. Meanwhile, Tang Jiyao, a native Yunnanese, was

promoted to governor of Yunnan. Tang had proven his reliability to Yuan during the

1913 Revolution, by ruthlessly suppressing various insurgents that included members from both secret societies and the GMD.524 In Zhu’s view, Cai E had little choice but to accept Yuan’s offer; if he had not, Yuan would have attacked Yunnan. In addition, Zhu believed that Cai E was buying time for a renewed revolutionary movement and had

planned all along to maintain a revolutionary regime in Yunnan until Republican forces

could reorganize themselves from their defeat during the 1913 revolt.525 Zhu attempted,

in retrospect, to ascribe ulterior revolutionary motives to his mentor and patron. But

given Cai E’s beliefs in a strong centralized state and distrust of political parties,

including the GMD, Cai E, at least initially, was probably not planning to support a new

revolution against Yuan Shikai’s rule.

In addition to personnel transfers, another of Yuan’s centralization policies was

directed at the military forces in the provinces and was an attempt to gain more control

over the armies in Yunnan and other southern provinces. During this period, the Yunnan

Army was for the most part administered independently from the Ministry of War in

Beijing. The most the Ministry of War could do was control the appointments of senior

generals, but it usually deferred to the military governor’s choice for other positions. As

523 Young, 138, 142. 524 Sutton, 165 and Smedley, 109.

254 part of a general policy to cut military expenditures, and also to curb the Yunnan Army’s

independence, the Beijing government scaled back its financial support for the Yunnan

military, from $320,000 in 1914 to $240,000 by 1915. The result was that in 1915, the

Yunnan Army was forced to reduce its personnel to around 6,000 soldiers, a steep

reduction from its highpoint in 1912 when it numbered over 18,000. There was,

however, an unintended consequence of this policy. The Ministry of War in Beijing

made no provision for the employment of officers and men released from the army, and

southern officers in general were discriminated against in Northern units and military

schools. This created a group of disaffected ex-officers and soldiers, who became hostile

to Yuan’s government, with some joining the newly formed GMD in Yunnan.526

Before Cai E left Yunnan in December 1913, he ordered units of the First

Division deployed along the length of the French railway that stretched from Yunnanfu to

Haiphong and along the Yunnan border with Indochina.527 At this time, Zhu was a

battalion commander in the Second Regiment, Third Brigade, of the First Division.528

Zhu’s battalion, along with another battalion, was stationed near the southeastern frontier with French Indochina, garrisoning the towns of Liuan (modern Jianshui), Mengzi, and

Gejiu.529 Zhu believed that the reason for this deployment was because the French were

secretly arming Yunnan bandits and tribesmen so they would make raids into French

Indochina to give the French an excuse to chase them back over the border into Yunnan

so that French troops could then take control of Yunnan border territory. In Zhu’s view,

the French were to blame for the unrest in southeastern Yunnan. Over the next two years,

525 Smedley, 109. 526 Sutton, 168-169. 527 Smedley, 109-110. 528 Zhu De nianpu, 21.

255 from 1913 to 1915, Zhu’s battalion engaged in counterinsurgency operations against bandits and local tribesmen.530

1913-15 Counterinsurgency Operations in Southern Yunnan

Despite Zhu’s belief that the French were the instigators of the troubles in southeastern Yunnan, the area had long been a region of unrest going back to the Qing period. Zhu’s assignment to the southeastern Yunnan border region with Indochina taught him many lessons about guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency operations. Most of these lessons had to be learned on the job because his training in conventional warfare at the Yunnan Military Academy did not prepare him in how to suppress bandits and tribesman using guerrilla tactics. He had to think through these problems on his own and develop his own solutions. In southeastern Yunnan, Zhu not only faced hostile bandits and tribesmen, but he also had to overcome the environment that included difficult terrain, a semi-tropical climate, and disease.

One of the first challenges that Zhu had to deal with was the environment in which his troops had to operate. In his reminiscences of this period, Zhu did not describe in any detail the terrain or population he encountered in southeastern Yunnan. A contemporary assessment of the geography and ethnography of central and southeastern

Yunnan during this period was, however, made by a British diplomat, E.C. Wilton, who had undertaken extensive travel through the province from 1907 through 1916 and described the same regions in which Zhu De conducted his counterinsurgency campaign.

As described by Wilton, the environment of southeastern Yunnan presented any commander trying to pacify this unsettled border region with the challenges of terrain,

529 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 55. 530 Smedley, 109-110.

256 disease, tribal autonomy, and numerous and very active bandit groups composed of a mix

of both Chinese and local tribesmen. In describing the geography of Yunnan, Wilton

estimated that the province was about 150,000 square miles in area, with the majority of

the terrain as mountainous interspersed with many lake basins. Yunnan was

characterized geographically as a broken plateau with an average elevation of 6,000 feet,

traversed by mountain ranges running roughly north and south with smaller ranges

running east to west. As for the population, Wilton estimated that it was approximately ten million in 1916, with 40 percent dwelling in the lake basins and the remainder living in the hilly areas. Wilton observed that the majority of Han Chinese lived on the level lands, while most tribal populations, such as the Shan, Lolo, and Miao, lived in the highlands.531 In regard to the location of different tribes, Wilton also observed that the

three main tribal groups (Lolo, Miao, Shan) were separated from one another according

to the elevation at which they dwelled. The Miao usually occupied the tops of hills, the

Lolo settlements were on the slopes, while the Shan villages were at the lowest

elevations.532 Having to operate in such a region may have taught Zhu how to deal with

areas inhabited by mixed populations of indigenous peoples and ethnic Han Chinese, and

the complex interrelationships among these different communities. This background no

doubt assisted him in his dealings with the heterogeneous groups he later found in

531 E.C. Wilton, “Yun-Nan and the West River of China” The Geographical Journal, vol. 49, no. 6 (June 1917): 419. As mentioned in the last chapter, E.C. Wilton was a British diplomat and explorer who had made several trips through Yunnan starting in 1907 through at least 1916. This article was a geographic and ethnographic assessment of Yunnan presented to a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society on January 22, 1917. It is useful for information on the conditions found in Yunnan, especially southeastern Yunnan, which are contemporary with Zhu De’s own activities in the province. Of particular interest is Wilton’s assessment of southeastern Yunnan around the time that Zhu De had been assigned to conduct counterinsurgency operations in this area. Donald Sutton, in his history of the Yunnan Army, quotes Wilton’s favorable assessment of the Yunnan Army prior to the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution. See Sutton, 68. 532 Wilton, 428.

257 Jinggangshan. For a map of the region in which Zhu De conducted his counterinsurgency operations, see Figure 8.

As pointed out in the last chapter, gaining access to the interior of China was difficult during this period and this was highlighted by Wilton when he traveled up the Xi

River from Hong Kong to Yunnan.533 Wilton found that the navigability of the Xi River and its tributaries was confined to the first 800 miles of its course from Guangdong

258 through Guangxi, as far as the town of Bose in Guangxi. Beyond this point, Wilton could

not use water transport due to the numerous rapids and had to switch to overland

communication in order to proceed to Yunnan. On entering eastern Yunnan by a land

route, Wilton found a sparsely populated region that he believed was due to brigandage

and general unrest. On a 1909 trip through Yunnan, Wilton described the area in which

Zhu De was stationed from 1913 to 1915. Wilton traveled southeast from Yunnanfu

toward the border with French Indochina, just east of the French railway, to the town of

“Kai-hua.” From “Kai-hua,” Wilton took a road northeast to Mengtse (Mengzi) near

where the famous tin mines of “Kochiu” (Gejiu) were located. Both Mengzi and Gejiu

were towns later garrisoned by Zhu De’s troops.534

In traveling the areas around Mengzi and Gejiu, Wilton commented on the

prevalence of opium use among the military patrols he encountered. Even though its use

was prohibited, Wilton observed that soldiers used opium as an antidote for fever

common in the valleys.535 Not confirmed until 1935-36, malaria was endemic to

Yunnan, especially in the southern and southwestern Yunnan frontier regions.536 At the time it was widely believed by both Han Chinese and local tribes that opium smoking acted as a prophylactic against malaria.537 A traditional belief among Chinese elites was

that malaria was caught by inhaling noxious vapors from decaying animals or plants in

533 See for instance the assessment by Hsi-sheng Ch’i of the strategic problems associated with communication and travel in the Chinese interior as summarized in the previous chapter. Ch’i, 130-131. 534 Wilton, 423, 425-426, 428-429. 535 Ibid., 429. 536 David A. Bello, “To Go Where No Han Could Go for Long: Malaria and the Qing Construction of Ethnic Administrative Space in Frontier Yunnan,” Modern China, no. 3, (2005): 298-299. 537 Bello, 299. This could also offer another explanation for why Zhu De took up opium smoking. Zhu himself claimed to have only started opium smoking in 1920 after becoming despondent over the deaths of his brothers, but his friend and subordinate Yang Ruxuan claimed that Zhu had been using opium prior to 1917. See Yang, 4 and Smedley, 130.

259 deep valleys.538 Zhu in his reminiscences of his time in southeastern Yunnan echoed

these same views. Indeed, Zhu hated his assignment patrolling the border region. Zhu

described this area as “a sweltering tropical region of high mountains and malarial

valleys shrouded in dense fogs that breed lung diseases, and with water so bad that

everyone suffered from intestinal disorders.”539 Zhu commented that the bad climate and

foggy air degraded the military effectiveness of the units under his command, with many

of his troops becoming ill. He had originally started with one battalion but it was reduced

to only two companies due to sickness among the soldiers. Fortunately, Zhu remarked,

there were very few fatalities among the sick.540

As Wilton traveled north from Mengzi, then east toward the frontier with

Guangxi, he described the region as very mountainous and infested with both Chinese

and Miao bandits well-armed with modern breech-loading rifles. Wilton’s party was

attacked by a group of bandits in this area. These bandits were a mixed group of Chinese

and Miaos around thirty in number. After a few shots, the bandits broke off the attack

and retreated with the cattle they had raided toward the Indochina frontier. Each bandit,

according to Wilton, carried a rifle, cartridges, a bag of maize meal slung across their

backs, but no other kit. Bandit groups such as these would routinely retreat to the

Indochina frontier whenever they were threatened by Chinese patrols, but would often be

chased back into Chinese territory by French frontier guards.541 In contending with bandits, Zhu’s comments were similar to Wilton’s observations, especially on how well armed the bandits were and that they seemed to be operating in cooperation with local

538 Bello, 299. 539 Smedley, 110. 540 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 55. 541 Wilton, 430-431.

260 tribal groups. Zhu’s accusation that the French were arming the local bandits and

tribesman with modern French rifles so they could raid into Indochina to give French

forces an excuse to chase them back into Yunnan and hold Yunnan territory should,

however, be looked at with some skepticism.542 Yunnan’s southern frontier had been a politically unstable region and a grey area administratively since at least the mid- eighteenth century under the Qing. Given that the exact demarcation of Yunnan’s southern border with British Burma and French Indochina was in dispute and the autonomous nature of tribal rule in the area, both bandits and tribesmen alike could use

the frontier region as a safe haven and continuously traversed the frontier to raid on both

sides of the border.

Wilton traveled through the area east of the French railroad in southeastern

Yunnan near the frontier with Indochina. There, the country was hilly and very wooded,

with many Lolo settlements. Referring to the political autonomy of the local tribes,

Wilton commented that Chinese officials exercised only nominal authority over these

tribes who were directly administered by their own chieftains.543 This degree of tribal

autonomy was linked to the prevalence of malaria in the southern Yunnan frontier region

that restricted the extension of Qing regional control. In the view of Qing officials, local

tribal peoples had more immunity to malaria than Han Chinese. Malaria restricted Qing

military operations into these areas and prevented Han Chinese troops from manning

inner-frontier garrisons. Thus, malaria determined the ethnic composition and

deployment of frontier garrisons, and therefore the degree of Qing control over this

542 Smedley, 109-110. 543 Wilton, 428.

261 region.544 The result was to create separate ethnically based administrative areas. These

tribal areas were administered by a system of native chieftains that lasted into the

twentieth century. The chieftain-administrated areas were semi-autonomous and formed

an inner frontier buffer zone that was supposed to keep out and control the “wild” tribes

living in the frontier areas who had no allegiance to any state. The wild tribes, however,

often intermixed with the tribes in the inner frontier zone, which created a politically unstable system characterized by civil unrest and banditry.545 This was the situation that

Zhu was sent to rectify.

These bandits (tufei), Zhu found, were very skilled at using their knowledge of the local terrain and people, and were highly mobile. Previous regular army units that had been sent to destroy them could never make contact with them. Zhu observed that the bandits often cooperated with local tribal groups and had even formed alliances with local ethnic elites. For Zhu, the convergence of these two groups exacerbated ethnic hostilities and ethnic disputes in the frontier region. Wilton had commented on encountering bandit groups composed of a mix of Miao and Han Chinese, along with

ethnic hostilities between local tribes and the Han population. In Zhu’s eyes, this made the suppression of the bandits much harder to undertake.546

When Zhu and his troops arrived in the frontier area they set up their bases in

defensible positions, occupied strategic areas, and built fortifications.547 Every day,

according to Zhu, there was fighting and the natives and bandits were good enough

marksmen to pick off whatever sentries were stationed outside the gates of the high walls

544 Bello, 300-301. 545 Ibid., 285, 289. 546 Guo, 105. 547 Ibid., 105.

262 surrounding the battalion camp. Zhu admitted that he learned much from these kinds of

enemies and he was quite proud of the fact that with only two battalions, the Yunnan

Army was able to suppress the banditry in an area that consisted of several districts and more than ten counties. Initially, Zhu’s counterinsurgency plan was, on the one hand, to use persuasion and on the other, to attack the bandits.548 At first, Zhu met with success in destroying small groups of bandits and publically executing their leaders. But other

bandit groups quickly adapted and when Zhu’s forces advanced, these bandits would quickly melt back into the forests and mountains, and Zhu’s troops could no longer catch them.549

As Zhu was thinking through the problems of more effective ways to suppress

these bandits, he consulted his copy of Sun Zi’s Art of War (Sun Zi Bingfa). Zhu had been very impressed with Sun Zi and carried a copy around with him at all times. The sections that he found most enlightening, given his current situation, were the passages stating that the key to victory is in knowing yourself and knowing your enemy, and when

the enemy changes one must change in response. Once you are able to understand these

changes you can deal with the enemy more effectively.550 After he had studied these

548 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 55. 549 Guo, 105. 550 Ibid., 105-106. The actual passages that Zhu highlighted from the Sun Zi Bingfa were as follows: “Therefore, there are five factors to consider in anticipating which side will win, namely: The side which knows when to fight and when not to will win; The side which knows the difference between commanding a large army and a small army will win; The side which has unity of purpose among its officers and men will win; The side which engages enemy troops that are unprepared with preparedness on its own part will win; and The side which has a capable commander who is free of interference from the sovereign will win. Bearing these points in mind, one is able to forecast victory in a war. Therefore I say: Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without peril. If you are ignorant of the enemy and know only yourself, you will stand equal chances of winning and losing. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you are bound to be defeated in every battle.”

263 passages, Zhu adapted to the bandit-style of warfare. He personally undertook a

thorough reconnaissance of the topography and people in the region, and tried to

understand in detail the character and patterns of bandit activities. He went over the

intelligence data he received and integrated it with the military theory he had studied

before. Zhu concluded that the best method for dealing with bandits was to use the

bandits’ own tactics of mobile guerrilla warfare (liu dong you ji). Zhu divided his own

troops into small flexible units to conduct constant search-and-destroy operations against

the bandits. After the adoption of this method, Zhu’s forces met with more success.551

In August 1914, a large nearby town was attacked by bandits who killed the

government officials and robbed the treasury as a warning to Zhu and his forces. To

locate this band and destroy them, Zhu disguised himself and some of his soldiers as

civilians to travel through bandit areas to collect intelligence. Zhu and his group came

across several uniformed soldiers at a local wine shop who claimed they were actually

soldiers sent out by Zhu to search for bandits. Zhu maintained his disguise in order to

garner more information out of these soldiers. The soldiers then took what money Zhu

and his companions possessed. Afterward, Zhu concluded that these soldiers were

bandits who were former Qing soldiers who had deserted during the 1911 Revolution and

had moved to this region and combined forces with the local bandits. These combined

groups of former soldiers and bandits formed bandit groups with considerable military

strength. Two days later, Zhu returned to this wine shop with his troops and killed or

Sun Zi: The Art of War and Sun Bin: The Art of War, ed. Wu Rusong and Wu Xianlin (Beijing: People’s China Publishing House, 1995), 31. “There is no fixed tactic in war, just as there is no constant course in the flow of water. He who wins modifies his tactics in accordance with the changing enemy situation and this works miracles.” Ibid., 40. 551 Guo, 106.

264 captured the bandits and their leader.552 Zhu’s encounter with bandit groups that

contained a mix of former soldiers and bandits was common during this period. There

was a middle ground where distinctions between soldiers and bandits became blurred,

and there was recurring movement of soldiers becoming bandits and bandits becoming

soldiers. It was common for defeated, deserting, or demobilized soldiers to become

bandits, especially when the alternative was a civilian life without prospects. Indeed,

defeated soldiers made up one of the largest categories of recruits for bandit groups.

Sometimes, a stable pattern of aid and cooperation among soldiers, bandits, and local

officials developed, where all three groups mutually exploited the local populace. In

some regions, there was almost equality between bandits and soldiers in exercising local

power. Bandits also became dependent on soldiers for their arms and ammunition.553

These conditions were certainly present in the region where Zhu was conducting his operations. Zhu had to contend with bandits well equipped with modern arms who worked in cooperation with local tribal groups and tribal authorities.

Some of the bandit groups that Zhu had to deal with were quite large, comprising several hundred members. In September 1915, Zhu had to deal with a large bandit group of 500 to 600 men who had set up a base in the tribal areas. Zhu was ordered to lead two companies of troops to meet up with other local armed forces in Linan County to surround and annihilate these bandits. Zhu divided his forces into a main body and two smaller units to secretly surround the bandit camps. When the troops were in position,

Zhu led the main force to directly assault the main bandit camp and headquarters. The

552 Ibid., 106-108. This account of Zhu’s personal encounter with a group of bandits is quoted by Guo from Zhu’s own official report on the incident sent to his brigade commander, Liu Yunfeng, on November 18, 1914. 553 Lary, 60-61, 67-68.

265 counterinsurgency methods that Zhu used were not solely punitive in nature, but also

included techniques for garnering the support of the local population. He successfully generated popular support not only by reducing bandit depredations, but also by

requesting that the Yunnan government compensate villagers who had suffered losses

from bandit raids.554

For his successful suppression of bandits in the border region from 1914 to 1915,

Zhu was promoted in succession from battalion commander to deputy regimental

commander, and then to regimental commander. Even though he did not become a

regimental commander until after he returned to Yunnanfu, Zhu pointed out that he had

already been exercising this level of responsibility before his promotion, for he had

already been commanding the two battalions assigned to bandit suppression operations in

southeastern Yunnan.555 Zhu was promoted to full colonel on December 15, 1915. On

January 6, 1916, he was given command of the Tenth Infantry Regiment of which Zhu’s battalion had been part. Zhu later learned that this promotion was due to the recommendation of his patron, Cai E.556

Two years of fighting bandits on the border gave Zhu De unique training in

conducting counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare, and these types of mobile guerrilla

tactics that Zhu learned could not be found in the military manuals of the period.557 In

his reminiscences of his Yunnan Army career, Zhu De highlighted the experience he gained in guerrilla warfare during his assignment on the frontier of southeastern Yunnan,

554 Guo, 108-109. 555 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 55. Guo, 108. 556 Smedley, 110-111. Zhu De nianpu, 23. 557 Guo, 110. PRC historian Guo Junning views the tactics that Zhu De learned during this period as the foundation of the guerrilla tactics that would be further developed and refined during the later revolutionary war and at Jinggangshan, where Zhu and Mao summarized these guerrilla principles into the famous

266 and went so far as to state that the lessons he learned while suppressing bandits and

tribesmen along the border provided the basis for his later Red Army guerrilla tactics.558

In addition, his early and extensive experience with guerrilla warfare during his service with the Yunnan Army bolstered the claim he made when referring to his 1926 military training in Moscow that he was one of the first to develop guerrilla warfare concepts for fighting in China.559 By the end of 1915, the experience that Zhu had gained in both

conventional and guerrilla warfare would serve him well in the coming war between

Yunnan and the forces of Yuan Shikai.

1916 National Protection War

Background for War

The 1916 National Protection War was essentially a rebellion launched in

response to Yuan Shikai’s efforts at administrative centralization and the consolidation of

central government power, capped by his decision to declare his intention to become emperor on December 11, 1915.560 From 1914 through 1915, Yuan’s reforms and movement toward reestablishing the monarchy had alienated many of his supporters, most notably the leading intellectual, Liang Qichao, who now publicly denounced Yuan’s monarchial aspirations, and Cai E, who began to organize a rebellion against Yuan’s regime. Many Chinese leaders had come to see Yuan as ineffectual and his reforms as a threat to provincial autonomy and a republican form of government.561 Under the leadership of Cai E, Yunnan became the center of military opposition to Yuan Shikai and

sixteen character saying. See Guo, 110. Refer to the previous chapter on the early Red Army for this saying. 558 Wales, 112, 115. 559 Zhu, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 132-133; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,” in Zhu De xuanji, 126. This passage was quoted in the previous chapter on the early Red Army. 560 Young, 201, 213, 222.

267 served as a gathering place for military leaders opposed to Yuan’s regime.562 By

September 1915, Cai E and other Yunnan Army leaders began to plan for a rebellion and

to declare Yunnan independence in opposition to Yuan Shikai’s policies. The rebels

hoped that by raising the first banner of revolt they could rally other provinces to follow

and join in the rebellion. Anti-Yuan leaders began to gather in Yunnan, while Cai E

escaped from Beijing to join them in Yunnanfu. On December 20, 1915, Cai E, Tang

Jiyao and other Yunnan Army officers reached a consensus to oppose Yuan Shikai and

start a war led by Yunnan.563 Most of the leadership of the revolt were Shikan graduates

like Cai E, Tang Jiyao, and Luo Peijin, who were bound together by their previous

experience as military reformers in Yunnan and now shared opposition to Yuan’s

policies.564 Tang Jiyao was named governor (dudu) of Yunnan, with complete civil and military authority. In one of his first acts, Tang reconstituted the provincial assembly that

had been dissolved by Yuan in 1914.565

The Yunnan rebels with their public declaration of revolt wanted to act as patriots

and rally all anti-Yuan forces in China. The rebels shaped their message to appeal to a

wide spectrum of opinion in order to forge a broad alliance of anti-Yuan groups.566

When the public ultimatums sent to Yuan Shikai on December 23 and 24 calling for him to abandon his plans to become emperor were ignored, the Yunnan rebels launched previously planned military expeditions.567 The rebel military forces were named the

National Protection Army (Huguojun), the core of which was formed by the 6,000 troops

561 Ibid., 230-232. 562 Ibid., 233. 563 Sutton, 186. 564 Young, 233. 565 Sutton, 192. 566 Ibid., 192. 567 Young, 233.

268 of the Yunnan Army.568 The war would be prosecuted by units of the Huguojun

advancing into Sichuan and also into Hunan and Guangdong. In 1916, as the war progressed, Huguojun became a generic term for military forces opposing Yuan Shikai

that rose in rebellion in other parts of China.569

As the core of the National Protection Army (Huguojun), the Yunnan Army was

reorganized for the impending war. The units of the Yunnan army were organized into

three armies. The First Army would be commanded by Cai E himself with Luo Peijin as

his chief of staff. The Second Army would be commanded by Li Liejun, while the Third

Army was under the command of Tang Jiyao. These armies were in turn divided into a

number of ad hoc dituan that were equivalent to a brigade-sized unit. A dituan would be

subdivided into a number of zhidui equivalent to a regiment in size. A zhidui in turn was composed of a number of ying (battalion)-sized units, most of which were under strength.

Cai E’s First Army was organized into four dituan, with each dituan divided into two

zhidui. Three of Cai E’s four dituan fought in Sichuan, while the fourth dituan was sent

to the Guizhou border area. Zhu De was assigned to command one of the zhidui under the dituan commanded by Gu Pinzhen, which was part of the First Army sent to Sichuan.

The dituan of the First Army were composed of existing units from the Yunnan Army.

Dituan in the other two armies were composed of a mixture of existing units, even xunfangying (defense force units) and new recruits. Many of these new recruits were not so new; quite a few were veterans who had been disbanded when the Yunnan Army was downsized from 1912 to 1914. All the Huguojun dituan were continuously replenished at

the front with new recruits. The Huguojun started the 1916 campaign with 6,000 soldiers

568 Sutton, 191. 569 Young, 233.

269 from the Yunnan Army’s original three brigades, who were allocated among the three armies of the Huguojun (all twelve dituan). By May 1916, near the end of the war, the

Huguojun had added 8,000 more troops to its ranks.570

Cai E’s Strategy and War Plans

Cai E and other Yunnan leaders had originally planned first to send Yunnan forces secretly to the border with Sichuan, then to declare independence publicly from

Beijing. From a military perspective, a preemptive strike would have been the best option for the outnumbered Yunnan forces, for their best hope was to takeover Sichuan before Yuan Shikai’s reinforcements could arrive and then use Sichuan as a base from which to launch an offensive against Yuan.571 A contemporary assessment of Cai E’s decision making and strategic plans can be found in the account of the National

Protection movement and war by B. L. Putnam Weale, who provided a contemporary

Western perspective on the 1916 war and on Cai E’s strategic intent.572 According to

570 Sutton, 196-198. Chinese terms dituan and zhidui correspond approximately to a Western style brigade and regiment, however, since the organization of a dituan or a zhidui was fairly ad hoc and depended on what units and troops were on hand at any given time, I have chosen to use the Chinese unit terminology to more accurately reflect the type of unit referred to in the text. This has also been done to avoid confusion because there are inconsistencies in unit terminology between different primary sources. In Smedley’s text, the terms division, brigade, and regiment are used in place of jun, dituan, and zhidui. In English translations of Zhu De’s works, the terms army, brigade, and detachment are used in place of the equivalent Chinese terms, although in the Chinese text, the original Chinese unit terminology is used. If on the other hand, the original Chinese text uses the terms lu, tuan, or ying, I have used the English equivalent of brigade, regiment, or battalion. In addition, individual dituan and zhidui were not usually given unit numbers, but instead were identified by their commanders name in army rosters or operational orders, i.e., Gu dituan or Zhu zhidui. In the case of the Yunnan Army on campaign, a dituan would number around 1,000 men, while its individual zhidui could number anywhere from 300 to over 600 soldiers each. A zhidui itself would be composed of various under strength ying (battalions) that could range from 200 to 400 troops a piece. For an example of an army order of battle on campaign, see Cai E’s report on the Huguojun First Army for March 12, 1916, in Cai E Ji, 426-427. 571 Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China 1840-1928 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), 329. 572 B.L. Putnam Weale (pseud. for Bertram Lenox Simpson), The Fight for the Republic in China (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1917), 245-249. Weale published his account of the 1916 anti-Yuan revolt in 1917. Weale, however, had only a limited knowledge of the actual fighting. He was not in Yunnan or Sichuan during the war, but he did seem to make use of information from the U.S. military attaché who accompanied some of Yuan’s forces as they advanced up the Yangzi River towards the Sichuan front.

270 Weale, when Cai E arrived back in Yunnan in early December 1915, he found preparation for the revolt well underway, but the Yunnan Army short of arms and ammunition. Overall, Weale had a high regard for Cai E’s military abilities and strategic planning, and in Weale’s view, had Cai E had another fortnight to prepare for the campaign, “… he would have probably made the most brilliant modern campaign that has been witnessed in China, for he was an excellent soldier.”573 Continuing in his appraisal of Cai E’s generalship, Weale believed that, “Acting from the natural fortress of Yunnan

it was his plan to descend suddenly on the Yangtsze Valley by way of Chungking and to

capture the upper river in one victorious march thus closing the vast province of

Szechuan to the Northern troops.”574 In Weale’s assessment of the military situation

facing Cai E, the need to gain control quickly over the upper reaches of the Yangzi River

was critical for the Yunnan rebels. According to Weale, the Yangzi River region played

a key strategic role in Chinese politics because it was a major communication route into the interior of China and flowed through more than half of all Chinese provinces. After the defeat of the 1913 rebellion, Yuan Shikai, to safeguard this strategic route, had garrisoned the river towns with his own troops under commanders of assured loyalty to

the central government.575

After the December 22, 1915 blood oath that anti-monarchial movement leaders

took, Cai E and other rebel leaders decided on what form the challenge to Yuan would take and developed appropriate war plans. Because political considerations would take

precedence over military imperatives, Cai E did not follow the original plan, which was

to march the Yunnan Army to the Sichuan border and then declare independence. For

573 Ibid., 245. 574 Ibid., 245.

271 political reasons, the date for an open declaration opposing Yuan Shikai’s regime was advanced to December 23/24, before most Yunnan Army units could reach Sichuan.

This decision by the Yunnan rebels would give Yuan’s forces time to mobilize in Sichuan but would also pressure other southern provinces to respond more quickly to a call for open revolt.576 This was a risky strategy for Cai E to pursue, for he hoped to force the hands of other provincial leaders, whom he knew disagreed with Yuan’s policies, to openly declare their opposition and support the rebellion. Cai E knew that by taking this political action he would place Yunnan forces at a military disadvantage in the coming war by losing the element of surprise. But Cai E and the Yunnan rebels needed to ensure that other provinces would join them. There is some evidence that other provinces were waiting for Yunnan to act first, such as the leader of Guangxi who held off declaring his support for the Yunnan-led rebellion until Yunnan acted first.577 Therefore, Yunnan needed to take the first step and publicly announce its intention to defy Yuan Shikai’s regime and hope this would then compel other anti-Yuan leaders in other provinces to then commit themselves.578 In observing the strategic calculations of his mentor, Zhu De

575 Ibid., 245-246. 576 Sutton, 191. 577 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 329. 578 There are other interpretations on why Cai E announced Yunnan independence several weeks before Yunnan troops could have been in place in southern Sichuan, thus losing the element of surprise. These interpretations see the reason for the early declaration of rebellion not so much as following a pre-planned political strategy but as a response to changing political circumstances that forced Cai E and other Yunnan leaders to be reactive and issue a premature declaration of rebellion. Weale believed that Cai E and the other rebel leaders were forced to send their ultimatum to Yuan a fortnight earlier then desired because of circumstances, thus giving the central government enough warning to counter the offensive from Yunnan. See Weale, 245. One of the generals commanding Yuan’s troops was Feng Guozhang at Nanjing, who was willing to support the revolt with his troops but needed the revolt to begin before his imminent replacement by Yuan Shikai, who suspected him of disloyalty. For Weale, this is the reason why Cai E declared the Yunnan revolt fourteen days too soon, before Yunnan forces could march into Sichuan and seize Chongqing. In Weale’s view, Cai E missed an opportunity to surprise Yuan and occupy Chongqing, which could have barred Yuan’s forces advance into Sichuan because the river defiles in this area could be easily defended against attackers. The early declaration of revolt did have its desired effect and allowed Feng Guozhang to stay in Nanjing. See Weale, 246-247. In Chinese historian Li Chien-nung’s view, Yunnan leaders found out in December 1915 that Yuan was negotiating a treaty with Japan that was set for

272 would have discerned the importance of keeping a clear focus on the overall political objectives of a war even if they conflicted with immediate military imperatives.

Despite the differing interpretations of why Cai E announced Yunnan independence before his troops were in position, there is a consensus that in Cai E’s strategy for the rebellion against Yuan Shikai, political considerations would take precedence over military ones. All the reasons given for Cai E’s early announcement of independence center on achieving political objectives that outweighed military imperatives. Thus Cai E announced independence before Yunnan forces had entered

Sichuan and by doing this he hoped to force other provincial governments to make a choice to support the rebellion against Yuan.579 Unfortunately, Cai E’s plan did not initially go the way he had anticipated. In his strategic calculation, Cai E had assumed that Guizhou intended to announce independence from Beijing at the same time as

Yunnan, to be closely followed by announcements from Guangxi and Jiangxi. But

Guangxi and Guizhou provinces delayed their response, while Jiangxi did not declare a break with Beijing at all. Therefore, initially Yunnan was left alone to fight the combined forces of Yuan’s government. Guizhou finally declared independence near the end of January 1916, while Guangxi did not support the rebellion until mid-March

1916.580 This lack of support from other provinces created military and political disadvantages for Yunnan at the beginning of the war. For the first two and a half months Yunnan was isolated and on its own. It was only in mid-February on the Sichuan

ratification in January 1916. Yunnan leaders wanted to prevent this from occurring so they announced independence three weeks earlier than planned even though this made the military situation more difficult by allowing Yuan’s forces time to reach Sichuan before the Huguojun. See Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 325, 329. 579 Sutton, 191. 580 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 329, 332.

