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Xorox University Microfilms 300 North Z w b Rood Ann Arbor, Michigan 4310# 75-3066

FITZPATRICK* John Steven* 1948- UNDERGROUND MINING: A CASE STUDY OF AN OCCUPATIONAL SUBCULTURE OF DANGER.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1974 Sociology, labor relations

Xerox University Microfilms,Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© 1974

JOHN STEVEN FITZPATRICK

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. UNDERGROUND MINING:

A CASE STUD* OF AN OCCUPATIONAL SUBCULTURE OF DANGER

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduato

School of the Ohio State University

By

John Steven Fitspotrick, B. A., M. A.

The Ohio S tate U nivorsity

197U

Reading Committee: Approved By

Dr. Russell Dyne3

Dr. Enrico Quarantelli

Dr. Margaret Helfrich Department of Sociology ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to extend my deepest appreciation to my professors

Dr. Russell Dynes, Dr. Enrico Quarantelli, Dr. Margaret Uelfrich, and

Dr. Hoscce Hinkle for their help, time, and consideration during my stay in graduate school ar.d in assisting mo to reach my educational goals.

My thanks also goes to t.lie members of my family: Connie, my wife; Natalie, my mother; Marcus, my father: Thomas and Eugene, my brothers for their continued help, assistance, and support in my effort to become a Doctor of Philosophy.

i i VITA

September 19, 19L6 . . . • • Born - Anaconda, Montana 1970 ...... Bachelor of Arts, University of Montana, M issoula, Montana

1971 ...... Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1971 - 197U ...... Research Associate, Disaster Research Center, The Chio State University, Colunbu3, Ohio

1973 ...... Teaching Associate, Department of Sociology, The Ohio S tate U niversity, Columbus, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS AND PAPERS

The March. 1972, Louisville, Kentucky, Chlorine Leak Threat and EvacuaTion; Observations on Community Coordination (co-authorl. Working Paper No. UU (Columbus, Ohio* D isaster Research Center, 1972).

A Social Control Organizational Perspective of Four Disturbances (co-author), Preliminary Paper No. d '(Columbus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, 1973)* Polico Department Perceptions on the Occurrences of Civil Disturbances (co-author) paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, April 12, 197U. . "Polico Department Perceptions of the Occurrences of Civil Disturbances," (co-author), Sociology and Social Research, October 197U (forthcoming).

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field? Sociology

Industrial Sociology. Professor Margaret Helfrich

Social Stratification. Professor Russell Dyne3

Social Theory. Professor Roscoe Hinkle i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... i i

VITA...... i l l

LIST OF FIGURES...... v ii

Chapter

I . INTRODUCTION ...... 1

The Problem Concepts and Definitions Significance of the Rosoorch Outline of Chaptors Notes

I I . EXISTING RESEARCH...... 15

Major Themes Theme li The Dangerous Nature of Mining os an Occupation Theme 2: The Nature of Mine Dangers: Size, Scale, and Predictability Theme 3: The Nature of Mine Dangors: Controllable? By Whom? Theme U: The Human C ontribution to Mine Dangers Theme 5: The Effoct of Occupational Danger, Particularly Mine Danger, on Human Populations Summary Notes

I I I . SETTING AND METHODS...... 36

Introduction The Occupation The S ettin g The Research Role and Methodology Data Collection, Recording, and Evaluation Data Organization and Presentation Notes

iv Chapter

IV. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MINE, . , .

Introduction The Formal Organization of the Mine Technology, Work Flow, and Mine Work Physical S tru ctu re, Technology, and Formal Organization The Union and the Government Summary Notes

V. ANALYSIS OF COLLECTBO DATA ......

Introduction Structural Analysis Normative-Valuativo System: Belief Summary Notes

VI. ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA ......

Introduction Structural Analysis Continued Normative-Valuativo System: Norms Nonnative-Valuative System: Sanctions Normative-Valuative System: Values Summary Note3

VII. ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA......

Introduction Structural Analysis Continued Position Network Summary of Structural Analysis Processual Analysis Summary of Processual Analysis Functional Analysis Summary of Functional Analysis Note3

V III. AN OCCUPATIONAL SUBCULTURE OF DANGER . . .

Introduction A Model * Generalization from the Model Summary Notes Chapter Page IX. CONCLUSION 2hh

Introduction General Summary The Research Contribution Directions for Further Research Hote3

APPENDIX

As A 01os3ary of Mining Torr.iinolgy, 257

B: Examples of Three Days of F ield Notes. 262

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 271

vi L IS T OF fTJURES

T itle ‘ ' Page

1. Formal Organizational Chart ...... 62

2. Dimensions of a Subculture...... 87

3. The Development of a S u b c u ltu re ...... 218

U. A Model of an Occupational Subculture of Danger . * • 221

$, The Formation of Occupational Subcultures of Danger in Varied Occupational Settings...... 237

v i i CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

Thia is a stud/ of how people who work in dangerous occupations adapt to the stresses, threats> losses, and injuries to which they are exposed in the course of their work. The effect of danger upon partici­ pants in an occupational context has received little systematic examina­ tion. This research, through a detailed case study of the social set­ ting of one dangerous occupation, w ill construct a theoretical framework that seeks to explain how people adapt to the dangers of their work en­ vironment.

A major precedent for this research has come from the study of natural disasters. Recently sociologists have looked more closely at the effects of natural disasters on segments of the population which are systematically subjected to these events. Hurricanes and floods have been of particular interest because of their propensity to strike fre­ quently within certain geographical boundaries. In assessing the relationship between these natural phenomena and the affected human popu­ lation, sociologists have advanced the possibility that distinct subcul­ tures may characterize human populations in areas vulnerable to natural d is a s te rs .

This idea is not without intellectual and historical precedent.

1 Writing in the mid 1800's, the English social historian, Henry Buckle,

advanced a thesis which suggested geography and geographical conditions

as being the prime force in the development and evolution of human

culture.3- More recently anthropologist Fella Keesing has stated!

The habitat will be seen as providing not a single or prime determiner of culture . . , rather, its constit­ uents - climate, physiography, resources, and so on - comprise another type or class of determinants which help to shape the behavior of groups and Individuals, and which in turn are shaped by such behavior.2

In a similar fashion, Kelville Herskovits,3 while discussing some

propositions of the theory of culture, indicated that variables from the

natural environment were significant factors in the derivation of human

c u ltu re s •

However, it was Harry Moore in an analysis of the effects of

Hurricane Carla who spelled out in more detail the relationship between

n a tu ra l d isa ste rs and c u ltu ra l phenomena through the development of the

concept "disaster culture or subculture."^ The concept includes those

adjustments, actual and potential, social, psychological, and physical

used to cope with the threats, stresses, strains, and losses caused by

recurrent exposure to disaster. A test of thi3 concept made in two

Florida communities, ono where hurricanes wero rare and the other where

such storms were a common occurrence, largely substantiated Moore's

earlier work. "The results from this study imply that in an area like

Key West where hurricanes inject some degree of awareness into the lives

of local residents, a dictinct subculture can and doesexist.Further

refinement of the disaster subculture concept has come from Wenger and

Weller.^ Their work, based on data from cities where floods have

occurred, attempted to more carefully delimit the variables in disaster subcultures, explain variations in disaster subcultures, and review some of the consequences of disaster subcultures*

To the present, the disaster subculture concept has been utilised at the community level and has referred, primarily, to the development of subcultural characteristics in the face of relatively massive natural disaster threats* There are analogous situations where a concept of this type might also be applicable. One of these might be the occupa­ tional setting. A number of people in society are engaged in occupations where danger is a frequent and reoccurring condition of the occupational context. Mining, fire fighting, police work, and construction are examples* Despite the plethora of occupational studies and the wide ranging research on stress, uncertainty, and disasters, there has been little systematic examination of the effect of occupational danger upon occupational participants. Examination of this effect is the focus of this research. The effect and relationship between occupational danger and the participants of an occupation w ill be examined using a sociological per­ spective. That is, the study w ill focus upon emergent phenomena such as norms, values, and sanctions rather than personal acts, ideas, or motives.

To study this relationship the research will examine, in detail, the social setting of a dangerous occupation. From data generated at this level, the research will delineate the content and form of the occupa­ tional subculture. If occupational danger is a sufficiently salient environm ental v a ria b le , the e ffe c ts o f th is phenomenon w ill be m anifested in the occupational subculture. It is assumed that occupational danger w ill act in a manner described by the aforementioned anthropologists and students of the disaster subculture. That is, if occupational danger is an entity of importance, its effect upon the occupational group w ill be • • made manifest in a distinctive occupational subculture.

This perspective is not without precedent. Already mentioned is the disaster subculture concept. Empirical studies of occupations add a second dimension. Students of occupations have often alluded to the idea that the effect of occupational danger upon the occupational parti­ cipants is manifested in the subcultural constructions of the work set­ ting. For example, Qouldner,? Lantz,® and Lucas? in their studies of miners have noted a generalized belief which held that certain mine dan­ gers were predictable and, thus, partially controllable from cues in the environment. Some beliefs were mythical in nature such as rats leaving a dangerous mine like a sinking ship. Other beliefs pertained more direct­ ly to knowledge of mining, geology, and so forth such as the cracking of timbers and rock indicative of cave-ins. The study by Lucas, reports of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC),10 and popular accounts of mine disasters have Indicated the presence of a strong, informal norm which demanded that all available miners free for rescue work volunteer for such duty and that they continue rescue operations until there was an accounting of all men in the mine. Lucas sayst

The Informal but sacred miners* code was a common under­ standing among all miners that.in case of a mine disaster the miners on the surface work ceaselessly at digging and clearing operations until the last man or the laBt body in the mine was fo u n d .^

The concept of subculture also fits this perspective. A subculture is defined as an "alternative and subordinate variation of culture. Its foundation is composed of the basic c u ltu re . To these are added th e 5 special adaptations of a particular g r o u p . "32 Walla c e , 13 Cohen,^ and

Arnold^ among others fortify this definition by suggesting that a sub­ culture is a product of social interaction in response to conditions re­ quiring human adjustment. As it w ill be used in this study, occupation­ al participants adjust to the problem(s) of occupational danger through social interaction. The product of this process is a distinctive occu­ pational subculture.

Again, empirical research of occupations supports this perspective.

Niederhoffer1^ has spoken of police officers being a part of a "subcul­ ture of cynicism" while Dunham and Weinberg1? have referred to a "culture of control" among mental hospital attendants. Roy's1® studies of "gold- bricking" and work restriction in a machine shop, Whyte's1? analysis of human relations in the restaurant industry, the Hawthorne studies,2° and others have used the subculture theme implicitly if not explicitly.

This study, drawing upon a backlog of industrial and occupational research, holds as a basic assumption that each occupational setting is characterised by some form of distinctive occupational subculture. The specific content and form of this subculture w ill depend upon the parameters of the interactive process, the conditions or problems re­ quiring adjustment, and the content of the larger cultural context. It is thus assumed that if danger is a variable of salience within the * « occupational setting, the participants in that setting will respond to this condition and create an occupational subculture of danger.

The concept occupational subculture of danger is analogous to that of the disaster subculture. It refers to an occupational subculture in which danger acts as a motivating condition to create a distinct complex 6 of elements that serve ss an adaptive mechanism to the threats, stresses, strains, losses, and injuries encountered by work in a hazardous occupa­ tion. As previously stated, this research is oriented to examining the relationship between occupational danger and the occupation's partici­ pants. By drawing data from an analysis of a hazardous social setting, the research w ill delineate the content of the occupational subculture.

If occupational danger is a variable of salience, it will manifest it­ self in the content and form of the occupational subculture, that is, as a complex of elements which are titled here as an occupational subculture o f danger. Five major research questions w ill guide this endeavort

Question One, Are dangerous occupations characterised h/ some type of distinctive subculture which is adaptive for the occupational participants in the face of recurrent occupational threat? This question is aimed at tying together a series of indications and research findings that sug­ gest but do not systematically detail.the existence of an occupational subculture of danger. However, this question is basically one of degree.

Existing research has suggested that it is reasonable to expect that occupational danger w ill manifest itself in the subcultural construc­ tions characterizing an occupational setting. But, is occupational dan­ ger a variable of sufficient saliency to systematically permeate the structure of an occupational subculture in a complex of interrelated sub­ cultural elements?

