FROM IMPERIAL SOLDIER TO COMMUNIST GENERAL: THE EARLY CAREER OF ZHU DE AND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE FORMATION OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY By Matthew William Russell B.A. June 1983, Northwestern University M.A. June 1991, University of California, Davis M.Phil. May 2006, The George Washington University A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 17, 2009 Dissertation directed by Edward A. McCord Associate Professor of History and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Matthew W. Russell has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of March 25, 2009. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. FROM IMPERIAL SOLDIER TO COMMUNIST GENERAL: THE EARLY CAREER OF ZHU DE AND HIS INFLUENCE ON THE FORMATION OF THE CHINESE RED ARMY Matthew William Russell Dissertation Research Committee: Edward A. McCord, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Dissertation Director Ronald H. Spector, Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member Daqing Yang, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2009 by Matthew W. Russell All rights reserved iii Dedication This work is dedicated to my mother Dorothy Diana Ing Russell and to my wife Julia Lynn Painton. iv Acknowledgements I was extremely fortunate to have Edward McCord as my adviser, teacher, and dissertation director, and I would not have been able to complete this program without his sound advice, guidance, and support. He was especially instrumental in guiding me through the difficulties of preparing a dissertation and his comments and advice were invaluable. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee Daqing Yang and Ronald Spector. In the classroom, Daqing Yang gave me insights into the development of modern Japan and the complexities of the Sino-Japanese relationship, while Ronald Spector offered deeper perspectives on military history and its interconnection with broader issues. In addition, I offer my thanks to Shawn McHale and Bruce Dickson who also consented to be on my dissertation committee. To complement my study of the Chinese past, Harry Harding gave me insightful perspectives on contemporary Chinese politics and foreign affairs. I also offer special thanks to Beverly Hong for her patient work with me on the Chinese language in all its intricacies and subtle nuances. My experience at GWU would have been less enjoyable and stimulating without my fellow Asian history doctoral students, especially Sharon Chamberlain, Yufeng Mao, Lynn Sholtis, and Terrance Rucker. They provided a supportive intellectual community that helped make the long journey bearable. Undertaking this program mid-career had its challenges and rewards. I therefore would like to thank those individuals who first encouraged me to pursue this program so many years ago, notably Michele Flournoy and Forrest Morgan. Initially, I would not have been able to commence this program while continuing with my professional career without the support of Jim Callard and Peter Faber on the Air Staff, along with Sue v Chodakewitz. In offering me the time and flexibility to complete this program, I owe special thanks to my current employer, and most especially to the support of Jim Burke and Chris Waychoff. Finally, I would not have been able to pursue this program without the support of my family. I owe a debt of thanks to my mother Dorothy Russell for her support throughout my time as a graduate student. Most importantly, this all would not have been possible without the unstinting love, support, and infinite patience of my wife Julia, who accompanied me every step of the way on my long journey. vi Abstract of Dissertation From Imperial Soldier to Communist General: The Early Career of Zhu De and His Influence on the Formation of the Chinese Red Army This dissertation examines the early career of Zhu De (1886-1976), the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Red Army, to provide a fuller perspective and better understanding of the origin and development of the early Red Army and ultimately why it was so successful. This army was a complex force that reflected an equally complex strategic, operational, and tactical heritage derived from a wide array of sources. Contrary to popular perceptions of the early Communist military operating mainly as guerrillas, the Red Army was, in reality, a hybrid force made up of regular troops, full- time guerrilla units, and local part-time self-defense forces. Its hybrid nature was also reflected in its operational style that combined conventional operations with guerrilla warfare. The military theory and operational concepts on which the Red Army relied were equally complex. While originating in military institutions and military theories that stretch back to the late Qing, they