273 front that Yunnan forces received reinforcements of several Guizhou regiments. In

addition, because both Yunnan and Guizhou were poor provinces, funding was tight to finance any military campaign.581

On December 23 and 24, Cai E and other Yunnan leaders sent ultimatums to

Yuan Shikai calling on him to renounce his plans to reestablish the monarchy, which

Yuan ignored. Consequently, the Yunnan rebels on December 25 issued a public

challenge to Yuan calling on civilians and soldiers throughout China to come to the

defense of the Republic. This was equivalent to a public declaration of war against the

central government by Yunnan and its military.582 In response to Yunnan’s declaration

of revolt, Yuan planned to surround Yunnan and Guizhou with converging armies from

the north and east. Generals Cao Kun and Zhang Jingyao would lead a large force of

Northern troops into Sichuan and then attack Yunnan from the base they had secured in

southern Sichuan. Other forces loyal to Yuan would enter Guizhou from Hunan, while a

unit of troops from southern China (Guangdong) would invade southern Yunnan in coordination with troops from Guangxi.583

In mid-December 1915, Zhu De and his fellow officers stationed at Mengzi had

received instructions from Cai E informing them of plans for the rebellion against Yuan

Shikai. On December 25, Zhu administered to his troops the oath of allegiance to the

Republic as instructed, then loaded his soldiers onto trains destined for Yunnanfu. Upon

his arrival in Yunnanfu, Zhu went straight to Cai E’s headquarters. There, Cai E

described his plans for the rebellion to Zhu and said that Yunnan would carry the burden

alone and that the military offensive would buy time until other republican forces could

581 Sutton, 192-193. 582 Ibid., 191.

274 organize rebellions in other provinces. In three days, Yunnan units were scheduled to

depart for Sichuan, where Yuan, according to Zhu, had some of his strongest forces.584

On January 6, 1916, Zhu De was appointed commander of the Yunnan Army’s Tenth

Infantry Regiment, the unit of which his battalion had been a part. When the Huguojun was organized, this unit was incorporated into the First Army’s third dituan, sixth zhidui, with Zhu De in command of this zhidui, a zhidui being equivalent to a regiment.585 See

Figure 9 for a photo of Zhu De when he served as a regimental commander in the

Huguojun. Yang Ruxuan served under Zhu in the Tenth Regiment, as the first battalion’s deputy commander and as a company commander.586

Cai E had anticipated that Yuan would launch offensives from the north and east

against Yunnan. Despite the late start, Cai E would still try to preempt the advance of

Yuan’s forces into Sichuan and Guizhou and protect Yunnan. The Huguojun First Army would form the core of the Sichuan expedition, while additional reinforcements would follow as they were trained. As the First Army’s commander-in-chief, Cai E would command the Sichuan expedition in person.587 Cai E’s strategic plan called for the First

Army to proceed north through southern Sichuan and then down the Yangzi River to

eventually attack Wuhan. The First Army was composed of three dituan divided into six

zhidui, two zhidui per dituan. Zhu De was in command of the sixth zhidui under Gu

Pinzhen’s third dituan. The Second Army, under its commander-in-chief Li Liejun, was assigned the mission of marching through Guangxi and Guangdong, and then waiting for

583 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 330. 584 Smedley, 111-113. Zhu De did not arrive in Yunnanfu until January 6, 1916 according to the chronology in Zhu De nianpu, 27. Zhu had related to Smedley that it was at the end of December. 585 Smedley, 110-111. 586 Yang, 3-4. 587 Smedley, 112-113.

275 an opportunity to take Hunan and Jiangxi before linking up with the First Army at

Wuhan.588 But before the Second Army proceeded to Guangxi and Guangdong, it would

588 Zhang Yutian, Zhongguo jindai junshi shi (Recent Military History of China) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1983), 526. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 388; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 383-384. In different sources there is some confusion over the unit Zhu De initially command, with some stating he commanded the third zhidui and others the sixth zhidui. Even Zhu De’s memory could be fuzzy on this point, with him stating that he only commanded the third zhidui during the campaign to Smedley in 1937 and in his subsequent reminiscences of the 1916 campaign in 1961. A possible reason for this confusion could be from the fact that Zhu De started the campaign in January in command of the sixth zhidui of the third dituan, but when he arrived at the Naxi front on February 17, he was transferred to command the third zhidui of the second dituan. See the chronology in Zhu De nianpu, 23.

276 first clear out Yuan’s forces stationed in Guizhou.589 The Third Army under Tang Jiyao,

was composed of six dituan on paper and it was originally intended to send the Third

Army to the Hunan front. But this plan was canceled, and instead the first three dituan of the Third Army were deployed to various other fronts during the war, while its other units remained in Yunnan.590

As the newly created Huguojun commenced the war against Yuan Shikai, it

possessed certain key strengths and weaknesses compared to its adversaries. One factor

that made the Huguojun so effective was its superior officer corps derived from the

Yunnan Army. In battle, these officers would lead from the front and inspire their men

by example. On the whole, Huguojun officers possessed a higher personal commitment

to the cause they were fighting for and had a better relationship with their men than

officers of the opposing Northern armies. Given these attributes, the Huguojun was able

to maintain a high level of esprit de corps among its units.591 In commenting on the

Yunnan Army of this period, Zhu stressed the importance of high quality officers who have confidence and an ability to endure battle. Zhu took pride in the fact that the

Yunnan Military Academy at that time was producing such officers.592

The officer corps of the Huguojun in 1916 had similar characteristics as the

Yunnan Army officer corps of 1912, mainly because many former officers who had been

disbanded, retired, or in the reserves rejoined the Yunnan Army for the 1916 war. It was

an officer corps that maintained a more impersonal military command culture, where provincialism was muted and dedication to a higher cause was emphasized over personal

589 Smedley, 112-113. 590 Sutton, 198. 591 Sutton, 205-206. 592 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 57.

277 gain. Many non-Yunnanese held high level command positions, such as Cai E who was from Hunan or Zhu De from Sichuan. Indeed, a significant number of Sichuan native

officers, like Zhu De, stayed in the Yunnan Army through 1920. Because of this

professionalism, the Huguojun enjoyed a significant advantage over its opponents during its various campaigns, where unit commanders subordinated themselves to the needs of the Huguojun organization. The effectiveness of the First Army in Sichuan can, in a large part be due to this level of military professionalism manifested on campaign by the balance attained between dituan level initiative and centralized control.593

Despite its advantages in leadership, the Huguojun was inferior to its Northern opponents in arms and equipment. The domestic Chinese armaments industry of this period was inadequate to meet the demand for modern arms within the country. In 1916, there were only eight arsenals in China that could produce modern arms, all of them located in six provinces (Sichuan, Hubei, Shandong, Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Henan) along with another twenty one smaller arsenals used mainly for storage and repair.

Therefore, foreign-manufactured arms became the main source of supply to Chinese armies of this period, with some of the major suppliers being Japan, Germany, and eventually the Soviet Union. Because of the uneven distribution of domestic arsenals and the heavy dependence on foreign arms that required access to ports, many armies located in interior provinces were at a distinct disadvantage compared to their eastern counterparts. In general, armies located in coastal provinces or in a province with an arsenal were better armed than armies located in interior provinces, who being denied

593 Sutton, 198-199, 201, 232.

278 access to these sources of armaments, were usually the worst armed.594 Zhu De’s deputy,

Yang Ruxuan, commented on the obsolescent rifles the Yunnan Army had to use during

its campaigns in Sichuan from 1916 to 1920.595 The arms and equipment of the

Huguojun were inferior to its Northern opponents during the 1916 war, and it was

chronically short of ammunition, especially artillery shells. In addition to being well

supplied with arms and ammunition, the Northern armies had pontoon bridges to cross

the Yangzi River and even a few airplanes for reconnaissance.596

The shortages of arms and ammunition were so serious for the Huguojun that

during the initial planning for the campaign into Sichuan, Luo Peijin, Cai E’s chief of

staff, even suggested that the first major objective of the campaign should be Chengdu

and its arsenal before advancing on Chongqing. To make up for its deficiencies in arms,

Yunnan ordered 14,000 rifles from Japan, but these did not arrive until May 1916 after

the major fighting had been completed. The Huguojun had to also rely on capturing arms from its adversaries, where after one battle over 1,000 rifles were captured and reused by units of the Huguojun.597 The practice of relying on captured arms to equip ones’ own

forces was common and was later used extensively by Zhu De’s Red Army to equip its

soldiers. While participating in the 1916 war, Zhu De gained experience conducting

operations with military forces that were chronically short of arms and material, and

became familiar with the necessity of capturing what they needed from the enemy.

594 Ch’i, 118, 122, 125-126. The geographical difference in the distribution of arms was a key variable in determining the tactics used by armies and the pattern of conflict between them, and also influenced the distribution of political power among various militarist factions. See Ch’i, 126. B.L. Putnam Weale, a contemporary Western commentator on the 1916 war, noted that because the Yunnan army was not as well equipped with mountain artillery and supplies as Yuan’s troops, they were forced out of necessity to rely mostly on guerrilla warfare. See Weale, 248. 595 Yang, 13. 596 Sutton, 203. 597 Ibid., 194.

279 The Huguojun communication and logistic system between Yunnanfu and the various frontlines was primitive and slow compared to the Northern forces’ ability to use the Yangzi River to transport larger quantities of supplies and reinforcements. In order to advance up the Yangzi River toward Sichuan, Yuan’s forces commandeered junks to carry their troops and supplies along the river. Figure 10 shows junks transporting

supplies for Cao Kun’s forces being tracked up the rapids of the upper Yangzi River in

1916. In contrast, the various units of the Huguojun had to rely on a modified imperial

post system utilizing pack horse caravans to transport supplies. From the Military Post

Headquarters in Yunnanfu, three main and several secondary supply lines radiated out to the various battle fronts, these for the most part being nothing more than footpaths. Pack horse caravans were used to move supplies along a system of post stations, located one

280 day’s ride apart, run by civil officials. Every evening, a post station would accommodate a caravan of supplies moving up to the front from Yunnanfu and a caravan returning from the front with written reports and messages, and the wounded bound for Yunnanfu. The provincial police provided detachments to serve as armed escorts for these caravans.

Movement from one post station to another was monitored through the telegraph.

Despite a constant stream of caravans moving between Sichuan and Yunnanfu, the

Huguojun frontline forces continued to suffer severe shortages of supplies and ammunition.598 See Figure 11 depicting a typical pack horse caravan traversing a mountain path in Sichuan during 1916-1917.

598 Ibid., 194.

281 Conduct of the 1916 Campaign in Sichuan

At the operational level, the Huguojun First Army that would enter Sichuan was

divided into left and right columns. The first dituan, led by Liu Yunfeng, would form the

left column and had already left for the Sichuan border before Yunnan declared

independence. They were to proceed through Dongchuan to Yanjin at the Yunnan-

Sichuan border. There they would enter Sichuan and take the Yangzi River town of

Xuzhou/Xufu (modern Yibin). The right column was composed of the second dituan

under Zhao Youxin and the third dituan under Gu Pinzhen, which contained Zhu De’s

zhidui. This column was the main force and would proceed through Xuanwei and then

march through Guizhou province to enter Sichuan by way of Xuyong (Yongning) in

order to attack Luzhou located on the Yangzi River to the east of Xuzhou/Xufu. There

was also a small column composed of one ying (battalion) that Cai E had ordered to

march eastward into Guizhou to link up with anti-Yuan forces and then organize a joint

Yunnan-Guizhou army.599

In January 1916, before it entered Sichuan, Cai E’s First Army numbered around

3,000 to 3,100 troops. By April, this number would grow to 5,000 to 6,000 with the

defection of Sichuan units and reinforcements from Yunnan. In addition, the First Army

was augmented by a large number of Sichuan irregular forces.600 Initially, Cai E’s forces

would face 32,000 to 35,000 soldiers loyal to Yuan Shikai in Sichuan, composed of

20,000 Sichuan troops and 12,000 to 15,000 Northern troops that had originally

599 Zhang, 526-527. Guo, 127. The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. It links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. See United States Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, 2-2 – 2-3. 600 Sutton, 202-203. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 388; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 383-384.

282 accompanied Governor Chen Yi when he arrived in the province during the summer of

1915.601

On receiving the declaration of Yunnan’s independence and open rebellion, Yuan

Shikai dispatched Northern army units up the Yangzi River towards Sichuan. These units were Cao Kun’s Third Division, Zhang Jingyao’s Seventh Division, and Li Changtai’s

Eighth Division. In addition, three independent brigades were sent.602 This force numbered around 25,000 to 30,000 troops. The intention was for these units to meet up at Luzhou in order to guard the border area between Sichuan and Yunnan. When Yunnan declared independence in late December 1915, Yuan had designated Cao Kun as commander-in-chief of the government forces opposing Yunnan and Zhang Jingyao as

the front line commander.603 Serving under Zhang Jingyao were commanders such as

Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang, who commanded one of the independent brigades. With the addition of the reinforcements under Cao Kun and Zhang Jingyao, Yuan’s forces in

Sichuan now totaled around 60,000 to 70,000 troops.604 Yuan’s forces advancing up the

601 Young, 234. 602 Cai E Ji, 12. 603 Guo, 127 and Yang, 12. 604 Yang, 12. There are differing estimates on the total number of troops in the Huguojun and Northern armies during this period. A wide range of numbers are cited by different sources. For instance, Zhu De states that the First Army numbered 6,000 troops facing 100,000 troops under Yuan’s general Cao Kun, see Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 388; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 383-384. Chinese historian Guo Junning also estimates that Cao Kun was leading approximately 100,000 troops, but that the Huguojun was composed of around 20,000 troops in total (Guo, 127). Historian Ernest P. Young estimated that Cai E started with approximately 3,000 troops under his command that was later increased to 5,000. They in turn initially faced 20,000 Sichuan troops and 12- 15,000 Beiyang troops stationed in Sichuan who were later reinforced by 25,000 soldiers under Cao Kun (Young, 233-234.). Donald Sutton estimated Cai E’s force at 3,100 in February 1916 and that by April they had increased to 5,000 along with an unspecified number of Sichuan irregular forces. According to Sutton, Cai E initially faced 4,000 Sichuan troops, and one under strength northern division and one regiment under Feng Yuxiang, which was later reinforced by three northern divisions totaling 30,000 under Cao Kun (Sutton, 202-203). According to Cai E’s biography in the Cai E Ji, the forces under Cai E were approximately 3,100, with no estimate for enemy forces initially in Sichuan other than the 5,000 troops of the Sichuan Second Division that defected to the Huguojun. As for the Northern forces dispatched by Yuan Shikai to Sichuan, there were three divisions and three independent brigades, totaling 30,000 troops (Cai E Ji, 12.). Among Cai E’s military papers from this period, there is a roster of the First Army’s units

283 Yangzi River were in a race with the forces from Yunnan to reach the strategic city of

Chongqing first. Speed was imperative, for even though Sichuan province was garrisoned by Northern forces, Yuan perceived these units to be weak and surrounded by

Sichuan units of questionable loyalty.605 In early January, troops under Cao Kun reached

Chongqing before the Huguojun and they then established their headquarters in the city.606

At least on paper, Yuan’s forces enjoyed an overwhelming numerical superiority over Cai E’s First Army as the campaign in southern Sichuan commenced. Yuan’s forces, however, could never fully take advantage of their numerical superiority because of a lack of coordination and integration between various units. The 25,000 to 30,000 troops of the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Northern divisions entered Sichuan in a piecemeal fashion. The Third and Seventh divisions arrived in Chongqing in early

January, while the Eighth division arrived in three parts in January, February, and March.

dated March 12, 1916 that gives a figure of 3,130 men under the command of Cai E (Cai E Ji, 426-427.). Historian Li Chien-nung estimated that the Huguojun First Army started with 3,130 troops (Li, 329.). Given the range of figures on the number of troops engaged in the southern Sichuan campaign, a reasonable estimate would be that Cai E’s First Army initially numbered between 3,000-3,100 soldiers. As the campaign progressed, it was augmented with reinforcements and defecting Sichuan troops to bring it to a total of between 5,000 to 6,000 troops. There does not seem to be any precise figures on the number of Sichuan irregular forces that cooperated with Cai E’s First Army, although Ernest P. Young gives an upper estimate of around 100,000 by mid-1916 (Young, 235-236.). The total number of forces loyal to Yuan Shikai initially stationed in Sichuan can be estimated at between 32,000 to 35,000, if one were to use the figure of 20,000 Sichuan troops from the two modern divisions stationed in the province and the estimated 12-15,000 northern troops that originally accompanied governor Chen Yi to the province in 1915. As for the forces of Cao Kun, it would be safe to say that they numbered around 25,000 to 30,000. Therefore, the upper estimate for the total enemy forces facing Cai E’s First Army during the Sichuan campaign would be around 65,000 at most, not the 100,000 given by Zhu De and Guo Junning. The 65,000 figure is supported by one of Zhu De’s subordinates, Yang Ruxuan, who estimated that Yuan Shikai’s forces totaled around 60-70,000 troops (Yang, 12.). 605 Weale, 247-248. At this point in his narrative, Weale acknowledged that he had little accurate information on the actual fighting that took place, but according to his information prolonged and heavy fighting ensued in the mountains, where Yunnan forces were only partially successful. Weale relied on second hand information regarding the fighting in Sichuan, although as indicated by the credits for some of the photos in his book, Weale was in contact with Major Isaac Newell, the U.S. military attaché, who seems to have accompanied Cao Kun’s forces as they advanced up the Yangzi River towards Chongqing. 606 Young, 233-234.

284 This force was never integrated with the troops already in Sichuan and was not well

coordinated internally.607 Because of a lack integration and poor coordination between

different units, Northern forces were never able to use their numerical advantage over

smaller Huguojun forces, who were always outnumbered on the battlefield. In general,

Huguojun units repeatedly defended against or attacked units twice their size.608 Zhu observed that despite the small size of the Huguojun, it seemingly was able to defeat the whole Northern army. But Zhu acknowledged the reality that Yuan’s army was a disorganized “hodge podge” of different units that could be defeated. In addition, Zhu related that some of Yuan’s seemingly most trusted commanders, such as the Sichuan military commander Liu Cunhou and the Sichuan military governor (dujun), were secretly supporting the Huguojun movement.609

In contrast to the weaknesses of Yuan’s forces, the Huguojun enjoyed certain key

advantages. Cai E was probably one of the most talented military commanders during

the early Republican period and was able to achieve a superior level of coordination

among the different units of his forces. The Yunnan Army had a cohesive officer corps

and troops that were well trained and disciplined compared to their adversaries. Indeed, the Yunnan troops’ good behavior toward the Sichuan population helped reinforce the

Sichuan populace’s sympathy toward the anti-Yuan cause. The Yunnan units of the

Huguojun were welcomed by the Sichuan population and were more popular in Sichuan than in Yunnan. The consequence of Huguojun popularity in Sichuan was to create an

607 Sutton, 202-203. 608 Ibid., 203. 609 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 58. Indeed, beginning in January 1916, even the Sichuan governor Chen Yi was in secret negotiations with Cai E. See Young, 236. During the February 1916 battles south of Luzhou, Zhu related that some of Yuan’s army commanders were wavering, such as the brigade commander Feng Yuxiang, who sent representatives to Cai E to arrange for a separate truce. See Smedley, 115.

285 impression that Sichuan troops could not be relied upon by the Beijing government. Cai

E’s forces benefited from the defection of the Sichuanese units along with their commanders.610 For instance, on February 2, 1916, after Cai E’s First Army entered

Sichuan, Liu Cunhou’s Second Sichuan Division defected and declared its support for the

Huguojun against Yuan Shikai. The Second Sichuan division subsequently cooperated with Cai E’s main force as it headed for Luzhou.611 This defection was not unexpected for Cai E given his personal and school ties with Liu Cunhou, for Liu had been Cai E’s subordinate in the old Yunnan Nineteenth Division and had been a fellow Shikan graduate.612

In his reminiscences of the 1916 war, Zhu emphasized the strict discipline shown

by the Huguojun First Army, which generated support from the Sichuan populace and

was responsible for its superior combat effectiveness. In Zhu’s view, the two factors that

allowed the First Army to defeat numerically superior foes was the support of the

Sichuan people and taking full advantage of the mountainous terrain in the area of

operations.613 In marked contrast to the good discipline displayed by the Huguojun, the behavior of Northern troops was characterized by looting and rape that turned the

Sichuan populace violently anti-Northern. The superior behavior of the Huguojun troops should be credited to their officers and NCOs who maintained high standards of discipline among their soldiers that extended to issuing soldiers with a list of rules of conduct and proper hygiene.614

610 Young, 234-235. 611 Cai E Ji, 12. 612 Sutton, 190. 613 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 388; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 383-384. 614 Sutton, 206-207.

286 The basis for this high level of discipline and unit cohesion can be found in the superior training that the soldiers of the Yunnan Army received. When Zhu had arrived back in Yunnanfu on January 6, 1916 he was appointed commander of the newly organized Tenth Regiment. This unit was subsequently incorporated into the Huguojun’s

First Army, third dituan. The third dituan was composed of soldiers from different units

along with newly enlisted recruits. Zhu De and his fellow officer, Fan Shisheng, were

assigned to train the soldiers of this dituan to get them ready for the campaign. In the training, Zhu De strictly followed Yunnan Army and Huguojun regulations on training new recruits and educating soldiers and officers. These regulations stressed the maintenance of strict discipline, order, and cohesion. They included stipulations that soldiers must not enter people’s homes at random; for hygiene they must clearly define latrine areas when encamped; all purchases must be at a fair price and the price not

suppressed according to authority of the soldiers; and when in battle, officers must lead their troops and be a model for their subordinates. The adherence to these regulations created a fighting force with strict organizational discipline.615 These lists of rules and

regulations bear a remarkable resemblance to the later Red Army’s “Three Main Rules of

Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention.”

Gaining the goodwill of the Sichuan populace paid other big dividends for the

Huguojun. It gave them an advantage in intelligence gathering and reconnaissance,

enabled the Huguojun to raise and borrow large sums of money from the Sichuan elite,

and encouraged the defections of thousands of Sichuanese troops who joined the

Huguojun. In addition, having the goodwill of the Sichuan population helped neutralize

many potentially hostile Sichuan units in the Northern army. These units often held back

615 TP PT Guo, 129. 287 during battles and let their Northern allies bear the brunt of the fighting or chose not to engage in the fighting at all.616 The support of the Sichuan population also allowed the

Huguojun to receive large-scale assistance from Sichuan partisan units.

An interesting aspect of the Huguojun campaign in Sichuan was that it was

carried out in conjunction with a large-scale guerrilla war that hampered the operations of

the Northern forces sent by Yuan to southern Sichuan. The Sichuan guerrilla forces were

often composed of secret society members, such as the Gelaohui, and veterans of the

1913 rebellion. There had already been on-going guerrilla operations in Sichuan prior to

the 1916 war, and by 1915 it had become difficult to distinguish political agitation from

organized brigandage. At the beginning of the anti-Yuan war, the Huguojun had sent

agents to stir up more guerrilla activity in Sichuan. Throughout the province in early

1916, the clandestine large-scale mobilization of guerrilla bands was taking place,

especially among secret society members, bandits, and former soldiers. Some of these

partisan units were sent to southern Sichuan to assist Huguojun military operations, while the rest operated in their home districts, with some units adopting the name Huguojun.

The result was the creation of a popular armed movement in Sichuan. Some of these guerrilla units numbered over a thousand and attacked towns and cities. In these attacks,

looting occurred, arms and public funds were seized, official buildings were burned, and prisoners set free. In certain instances, guerrilla groups would occupy a town and set up a new administration.617

Cai E allied his forces with these guerrilla bands in Sichuan in order to wage a

guerrilla war against Yuan’s forces. These guerrilla units attacked the supply lines of the

616 Sutton, 208. 617 Young, 235.

288 Northern forces, interrupted shipments of arms and ammunition, and provided Cai E’s

forces with transportation services. One estimate put the total number of guerrilla forces

operating in Sichuan by mid-summer 1916 at over 100,000.618 In commenting on the guerrilla warfare being waged in Sichuan, Zhu stated, “We did our first mass work among the peasants during this war against the monarchy. Led by the Gelaohui, the

peasants arose in arms, attacked enemy transports, and delivered food and ammunition to us. Boatman moved up and down the river with supplies for us, ferried our troops across the river, and carried our wounded from the battlefield.”619

Cai E’s alliance with these local guerrilla forces, however, was only tactical. Cai

E did not want to overturn Yuan’s government administration in Sichuan but to win over

its leaders. From January 1916, Cai E was in secret communication with Yuan’s

governor in Sichuan, Chen Yi, and tried to convince him to join the revolt and negotiate a

local settlement. Chen Yi had been appointed both Sichuan civil and military governor

by Yuan in 1915. Chen Yi knew Cai E from their service together in Yuan’s government

in Beijing from 1914 to 1915. From January 1916 onward, Chen Yi was in contact with

Cai E, and Chen offered to break with Yuan under certain conditions. Chen tried to stay

in between the two sides and negotiate a favorable deal. The effect of this was to

undermine the opposition to the Huguojun in Sichuan. Chen Yi also felt pressured to

oppose Yuan in order to better deal with the development of the brigand Huguojun

(guerrilla units) who were staging attacks near Chengdu. Chen Yi continued to waver in

618 Ibid., 235-236. 619 Smedley, 114.

289 his negotiations, but did order his subordinates in March not to press the battle against the

Huguojun.620

The Huguojun First Army in Battle

During the Huguojun campaign in Sichuan, the battle front remained around the

Yangzi River valley in the southern region. The initial offensive by the first dituan

toward the Yangzi River resulted in the defeat of some Northern and Sichuanese forces

and the capture of Xufu/Xuzhou on January 22, 1916.621 As more Northern forces

arrived from Chongqing, the Huguojun First Army switched to more defensive

operations. The constant concern of Huguojun officers was the precarious state of their supply lines back to Yunnan that relied on pack horse caravans traversing steep mountain paths between Yunnan and southern Sichuan, and throughout the campaign the army was always short of supplies and money.622 Indeed, the Huguojun First Army had left

Yunnanfu undersupplied for any extended campaign, carrying only two months’

provisions.623

Despite its shortages of supplies and arms, the Huguojun was still able to hold on

to its position in southern Sichuan along the Yangzi River despite repeated attacks by

superior numbers of enemy forces. The Huguojun became engaged in a protracted war

with Yuan’s forces, where its continued survival was a key element in achieving the

rebels’ objective of widening the rebellion against Yuan throughout China. As long as

the Huguojun could show that Yuan Shikai was not invincible and could not repeat the

quick victory attained over the rebellion in 1913, then Cai E and other rebel leaders

620 Young, 236-237. 621 Ibid., 233-234. 622 Sutton, 200-201. 623 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 329.

290 believed they could induce more provinces to support the rebellion against Yuan

Shikai.624

At the tactical level, the battles between the First Army and the Northern forces

fought around Xuzhou and Luzhou were characterized by rapid maneuvers in the open

field along with trench warfare. The battles around Luzhou lasted forty five days that

eventually saw three lines of trenches dug around the city. The Northern troops were not well prepared for mobile warfare and were unfamiliar with the terrain and hampered by

clothing better suited for northern China. Huguojun military leaders attempted to choose

the timing and manner of battles, with an emphasis on mobile warfare that combined

bayonet attacks and night assaults. They hoped to use daring and surprise to compensate

for their numerical inferiority. One of the major tactical handicaps of the Northern forces

was their inability to maneuver at night, with the Huguojun often relinquishing their

position or camp during daytime fighting but then retaking them after nightfall.625

There were certain characteristics of the First Army’s battles with Yuan’s forces.

For the most part the fighting around Xufu/Xuzhou undertaken by Liu Yunfeng’s first

dituan from January to the end of February was isolated from the battles being conducted

by Cai E with the second and third dituan near Luzhou. The battles themselves took on

certain phases, with the First Army initially launching attacks against its main objectives,

then being pushed back by Yuan’s forces, which forced Huguojun units to take up

defensive positions. Once they had several days to recuperate, Huguojun units would

then launch a general counterattack lasting several days, and the pattern would repeat

624 Young, 233-234. 625 Sutton, 203-204. Tactics is the employment of units in combat. The tactical level of war includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate

291 itself. In this way, combat ebbed and flowed around Xufu/Xuzhou and Luzhou from late

January through March 1916.626

January 1916

As they headed north toward the strategic Yangzi River town of Xufu/Xuzhou, the left-hand column of the First Army, consisting of Liu Yunfeng’s first dituan, was the first to make contact with Yuan’s forces in southern Sichuan. Yuan’s forces were guarding the important communications hub at Yanzipo mountain pass. On January 16,

Liu’s first dituan executed a feigned attack on the front of this enemy force while simultaneously launching a surprise attack on the enemy’s flank and rear to force the enemy to retreat, and thus captured the pass. The enemy troops retreated to Hengjiang to set up another defensive line. The first dituan defeated the enemy again by dividing into two wings and launching flanking attacks. On the night of January 18, the first dituan reached the south bank of the Jinsha River; on the north bank was the important border town of Anbian that guarded the route between Yunnan and Sichuan. A large contingent of Yuan’s army was stationed here to guard this town. On January 19, the first dituan

again divided into two columns. One battalion of infantry and an artillery piece made a

potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. See United States Army, Field Manual 3- 0 Operations, 2-5. 626 For primary source documents on the First Army’s operations during the National Protection War, see Cai E, Cai E Ji, (Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1983) for Cai E’s orders and instructions to units of the First Army along with telegrams he sent back to Tang Jiyao in Yunnan reporting on the progress of the campaign and requests for men and supplies. Included within Cai E’s various orders to the army are directions given to Zhu De’s zhidui. See for instance an order issued on Februray 27, 1916 instructing the army to prepare for a general attack and specifying the units to be allocated to each zhidui commander that included Zhu De’s command. The order also specified how the available artillery and machine guns would be distributed amongst the various zhidui. (Cai E, Cai E Ji, 419-420.) Another collection of National Protection Army (Huguojun) documents can be found in Huguo wenxian (Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1985), which include unit histories and accounts of the fighting by various participants. In addition, there is a collection of original battle reports from the Huguojun second dituan, which Zhu De was assigned to after February 17, 1916 to command its third zhidui, among the orders issued by Cai E held at the original document depository at the Beijing Library (See “Huguojun dier dituan zhandou xiangbao,” Cai zongsiling mingling, Yuanjiancang Beijing tushuguan).

292 feigned attack from the south bank of the Jinsha River. Meanwhile, most of the first

dituan troops followed the river upstream for 50 li, then used small boats and bamboo

stalks to cross over to the north bank. They then launched an attack on the flank and rear

of the enemy forces defending Anbian who had only prepared to defend their front, not

their rear. Anbian was captured on January 20. Yuan’s forces in this area then collapsed

and fled, which allowed the first dituan to easily occupy Xufu/Xuzhou on January 22,

1916.627

The main objective of the right-hand column of the First Army was Luzhou, and

this column would be led by Cai E himself. Luzhou was a militarily important town in

southern Sichuan located on the Yangzi River and controlled the route to Chongqing

down the river. Cai E anticipated that Yuan’s forces would try to reinforce Luzhou, so

Cai E was determined to take Luzhou before the forces of Cao Kun and Zhang Jingyao

arrived. On January 10, the right-hand column, at this point consisting only of the second

dituan, left Yunnanfu.628 At the Sichuan-Yunnan border, the right-hand column met two

Sichuan units that joined the Huguojun. These were probably the forces under

Sichuanese commander Liu Cunhou, who informed Cai E that enemy forces were

headquartered at Naxi, a small town south of Luzhou on the Yangzi River, which also had a telegraph office that Cai E needed to communicate with other Huguojun forces

advancing into other provinces.629 Near the end of January, Cai E’s force arrived near

the town of Naxi. Meanwhile Zhu De’s sixth zhidui was slow to mobilize because of the

627 Guo, 127-128. 628 Ibid., 128. 629 Smedley, 113-114.

293 training and organizational requirements for creating the third dituan, of which the sixth zhidui was part, and did not depart Yunnanfu until January 22, 1916.630

February 1916

Throughout the First Army’s battles in southern Sichuan, Yunnan officers tried to

avoid set-piece battles, and instead met frontal assaults by counterattacking the enemy’s flanks. An example of this was demonstrated by the Huguojun’s defense of Xuzhou, which had been captured and occupied by Liu Yunfeng’s first dituan on January 22. In early February 1916, Feng Yuxiang with 2,500 well equipped Northern troops commenced his first attempt to recapture Xuzhou from the rebels. Yunnan Army defenders enticed Feng’s forces to within six li of Xuzhou, then a Yunnan detachment swung around and pinned Feng’s forces against the river and succeeded in routing the

Northern units.631 This maneuver resembled the active defense tactics of “luring the

enemy in deep,” later used extensively by the Red Army. In general, to compensate for

their numerical inferiority, Huguojun units seem to have relied on mobility to defeat

enemy forces that was characterized by indirect and flanking attacks instead of frontal

assaults. These tactics had been emphasized in both the Caofa and by Cai E. A Western

630 Guo, 128-129. The January 22 departure date is confirmed by the chronology in Zhu De nianpu, 23. In his account of this period to Agnes Smedley, Zhu stated that his unit formed part of the vanguard of the Sichuan expedition. According to his narration in Smedley, three days after Zhu and his unit had arrived back in Yunnanfu from the south, the military expedition departed for southern Sichuan. Because Zhu’s unit had two years experience in guerrilla warfare fighting bandits and tribesman on the frontier, it was chosen to lead the attack on Yuan’s forces whose units only knew positional warfare, see Smedley, 113. This account is not consistent with the information in Guo Junning and the chronology in Zhu De nianpu, see Guo, 129-130 and Zhu De nianpu, 23. According to Guo and the Zhu De nianpu, Zhu’s unit followed behind the main force led by Cai E, who had departed Yunnanfu on January 10, while Zhu himself did not leave Yunnanfu until January 22, 1916. This is probably an example of Zhu exaggerating to Smedley the importance of his role in key events during his early life. 631 Sutton, 204.