Question Two, What is the content of an occupational subculture of dan­ ger? That is, what are the normative and valuative elements and how are they interrelated? Question Three, How is the content of the subculture transmitted to new members of the occupation? Specifically, what is the socialization pro­ cess and how does it operate?

Question Four* How fruitful is the concept occupational subculture of danger in explaining human behavior in dangerous occupations? For exam­ ple, can accidents be explained, at least partially, utilizing this concept? Question Five, Is it possible to construct a model of an occupational subculture of danger? That is, is it possible to abstract out certain variables which seem central to the development, maintenance, and opera­

tion of an occupational subculture of danger?

In order that these questions might ultimately be answered and thus serve to explain and understand the effects of occupational danger on an occupation's participants, this research w ill analyze, through a detailed case study, one occupation significantly characterized by danger* The occupation in question is underground mining* Data collection was oriented to capturing the totality of social life within the mine set­

ting* Beliefs, norms, roles, values, status systems, etc*, of an under­ ground mine have a ll been reviewed. Production crews, the men who

routinely work in dangerous conditions, received special attention.

From this broad analysis of the mine as a social setting, the research w ill demark the content and form of the occupational subculture of the miners* At this level, should occupational danger be a variable of

salience, a distinct cooplex of subcultural elements w ill be manifest

that allow the miner and his work group to adapt to the threats of their

occupation* B

Concepts and Definitions

Five main concepts w ill be used throughout this study. Their definitions are as follows:

Miner: This tern applies to those individuals who work underground at the excavation of coal, ores, and other mineral substances ana those who work at directly providing services to facilitate the excavation process.

This definition is somewhat broBd. It includes not only those who dig out the minerals but also those individuals such as trammers,* timbermen, and muckers who facilitate the mining process by the development of un­ derground mine workings and by loading and transporting minerals, waste rock, and supplies. Excluded from the definiticn are employees of sur­ face mine operations (i.e., quarries, open pits, and strip mines) and surface personnel at underground mines such as maintenance men, supervi­ so r and office personnel, and surface labor crews.

Occupational danger: This tern refers to those threats and hazards which are encountered as part of the work process. That is, to successfully completo the tasks of the occupation the worker must face and deal with certain hazards. These dangers are part of the job, not anacillery accompaninonts which surface occasionally.

Occupational participants: This tern refers to that category of indivi­ duals who engage in a given occupation. The tem denotes an aggregate of people (a plural number of persons sharing a similar classification such

03 age, income, occupation, etc.) compared witha group (any collection of persons bound together bya distinctive set of social relations).^

In this study, the word miners is used interchangeably with occupational

*A glossary of mining terms is located in the Appendix A. participants. Specific groups within this collectivity are demarked by terms such as work group and production crew. Subculture and occupational subculture! "A subculture is an alternative and subordinate variation of culture. Its foundation is composed of the basic culture. To these are added the special adaptations of a particu­ la r g r o u p . "22 An occupational subculture is thus a complex of particular adjustments developed and sustained within the boundaries of an occupa­ tional milieu. Like its parent concept culture, a subculture is learned, derived from biological, environmental, psychological, social, and historical components of human existence, is structured, composed of different dimensions, is dynamic and variable, exhibits regularities that permit its analysis by the methods of science, is an instrument by which the individual adjusts to his environmental setting, and is an emergent phenomenon. A subculture is, to use Durkheim's term, a social fact.2^

Its genesis lies ultimately in human Interaction and its existence is sustained, modified, and changed by such activity.

Occupational subculture of dangen This is an occupational subculture which serves as an adaptive mechanism to the threats, stresses, strains, losses, and injuries encountered by work in a hazardous occupation. The element of danger is seen as a major variable which influences the development, content, and form of subcultural elements. Aa such, the subculture w ill manifest distinct, dements to deal with occupational danger - its manifestations, occurrences, and consequences. 10

Significance of the Research

While this research is grounded in a case study of one occupation, its intent is more than mere description of that occupation or the effect of occupational danger upon the participants of that occupation.

While these aspects w ill be immediately covered in the course of analy­ sis, a worthwhile endeavor in itself by contributing to the fund of knowledge regarding occupations, the research is aiming at the more global objective of explaining the effect of occupational danger on an occupation's participants. The final aspect of this research is to draw out the relevant variables and to generalize beyond the mine setting so that something might be said about human behavior in all dangerous occu­ pations and, potentially, non occupational situations characterized by danger. The model of an occupational subculture of danger is designed to serve this purpose.

The research also has a potential for application to practical prob­ lems. There is an ever present need for answers to questions related to accidents and safety, both of which have a tie to occupational danger.

Accident statistics and "industrial disasters" such as that at the Sun­ shine Mine in Kellogg, Idaho, where 91 men were k ille d in 1972 haw prompted the asking of "why," "what can be done to encourage safety," . and "how can disasters (like that at the Sunshine Mine) be prevented."

Questions of this type remain unanswered. Legislative action, safety engineering, and psychological investigations have attempted to resolve many of these issues. But, more is involved. The task requires an explanation and understanding of human behavior in a social context.

Police officers, firemen, construction workers, and miners work in a 11

social setting* Any attempt to understand the behavior of participants

..in these or other occupations be it with regard to productivity, absent­

eeism, accidents, safety, or whatever requires an understanding of

social structure, its functions and processes. This research attempts

to add to the fund of information from which answers to the aforemen­

tioned questions might be drawn* By expanding the theoretical know<-

ledge of human behavior in dangerous occupations, practitioners

concerned with problems related to accidents and safety w ill have an

enlarged and more fruitful fund of information from which to draw.

Outline of Chapters

In this opening ohapter the major intent of the research has been

outlined. That is, it will examine the effects of occupational danger

on an occupation's participants. Five major research questions were

posed to guide this examination and the major concepts were delimited

and defined. Chapter II will contain a review of existing literature

that has dealt with occupational danger and its effect on occupational

participants* Particular attention will be paid to those research

endeavors which have examined the problem from a sociological perspec­

tive and those works which have focused on miners. Inasmuch as this

study is sociological in nature and draws upon an examination of miners

as the principal data source,this emphasis seems logical. Chapter III

will contain a description of the setting of the study and discuss the

limitations and advantages therein. The chapter will also discuss the

major methodological tools by which the data were collected and how the

data are organised. 12

Chapter IV w ill contain a description of the mining environment.

Particular attention is given the social organization of the mine and is provided as a context in which to examine, evaluate, and understand the analysis of the collected data* Chapter V will initiate the analysis of the collected data with a specification of the subcultural elements under consideration. This chapter will also start a descriptive narra- tive of the structural components of the miners' occupational subculture.

Chapter VI will, continue the structural analysis. In Chapter VII the structural analysis will be completed. Processual and functionalistic perspectives^ w ill then be employed in an examination of the miners' occupational subculture. Chapter VIII w ill abstract from the previously presented data the salient variables which promote or retard the development and maintenance of an occupational subculture of danger. This effort will be made to construct a model of an occupational subculture of danger. Chapter IX w ill provide an overall summary of the research findings and suggestions for further research. 13

Notes: Chapter I

1. Nicholas S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and its Growth, 3rd edition (New York: Random House, 1967)» pp. 5U-55•

2. F e lix M. Keesing, C u ltu ral Anthropology: The Science of Custom (New York: Rinehart-and Company, 1958), p. 107. 3. Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York: Knopf, 19U6), p . 625. U. Harry E. Koore, And the Winds Blew (Austin, Texas: The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, 19 6U), p. 195.

5. Charles S. Osborn, The Disaster Culture Concopt: A Study of Elements Which Comprise the Notion of a Separate Culture which Is Unique to Hurricane Prone Areas (MA Thesis, Mississippi State College, 1970), p. 8 9. 6. Dennis E. Wengor end Jack M. Weller, Disaster Subcultures: The Cultural Residues of Community Disasters, Preliminary Paper No. 9 Columbus, Ohio: bisaster Research Center, 1973). 7. Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureoucracy (Olencoe, Illinois:. The Free Press, lS)5h)» Chapter 6-8.

8. Herman R. Lant*, Peoplo of Coal Town (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), Chapter ?•

9. Rex A. lucas, Men in Crisis (New York: Basic Books, 1969), Chapter 1. 10. National Opinion Research Center, Human Reactions in Disaster Situations, vol. 3: Report on the West Frankfort, Illinois, Mine Explosion, December 21, 1951 (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 195b), Appendix B-3* 11. Lucas, Mon In Crl3ls, p. 6.

12. Joseph S. Himes, The Study of Sociology (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 196B), p. 82.

13. Samuel E. Wallace, Skid Row as a Way of Life (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965). lb. Albert K. Cohen,< "A General Theory of Subcultures*in The Sociology of Subcultures, edited by David 0. Arnold (Berkeley, (iallfornie: Tne Olendessaiy Press, 1970), pp. 96-108. li*

15. David 0. Arnold, "A Process Model of Subcultures," in The Sociology of Subcultures, edited by David 0. Arnold (Berkeley, Californiat The Olendessary Press, 1970), pp. 112-120.

16. Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Schield; The Police in Urban Society (New York* Anchor Books,"1967). 17. H. Warron Dunham and-S. Kirson Weinberg, The Culture of the State Mental Hospital (Detroit, Michigan* Wayne State University Press, I960)•

16* Donald Roy, "Quota Restriction*-and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop," American Journal of Sociology 57 (March 1952), pp. l*27-Ul*2j "Efficiency and the Fixt Informal Intergroup Relations in a Piecework Machine Shop," American Journal of Sociology 60 (November 195U), pp. 255-^65. 19. William F. Whyte, Human Relations In the Restaurant Industry (New York* McOraw-Hill, l9l*B).

20. Fritz Roethlisberger and William Dickson, Management and the Worker (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1939)'.' 21. Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology, 3rd edition (New York* Harper and Row, 1963), p. 31* 22. Himes, The Study of Sociology, p. 62.

23. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York* The Free Press, 1968)7

2U. For further discussion of the types of sociological analysis see Marvin E. Olsen, The Process of Social Organization (New York* Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), Clapter 11*. CHAPTER I I

EXISTING RESEARCH

Introduction

In introducing this study it waa noted that the effect of occupa­ tional danger on occupational participants has not been systematically researched. This does not imply that the variable of occupational danger has been ignored but, rather, that its effect on human popula­ tions remains relatively unspecified. There is a vast array of litera­ ture that has touched upon occupational danger. Host of this literature, however, has not extensively developed the concept in the abstract.

Rather, it has focused on manifestations of occupational danger princi­ pally accidents and accident prevention.

Empirical research, particularly by sociologists, which has dealt with occupational danger has been done tangentially, usually as a part of a larger examination directed toward other research goals. Thus, the literature reveals a myriad of implications, facts, and findings related to occupational danger but, these findings are not cohesively linked'to a conceptual core.

The scattered array of research findings and a relative absence of conceptual or theoretical frameworks underpinning the existing literature, necessarily places this research in a position of having to draw on a multitude of sources to bring out themes and implications that can be

15 16 systematically examined in this work. This chapter is a review of exist­

ing research that has studied, in some fashion, the variable of occupa­

tional danger. The chapter's intent is to draw out relatively broad

themes, common in the existing research, so that these themes might be examined in the light of data collected by this study. Since this

research is using a case study of miners as its data source, the litera­

ture being reviewed is principally work that has examined mine settings.

Major Themes

A number of relatively broad nomutually exclusivo tlier.es cut

across the literature that has worked with the variable of occupational

danger, particularly in the mine setting. These themes include:

1 . a concern with the nature of mining as an occupation. Here, the major focus is on how dangerous is the occupation.

2. a concern with the nature of mine dangers. Here, the focus Is on the typo, siee, and scale of mine hazards and whether these hazards are viewed as being predict­ able or unpredictable.

3. a concern with the controllability of nine dangers. That is, are mine hazards viewed as being controllable and correctable? Also, if controllable, who has the responsibility in this regard?

U. a concern with the human contribution to mine danger. That is, does human activity intensify or mitigate existing or natural conditions of threat?

£• a concern with the effeot of occupational danger, particularly mine danger, on human populations.

There 1: The Dangerous Nature of Mining as an Occupation

The dominant conception that emerges at this point is that mining

is a very dangerous occupation. Descriptions of raining, particularly those which appear after major mine disasters, almost invariably point to the hazardous nature of the job. In an article on coal mining

Fortune* notedt "From the time a miner changes into working clothes in the company bathhouse and climbs into a mantrip railcar to ride to the mine face, his life is in danger." The American Federatlonist^ has labeled coal mining a "most dangerous trade." A Journalist describing life in an Illinois coal mining community stated: "Goal mining is hard, dirty, dangerous work.... A minor is never far from danger. . ..