were equally affected by the military transformations of the early Chinese Republic and influenced by wider military developments in the world, especially in Japan, Germany, and Russia. By studying Zhu’s life and military background prior to 1927, this study has identified the varied antecedents to and influences on the Red Army and its operational concepts. The lessons and experiences Zhu derived from his service in the Yunnan Army from 1909 to 1922, clearly showed the influence of traditional Chinese military theory and practice, along with that of Western military models. Zhu was further influenced by his study of the German and Russian armies while he was in Europe from 1922 to 1926. It was Zhu who provided the bridge that spanned these different military traditions. vii Through his wide ranging and unique military experience and education, he could draw on these different military traditions and models and apply them to the development and operations of the Red Army. In the end, the key to the Red Army’s success was its adaptability and organizational flexibility in the face of different conditions and changing circumstances, where Zhu’s background would have been a great asset. viii Table of Contents Dedication iv Acknowledgments v Abstract of Dissertation vii Table of Contents ix List of Figures x List of Tables xi Introduction 1 Chapter 1: The Early Red Army Under Zhu De 30 Chapter 2: Early Life and Education 1886-1911 106 Chapter 3: Early Military Experience 1911-1912 183 Chapter 4: Early Campaign Experience 1912-1916 233 Chapter 5: Early Campaign Experience 1917-1922 315 Chapter 6: Experience and Education in Europe 1922-1926 355 Conclusion 421 Bibliography 426 ix List of Figures Figure 1 Lujun/xinjun Division Organization 136 Figure 2 Active Defense Tactics 147 Figure 3 Ying Deploying While Advancing Towards the Enemy 149 Figure 4 Ying Deployed for Combat 150 Figure 5 Late 19th Century Infantry Attack Concept 152 Figure 6 General Cai E 1912-1916 198 Figure 7 Map of Southern Sichuan and Northern Yunnan 236 Figure 8 Map of Central and Southeastern Yunnan 258 Figure 9 Zhu De Serving as Regimental Commander in the Huguojun 1916 276 Figure 10 Northern Army Supplies Being Transported Up the Yangzi River Rapids 280 Figure 11 Pack Horse Caravan on Mountain Path in Sichuan 1916-1917 281 Figure 12 Map of Luzhou and Naxi Area of Operations February to March 1916 296 Figure 13 Zhu De in Chengdu in Late 1916 316 Figure 14 German Offensive Infantry Tactics 1917-1918 381 Figure 15 Infantry Assault Tactics 1918: Example of Double Encirclement 382 x List of Tables Table 1 Comparative Military Unit Terminology: lujun/xinjun, Republican, Western 137 xi Introduction A key element of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) survival and success during the crucial years of 1927-1931 was the establishment of military power through the formation of the Red Army. While the importance of the Red Army’s contribution in this period is often noted, most of the English language historiography on the early Red Army tends to be very “Mao-centric,” with Mao Zedong given most credit for the development of Communist military strategy and Red Army doctrinal innovation.1 In such cases few questions are raised over how Mao could have developed such an effective fighting force and an accompanying military theory without any military background or training. There are some, though, who question this conventional narrative. Historian William Wei, for example, has argued that Mao’s role in CCP military history has been greatly exaggerated. Noting that Mao initially had little knowledge of military strategy and tactics, Wei even questions the authorship of some of Mao’s early military writings, which he suggests may actually have been the work of other military commanders. One reason why the military contributions of other Red Army leaders have been obscured until recently was because of the personality cult that developed around Mao. According to Wei, “Mao subsumed the accomplishments of other leaders so that he became a composite figure incorporating the achievements of Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, and other Communist military leaders.”2 Wei, therefore, calls for a reassessment of Mao’s role in the development of the Red Army along with studies of the contributions of other Red Army senior leaders. This dissertation is an 1 A good representative example of this Mao-centric approach can be seen in Samuel B. Griffith, II, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), 6. 2 William Wei, “”Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun”: Mao and the Red Army,” in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 231. 1 effort to address this challenge through a study of one of the most important of these leaders, Zhu De (1886-1976).