294 missionary, W.H. Hockman, observing the attack on Xuzhou, commented that the

defender’s victory “was won by tactics, rather than by heavy attack.”632

During February 5-12, the right-hand column of the First Army became involved

in an initial series of battles around Luzhou.633 Huguojun units under Dong Hongxun

and Liu Cunhou had advanced north from Naxi to besiege Luzhou. They had managed to

capture two strategic positions on the south side of the Yangzi River, Lantianba and

Yueliangyen, where they established camps. The control over these positions allowed

them to occupy the high ground (cliffs) on the south bank of the river opposite Luzhou,

where they emplaced a battery of eight mountain guns.634 The Northern forces defending

Luzhou, however, counterattacked on February 12, routed the Huguojun units and forced

them to flee halfway back to Naxi. The rout was not halted until He Haiqing’s zhidui of

the Huguojun second dituan arrived and stopped the pursuing Northern forces at the hilly

areas of Mianhuapo (Cotton Hill/Slope) northeast of Naxi. Dong Hongxun’s two yings

later met up with He Haiqing’s zhidui, and together they took up defensive positions around Mianhuapo. A few days later, the rest of the dispersed Huguojun troops joined

He and Dong’s forces. With the success of the counterattack on February 12, the

Northern commander, Zhang Jingyao, and his 15,000 troops in Luzhou, which included his own Seventh Division, now prepared to attack Naxi itself. The Huguojun’s intended offensive against Luzhou now shifted to a defense of Naxi. In Naxi, Cai E’s forces numbered no more than 5,000 in total, which probably included the allied Sichuan troops

632 Sutton, 204. 633 Zhu De nianpu, 23. 634 Guo, 130.

295 under Liu Cunhou.635 For a map of the area of operations around Luzhou and Naxi, see

Figure 12.

On February 15, Zhu De and the third dituan had arrived at Yongning (modern

Xuyong) in the southern Sichuan border region north of Yunnan. Zhu was ordered by

Cai E to quickly move his forces to the front at Naxi.636 Cai E urgently needed these reinforcements because of the battle developing to control the strategic high ground of

635 Guo, 130-131. Zhu De nianpu, 23.

296 Mianhuapo, which both sides considered key to the defense of Naxi.637 On February 17,

Zhu arrived at the Naxi front and was directed to replace Dong Hongxun as third zhidui

commander under Zhao Youxin’s second dituan.638

The Battles Around Naxi and Mianhuapo

An intense seesaw battle emerged around Mianhuapo and Naxi that lasted approximately 45 days from February to March 1916, and pitted Cai E’s outnumbered forces against the Northern troops under Zhang Jingyao and Wu Peifu.639 In order to

break up the Northern army’s offensive, Cai E planned to counterattack on February 19

using his “offensive defensive” (gongshi fangyu) tactics. Cai E instructed his forces to

divide into three routes (columns). The first route would be led by Lu Guofan with one

ying (battalion); the second route by He Haiqing with two ying; and the third route would

be under Zhu De with two ying, an artillery company and a machine-gun platoon.

Simultaneously, all three routes would launch a general counterattack from the

Mianhuapo/Naxi area against the Northern forces. Cai E also directed Liu Cunhou to

lead some troops across the Yangzi River to the north bank and make a feint attack as a

diversion to mask the Huguojun main forces’ true objectives. It was probable that the

first route was on the left flank nearest the Yangzi River, the second route was in the

center, while the third route was on the right flank. All three routes attacked in a

northeasterly direction from the area around Mianhuapo toward Luzhou. The opposing

636 Zhu De Nianpu, 23. 637 Guo, 131. 638 Zhu De nianpu, 23. Yang, 12. 639 Yang, 3.

297 Northern forces had taken up defensive positions and enjoyed the advantages of strong

defense works and the occupation of high ground.640

When Zhu first took command of the third zhidui on the Naxi/Mianhuapo frontline, he assessed that it was occupying a militarily disadvantageous position. As part of the counteroffensive by the Huguojun, Zhu resolved to attack and occupy Taojia dawu

(Tao village) and the nearby high ground. Zhu had previously commanded the troops in the third zhidui while stationed at Mengzi, and they had retained their high esprit de corps and morale. Zhu launched the initial attack on Tao village at night in the rain.641 Yang

Ruxuan’s battalion was designated to attack Tao village. The Northern forces occupying

this village hoped to rely on the surrounding precipitous terrain and their superior

armaments to defend this position to the last. Yang’s troops attacked the village over

many days without success. Cai E, who had accompanied a portion of Zhu De’s zhidui to

the frontline, revised the deployment of the troops. Due to Yang’s battalion commander

being killed in battle, Yang was promoted from deputy battalion commander to battalion

command. Cai E ordered Zhu to attack the artillery redoubt that had been established in

the village. Zhu employed a night attack using a picked group of soldiers to use

explosives to breach the fortifications of the village. This attack succeeded and Zhu’s

troops broke through the defenses and even overran Wu Peifu’s headquarters.642 The

Northern forces who had occupied the village and surrounding slopes were completely

surprised and fled, allowing Zhu’s forces to occupy the village and other strategic points

on Mianhuapo. His troops were now directly opposite the Northern forces’ positions on

Mianhuapo. Zhu also showed his composure under fire during this battle. When the

640 Guo, 131-132. 641 Ibid., 131.

298 Northern forces had regrouped after Zhu had routed them, they counterattacked and broke through an unguarded area of his lines. At this critical moment, Zhu was able to coordinate with other friendly units, push the enemy back, and recover the ground lost.643

During the intense battle for Tao village, Yang commented that Zhu was very

good at explaining the overall situation to his officers and men, and skilled at motivating

his troops.644 Indeed, Zhu’s unit developed a superior reputation during the initial battles

around Naxi and became known for their skills at night fighting and hand-to-hand

combat.645 In general, the Huguojun often attacked at night and during their February

battles launched attacks on ten consecutive nights that deprived the Northern troops of

sleep and eroded their morale.646 During the February 19 counteroffensive, Zhu’s third

zhidui participated in the attacks and counterattacks around the Mianhuapo battlefield. It

was during these battles that Zhu began to utilize a successful combination of night

attacks and outflanking tactics.647 His force would implement flank attack tactics in

coordination with fire support from artillery and machine guns. Zhu would use part of

his infantry with the artillery and machine guns to first pin down the enemy’s front, while

the majority of his forces would turn to the sides and attack the enemy in the flanks,

encircle them, and force the enemy to retreat to the rear.648 These types of envelopment

tactics were typical of the era and emphasized in the Caofa under offensive tactics and by

Cai E in his Quotations of Zeng and Hu. They would also be extensively used by the

later Red Army under Zhu De.

642 Yang, 3-4. 643 Guo, 131-132. 644 Yang, 12. 645 Smedley, 114. 646 Sutton, 204. 647 Zhu De nianpu, 23. 648 Guo, 132.

299 Another problem facing the Huguojun during these battles was the artillery of the

Northern forces that was not only superior to that of the Huguojun, but also enjoyed

larger stocks of ammunition. It was during the frequent artillery bombardments of the

Huguojun positions on Mianhuapo that Zhu displayed his leadership qualities under fire,

where he was always on the frontline so he could be seen and heard by his troops in order

to maintain their morale.649 To protect his troops from the artillery shelling, Zhu

improvised makeshift trench systems by draining the many irrigation trenches that crisscrossed Sichuanese farm fields. His troops would use these trenches for shelter during the day from enemy artillery fire and would only come out at night to launch attacks.650

Because Zhu De showed his command and leadership abilities on the first day of

the February 19 counterattack, Luo Peijin, chief of staff to Cai E, asked Zhu to lead an

additional unit, a ying from the Sichuan army. Zhu was ordered to continue offensive

actions and launch a series of attacks in coordination with his artillery, a six gun battery.

On February 21, in order to coordinate an attack on the left flank of the enemy at

Linjiaotang, Zhu continued to use offensive tactics to control the Northern force, so his

zhidui and He Haiqing’s could coordinate their attacks and rout the enemy.651

After three days of battle, because of the discrepancy in the number of troops between the

Huguojun and the Northern forces, Cai E’s First Army could not defeat Yuan’s forces around Luzhou. Huguojun units had suffered high casualties, especially among unit

commanders. On February 21 or 22, Cai E decided to halt the offensive and temporarily switch to the defense to allow for a reorganization of his army, a distribution of

649 Ibid., 132. 650 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 59.

300 ammunition, and a redeployment of troops. On February 23, Cai E would receive

additional reinforcements from the first dituan at Xuzhou/Xufu, which sent two ying to

Naxi. At this time, Cai E also promoted Zhu to the rank of brigadier general, although he would continue to command his zhidui. During this lull, Zhu visited each of his companies to review their experiences during the recent fighting and draw lessons that could be used to improve future combat performance.652 This seems to be an early use of

an after-action critique that Zhu would utilize extensively in the later Red Army.

Five to six days after this halt was initiated, the First Army was prepared to go on the offensive again. On February 28, Cai E ordered all three routes/columns of his army to launch a counterattack to break the encirclement of Naxi. In this counterattack, Cai E

used envelopment tactics. He Haiqing commanded the main attack force with orders to

attack the flanks of the enemy positions, while Zhu De’s zhidui with another zhidui, along with Liu Cunhou’s Sichuan troops, would screen the movement of the main force by attacking on the enemy’s front. The critical nature of the battle was reflected by Cai E’s order that anyone retreating without orders would be executed on the spot. Zhu used his

artillery to cover and clear the way for He Haiqing’s units to advance. The Huguojun pincer attacks forced the Northern frontline to become a sharp angle, which was

penetrated and pushed in on both their left and right flanks.653

March 1916

South of Luzhou, combat between units of the Huguojun First Army and Yuan’s

Northern forces continued into March. In commenting on the significance of the battles

around Mianhuapo and Naxi, Cai E observed that these engagements demonstrated the

651 Guo, 133. 652 Guo, 133. Smedley, 114.

301 first significant use of artillery by Chinese forces during the Republican period. The

fighting had been intense and the Northern forces suffered heavy casualties, but they

continued to receive reinforcements, while Huguojun units were becoming fatigued, had

received few replacements, and were running low on ammunition. After 45 days of

combat, Cai E recognized that his army could not make progress against the more numerous Northern forces. On March 7, Cai E decided to temporarily retreat from Naxi to let his army rest and replenish their manpower and materiel.654

The battles around Naxi occurred at a key moment in the Huguo (National

Protection) movement, when the Huguojun’s continued resistance demonstrated to other potential anti-Yuan forces that “they can use the few to defeat the many.”655 Cai E

commented that his forces lost no fewer than 1,000 men, while the enemy lost between

3,000 to 4,000 men. But the most important result was that the Naxi battles had raised the confidence of the Chinese population to resist Yuan Shikai’s restoration of the imperial system and gained time for the Huguo movement to develop within the whole

country.656 This highlights the political importance of the Huguojun battles around Naxi and Luzhou, for they were less for specific military objectives than for the political goal of rousing other provinces to join the anti-Yuan cause.

The retreat from Naxi and Mianhuapo did not mean an absence of fighting, for

Cai E’s forces continued to launch surprise attacks and raids against the Northern forces.

Zhu related that after the First Army’s retreat from Mianhuapo, his forces launched a counterattack at night. Zhu again commented on the poor quality of the Northern troops

653 Guo, 133-134. 654 Ibid., 134. 655 Ibid., 134. 656 Ibid., 134-135.

302 opposing his units, who in his view displayed poor discipline, stole from the local populace, and raped women. Zhu’s night attack caught the enemy completely by surprise, with most still sleeping when their camp was overrun.657

After the retreat from Naxi on March 7, the Huguojun recuperated and

reorganized, while Cai E planned for a new counteroffensive.658 On March 12, 1916, Cai took stock of the forces currently under his command. In the order of battle report that

Cai E prepared, he had a total of 3,130 troops, divided into two dituan and two additional zhidui. Gu Pinzhen’s dituan numbered 1,000 men, with Wang’s zhidui at 620 and Lu’s zhidui at 380. Zhao Youxin’s dituan numbered 850 men, with Zhu De’s zhidui at 550, with the roster noting that 350 of these soldiers were a newly joined unit, while He’s zhidui numbered 300. The two additional zhidui were Jin’s zhidui at 400 and Zhang’s

zhidui at 880, which may be the unit of yiyongjun (army of volunteers) that had earlier

joined Cai E’s forces.659

During this time, Zhu De visited Cai E at his headquarters, where Cai E informed

Zhu about his plans for the coming counterattack. Cai E observed that the Northern

forces did not have an offensive spirit. Therefore, the First Army should prepare a small

portion of its forces to attack the front of the enemy to distract it while the main force

would attack its flanks. With such an attack, Cai E judged, the enemy would

automatically retreat and flee. Cai E went on to instruct that all his commanders must

retain more of their reserve forces under their control in order for them to be deployed

when needed for the attack. Based on Cai E’s orders, the Huguojun First Army was

657 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 58. 658 Guo, 135.

303 divided into three routes to implement the counteroffensive beginning on March 17. The

center route was composed of Gu Pinzhen’s dituan, while the left route was composed of

He Haiqing’s zhidui and Liu Cunhou’s Sichuan forces, their mission being to guard the

left flank of Gu Pinzhen’s force. The right-hand route was the main force composed of

Jin Handing’s and Zhu De’s two zhidui along with two zhidui of yiyongjun (army of volunteers); its mission was to advance and retake Naxi and sweep the enemy from the south bank of the Yangzi River. Zhu De’s zhidui was assigned the primary responsibility for the main forces’ attack from the right.660

Zhu’s force was in battle continuously from March 18 to 22. On March 18, Zhu

faced Northern units in prepared positions located in difficult mountainous terrain, with

narrow roads, dense forests, and agriculture fields crisscrossed by irrigation canals, which

made this area ideal for defense. These Northern forces were composed of the 27th and

28th Regiments from the Seventh Division under the command of Wu Xintian that was

two to three times larger than Zhu’s force. Wu deployed two battalions to occupy the

high ground and set up his artillery and machine guns to form interlocking fields of fire.

On the night of March 18, Zhu ordered two companies to take a detour around this

defended position to attack Wu’s troops from the flank, while Zhu would lead the rest of

his force, including his artillery and machine guns, to attack and pin down the front of

Wu’s force. All of Zhu’s forces successfully deployed into their proper positions by the

morning and his attack forced the enemy to abandon their occupied positions and retreat.

But the enemy was not completely defeated and waited for an opportunity to launch a

659 Cai E, “Luzhou huiyi bingli tongji biao,” (March 12, 1916), in Cai E Ji, 426-427. This report on Cai E’s troop strength at Luzhou was prepared during the lull in fighting after the Huguojun’s retreat from Naxi on March 7 and before the Huguojun counterattack was launched on March 17. 660 Guo, 135-136.

304 counterattack against Zhu’s advancing forces. One enemy battalion detoured to the rear

flank of Zhu De’s force and attempted to attack Zhu’s rear. But, because of Zhu’s close

relationship with the local populace, Zhu received intelligence warning him of this attack.

Zhu had time to prepare a counter ambush with four of his companies. The enemy force

advanced into the trap, was surrounded, and defeated.661 Zhu took advantage of intelligence from the local populace to enable his outnumbered forces to counter enemy actions and allow him enough time to set an ambush. Zhu would later emphasize the value of obtaining intelligence from the local population that would give his outnumbered

Red Army forces an important advantage over their more numerous opponents.

On March 19, as Zhu’s forces advanced, they encountered enemy units who had taken up strong defensive positions in irrigation canals and on cliff tops in the area around Sankuaishi. On assessing this situation, Zhu changed his original attack plans and adopted the tactics of “avoid the solid and attack the weak” (bi shi ji xu). This tactical principle Zhu had learned from Sun Zi and he would later practice it while leading the

Red Army.662 Zhu left a small portion of his troops to pretend that they were attacking the enemy in order to control them, while he led the majority of his forces to bypass this heavily defended position and marched on to his objectives beyond Sankuaishi at

Nanshoushan and Guanyinbang. In this way, Zhu demonstrated his highly flexible command style and his ability to adapt quickly to new situations.663

661 Ibid., 136-137. 662 Ibid., 137. See “we must avoid the enemy’s strong points and seek out his weak points” in Sun Zi, The Art of War, 40 or Sun Zi bingfa, 25. See also Zhu’s views on the relationship between strategy and tactics in Zhu, “Some Basic Principles Concerning Tactics,” in Selected Works of Zhu De, 25; or “Tan ji ge zhanshu de jiben yuanze,” in Zhu De xuanji, 15. 663 Guo, 137.

305 By March 22, Luzhou had only one remaining line of defense at Nanshoushan.

On March 23, when Zhu was preparing to launch an attack, Cai E ordered a cease fire.

This was because Yuan Shikai had announced the cancellation of the monarchy on March

22. On March 24, Cai E ordered his army to withdraw from around Luzhou and march

back to Naxi to rest and reorganize.664

In summarizing the campaign in southern Sichuan, Zhu remembered, “We had the

Ko Lo Hui peasants behind us, and they were like the sands of the sea. North of the river,

cities changed hands a dozen times, but our troops finally captured and held Suifu (Xufu)

and other cities and laid siege to the fortified enemy stronghold, Luchow (Luzhou). Tsai

Ao’s headquarters moved with my brigade, shifting with the tide of battle. Nachi (Naxi)

changed hands three times. I had such heavy losses that my 10th Regiment had to be

replenished three different times. It was in this battle that the Yunnan Army won the

renown that is still associated with it.”665 The Huguojun First Army’s campaign in

Sichuan would have a significant impact on Zhu De’s future military career, for it was

during the 45 days of battle around Naxi and Luzhou that Zhu De first established his

reputation as a battlefield commander.666

Generalizations about Combat during The National Protection War

The ability of the Huguojun to hold out for several months against superior numbers of Northern troops contributed to the success of the anti-monarchist/anti-Yuan movement. Much of the credit for the Huguojun’s exceptional combat effectiveness should go to Cai E and his leadership. There seems to be a consensus that Cai E was one of the outstanding generals of the early Republican period, attested to by not only Zhu

664 Ibid., 137-138. 665 Smedley, 115.

306 De, but also by contemporary foreign observers, such as B.L. Putnam Weale. Early

twentieth century Chinese historian Li Chien-nung also viewed Cai E’s leadership and his soldiers’ courage as key to the Huguojun’s ability to successfully resist superior enemy forces.667 In a more recent Chinese assessment of modern Chinese military thought, Cai

E’s generalship of the Huguojun First Army is held up as exemplifying modern military

command and control practices. The functioning of Cai E’s headquarters and the form of

his commands to his subordinates gave his unit commanders a clear appraisal of the military situation and conveyed to each of them Cai’s overall intent, which allowed them to fulfill their separate combat missions.668 As one of Cai E’s unit commanders, Zhu De could well appreciate the necessity of a well run headquarters and a clear and concise command and control system in battle, which Zhu would later emulate in his battlefield commands to Red Army units.

During the battles in southern Sichuan, there was a marked difference between the officer corps of Yunnan units in the Huguojun and those in the Northern armies. Yunnan officers were more professional and displayed more personal bravery on the battlefield than their Northern counterparts. Indeed, Yunnan army regulations required them to personally lead their troops into battle. The result was that many Huguojun unit

commanders were wounded or killed in battle, and even Cai E and his chief of staff, Luo

Peijin, engaged in hand-to-hand combat beside their troops. These Yunnan officers

666 Ibid., 115. 667 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 329-330. 668 Shi Duqiao, Zhongguo jindai junshi sixiang shi (A History of Recent Chinese Military Thought) (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 2000), 456.

307 displayed an unusual commitment to the anti-Yuan cause and maintained a high esprit de

corps during the campaign.669

In the major battles around Xuzhou and Luzhou, both sides suffered high casualty

rates, with Northern army casualties numbering in the thousands; by April 1916

Huguojun forces were down to 1,200 to 1,600 men, with 2,000 wounded. These were

very bitterly fought battles, with soldiers on both sides often killing enemy wounded, despite their officers’ attempts to prevent this practice.670 This counters some accepted

generalizations about the pattern of warfare in the interior of China during this period,

namely that commanders spent more time maneuvering than engaging in battle; that the

battles themselves were of low intensity and limited casualties; and that troops lacked

commitment to a cause.671 In fact, the wars fought in Sichuan from 1912 to 1916 were

often characterized by prolonged and bitterly fought battles, undertaken by highly

motivated soldiers, suffering high casualties relative to the number of troops engaged.

Zhu stated that he learned many lessons from the battles he fought during this

period. During the fighting in and around Naxi, Zhu saw how the Huguojun relied on

guerrilla warfare and the support of the local population. Zhu also learned how to

coordinate the operations of infantry units with artillery support, which he gained while

commanding an infantry unit and an artillery company during the defense of Mianhuapo.

In addition, Zhu listed other lessons learned by Chinese revolutionaries and himself from

the Huguojun campaign, such as how to organize a united front with other political groups, and how to rely on the local populace for support. He also learned the importance

of maintaining Yunnan as a revolutionary base area that took in and protected

669 Sutton, 204-205. 670 Ibid., 203.

308 revolutionary refugees from all over China. Taken together, Zhu was able to observe

how an accumulation of revolutionary power, even though small, was able to achieve

victory over Yuan Shikai. Zhu lamented that in his mind this Huguojun campaign was as important as the 1911 Revolution, but that modern history had ignored it.672 The

importance of the Huguojun campaign from December 1915 to June 1916 is nonetheless

echoed by Chinese historian Li Chien-nung, who asserts that this campaign was as

significant as the 1911 Revolution that overthrew the Qing regime.673

The Role of Foreign Assistance to Yunnan

Throughout his accounts of events during the early Republic, Zhu is unremitting

in his hostility towards the Western powers and their supposed opposition toward any

reform or revolutionary movement within China. By the 1930s, when Zhu began to

describe his early life, he was giving the party line on the imperial powers involvement in

China. In contrast to Zhu’s view, there is evidence that the French assisted the Yunnan

rebels during the National Protection War of 1916. B. L. Putnam Weale, a contemporary

Western observer, alluded to possible French assistance to the Yunnan rebels. After his

escape from Beijing, Cai E passed through Hong Kong, and then used the French railroad

from Tonkin to reach Yunnanfu by early December 1915.674 Weale claimed that Yuan

Shikai asked the French to close the railroad from Indochina to Yunnanfu, but the French

refused and instead allowed revolutionaries and arms to travel on it to Yunnan.675

Historian Donald Sutton also stated that French authorities assisted the Yunnan rebels and hindered Yuan Shikai’s efforts to isolate Yunnan. The French allowed the free

671 For this characterization of warfare in China’s interior, see Ch’i, 134-135. 672 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 57-58, 60. 673 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 304. 674 Weale, 245.

309 passage of rebel officers to Yunnan using the Indochina-Yunnan Railway despite having

signed a treaty with Yuan that required them to block the travel of these individuals.

Also, the French did not interfere with the continued export of Yunnan tin to Europe that was bringing in large sums to the Yunnan treasury. In addition, when Yuan requested permission to transport his troops on the French-owned railway into Yunnan, the French refused.676

Another reason Yuan Shikai backed down in 1916 was because he lost the

confidence of the Western powers. As other provinces declared independence, Yuan was

not only losing support domestically, but also foreign governments began to lose

confidence in Yuan and withdrew their support, especially the Japanese government.

After Guangxi declared independence in mid-March, Japan turned against Yuan.

Throughout the war, Yuan lacked funds to conduct a successful suppression of the

rebellion and sought foreign loans to finance the war. The Japanese government,

however, refused to make these loans to Yuan and obstructed other nations from making

these loans. This ultimately forced Yuan to seek a compromise with the anti-monarchist

forces.677

End of the 1916 National Protection War

It was only after the Yunnan Army engaged in the Sichuan campaign that other provinces began slowly to declare their support for the rebellion. On January 27, 1916,

Guizhou declared independence and joined the rebellion. Not until February 1, 1916, did political groups in Sichuan declare support for the rebellion and the Huguojun, while

Guangxi declared independence on March 15. Finally on March 21, Feng Guozhang and

675 Ibid., 256-257. 676 Sutton, 195-196.

310 other Beiyang leaders withdrew their support of Yuan. On March 22, Yuan was forced to cancel his plans to reestablish the monarchy, and on June 6 he died of kidney disease in

Beijing.678

The Huguojun’s continued resistance against Yuan’s forces contributed to the erosion of support for Yuan Shikai. In addition, local military bands using the Huguojun name, had staged uprisings to fight Yuan’s forces and had caused serious disruption in various provinces in April and May of 1916, most notably in Guangdong, Sichuan,

Hunan, and Shandong. These uprisings helped undermine Yuan’s authority and encouraged his former supporters to turn against him.679 But it was not just military resistance that led to the defeat of Yuan, as B. L. Putnam Weale points out, military action was only one of several factors that forced Yuan Shikai to withdraw plans to become emperor. In Weale’s view, political factors were more important. For Weale, the most important events that led to the defeat of Yuan Shikai were not on the battlefield or even in public, but occurred behind the scenes. Yuan’s foreign supporters, such as the

Japanese, had grown tired and suspicious of him, and Chinese intellectuals, like their leader Liang Qichao, had turned against him.680

Yuan announced the cancellation of the monarchy on March 22, 1916 and agreed to a truce with the Huguojun in Sichuan. Sichuan Governor Chen Yi moved to support the Huguojun position. In early May, he called on Yuan to retire and by late May he had declared Sichuan’s independence. In May, military representatives from ten provinces

677 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 333. 678 Sutton, 192. 679 Ibid., 209. 680 Weale, 248-250.

311 met in Nanjing, where most of the delegates favored Yuan’s retirement.681 Despite its

seeming success, in historian Donald Sutton’s view, the Huguojun movement ultimately

failed. Its leaders wanted to restore a strong reunified Chinese Republic, but instead the

country descended into warlordism. The Huguojun movement could not stay unified

because its officers lacked any common deep ideological commitment other than their

opposition to Yuan Shikai. Most of these officers did not want to promote revolution and

once Yuan was gone there was nothing to hold the movement together.682

After the end of hostilities, Sichuan authorities requested that the Yunnan Army

stay to maintain order. Cai E was pragmatic and realized that for the Yunnan army

occupation to succeed he needed to maintain Sichuanese goodwill in order to achieve his

objectives of reestablishing order in Sichuan and to have his troops paid. Early in July

1916, Cai E was appointed both military and provincial governor (dujun and shengchang)

of Sichuan by the new leaders of the central government in Beijing. On July 10, the

Yunnan Army entered Chengdu. It subsequently garrisoned southern Sichuan from 1916 to 1920.683 Earlier, on June 7, Cai E had ordered Zhu De to occupy Luzhou and garrison

the surrounding area, including the Ziliujing salt well region. Zhu stated that his unit received the honor of entering Luzhou first, but this was tempered by his estimate that more than half his original force had been killed in battle.684

On August 9, Cai E had to leave his post in Sichuan because of a serious illness,

variously described as tuberculosis of the throat or throat cancer.685 With the departure of Cai E, Zhu De was pessimistic about the future and feared that leaders within the

681 Young, 236-237, 238. 682 Sutton, 211-213. 683 Ibid., 219-221. 684 Smedley, 117.

312 Huguojun would go their separate ways and become warlords. In Zhu’s view, “Tsai’s

genius and selflessness had commanded their allegiance in the past, and Chu doubted if

even Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whom few of them had ever seen, could take Tsai’s place. There

was no leader of Tsai’s stature in west China.”686 Cai E went to Japan to seek medical treatment, but died there on November 8, 1916.687 Zhu believed that if Cai E had lived, the revolution could have succeeded. But with Cai E’s death, the revolutionary coalition in Sichuan broke up and the different factions began to fight among themselves, and even formerly allied Sichuan commanders now attacked the Yunnan Army.688 Smedley

related that upon hearing of the death of Cai E, “Chu Teh was desolate. Tsai had been

not only his supreme commander and the man on whose political leadership he had

depended for years, but also his friend and teacher … Tsai had represented all that he had

respected, if not worshipped: brilliancy of mind, knowledge and vision, tenacity and

selflessness. Tsai had been his lodestar, and now he could not see his way.”689

Conclusion

The close of 1916 marked the end of the Cai E era and the apogee of the Yunnan

Army. The 1916 National Protection War was significant for both the Yunnan Army and

Zhu De. The personnel of the Yunnan Army, which formed the core of the Huguojun,

saw themselves as a national army undertaking the work of national salvation and

preserving the Republic. Zhu De considered his service in the Yunnan Army under the

command of Cai E as a high point in his military career, from which he took away many

lessons that he would use later in his command of the Red Army. At the strategic level,

685 Boorman and Howard, 290. 686 Smedley, 119. 687 Sutton, 221. 688 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 60-62.

313 Zhu saw the importance of maintaining a clear focus on overall political objectives even if they conflicted with military imperatives. At the operational level, Zhu learned the

advantages of gaining the support of the local population, taking advantage of political

divisions within the enemy’s ranks, knowing how to wage a guerrilla war, and the

effectiveness of coordinated operations between conventional military units and guerrilla

forces. Tactically, Zhu learned how to fight more numerous opponents by relying on

tactics emphasizing mobility, envelopment, and surprise. In addition, Zhu could appreciate the critical role a highly motivated and trained professional officer corps played in creating a well disciplined and effective military force. Finally during the 1916

National Protection War, Zhu De earned a well known reputation as an exceptional battlefield commander.

After Cai E’s death in November 1916, the Yunnan Army began to change. Its officers and men still maintained their old esprit de corps, but a decline in their

professionalism was discernable during the long occupation of southern Sichuan and the

involvement and conflict with various Sichuan militarist factions. This decline was

mirrored in Zhu De’s own life, as he slowly became disillusioned with his military career

while serving as a brigade commander in charge of the garrison at Luzhou during the

five-year occupation of southern Sichuan.

689 Smedley, 120-121.

314 Chapter 5: Early Campaign Experience 1917-1922

The Yunnan Army began to decline as a professional military organization with

the death of Cai E, and Zhu De gradually became disillusioned with the course of the

revolution and his military career. From the latter part of 1916 through 1920, Zhu De

was a brigade commander with the Yunnan Army force occupying southern Sichuan.

During this period, Zhu participated in incessant warfare between the Yunnan “guest

army” and various Sichuan militarists. Serving as the garrison commander of the

strategic town of Luzhou on the Yangzi River, Zhu was drawn into the warlord politics of

Sichuan. During the five-year occupation of southern Sichuan, the Yunnan Army began

to exhibit a decline in its professionalism and a loss of its sense of national purpose, reducing it to a more personalized military organization. The Yunnan Army essentially became more like other warlord/provincial armies of the era. As a result, Zhu became disillusioned with his career in the Yunnan Army and began to seek a different path to fulfill his desire for Chinese national salvation. This chapter will continue to gauge the degree of influence that Zhu’s Yunnan Army service had on the development of the later

Red Army in such areas as military command, organization, training, planning, doctrine, strategy, and tactics; and his overall views on what an effective military force should look like and what values it should embody. Along with analyzing Zhu’s battlefield experiences, this chapter will also examine the factors that led Zhu De to become disillusioned with the “warlord” paradigm and search for an alternative path, which would eventually lead him to abandon his established position in the Yunnan Army in

1922 to study in Europe, and to develop an interest in Communism.

315 1917 Protect the Constitution War

Background and Cause of War

At the end of the National Protection War, Huguojun units under Yunnan

leadership had initially marched to occupy the Sichuan capital, Chengdu. Shortly after,

Tang Jiyao disbanded most of the Huguojun, leaving only two Yunnan Army divisions690 in Sichuan under the command of Luo Peijin, the former chief of staff of the Huguojun

First Army. Most of these Yunnan forces, including Zhu De, were eventually withdrawn back to southern Sichuan. (See Figure 13 for a photo of Zhu De when his unit was still in

Chengdu in late 1916.) Meanwhile, on September 13, 1916, Luo Peijin was made acting

military governor (dujun) of Sichuan, while Dai Kan, the commander of Guizhou forces in Sichuan, was made acting provincial (or civil) governor (shengchang). They in turn

690 In Chinese texts these two divisions are often referred as jun or “army” rather than as shi, the usual term for division.