Any mine - c o a l, iro n , copper - is dangerous."3 Following a 1966 co al mine fire and explosion at the Consolidation Coal Company No. 9 Mine at

Farmington, West Virginia, where 76 men were killed, then Governor

Hulott Smith remarked that "this is a hazardous business and what has occurred here is one of the hazards of mining."^ Writing after a Cen­ tralis, Illinois, coal mine explosion in 191*7 in which 111 men died,

Theodore White aptly summarized the nature of a ll mining enterprises.

Mining is the most dangerous, dirty, and exhausting of all industrial occupations. It i6 not the catas­ trophic explosion, the spectacular disaster that makes coal so vicious an industry* It is the clanking, hand braked rail lines that rumble through miles of tunnel, maiming, amputating, crushing men in the darkness; it is the cracking of shale and rock from the roof, even in the boBt timbered mines; it is the dust that chokes the throat and clogs the lungs.*

Assessments of this type, though they most often surface after mine disasters, are supported by a large body of statistical evidence.

Various estimates claim that between 60,000 and 120,000 men have been killed and countless more injured in mine accidents in the last 100 years of American mining.** U. S. Bureau o f Mines s t a t i s t i c s rep o rt th a t

83,Mil men were fatally injured in coal mines for the period 1906-1967. 18

From 1931-1967 Tor which comparable statistics are available from a ll sectors of the mining industry (e.g., metal mining and quarrying as well as coal mining) 32,508 men were killed and another 1,68U,3?9 received non-fatal injuries in mining mishaps.7

National Safety Council and U. S. Department of Labor statistics indicate that mining is the most hazardous occupation in the United States based upon rates for accident frequency (the number of disabling injuries per million man hours worked) and accident severity (the number of time charges in days per million roan hours worked). While statistics fluctu­ ate from year to year with certain industries exhibiting an increase and other industries a decrease in accident rates, mining has historically occupied the position of having the highest industrial accident rates, outstripping its nearest competitors lumbering, construction, and marine transportation nearly two to one.®

While the conception of mining as a very dangerous occupation is dominant, it is by no means a unitary assessment. Different commentaries exhibit varying conceptions of the degree of danger incumbent in mining.

In reviewing these commentaries it appears that as the source making the observation about mine danger becomes more c lo sely a f f ilia te d or fam iliar with the mining industry, the conceptions of the dangerous character of mining are modified. Ellsworth? in a study of an Idaho mining district indioated that non-miners were much more apt to label mining as a hazard­ ous or very hazardous occupation than were miners. Twonty-eight percent of the non-miners rated the occupation as hazardous compared with twenty percent of the miners. Mining as a very hazardous occupation was rated as such by fifteen percent of the non-miners and six percent of the ly m iners.

Lantz,*0 in his study People of Coal Town, noted that miners expressed a range of opinion regarding the dangerous nature of mining.

The majority of the miners held the dominant conception of mining as a dangerous occupation. There were others, however, that viewed mining as being relatively safe. Research by Havighurst^-and Seidman-^ largely support Lantz's contentions. However, each of these studies goes on to suggest that the miner adjusts to the hazards of his occupation.

Havighurst notes:

Fully recognizing the dangers of their work, they had come to accept them as a matter of course. Whatever their in itial anxieties may have been, most men had succeeded in rationalizing and' philosophizing to the point at which danger seemed normal; but it is doubt­ ful if it is every completely forgotten.^3

Thus, while there are differing conceptions about the degree of danger • i affiliated with mining, it is broadly recognized, both outside and with­ in the industry, that mining is a dangerous occupation.

Theme 2: The Nature of Mine Dangers: Size, Scale, and Predictability

The layman's view of mine hazards is couched in terms of massive

threats such as fires and explosions. This is understandable since descriptions and discussions of mining that most commonly reach the

popular press are connected with some type of mine disaster. However, * * mine dangers are not of the size and scale portrayed by the popular

press. For the period 1956-1970 there were 25 mine accidents that

claimed five or more lives. Four of these disasters resulted in the

deaths of 25 or more men* This period placed the total number of disas­

ter related fatalities (e.g., five or more deaths per incident) at1*30 20 men.^ Mine disasters, though widely publicized, actually account for only 10*15 percent of the mine f a t a l i t i e s . Most mine accidents are small, isolated Incidents involving one or two men.*5 Statistically,

rock falls are the most common hazard resulting in death or injury

followed by transportation related mishaps, fires and explosions, equip­

ment related hazards, and miscellaneous accidents including electrocu­

tio n , f a l l s , and so fo rth .

While the public at largo is largely misinformed about the nature

of mine danger, this is not the case for the miner. AsOouldner,^

Lantz,*° Lucas,^ and Ellsworth2® indicate, miners demonstrate a thorough

knowledge of the hazards ol' their environment. Moreover, it is suggested

that there is a classificatory system of mine dangers. Some hazards are

viewed as predictable; others are not. Lucas21 explicitly makes this

distinction in his study of a coal mine disaster. He notes, for example,

that certain hazards such as coal gas were predictable from definite cues

in the environment. Other hazards such as "bumps" were not. Lantz22

and Gouldner2J takea similar position in their discussions related to

rock falls and cave-ins. In each of these cases the authors go on to

point out the value of prediction in relation to mine hazards - that

being protection of the miner.

The major point to be noted in this literature is that minors are

capable of assessing the nature of hazards they face. Moreover, based

upon their knowledge of the nature of mine hazards, it is possible to

predict the occurrence of threatening situations and develop patterns

of amieliorative action. This latter point leads naturally to the next

major theme. 21

Theme 3t The Nature of Mine Dangersx ' Controllable? - By Whom?

It is assumed that prediction of an event insures some degree of control over that event. This control can be direct, as in the case of forest fires where prediction of the fire's path assists activity directed toward extinguishing the blaze, or indirect, such as the evacua­ tion of human populations in the faoe of hurricanes or floods. Control through prediction is also the case in the mine. Lucas points out that for miners, "the level of expert knowledge accumulated through years of experience in the mine permitted the men to handle a wide range of pre­ dictable or detectable danger in such a way that it became a casual day to day matter."2U Other studies of miners strike a similar chord. The reverse is also true. Unpredictability thwarts control.

Closely related to the notion that mine dangers are controllable, at least in some cases, is an affiliated question which asks who has the responsibility for the control and correction of mine dangers. This question emerges most clearly in discussions of mine accidents and dis­ asters* The answer to this question has four major foci. First, there is the idea that accidents and disasters are uncontrollable and, there­ fore, no individual, group, or agency can be charged with responsibility.

Seoond, there is the assumption that most dangers are controllable and it is the task of organizations, principally the mining companies and governmental regulatory agencies, to oversee control of such hazards.

Third, there is a stream of thought which contends that most dangers are controllable but it is the individual miner who bears the burden for their control. Finally, there is a middle position, again assuming con­ trol over mine dangers, which looks to both organizational and individual 22 action for tho control of hazards.

The f i r s t of these ideas views mine dangers as phenomena inherent in the situation. Accidents, an outcome related to such hazards, are considered as "just happening," "freaks of nature," or "an act of God."

This is a connon, popular stereotype of accidents and disasters^ but is not given much credence by those knowledgeable of such events. Evidence of this conception is seen most commonly following mine disasters in official statements which deny any organizational culpability in the event. For example, an attorney for the Sunshine Mining Company termed the Sunshine disaster "a very tragic, but freak accident.Follow ing the Consol No. 9 Mine fire and explosion, then United Mine Worker's

President W, A. (Tony) Boyle statedt "as long as we mine coal, there is always this inherent danger."27

The second notion, control of mine danger and accidents through organizational action, is a popular theme with journalists, union offi­ cials, legislators, and governmental agencies. Citing scientific evi­ dence which indicate the potential for reducing mine hazards and nuking charges that mining companies are derelict in their responsibility to provide a safe work place, these sources suggest safety legislation and engineering as the key to controlling mine danger. Central to this argu­ ment is that it is the responsibility of organisations, principally mining companies and governmental regulatory bodies, to set safety standards, implement safety programs, and enforce safety regulations to insure control over mine dangers. Representative of this idea are words from a 1951 British publication and from Business Week.

Up to the present time the attack upon the accident problem has been mainly by statutory regulation and 23

inspection, assisted by scientific research into specific mining dangers.... That these lines of attack have achieved a considerable measure of suc­ cess over the years is shown by the progressive reauction in the accident rates for fatal and serious non-fatal accidents. There is s till much to be done along these lines. The attack must continue byway of further regulations as the results of new mining roethouu, machines, and safety practices are devised • . .by the general adoption of higher standards of engineering production . . .

. . . legislative changes alone will not do the job} the inuustry itself must make a far more determined effort to protect workers. It should take more direct responsibility for finding and using better ways'to avoid 'bug1 - explosive coal dust - and methane gas. It should use technological knowledge to improve com­ munications with below surface crews and to provide surface monitored as well as in-mine detection of hazards. And it should explore the possibilities of safer power sources and equipment; a spark in gassy conditions could have cost the lives of the 78 miners in November.

The third idea, control of mine dangers and related accident beha­ vior through individual action, is found yearly in the annual Declaratiai of Policy of the American Mining Congress, an association of mine opera­ tors. "The responsibility for safety lies ultimately with the individual worker and his supervisor."3° A former official with the U. S. Bureau of Mines has written: "it is an undeniable fact that large numbers of accidents occur through acts of omission or of commission of some per­ son, very frequently the victim of the accident being the offender."^

Since most mine accidents are relatively small, isolated events

and not catastrophic occurrences, this perspective has received extensive

coverage within the literature. Moreover, the bulk of scientific acci­ dent research has also worked from a rather "individualistic" perspec­

tive. Conducted principally by psychologists, this research has stressed

individual actions and motivations as the key to accident causality and prevention.^2 While psychological theories of accident behavior lend credence to the idea of individual responsibility for the control of danger, this stream of research has not extensively used the concept of occupational danger as a variable related to accidents*

The final notion, control of mine hazards through individual and organization action, expresses the middle and, perhaps, dominant perspec­ tive. When one cuts through the verbiage and scapegoating that inev­ itably clouds a discussion of mine hazards, accidents, and disasters,33 there is a strong theme of mutual responsibility for the control of dangers. The miner is admonished to work safely, government agencies to enforce safety regulations, and the companies to provide a safe work environment. Typical of this perspective are the words of 19$0a b u si­ ness periodical.

Coal digging is dangerous. It is neither as dangerous as John L. Lewis claims nor as safe as the operators insist. Somewhere in the middle is the truth: a hazard­ ous industry where the incidence of injury rises and falls in exact ratio to the observance of rules and regulations by operator and miner alike*3u

While the topic of responsibility for the control of mine danger is widely discussed in the literature, there has been little considera­ tion of how the miner views the problem. It has been noted that miners express their belief in the controllability of certain mine hasards and attempt to develop patterns of amieliorative action. Lant»35 indicated that the miners were suspect of the company's interest in safety and the control of mine dangers. Havighurst touched a theme that the miners' work group was held responsible for the control of danger and the wel­ fare of its members. "(There was) a strong feeling of interdependence 25 and of responsibility for each other's welfare . . Seidman,37 the NORC study,38 Qouldner,39 and others cited a similar finding. And, finally, there was also a current of the individual miner's responsibil­ ity for safety and the control of hazards. This his been pointed out with varying degrees of explicitness by Lentz**0 and journalistic accounts of mine accidents and disasters.

In following chapters where the data for this study are analyzed, the themes of predictability, controllability, and responsibility for such control w ill again be examined. Receiving special emphasis will be how miners define the nature of mine danger (e.g., as predictable, con­ trollable, or whatever), how miners act in relation to these definitions, and who or what is viewed as being responsible for the oontrol of mine hazards.

Theme U: The Human C ontribution to Mine Dangers

The dominant conception of mining is one of a dangerous occupa­ tion. However, danger is viewed as emanating from two major sources - the natural environment and human activity. The contribution of the natural environment is seen in such things as explosive coal gas and dust which are normally liberated in the course of mining. The contri­ bution of human activity is more problematic and uncertain. While there has been continuing discussion of this topic, there is little agreement regarding how and why human activity contributes to or mitigates dan­ gerous mine conditions.

The bulk of commentary has been directed toward how miners contri­ bute to mine dangers. These discussions tend to see miners as ignorant, 26 reckless, or Incredibly careless. The background to these charges is usually rooted in the knowledge that miners frequently disobey safety regulations, resist new safety programs and innovations, and so forth.^

Despite this knowledge, there is a dual perspective of why miners act in such a manner* The most common conclusion is that the action is indivi­ dual with the miner acting from some personal motivation. A representa­ tive comment by a journalist illustrates this idea.

Many of the accidents which k ill and malm miners are their own fault. Orown calloused to danger through long fam iliarity with it, some of them become guilty of almost incrediblo carelessness. This writer has himself seen coal miners tamp detonator caps - which could blow their heads off - with their teeth. Some harebrained oneB w ill sneak smokes in gassy mines, and more than once a stolen smoke has set off an explosion which killed the smoker and a number of his mates. Hundreds of minors have been killed because some men foolishly misused equipment, such as flame sa fe ty lamps.***

While the view of the human contribution to mine danger has tended to stress the role of the individual minor, there has also boon a growing body of literature, particularly by social scientists, which has pointed to the influence of social processes. This literature has looked at the role of social processes in intensifying mine danger as well as its miti­ gating qualities. One early citation suggested the process of imitation as a cause of accidents with men copying the bad habits of others

More recently another author notedt "not infrequently, group norms develop which are contrary to safety practices."W*

The positive features of social processes have already been par­ tially discussed. The reference here is to commonts by Havighurst^ and others which pointed to the role of the work group in insuring the w elfare of i t s members. Another author has said t

Within a mining organization, if the norms developed within the social group have been those favorable to a high degree of safety consciousness, the group itself w ill encourage and even enforce safe practices much better than can even supervision.11®

An experimental study of accident prevention in a British colliery conducted by Paterson and W illett^ adds empirical support to this per­ spective. The authors note that groups marked by increased social solidarity demonstrated a significant reduction In accidents compared with other groups of miners.

Again, data analysis in later chapters will examine some of the dimensions discussed under the heading of this theme.

Theme 5? The Effect of Occupatioonsl Danger, Particularly MineTDanger, on Hunan Populations

This theme offers a mixed collection of findings. One major impli­ cation discovered in a variety of sources is a tie between occupational danger and fatalism. Lantz,^ Havighurst,b9 and Seidman^O mention this conception in their explanations of how miners adjust to the threats of their work environment. That long fam iliarity with danger has inured miners to its consequences has also been reported by Lucas,51 NORC,^ and popular accounts of miners and mine disasters.

Yet the grimy, coughing coal miner is inured to the dangers of his calling. He is stoic about the deaths of friends and relatives and accepts as 'part of the game' the high possibility that he may be crushed, burned, suffocated, or drowned in his own Cimmerian tomb,53

Mine danger has also been related to "masculinity." Lucas's^ examination of human behavior in a mine disaster draws heavily upon 28 conceptions of the male role end its implications for behavior. The

NORC study illustrates a similar tone* ". . . the informal social code of minors which tends to label anyone who quits out of fear c a o w a r d ."55

Moreover, this normative requirement appears to cross occupational lines.

Studies of construction iron workers have Indicated norms which require

the management of fe a r in a very hazardous s i t u a t i o n .^

Group solidarity has been linked to occupational danger. Skol- nick57 in an analysis of polico officers touched upon this dimension-as did Smith's5& novel about Hew York City firemen. Occupational solidarity

is almost legendary in accounts of miners though the tie to danger has

not been made by a ll authors. Tho NORC study, however, did touch upon

or.e aspeot of this dimension.

In general, interviews with volunteer rescue workors indicated that intimate personal identification with the trapped miners was the strongest motivating fac­ tor among men who volunteered. Some, of course, had relatives or close friends in the mine at tho time of the explosion and were particularly concerned with their safety. Other volunteers themselves had been saved in previous nine disasters and felt that they had a special debt to repay. Many, however, had only the general identification with the miners by virtue of their sharing of common life experiences and the knowledge that they themselves might face a sim ilar situation In the future

Group solidarity has also been mentioned in relation to the pro­

tection of group members from occupational threat. The study by Paterson

and Willett^0 is a classic in this regard.

Perhaps the most thorough examination of the effect of occupation­

a l danger upon human populations comes from G o u ld n er.^ He suggests that the presence of continuous occupational threat wan a major variable

leading gypsum miners to the formation of an informal social system 29 which varied significantly from that manifested by surface workers em­ ployed by the same company. Hiners exhibited more group solidarity, showed a strong tendency to disreg ard formal work and bureaucratic rules, formed a status system at variance with that negotiated through collective bargaining, and were more personal in their dealings with managerial officials.

As these studies illustrate, occupational danger has been linked

to both psychological and social phenomena. In many cases, these works

actually specify the dimensions or content of whet might be termed an

occupational subculture of danger (e.g., norms, beliefs, values, etc.

related to danger) though they fall short of systematically drawing out

the implications they suggest.

Summary

In this chapter a diverse range of literature has been reviewed to

draw out major themes capable of being analyzed in more detail with data

collected for this study. Five major themes were delineated:

1. The dangerous nature of mining as an occupation.

2. The nature of mine dangers; s iz e , s c a le , and predictability.

3. The naturo of mine dangers: controllable? - by whom?

It. The human contribution to mine dangorc. 5. The effect of occupational danger, particularly mine danger, on human populations.

In discussing each of these major themes a number of conceptions

and research findings were illustrated. In later chapters the points

raised In this discussion w ill be re-examined and compared with data 30 collected for this research. In making this examination it is antici­

pated that this will clarify and unite the range of implications; facts,

and findings found in existing research and, systematically relate this work to a conceptual framework. 31

Notes: Chapter II

1. "The Bleak Life of Skilled Diggers," Fortune 83 (January 1971)# p . 83* 2. "The Miners Ask Only for Justice," American Federatlonlst 5U (January 19k7), p. 5.- - 3. John Bartlow Martin, "life and Death In Coaltcwn," Hew York Times Magazine (January 13, 1952), pp. 3U-35# U. Brit Hume, Death and the Mines (Hew Yorkt Grossman Publishers, 1971), pp. 5. Theodore H. White, "Number Five was a Dry Mine," The New Republic 116 (May 5, 19li7), p. 21. 6. Mine accident statistics are partial and incomplete. The U. S. Bureau of Mines, the major collector of such statistics was not created until 1910. Figures for years prior to 1910 are drawn largely from Journalistic accounts, reports of state mine in­ spectors, and charitable organizations. See also Ben A. Franklin, "The Scandal of Death and Injury in the Mines," New York Times Magazine (March 30, 1969), pp. 25-27 and 112-130.

7. U. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Injury Experionce in Coal Mining, 1968 by F o rrest T. Moyer and Mary B. McNair, Information Circular No. 8556 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 98-99; V. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Historical Injury Experience in the Metallic M ineral India tr ie s (In two p a r is h No. 1. 195&-67 ty Donald E. Redmon and Leonard P. Larson, Information Circular No. 8589 (Washington, D. C.t Government Printing Office, 1973), P* 11; U. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Historical Injury Experience In Quarrying (in three parts)T Mo.2,~~T966-1967 by Donald E. Redmon and Leonard P. Larson, Information Circular No. 8567 (Washington, D. C .: Government P rin tin g O ffice, 1973), p. 11. 6. Accident statistics must be interpreted with some caution and re­ servation. The proportion of reporting units varies from industry to Industry and within an industry the number of reporting units varies from year to year. Therefore, comparisons between industries or between different time periods should be made only with the realization of possible differences in coverage. Nevertheless, the magnitude of difference between the accident rates of mining versus other industries is so large and so historically consistent that a generalisation to the effect that mining is the most dangerous occupation in America seems reasonably safe. For a comparison of accident rates by industry see U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor S ta tis tic s , Handbook o f Labor S ta tis tic s , B u lletin No. 1735 32

(Washington, D. C.: Oovernncnt Printing Office, 1972); National Safety Council, Accident Facts (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1972). 9. Idaho, Bureau of Mines and Geology, Community Perceptions in the Coeur d’Alene Mining D istrict by Lawrence E. Ellsworth, Pamphlet No. 1^2 (Moscow, Idaho: Idaho Bureau o f Mines and Geology, 1972), p . 30. 10. Herman R. Lenta, People of Coal Town (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), Chapter 7.

11. Robert J . Havighurst and Eugene A. Friedmann, The Meaning of Work and Retirement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195U), pp. 62-61*.

12. Jo e l Seidman e t. e l , . The Worker Views His Union (Chicago: Univer­ sity of Chicago Press, 195B), pp. 20-22.

13. Havighurst, The Meaning of Work and Retirement, p. 6U.

1U. Metropolitan Life, "Catastrophic Accidents," Statistical Bulletin 55 (A pril 1971*), pp. U-5. 15. Hume, Death and the Hines, p. 9

16. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Injury Experience in Coal Mining, 1968, pp. 98-99. 17. Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Indiretrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 195U), Chapters 6-B.

18. Lantz, People of Coal Town, Chapter 7.

19. Rex A. Lucas, Men in Crisis (New York: Basic Books, 1969), Chapter 1. 20. Ellsworth, Community Perceptions in the Coeur d’Alene Mining Dis­ tric t, B>. 29-#?. 21. Lucas, Hen in Crisis, pp. 13-lli.

22. Lantz, People of Coal Town, pp. 135-136.

23. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, pp. 115-123.

2lu Lucas, Men in Crisis, p. 16.

25. W illiam Haddon, Edward A. Suchman, and David K lein, Accident Research (New York: Harper and Row, 1961*), Chapter 1; Russell it. Dynes and Daniel Yutsy, "The Religious Interpretation of 33

Disasters," Topic 10; A Journal of the Liberal Arts (Fall 1965)* pp. 3U-U8.

26. Rachel Scott, "Yes, Sir, This Has Certainly Been Considered a Safe Mine," The Atlantic Monthly 230 (December 1972), p. 107.

27. Hume, Death and the Mines, p. 16. 28. "Physiological Problems of Mining," Nature 168 (October 13, 1951)# p. 61*3. 29. "The Shocking Record o f Mine A ccidents," Business Week (December 11*, 1968), p. 176.

30. "Declaration of Policy of the American Mining Congress," Hinlng Congress Journal 58 (November 1972), p. 73.

31. U. S. Deportment of Interior, Bureau of Hines, Some Phases of the Relative Responsibility of Management and Workers for Accidents in Mines ^by D. Harrington, Report of Investigations No. 2993 (Wash­ ington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 1.

32. For a discos ion of theories related to accidents see Abraham K. Komen, In d u s tria l and O rganizational Psychology (Englewood C lif f s , New Jersey* Prentice-Hall, 1971); Willard Kerr, "Complementary Theories of Safety Psychology," in Readings in Industrial and Business Psychology, edited by Harry W. Karn and B. von Haller (Ulmer (tiew Yorki McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 26ti—270.

33* Thornes E, Drabek and Enrico L. Quarantelli, "Scapegoats, Villains, and Disasters," Transacticn (March 1967), pp. 12-17.

31*. William J. Slocum, "The Job that Nobody Loves," Nations Business 38 (November 1950), p . 1*8.

35. Lantz, People of Coal Town, pp. 11*0-11*1.

36. Havighurst, The Meaning of Work and Retirement, p. 65.

37. Seidman, The Worker Views His Union, p. 21.

38. National Opinion Research Center, Human Reactions in Disaster Situations, vol. 3j Report on the West Frank fori, Illinois/M ine Ex­ plosion,. December 21, 1951 (Chicago* National Opinion Research C enter, 1951*), p. 66.

39. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, p. 129.

1*0. Lanta, People of Coal Town, pp. ll*l-ll*3. 1*1. Herbert A. Wendel, "Reaching the Miner with Safety Education," 3U

vol. 16; national Safety Congress Transactions (Chicago: National Safety Council, 196U), p. 2kI Lantz, People of Coal Town, pp. 11*2- Ui3. 1:2. David 0 . W ittels, "The Bloody Price of Coal," The Saturday Evening Post 221 (February 12, 19U9), p. 95. 1*3. C. Lorlmer Colburn, "The Influence of Bad Habits In Mine Safety," National Safety News 7 (February 1923), p. 35.