316 had to deal with an enlarged Sichuan military establishment that had grown to five

divisions.691

As acting dujun of Sichuan, Luo Peijin had to contend with the intense rivalries

among the commanders of the various Sichuan divisions. From the summer of 1916 into

1917, these Sichuan commanders rushed to consolidate their own power and launched

recruitment drives to increase the size of their own forces that often resulted in the

recruitment of irregular and bandit units into their divisions. Luo Peijin faced a challenge in how to pay for the growing number of Sichuan troops while suppressing bandits and

maintaining the cooperation of Sichuan leaders. Receiving little cooperation from

Sichuan military leaders or from the central government, Luo could only maintain his position of authority by exploiting the rivalries among the various Sichuan military

leaders while depending on the superior quality of his Yunnan Army units. He also

benefited from the permission he received from the central government to retain

Sichuan’s salt revenues for several months. At the same time, Luo had been instructed

by the central government in Beijing to reduce the size of both Yunnan and Sichuan

military units. Luo obviously favored the reduction of Sichuanese forces over those of

Yunnan, which alienated Sichuan military leaders. Thus, when Luo attempted to disband

Sichuan military units around Chengdu in April 1917 it provoked an armed conflict between Yunnan forces and Sichuan forces in Chengdu, including the revolt of the

Second Sichuan Division led by a previous ally, Liu Cunhou. By the end of April 1917, a

ceasefire had been negotiated and Luo Peijin was able to leave Chengdu with his Yunnan

691 Sutton, 221-222.

317 units to join the main Yunnan Army in southern Sichuan. On June 20, 1917, Luo set up

his headquarters at Luzhou.692

When Chengdu was besieged by Sichuanese forces in April 1917, Zhu De had

been dispatched from his base at Luzhou in south Sichuan with two brigades to relieve

the city. Zhu made it only halfway to Chengdu before Luo Peijin had negotiated a

ceasefire and retreated from the city with his forces. Therefore, Zhu turned around and

retreated back to Luzhou. In making a general comment about events in Sichuan during

1917, Zhu related that there was on and off again fighting throughout the province and

that from that time onward he “ … was caught in the net of warlordism without

recognizing it as such.”693 During the truce between the Yunnan Army and Sichuan

forces after the seizure of Chengdu, Zhu stated that the Sichuan forces sent an emissary to

Luo’s Yunnan forces to propose an alliance against Guizhou and even against Yunnan province and Tang Jiyao. At the same time, the Sichuanese also sent emissaries to

Guizhou and Yunnan provinces proposing an alliance against Luo’s Yunnan Army in

Sichuan. Zhu related this story to show his contempt for this duplicity and double-

crossing that he found typical of warlords. In Zhu’s view, warlords had no principles. In

a coincidence, the emissary sent by the Sichuanese to Luo’s Yunnan forces was Liu

Bocheng, later to be a Red Army commander under Zhu De and eventually a People’s

Liberation Army marshal.694

With the departure of Luo Peijin from Chengdu, Guizhou commander Dai Kan

was appointed both military and civil governor. Unfortunately, he also antagonized the

Sichuan military leaders and their forces lay siege to Chengdu. Dai Kan and 2,000 of his

692 Ibid., 222-223. 693 Smedley, 121.

318 Guizhou forces were forced to leave Chengdu after a ceasefire was agreed to on July 18,

1917. On their retreat south from Chengdu, Dai Kan and his retreating forces were

continually ambushed and attacked by Sichuan troops, irregular forces, and bandits.

Eventually, Dai Kan and his remaining soldiers were surrounded and Dai Kan committed suicide. Having been informed of Dai Kan’s predicament earlier in July, Luo Peijin

vacillated over whether to send forces to Chengdu. It was only on July 13 that he decided

to send a relief force to assist Dai Kan. The force that Luo sent numbered 10,000 men

under Liu Yunfeng; their objective was to counterattack and retake control of the

Chengdu basin from the rebellious Sichuan units. This Yunnan force was organized into

three columns and would be facing Sichuan forces that outnumbered them by two and

half times. The center and left-hand columns of the Yunnan relief force managed to get

within twenty-five miles of Chengdu, but were forced to retreat because of the severity of

the fighting that caused 2,000 wounded within the Yunnan Army alone. Yunnan forces

were pushed back from Chengdu and on August 2, 1917 a truce was signed with their

Sichuan foes. Besides suffering a military setback, Luo Peijin’s actions had also

alienated the Sichuanese population, which led to an increased number of “minjun”

(people’s army or partisans) hostile to the Yunnan forces occupying southern Sichuan.695

After suffering defeats in July and August, Luo Peijin was removed from his

command in Sichuan by Tang Jiyao.696 Tang Jiyao then took over directly as commander of Yunnan forces in Sichuan. In July 1917, Tang had renamed the Yunnan Army the

National Pacification Army (Jingguojun) in opposition to the central government under

Duan Qirui. In August 1917, Tang Jiyao authorized the reorganization of Yunnan forces

694 Ibid., 125. 695 Sutton, 223-225.

319 in Sichuan and appointed new commanders.697 Originally organized into dituan and zhidui, the Yunnan Army, now renamed the Jingguojun, was reorganized into two armies

(jun); each jun was composed of two brigades (lu). The First Army was under the command of Gu Pinzhen, with the First Brigade under Geng Jinxi and the Second

Brigade under Xiang Xin. The Second Army was commanded by Zhao Yuxin, with the

Third Brigade commanded by Zhu De and the Fourth Brigade by Jin Handing.

According to Yang Ruxuan, the brigades of Zhu De and Jin Handing had reputations for a high level of combat effectiveness and the opposing Sichuan forces therefore avoided combat with them.698 As a brigade commander in the newly organized Jingguojun, Zhu and his unit were stationed at Luzhou.699

The reason for Tang Jiyao’s opposition to the Beijing government was that, during the fighting between Sichuan forces and the Yunnan Army in the spring and summer of 1917, Duan Qirui as head of the central government in Beijing had implemented plans to reassert central authority over the independent provinces in the south.700 On July 19, 1917, Tang Jiyao was the first southern military leader to denounce the Duan Qirui government. In preparation for war, Tang began to enlarge the newly renamed and reorganized National Pacification Army.701 Tang was soon joined by the leaders of other southern provinces, who were equally opposed to Duan’s moves to reconquer Sichuan and Hunan with Northern armies. The coalition that formed to oppose

Duan Qirui’s regime justified itself, however, on constitutional grounds, denouncing

696 Ibid., 225. 697 Zhu De nianpu, 25. Guo, 155. Sutton, 227. 698 Yang, 13. 699 Zhu De nianpu, 25. Guo, 155. 700 McCord, The Power of the Gun, 253. 701 Sutton, 228.

320 Duan’s refusal to restore the original early Republican constitution and parliament that

had been abolished by Yuan Shikai and his attempt to pack a new parliament with

supporters of his own recentralization drive. Sun Yat-sen became the leader of this

“Protect the Constitution Movement” when he arrived back in Guangzhou and organized

the “Military Government to Uphold the Provisional Constitution” to oppose Duan’s

Beijing regime. On September 3, 1917, Sun Yat-sen proclaimed the establishment of a

military government with himself as generalissimo (dayuanshuai) and supported by two

marshals, the Yunnan leader Tang Jiyao and the Guangxi leader Lu Rongting. Always

the pragmatist, Tang only allied with Sun Yat-sen to counter the threat from Duan Qirui.

This was also true of the motives of Lu Rongting, and both Tang and Lu looked upon

their alliance with Sun as very conditional.702 The same could be said of Sun, who

formed an alliance with these two militarists to make common cause against the threat

from Duan Qirui to his own vision of a restored Republic.

Donald Sutton sees the year 1917 as marking an important point in the history of the early Chinese Republic, where relations between northern and southern China collapsed and militarist armies began to lose their cohesion as their units began to form closer relationships with the local areas where they were stationed. There were also signs that the Yunnan Army was beginning to deteriorate from its high point under Cai E in

1916, but its officer corps maintained its unity and the Yunnan Army was still the strongest military force in Sichuan.703

702 Dreyer, 65-66. Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 377. Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 389; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 384. 703 Sutton, 226.

321 Conduct of Protect the Constitution War of 1917

In his strategy to defeat the southwestern Chinese provinces opposing him, Duan

Qirui planned to take control first of Hunan and Sichuan, and then use Hunan as a base to

conquer Guangxi and Guangdong, and to use Sichuan as a base to strike at Yunnan and

Guizhou.704 In addition, Duan took out a large loan from the Japanese government to

finance the war. Meanwhile, the southwestern provinces attempted to unify themselves

into a coalition to oppose Duan under the Protect the Constitution Movement. On

October 6, 1917, war between northern and southern China broke out.705 With the

outbreak of this war, Sichuanese forces allied with Duan Qirui in an attempt to push the

Yunnan Army from its borders. While the Yunnan First Army under Gu Pinzheng

succeeded in temporarily holding onto Chongqing in the face of this Sichuanese

offensive, the Yunnan Second Army under Zhao Yuxin failed in its defense of Luzhou

and by late November Yunnan forces, including Zhu De’s unit, had to abandon Luzhou

and Xuzhou, and retreat to the Yunnan border.706 With the arrival of Northern forces in east Sichuan, Gu Pinzheng also was ultimately forced to withdraw.

Following this retreat, Zhu De expressed to Yang Ruxuan his determination to

retake Luzhou. According to Yang, Zhu also gave up his opium habit prior to the

counterattack into Sichuan, suggesting the strength of Zhu’s focus on this effort. (It

should be noted, though, that Yang’s account was contrary to what Zhu himself later

related about his opium habit.) 707 Zhu’s determination was shared by his superiors, who

were also eager to regain the ground they lost in south Sichuan. Before launching a

704 Zhang, 540. 705 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 378-379. 706 Sutton, 225. Yang, 4.

322 counterattack on Luzhou, however, the Second Army commander, Zhao Yuxin,

implemented administrative reforms within his forces, with the most important change

involving a tightening of the Second Army’s organizational structure—no doubt

reflecting an effort following this defeat to make the organization reflect actual troop strength. Thus, brigade commanders were now redesignated as regimental commanders, regimental commanders became battalion commanders, and battalion commanders became company commanders. The whole Second Army was reorganized into four regiments. Zhu De was appointed commander of the First Regiment, while Jin Handing became the Second Regiment commander. Yang Ruxuan was appointed deputy regimental commander under Zhu De.708

On December 1, 1917, the Yunnan Army launched its counterattack into southern

Sichuan.709 Zhu De played a particularly important role in the counterattack in the retaking of Luzhou on December 13, 1917.710 During the counterattack on Luzhou, Zhu

De’s forces successfully implemented combined arms tactics employing infantry and

artillery. Zhu was across the river from Luzhou in an artillery position on the high

ground overlooking the city. He personally directed the artillery bombardment to make

calculated strikes against enemy troop concentrations and screen his infantrymen as they

scaled the city walls. Zhu gained a great victory and recaptured Luzhou.711 This would be the beginning of a successful Yunnan Army sweep into Sichuan, though a sweep that owed as much to political machinations as the skills of its commanders.

707 Yang, 4. At that time, Yang Ruxuan had been promoted to command the 24th Regiment of the Fourth Brigade. According to Zhu, he only took up opium smoking in 1920. See Smedley, 130 and Wales, 116. 708 Yang, 4-5. 709 Sutton, 227. 710 Guo, 156. 711 Yang, 5.

323 For the most part, Yunnan leaders used the constitutional crisis and the Protect the

Constitution War to justify their reconquest of Sichuan. Sichuan military leader Liu

Cunhou, who had forced the Yunnan Army out of Sichuan, had allied with Duan Qirui’s government. But due to the political and military fragmentation of Sichuan, not all

Sichuan factions supported the Northerners and other Sichuan military leaders and the populace began to reassert their anti-Northern sentiments. Sichuan’s political and military fragmentation also contributed to a lack of cohesion among Sichuanese military forces that assisted the Yunnan Army in its reconquest of the province. From December

3 to 4, the Northern forces occupying Chongqing, who had originally been sent to

Sichuan to support Liu Cunhou, were forced to leave by Guizhou and Sichuan forces. No other Northern assistance was forthcoming for Liu Cunhou. In January 1918, Liu

Cunhou’s former supporters and the Sichuan elite allied themselves with the Yunnan

Army. Within three months, Liu Cunhou was defeated and forced to flee from Chengdu by the advancing Yunnan Army offensive.712

Tang Jiyao seems to have skillfully taken advantage of the Protect the

Constitution Movement and subsequent war to reestablish Yunnan’s position in Sichuan after facing a total ouster from the province by Sichuanese forces in mid-1917. By aligning Yunnan with the anti-Northern and anti-Duan Qirui movement, Tang Jiyao gave the Yunnan Army a cause to fight for and undermined any unified Sichuanese opposition to Yunnan Army occupation of Sichuan. Indeed, Tang played on Sichuanese anti-

Northern feelings and managed to garner support from Sun Yat-sen’s GMD supporters in

712 Sutton, 227-228.

324 Sichuan. In addition, Tang revived the Yunnan-Guizhou alliance, and Guizhou sent

military forces to help Yunnan retake control of Sichuan.713

If Tang Jiyao and Yunnan were one of the major victors in the war, in general the

North lost the war mainly because of internal dissension within the Beiyang faction

controlling the government in Beijing. The rivalries contributed to Northern military

failure in Sichuan and Hunan and ultimately the downfall of Duan Qirui.714 The defeat of Duan’s Northern forces in Sichuan was also the result of more specific reasons, including the incompetence of the Northern commander, Wu Guangxin (Duan’s brother- in-law), and the defection of the Sichuan general, Xiong Kewu, who threw his support to

Yunnan and the other rebellious southern provinces. Wu Guangxin, who had been appointed by Duan as commander-in-chief of the Upper Yangzi and inspector of Sichuan, moved his Northern army so slowly up the Yangzi to Chongqing, and in a piecemeal fashion, that Xiong Kewu’s Sichuan troops could easily defeat them.715

Despite its battlefield victories, Zhu ultimately saw the Protect the Constitution

Movement as a failure because of the betrayal of Sun Yat-sen by Tang Jiyao and others.

Zhu saw that Tang Jiyao had his own ambitions to become “King of Yunnan” and to

control both Sichuan and Guizhou. These ambitions, according to Zhu, contributed to the

further fragmentation and disintegration of the forces supporting the revolutionary cause.

Nonetheless, in retrospect, Zhu would argue that the fundamental reason for the failure of

the movement was because it did not mobilize or rely on the masses.716 Whether or not

the Protect the Constitution Movement achieved the principles for which it was

713 Ibid., 228. 714 Li, The Political History of China 1840-1928, 378. 715 Ibid., 379-380. McCord, The Power of the Gun, 253.

325 supposedly fought, the end result of the fighting in Sichuan left Yunnan in an enhanced

position of power in the province. The distribution of the forces occupying Sichuan were

as follows: the Sichuanese ally of the Yunnan Army, Xiong Kewu, held Chengdu;

Yunnan’s Guizhou allies held Chongqing; and Yunnan Army units held territory in

southern Sichuan bordered by the cities of Jiating (possibly modern Jiajiang), Zizhou

(possibly modern Zizhong), Xuzhou (modern Yibin), and Luzhou, which also included

control over the lucrative Ziliujing salt wells.717

1917-1920 Yunnan Army Occupation of Southern Sichuan

The ostensible purpose for the Yunnan Army’s occupation of southern Sichuan as

a “guest army” from 1917 to 1920 was to maintain order. More importantly, however,

Yunnan also wanted to keep its army financed from the wealth of Sichuan. This shifting

focus on the acquisition of wealth, for both the Yunnan Army and its commanders,

contributed to the Army’s decline as an institution with a slow erosion of the professional

ethos of its officer corps. Competition over resources hastened the army’s devolution

into a more personalistic organization, along with the development of hostile factions

within the officer corps itself. Zhu De’s own career in this period reflects some of these

developments. From 1917 to 1920, Zhu was in command of the region around Luzhou,

which involved him in numerous smaller conflicts with local Sichuan militarists and

bandits. In addition, once Zhu had attained a senior level position as a brigade

commander, he began to create his own personalized military organization, in which he acted as a patron and chose members of his own family, two of his brothers, to serve as

officers under him. The declining professionalism of the Yunnan Army also had an effect

716 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 389; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 384.

326 on its relationship with the population of the territory it occupied, insofar as the people

began to be seen as resources to be exploited rather than citizens to be defended.

Although initially not influencing any of his decisions, Zhu’s Sichuan connection would

begin to play a role in his growing sympathy for the Sichuanese resentment of Yunnan

Army occupation.

The Yunnan “Guest Army” in Sichuan

The year 1918 could be considered the high point of Yunnan expansion, with

Tang Jiyao declaring himself military director of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou. Tang

also planned to form a confederation of all three of these provinces. In addition, Tang

became commander of the Allied Army of Seven Provinces (Yunnan, Guizhou,

Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan, Hunan, and Shenxi) and increased the size of the

Yunnan-led National Pacification Army (Jingguojun) from six to eight armies. The

Jingguojun, however, was not a unified force, even though the armies of Shenxi, Fujian,

Hubei, and Hunan were designated as part of the Jingguojun, they were more allies than under Tang Jiyao’s direct control.718

In general, the key factor affecting a local population’s acceptance of occupation

by native or “guest armies” was the behavior of these forces. In Sichuan, native

resentment against outside armies was balanced by Sichuan militarist cooperation with

these same armies, where they would share occupation of important regions or even

allow outside armies complete control over sections of Sichuan territory. Instances

where there was violent local opposition to occupying forces was often not only aimed at

717 Sutton, 228. 718 Ibid., 229.

327 troops from outside Sichuan, but also against other Sichuanese forces as well.719 Given these circumstances, in order to maintain Yunnan control over Sichuan, Tang Jiyao needed to tread cautiously so as not to inflame Sichuanese resentment. Thus Tang appointed Sichuanese General Xiong Kewu, a Yunnan ally in the recent war, as military and civil governor of Sichuan. Tang also attempted to keep the various Sichuan factions divided through his control over the government appointment system.720

The Yunnan Army occupation of Sichuan from 1917 to 1920 was not generally

viewed as brutal “guest army” rule, because it was made possible by the cooperation of

various Sichuan military forces and the Sichuan elite. Throughout the occupation, the

only way for Yunnan rule to work was with the cooperation and collaboration of the

Sichuanese elite and populace. Many Sichuan elites considered Yunnan Army rule

preferable to rule by disorderly and corrupt Sichuan military forces. This allowed

Yunnan to maintain control over a Sichuanese population of several tens of millions with

a military force of only 20,000 to 30,000 troops.721 In addition, the Yunnan Army was

able to occupy and control a large part of southern Sichuan because Sichuan militarists

were not unified. Sichuan army divisions resembled personal armies or semiprivate

forces, where the local commander sought his own self interest and developed a personal

powerbase. These local commanders would often make alliances with “guest armies” to

gain an advantage over their Sichuanese rivals.722

The relationship between various Sichuan factions and outside “guest” armies was

characterized by an oscillation between cooperation and hostility that was typical of the

719 Kapp, 16-17. 720 Sutton, 230. 721 Ibid., 230-231. 722 Ibid., 228-229.

328 fragmented political environment existing in Sichuan from 1911to 1926. There were periods when individual Sichuan militarists invited outside armies into Sichuan to assist them in fighting their rivals, while at other times these Sichuan militarists would form coalitions to drive out these “guest” armies.723 As Luzhou garrison commander, Zhu De

became well acquainted with this pattern of relations between the Yunnan Army and

various Sichuanese militarists. Zhu could cite examples of these types of behaviors by

Sichuan military leaders from his personal experience. One was Xiong Kewu, who had

originally supported the revolution and was a member of the GMD. Xiong allied himself

with the Yunnan Army in 1917 and was subsequently appointed governor of Sichuan by

Tang Jiyao in 1918. Xiong then used his position to enrich himself and to build up his

own private army. Finally, in 1920, he formed an alliance with another Sichuan warlord,

Liu Xiang, to drive the Yunnan Army out of Sichuan.724 Another example was Yang

Sen, who had been a commander in the Huguojun and a friend of Zhu’s. But in 1920

Yang Sen defected from the Yunnan Army and established himself as an independent

warlord in eastern Sichuan with Chongqing as his capital.725 This case in particular

reflected a rising sense of provincialism whereby many Sichuanese officers like Yang

Sen, who had been in the Yunnan Army, could no longer reconcile themselves to serving

in an outside army occupying their native province.

The emergence of provincialism within the ranks of the Yunnan Army officer

corps was another indication of the decline of the Yunnan Army as an institution. As

Donald Sutton’s notes, “The narrow provincialism of society outside, stimulated by guest

723 Kapp, 16. 724 Smedley, 126-127. 725 Smedley, 127. Sutton, 236.

329 armies’ occupation, had infected the institution of the (Yunnan) army.”726 Some

Sichuan- origin officers, however, chose loyalty to the Yunnan Army over ties to their

native province. Zhu De stayed with the Yunnan Army and fought against his fellow

Sichuanese, while other Sichuan-origin officers like Yang Sen defected. This does show that even in 1920, the Yunnan Army officer corps still retained enough of an impersonal organizational culture that was not dominated by provincialism, to still allow officers from other provinces to serve at senior levels, like Zhu De.727 During this period, Zhu

continued to believe in the Yunnan Army and remained loyal to the ideal of a trans-

provincial institution. Zhu commented that even at the beginning of 1921, the Yunnan

Army still retained its reputation as the arm of the revolution.728 But the example of

Yang Sen does illustrate the gradual breakdown of loyalty by non-Yunnan officers to the

Yunnan Army, an institution that had previously transcended provincial loyalties.

The main reason why the Yunnan Army remained so long in southern Sichuan

was that the occupation was very lucrative for Yunnan and for the officers of its army. It

was common for “guest” armies to collect their own taxes and appoint their own officials.

One of the major sources of wealth in Sichuan was salt, which became a critical source of

revenue for the Yunnan Army.729 Indeed, it was the trade routes by which the salt moved

out of Sichuan that influenced where the Yunnan Army established its garrisons in

southern Sichuan. Zhu was stationed in Luzhou because it was one of the major Yangzi

River towns that controlled the trade routes out of Sichuan, especially for salt exports and

the revenue it generated. It was common for Yunnan Army garrisons occupying towns

726 Sutton, 236. 727 Ibid., 232. 728 Smedley, 131. 729 Sutton, 230.

330 along the Yangzi River to levy additional taxes on salt shipments leaving the province.730

In addition, Yunnan and Sichuan militarists all profited from the opium trade, with the

Yunnan Army even facilitating and protecting the importation of Yunnan opium for sale

in Sichuan. The sale of Yunnan opium in Sichuan and the accumulation of personal

wealth by Yunnan officers involved in the drug trade resulted in a drain on the Sichuan

economy.731 The availability and pervasiveness of opium was attested to by Zhu, when

commenting on his life in Luzhou in 1919. Zhu related that opium smoking was very

common among his fellow army officers and civil officials, and he even took up the habit himself.732

Zhu De Stationed in Luzhou 1917-1920

From 1917 until 1920, Zhu’s command was headquartered in Luzhou, with his

forces occupying an area in southern Sichuan between Xufu and Luzhou.733 One of Zhu

De’s chief responsibilities while in command of the region around Luzhou was to

suppress bandit activity in the area. Initially, bandit groups were a serious threat and were composed of the many defeated soldiers who joined with local elites to form bandit units. One of these bandit groups, mustering around 1,000 men, attacked Luzhou itself.

The bandit force crossed the Yangzi River from the south bank to the north to attack

Luzhou from the landward side. (See the map in the previous chapter showing the area

around Luzhou.) Zhu directed the defense of the city himself and finally used artillery

fire to drive off the bandits, with the entire battle lasting about an hour.734

730 Adshead, 732-734. 731 Sutton, 230, 231-232. 732 Smedley, 130. 733 Wales, 114. Smedley, 124. 734 This group of “bandits” appeared to be highly organized and was large enough to attempt the capture of a major urban center on the Yangzi River. They also possessed the capabilities to launch an amphibious

331 In order to counter the bandit threat, Zhu drew on his past experience fighting

bandits around Mengzi in southeastern Yunnan. He devised a two pronged military-

political strategy. On the one hand, he adopted the flexible and mobile tactics of

guerrillas and deployed his troops over a wide area to seek out and destroy local bandit

units. On the other hand, he publicly declared that he only wanted to execute the leaders

of bandit units and would forgive their followers and allow them to negotiate terms. In

addition, those who turned in their weapons would be paid for these arms and not

harmed. This was part of a large-scale political campaign to divide and conquer these

bandit groups. After about half a year, this strategy succeeded in pacifying the area

around Luzhou and restored the local population’s confidence in Yunnan Army rule in

southern Sichuan.735 This case shows how Zhu once again drew on his past experience in counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare to devise an effective pacification strategy.

This was knowledge that could just as easily be used in waging a guerrilla war when he

later commanded the Red Army.

While contending with external threats, the officers of the Yunnan Army in

Sichuan also did a certain amount of soul searching. As mentioned previously, when major decisions affecting the Yunnan Army had to be made, its senior leaders had to take into account the opinions of the officer corps as a whole. There was, to a certain extent, a

form of collective decision making among the officer corps that was now exercised over

the question of whether to continue with the occupation of Sichuan or to return to

Yunnan. In February 1918, a conference of the senior officers of the army was convened

at Ziliujing. The conference was prompted by the growing discontent within the officers

landing in an attempt to surprise the Luzhou defenders. This “bandit” group may actually have been a local unit from the large number of irregular/militia forces then prevalent in Sichuan. See Kapp, 10-11.

332 of the Yunnan Army, especially lower-ranking officers, over whether to continue with the

occupation of Sichuan. Many officers were becoming fatigued and exhausted by the constant warfare, which in turn fed a growing anti-war mood. The conference was held

to decide the next course of action for the army, and was attended by the senior

commanders from the Yunnan First and Second Armies in Sichuan.736

Zhu immediately assumed a leadership role during the conference. Politically

astute, Zhu realized that the Sichuan population was growing resentful of outside

occupation. He also foresaw that the Yunnan Army’s continued occupation and

continued warfare with Sichuanese forces would ultimately end badly for the Yunnan

Army. In his view, then, it was best to leave voluntarily at that point rather than be

driven out in the future after being defeated. Zhu advocated that the Yunnan Army return

to Yunnan, that political power be returned to the Sichuan people, and that Sichuan and

Yunnan should be politically reconciled.737

Most officers agreed with Zhu’s proposal, but many were reluctant to leave

Sichuan’s wealth behind. In addition, Tang Jiyao refused to allow the army to return to

Yunnan because he wanted to continue Yunnan’s control over Sichuan. Therefore, when

Zhu’s proposal was taken up for a decision, it was not adopted.738 This conference was

an early indicator of divisions within the Yunnan Army officer corps over the continued

occupation of Sichuan. The roots of these divisions could be traced back to 1917, when

many officers had opposed Yunnan’s intervention in Sichuan and the demands that this

735 Guo, 159-160. 736 Yang, 5, 13-14. 737 Ibid., 5, 13-14. 738 Ibid., 5, 13-14.

333 war made on the Yunnan population and economy. This dissatisfaction was coupled with

a growing resentment toward Tang Jiyao’s rule in Yunnan.739

Zhu himself was subject to conflicting impulses and motivations during the

occupation of Sichuan. During his five years stationed at Luzhou, Zhu admitted to being

sucked into the warlord politics of Sichuan.740 Nonetheless, despite his involvement in

warlord politics, Zhu also still considered the Yunnan Army and himself as an arm of Sun

Yat-sen’s republican government in South China. Zhu was, therefore, often of two minds

during this period. Outwardly, he engaged in incessant conflicts with Sichuan warlords,

while inwardly, Zhu viewed himself as a follower of the progressive May 4 Movement

and had even established a study group in his home in Luzhou to debate its ideas.741

In the fall of 1919, Zhu brought his extended family to Luzhou and ended up supporting twenty relatives who lived with Zhu and his wife in their Luzhou home.

During this time, Zhu admitted to behaving like a “warlord” by using his office for personal ends, in particular appointing his relatives, in this case his two younger brothers, as officers within his brigade.742 Zhu’s ability to make these appointments indicated that

he had administrative autonomy in commissioning officers into his unit, and no longer

had to go through Yunnanfu for approval. This was another sign that the formal

bureaucratic structure of the Yunnan Army was weakening and becoming more decentralized.743

During a short conflict with a local Sichuan warlord near the end of 1919, Zhu’s

brigade was defeated with heavy casualties and both of Zhu’s brothers were killed. Zhu

739 Sutton, 254. 740 Wales, 114. Smedley, 124. 741 Smedley, 127-128. 742 Ibid., 128-129.

334 was forced to retreat back to Luzhou. There, Zhu sank into depression and, at least in his own account, first began smoking opium out of humiliation and guilt. Perhaps seeking to deflect some of the disapprobation for this habit, Zhu made a point of stating that opium smoking was a common and acceptable activity among military officers and officials during this period. But there is no question that he saw his opium smoking as a personal failing.744 In addition to his personal problems, Zhu was progressively becoming disillusioned with his career in the Yunnan Army and the course of the Chinese revolutionary movement. One benefit of being stationed in Luzhou for five years was that it allowed Zhu time to read and study, and he was introduced to new ideas by his secretary, Sun Bingwen, a Beijing University graduate. During 1919-1920, Zhu, although still ignorant of Marxism because he had no Marxist literature, was impressed with the success of the Russian Revolution, the victories of the Russian Red Army, and the ability of the Russian revolutionaries to defeat their enemies and establish an independent government. Zhu expressed frustration that China could not do the same and that China was on the wrong path. At this time, Zhu resolved to travel abroad to learn how other nations maintained their independence.745 Yang Ruxuan also related a very

743 Sutton, 237. 744 Smedley, 129-130. This account by Zhu on when he started his opium habit conflicts with an earlier account given by his subordinate Yang Ruxuan, who implied that Zhu had taken up opium smoking earlier in his life and had given it up before his attack on Luzhou during the 1917 war. Either Yang’s memory was faulty or it may possibly indicate that Zhu was trying to hide the fact that during this period he had an on- going problem with opium addiction, which was very prevalent within the Yunnan Army. Zhu may have only mentioned picking up his opium habit in 1920 because he could justify it as caused by personal tragedy and political disillusionment with the course of the revolution. For Zhu and the CCP, these reasons would be more publicly acceptable than if he had confessed to an on-going addiction to opium when he was still enjoying a successful military career prior to 1917. If Zhu had an on-going problem with opium, he may have first acquired it during his time in southeastern Yunnan in 1913-1915, where it was widely believed that opium smoking could ward off malaria. 745 Smedley, 128. For background information on Sun Bingwen, see Smedley, 114-115, 119, 156, 191. Like Zhu De, Sun Bingwen was originally from Sichuan. A follower of Sun Yatsen, Sun had been involved with revolutionary activities since 1911. Sun had graduated from Beijing University and was a follower of the May 4 Movement. In 1916, Sun was appointed as Zhu’s brigade secretary and became

335 similar account on why Zhu decided to leave the army and travel to Europe to study. Zhu

told Yang that he had become frustrated and despondent over the continuous warfare in

Sichuan, not only because he had lost many friends in the fighting but because it was

causing hardship for the people. In addition, Zhu was also disheartened by the continuing failure of Sun Yat-sen. Zhu told Yang that he wanted to find a solution to the disease now afflicting China and he would go overseas to find it. Yang related that from 1920 onward, he heard Zhu often talk about finding ways to raise money to go overseas.746

The Yunnan Army’s prolonged occupation and conflict in Sichuan had a

profound impact on Zhu De. It acted as a catalyst that sent Zhu to seek out new ideas and

change the course of his life up to that point. He began to look outside China for the

answers he was seeking and decided to pursue another path to save China. Zhu stated

that because of the Russian October Revolution, he started to think of a new route for the

Chinese revolution. Zhu wrote that “ … the conflict between the Sichuan and Yunnan

armies helped me realize it was impossible to achieve our revolutionary goal by

continuing the old methods of military struggle. Due to the impact of the October

Revolution, I also became firmly convinced that we must learn from Russia’s new

revolutionary theory and methods and start all over again to make our revolution.”747

Zhu related a similar account to Nym Wales (Helen Foster Snow) in 1937 on the reasons for his new outlook:

“My interest in Communism and Bolshevism developed out of my own reading on the Russian Revolution. My only other influence was a few talks with

Zhu’s close and influential friend, who would eventually accompany Zhu to Europe. Sun returned to China in 1924 with Zhou Enlai and became Zhou’s deputy running the political department at the GMD’s Huangpu Military Academy. In 1927, Sun was killed during Jiang Jieshi’s purge of the Communists and left-wing of the GMD. 746 Yang, 14. 747 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 390; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 385-386.

336 returned students from France. While I was stationed in Szechuan, I studied everything I could find about the World War and the Russian Revolution. Until this time I had given all my energies to fighting for the Republic and the realization of Sun Yat-sen democracy in China. But the failure of the 1911 Revolution and the reaction into wasteful militarist war into which the country was plunged afterward discouraged me greatly. I realized that the China Revolution must go deeper and be as fundamental as that in Russia, the continuing success of which gave me hope.”748

Zhu was now determined to embark on a new path in his life, resign from the Yunnan

Army, and go to Europe to study. If there was any hesitation on Zhu’s part to begin this

new chapter in his life, his decision would shortly be forced by circumstances and the fate

of the Yunnan Army in Sichuan.