UU. Quinn 0, McKay, "People: Problems and Promise for Safety," vol. 16; National Safety Congress Transactions (Chicago: National Safety Council, T96B), pTir.------1*5. Havighurst, Tho Meaning of Work and Retirement, p. 65.

1*6. McKay, "People: Problem; and Promise for Safety," p. 21.

U7. T. T. Paterson and F. J. W illett, "An Experiment in the Reduction of Accidents in a Colliery," Sociological Review o.s. 3 U (Winter 1951), pp. 107-122; T. T. Paterson and F. J. W illett, "An Anthropological Experiment in a B ritish Colliery," Human Organisation 10 (Summer 1951), pp. 19-25. U8. Lantz, People of Coal Town, Chapter 7.

1*9. Havighurst, The Meaning of Work and Retirement, Chapter 3*

50. Seidman, The Worker Views His Union, Chapter 2.

51. Lucs 3 , Men in Crisis, Chapter 1.

52. NORC, "Report on the West Frankfort, Illinois, Mine Explosion, December 21, 1951," Appendix B-3*

53* "Too Late fo r 78," Time 92 (December 6, 1968), p. 32. 5U. Lucas, Men in C risiB .

55* NORC, "Report on the West Frankfort, I llin o is , Mine Explosion, December 21, 1951," p. 72. 56. Jack Haas, "Binging: Educational Control Among High Steel Workers," American Behavioral Scientist 16 (September 1972), pp. 27-3b| Frederick C. Klein, "A Top Connector," in Living Dangerously, edited by John Barnett (Princeton, New Jersey: Dow Jones Books, 1971), PP. 68-79. 57. Jerome Skolnick, "Why Cops Behave the Way They Do," in Deviance, edited by Simon Dinlts, Russell R. Dynes, and Alfred C. Olarke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 1O-U J 7* 35

56. Dennis Smith. Report from Engine Co. 82 (New York* Pocket Books, 1973). 59. NORG, "Report on the West Frankfort, Illinois, Mine Explosion, December 21, 1951»" P- 65* 60. Paterson and W illett, "An Experiment in the Reduction of Accidents in a Colliery,” and "An Anthropological Experiment in a British C o llie ry ."

61. Oouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, Chapters 6-8. CHAPTER I I I

SETTING AND METHODS

Introduction In formulating this study there were two major considerations.

First, there is requirement for the collection and analysis of valid and reliable data leading to valid and reliable research findings and second, the study must be of feasible dimensions. Just as the dictates of science require that work within its tradition meet certain standards of objectivity, clarity, reliability, and generalizability, research must also meet certain pragmatic considerations.^- It makes little sense to embark upon a research endeavor if the proposed work cannot be satisfac­ torily initiated and carried tlirough to completion. An attempt to har­ monise both the scientific and pragmatic requirements of the research process led to this study of the effect of occupational danger on an occupation's participants within parameters specified by a case study of an underground mine as a social setting. This chapter will contain a discussion of the reasoning behind the choice of the particular occupa­ tion and setting studied, the methodology used to collect data, and the focus and technique of data analysis.

The Occupation In selecting underground mining as the occupation to be studied, five major criteria were considered. The occupation to be studied was to be dangerous, accessible, typical, previously studied, and capable of 36 37 being examined in a study of feasible dimensions. The demand for a dangerous occupation stemmed from the common sense consideration that if one wishes to examine the effect of occupational danger on an occupa­ tion^ participants, the occupational context must possess the potential for such an effect to be manifest. Second, the occupation needed to be accessible to the research process. The major concern in this regard was whether entre/ into the occupational setting could be achieved. Third, the occupation was to be typical. Typical in this case refers to an occupation employing a large number of men in a variety of similar set­ tings. Furthermore, it was desirable to study an occupation free of unique institutional requirements. The reference here is to occupations such as the military where danger is an expected part of the job and, for which there is formal, specialized training. The desire for a typical occupation was based in the requirement that the research findings be generalizable. Studies of dangerous occupations such as infantrymen or astronauts may be valid in a specific context but the unique character of thesa occupations renders research findings of low external validity.

Cases of this type often make it difficult to tie the research to a broad conceptual framework. Fourth, it was desirable to study an occupation that had been previously examined. In part this was in keeping with the scientific tradition of building upon the work of predecessors.2 More

» pragmatically, this requirement was viewed as necessary so that the re­ search would have a tase of information specifying some of the relevant dimensions to be studied. Finally, the occupation needed to be one capable of examination in a study of feasible dimensions. This was basically a concern with pragmatic considerations such as the cost of the research endeavor, the budgeting of time for field work, and what­ ever. In applying these criteria to a number of potential occupations to study, underground mining was selected as the most suitable. It is a dangerous occupation not only statistically but also by the evaluation of the public-at-lsrge and by miners.^ Mining is relatively accessible.

Unlike some other occupations, mining is not an industry with many for­ mal entry requirements. Since this study was to be done utilizing participant observation as a primary research tool, the relatively open entry requirements of the occupation were important. Moreover, there are a number of mining operations scattered throughout the country.

Even if certain research sites within the industry were inaccessible, there were a number of available alternatives. Mining is also a rela­ tively typical occupation at least by the criteria set forth here. It is civilian and employs a large number of men working in relatively similar conditions.^

Mining is an occupation that has bnen extensively studied. Since its creation in 1 9 1 0 the U.S. Bureau of Mines has published thousands of studies.^ While most of these works deal with engineering, geology, and the technical problems of mining, there is a significant body of litera­ ture dealing with topics related to this study, principally mine acci­ dents - their cause and prevention. Reports from state bureaus of mines provide a similar source of information. There is also a sizeable collection of literature that has focused on life in mining communities including exposed of working and living conditions, studies of industrial relations and unionism, historical accounts, and, the standard fare 39 after a mine disaster, editorials and tracts urging safety legislation, safety research, and so forth.^ While most of these works were written

from 30 to $0 years ago and are of limited utility in reflecting current

• ■ • conditions within the industry, they are useful in providing a descrip­

tive end historical backdrop to the research. Most important, however,

is that mining has been studied by social scientists. While the number

of studies in this regard are relatively few, they have been especially

helpful in delimiting a number of considerations to be examined here.

Furthermore, compared with other occupations that might be labeled dan­

gerous, the studies of mining provide a somewhat larger data base than

is evident for other occupations. Most dangerous occupations fall in the

purview of blue collar tfork. Occupational studies have tended to move

away from this sphere as the fields of Industrial and organizational

sociology have expanded their research intorests and capabilities.? On

balance, mining was the one dangerous occupation with a relatively large

existing data base from which to launch this research.

Finally, a study of mining was considered feasible within the

limits of the investigator's resources. Financial cost, budgeting time

for field work, and other considerations pointed to an occupation which

could be intensively studied at one research site. Mining fit this re­

requirement and, in combination with the aforementioned considerations,

was selected as the most suitable occupational context in which to ex­

amine the effect of occupational danger on an occupation's participants.

The S etting

In selecting a site for this study a number of choices were Uo possible. There are literally thousands of operating nines scattered throughout the nation. Certain regions, however, are characterized as mining areas and produce the largest share of mined mineral products.

Coal mining is principally located in the Appalachian states and the southern portions of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Metal mining Is pre­ dominantly found in northern Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota (copper and iron), the tri-state lead-zinc region (Missouri, Kansas, and Okla­ homa), and the Hocky Mountain states (non-ferrous metals). Non-metals

(phosphate, barite, limestone, sand, gravel, etc.) are mined in all fifty states.

In choosing a particular mine setting in which to conduct the re­ search, five major criteria wore operative. The operation was to be an underground mine, bureaucratically organized, unionized, of relatively larg e dimensions employing a t le a s t 100 men, and be a "hardrock" mine.*

An underground mine was desirable mainly because of tho danger involved.

Underground mining exhibits significantly higher accident rates than □ does surface mining. Moreover, the environmental nature of underground mining suggests a setting in which danger is paramount.

The bureaucratic dimension was considered important because tho truly significant portion of the mining industry is organized along these principles.^ Despite the fact that thoro are thousands of opera­ ting mines in thi3 country, mine production is dominated by a relatively

J*11 Hard rock" is a label applied to cortain types of non-coal mining operations. The label is derived from the geology of the mineral sub­ stance involved. Metal and some non-metal mining operations are typical­ ly titled hardrock. few large, bureaucratic, often multinational firms. If this study were to have any significant validity, the bureaucratic dimension had to be considered. More importantly, though this study is aimed at examining the effect of occupational danger on an occupation's participants (an effect which is expected to reveal itself in occupational subculture of the mine setting) such a study must consider, ail the relevant variables.

What takes place informally (i.e., the occupational subculture) depends, to some extent, on the structure anci demands of the formal organization.

Tne third requirement, a unionized mine, is similar to that de­ manding bureaucratic organization. Again, typicality is an issue*

Most mining operations are unionized though not necessarily by the sane union. Moreover, unions normally negotiate health, safety, and welfare clauses in their contracts with management and thus have some type of input into issues related to occupational danger*

The fourth c rite rio n was th a t the mine be of re la tiv e ly large size employing at least 100 men. It was believed that the division of labor would be more pronounced in a larger organization. It is commonly recognized that the larger the social unit and the more complex the task it seeks to accomplish, tho greater the propensity for the unit to be­ come explicitly organized around a formal division of labor. ^ In an effort to capture the totality of the mine setting, the research had to be cognizant of and examine the relationships between groups and indivi­ duals engaged in different tasks. Typicality was also an issue in this regard. Small operations where the miner performs not only the tasks of mining but also haulage and maintenance chores are not the usual case.

However, it was also desirable not to locate the research at a mine of massive dimensions, say where over bOO men were employed. It was be­ lieved that if the nine were too large and/or the division of labor too extensive, the research would be hindered in its efforts to capture the totality of the mine as a social setting. The fifth requirement was that the study be located at a hardrock mine. While coal mining might have been a more logical choice in terms of the saliency of danger since considerably more men aro injured and killed in the mining of coal than.in hardrock operations, it was be­ lieved that the research would have difficulty studying coal miners.

Because of the decline in coal mining during the 1950's and 1960'u, a number of coal mines have closed. Those mines that have remained open have done so in the relatively "rich" coal districts, principally in

Appalachia. Coal mining in this area is richly infused with a relative­

ly unique social and historical tradition. Since the data for this stuay were to be collected primarily by participant observation, it was anticipated that t.ie roaearcher, as an outsidor, might have considerable

dif .iculty in establishing an adequate researclt presence.^ "Acceptance of the field worker depends more upon the kind of person lie is than the In perceived value of the research.This was considered less of a prob­

lem with hardrock mining. The researcher, having been born and reared

in a hardrock mining district, was already familiar with the life style

of these areas. As such, it was anticipated that he would have less

difficulty in overcoming the role of the "outsider" and would be able

to more adequately establish a fruitful research presence. U3

The mining operation# selected for the study met each of the pro* posed criteria* It was an underground, hardrock mining operation employing approximately 200 men. The mine as one operation run by a large multinational mining company was bureaucratically organized, not only in relation to the rest of the firm but internally as well. All non-salaried personnel employed a t the mine were members of a lo c a l chapter of a large international union. In terms ol‘ the proposed cri­ teria the research site did have one shortcoming. Though unionized, the union was relatively inactive. Industrial-labor relations at the mine were generally considered harmonious. As such, it was difficult to assess the union's input into the social fabric of the nine setting.

The mine was located in the western United States. The commodity being mined was non-metallic. The actual study site (hereafter referred to as Mine A) was one of th re e mines operated by the same company in the same general location. All three mines were inter-connected underground by intersecting drifts, stopes, raises, and dragways. Specially arrangod,

the main portals of the three mines formed a roughly triangular pattern.

Each mine portal was approximately three air miles (four miles under­ ground) from any other.

Kine A was the newest of the three mines. It opened in tho raid- l?60's and employed approximately US men divided into two work shifts.

Mine B was the largest operation* The remaining 150 men employed by the company headquartered hero. This mine was also the s i t e of the general offices, warehouses, and maintenance shops. This particular mine opened

*In order to protect the confidentiality of the company, union, and individual respondents, nameB and identifying characteristico are not revealed. In cases where names are appropriate, pseudonyms are usea. uu in the late 1950's. Mine G was the oldest of the three having begun operations in the ly20's. Ore at this location was pretty well worked out with large portions of the underground workings as well as most surface installations abandoned. Except for a distinction made on the mine map, this unit ceased to exist. Production figures were tabulated with those of Mine B, and the men who worked the remaining open levels used the dry at Mine B and were brought to their work place by truck.