End of Yunnan Army Occupation of Sichuan 1920

As the Yunnan Army occupation of southern Sichuan wore on, there was a corresponding increase in the movement to restore control over Sichuan to Sichuan natives by both Sichuan militarists and civilian politicians. They in turn exploited popular resentment against the “guest” armies to generate popular support for their movement to oust the Yunnan occupiers. In 1920, Sichuan Governor Xiong Kewu along with other Sichuan militarists like Liu Cunhou, joined forces under the banner of

“Sichuan for the Sichuanese” to drive out the Yunnan occupation forces.749 By the early

spring of 1920, the previously discussed split within the Yunnan officer corps over

whether to continue the occupation or return occupied territory to Sichuan control,

contributed to indecision over moving against Xiong Kewu. Although originally a

Yunnan ally, at this time Xiong Kewu was planning to betray Yunnan and was gathering

a coalition of Sichuan warlords to drive out the Yunnan Army. But the original Yunnan

supporters of Xiong, including Gu Pinzhen and Zhu De, hesitated to strike at their

748 Wales, 116-117.

337 ostensible ally, which would have disastrous results for the Yunnan Army in Sichuan.750

Zhu was especially torn, because at the February 1918 Ziliujing conference, Zhu had supported the nomination of Xiong Kewu to be the new Sichuan military governor

(dujun).751

On May 23, 1920, Xiong Kewu and a coalition of Sichuan warlords launched an attack against Yunnan Army units south of Chengdu. Through the summer of 1920, there were a series of see-saw battles across central Sichuan between Xiong’s forces and the

Yunnan Army. In July, Xiong temporarily lost Chengdu to a Yunnan counterattack, but

Xiong then formed an alliance with Liu Cunhou and recaptured Chengdu. The Yunnan

Second Army under Zhao Yuxin counterattacked in an attempt to retake Chengdu, using the 4,000 men of the two brigades commanded by Zhu De and Jin Handing. These two brigades of the Second Army faced 16,000 Sichuan troops and in a vicious battle characterized by hand-to-hand combat, the Yunnan forces suffered a major defeat with heavy losses and were forced to retreat south. By October 1920, most Sichuan militarists and their forces had joined the coalition to drive out the Yunnan Army from Sichuan territory. The Yunnan Army suffered a succession of defeats, losing Luzhou on October

8, Xuzhou on October 12, and Chongqing on October 15. With the loss of these cities,

Yunnan Army rule in Sichuan came to an end.752

Given the Yunnan Army’s formidable military reputation, why had the military

forces of Sichuan been able to defeat the Yunnan Army in a few months? The Yunnan

Army by 1920 was internally in decline and beset by internal weaknesses even while it

749 Kapp, 17. 750 Sutton, 232-233. 751 Yang, 5. 752 Sutton, 232-234.

338 externally faced new and more challenging military and political threats. During the

occupation, it had declined as a modern military institution. Because the tax system was

inadequate to maintain Yunnan Army occupation forces, officers, in order to pay and

support their units, became opium entrepreneurs with the accompanying corruption as

officers also sought personal profit. In addition, the garrison system set up for the

occupation required officers to devote a significant portion of their time to civil

administration and politics, which had a detrimental effect on military efficiency.753

Even Zhu De admitted that during this period his devotion to military duties became lax

and he himself developed an opium habit.754 Meanwhile, in facing external challenges, even though Yunnan soldiers managed to retain their superior fighting spirit and esprit de corps, they could not prevail against superior numbers of Sichuanese troops, now that more Sichuan militarists were willing to cooperate with each other and band together to end Yunnan occupation. By 1920, the continuing recruitment drive by Sichuan provincial forces had increased the number of troops to around 100,000, while the

Yunnan Army in Sichuan was unable to do the same due to the distance from Yunnan population centers. The extended lines of communication back to Yunnan also created shortages of ammunition and supplies that exacerbated the Yunnan Army’s numerical inferiority in battle. The Yunnan defeat in Sichuan was derived not only from military weaknesses, but also from political causes, for Tang Jiyao’s policies had progressively alienated Yunnan’s Sichuan allies and allowed Sichuan militarist factions to unite against

Yunnan rule.755 Because Tang had been unable to maintain his original policy of keeping

the various Sichuan militarists divided against one another, the Yunnan Army in Sichuan

753 Ibid., 234-235. 754 Smedley, 130.

339 now faced an overwhelming coalition of hostile Sichuan forces that not even their high

level of combat effectiveness could overcome.

Up to 1920, the Yunnan Army in Sichuan was able to retain its formal

organizational hierarchy that kept fragmentation in check. The Yunnan Army preserved

its formal chain of command that continued to subordinate it to Tang Jiyao back in

Yunnanfu. It also continued to administer itself in formal brigade-and-division size units.

Before 1920, the bonds within the officer corps remained strong and the Yunnan Army

was able to avoid internal disputes, mutinies, or defections by any of its commanders or

units. Indeed, the army was able to retain its higher sense of purpose, internal solidarity,

and sense of loyalty and cooperation. Donald Sutton has commented that the persistence

of this solidarity was unusual when compared to other Chinese provincial armies of this

period. This solidarity was based on the continuing personal ties among the officers,

derived from school ties and from superior-to-subordinate and teacher-to-pupil

relationships. The sense of solidarity among the officers was also reinforced by their

shared experience of isolation during the occupation of Sichuan and the shared

experience of serving in the 1916 Protect the Nation and 1917 Protect the Constitution

wars.756

Despite its disastrous defeat in 1920 at the hands of Xiong Kewu and the Sichuan

militarists, the Yunnan Army managed to retain its cohesion as a military force and come

to a resolution on its next course of action. In the recent fighting, Zhu had lost all but one

regiment from his brigade and he realized that the Yunnan Army would be exterminated

if it remained in Sichuan. Once again, the officers initiated a collective decision making

755 Sutton, 234, 236. 756 Sutton, 236-237.

340 process by holding an army conference in late 1920 to decide on what the remnants of the

army should do next. Zhu participated in this conference where it was decided to return

to Yunnan and overthrow the regime of Tang Jiyao. The defeat of the Yunnan Army in

Sichuan only added to the disillusionment Zhu felt towards his military career and renewed his resolve to quit the military and travel overseas with Sun Bingwen to study political thought and institutions. Before Zhu could undertake this new course of action, however, he first wanted to return to Yunnanfu with the army and overthrow Tang

Jiyao.757

Looking back at this period, Zhu expressed his own views on why the Yunnan

Army as a revolutionary force was initially so successful. Zhu believed that the best

troops were politically aware and motivated, and that they must gain the support of the people. The army and the people must cooperate to achieve success. If this was ignored or lost, then the revolutionary movement would fail.758 Zhu supported the concept of the

need for a close interrelationship between the military and the people to achieve larger

political or revolutionary objectives. These ideas were similar to Cai E’s beliefs and his

views on the relationship between the military and the nation that were originally derived

from Japanese and European militarism, as stated in previous chapters. Zhu would later

apply these ideals during the development of the Red Army, especially the emphasis on

the political indoctrination of soldiers and the importance of gaining and maintaining the

support of the local population as part of an overall revolutionary strategy. In addition,

Zhu summed up his views on the reasons for the failure of the 1911 Revolution and why the Yunnan Army ceased to be a supporter of the revolution. For Zhu, the “republicans

757 Smedley, 130-131.

341 compromised with their mortal enemies.” After 1911, “Yunnan was one of the very few

provinces that made political and military progress – though this also did not last long.”

Zhu continued, “On the revolutionary side we failed because we did not introduce

democracy. Also, the desire for profit and promotion was very great in our own ranks so that, after the first selfless burst of revolutionary fervor, it was easy for men to lose their character.” This last statement was a pointed criticism by Zhu on the conduct of the

Yunnan officer corps during the occupation of Sichuan and the resulting decline of the

Yunnan Army.759

Taking a Different Path: Reasons Zhu De Left the Yunnan Army

Zhu returned with the Yunnan Army from Sichuan to Yunnanfu to help overthrow

the Tang Jiyao regime. During this period, Zhu became involved with factional politics

within the Yunnan Army even as he began preparations to leave China for Europe. Zhu

was part of the faction of Gu Pinzhen, the commander of the Yunnan Army in Sichuan

and Zhu’s long-time superior officer. In the end, Zhu claimed that ideological factors

determined why he chose to end his affiliation with Yunnan militarist factions and the

army, although his decision may have been more influenced by the fact that he became a

victim of factional politics and conflicts. Ultimately, Zhu was forced to leave Yunnan

because his group, Gu Pinzhen’s faction, lost to Tang Jiyao’s faction. After the defeat of

Gu Pinzhen’s faction, Tang initiated a bloody purge of Gu’s former associates, forcing

Zhu to flee for his life with Tang’s troops in pursuit. Zhu managed to elude his pursuers

and headed to Shanghai where he embarked on a ship for Europe.

758 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 388- 389; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 383-384. 759 Smedley, 101.

342 Zhu’s desire to help overthrow Tang Jiyao stemmed from a long-standing

hostility to Tang that Zhu claimed went back to 1917, when Tang was allied with Sun

Yat-sen during the establishment of the Military Government to Uphold the Constitution.

Zhu blamed the failure of the 1917 Protect the Constitution Movement mostly on Tang

Jiyao, who in Zhu’s view, betrayed Sun Yat-sen. For Zhu, it was Tang Jiyao’s personal

ambition to control both Guizhou and Sichuan that contributed to the disintegration of the

“bourgeois revolutionary forces.”760 Near the end of 1920, Zhu was part of the defeated

and mutinous Yunnan Army led by Gu Pinzhen that returned from Sichuan. Enroute to

Yunnanfu, Gu informed Tang Jiyao that he owed the army nine million dollars in back

pay and some of Gu’s subordinates also urged Tang to resign. On February 8, 1921,

faced with a hostile military force and the loss of support from his allies in Yunnan, Tang

Jiyao fled from Yunnanfu. With Tang Jiyao’s flight from Yunnan, Gu Pinzhen became

the new provincial governor. Unfortunately, Gu’s governorship lasted only a year

because Gu was unable to establish his authority over the various military factions within

Yunnan. The only consistent supporters that Gu could count on were from his former

subordinates in the Yunnan Army in Sichuan, such as Zhu De and Jin Handing.761 While it lasted, Zhu reaped the rewards of his loyalty to Gu Pinzhen. In March 1921, Gu appointed Zhu as commander of the Yunnan Army military police.762 After Zhu resigned

from the army, he served from September to October 1921 as Commissioner of Police for

Yunnan province.763

760 Zhu, “Reminiscences of the Revolution of 1911,” (October 10, 1961), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 389; or “Xin hai geming huiyi,” in Zhu De xuanji, 384. 761 Sutton, 254-255. 762 Zhu De nianpu, 32. 763 Wales, 115.

343 After Zhu returned to Yunnanfu and Gu Pinzhen assumed the governorship of

Yunnan, a curious incident occurred that provides a brief peek under Zhu’s carefully crafted popular image.764 Yang Ruxuan related that Zhu talked to him about different methods to raise funds so Zhu could go to Europe to study. Zhu thought the best option was to become the head of the Fudian Bank in Yunnanfu. At the time, the director of the bank was Gu Hanjia, a former protégé of Tang Jiyao. Zhu asked Gu Pinzhen to replace the director with himself, but Gu replied that to do this quickly was not an easy task. Zhu then concluded that the simplest way was to have Gu Hanjia killed. Zhu asked Yang to dispatch two soldiers to carry out the mission. Yang hesitated and asked Zhu why he did not dispatch some of his own soldiers to carry this out. Zhu replied that it would be inconvenient to do so. Yang then asked for and received the consent of Jin Handing to carry out this act. Yang then dispatched two of his soldiers and using their pistols they finished off Gu Hanjia on the Wucheng road. But the killing aroused such a popular outcry that Zhu could not be appointed as the new bank director.765 This account

764 In contrast, Zhu’s well known popular image was summarized by Nym Wales (Helen Foster Snow) in her first impression of Zhu De in 1937. She observed that, “He is fatherly, kind, quiet-spoken and above all modest, even to the point of self-effacement….I had the impression that he is at heart that rare thing in China, a humanitarian:” See Wales, 110. Snow continued, “Chu Teh has none of the mannerisms of the military. One could no more imagine him with a gilded saber dangling around his legs, than Von Hindenburg in one of Chu Teh’s unpressed, faded cotton uniforms, with tennis shoes and puttees.” See Wales, 110. This image of Zhu in 1937 can be contrasted to the photos of Zhu De when he was an officer in the Yunnan Army in 1916 at the beginning of this chapter and in the previous chapter, where he seems almost Prussian in his pressed uniform, jack boots, and saber. 765 Yang, 6-7. Not surprisingly, this Fudian Bank story appears nowhere in Zhu’s own accounts of the period, nor in Smedley or Wales’ interviews. Yang Ruxuan’s oral history is the only source for this story. The veracity of the story may be judged by Yang’s attitude towards Zhu in his oral interviews given in 1977 and 1978 in Yunnan. In his account, Yang was not hostile to Zhu and did not seemed to bear him any grudges. On the whole Yang is complimentary, if not admiring, of Zhu’s character and leadership qualities. Yang seems to have no apparent reason to make up this story to denigrate Zhu’s character or reputation. One can only speculate on why Zhu, in seeking to quickly acquire a large sum of money, would view the bank director position as being the most lucrative option. Zhu must have been thinking of more than just the bank director’s salary and he possibly contemplated kickbacks, bribes, or other corrupt practices to acquire cash. Curiously, in Zhu’s account to Smedley of this period, he stated that he had transferred his life savings of $10,000 in Chinese money to a Paris bank, ostensibly to help his wife and child even though he was planning on leaving them in China when he went to Europe. See Smedley, 133.

344 indicates how ruthless, duplicitous, and single-minded Zhu could be in pursuit of his

goals. It also indicates that he was aware of the political sensitivities of the action he was

about to take and thus his cold-blooded plan to conceal his involvement in the

assassination by asking Yang to use his own soldiers and not Zhu’s troops. Zhu

obviously would use any means possible, including murder, to achieve his aim of raising

enough funds to allow him to leave Yunnan and study in Europe. This incident may also

have contributed to the personal enmity Tang Jiyao felt toward Zhu after Tang returned to

power. After Zhu escaped from Yunnanfu, Tang offered large rewards for Zhu’s capture

and sent troops to pursue him through three provinces.

In May 1921 in Guangzhou, Sun Yat-sen declared the creation of a new southern

nationalist government. At the beginning of 1922, Sun Yat-sen requested the Yunnan

Army to come east and assist the new nationalist government with its campaign against

various warlords. Only a small garrison was left behind in Yunnanfu. A few weeks after

the bulk of the Yunnan Army had marched east to assist Sun Yat-sen, Tang Jiyao took

advantage of this situation to retake Yunnan.766 In January 1922, Tang Jiyao’s return to

Yunnan was made possible by the secret deals that he made with Yunnan officers to

betray Gu Pinzhen and defect to Tang’s side. Tang had also made deals with various bandit groups to secure their military assistance. From February into early March 1922, civil war raged within Yunnan. Leading the Yunnanfu garrison into battle, Gu Pinzhen

was defeated and died in combat. On April 3, Tang Jiyao resumed control over

Yunnan.767

766 Smedley, 133. 767 Sutton, 255-256. Smedley, 133-134.

345 After he returning to power, Tang Jiyao initiated a purge of all those who had

supported Gu Pinzhen within the Yunnan officer corps. Tang either had them executed

or forced them to flee Yunnan.768 Zhu, accompanied by Luo Peijin, fled for their lives,

but Luo was later captured and executed by Tang Jiyao.769 During the purge, Tang made

a point of eliminating his remaining fellow Japanese-educated classmates, such as Luo

Peijin, and except for Tang himself, the purge effectively removed this leadership group

from power in Yunnan. Tang also purged pre-1912 Yunnan Military Academy

graduates, such as Zhu De.770

In many ways, Zhu was a victim of the warlord political system and the fragility

of militarist factions. Zhu, unfortunately, remained loyal to a factional leader, Gu

Pinzhen, who lacked political ability and had failed to integrate other Yunnan military

factions into his own after the ouster of Tang Jiyao. Because Gu’s faction had weak

cohesion and integration, it became brittle when subjected to stress, such as a major

conflict with another warlord faction. Hsi-sheng Ch’i in his study of warlord politics

observed that “The low degree of integration achieved by a faction as a result of its

emphasis on personalized relationships and its inhibition on vertical and horizontal

communications gave it a low tolerance for major stress. Nothing exposed this low

tolerance more succinctly than a change in leadership.”771 Removal of a faction leader created a crisis within the faction over who possessed legitimate authority. Warlord factions were very personalized organizations and often did not have a legitimatized or

768 Sutton, 256. 769 Smedley, 134. 770 Sutton, 256-257. 771 Ch’i, 64.

346 institutionalized system of leadership succession.772 While serving in Sichuan, Zhu and

other Yunnan Army officers had formed personalized subordinate-superior relationships

with Gu Pinzhen, a bond that was reinforced by their long service together during the

occupation of Sichuan. This was a symptom of the decline of the Yunnan Army from an

impersonal bureaucratic institution to a personalized organization similar to many other

Chinese provincial militaries of the period. Yunnan Army officers serving in Sichuan felt

little loyalty to Tang Jiyao, even though legally Tang was governor of Yunnan and

commander-in-chief of the Yunnan Army. When Gu Pinzhen was killed in battle

fighting Tang Jiyao, his faction fell apart. In contrast, Tang was more successful in

building his coalition and maintained his faction. When Tang returned to power, he

ruthlessly ensured that rival faction members were eliminated.

Despite his desire to leave Yunnan and study in Europe, Zhu had continued to

stay in Yunnanfu through 1921, under the patronage of Gu Pinzhen as part of Gu’s faction. Zhu left Yunnan only when forced to by the defeat of Gu by Tang Jiyao. One could speculate that if Gu had remained in power, would Zhu have stayed longer despite

his insistence that he was anxious to leave and study in Europe? Under Gu’s regime, Zhu

De did not lack employment prospects and was given important posts in the Yunnan

government.

With Tang’s purge, Zhu had to flee Yunnan while being pursued by Tang troops.

Zhu’s escape route led through northern Yunnan and into Tibet, then through Sichuan,

where Zhu planned to take a boat down the Yangzi River to Shanghai. Along the way

Zhu was helped by Gelaohui members. During this journey, Zhu claimed he began to

772 Ibid., 64-65.

347 wean himself off his opium habit.773 The escape route that Zhu took through Tibet and

Sichuan had a fortuitous future outcome for the Red Army, for it was, as Zhu stated to

Nym Wales, the exact same route he followed during the 1935 Long March.774

Zhu’s Military Reputation by 1922

While fleeing en route to Shanghai, Zhu De entered Sichuan in June 1922. In

Chongqing, Zhu met Liu Xiang, the governor-general, and Yang Sen, the Chongqing

garrison commander and former fellow officer in the Yunnan Army. By this time, Zhu

claimed his reputation as a military commander was well known, especially for his

“special tactics,” which made Zhu highly employable as a military expert. Therefore, Liu

Xiang wanted to appoint Zhu as a division commander in the Sichuan forces, but Zhu

stated that he turned down this offer because he had already made up his mind to go to

Europe.775 Possibly another reason why Zhu rejected the offer was that Zhu may not have trusted Liu Xiang or Yang Sen, for they could have betrayed him to Tang Jiyao.

In his 1937 interviews with Nym Wales (Helen Foster Snow), Zhu stated that his

tactical principles as of 1922 had already become well known. Zhu’s “special tactics”

that he claimed he had used successfully against Yuan Shikai’s army in 1916, were:

“ … mobile partisan tactics which I learned mainly from my experience on the Indo-China border and in fighting the Man-tzu tribes and bandits. I learned from a hard school of experience in fighting against mobile groups of bandit deserters from the armies, which was especially valuable. I combined with this guerilla (sic) experience, of course, what I had learned from books and in school …. My own particular tactics in leading an army were these: I was myself physically strong, so I lived with my men and kept the closest contact with them, thus establishing confidence in them. Before any engagement, large or small, I looked over the topographical situation and planned every detail very carefully. My main tactics were usually sound because of careful management and personal leadership of the troops. I always insisted upon getting a clear picture of the

773 Smedley, 133, 135, 137. Wales, 116. 774 Wales, 115. 775 Ibid., 115.

348 enemy position from all angles. I also usually had good relations with the people, which helped me very much. Ts’ai Ao (sic), who was famous for his commanding tactics, taught me very much …. I think that the other element important for both commander and men is an understanding of the political situation so they have the morale to fight firmly for a principle. The rest is experience - the more you fight, the better you are able to grasp the situation.”776

When reflecting back on his past military experience, including this period, and asked what his assessment was of the Chinese soldier compared to soldiers of other nations,

Zhu had this to say, “It is the officers and not the soldiers of China who are incompetent

and bad. The men only need political training. If the Chinese soldiers could be properly

trained they would be the finest fighters in the world, ... ”777 These comments reiterate

Zhu’s key concerns in developing an effective military force: the importance of a good

officer corps, a high level of training for both officers and men, and creating and

maintaining troop motivation and morale. All of these factors Zhu would emphasize

during the development of the Red Army.

After arriving in Shanghai, Zhu met Sun Yat-sen and other GMD leaders. At this

meeting, Sun tried to convince Zhu to return to Sichuan to fight the militarists there, but

Zhu refused. Sun then tried to urge Zhu to go to America. In turning down Sun Yat-sen,

Zhu stated his determination to travel to Europe to study and told Sun, “I was interested

in going to Germany to study military science and to see the effects of the great World

War for myself.”778 In September 1922, Zhu embarked on a ship for Europe

accompanied by Sun Bingwen. Zhu’s route took him through Singapore, Southeast Asia,

India, East Africa, and Egypt. He eventually disembarked at Marseilles. Both Zhu and

776 Ibid., 115-116. 777 Ibid., 121. These remarks were made to Nym Wales during her 1937 interviews with Zhu. They followed Zhu’s comments on whom he considered to be the best military commanders in history and Zhu’s appraisal of Cai E as the best modern Chinese military leader. 778 Ibid., 117.

349 Sun Bingwen decided on a short stay in France and traveled to Paris, then continued on to

Berlin, their ultimate destination, arriving there in October 1922.779

Conclusion

In characterizing warfare during the early Republic and initial warlord eras, one can overgeneralize about the nature of armies and how wars were waged during this period. In his The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics,

1927-71, William Whitson identified three competing military models or styles that shaped and influenced the development of the Red Army: the warlord, the Russian, and the peasant models. The warlord model for Whitson was characterized by a personalized military force that emphasized personal loyalty to one’s superior as the criterion for advancement, armies organized along Western lines, strategy driven by balance of power considerations and a focus on the control of key urban centers, and rudimentary tactics emphasizing frontal assaults by lines or waves of ill-trained infantry supported by artillery and machine gun fire.780 Whitson contends that Mao represented the peasant model that emphasized guerrilla warfare. This is in opposition to the professional officers, such as Zhu De, who represented the warlord and Russian models that emphasized regular military forces and conventional operations. For Whitson, Zhu personified the warlord tradition, setting him and other professional officers in opposition to Mao’s model.

Zhu’s experience in the Yunnan Army suggests that Whitson’s model of warlord armies and warfare inadequately reflects a reality that was more complex with more varied types of armies and styles of warfare than portrayed by Whitson. Warfare, during

779 Wales, 117. Smedley, 150-151. 780 Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 8-13.

350 the warlord era, was characterized by regional differences in the conduct of war between that of eastern China and the interior. There were regional differences in the availability to various military forces of arms and technology, and the means of transportation and communication. Operationally, armies relied on not just conventional warfare, but on occasion combined it with guerrilla operations. Militaries of the period also had to be adept at waging counterinsurgency operations and developing effective political/military pacification strategies. At the level of tactics, some armies could undertake sophisticated tactical maneuvers similar to Western armies of the period. Institutionally, military organizational cultures could range from the impersonal to the personal, while the motivation of officers and soldiers could range from a dedication to national ideals and self-sacrifice to that of abject self-interest. The level of training and discipline of an army could also vary, from a highly professional force closely resembling Western models to that of a near rabble. Young officers who gained their initial military experience during this warlord period, like Zhu De, would have been exposed to a range of warfare styles and gained valuable lessons that they could later combine with other models that would then influence the early development of the GMD military and the Communist Red

Army. Granted, the Yunnan Army, when compared with other Chinese armies of the period, was the exception and not the rule, but it was an important exception given that

Zhu De spent his initial and formative military service in its ranks, rising to become a senior commander.

Zhu De gained both positive and negative lessons from his campaign experiences from 1912 through 1922. His evolving military thought and lessons he had learned up to this point could be grouped into three categories. In the realm of strategy and politics,

351 where the preconditions for military success and the achievement of war aims are set,

Zhu learned of the need for the primacy of political objectives over military imperatives,

and the need to develop a comprehensive political/military strategy to achieve overall goals and create a unity of effort among all one’s forces. Zhu learned of the benefits of gaining the support of the local population to the conduct of operations and the development of military forces, along with the disadvantages of losing popular support, illustrated by the end of the Yunnan occupation of southern Sichuan in 1920. During the numerous campaigns Zhu participated in, he could see the utility of the political subversion of enemy forces and the advantages of exploiting any divisions within the

enemy’s ranks to attain the goal of winning without fighting. Zhu was able to practice

this in the counterinsurgency operations he conducted, and he could observe on a larger

scale how divisions within Sichuan and Northern forces could be readily exploited during

the 1916 and 1917 campaigns in Sichuan.

At the operational and tactical levels, Zhu learned of the need to adapt to local

conditions and circumstances, along with the importance of organizational and operational flexibility. He learned that mobile warfare was better than positional warfare, and that the use of envelopment/encirclement tactics, not costly frontal assaults, was the key to achieve a battle of annihilation. Throughout this period, Zhu gained extensive practical experience in conducting counterinsurgency and guerrilla operations, and in conducting operations in mountainous regions and other difficult terrain. Zhu saw the utility of imitating the tactics and organization of bandit and guerrilla bands, and divided his own forces into small units that used flexible and mobile guerrilla tactics. Zhu could also observe the effectiveness of combining conventional operations with guerrilla

352 warfare. He experienced this first-hand during the 1916 Huguojun campaign in southern

Sichuan that included the conduct of coordinated operations between regular forces and

guerrilla units. And finally, Zhu saw the critical importance of comprehensive

intelligence on the enemy and undertaking a first-hand reconnaissance of the battlefield.

In the creation and development of an effective military force, Zhu’s

organizational and institutional lessons from this period included most importantly that a

better trained and disciplined military force was more effective in combat, and could

defeat a more numerous, but less trained and motivated foe. The maintenance of good

discipline among one’s troops would also help gain the support of the local population, just as the lack of it could quickly turn the local populace against them. Zhu realized that one of the key factors for an effective military force was to develop and maintain a superior officer corps that would lead by example and possess individual initiative. A corollary to this was the need to maintain rigorous ongoing training and education of officers and soldiers. In addition, political indoctrination was critical to maintain the motivation and morale of the troops. In the case of the Yunnan Army during its occupation of Sichuan, Zhu witnessed the degeneration of a military organization when the above factors were not maintained. Ultimately, Zhu believed that a force inferior in number and materiel could defeat a larger and better armed enemy if it possessed the above characteristics.

When Zhu De embarked for Europe in 1922, he possessed an extensive store of

military knowledge and experience gained over the preceding fourteen years. While in

Europe, Zhu was determined to study not only new political ideas, but also German and

353 European military science, and the lessons of World War One. With these goals in mind,

Zhu would pursue his education in Germany and Russia.

354 Chapter 6: Experience and Education in Europe 1922-1926

Foreign influences derived from the military theories of European powers,

notably Germany and Russia, along with those from Japan, and even from the Boer

Republic in South Africa can be found in the development and operations of China’s Red

Army. The threads of these influences can be found combined in the experience of Zhu

De, the commander-in-chief of the Red Army and the man most credited with the

military development of the Red Army. In his autobiographical sketch given to Nym

Wales (Helen Foster Snow) in 1937, Zhu himself credited many influences on his

military thought, including not only his days in the Yunnan Army under Cai E but also

his study of German and Russian military science while in Europe.781

This chapter will attempt to gauge how much influence Zhu De’s study in

Germany from 1922 to 1925 and in Russia from 1925 to 1926 had on his military

thought. What military lessons could Zhu De have learned from his education and

experiences in Germany, especially his intensive study of the campaigns of the German

army during World War One? What Soviet military thinking and training did Zhu De receive in Moscow and how could it have influenced his subsequent military thought? In addition, this chapter will try to establish whether Zhu De knew about on going Soviet

army debates regarding military theory in the early and mid-1920s, especially issues

related to the supremacy of politics over military strategy, guerrilla warfare theory,

defensive vs. offensive operations, and operational art. This chapter will then assess

whether he may have applied those lessons to the development and operations of the

Chinese Red Army.

781 Wales, 113, 115-116, 117, 121.

355 Chinese armies had been exposed to innovations in European military theory and practice since the late Qing military reforms, and this continued through the early

Republican period and after World War One. Of note was the German army, which had a significant influence on the development of Chinese armies and military thought during the early twentieth century. This information was passed directly to Chinese military personnel through German military advisers in China or through military education received by Chinese in Germany. It was, however, more commonly transmitted indirectly through the Chinese emulation of the Japanese army, which had modeled itself on the German army and even used translations of German military regulations to train

Japanese troops. Many Chinese officers were trained in Japanese military schools or by

Japanese advisers in China. Pre-1914 German operational concepts and tactical theory were prevalent among Chinese armies through the early Republic and warlord periods.

The operational and tactical innovations developed during World War One by all the

European belligerents were more slowly assimilated by Chinese armies during the 1920s.

One of the more significant innovations was a transformation in operations and infantry tactics that had occurred in the armies of all the belligerents that changed the way armies’ conducted themselves on the battlefield. The German army played a critical role in the development of this transformation in infantry tactics that moved from the linear concepts prevalent among all armies in 1914 to the non-linear, defense in depth, and offensive infiltration/pincer tactics prevalent in 1918. In addition, the Russians under the late

Czarist and new Bolshevik regimes had begun to develop their own theories on modern warfare and military operations, especially with the experience gained during World War

One and the Russian Civil War. These concepts were then introduced to Chinese soldiers

356 and students by Russian military advisers to the GMD in China or through training in the

Soviet Union beginning in the 1920s. These Russian concepts may also indirectly reflect

German operational theory and innovations in tactics developed near the end of World

War One, which were passed on to the Soviets in the early 1920s by German military advisers in Russia.

Given these changes in military art brought about by World War One, Zhu was eager to become a student in Germany, not only to study Marxism but also German military science. While studying in Germany and Russia, Zhu spent most of his time involved in the activities of various Chinese Communist student organizations and the study of Marxist-Leninist thought. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the focus will be on Zhu’s military studies and not on his political education.

French Experience 1922

Zhu’s ship arrived in Marseilles, France, near the end of September 1922. En route to Germany, Zhu and Sun Bingwen stopped in France for a few weeks. In Paris, they stayed with a Chinese merchant and were told about a group of Chinese students who had just organized a branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in France. The chief organizer of this group was Zhou Enlai. Other students in this group included Chen

Yi, Li Lisan, and Nie Rongzhen, all future leaders of the CCP or Red Army/PLA.

Wishing to join the CCP, Zhu wanted to find Zhou Enlai, but was told Zhou had already moved to Berlin to organize another student CCP branch. Zhu was given Zhou’s address in Berlin. While in France, Zhu did express an interest in France’s World War One experience, and he and Sun Bingwen visited the French battlefields.782 In his 1937 interviews with Nym Wales (Helen Foster Snow), Zhu stated his admiration for French

357 Marshal Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929), who had been commander-in-chief of all Allied forces on the Western Front in 1918. Zhu thought Foch’s defense of France had been brilliant.783

Marshal Foch was at his best at strategic-level coalition management, where he was able to coordinate the efforts of French, British and Belgian forces to maintain the

Western Front against numerous German offensives. The greatest challenge Foch faced was over how to defeat the anticipated 1918 German offensives in France. Despite his preference for preemptive attacks to counter the planned German offensives, Foch had to stay on the defensive due to politics within the allied coalition and the need to wait until more American forces had arrived.784 Beginning in March 1918, the German army launched a series of offensives against the allied front line. The initial German offensive broke through the allied lines and captured 1,200 square miles in two weeks. In March

1918, Foch was appointed generalissimo of all Allied armies on the Western Front. The focus of Foch’s strategic thought at this time was the quest for the Clausewitzian culminating point, the point at which the German offensives lost their momentum, at that point the Allies would launch their counteroffensive. His overall strategy was for the

Allies to remain on the defensive and wait for the right opportunity to counterattack.

Facing skeptical coalition partners, Foch had to exert command through persuasion rather than through coercion in order to obtain support for his plans.785

With the end of the fifth German offensive in June 1918, Foch believed that the culminating point was near. Foch wanted to preempt another German attack with an

782 Smedley, 151. 783 Wales, 121. 784 Michael S. Neiberg, Foch: Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), 37, 54, 57, 59.

358 allied offensive, but he was convinced by his subordinates to adopt a more cautious

strategy of letting the enemy attack first then responding with counterattacks. By July

1918, Foch sensed that the Germans were weakening and devised plans to regain the

initiative for the Allies with a series of offensives to keep the Germans continuously off

balance. Foch’s concept was for a series of successive operations to be launched; when

one offensive wound down Foch would begin another offensive to maintain constant

pressure on German forces.786 These successive allied offensives eventually forced the

Germans to agree to an armistice in November 1918.

There may have been some facets of Foch’s leadership or strategic approach that

Zhu De may have found relevant to his later Red Army command, including his skill at coalition building or the idea of successive offensives. Unfortunately, Zhu’s stated admiration for Foch in his later interviews included no specifics on the ways in which

Foch may have influenced his own leadership or strategic approaches. In the end,

though, Zhu’s time in France was limited and it is clear that it was his next stop in

Germany that would have a much greater impact on his military thinking.