The research site was very catholic in what it encompassed. It had adits, inclined shafts and vertical shafts; flat veins, steep veins, and those in-between; wet areas and dry areas; shrinkage stopes, open stopes, and timbered stopes. The mine thus incorporated virtually every task, situation, hazard, and condition encountered in the diversity of mining.

Approximately two-thirds of the 200 men employed at the entiro operation workea underground. Those individuals who worked on the sur­ face did so as general laborers, truck drivers, maintenance and warehouse personnel, office help, and supervisors. Women were not employed at

Jobs outside of the office. Most of the men on the surface crews, the supervisory personnel, and office staffs worked a standard eight hour day (8:00 a.m. - Ui30 p.m.). Underground crews and their immediate supervisors alternated shifts. A two week turn of day shift (8:00 a.m. - h:00 p.m .) was followed by two weeks on the n ight s h if t (6:00 p.m. -

2:00 a.m.). The two hour interval between shifts was scheduled so that the mine could be ventilated following blasting and the air cleared of noxious gas produced by the detonation of explosives. The mines aid not operate on Saturday or Sunday. The mines were located in a mountainous area along a major earth­ quake fault line in.that region. A major highway and rail connections were located about six miles away from the mine operations. Oeologlcal-

ly, the rock formations of the area were sedementary in nature. The ore was sandwiched between a layer of chert on top end quart2 i t e below.

There was no community located a t the mine mouth. Located in a relatively uninha bitea area* this operation was commuted to by the em­ ployees. Men drove to work from at least six different communities and rural areas. Some of the men traveled a distance of$0 miles to and from work. However, approximately $0 percent of those employsd at the operation resided in a small community of about U,UOO peoplo some 20 miles d is ta n t from the mines. This town was not a "mining town" in the classic sense of the word. Founded in the late lBOO's as a service cen­ ter for the surrounding agricultural population, this function in still viable today. The economic base of the concnunity has broadened, however.

Railroads, sawmills, government, business, and service industries all employ more nen than does mining.

As an overall assessment, the mine, while not perfectly meeting a ll the specified criteria as a research setting, provided an adequate loca­ tion for tne scope and direction of this research.

The Research Role and Methodology

Data for this study were collected principally through participant observation utilizing the role of the "complete perticpant."^ The re­ searcher worked as an underground miner for twelve weeks during which

time the data were gathered. Neither the company, union, nor other 1*6 workers were aware of the study. The researcher was "just another miner." Formal, unstructured interviews with ex-miners and a state mine inspector as well as documents collected from the mining company, union, state ana federal mine regulatory agencies served as supplementary sources of information. To f ill the role requirements of the complete participant, the researcher indulged in four major activities: observation, listening, questioning, and particpation. Observation in thi3 case refers to visual inspection of tho mine and its inhabitants. The intent of this action was to see how the miners actea toward each other, acted toward the mine environment particularly' its hazards, and determine how well the miners' behavior coordinated with their percoptions and wrbal accounts of their action. The activity of listening was oriented to discovering the miners' perceptions, attitudes, opinions, and knowledge of themselves, their occupation and its environment, other mine per­ sonnel, and related formal organizations. Questioning was an activity designed to more fully draw out the implications of the miners' concep­ tion of the mine sotting. In the norol course of conversation topics woild be raised of particular relevance to the study such as the proper way to handle a dangerous situation. In an effort to systematically explore such areas the miners were questioned as tu the "hows" and

"whys" o f c e rta in courses of a c tio n .

Participation was an activity required on two accounts. First, there was the demand th at the researcher take p a rt in tho s o c ia l and work a c tiv ity of the mine in order to c o lle c t the d a ta , th a t i s , to fu lfill the research role. Second, participation was demanded by the researcher’s other role, that of a miner. Thi3 necessitated taking part in the normal work routines specified for a miner as well as the custo­ mary, informal social life incumbent in the mine setting. Particpation in the role of miner structurally set the stage for the role of research­ er. Working in the mine setting provided the opportunity for observing, listening, and questioning. Prom that point it was only a matter of act­ ing upon such opportunities to collect the information and systematically record the data. The role of the complete participant was not one anticipated in the initial formulation of the research. At that time the expected research role was ”parttcipant-as-observer," (e.g., a known observer).The original plan called for the assistance and support of the mining com­ pany and union in conducting the study. However, the presentation of tho research proposal to mining company officials was met with a decidedly negative response, lhf.se officials voiced considerable apprehension that the research might ultimately hurt the company and/or its public lmage.l!>

At that point a decision was made to assume the role of tne complete par­ ticipant and seek entre / at a mine opera tea by another firm. The effort was su ccessfu l.

It> making the transition to the role of the complete participant, two problems emerged. The need to play the role of "just another miner" prohibited access to certain data sources. Fontal interviews with com­ pany and union officials were impossible. Documentary data from company files was also out of reach. The average miner doesn't ask to see per­ sonnel f i l e s and the lik e w ithout arousing suspicion. As such, a number of data sources which could have embellished the study had to be U8 neglected.

This problem is Janis headed. On one hand the research role pre­ vented detailed examination of tho role of the formal organization and supervisory personnel in tho mine setting. But, a considerable amount of data were forthcoming with regard to the production crews and their informal socio-cultural context. This skews, to some extent, the data base toward the production crews. As 3Uch, the analysis of the mine social setting is predominantly characterized by data from one element w ithin th a t s e ttin g - the production crews. Howover, th is study is directed at those occupational participants which commonly face danger.

In the mines this means the members of the production crews. While the study may fall short of a complete and total examination of the mine as a social setting, it contains a l-irge data base from which to study the core of an occupational subculture and ultimately the effect of occupa­ tional danger on an occupation's participants.

The second problem with the research role was that the recording of field note3 could not be accomplished as observations *>era made. The researcher was required to retain by memory what had transpired at the mine until he returned home and could chart his observations. Obviously, some material was lost by this restriction.

The transition to the role of tho complete participant was not entirely negative. Three major advantages were forthcoming. In the first instance there was no necessity for the researuher to establish the legitimacy of the research or prove that he, as a researcher, was a

"good guy and could be trusted with what uncoveredIt he was only necessary to establish himself as a miner, a process faced by all new 1*9 men at the mine. As ouch, it was possible to begin the process of data collection almost immediately relatively unconstrained with having to develop a rapport with the subject population. Secondly, as an unknown observer the researcher was relatively free of problems such as the defensive respondent, destructive rumors, and the all-too-willing infor­ mant passing on erroneous in fo rm a tio n .^

Finally, tho role of the complete participant minimizes the reac­ tive effects of the observer. Aside from problems such as tlia dolensive respondent (also a reactive effect), people act differently, at least initially, in the presence of a known observer even if his presence is b a sic a lly accoptable. Assuming th e role o f the complete p articip an t enablo3 tho researcher to perhap3 see a more honest or typical pattern of behavior.

The role of the complete participant, though not originally in- tenaed, is in keeping with the primary methodological technique selected for this study - participant observation. The manner in which this study is constructed demanded a fle x ib le research to o l capable of providing a detailed, on-going stream of data over an extended period of time. In order that the resoarch might capture the totality of the mine setting and thus be able to provide a picture of the occupational subculture thorein* a methodological technique was required which could observe the setting in all its vagaries, changes, and subtleties. Delineating the content and form of the occupational subculture is necossary since it has been assumed that if occupational danger were to have an effect on an occupation’s participants, this effect would be manifest in the content of the occupational subculture. 50

A study of a subculture is preeminently a study of symbolically constructed phenomena. That is, the research process attempts to dis­

cover and explain the nature of a particular socio-cultural reality, the

shared human reality of the subjects under study. The data are made up of human meanings conveyed and interpreted through the communication pro­ cess. In order that these meanings might be logically interrelated,

interpreted, and understood, the researcher must also understand the

context in which meanings are generated and sustained. Participant

observation is particularly veil .suited in thi3 regard. The researcher

3hares in the life activities of the group under study, is a part of the group's cultural milieu, and communicates with the subjects in terms of

their realities and referents. The participant observer is close to tho d9ta, sees it In its totality, and understands it as a whole. ^

Faced with a need for a versatile, ^ flexible tool capable of pro­ ducing an in-depth, dynamic, and holistic picture of the mine setting, a

review of methodologies 3ug.>ested participant observation as the most suitable procedure for this research.

Data Collection, Recording, end Evaluation

At the mine, as a miner-reseorcher, the process of observing, lis­

tening, and questioning generated considerable data.* Observation

primarily brought forth descriptions of the mining environment and be­

havioral patterns of mine personnel. Questioning and listening probed matters of perception, reasons for human action, and evaluations of the

various components of the mine setting. In this latter respect, the

^Representative examples of the field note3 are located in Appendix B. 51 researcher relisd on ether miners to be both respondents and infor­ mants.^ Younger miners, (i.e., those relatively new to the mine set­ ting) were viewed primarily as respondents. The intent here was to examine these men's perceptions and evaluations of the mine and its en­ vironment as well as study tljeir personal exparionc.-;3 within the mine.

Tho more experienced miners wore U3ud principally a3 informants. This action was oriented to gathering information on the mine as a whole, the reasons behind certain practices and actions, and to get a perspective on c lange w ithin the mine ( e .g ., how tnings were clone in thepa3t com­ pared with bite present). The division of the mine personnel into the broad categories of respondent and informant was dictated by the assump­ tion that increasing experience within the mine setting would enlargo

the individual's knowledge of the setting.As such, the more experienced men were selected to serve in tho capacity of informants though they also contributed to the data base as respondents.

In an effort to insure a degree of control over the quality of the data, the researcher endeavored to continually cross check data supplied by the subjects. This necessitated asking the same questions end dis­ cussing tnc same insuos w ith a number of d iffe re n t m iners. Action of this type was taken to insure continuity and accuracy in the data and prevent distortion from sources such as a miner describing a personal a c tiv ity in terms which would suggest th at i t was common p ractice by personnel throughout the wine.

Because the data were being gathered by a compiote participant, recording observations, as they were made was virtually impossible.

It was occasionally possible, however, to jot down a short note of 52 something that had been observed to assist retrieval of the information from the reoearoller's memory. The researcoor maintained a diary of field notes which were recorded immediately following each work aay at the mine. An on-going process of selection took place with reference to what was considered relevant material. The general rule governing this selection was to include all material related to the mining sn- vironment - social, psychological, and technical - regardless of its immediately percwived relevancy to the topic of occupational danger.

Excluded material was primarily conversational content considered basio- ally unrelated to the mine sotting. This incluied s ich things as dis- c .i- jio ;i3 uf nunting, repair of automobiles, domestic problems, and so forth. After noting the general content and topics discussed by the miners at work, no effort was made to detail the course of such subjects.

In an effort to control both the quantity and quality of tho data, the researcher elmrted his observations as quickly as possiblo and thus attempted to minimize distortion caused by lsn3o of irjomory. More impor­ tantly, to control bias introduced by the researcher's personal perspoc- p o tive, anxiety, and extended affective participation, notes were kept concerning the researchor's own feelings, dispositions, ana perceptions so that they might be checked against the data and avoid misinterpreta­ tion, Records of conversations and observations were made without comment as to the rigntfulness or wrongfuiness of tao subjects' attitudes, motives, or actions. Finally, the researcher attempted to keep a low profile within tie work group. That is, he made no effort to initiate or lead group activity or become significantly involved with one faction versus another. It was desirable at ail times to stay on amiable terms 53 with all nine personnel so that the research process wouLi00 able to in­

corporate input lYom all involved parties.

Despite these quality controls, it was difficult, particularly with

conversational aata, to preserve exactness in full detail. In following

chapters where the data are analysed, a number of comments and conversa­

tions will be illup I r a te i . Exact wording was pre3urved where possible

though some examples are paraphrases which convey the essence of what

transpired.

Evaluation and organization of field note entries was a process

initiated while the aata wore still being collected. In an effort to

explore a topic in detail, the data were constantly being revicweu for

informational gaps that might, bo filled as the research progressed.

However, the major effort in this regard commenced with tho close of the

field work. Following the lead of VJengor andW e l l e r , 23 broad categories

were constructed reflecting the constituent elements of a subculture.