German Experience 1922 – 1925

After their brief stay in France, Zhu De and Sun Bingwen continued their journey

to Berlin to commence their studies and to gain membership into the CCP.787 Both Zhu

and Sun Bingwen arrived in Berlin in late October 1922 to find Zhou Enlai and seek membership in the CCP student group there. Zhu was not typical of the Chinese students

785 Ibid., 61-63, 64-65. 786 Ibid., 72, 76-77. 787 In her biography of Zhu De, Agnes Smedley includes only one chapter on Zhu’s experiences and studies in Germany, and this mostly focuses on his personal life, CCP work, and political education. See Smedley, 150-165. Similarly, in Nym Wales’ 1937 interviews with Zhu De there is only one page on Zhu’s life in Germany that focuses on his CCP work and political education. See Wales, 117-118.

359 then studying in Europe. He was 36 years old at the time and had had a professional

career, a wife and family, while most of his fellow Chinese students were in their early

twenties. After an interview, Zhou Enlai agreed to sponsor their memberships in the

CCP.788 Their applications had to be sent to China for final approval, and after a few

months both Zhu and Sun Bingwen were accepted as CCP members. Interestingly, Zhu’s

CCP membership was kept secret from other Chinese students in Berlin. The reason for

this, according to Zhu, was that the CCP at some future date might want to send Zhu back

to Yunnan to undertake CCP work and since Zhu was well known in Yunnan, it was best

to keep his Communist affiliation secret for the time.789

As a member of the CCP student group in Berlin, Zhu and his fellow members

spent most of their time at study, with evening discussion meetings devoted to Marxism-

Leninism, the Chinese revolution, and other Marxist literature. At this time, Zhu also

struggled to learn German so he could attend a German university.790 Zhu eventually could speak German and after long hard study he could also read Marxist-Leninist literature in German.791 While in Germany, Zhu retained his professional military

outlook even with his new ideological and political views, and perceived the world

through the eyes of a professional soldier. As he strolled through the streets of Berlin, he

would constantly imagine how he would defend every landmark and city block.792

During his stay in Germany, Zhu also took the opportunity to tour most of the country and visited major German cities, factories, and the countryside, all the while writing

788 Smedley, 151-152. Wales, 117. 789 Smedley, 152. 790 Ibid., 152-153. 791 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 89. Agnes Smedley conducted her 1937 oral interviews with Zhu in a mixture of Chinese and German with the help of a translator when Smedley had difficulty understanding Zhu’s Chinese. Smedley had learned German when she lived in Germany for eight years during the 1920’s and first came to China in 1928 as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung. Smedley, x, 4.

360 down his observations in notebooks. Zhu accumulated a trunk full of German language books and maps on the country, which he saved and sent back to China.793

After staying in Berlin for one year, in early 1923 Zhu went to study at Gottingen

University and enrolled in the political science faculty, where he attended social science courses for two semesters. Zhu had decided to attend a university not just to study, but also to ensure his student status in order to continue his stay in Germany. In addition,

Zhu chose Gottingen University because it had a large number of Chinese students and a strong student CCP branch.794 In early 1924, Zhu left Gottingen to return to Berlin in

order to help organize a branch of the GMD that was now part of a new united front that

included the CCP. Zhu commented that the Chinese students in Germany at this time

were split into two hostile groups: the CCP/GMD versus the conservative Chinese Youth

Party that was loyal to the government in Beijing. Becoming more involved in political

issues, Zhu edited a weekly GMD political newspaper in Berlin. At the time, both GMD

and CCP students were watched by the Berlin police and Zhu was arrested twice for his

political activities. During this period, Zhou Enlai, Sun Bingwen, and some other

Chinese students had returned to China. Zhou left to become the director of the political department at the new Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou, with Sun Bingwen serving as the deputy director.795

Besides his desire to study Marxism and the social sciences while in Germany,

Zhu had also gone to Europe to study the conduct and afteraffects of World War One. He

had an intense interest in the recent history and military theory of the German army.

792 Smedley, 154. Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 88. 793 Ibid., 155. Ibid., 88. 794 Wales, 117-118. Smedley, 155. 795 Ibid., 118. Ibid., 156, 158.

361 While living in Berlin, Zhu on his own began to study German military history with frequent visits to the Berlin War Museum.796 His approach to studying these subjects followed his own methodical style, which was to combine voluminous reading on recent

German military history along with private instruction from a retired German general to better understand German army operations and the lessons of World War One. Zhu purchased a multi-volume German military history of World War One that had been written by multiple authors and covered the major campaigns of the war, and spanned ten to twenty volumes. 797 To better understand German operational methodology, while in

Gottingen Zhu also engaged a former German army general, who also happened to be his landlord, as a tutor for private lessons on military subjects.798 Zhu described the general as over 60 years old and a member of the German aristocracy, who had been a former brigade commander and member of the German General Staff. He and Zhu often talked about military affairs, although Zhu was ambiguous about the usefulness of these discussions to the development of his own thought.799

796 Smedley, 154. 797 Fang Shiliang, “Zai Deguo, Sulian shi de Zhu De,” in Hua shuo Zhu De (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 42-43, 48. This source is an oral history given by Fang Shiliang, who was a student with Zhu De in Germany and the USSR. The set of books referred to was probably not the official German history of World War One but another multivolume military history of the war. The semi-official history of German military operations during World War One, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, was published by the Reichsarchiv from 1925 to 1944 in fourteen volumes. See Wallach, 226. Zhu may have obtained some of the first volumes while in Berlin in 1925. While buying books in Germany, Zhu had a wide variety of publications to choose from on the campaigns of the German army during the War because many studies were produced during the 1920’s and 1930’s by former officers and senior commanders. For a partial list of books see Wallach, 223-225. 798 Fang Shiliang, 42-43. Smedley, 155. 799 Zhu, Zhu De Zishu, 89. Huang Chen-hsia, Zhong gong jun ren zhi (Mao’s Generals) (Hong Kong: Dangdai lishi yanjiu suo chuban, 1968), 88. Zhu told Smedley that these lessons were not very useful and did not teach him anything that he did not already know. Smedley, 155. In other sources, however, Zhu expressed a more positive view of these sessions.

362 German Military Theory and the Lessons of World War One

Given Zhu’s deep interest in World War One and the German military, what

information and concepts could Zhu have read about or been tutored in regarding the

German army and its military theory? The German military thought that Zhu would have

been exposed to would have been dominated by the theories of General Alfred von

Schlieffen (1833-1913) who served as Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to

1905. His concepts dominated the German army’s military thought and doctrine prior to

World War One, and not only influenced the conduct of German military operations

during that war but also continued to influence operations during World War Two.800

Schlieffen’s ideas built on those of his predecessor, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, and

grew from the unique conception of war that the German army had developed during the

nineteenth century. In assessing German military theorists of the period, historian Azar

Gat observed that these military thinkers held that, “war was the sphere of clashing wills,

rising emotions, uncertainty, and confusion; no universal rules and principles could in

any real sense reflect its diverse complexity and endless contingencies; these could only

be mastered by the general’s practical genius and iron will.”801 Because any dogma or

formal system of principles governing warfare was rejected, this outlook imparted

enormous flexibility to the formulation of military theory, and stressed the overriding

800 Wallach, 35-36. 801 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 315. Gat’s chapter on German military theory is especially useful in that he places German military thought in the context of larger changes in German cultural and intellectual history of the nineteenth century. Works dealing with the German army and its military thought prior to 1914 are too numerous to list. For a sampling of recent studies on late nineteenth century German military thought and the development of the German army, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000) or Eric Dorn Brose, The Kaiser’s Army: The Politics of Military Technology in Germany during the Machine Age, 1870-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). As for works assessing Schlieffen’s military thought, there is Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (Providence: Berg Publishers, 1991) or the

363 importance of historical change, free circumstantial study, and moral forces. Despite his supposed rejection of all dogma, the very precision of his outlook would also lead some leaders of the German army to criticize Schlieffen for actually being too dogmatic in his theories. At the operational level, this conception of warfare advocated the total overthrow of the adversary’s will to resist through the envelopment and destruction of his field army in battles of annihilation, which in turn required a rapid concentration of military forces, a mobile strategy, and an emphasis on offensive action.802

The contingent nature of war was well appreciated by Zhu, who in his own tactical principles stressed that one should be aware that things and situations change, so set rules are impossible in commanding troops. Battlefield decisions depend on the specific task at hand, the enemy’s situation, and the terrain. Because all of these can often change, Zhu stressed that one must be able to change one’s decisions and tactics to accommodate these changes.803

Schlieffen’s military theories were developed to address the strategic challenges facing Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century, which was how to win a potential war on two fronts against materially and numerically superior adversaries,

France and Russia. Given Germany’s materiel and numerical inferiority to its potential enemies, a war would need to be short and decisive. Schlieffen’s solution from a military perspective was brilliant, but from a political perspective it was seriously flawed. His solution was to stay on the defensive at the strategic level and exploit interior lines to

well known study by Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958). 802 Gat, 368-369, 381. This concept of war was initially developed by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder when he was chief of the general staff from 1857-1887. See Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 296.

364 quickly mass and move German military forces, while going on the offensive at the

operational and tactical levels and exploit exterior lines to encircle and annihilate enemy

forces, with an emphasis on offensive/mobile action and not defensive/positional

warfare.804 A major problem with Schlieffen’s concept was a disconnect between

military strategy and political policy. Thus the execution of the famous Schlieffen Plan,

which sought first to encircle and defeat French forces then shift the German armies to

the east to defeat Russia, ignored political considerations and focused only on operational

issues. Despite its uneven applicability during World War One, which saw the

unsuccessful implementation of Schlieffen’s theories on the Western Front but more

successful application on the Eastern Front, Schlieffen’s theories continued to exert an

influence over the German army after the war, and then extended to how the German

army’s conduct during the war was presented in postwar histories.805

Beginning in the 1920s, the supporters of Schlieffen’s theories were very active in writing the official and popular history of German army operations during World War

One. Many of these books could have been purchased and read by Zhu during his stay in

Germany from 1922 to 1925. In historian Jehuda Wallach’s view, there is evidence that an actual “Schlieffen school” existed during World War One and that the most important

part of the German officer corps were members. After the war, officers of the Schlieffen

803 Zhu, “Some Basic Principles Concerning Tactics,” (1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 24-25; or “Tan ji ge zhanshu de jiben yuanze,” in Zhu De xuanji, 14-15. 804 For a current definition of interior and exterior lines, see United States Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, 5-7, 5-8. The definition in FM 3-0 states that, “Lines of operations define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives…Lines of operations may be either interior or exterior. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to each other. Interior lines allow a weaker force to mass combat power against a portion of the enemy force by shifting resources more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Operations on

365 school were very active in writing memoirs and operational histories of the war. They

argued that the reason for German military failures was that top military commanders,

such as Moltke the Younger and Falkenhayn, had violated the teachings and principles of

Schlieffen, and that Germany could have won the war if Schlieffen’s principles had been

followed. The Schlieffen school also influenced the writing of the official history of the

war by the Reichsarchiv, since many of the staff of the Reichsarchiv were Schlieffen

school members. Official histories emphasized Schlieffen’s theories and concepts, and

attributed any German military success to adherence to Schlieffen’s principles, while

German defeats were attributed to not following Schlieffen.806 Historical studies and

assessments of World War One operations by the covert General Staff also vindicated

Schlieffen’s concepts, arguing that the Schlieffen Plan would have been successful in the

West if Moltke had not altered it, while the Schlieffen doctrine was successfully applied in the East at Tannenberg.807 Schlieffen school members were also active in publishing

popular works setting forth their thesis that included books, magazine articles, and

newspapers. They also attacked works and authors that did not conform to their thesis.808

The influence of the Schlieffen school also affected views on the future of warfare. For instance, General Friedrich von Bernhardi’s On the War of the Future

published in 1920 reaffirmed Schlieffen’s ideas. In Bernhardi’s view, future wars would not follow linear strategy or tactics, but would be characterized by mobility and encirclement of the enemy at the strategic and tactical levels. Attrition strategies were

exterior lines offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile enemy; however, they require stronger or more mobile forces.” 805 Rothenberg, 296-297, 318, 320. 806 Wallach 211-212, 213-214. 807 T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Fairfax: Hero Books, 1984), 212-213. 808 Wallach 213-214.

366 rejected, and only through a war of movement and mobility that attempted to outflank the enemy and attack his rear, would one be able to achieve a decisive outcome. Schlieffen’s ideas were also reflected in the Reichswehr’s (Germany’s postwar army) 1921 field manual, Conduct and Battle of Combined Arms, which stressed the importance of offensive attacks on the flank and rear of the enemy to achieve his annihilation.809

The histories of the German army and other works on military theory that Zhu De could have read or learned about likely would have had this bias toward Schlieffen’s concepts. Many of Schlieffen’s theories would have appealed to Zhu because of their emphasis on how a numerically and materially inferior force could defeat a stronger force. Indeed, in historian Jehuda Wallach’s view, Schlieffen’s major contribution to the modern theory of war was demonstrating that it was possible to achieve a crushing victory with unequal forces.810 Schlieffen’s concept of using interior lines and adopting the strategic defensive, while using exterior lines and acting offensively at the operational and tactical level, would have also appealed to Zhu, given his past military experiences during the early Republic. It would also have been relevant to his subsequent experience defending the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi Soviets with an outnumbered and outgunned Red

Army after 1927. The evidence for any direct influence of German military theories on

Zhu’s later military thought while commanding the Red Army is very circumstantial, but there are enough parallels to make it worth summarizing some of the key concepts dominant in the German army before and during World War One.

809 Ibid., 216. 810 Ibid., 42-43.

367 The Relationship Between Politics and War

At the level of national strategy, despite Clausewitz’s well known assertion of the primacy of politics over war and that war is a continuation of policy, German military leaders by the beginning of the twentieth century had upended Clausewitz and came to view military imperatives as often outweighing political objectives. Schlieffen should bear some of the blame for this for he saw his own strategic planning as independent of politics, with the military imperatives of his war plans taking precedence over political considerations.811 This is a viewpoint that Zhu would have rejected, given his mentoring by Cai E and his training in Marxism-Leninism. In matters of strategy, Zhu was always sensitive to the primacy of politics over war and in this sense one could place Zhu as closer to Clausewitz than Schlieffen in strategic thought.

Battles of Envelopment, Encirclement and Annihilation

For Schlieffen, victory would be attained through the total annihilation of the enemy force. The best way for a numerically inferior force to achieve this was to encircle the enemy force and attack the rear to annihilate it. Schlieffen used the historic battle of Cannae, where Hannibal annihilated a larger Roman army with a double envelopment, as the model for his concept. Using Cannae as his touchstone, Schlieffen argued that the use of encirclement and envelopment at the operational and tactical level would allow a smaller force to achieve a decisive victory over a larger force.812

Schlieffen came to view encirclement as the only form of attack and opposed frontal and break-through attacks.813 Zhu’s Red Army also showed a preference for encirclement and envelopment to achieve annihilation of an enemy force. The regular units of the Red

811 Ibid., 37-38. 812 Wallach, 42-43. Rothenberg, 314.

368 Army saw their primary mission as seeking out the adversary’s main forces and

destroying them in a battle of annihilation (jianmie zhan).814 Red Army operations

placed an emphasis on gaining local superiority over enemy forces, making full use of its superior maneuverability, and using non-linear, envelopment and circular maneuvers to

attack the enemy’s flanks and rear in order to inflict the maximum psychological shock

on the enemy and annihilate its forces.

Leadership

In examining the factors that would enable an inferior force to defeat a superior

force, Schlieffen considered the leadership qualities that would be required to execute such an operation. In Schlieffen’s view, the higher level commander would be responsible for the overall coordination of the units converging to execute an envelopment of an enemy force, while subordinate commanders would march in the

direction ordered, engage the enemy, and carry through an attack without follow-on

support. These subordinate commanders would need to be well trained in the military

profession and be able to understand their superior commander’s intentions.815

In commenting on the qualities of leadership that were required, Schlieffen stated

that he sought, “an aim-conscious leader, an iron character, with an obstinate will for

victory and troops which clearly understand the issues at stake.”816 But these qualities

alone were not enough, for a leader of an inferior force needed to achieve surprise to

813 Wallach, 45. 814 Averill, 211. Jin, 305-306. 815 Wallach, 48. 816 Ibid., 48.

369 create a shock effect on the enemy force, and this could only be accomplished by

concentrating all of his available forces for a decisive blow at a critical point.817

Concentration of Force and the Center of Gravity

It was Schlieffen’s maxim that, “To achieve a victory you need the concentration

of superior forces at one point …. It is a rule to gather all available forces for one

thrust.”818 To counter the problem of fighting against superior enemy forces on two fronts, Schlieffen stated that a commander needed to decide not only where to deliver the first blow, but also how to accumulate superior forces at the decisive spot to launch this blow. For Schlieffen, this led to the concept of a strategic “center of gravity” or thrust

point: the “Schwerpunktbildung.”819 It is significant that the Red Army, under Zhu’s

leadership, also concentrated what units it had to achieve local superiority over an enemy

force, even if the enemy force was numerically superior, then strike at the enemy’s

weakest point, exploiting the Red Army’s advantages in intelligence, maneuverability,

stealth, and surprise, to administer a psychological shock to the enemy. This suggests a

strong connection between Red Army practice and ideas Zhu may have picked up during his study in Germany.

Command and Control

The designation of the Schwerpunkt or focus of effort was also used to ensure that

soldiers operating in small dispersed units would strive to achieve the objectives of the operation even if their unit was isolated from higher-level command. Unit leaders would be given the commanders’ intent for the battle and the overall picture of the operation.

For units at the Schwerpunkt, they would be told how important their mission was to the

817 Ibid., 48. 818 Ibid., 48.

370 success of the battle and that they were responsible for the overall success or failure of the operation.820 This concept was formally put into practice through Auftragstaktik or mission tactics.821 The commander would establish a mission Auftrag, then explain it in a brief, clear order, but left the methods and means of achieving the mission to the officer on the ground.822 The German army command philosophy encouraged individual initiative and independence by lower-level commanders. This extended to German

NCOs and squad leaders during World War One. To prepare their NCOs for this level of responsibility, the German army gave their NCO’s training usually given to junior officers, such as participation in tactical decision games. This emphasis on exercising personal initiative and responsibility required individual officers down to squad leader to take the initiative and do whatever the situation required. In some cases, this would require a commander to disobey an order that was not consistent with the situation at hand.823

Zhu also emphasized lower-level officer initiative and independence. Before a

Red Army operation, the higher-level commander’s intent and overall objectives for the battle would be communicated to lower-level commanders; they in turn would be given flexibility in how to achieve those objectives. Zhu stated that, “Obeying orders and displaying independent initiative are not contradictory. Functioning independently should never be mistaken for disobeying orders. It is also inadvisable to execute orders

819 Ibid., 49. 820 For a fuller description of German methods, see English and Gudmundsson, 61-62, 63-64. 821 Dupuy, 116. Moltke the Elder is often credited with introducing the concept of Auftragstaktik or mission tactics to the German army, while Schlieffen, when deputy chief of staff, supported their formal adoption in the new infantry regulations of 1888. See Rothenberg, 296, 313. After being translated verbatim into Japanese, these 1888 regulations were used as the drill regulations of the Japanese Army. See English and Gudmundsson, 7. These regulations in turn were transferred to the Chinese by Japanese military schools and advisers. 822 Citino, 19-20.

371 mechanically without exercising any independent initiative.”824 In coordinating the

actions of large troop formations, Zhu stated that it was essential “ … that each and every

unit understand, when accepting an assignment, the essence of the superior’s decision and

what role its own task plays in carrying out that order …. If the situation has changed and

communications have been severed, they should function independently according to the

superior’s order and local conditions, which should not be interpreted as disobeying the

superior’s order.”825

Positional/Defensive versus Mobile/Offensive Warfare

Rejecting defense and positional warfare, Schlieffen favored offensive actions and

movements as the only way an inferior force could prevail over a superior force.

Schlieffen’s prescription for the inferior force was to use flank movements to encircle the

enemy. He even viewed the purpose of fortresses as not for defense but to allow an

inferior force to undertake offensive action. The inferior force must maintain the

initiative, but would cede the initiative to the enemy if it adopted a defensive position and

then would face being surrounded.826 For the German army, the term “positional warfare” (Stellungskrieg) essentially meant warfare that was characteristic of the trench warfare of the Western Front from 1915 to 1917. A “war of movement”

(Bewegungskrieg), on the contrary, was characterized by a series of hard blows by large

823 English and Gudmundsson, 63-64. 824 Zhu, “The Great Victory and Lessons of the Huangbei and Dongbei Campaigns,” (May 28, 1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 21; or “Huangbei Dongbei liang ci zhanyi weida shengli de jingguo yu jiaoxun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 11. 825 Zhu, “Some Basic Principles Concerning Tactics,” (1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 25; or “Tan ji ge zhanshu de jiben yuanze,” in Zhu De xuanji, 15. 826 Wallach, 49-50. Adhering to the offensive and envelopment of enemy forces, for Schlieffen, could even mitigate the effects of friction and the independent will of the enemy. Schlieffen believed that by taking the offensive, maintaining the initiative, and by directing attacks at an adversary’s flanks, one could keep the enemy off balance and limit their strategic options. In doing this, one could compel an adversary to conform to one’s operational plans. See Rothenberg, 314.

372 units maneuvering in the open field with the objective of destroying the enemy field

army, which was seen as the only way to achieve decisive victory. The ultimate goal

according to Schlieffen was a “battle of encirclement” (Kesselschlacht), which would

destroy the enemy force and was analogous to a battle of annihilation.827 Zhu also

emphasized maintaining the initiative and the use offensive/mobile warfare to achieve the

encirclement and annihilation of an enemy force. The Red Army even employed similar

terminology as the German army, with terms such as “positional warfare” (zhendi zhan),

“mobile warfare” (yundong zhan), and “battle of annihilation” (jianmie zhan).828

Despite the hostility of the German army under Schlieffen to defensive concepts,

Clausewitz devoted a lengthy discussion to defense in his On War. Clausewitz viewed defense as the strongest form of war and that the strategic defensive should be linked to a

tactical offensive, and that adopting a defensive posture did not mean being passive.

Clausewitz drew on his own experiences during Napoleon’s 1812 campaign in Russia to

develop a concept of flexible defense. An application of the strategic defensive and

tactical offensive concept could be an operation involving the planned retreat of the

defender into the interior of his own territory, thus luring the enemy into pursuit. The

defender would continue to harass the forces of the attacker and disrupt his supply lines.

The combination of these actions and the overextension of the attacker’s lines of communication would eventually weaken the attacker to such an extent that his advance would halt out of exhaustion and his prior superiority would be negated. At this point, the defender would take advantage of an opportune moment to launch a counterattack to destroy the enemy. The essence of Clausewitz’s approach was to trade space to gain time

827 Citino, 195, 213. 828 Jin, 305-306.

373 in order to wear down the enemy.829 The German army was aware of Clausewitz’s flexible defense concept, but in Jehuda Wallach’s view they did not use it effectively or to its full potential during World War One. An example of this failure was the 1917 planned retreat of German forces to the Siegfried Line to avoid the Allies’ spring offensive. Once the retreat was accomplished, however, the Germans did not use it to regain the initiative and launch a counterattack.830 The German army seems to have been more successful applying this concept to the tactical level where it appeared in the new tactical defense-in-depth doctrine in 1917.

Clausewitz’s flexible defense concept is similar to the “luring the enemy in deep” strategy practiced by the Red Army during the defense of the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi

Soviets. The “luring the enemy in deep” strategy entailed first provoking GMD units to pursue Red Army units, then allowing enemy forces to advance into the interior of the base area all the while harassing them with guerrilla forces. As the enemy continued its advance and became progressively exhausted, Red Army units could choose a favorable opportunity to concentrate their forces against isolated enemy units and then launch counterattacks to defeat individual adversary forces in succession.831 While there is no

829 Wallach, 24, 166-167. For the relevant text on flexible defense see Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 370-371, 469-478. Interestingly, Zhu’s mentor Cai E, in his own military works, had advocated a flexible defense strategy similar to Clausewitz. In his 1911 Zeng Hu zhibing yulu (Quotations of Zeng and Hu Regarding the Administration of the Armed Forces) Cai E wrote that, “China should primarily take a delaying resistance and retrograde defensive strategy to preserve its own forces while luring the enemy in deep. When the enemy is exhausted and does not have enough force to support itself, China can wipe it out with one strike.” Cai E concluded by comparing this concept to the successful Russian strategy that destroyed Napoleon’s army in 1812, and that this should serve as a lesson for China. Tien, 131-134. Cai E, Cai E Ji, 81, 83-84. 830 Wallach, 167. 831 For a succinct summary of the Red Army’s “luring the enemy in deep” concept, see the September 1932 telegram sent to the Red Fourth Front Army that was originally attributed to Mao but is now attributed to Zhu De. See “Proposal as to How the Fourth Front Army Can Smash the Fourth “Encirclement and Suppression,”” (September 1932), in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:259-260; or “Dui hong si fang mian jun

374 direct evidence that Zhu had read Clausewitz, given Clausewitz’s prominence in

European military theory, it seems likely that Zhu would have included his work among the books he collected, or at the very least learned about his theories as he was tutored by former German officers on German military theory.

Combined Use of Interior and Exterior Lines

In his solution to the problem of successfully fighting a two-front war against

both Russia and France, Schlieffen developed a plan that would utilize interior lines at

the strategic level and exterior lines at the operational and tactical levels. In the famous

Schlieffen Plan, the German army would exploit interior lines at the strategic level to first

move its forces west to attack and eliminate the French army, then shift German forces

rapidly to the east to deal with the more slowly mobilizing Russian army. At the

operational and tactical level, the German army would use exterior lines to encircle and

annihilate enemy forces.832 This concept also bears some similarities to Red Army

operations in defense of the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi base areas, where they took

advantage of their interior lines to fend off offensives by numerically superior GMD

forces. In his tactical principles, Zhu described how to defend against enemy units

attempting to envelope a Red Army force: “If our forces are caught in a pincer attack or

encircled by several enemy columns and want to launch an assault against one of these

columns, they should seek a wide interior arc where they can maneuver easily, and take

advantage of strategically important terrain to pin down the other columns. Otherwise it

fensui di si ci “wei jiao” de jianyi,” in Zhu De Junshi wenxuan, 92. See also the introductory essay by Stuart R. Schram in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:xxx. 832 Wallach, 47.

375 would be more advantageous to attack the exposed wing and rear of a single enemy

column.”833

The pervasiveness of Schlieffen’s ideas in the pre-World War One German army

can be seen in the army’s instructional manuals. In the January 1910 manual Principles

of Higher Troop Conduct (Grundzuge der hoheren Truppenfuhrung vom 1), the influence

of Schlieffen’s concepts were apparent. The manual asserted that German forces would

likely be at a numerical and materiel disadvantage compared to its future adversaries. To

compensate, German forces would have to rely on their superior leadership and quality of

troops. In conducting operations, the primary objective was the annihilation of the

enemy force, which could be accomplished through the envelopment and encirclement of

the enemy.834 During the World War One campaigns of the German army, despite

changing operational and tactical circumstances, the pre-1914 training in Schlieffen-style

warfare was hard for German units to give up. When German units did achieve

breakthroughs of the enemy line, it was often hard to prevent them from trying to wheel inward too soon to envelop the enemy flank when they should have kept on moving to exploit the penetration.835

The Revolution in Infantry Tactics

As World War One progressed, one area of military operations changed

drastically to compensate for the new circumstances found on the battlefield. Significant

changes to infantry tactics occurred from 1914 to 1918 that responded to problems posed

by increases in firepower and shortfalls in mobility that presented new challenges for

833 Zhu, “Some Basic Principles Concerning Tactics,” (1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 26; or “Tan ji ge zhanshu de jiben yuanze,” in Zhu De xuanji, 16. 834 Wallach, 78-79. Very similar concepts can be seen in the previously discussed tactical theories found in the Caofa, Cai E’s Zeng Hu Zhi bing yu lu, and the tactics practiced by various warlord armies.

376 both defensive and offensive operations. In 1914, infantry attacked by battalions and

companies in line with several paces between each soldier. By 1918, infantry

organization and tactics were radically different.836 Now infantry operations were characterized by increased dispersion and depth, with the main tactical units shifting from battalions and companies down to platoons and squads, along with an accompanying shift from linear to non-linear formations and an emphasis on infiltration-style offensive tactics and defense in depth. The tactical innovations of the German army are best known, but the armies of all the belligerents also changed their tactical doctrines. The

German innovations in tactics during 1917-18 responded to specific problems faced by the German army in its defensive and offensive operations, such as how to preserve its forces when on the defensive against superior numbers of Allied artillery or the difficulties units faced in exploiting the initial breakthrough during an offensive.

In developing a new infantry tactical doctrine, the German army’s success owed

much to the methodology whereby tactical concepts were not isolated in the realm of

theory but were tested against actual battlefield circumstances where they would be used.

This approach was a natural outgrowth of the German army’s views on the nature of

warfare and the close interrelationship between theory and practice. The German army

was aware that any tactical changes required extensive training efforts, and through a

dedication to training the Germans would be able to successfully implement the new

doctrine. The Germans viewed tactical principles as guides for the exercise of sound

judgment in different situations, not a formula to obviate the need for sound judgment. A

tactician applied force utilizing his own judgment according to the specific conditions of

835 Wallach, 166. 836 Griffith, 95-96.

377 the enemy, terrain, his own forces, and his mission. The development of tactical principles was a corporate and collective effort. New doctrine only emerged after army headquarters had first solicited ideas and combat experiences from units and individuals.

The process for the development of doctrine was inductive and so was the application of new doctrine, which was not allowed to become dogma. For the German army, all tactical solutions were tentative and they always viewed doctrine with an air of uncertainty, which fostered more mental flexibility and curiosity.837 The important point here is the close interaction between theory and practice, where one constantly informs the other. For the German army, a superior commander of troops should be a mixture of both the theorist and practical soldier. General Friedrich von Bernhardi’s view was that

“the pure practitioner of war is bound for failure as much as the pure theorist,” because both lack a sense of reality.838

In his general approach to military operations and training, Zhu also stressed the need for experience and theory to inform one another, and to be constantly alert for changes in the military situation or the nature of warfare, to adapt appropriately, and not to be wedded to outmoded concepts or ideas. As part of the operations planning system,

Zhu instituted a lessons-learned process that centered on holding meetings involving officers and men at all levels of the army to critique past operations, criticize the conduct of commanders, discuss what could be improved, and how to best plan for the next operation. At post-battle conferences officers and men could come together to analyze and critique the conduct of recent battles and campaigns or the planning for future

837 Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1981), 55-58. 838 Wallach, 8.

378 operations. Zhu considered these conferences of high educational and technical value to

the Red Army and had the results of these conferences published as pamphlets and study material for soldiers.839

In developing a new tactical doctrine, the German army did not seek a solution through technological innovation, but instead chose to accomplish an offensive action with existing combat means in a carefully coordinated attack that relied on surprise. In the new German doctrine, there was a close connection tactically between offensive action and the defensive counterattack. Attacks or counterattacks would strike deeply into the enemy, with a focus on disruption of enemy forces and communications. The emphasis in the new doctrine was to keep the enemy off balance, to launch continuous attacks, and retain the initiative.840 The new German defensive and offensive tactical

principles were based on the total depth of the battlefield and the engagement of the total

enemy force. It did not focus on the forward edge of the battle area and did away with

the view that every inch of defended space must not be given up. Instead, under the new

defensive doctrine, the enemy was allowed to penetrate the defended space. The deeper

the enemy advanced the weaker they would become, while the defenders would preserve

themselves and prepare to launch a counterattack. Under the new offensive principles,

German units did not focus on destroying all enemy forces in the initial area of contact;

they instead utilized firepower and movement in a complementary way to suddenly attack

the entire defending enemy force. Under these defensive and offensive principles enemy

forces were the primary objective, not the capture and occupation of ground.841 The aim

of both defensive and offensive tactics was to achieve surprise over the enemy, deprive

839 Smedley, 292. 840 Lupfer, 41.

379 the enemy of artillery support, and surround enemy troop positions so they could be eliminated in detail.842 Similarly, the main task of the Red Army’s regular units was to seek out and annihilate enemy forces, use envelopment tactics, and follow a doctrine that emphasized mobility and surprise. Likewise the Red Army generally did not focus on occupying and defending ground.843

On the offensive, the German infantry spearheading the attack was organized in- depth and relied on speed and depth of movement to safeguard its flanks and rear. These new tactics were termed “infiltration tactics.”844 Infantry in the attack used pincer- like tactics that would envelop the enemy’s flanks and rear, with the objective being to penetrate enemy positions in depth at the initial assault and surround enemy strong points with small elite groups armed with machine guns, grenades, and mortars. These small groups relied on decentralized initiative with their only orders to keep moving forward.

A second echelon of conventional infantry units would follow these specialized groups to eliminate those cut off enemy positions.845 For an illustration of how this offensive concept would work, see Figure 14.

For the spearhead of both offensive and defensive operations, the Germans relied on a new type of infantry unit known as “storm troopers,” who were organized to fight in small groups. In an offensive, groups of storm troopers would skirmish forward and try to infiltrate an enemy position rather than attack it directly. In defensive operations, storm troopers would act as counterattack units in support of a dispersed web of small

841 Ibid., 57. 842 Griffith, 100. 843 Refer back to Chapter 1, especially the section on Red Army doctrine and Zhu’s 1932 telegram to the Fourth Front Army. See “Proposal as to How the Fourth Front Army Can Smash the Fourth ‘Encirclement and Suppression,’” (September 1932), in Mao’s Road to Power, 4:259-260; or “Dui hong si fang mian jun fensui di si ci “wei jiao” de jianyi,” in Zhu De Junshi wenxuan, 92. Averill, 211. 844 Lupfer, 42.

380 strongpoints. Storm troopers were infantry units that could fight their own way forward using their own organic weapons. In this type of infantry combat, the hand grenade replaced the bayonet as the ideal close-quarter weapon.846

It should also be pointed out that innovations in infantry tactics were not unique to the German army by the end of World War One. Allied armies also developed new tactics in response to combat experience on the Western Front. These new Allied infantry tactics also emphasized envelopment and encirclement of enemy positions by small units, either platoons or companies. These units would utilize non-linear fire and movement tactics to encircle enemy positions. Infantry units would no longer use just

845 Griffith, 100-101. English and Gudmundsson, 26, 37, 40-41. 846 Griffith, 96.

381 rifles and bayonets, but would now use a combination of weapons, such as hand

grenades, light machine guns, and rifle grenades. 847 See Figure 15 illustrating how an

infantry platoon would launch an attack to envelope both flanks of an enemy position.

The deployment of an infantry platoon undertaking such an attack now resembled a “V” like formation rather than a linear firing line formation that had been used up to 1914 to launch an infantry assault. Compare the new infantry tactics illustrated in Figures 14 and

15 to the diagram of a late nineteenth-century infantry attack concept in Chapter 2 on

Zhu’s “Early Life and Education.” While there is no evidence that Zhu was influenced

directly by knowledge about innovations that occurred on the Allies’ side, to the extent

847 For an example of new Allied infantry tactical concepts, see Major Donald M. McRae, Offensive Fighting (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1918), 131, 144. This book is a compilation of a series

382 that these developments would have been commonly known, if not directly mirrored, in the German army makes it fairly certain that Zhu would have known about them.

In November 1927 after the failure of the Nanchang Uprising, Zhu undertook the retraining and consolidation of his remaining forces. Zhu conducted daily military training classes where new tactical questions were explored, such as how to switch between large to small-scale warfare (i.e., guerrilla warfare), and how to change from fighting in linear formations in combat to an inverted “V” formation (“ren” zi in the

Chinese text).848 A “V” like tactical formation was more effective in enveloping an enemy unit’s flanks and rear and seems to indicate Zhu’s knowledge of new infantry tactical concepts developed near the end of World War One. Obviously, Zhu believed that the tactical training his units had received under the National Revolutionary Army

(NRA) was inadequate and more advanced tactical principles needed to be taught.

During the southern Hunan uprising at the battle of Pingshi, Zhu was dismissive of the older linear tactical style used by the GMD commander. This commander deployed his six regiments in a single-line battle formation, which allowed Zhu’s force to easily defeat them in a piecemeal fashion.849

of lectures for junior officers on small unit (platoon) tactics published in 1918. See especially Chapter 6 “Infantry in Attack.” 848 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 400; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 394-395. 849 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962) in Selected Works of Zhu De, 403; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De Xuanji, 397. The pre-1914 character of most Chinese forces was apparent to foreign military advisers sent to China during the 1920’s. The antiquated nature of even NRA units was commented upon by the Russian advisers sent to train the GMD’s military forces in 1925-26. In an assessment of the NRA, a Soviet adviser commented that the army must be trained in accordance with its armaments and the armaments of its probable adversaries. Because of the inadequacies in arms, equipment, and supporting and auxiliary units, the training of the NRA, “…must be conducted approximately according to the same standards as the training of the European armies before the great war, adding to it the political instruction.” See C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien- ying How, Document 29, “The Training of the National Revolutionary Army for War,” 623. The adviser goes on to comment on the primitive level of training and lack of proper military instruction, the inertness of older officers and the ignorance and inexperience of junior officers. In addition, “the drill regulations

383 To implement these tactics effectively there were new requirements for junior

officers and soldiers. New psychological conditioning was needed to allow soldiers to

operate in small units that required more lower-level initiative and motivation. In order

to deal with these more difficult combat conditions, the individual quality of each soldier

needed to be improved. As individual soldiers became more dispersed, each man would

need to possess higher standards of morale and training to remain effective. Military

thinkers by the end of World War One believed that the key to offensive warfare was the use of infiltration tactics under NCO initiative. For defense, it was a flexible defense in depth with strong local counterattack units. To achieve this, a smaller highly trained elite force was better than a large force of conscripts. Only these types of soldiers would be able to continue to maneuver, retain an aggressive military spirit, and know how to use a combination of modern infantry weapons effectively. Many military thinkers believed that man was the most important element, with technology in a secondary role.850 Even though the new German doctrine emphasized the close cooperation between infantry and artillery, the doctrine reminded infantrymen that success ultimately depended on their own skills and their responsibility to close with the enemy.851

Aware of these new requirements, Zhu emphasized a high level of individualized

training for officers and men, as well as instilling motivation and esprit de corps. One of

the more effective ways to raise troop morale and increase confidence, Zhu found, was to

hold mass meetings of officers and men to explain the current military and political

and the textbooks on tactics which the army uses are extracts compiled from the German and Japanese regulations which were used in those armies in the beginning of this century and which do not agree with the methods of modern warfare.” See C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Document 29, “The Training of the National Revolutionary Army for War,” 623. 850 Griffith, 101-103. 851 Lupfer, 42.

384 situation, and the tasks of the revolution that needed to be accomplished.852 Zhu used

regular mass meetings to explain the overall situation to his soldiers, why they were

fighting, the purpose of an impending operation, and to ensure that everyone would know

the overall plan and their roles in it. This, Zhu found, would give everyone a sense of

purpose and increase their motivation in battle.853 Ultimately, Zhu believed with the

right revolutionary spirit and determination, Red Army forces could overcome a

numerically and materially superior enemy.

These new infantry tactics were written about and assessed in the German army’s

historical studies of World War One operations immediately after the war. Zhu may have

either seen them or was briefed on them. These studies validated the success of the new

‘infiltration” tactics, which the German army viewed as a logical application of

traditional military principles to new weapons to create flexible tactics of fire and

movement. The assessment concluded that the reason why German forces, despite

tactical successes, were not able to achieve strategic breakthroughs was that they lacked

battlefield mobility to exploit their tactical achievements.854

Hindenburg and Mackensen

Through his study of World War One and the German army, Zhu came to admire the German generals Paul von Hindenburg and August von Mackensen, referring to the latter as “a German military expert in maneuvering warfare.”855 Paul von Hindenburg

(1847-1934), is best known for his victory at the battle of Tannenberg in August 1914 in

East Prussia, where he commanded the German Eighth Army and inflicted defeats on the

852 Zhu, “From the Nanchang Uprising to the Jinggang Mountains,” (June 1962), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 400; or “Cong Nanchang qiyi dao shang Jinggangshan,” in Zhu De xuanji, 394. 853 Smedley, 240-241. 854 Dupuy, 213-214.

385 numerically superior Russian First and Second Armies. German forces were able to outmaneuver and outflank the slower and less mobile Russian armies, and at Tannenberg they encircled and annihilated of the Russian Second Army.856 Zhu was probably impressed by Hindenburg’s command of an outnumbered German Eighth Army defending East Prussia against two converging Russian armies from the east and south.

Hindenburg used the German army’s superior mobility to fight a defensive campaign offensively by exploiting interior lines to first check the Russian First Army offensive from the east, then rapidly redeploy German forces southward to encircle and annihilate the Russian Second Army advancing from the south at Tannenberg. After the Russian

Second Army’s annihilation, German forces were then redeployed to the north to finally defeat the Russian First Army. Hindenburg was able to defeat numerically superior

Russian forces in succession before they could converge and execute an envelopment of the German Eighth Army. The battle of Tannenberg demonstrated the German army’s attributes of superior mobility, flexibility, and improvisation that enabled German forces to execute a battle of encirclement and annihilation against numerically superior foes. In

November 1914, Hindenburg was named commander in chief of all German forces on the

Eastern Front where he successfully oversaw offensives against Russia using mobile warfare.857

855 Wales, 121. 856 William J. Astore and Dennis E. Showalter, Hindenburg: Icon of German Militarism (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005) 19-20. 857 Wallach, 155-158. Astore and Showalter, 26-27. The battle of Tannenberg was quickly mythologized by the German public and made Hindenburg a national hero with his own cult of personality. See Astore and Showalter, 20, 22. The 1914 defense of East Prussia was seen by the German army as an exemplary demonstration of the Schlieffen concept of using interior lines at the strategic level in a defensive strategy while utilizing exterior lines at the operational and tactical levels offensively to achieve the envelopment and annihilation of an enemy force.

386 By August 1916, Hindenburg was appointed Chief of the General Staff and responsible for overseeing the operations of all German forces in the war.858 In early

1917, Hindenburg oversaw the build-up of German defensive capabilities in the west to prepare for the anticipated Anglo-French spring offensive of 1917. Many agree that the most astute decision by Hindenburg was to shorten the German lines on the Western

Front by withdrawing German forces secretly from the front line and redeploying them to a “prebuilt and elastic system of defense in depth” in February 1917. This new defensive line was known as the Siegfried Line to the Germans and the Hindenburg Line to the

Allies. This skillful withdrawal was much praised at the time and allowed the Germans to trade space for time and avoid incurring heavy losses from the initial assault of the

Allied spring offensive.859

General August von Mackensen (1849-1945), commanded German and multinational army groups on the Eastern Front against the Russians, Serbs, and

Rumanians. Known for fully utilizing the superior mobility of German forces,

Mackensen is best remembered for the Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive in May 1915, where his German 11th Army broke through the Russian front line and recaptured Galicia from the Russians, advanced 200 miles, inflicted 300,000 Russian casualties, and conquered most of Poland.860 Mackensen was also known for the defeat of Rumania when it entered the war at the end of August 1916 on the side of the Allies. The war lasted only

858 Astore and Showalter, 38. 859 Ibid., 43-44. 860 Astore and Showalter, 32. Dupuy, 162.

387 four months and ended in the total defeat of Rumania with Mackensen’s capture of

Bucharest in December 1916. For this campaign he was promoted to field marshal.861

That Zhu De would later think it important to relate his appreciation for

Hindenburg and Mackensen during his studies in Germany must be taken as proof that he

took lessons away from what he learned about their careers and achievements. As in the case of Ferdinand Foch, however, Zhu left behind no direct evidence of the specific ways

in which his admiration for Hindenburg and Mackensen may have influenced his own

thought or behavior. Nonetheless, it is fairly clear that what he would have learned about

these men would have reinforced many of the other lessons he gained from his German

experience.

There is, in the end, considerable circumstantial evidence that Zhu was very

familiar with recent German military history and the operations and evolution of the

German army during World War One. This makes it fairly easy to identify the roots of

many later Red Army practices in what Zhu learned from his German experience.

German army concepts that had parallels in later Red Army practices include the German army’s flexible style of command and use of mission tactics, the collaborative approach to the development of new doctrine, and the emphasis on the close interaction between theory and practice. At the operational and tactical levels of warfare, the Red Army under Zhu showed a marked preference for mobile/offensive warfare leading to battles of envelopment and annihilation. In defending Communist base areas, the Red Army also implemented defensive operations similar to German concepts on flexible defense and defense in depth. In addition, at the very beginning of the Red Army, Zhu introduced

861 Astore and Showalter, 43. Mackensen has been identified as a disciple of Schlieffen and a member of the Schlieffen school during and after the war. See Wallach, 210.

388 new concepts that reflected the innovations in infantry tactics that had occurred by the end of World War One, especially the dramatic shift from linear to non-linear tactics.862

In the end, Zhu’s apparently profitable experience in Germany would be cut short.

While Zhu was living in Berlin during 1924-25, the German government prohibited

Chinese citizens from actively participating in public events. They could attend but not speak at these meetings; if they did so they faced arrest and deportation. Zhu at this time was actively helping to organize Chinese student and German working class demonstrations.863 In 1925, Zhu was arrested twice by the German police for his political activities. His first arrest was for attending the World Student Congress, while his second arrest was for his activities supporting the May Thirtieth Movement at a CCP sponsored conference. After the second arrest, the Chinese Embassy in Berlin, knowing that Zhu was a member of the CCP, had Zhu deported from Germany.864 Zhu and other deported Chinese Communists received assistance from a Communist-front organization to travel to the Soviet Union. Around July 1925, Zhu left for the Soviet Union.865 At the

862 In addition to its likely indirect influence on the Red Army, the post World War One German army’s influence was most directly felt in China by the GMD military after 1927, when Soviet military advisers were expelled. In 1928, Jiang Jieshi invited Germany to send military experts to advise the Nationalist Army that resulted in the establishment of a German military mission that advised the Nationalist military from 1928-38. The most famous of these advisers was General Hans von Seeckt, architect of Germany’s post World War One army, the Reichswehr, a member of the Schlieffen school, and the former chief of staff to General Mackensen during the war. In addition, Colonel Max Bauer was also an adviser, who had been one of the chief developers of the German defense in depth concept used during 1917-18. For additional information on the role of German military advisers in the development of the Nationalist Army see F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China 1924-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); John P. Fox, “Max Bauer: Chiang Kai-Shek’s First German Military Adviser,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 5, no. 4 (1970), 21-44; Billie K. Walsh, “The German Military Mission in China, 1928-38,” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 46, no. 3 (September, 1974), 502-513; and Donald S. Sutton, “German Advice and Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy,” The China Quarterly, no. 91, (September, 1982), 386-410. For a more general study of German influence on China, see William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). 863 Smedley, 161. 864 Wales, 118. Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 91. 865 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 91, 94.

389 time of his departure from Berlin, Zhu made sure to ship back to China three large cases of books, maps, and other documents he had acquired while in Germany.866

Experience in the Soviet Union 1925 - 1926

It is already well known that the Russian military influenced the early development of the Chinese Red Army. Many senior Red Army leaders had received military training in Russia or from Russian military advisers at the GMD’s Huangpu

Military Academy during the mid 1920s.867 When Zhu embarked on his journey to the

USSR from Germany, he was following in the footsteps of many Chinese revolutionaries seeking assistance from the new Communist regime in Russia.868 By 1921, the Soviet

Union had become the primary training ground for Chinese revolutionaries and Chinese visitors often remained in the USSR for formal leadership training. Up to 1925, the primary institution for training Chinese Communist Party members was the Communist

866 Guo, 196. Smedley, 164. 867 See the following sources for Russian military influence on Chinese Communist military leadership, Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 472-479; C. Martin Wilbur, “A Different Kind of Missionary: Soviet Advisers in China in the 1920’s,” Chinese Studies in History 21, no. 4 (Summer 1988): 3-31; and Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 1920-1927. This last work also contains an extensive set of Russian documents translated into English that cover Soviet adviser activities in China, including reports by Soviet military advisers on the training of the NRA, the characteristics of the Chinese military forces they had contact with, and the conduct of the Northern Expedition. 868 Neither Smedley nor Wales mentions Zhu’s year-long study and military training in Moscow. They only mention that Zhu traveled through the USSR on his way home to China in 1926. In his interviews with both Smedley and Wales concerning his time in Europe, Zhu falsified the timeline for his stay in Germany to conceal that he had studied for a year in Moscow. Smedley’s account includes a couple of paragraphs concerning Zhu’s training in the systematic analysis of economic and political data, along with instruction in statistics. This instruction, Zhu told Smedley, took place in the fall of 1925 in Germany. The location of this instruction, however, was incorrect, for later accounts by Zhu show that he had left for the USSR in July of 1925, and this instruction had actually occurred in Moscow. Compare the account in Smedley, 162 to the account in Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 95. Zhu also told Smedley that in mid June 1926 he attended a mass meeting on China in Berlin and this is when he was arrested and deported, subsequently taking a train through Russia back to China. Zhu, however, was really in Moscow at that time. See Smedley, 164. As for Nym Wales, Zhu was vague regarding his whereabouts in 1925-26 and he merely stated that he traveled around Europe and went to the USSR, then returned to China in 1926. See Wales, 118. Given the situation in 1937 when the CCP was making concerted efforts to garner foreign sympathy and assistance, especially from the United States, Zhu may have wanted to conceal from his American interviewers that he had studied in the USSR for a year and received Russian military training, which may have detracted from the image of an independent, homegrown Chinese Communist movement.

390 University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow, which had been founded in 1921 and

was operated under the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Department of the Executive

Committee of the Comintern.869 Indeed, a significant portion of Chinese revolutionaries

during the 1920s to the 1940s, from both the CCP and GMD, received political education

in the USSR. Many officers from the Chinese Red Army and the NRA also attended

Soviet military schools. Of the 118 top CCP leaders who had studied overseas, seventy

percent had studied in the Soviet Union, with Zhu De listed as having studied at the

University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow.870

The primary objective for the Russians in educating Chinese Communist students

in the USSR was to foster a commitment to Marxist-Leninism, develop and improve their

party-political work, and ensure their devotion and loyalty to the Russian Communist

Party and its leaders. Chinese students also received ideological training and indoctrination from their Russian teachers, but this would often lead to Chinese students being drawn into the ideological conflicts between various Bolshevik factions during the

1920s.871 Course work was conveyed to the Chinese students through interpreters,

usually Chinese students who knew Russian, which enabled Chinese students with weak

Russian language skills to attend lectures. These language problems, however, slowed

the educational process and a significant amount of the Chinese students’ time was taken

up with Russian language courses.872 One of Zhu’s fellow students related that the

instructional method was for a Russian military expert to explain something that would

869 Jane L. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars: The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920-45 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976), 30, 32. 870 Alexander Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution 1919-1927 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 169-170. 871 Pantsov, 175, 177. 872 Price, 33.

391 then be translated into Chinese, which he found to be a very time-consuming method.873

The lack of Chinese language instructional materials was a continued hindrance to the

teaching process at the University of the Toilers of the East and was not adequately

addressed until 1927, the year after Zhu had left Moscow.874

As part of the curriculum, guest lecturers were invited to address the students and frequently these lecturers were prominent Soviet Communist leaders, such as Stalin or

Trotsky. In addition, group study among the students was encouraged. To address the

Marxist concern with the interconnection between theory and practice, the excursion method of instruction was introduced, with students participating in work outside the university, such as Communist Party work in local factories. Students would also participate in military training as part of the regular curriculum, in order to develop not only functionaries of a socialist state but also active revolutionaries.875

Because the faculty at these various training schools was staffed by top

Communist intellectuals, these schools became ideological battlegrounds between different Russian Communist Party factions. This had an effect on the Chinese students and what they were taught on Communist theory.876 The curriculum at these schools was

significantly influenced by the ongoing ideological and political debates and conflicts

within the Russian Communist Party during the 1920s. Prior to 1924, Chinese students

were taught the Leninist-Trotskyist theory of world development. But with Trotsky’s

defeat in 1924 by Stalin, the course work was Stalinized with topics devoted to criticism

873 Liu Ding, “Zhu De zai Deguo de xuexi he geming huodong,” in Hua shuo Zhu De (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 36. This source is an oral history given by Liu Ding, who was a student with Zhu De in Germany and the USSR. 874 Pantsov, 173. 875 Price, 33-35. 876 Ibid., 35-36.

392 of Trotsky’s theories and new courses on Leninism based on works written by Stalin.877

This illustrates that Chinese students were not isolated from the larger political and

theoretical developments on-going within the Bolshevik elite and that Chinese students

were often drawn into these ideological debates. This raises the issue whether Chinese

students undergoing military training in Russia were also privy to the vigorous debates on

military theory then occurring within the Russian Red Army and its various military

schools.

Zhu’s Studies and Military Training 1925-26

After his arrival in the Soviet Union, Zhu attended the University of the Toilers of

the East in Moscow for several months starting in the summer of 1925. Zhu stated that he experienced an intensive period of study while in Moscow and was taught dialectical

materialism, the economic geography of China, statistics, the economic geography of the

world, mathematics, science, economics, Marxism-Leninism, and military affairs.

Besides classroom study, Zhu remembered that Chinese students were also taken on field

trips to the revolutionary museum, the history museum, and to various schools and

factories. All these trips had a great influence on Zhu and his fellow students. After a

few months, Zhu related he was selected to join a secret military training class that would

last six to seven months.878

The Bolsheviks made a significant contribution to the military training of the

Chinese Communists. The Soviet regime established special departments within Soviet

military schools especially for Chinese students and routinely organized military training

877 Pantsov, 172-173. 878 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 95.

393 for Chinese Communists visiting Moscow.879 From the mid 1920s to the 1940s, Chinese

students attended Soviet military schools in Russia, most notably the Red Army (Frunze)

Academy in Moscow and the Leningrad Military-Political Academy. What differentiated

Soviet military training from that received from Western or Japanese instructors was its

focus on political training and political controls over the military. Chinese students

receiving military training in Russia or from Russian advisers in China at the Huangpu

Academy, were exposed to the Soviet military model that emphasized political

indoctrination. Students at these schools were trained to specialize in either military or

political skills that created two categories of officers, military commanders or political

commissars.880 Some notable Chinese Red Army leaders who studied at the Soviet

(Frunze) Military Academy were Nie Rongzhen (1924-25) and Ye Ting (1925), while

Liu Bocheng (1928-30) studied at the Leningrad Military-Political Academy.881

The Russian military approach to political controls and political issues shifted

during the 1920s depending on which Bolshevik ideological faction was dominant.

Chinese students receiving military instruction between 1924 and 1926, when Zhu was a

student, were exposed to M.V. Frunze’s concept of “unified strategy,” also known as

“unified military doctrine” that was popular in the Russian military during that period.

Unified strategy stressed military involvement with civilian activities and Communist

Party control over the military through political commissars within the military chain of

command. In contrast, Chinese students trained from the late 1920s onward were

exposed to “integral strategy” derived from the theories of Boris Shaposhnikov and

Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Integral strategy emphasized professional specialization and

879 Pantsov, 166. 880 Price, 65-66.

394 military strategic and tactical imperatives, and a de-emphasis on military links to civilian

activities and political controls in the military.882 In historian Jane Price’s assessment,

those Chinese Communists exposed to formal military training tended to support those

who favored a professionalized military in the Chinese Communist movement. The

formal military training that CCP members received, whether at Huangpu Academy, at

Soviet military schools, or subsequent CCP military training programs, all emphasized

“technical skills associated with conventional military operations and respect for

professional military expertise.”883

Along with a group of approximately thirty or forty other Chinese students, Zhu

De was selected by CCP leaders in Moscow to receive military training for eight months.

Zhu was subsequently appointed the group’s leader.884 Zhu and his fellow students did

not attend a Soviet military school, but received military training through the University

of the Toilers of the East. The course of military training at this school lasted between

six to nine months and was later lengthened to a three-year military course.885 The

training itself was held in a suburb of Moscow. To instruct the Chinese students, the

Communist International chose military experts with theoretical and practical experience

in guerrilla warfare tactics. The contents of the training curriculum ranged from the mass

movement to armed insurrection and the seizure of political power.886

881 Ibid., 71. 882 Ibid., 66. 883 Ibid., 66. 884 Fang, 44. 885 Pantsov, 171. 886 Liu, 35. Zhu’s period of study in the USSR may not have originally been planned by Zhu. According to his fellow student Liu Ding, Zhu along with 50 other Chinese students were traveling through the USSR on their way back to China. The CCP central representative wanted some of these students to stay in Moscow to join a military training class. Liu Ding and Zhu De were part of the group that decided to stay to receive the training.

395 Zhu excelled at his military studies because he already understood military affairs

and could read military maps and explain them to the rest of the class. In contrast to the

time-consuming instructional method whereby a Russian military expert explained

something that would then be translated into Chinese, Zhu could very quickly explain

what was being taught and make it clear to his fellow students. At that time, the Russian

instructors possessed topographical maps of several counties in Hunan along with maps

of Moscow. They used these maps to teach their students the principles of how a small

force could fight a larger force, and how to harass and disrupt the enemy. The Russian

instructors also taught their students guerrilla warfare tactics derived from the Russian

Civil War.887 As part of this training, Zhu De received instruction in Soviet military

thought, which included the theories of Frunze and “unified military doctrine.” There is

also some indication that Zhu was familiar with the concept of “integral strategy,” but

this concept only emerged in the late 1920s after Zhu had left for China.888 Possibly Zhu

learned about “integral strategy” from CCP members who had attended Russian military

schools during the late 1920s, such as Liu Bocheng.

A fellow student, Liu Ding, remembered that Zhu grasped all of these concepts very well. Liu related that Zhu assisted in teaching the class, which was not unusual at the university where some Chinese students would give lectures and even teach courses to their fellow students. The university also promoted group study and encouraged independent study and research. Liu remembered that Zhu taught them how to attack police stations and capture their arms. He also trained them in the use of machine guns, mortars, hand grenades and bombs. In regard to tactics, the class learned how to use

887 Ibid., 36. 888 Huang, 88.

396 topography, how to protect themselves during combat, how to wipe out the enemy, how to undertake reconnaissance, and how to launch raids on the enemy. According to Liu,

Zhu was well acquainted in all these areas.889 In addition to this training, Zhu related that he, along with his fellow students, conducted military experiments with poison gas and explosives. 890

Zhu De remembered an interesting incident during his military training in

Moscow when the Russian instructor asked him how he would fight when he returned to

China. Zhu replied by quoting the principles of guerrilla warfare: “Fight when you can win, move away when you can’t win,” and “Pull the troops back to the mountains when

necessary.”891 Zhu continued by stating, “I was criticized at the time for this view. In fact, however, this is a principle of guerrilla warfare. So on this score I have played a sort of leading role.”892 While in his reminiscences he claimed that this criticism came from the Soviet instructor, in other accounts relating the same incident the Soviet instructor is seen to have praised Zhu for this answer.893 The version of the story that has the instructor praising Zhu seems more credible since the Russians were teaching their

Chinese students guerrilla warfare concepts. Also in 1925-26, the ideas of Frunze, who

889 Liu, 36. Price, 34. Liu thought Zhu had previously only had experience commanding regular troops and that Zhu learned about guerrilla warfare from the Russians, which he subsequently applied when he returned to China and joined Mao on Jinggangshan. Refer to Liu, 36. The editors of Hua shuo Zhu De were quick to footnote Liu’s statement to point out that he was in error, for Zhu was already familiar with guerrilla warfare theory prior to his training in Russia, which he had learned earlier in his life fighting the Beiyang warlords and bandits in Sichuan and Yunnan. 890 Zhu, Zhu De zishu, 95. The Russian military during the 1920’s was still interested in chemical warfare, especially Tukhachevsky, who promoted the development of the Russian chemical industry in order to support the manufacture of chemical weapons. See Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 662. 891 Zhu, “Speech at a Forum on the Writing of the History of the Red Army’s First Army Group,” (1944), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 132-133; or “Zai bian xie hong jun yi jun tuan shi zuo tan hui shang de jiang hua,” in Zhu De xuanji, 126. 892 Ibid., 133; or Ibid., 126. 893 Ibid., 132-133; or Ibid., 126. See Guo, 197, for the account that has the Soviet instructor praising Zhu.

397 was more open to the teaching of guerrilla warfare theory, were dominant in Russian military theory at that period and not Trotsky’s, who had been hostile to the idea of guerrilla warfare. It is possible that the discrepancy in Zhu’s account may have been an effort to take more personal credit for the development of guerrilla tactics, or he may have simply remembered the opposition to guerrilla tactics that was indeed found among some of the Russians he encountered.

In Zhu’s list of European military leaders whom he admired most were the Red

Army commanders of the Soviet Union, whom he considered experienced and first rate, especially General Blucher.894 Vasili Blucher (1889-1938), a Red Army commander during the Russian Civil War, was known for his successful defense of the Urals and the defeat of Admiral Kolchak, the White Russian commander. Blucher also had a direct influence on military developments in China. He was one of a group of experienced military commanders sent by the Soviet government to China in 1924 at the request of

Sun Yat-sen’s Guangzhou Revolutionary Government. In October 1924, Blucher (using the name Galin) became chief military adviser to the Chinese Nationalist revolutionary army. Blucher was in China the first time from October 1924 to July 1925, when he was forced to return to Russia for health reasons. From May 1926 to May 1927, Blucher returned to China as chief Soviet military adviser. Blucher is credited with preparing the plans for the Northern Expedition, for the successes of the first Eastern Campaign, and the victories of the Northern Expedition from July 1926 to April 1927. Blucher was very popular among the Chinese and the Nationalist military. In building the NRA, Blucher

894 Wales, 121.

398 stressed the importance of political education for officers at the Huangpu Academy and

political work in NRA units.895

Soviet Military Theory

It is likely that the Chinese students who received Russian military training also

received instruction in conventional military operations as well as guerrilla warfare. K.Y.

Voroshilov, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and Commissar for Military

and Naval Affairs from 1925 to 1934 directed that the Soviet military academies should

aim to train the Chinese students to become officers capable of commanding large-scale

military units in China.896 When Zhu studied in Moscow in 1925-26, it was during the

height of the debate over Soviet military theory within the Russian Red Army that had

been on-going since 1921. This period was probably the most intellectually creative in

Red Army history and would lead to the development of new concepts in political- military relations and operational art.897

There is considerable overlap in many areas between the Soviet military theory of

the 1920s that Zhu would have been exposed to and German military theory. Russian military theory was heavily influenced by German theory not only prior to World War

One, but also after the Russian Revolution when Russian Red Army officers studied

German military theory and were taught tactics and training by German instructors

through the clandestine German-Russian military cooperation program established in

1921. The mid-1920s was considered the most important period for this collaboration,

with the Germans providing technical training for Russian airmen, engaging in joint

895 Jan J. Solecki and C. Martin Wilbur, “Blucher’s “Grand Plan” of 1926,” The China Quarterly, no. 35 (July-September 1968): 18-20. 896 Pantsov, 166.

399 production of military equipment, and having German officers serve on the Red Army

staff.898 In addition, there are strong linkages between Marxist-Leninism’s conception of war and the ideas of the leading German military theorist of the nineteenth century, Carl

von Clausewitz. His ideas on the preeminence of politics over war was in fact more

easily assimilated by Marxist theorists and Communist militaries than by the German

army, with a distinct affinity shown by some Communist leaders with Clausewitz’s ideas

on the relationship between politics and war.899 An important segment of the senior

commanders of the Chinese Red Army received Russian military training during the

1920s and learned Russian military theory that was closely linked to German theory.

One of the issues that distinguished Russian military thought from those of Germany,

though, was the degree of political control over the military and the role of political

indoctrination. The struggle for dominance between military and political imperatives

would plague the militaries of the Soviet Union and the CCP, manifested especially in the

relationship between the Party and the army, and the role of professional military officers

in politics. Another area that distinguished the Russians from the Germans was the

development of innovative theories on the operational level of war.

Lenin was clearly the most important Bolshevik leader whose views on war and

military affairs were influenced by Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. Lenin applied

Clausewitz’s ideas on war and statecraft to Bolshevik military policy, and Lenin’s

897 Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 122. 898 Dupuy, 215-216. Rice, 666. 899 Gat, 495, 510-511. This close affinity can be traced to the common philosophical roots of both Clausewitz’s thought and Marxism in Hegelianism and the development of German historicism during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in reaction to the Enlightenment and its embrace of universal systems and principles. Clausewitz had criticized Enlightenment military thinkers by arguing that their systems and principles, erroneously regarded by them as universal, only reflected a form of war during a certain period of history.

400 interpretation of Clausewitz’s ideas formed the basis for the militarization of Marxism-

Leninism and the concept of war under the new Soviet state. While in exile in

Switzerland from 1914 to 1915, Lenin undertook a close study of Clausewitz’s On War,

and took extensive notes that indicate the changes in Lenin’s views on the conduct and

role of modern war in the politics of the socialist movement.900 In his study of

Clausewitz, Lenin focused on two themes, one being the dialectic of attack and defense;

the other being “the function of war as a political instrument, its overall dependence on

political and social conditions, and, consequently, its continuous transformation through

history.”901 Lenin used Clausewitz’s ideas to support his own conception of the nature of

World War One as a capitalist war waged by the ruling classes to promote their own

interests, to advocate the Bolshevik policy of ending Russian participation in the war in

1917, and to call for a strategy of withdrawing deep into Russian territory in 1918. Most

significantly, Lenin popularized Clausewitz’s concept of the relationship between politics

and war, and legitimized the study and adoption of Clausewitz’s ideas by Marxists.902

This example reminds us that there was a constant interaction in the development of military theory across national borders, and as such the influences on Zhu may not be attributed to any single source.

900 Jacob W. Kipp, “Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism 1914-1921,” Military Affairs XLVIV, no. 4 (October 1985): 186. 901 Gat, 504. 902 Gat, 503-505. For a recent Russian perspective on the influence of German military theorists, such as Clausewitz and Moltke the Elder, on Soviet thinking about war, the relationship between war and politics, strategy, and military operations, see Andrei A. Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 21-26. Kokoshin was First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation from 1992 to 97 and had been a leading Russian researcher on international security and military affairs since the 1970’s.