Field note entries were then classified and cross referenced under these

headings. In following this procedure, extraneous material was separated

from that deemed relevant. Items were classified as to whether they

tended to reflect a belief, a norm, a sanction, a value, or whatever.

Items within each of these "elemental categories" were then re-examined

to systematically draw out broad commonalities.

This examination resulted in a second classificotory scheme based

upon major themes within each elemental category. For example, the

broad category of belief was divided into major themes such as mining

is not a good occupation, mining is dangerous, etc. Variations of a

particular theme were included as subcategories or qualifications. Thus, the theme of belief indicating that mining is not considered a good occu­ pation was followed and supported by subsidiary indications that mining is an occupation within which there is little chance for personal advance­ ment, mining is an arduous occupation, and so forth. Following these taxonomic endeavors a comment, conversation, or observation was pulled from tho data to serve as an illustrative example.

Dota Organization and Presentation

The taxonomic procedures used to evaluate the importance and rele­ vance of the collected data also initiated the organization of this material into a coherent form. The data were collected viewing the mine as a social setting. From this material it was necessary to abstract indications of the occupational subculture. It was assumed that tlx; effect of occupational danger on an occupation's participants would be revealed at this level.

In making the determination of what constituted tho relevant dimen­ sions of the occupational subculture, a lead provided by Wenger and

Weller u was followed. That is, the analysis looked for indications of social norms, values, sanctions, beliefs, knowledge, patterns of behavior and so forth which reflected the relative uniqueness of the mine as a social setting (i.e., the occupational subculture). Particular attention was directed at determining how each of these constituent elements was interrelated with all others. Thus, the focus of the work was to capture the socio-cultural totality of the mine.

This method of analysis is the case study. The case study is not a specific methodological technique. Rather, it is a way of organizing 55 data ,1so as to preserve the unitary character of the social object being stu d ied,"^5 The veiy nature of this work* with its focus on the mine setting and its constituent subculture, necessarily requires holistic analysis. Social settings are composed of a variety of elements each interrelated to the others. Any attempt to study one element requires a consideration of the rest. Any effort to understand tho whole must con­ sider the properties of interrelationship.

This case study will be presented descriptively. Following chap­ ters concerned with data analysis will present a descriptive account of the structure, processes, anrl functions of the occupational subculture within the mine setting. There is no attempt to trace the social history of the mine sotting or build a composite picture of social life under­ ground.^ The picture thot emerges is a descriptive, analytical narra­ tive of the mino setting and its constituent occupational subculture as it currontly exists, operates, and functions. From this picture it will examine the effect of occupational danger upon an occupation's partici­ pants. This effect will be seen directly- and immediately in the case of the miners. Generalization to other occupations w ill rest upon abstract­ ing the relevant variables from material presented here in an effort to construct a generalized model. 56

Notesi Chapter III

1. Sheldon Lachman, The Foimdatlons of Science (New Yorkt Vantage Press, I960). 2. Gerald R. Leslie, Richard F. Larson, and Benjamin L. Gorman, Order and Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973)» p . 6. —

3. See the discussion in Chapter II entitled Theme It - The Dangerous Nature of Mining as an Occupation.

U. U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 93rd odition (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,1972), p. 653* 5. The U. S. Bureau of Mines publishes or has published a number of serial publications including the Bulletin, Miner’s Circular, Information Circulars, Reports of Investigations, and Technical P a re rs.

6. Even a small enumeration of these works is too extonaivc to lint here. Two recent examples of literature in this vein include: B rit Hume, Death and the Mines (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971); Harry M. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands (Boston: L ittlo, Brown, and Company, 1963).

7. William Foote Whyte, Organizational Behavior: Theory and Application (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin-borsey, 1969), pp. 10-11.

8. National Safety Council, Accident Facts (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1972).

9. For a discussion of bureaucratic principles see Max Weber, The Theory of Social nnd Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1961:).

10. Theodore Caplow, "Organizational Size," Administrative Science Quarterly 1 (1957), pp. Uflk-505. 11. For a discussion of how being similar to a subject population, under study by a participant observer, facilitates research see Joseph T. Howell, Hard Living on Clay Street (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973), Appendix - Notes on Methodology.

12. John P. Dean, Robert L. Eichhom, and Lois R. Dean, "Establishing Field Relations*," in Issues in Participant Observation, edited by George J . McCall and J . L. Simmons (Reading,'M assachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p.6 9. 57

13. Raymond L. Sold, "Roles In Sociological Field Observations," Social Forces 36 (March 1958)1 pp. 217-223.

111. Gold, "Roles in Sociological Field Observations," pp. 217-223*

1$. For a discussion of the problems of doing research in organizations, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Formal Organizations," in Sociology; An Introduction, edited by Neil J. Smelser (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 0577, pp. 197-201; Robert Kahn and Floyd Mann, "Developing Research Partnerships," in Issues in Participant Observation, edited by George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (Reading, Massachusetts; Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. b5-5lj Chris Argyris, "Diagnosing Defenses Against the Outsider," in Issues in Participant Observation, edited by George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (Reading, Massachusetts; Addison-Wesley, 1969)* pp. 115-125. 16. Dean, "Establishing Field Relations," p. 69*

17. For a discussion of methodological problems related to respondents and informants see John P. Dean and William Foote Whyte, "How Do You Know if the Informant is Tolling the Truth," in Issues in Participant Observation,, edited by George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (Reading, Massachusetts; Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 105- llii; Argyris, "Diagnosing Defenses Against the Outsider," pp. 115-125.

18. Dean, "Establishing Field Relations," p.6 9.

19* For a detailed discussion and overall assessment of participant observation see Severyn T. Bruyn, The Human Perspective in Sociology; The Methodology of P articip an t Observation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, I960).

20. For a discussion of the versatility of participant observation as a research method see John P. Dean, Robert L. Eichhorn, and Lois R. Dean, "Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured Methods," in Issues in Participant Observation, edited by George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 19-2U. 21. Dean, "How Do You Know if the Informant is Telling the Truth," pp. 105-llh. 22. For a discussion of how the participant observer may bias his re­ search see Morris S. Schwartz and Charlotte Green Schwartz, "Prob­ lems in Participant Observation," in Issues in Participant Observation, edited by George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (Reading, Massachusetts; Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 89-lOii; George J. McCall, "Data Quality Control in Participant Observation," in Issues in Participant Observation, edited by George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 128-Iiil. 58

23. Dennis E. Wenger end Jack M. Weller, Disaster Subcultures: The Cultural Residues of Community Disasters, Preliminary Paper No. 9 (Columbus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, 1973), P« 1*

21*. Wenger, Disaster Subcultures: The Cultural Residues of Community Disasters, p. 1 25. William J. Ooode and*Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), p. 1 S T . 26. There are three general types of case studies. The type presented here is a study of one social object as it exists in the present. The developmental case study is a second type. This form of analy­ sis studies the life history of the object under investigation. The third form is one which studies a multitude of similar sources and attempts to build a generalized model of the unit under study. CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MINE

Introduction

This chapter contains a description of the social organization of the nine setting. The focus is mainly on the formal organization^- of the mine. Later chapters, where the collected data are analyzed, deal with the occupational subculture of the mine setting. This construction is largely informal though contributed to and influenced by the struc- 2 ture, functions, and processes of the formal organization. As such, the dimensions of informal organization will be largely passed over.

The intent of this chapter is two-fold. First, it is intended to pro­ vide a context in which to understand the analyzed data. Second, and more importantly, the discussion is aimed at drawing out the main organi­ zational variables that contribute to the occupational subculture.

These variables will then be examined in light of the collected data.

The chapter is divided and organized in four main discussions.

The first discussion is a description of the mine's formal organisation.

The major concern is with outlining the structure and activities of units which make up the formal mine organization. The second topic is a description of mine technology and work flow. The focus here is on the technological structure and its implications for work organization. The third discussion, and the most important, will tie together the impact 60 and interrelationship of the nine's physical structure with considera­ tions of its technology and formal organization. It is principally within this discussion that the organizational variables of particular relevance to the occupational subculture w ill be drawn out for further analysis. The final discussion will again be descriptive and w ill examine the role of other organizations, the miners' union and govern­ mental mine regulatory agencies, in the mine setting.

The Formal Organization of the Mine

The mine where the study was conducted was one of a number of operations run by the same firm . Mined ore was shipped to processing plants located over U00 miles from the mine site for refinement and marketing. Thus, the mine was the first in a sequence of operations that processed the raw material into finished products. Each operating unit of the firm was run relatively independent of all others. There was little pressure on the mining operation to meet daily production quotas in order to insure that processing plants had sufficient materials.

However, a y early tonnage requirem ent was o p erativ e. The mine func­ tioned on a year-round basis stockpiling ore during the winter months when transportation was difficult and dispatching the stockpiles to processing plants in the summer insuring their continued operation.

Local'management guided the mines ona dally basis with major policy d ire c tiv e s issued from company headquarters located ina metropolitan area. Viewed as a whole, the firm was divided in toa series of geo­ graphically based divisions each of which was hierarchically arranged.3

Internally, the mine was divided in terms of line and staff 61 functions and possessed a predominantly hierarchical structure of author­ ity, (See Figure 1.)^* The overall operation was directed by the superin- tendent of mines. Line functions were directed down from this level through the assistant superintendent, mine foremen (two in number, one for each shift), the six shift bosses, and the production crews.

Personnel, safety, office operations, and engineering were staff functions providing technical expertise and support functions necessary for the overall operation of the mines. The personnel office did the hiring, assigned men to work crews, processed Job transfers, and partial­ ly represented the company on committees to process form al grievances, negotiate labor contracts, and the like. Office operations handled com­ pany record keeping, purohasing, and payroll. The engineering department was responsible for the design and development of mine Installations.

The safety office was a branch of the personnel department. One man who also had personnel responsibilities staffed this position. His responsibility was to interpret federal and state safety regulations, see to their implementation in mine policy, and direct their enforcement.

The safety office had a dual program. On the one hand it supervised safety activity aimed at the organization as a whole such as seeing that the powder magazines were properly constructed and maintained and making sure that mine equipment met federal and state standards as safely acceptable. A second focus of this office was directed at the Individual miner. The office was to enforce safe work practice by seeing that the men possessed and used proper safety equipment and that they worked in a safe manner. No formal safety training programs, as such, were corn- ducted. Periodically, the office participated in first aid instructiai 62

FIGURE 1

Formal Organizational Chart

Superintendent ■ -o f Mines

Personnel Office Safety Operations

A ssistan t Superintendent

Surface Operating Engineering Foreman Foreman Department

S h ift Boas

Production Crews

C ontract * and Day's Pay Miners

Black linos indicate line and direction of formal authority. offered the miners. When a man was hired, the safety office issued him a company safety manual with instructions to read and follow its con­ tents. This practice constituted the extent of formal safety training.

However, to encourage safe work, tho office occasionally sent memoranda to the drys which were posted on the bulletin boards reminding the miners of various safety rules, informing them of upcoming disaster drills, new safety regulations, and so forth. The company, through the safety office, also offered a safety incentive program whereby a man accumulated points for each month of accident free work. At six month intervals, the accumulated points could be converted to cash with 4>lp.00 the maximum yearly bonus.

The researcher, not qualified as a mine inspector, was unable to accurately assess the effectiveness of the safety office with regard to specifications set for tho organization as a whole. However, after be­ coming familiar with state and federal regulations and making a visual inspection of much of the operation, it appeared as if the firm was broadly meeting its requirements in this regard.^ The safety program directed at the individual miners did not appear to fare so well. But, that is an involved issue and one which w ill be more thoroughly discussed in chapters concerned with data analysis.

The major function of the superintendent of mines is to oversee and direct the entire operation. The assistant superintendent is the major director of production. His role primarily includes supervising production and coordinating the engineering and development of mine installations. The foreman is the major operating official of the mine.

A general foreman in other industries would be an analogous position. 614

Tho shift boss Is the immediate supervisor of the production crew.

Support activities such as maintenance, operation of surface installa­ tions, warehousing, and surface* haulage fall under the direction of a surface foreman. This post takes direction from the assistant superin­ tendent and is co-equal with the operating foreman. While not techni­ cally part of the line organization, the surface foreman and his crews provide supportive services without which the mine could not function.