401 Command and Control

The pre-1914 Russian army was heavily influenced by German command and

control concepts, especially German mission-oriented tactics that emphasized lower level

commanders seizing the initiative. After the Russo-Japanese War and witnessing the

effective use of mission tactics by the Japanese army, Russian military theorists

recognized that the art of military leadership had to respond to the changes imposed by mass armed forces and industrial age warfare. They set about adapting German concepts to a Russian context, by redefining the terms “control” and “initiative.” This redefinition stressed the role of the commander in imposing order and control from above in the form of his plan of action. Initiative among subordinate commanders was subject to the limits imposed by their understanding of each of their unit’s role in the senior commander’s plan of action and the subordination of their actions to its needs. As for defining initiative, it became the application of professional skills to the continuous development of the attack in the necessary direction. The concept of control also required a feedback loop, for the senior commander could only develop his operational plan on the basis of up-to-date situation and intelligence reports.903 These pre-1914 debates influenced the

way the Russian army went to war in 1914. The Russian army in 1914 did implement the

concept of a unified supreme headquarters, or “Stavka,” and introduced an intermediary command level called a “Front” to control the operations of a group of armies in a sector of the theater of operations.904

903 Jacob W. Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art 1918-1936 (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1988), 3. Accessed via http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/fmso/kipp.htm. 904 Ibid., 4.

402 The approach to command and control by the Chinese Red Army under Zhu

showed some similarities to Russian practice in his emphasis on centralized planning and

decentralized execution. Before an operation, the higher level commander’s intent and

overall objectives for the battle would be communicated to lower level commanders; they

in turn would be given flexibility in how to achieve those objectives. As for higher level command structure, Zhu supported a centralized command structure and a top down system of military decision making. In 1930, the Chinese Red Army was reorganized with all the guerrilla and regular units organized into one system, with the main units of

the Red Army under the direct command of the Central Military Commission

(Zhongyang junwei) of the CCP Central Committee. The Central Military Commission

then issued a plan for the Red Army’s main units that reorganized them into army corps

that were subsequently redesignated as front armies. Each front army group had three

armies, with three divisions each, while a division had three regiments.905

Czarist military concepts continued to influence the development of the Soviet

Red Army after the Revolution, given that many Czarist officers joined the Bolshevik

Red Army in 1917 as military specialists. Some of these officers were prominent Czarist

military theorists who were influential in the development of Soviet Red Army military

theory, such as A. A. Svechin. These former Czarist officers helped to develop a theory

of operational art based on prewar debates and the military experience they garnered

from World War One and the Russian Civil War.906

905 Smedley, 269. Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 55. Subsequent developments in Red Army higher command included the creation in 1931 of the Central Revolutionary Military Committee to act as the high command of the Red Army, which contained staff and political affairs departments. By 1933, the staff department was redesignated as the general headquarters of the Red Army. See Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, 56. 906 Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art 1918-1936, 2, 4.

403 Lessons of the Russian Civil War

The Russian Civil War played a central role in shaping the Soviet Red Army. The

Civil War was one of maneuver because of the large scale of the geographical area

involved, the low density of forces, and economic backwardness of Russia. All of these

conditions were conducive to the development of a Russian theory of operational art.907

The focus on using the experience of the Civil War to shape the new Soviet army also took on a political tone, with Communist commanders, such as Frunze and

Tukhachevsky, emphasizing their Civil War experience that centered on maneuver and the primacy of the offensive in opposition to Trotsky, who focused on the lessons of

World War One and was critical of an overemphasis on the offensive at the expense of defense and positional warfare.908

During the Civil War, the enormous geographic areas involved and the inadequate

number of troops available made manning a continuous front impossible, which shifted

the advantage to the attacker and mobile warfare. Attackers could launch offensives that

generally broke through the front line of an adversary, and then they could turn the

defender’s position with a flanking maneuver. Since reserve forces that would be used

by the defender to contain the breakthrough were usually scarce, a breakthrough by an

attacker would generally turn into a general rout for the defender. Given the fluidity of

the front line, offensive operations could cover hundreds of kilometers. From a

geostrategic point of view, by occupying the Russian heartland, the Bolsheviks could use

interior lines with their goal to break out and extend their control over the rest of the

country. In contrast, the various White Russian armies operated on the periphery using

907 Ibid., 5. 908 Rice, 657-658.

404 exterior lines, with their goal being to penetrate the Bolshevik-controlled area and to

march to Moscow to bring down the Communist regime.909 Maneuver warfare was so

prevalent that Tukhachevsky, a former Czarist junior officer who became a Red Army commander during the Civil War, commented that it was not uncommon for operations to

sweep six hundred miles forward and six hundred miles back.910

The unique conditions of the Civil War affected the Russian Red Army’s use of

maneuver during the 1919-1920 period of the war, when the Red Army came to rely

heavily on flank attacks. In a typical operation led by Frunze, he would first pin down a

portion of an adversary’s forces with secondary attacks, than launch an attack to break

through the enemy front to allow turning movements to be launched against the enemy’s

flanks aimed at severing their lines of communication to the rear. Red commanders still

had to remind their subordinates to avoid frontal attacks and instead attack the enemy in

its flanks and rear with all available forces. In an October 1919 offensive against White

forces under Baron Peter Nikolaevich Wrangel, Red Army forces sought a decisive

action based on turning the enemy’s flanks, followed with a deep drive into the rear in

order to surround enemy forces and cut off their retreat. The Soviet commanders hoped

to achieve this with a double envelopment using two cavalry armies. Unfortunately, the

effort failed because of an inadequate number of troops in the main Soviet strike force.

The Red Army had a sound concept to attain the annihilation of an enemy force but

possessed inadequate means to carry it out. One of the key factors that increased the

909 Harrison, 85. 910 Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art 1918-1936, 7.

405 maneuverability of the Red Army was the enlargement of the cavalry arm and creation of

larger cavalry formations ranging up to entire cavalry armies.911

During his Civil War operations, Tukhachevsky combined maneuver warfare with

the concept of political subversion and class warfare as a combat multiplier. This

concept was called “the revolution from without,” and attempted to integrate

conventional military operations with insurrection in the enemy’s rear to disrupt its

military operations and war effort.912 In a similar way, Zhu’s Chinese Red Army also emphasized the use of political subversion to undermine the military effectiveness of enemy forces and the disruption of the enemy’s rear areas using guerrilla operations.

Guerrilla Warfare During the Civil War and in Early Soviet Military Thought

Partisans played a major role in some regions during the Russian Civil War,

especially in Siberia where Red partisans seriously harassed the White armies under

Admiral Kolchak. Red partisan groups operating in the eastern territories of Russia

included the Western Siberian Peasant Army and the First Peasant Army. Red partisans

were also active against Japanese forces that had intervened in the Far Eastern maritime

provinces of Russia as well as against German and Austrian forces in the Ukraine. Quite

a number of regular Russian Red Army units started off as partisan units.913 After the

Civil War, however, partisan units began to be labeled as having “partizanshchina,”

defined as “partisan spirit or guerrilla-ism” that was deemed incompatible with the

creation of a conventional Red Army. Lenin gave guerrilla warfare and partisans no

special role in the achievement of revolution, with these tactics and groups considered

911 Harrison, 104-105. 912 Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art 1918-1936, 7. 913 Ian F. W. Beckett, “The Soviet Experience” in The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, ed. Ian F. W. Beckett (London: Blandford Press, 1988), 84.

406 only as one of a number of means to be used by revolutionaries. In 1918, when Leon

Trotsky became People’s Commissar for War and Chairman of the Supreme Military

Soviet, he wrote that guerrilla warfare was a tactic of the weak and that it promoted

attitudes that undermined centralized authority. Trotsky believed that once workers had

seized the power of the state, then a regular army should be established.914 Similarly,

wariness of partisans and the tendency toward “guerrilla-ism” was also a concern for

Zhu, especially in enforcing discipline and maintaining centralized control over

Communist military forces.915

Trotsky’s dismissal of partisan warfare derived from his model for the

development of an army to protect the new Bolshevik state. Trotsky believed that the

USSR needed an effective conventional army given the adversaries they faced in the

White Russians and the capitalist states. This belief would lead Trotsky to rely on Czarist

military specialists to create, train, and lead a regular Red Army during the Civil War.

By the end of the Civil War, one third of all Red Army officers were former Czarist

officers, some even of general officer rank. For these reasons, Trotsky was criticized by left wing advocates of partisan warfare and those who believed that Trotsky had relied too heavily on Czarist military specialists who could undermine the revolution.916

By the mid-1920s, the role of partisan warfare had become a small part of the

larger debate between Trotsky and M.V. Frunze, Trotsky’s successor as Commissar for

914 Ibid., 84. 915 Wales, 260-261. In his interviews with Nym Wales in 1937, Zhu commented on past military operations where partisans acted too independently and followed their own interests and not those of the Red Army central command. Zhu stated that, “…we also made errors of permitting wide partisan fighting without strict army discipline. This tended toward individual action not in the broad interest of the mass. It permitted some of the peasant ideology of an inclination toward revenge to remain. The mass is always more radical than the Red Army and wants more killing than we permit. Although the Red Army comes from the mass, it does not reflect this peasant tendency toward revenge because of the strict education it receives.”

407 War in 1924, over the proper characteristics and role of military forces in the new Soviet

state. Frunze advocated an offensive-minded Red Army and less reliance on former

Czarist military specialists. The debate raised issues over the partisan experience in

terms of how far maneuverability and an offensive spirit had been unique to Red Army

forces during the Civil War. Trotsky argued that White forces had also used partisans, so partisan warfare was not unique to revolutionaries. By the end of the 1920s, partisan warfare was not included as part of Soviet military theory. This was upheld by Stalin, who like Trotsky, believed that partisans were too politically independent.917 Thus in the

end the Soviets never emphasized guerrilla warfare as a primary means of promoting

revolution. A 1928 Soviet manual on insurrection devoted only one chapter to guerrilla

warfare, authored by a young Vietnamese revolutionary who had attended the University

of the Toilers of the East from 1923 to 1924, named Ho Chi Minh.918

Despite the skepticism within Russian military circles on the usefulness of

guerrilla warfare, Zhu De and his fellow students received training in guerrilla warfare

theory during their military training in Moscow. This may indicate that despite Frunze’s

death in 1925, his theories were still dominant in Russian military affairs when Zhu

received his training in 1925-26. Frunze had been more supportive of partisan warfare

then either Trotsky or Stalin, and was open to the study of partisan warfare, although it

was not emphasized in Frunze’s military thought. Relying on his experience during the

Civil War, Frunze believed in the primacy of offensive and maneuver warfare, and that the Red Army should be a regular cadre army, not a militia force. Frunze asserted that peasants were too defense minded, while proletarians were naturally offensive minded.

916 Harrison, 76-77. Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art 1918-1936, 5. 917 Beckett, 84.

408 Frunze did assert that other forms of warfare should be studied, including partisan

(peasant) warfare, but the most appropriate strategy was the offensive, which could only

be implemented by a regular cadre army based on the proletariat.919 During Frunze’s

brief tenure as Commissar for War from 1924 to 1925, he was not able to create a

completely regular Soviet Red Army. Due to financial constraints he had to rely on the

territorial militia to form a large part of the Soviet Union’s military forces, comprising up

to fifty percent of the infantry. The Russian Army of the 1920s through the 1930s was a

mixed territorial military system, with its core of regular units supplemented by a

territorial militia.920 The organization of the early Chinese Red Army was also of a

mixed nature, made up of Red Army regular units, full-time guerrilla units, and part-time

local defense detachments. Unlike the Russian model, however, the Chinese organization

was developed to wage a hybrid form of warfare that combined both conventional and

guerrilla operations.921

Putting aside the mixed attitudes that the Soviet military had toward partisan warfare, the Russian Red Army had also gained extensive counterinsurgency experience during and after the Civil War. Indeed, M.N. Tukhachevsky is considered one of the founders of modern counterinsurgency theory. His theories were based on the experience

he gained while putting down guerrilla forces in Tambov province in the Volga region

from May to July 1921 following a local peasant revolt that started in August 1920.

Frunze also had experience organizing a counterinsurgency campaign to pacify the

Basmachi insurgents in Turkestan in 1920. Tukhachevsky would also be assigned to

918 Beckett, 84-85. Pantsov, 285. 919 Rice, 655. 920 Ibid., 659. 921 Averill, 211, 213.

409 Turkestan to combat the Basmachi insurgents in the early 1920s.922 Given the numerous

local uprisings and insurgencies that plagued the outer territories of the Soviet Union

during the 1920s and 1930s, counterinsurgency theory would seem to have been far more

useful to the Russian military than ideas on how to wage a guerrilla war.

Debate over Unified Military Doctrine 1921-1925

Frunze wanted to turn the Russian Red Army into a unified organism that was

held together by a unified view on the military tasks facing the Soviet Union. The way to

achieve this was to create a “unified military doctrine.” The development of such a doctrine was advocated by Frunze and supported by the more proletarian Red

commanders like Tukhachevsky, but it was opposed by Trotsky. For Frunze, a unified

doctrine would serve as the basis for the reorganization of the Red Army after the Civil

War. Frunze wanted to develop a revolutionary, proletarian military doctrine that had

great appeal to the more class-conscious Red commanders in opposition to Trotsky and

the former Czarist military specialists. Unified doctrine, according to Frunze, was

divided into two parts, the technical and the political. The technical part focused on more

purely military activities, such as training, equipment, and organization. The political

part, which was the most important for Frunze, is derived from a state’s political system

which is determined by its dominant social class. In the case of the Soviet Union, this

would be the proletariat.923 In 1922, Frunze defined “unified military doctrine” in the

following terms: “ ‘Unified military doctrine’ comprises the teachings adopted by the

army of a particular state which establish the character of the development of the armed

forces and the methods used in combat training and troop management based on the

922 Beckett, 85, 96-97, 99. 923 Harrison, 123-124.

410 state’s prevailing views on the nature of the military missions lying before it and the

means of executing them, which reflect the class nature of the state and are determined by

the country’s level of economic development.”924

In criticizing the adoption of a unified doctrine, Trotsky argued that such a

doctrine would become dogma and undermine his more pragmatic approach to military

affairs.925 Trotsky even invoked Clausewitz in his conflict with Frunze over the

development and adoption of a unified doctrine, by arguing that such a doctrine would be

seen as some kind of universal principle that was anathema to Marxist thought. Trotsky

“rejected the notion that there was a science of war, based on eternal principles, and

ridiculed the idea that Marxism prescribed or was able to offer a set of doctrines for any

particular art or trade, military or otherwise. These, he maintained, were practical

occupations, whose major traits were ever determined by the historical conditions

prevailing in any particular period.”926 In the end, when Frunze replaced Trotsky as

Commissar for War in 1924, Frunze’s interpretation of military doctrine was imposed on the Red Army.927

The concept of a “unified military doctrine” affects the level of involvement of

the Communist Party in military affairs and the interrelationship between politics and

military strategy. While undergoing military training in Russia from 1925 to 1926, Zhu

De would have been introduced to the concept of a “unified military doctrine” then

prevalent within the Russian military. Similar debates were played out within the early

Chinese Red Army. Despite Zhu’s initial resistance to extensive CCP involvement in

924 Kokoshin, 32. 925 Harrison, 124. 926 Gat, 507-508. 927 Harrison, 125.

411 military affairs, by 1931 Zhu acknowledged the need for politics to dominate the military

and that the Chinese Red Army must be under the unconditional leadership of the CCP.

Zhu even articulated similar views to those found in Frunze’s “unified military doctrine.”

Zhu stated that, “The Red Army is a special organization of the Soviet political power. It

must not only fulfill the tasks of the workers’ and peasants’ democratic revolution but

also serve as the mainstay in the building and safeguarding of socialism.”928 Zhu

continued, “ … the Red Army’s combat effectiveness hinges not only on military

techniques but mainly on its class consciousness and its political influence – on

mobilizing the broad masses of workers and peasants to destroy the enemy troops.”929 In

regard to the role of the CCP in military affairs, Zhu asserted that only under the

leadership of the party could the army fulfill its task of launching wide-scale

revolutionary warfare in order to defeat the warlord armies, expand the Soviet movement,

develop revolutionary base areas, and establish a central government. To that end, the

Red Army military command, and especially its political training and political commissar

system, must be under the undivided leadership of the CCP. Zhu highlighted the

importance of political training for officers and soldiers, and the role of political

commissars and party representatives in the army. The purpose of political training, Zhu

stated, was to raise class consciousness, engender belief in the soldiers of the necessity of

CCP leadership, and to know what cause one was fighting for.930

928 Zhu, “How to Forge an Invincible Red Army,” (July 1931), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 15; or “Zen yang chuang zao tie de hong jun,” in Zhu De xuanji, 5-6. 929 Ibid., 16; or Ibid., 6. 930 Ibid., 11-12, 13; or Ibid., 1-2, 3. See also Stuart Schram’s introduction in Mao’s Road to Power, 3:xliii- xliv.

412 Debate over Offensive versus Defensive Strategy

The argument over whether the Soviet Red Army should emphasize offensive or

defensive operations was influenced by political considerations, the debates over

doctrine, and by how the Red Army saw itself. In Frunze’s view, the Red Army was

technologically inferior to its capitalist adversaries, but their advantage could be

mitigated by the Red Army’s inherently offensive character derived from its proletarian

class composition. Therefore, the Red Army should emphasize offensive operations.

Trotsky, on the other hand, opposed this view and argued that an offensive character was

not unique to the Red Army for the White armies also displayed it. In addition, during

the Civil War, the Red Army used strategic defense and retreat quite effectively. The

terms used by the Red Army’s military theorists to define the debate used “strategy of

destruction” for the offensive versus a “strategy of attrition” for the defensive. The

“strategy of attrition” was advocated by Svechin, where a concern with geographic points

that encompass economic and political interests became paramount. It also took into

account intermediate political, military, and economic goals. In essence, it was an

incremental defensive strategy for a prolonged war. The “strategy of destruction” was

advocated by Tukhachevsky, where a decision was sought in the shortest time possible by

the maximum use of force at a decisive point. This strategy sought the destruction of the

main forces of the enemy as the only correct solution to achieve overwhelming

victory.931

By 1926, the advocates of the “strategy of destruction” had gained dominance

within the Russian Red Army, with a focus on the offensive and a neglect of defensive concepts. These debates were also linked to views on the character of a future war and

413 whether it would be dominated by positional warfare or maneuver. During the 1920s, both Frunze and Tukhachevsky shifted their views on this issue. Initially, they both advocated the belief that maneuver would dominate a future war and opposed positional warfare. Under the auspices of Frunze, when he was chief of the Red Army staff in 1924, the Red Army issued an operational manual that emphasized offensive operations and the use of maneuver, with the objective of each operation being the destruction of the adversary’s armed forces. By 1928, Tukhachevsky began to take a more middle ground and believed that positional warfare was possible while still believing that maneuver would also play a major role. The more ideological officers still favored the offensive and the myth of proletarian offensiveness, and often clashed with other theorists who pointed out the Soviet Red Army’s limitations and possibility that the next war could be a prolonged war of attrition accompanied by positional warfare.932 By the end of the

1920s, the conclusions that the Soviet Red Army had reached on the nature of future war led it to formally adopt a “strategy of destruction,” the paramount objective of which was the defeat of enemy forces using the overwhelming application of military force, and where all other considerations were secondary.933 There were similar debates within

Zhu’s Chinese Red Army over the advantages of mobile versus positional warfare. The debate was resolved by adopting an offensive “strategy of destruction” characterized by an emphasis on maneuver that sought the destruction of enemy forces in battles of annihilation. It was believed that offensive action was the only way for a smaller force to defeat a numerically superior force. In general, the Chinese Red Army avoided a defensive “strategy of attrition” and positional warfare.

931 Harrison, 128-131. 932 Ibid., 132-134, 136-137, 138.

414 Axis of Advance in Operational Art

Under Russian operational theory, the form and direction of an offensive strike,

the axis of advance, became a matter of the highest importance to an army commander at

the operational level. In the 1920s, Soviet operational art recognized three basic forms of

offensive maneuver: movement to turn one of the enemy’s flanks, movement to turn both

flanks, and a frontal assault that results in a breakthrough. The first two forms were more

likely to be used under conditions of maneuver warfare, while the last form would be

encountered under positional warfare. According to the operational theory of the period,

the most decisive form of maneuver was a series of offensives along intersecting axes

that were designed to surround, capture, and destroy the defender in a pincer movement.

The planned encirclement should cut off not only the defending enemy units at the front

but also their reserve forces, and the attackers’ enveloping wings should be heavily

reinforced in order to carry the attack to a depth of 35 to 50 kilometers.934 In his tactical

principles, Zhu suggested a similar concept. Zhu stated that in commanding large armies or small units, in your maneuvers, “ … you should choose the principal direction of assault and concentrate your maximum strength to engage the enemy in a decisive battle.

It will be sufficient to deploy containing forces in the other directions, but you must actively attract the enemy’s attention to yourselves to facilitate an assault in the principal direction.”935

933 Ibid., 137-139. 934 Ibid., 149-150. 935 Zhu, “Some Basic Principles Concerning Tactics,” (1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 25; or “Tan ji ge zhanshu de jiben yuanze,” in Zhu De xuanji, 15.

415 Theory of Consecutive Operations

During the Civil War, the Soviet Red Army began to execute consecutive operations based on theories that had been developed by pre-World War One Russian military thinkers. Consecutive operations during the Civil War were defined by a number of mostly consecutive operational efforts in the pursuit of a larger objective. The theory on consecutive operations set out a series of offensive efforts, each punctuated by short pauses for rest and refurbishment, before the cycle of offensives would begin again. The concept of consecutive operations later became part of the foundation for Soviet Red

Army operational art.936 During the 1920s, the theory of consecutive operations was further developed in response to the realization that modern armies in a prolonged war were highly survivable, and that it was very difficult to destroy them with a single battle or operation. Therefore, the destruction of an enemy’s military force would now have to be achieved over an extended period of time, using several operations. Russian military thinkers developed a theory for ways to conduct a series of consecutive operations where each operation would succeed a previous one, and would create conditions for launching the next operation according to a larger strategic plan.937 In his tactical principles, Zhu

De likewise recognized the need for a series of consecutive battles to achieve an overall objective. Zhu cautioned that if tactical victories are not achieved, then it becomes difficult to achieve strategic objectives and that, “It should be understood that total victory is the aggregation of numerous small victories.”938

936 Harrison, 106-107. 937 Ibid., 152, 154-155. 938 Zhu, “Some Basic Principles Concerning Tactics,” (1933), in Selected Works of Zhu De, 25; or “Tan ji ge zhanshu de jiben yuanze,” in Zhu De xuanji, 15.

416 Relationship Between Theory and Practice and the Formation of Tactical Doctrine

In the formulation of tactical doctrine, the Russian approach was similar to the

Germans regarding the close interaction between theory and practice. The Chinese Red

Army used Russian military manuals that emphasized this concept, and Zhu was probably aware that German military theory had similar views on this issue. In the introduction to his tactical principles of 1933, Zhu stated that the Chinese Red Army had much practical experience but lacked a theoretical study of tactics. In order to emphasize the importance of integrating theory with practice, Zhu quoted the slogan from the Soviet

Union’s military academies: “Practice divorced from theory is like groping in the dark; theory divorced from practice is purposeless theory.”939 Zhu then stated that the Red

Army needed more theoretical study to improve its military effectiveness, and that the

tactical principles that he outlined were derived from a synthesis of military theory and

practical combat experience.940

Legacy of Russian Military Training

In regard to military training and education, CCP military leaders used the

programs at Soviet military schools and at the GMD’s Huangpu Academy as models for

the creation of Chinese Red Army training institutions and the training programs for the

Chinese Red Army leadership. The Chinese Red Army did develop some differences in

practice compared to the Russian Red Army, notably putting greater emphasis on

political work and education than the Russians. Many of the essential features of the

Soviet military model were retained by the CCP, such as political commissars, political

departments, political education for officers and men, and military participation in mass

939 Ibid., 24 or Ibid., 14. 940 Ibid., 24 or Ibid., 14.

417 mobilization. All these have their origin in the military training CCP members received from the Russians during the 1920s.941

Conclusion

In May 1926, Fang Shiliang and Zhu De left Moscow to return to China. It took them half a month by train to reach the seacoast and then take a ship to China.942 On his return to China, Zhu De joined the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern

Expedition of 1926.

Compared to the circumstantial evidence for the German army’s influence on the

Chinese Red Army, there is more direct evidence for the role the Soviet Red Army played in the development of the Chinese Red Army and its operations. Many Chinese

Red Army officers received their military training in Russia or from Soviet military advisers at the Huangpu Academy. The Chinese Red Army also continued to use Soviet army manuals to instruct their officers and men. When reviewing Chinese Red Army operations, doctrine, style of command, organization, and training one can readily see similarities with Russian and even German military concepts, although the Chinese made these concepts and theories their own and adapted them to their own circumstances. As for the influence on Zhu De’s military thought, given that Zhu already possessed a wealth of both theoretical and practical military knowledge before he arrived in Germany and

Russia, the additional training may have reinforced ideas he already had or gave him a broader base of ideas from which to choose. Indeed, many of the operational concepts that Zhu encountered while studying in Germany and Russia had been practiced to some degree by the Yunnan Army and Cai E during the wars of the early Republican period.

941 Price, 67-68. 942 Fang, 44.

418 The Yunnan Army and its officer corps were in turn the products of military reform

efforts begun under the late Qing Dynasty using Japanese and German models. In

addition, Zhu and other Chinese officers were familiar with older Chinese military traditions that they could combine with Western military methods.

In assessing the degree of influence European military thought and practice had on the Chinese Red Army, it may be useful to compare excerpts from the following two documents that reveal parallels between German and Russian military theory and Chinese

Communist military theory. The German army’s operational and tactical concepts had been encapsulated in a January 1910 instructional manual, Principles of Higher Troop

Conduct (Grundzuge der hoheren Truppenfuhrung vom 1), which stated that,

“The art of conducting great masses consists of keeping them separated for as long as possible, while operating, but to concentrate them for the decision at the right time….In a future war we can reckon neither on superiority of numbers, nor on being better equipped than the opponent. Only superior leadership and quality of troops will win the day….The utmost goal of every martial act is the annihilation of the enemy. That must always be striven at. Surrounding, or, under certain circumstances, encircling, present annihilation as the price of victory….It is therefore necessary to tie down the adversary, if one attempts to assail his flank. That is only possible by occupying his front with part of the force, while advancing the other parts for the purpose of enveloping his flank. Engaging the front may be achieved in the most decisive manner by attacking; at the same time it will certainly prevent a hostile superiority against our flank attack.”943

In December 1947, during the second Civil War against Jiang Jieshi’s Nationalist forces,

Mao Zedong presented a situation report to the Central Committee of the Communist

Party. In this report Mao listed the operational principles of the People’s Liberation

Army. Some of these operational principles were:

“Make wiping out the enemy’s effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective….In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force…, encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to

943 Wallach, 78-79.

419 wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign….Give full play to our style of fighting – courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest)….Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should not in general be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.”944

The Chinese Red Army’s operational concepts were not unique, nor exceptional. When viewed in the context of the military developments not only in China, but also in Japan and Europe during the first few decades of the twentieth century, there are many parallels and influences apparent in how the Red Army functioned and in how it conducted its military operations.

944Mao Zedong, “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” (December 25, 1947), in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), 349-350.

420 Conclusion

The main goal of this dissertation has been to use an examination of the early

career of Zhu De to provide a broader perspective and better understanding of the origin

and development of the early Chinese Red Army and ultimately why it was so successful.

The early Red Army was a complex force that reflected an equally complex strategic,

operational, and tactical heritage derived from a wide array of sources. Contrary to

popular perceptions of the early Communist military operating mainly as guerrillas, the

Red Army was, in reality, a hybrid force made up of regular troops, full-time guerrilla

units, and local part-time self-defense forces. Its hybrid nature was also reflected in its

operational style that combined conventional operations with guerrilla warfare. The

military theory and operational concepts on which the Red Army relied were equally

complex. While originating in military institutions and military theories that stretch back

to the late Qing, they were equally affected by the military transformations of the early

Republic and influenced by wider military developments in the world. It was Zhu De

who provided the bridge that spanned these different military traditions. Through his

wide-ranging and unique military experience and education, he could draw on these

different military traditions and models and apply them to the development and

operations of the Red Army. As this study has shown, Zhu De in many ways embodied

and personified the evolution of Chinese military institutions and thought from the late

Qing Dynasty through the People’s Republic of China.

By studying Zhu De’s life and military background prior to 1927, and viewing the military developments of this period through Zhu’s eyes, this study has identified the varied antecedents to and influences on the Red Army. These antecedents included not

421 only Chinese foundations but also foreign influences that have not been closely examined

before. This study also places a particular focus on the influences on the Red Army’s

operational and tactical concepts, an area that also has received scant attention in

previous literature. The lessons and experiences Zhu De derived from his service in the

Yunnan Army clearly showed the influence of traditional Chinese military theory and

practice. Nonetheless, the organization and operation of the Yunnan Army was based on

Western military models. Beyond the hybrid knowledge and experience Zhu gained from

his service in the Yunnan Army, after he left this army he was further influenced by his

study of the German and Russian armies. As commander in chief of the Red Army, Zhu

was able to apply this knowledge to the creation of a military organization that could

operate effectively from the strategic down to the tactical level of war, and could

successfully integrate its functional areas (i.e., training, command and control, intelligence, etc.) to create a military force that would be superior to the forces of its

GMD adversary. In the end, the key to the Red Army’s (and PLA) success was not the

discovery of a particular strategy or a new form of organization, but its adaptability and

organizational flexibility in the face of different conditions and changing circumstances,

where Zhu’s background would have been a great asset.

The importance of the Red Army’s organizational flexibility has not gone

unnoticed in the scholarly literature. For example, in his article on PLA military

operations in Manchuria from 1945 to 1947, Harold Tanner asserts that the Communist

victory in Manchuria was due to the PLA’s adaptability to new circumstances, where

CCP and PLA leaders developed a hybrid strategy and doctrine that combined both mobile/conventional operations and guerrilla warfare, and utilized the resources of both

422 urban and rural base areas. Application of this hybrid strategy and doctrine enabled the

PLA to take advantage of GMD weaknesses and allowed Communist forces to move from the defensive in 1946 to the offensive by 1947 and defeat GMD forces in

Manchuria. This victory in turn would provide the basis for the eventual Communist victory in the Civil War by 1949.945 One goal of this dissertation has been to show, however, that the hybrid nature of Communist military forces and doctrine was not something that developed slowly over time but was present from the very beginning of the Red Army during the Jinggangshan period in 1928. What the CCP and PLA leaders did in Manchuria in 1946-1947 was something they were already familiar with and had done before, only now applied on a much larger scale. There is no question but that the circumstances the Red Army faced on the ground, both militarily and politically, favored the development of flexible strategies. Nonetheless, the ability to think and act flexibly under those circumstances was grounded in the knowledge and experience of its commanders. The particular contribution Zhu De was able to make in this regard, due to his unique background, education, and experience explains why he would emerge as the

Red Army’s preeminent commander during the army’s initial formation.

In broader terms, this study highlights the extent to which Chinese military developments during the first decades of the twentieth century were influenced by a wide range of sources, both Chinese and foreign. There was a blending of these influences, where one did not necessarily dominate the others, with Chinese military leaders synthesizing these various domestic and foreign military theories and concepts to create new Chinese military organizations, institutions, and theories. This dissertation also

945 Harold M. Tanner, “Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947,” The Journal of Military History 67, no. 4 (October 2003): 1178, 1180, 1202-1203,

423 shows that military experience during the early Republic and “warlord” periods was more

varied than earlier English language studies of these periods have indicated, especially

taking note of the varying characters of different regional armies and the spectrum of

operations undertaken, from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency. This also

provides a context for understanding the Red Army, as former officers from various

warlord armies, as well as those trained by the Russians in either the NRA or in the

USSR itself, found their way to the Communist cause. An examination of Zhu De’s early

career provides a particularly useful lens through which to observe the range of

influences on Chinese military developments, because his own experience intersected

with the many ways in which these influences reached into the Chinese military. Indeed,

the unique range of Zhu’s education, training, and experience provides a much broader

picture that can only be glimpsed piecemeal through the careers of many less experienced officers and commanders of his time.

This dissertation has also highlighted many gaps in the English language military

history of China. There are few studies, if any, in English of individual wars during the

early Republican period. As such, this study could only hint at what was clearly a

diversity in the patterns of warfare, such as the differences between large-scale warfare

prevalent in eastern and coastal China and the more constrained nature of warfare in the

interior. More studies of individual wars, and indeed individual battles, will be needed

before a true understanding of the military history of modern China can emerge. At the

same time, another conclusion to be drawn from this work is that more studies need to be

done not only on the diversity but also on the rapid transformation in the nature of

warfare in China during the early twentieth century. These studies, in particular, need to

1220-1222. 424 assess wars at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; along with changes in military organization and culture, logistics, command and control, and the actual experience of battle. These are all topics found in traditional military history that have so far been little explored by English language studies of China’s modern military history.

It is in recognition of this deficiency that this study paid special attention to Zhu De’s own training in strategy, operations, and tactics. Even so, Zhu’s experience can illuminate only some aspects of these largely unstudied areas. Finally, this dissertation has hopefully pointed to the importance of additional study of the interaction between the

Chinese militaries of the late Qing and early Republic and military developments in the wider world during this period. In the course of his training and education, Zhu De was exposed to a broad ranging debate over the lessons of the Boer War, Russo-Japanese

War, World War One, and the Russian Civil War. No military history of modern China can be complete without an acknowledgement of the global context within which Chinese commanders operated and an understanding of how the lessons of broader military developments impacted on their own military operations.

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