Production crews with approximately 20-25 men per crew are divided in to two classes of workers. Those on day's pay (e .g ., work for a fixed hourly wage) perform the bulk of the underground support activities such as the transportation of oro, waste rock, and supplies as well as house­ keeping tasks Bnd minor maintenance. They run tho trams, dregways, and do general labor. Day's pay personnel usually make up about one-third of the number of men on a production crew. The remaining members of the crew work on contract (e.g., a piece rate pay scale). The contractors are either timbermcn or miners. Timbermen are responsible for the con­ struction and repair of major timbered installotions such as ore chutes and bins. The contract miner does the actual excavating of oro and develops underground installations such as haulage driftB, raises, and sh a fts.

Each production crew (beyond the distinctions of day's pay versus contract miners) is made up of a collection of small groups and indivi­ duals who perform work tasks in assigned areas of the mine. Contractors work in groups of two or three menj day's pay miners e ith e r work in pairs or alone. Each group of contractors works independently of a ll others. Their work process does not hinge on production elsewhere in the mine* Only services provided by day's pay personnel (usually the trammer) directly affect their work. Thua, the need to coordinate activities between production units (i.e., groups of contractors) is small, if not nonexistent. Major coordinating activities are directed by the shift boss and stem primarily from the need to provide the con­ tractors with the services performed by day's pay personnel.

Technology, Work Flow and Mine Work

Mining is a mass production industry.6 it produces a large quan­ tity of a standardized product using a relatively fixed set of tools applied in a standardized manner. A d rill powered by compressed air, a collection of drill steel and bits, a quantity of explosives, materials for the support of underground workings such as timbers and rock-bolts, and a few hand tools such as shovels, axes, and clamping tools make up the miner's complement of work instruments. These tools are applied in a re la tiv e ly standardized work c y cle. The work cy cle, fo r the co n tract miner, is one that ends in blasting, so that each new shift finds a pile of broken rook in the stope. At the start of the shift, one man slushes the muck to an ore bin while the other starts drilling. Barring down loose rock, timbering, or repairs are made as needed. Completion of the drilling is followed by loading the d rill holes with explosives and blasting. This cycle is referred to as "round in and round out." Un­ like underground coal and "soft-rock" mining, technological change has not fundamentally changed the work process.? The method of work in hardrock mines is s till much like that done 70-100 years ago,® though technological changes have made the work easier, capable of greater 66 efficiency, and safer. Thus, for hardrock mining, technological change has had its major impact on the content of the work process not its stru c tu re .

A salient point about the work flow and technological structure of mining is that the mass product (ore), is produced by a collection of workmen working relatively independent of each other. Each work group is interconnected with the others only insofar as they are dependent upon supplies and services coordinated by the formal organization and actuated through the work of day's pay personnel. Within each work place (drifts, stopes, raises, etc.), the contractors perform all the necessary tasks of the mining cycle. Their end product (broken rock) is but one portion of a composite added together to make up the production figure for the mine as a whole. Unlike other industries such as assembly line auto manufacture, the miner can complete his work taBks even if other production units (e.g., other groups of contractors) are unable to finish their work. Thus, the technological structure and work flow is one which demands little coordination between production units and each is relatively free to work the pace with which it is capable or comfort­ ab le.

A second feature related to mine technology is that the final pro­ duct is rough and unfinished. Broken rock does not have to meet formal quality requirements. However, by common practice, two very gross stan­ dards are followed. First, the rock must be broken to a sufficiently small size capable of being transported, a requirement met in almost all cases by the routine blasting operation. And, second, the amount of waste rock mixed with the ore is to be minimized. Mining waste rock is not only uneconomical but also contributes to the erratic development of mine workings, possibly preventing further mining in the area or making the area unsafe. Since these standards are of a gross nature, they do not require constant monitoring. As such, mining technology is not one in which there is any significant need for quality control throughi n r spection or supervision.

Finally, mine technology is closely related to the geological structure of the mine. Ore bodies vary significantly within a mine. In some places a vein may be only a few inches wide, whereas in other loca­ tions its dimensions may exceed 100 feet. Veins vary in their steepness) some are vertical, others horizontal, still others in-between. Rock, even of the same ore, may vary in hardness) some quantities are relative­ ly soft vis vis other locations where it is hard. Thus, some locations are easier to mine than others. In a similar fashion some places are safer, more economical to mine, or more accessible to the mining process.

Qlven these contingencies the technological structure of mining must be flexible enough to fit variation in natural conditions and be organized in such a way that problems in one area of the mine are of minimal in­ fluence elsewhere. The actual mine technology incorporating a few sim­ ple, but versatile tools, reflects the geological considerations, the rough unpolished nature of the product, and the requirements of mass pro* duction. Moreover, the mine organized as a collection of relatively independent pockets of workmen, attempts to maximize the needs and effects of the technological structure.

Within this discussion, as in that which preceded, the focus has been almost purely descriptive. In the next section the considerations 68 raised thus far will be Integrated Into a larger discussion tying in the mine's physical structure so that some variables of importance might be delineated and examined further with the collected data.

Physical Structure, Technology, and Formal Organisation

A mine, particularly one in operation for an extended period of time such as the research site, has spralling physical dimensions.

Accounts of the Sunshine Nine disaster indicote the mine had over HO miles of underground workings and, on any given work day, mine personnel were at work in a myriad of locations from the earth's surface to levels

5600 feet underground.? While the research site may not have the physi­ cal dimensions found at the Sunshine, by any count it was large. In order to personally contact all 22 men that worked on the researcher's crew, taking the most direct route, one would have to travel a distance of about four miles including climbs of 500 feet or more to reach men working on levels above the main haulage d rift. It is not uncommon to find distances of a half mile or more separating work groups. Moreover, within the mine, spacial distance is not transcended by communicative media such as intercoms or telephone. While such apparatuses aro loca­ ted in certain areas, they are not found in work places such as stopes, drift headings, or raises. The physical structure of a mine can best be viewed as a collection of small, isolated work aroas interconnected by a haulage drift.

The mine's physical structure, technology, and formal organisation combine in forming a distinct pattern of work organization. This pattern has a dual nature - the contract system and that of day's pay. The contract pattern applies, with the exception of a handful of timbermen, to the miner digging the mineral (e.g., directly engaged in production).

This work is paid on a piece-rate pay scale. A fixed price is paid per cubic foot of rock removed. Wages depend on the amount of rock mined though a d a ily wage (cu rren tly 314 $ .0 0 ) is guaranteed if the miner fails to get his rock out. Measurements are taken each week, the number of cubic feet calculated, and the miner paid accordingly. While it is pos­ sible for the contractor to earn $80.00 - $100.00 per day, the daily average is closer to $55.00.

The contract system answers a number of problems faced by the organization. Beyond any "carrot and stick" philosophy or view of the worker as strictly motivated by economic concerns,^ the contract sys­ tem's major asset is that it makes the contractor's group (e.g., usually two men) almost completely responsible for structuring and completing the work process within their assigned work area. The contractor's group is thus autonomous and self-regulating.^- Provided the contractors meet the requirement of "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay," that is excavate a sufficient quantity of rock to cover the dally guaranteed wage, little supervision is exerted with regard to how or when the work is accomplished. The. formal organization may dictate howfar a stope is to be advanced, where to opena new work area, and the like, but it does not Intrude into day-to-day activities a of contracting group. Thus, while the organizational chart may delineate the basic lines of authority, lines which are operative for non-contracting personnel, contractors are largely outside the formal line of authority. The shift boss may be technically the contractors' superior but, in reality, he is more of an 70

advisor and coordinator of other mine services.

In placing the contract miner in an autonomous, self-regulating

group, the organization overcomes a number of hurdles built into the

mine setting by the physical plant and its attendent technology. Nor­

mally, mass production industries are characterized by a large span of

control.With each s h ift boss in charge of a crew with 20-25 members,

the mine is typical in this respect. Span of control refers to the

number of personnel directed by one supervisor and it is noted that as

this span increases, there is decreasing control over subordinates.11

However, mine conditions and technology both add to and d e tra c t from problems associated with the span of control. In the first instance,

the fact that one producing unit is not dependent upon another for the

successful completion of its tasks, means that a supervisor is not

necessary to constantly direct or coordinate production processes.

Second, the rough, unpolished nature of the final product (broken rock) abrogates the need for inspection and close quality control. Third, the mine's physical structure with men scattered in isolated work places, makes the mere process of traveling to these areas cumbersome and d iffi­ cult to closely supervise. As such, with the contract system shifting the producing units largely outside the formal organizational authority structure, the organization can concentrate its supervisory and coordin­ ating activities in spheres more crucial to the overall operation of the mine, such as transportation, operation of surface installations, con­ struction and maintenance.^

The coordination of activities toward the realization of some goal is a function of all formal organizations As already noted, there is 71 little need to coordinate mine production processes given the nature of the product and Its attendant technology* Coordination is vital, how­ ever, with services supportive of production. The contractor's work depends on services supplied by day's pay personnel. It is at this lovel that the formal organization alms its coordinating efforts. Mine production does not depend on the individual activities of the scattered groups of contractors. It does depend, however, on an uninterrupted flew of necessary production supplies such as dynamite and the continued removal of ore and waste rock. These services are provided by day's pay personnel. And, while there is considerable latitude for the contractors in their work process, this is not the case for day's pay miners. Their work is directly supervised and monitored as much as the physical setting of the mine will allow. Unlike the contractors, day's pay minors are very much within the formal authority system and they commonly feel its brunt. The need to insure coordinated and uninterrupted flow of suppor­ tive services demands that the authority structure keop direct control over such activities and the men who perform these tnsks. The need for coordination and direct control over processes such as mine transporta­ tion can be immediately seen in problems associated with production variation. Production from the various work places regularly fluctuates.

Even if all contracting groups worked at the same pace, their resulting tonnages would vary simply because rock in some places is easier to mine than in others. Tied to this geological-technological consideration is a variable spawned in the contract system whereby the production unit is self-regulating. The contract system specifies a production minimum refereed to as the "day's pay rock," that is a quantity of rock 72 sufficient to cover payment of the guaranteed daily wage* No maximum level of output is formally described. As such, depending on the in- terests of the miners within the contracting group, production output is variable. Some weeks a group may bring out tonnages so that the men are earning .570.00 per day. At other times the payments may be $3U*00 or some other level.

Variation of this type is not crucial for mine production as a whole since there is a certain "clustering around the mean."^ As pro­ duction drops from one group of miners, it increases elsewhere so that total mine production holds relatively constant. But, for a particular production crew this variation can be problematic. The shift boss must constantly monitor output in the different production areas to see that the rock is transported, supplies brought in, and maintenance completed.

Thus, while it is partially possible to set a schedule for day's pay activities, the schedule must be loosely constructed so that it can be adjusted to meet situational exigencies.

As this example partially illustrates, the dual nature of authority within the production crews (democratic for the contractors, authoritar­ ian for the man on day's pay)*? which allow the organization to harmonize its needs with the physical and technological considerations of the mine 18 setting, also creates social consequences of a dysfunctional nature.

In this instance it is the contract system allowing the miners to vsiy production as it suits their interests resulting in a need for tight control over the coordinating mechanisms. A second, related problem is a certain cleavage within the production crew between the contractors and day's pay miners. The first class of workmen is paid for what it 73 produces; the other is not. As such, there is always a certain tension within the crew between the two complements of men.^ As w ill be illus­ trated by the collected data, there is a conflict in values between the two se ts of workmen. The mine's au th o rity system, actuated through the shift boss, attempts to mitigate this cleavage with its "authoritarian" supervision of day's pay personnel. In its usual form the shift boss directs the day's pay men to fill the contractors' requests. However, this is only a partial solution and the contractor-day's pay relation­ ship is important in what transpires informally.

Another problem also stems from the contract system and its trans­ fe rrin g of au th o rity in the work place to the work group. In making the contractors responsible for production activity, the organization also relinquishes much of its authority over other matters. A major issue of this type is safety. While formally responsible for the safety of the m i n e r s ,20 and formally empowered to set and enforce safety standards, in actual fact, the organization rarely deals with the issue. What takes place in the stope is, or becomes, the contractor's business.

Just why this process takes place is unclear but three factors seem to be involved. First, the organization defines the contractors' work area as their own at least in terms of production. This is followed with a relatively democratic supervisory process giving the contractors great responsibility and latitude in structuring and completing their work. Finally, the physical dimensions of the mine prohibit a constant monitoring of work activities. As such, the contractors, as an autono­ mous, unwatched, self-regulating unit, co-opt other spheres of authority which the organization ostensibly retains for itself. A second factor 71* appears to lie in role requirements of the shift boss. This position is one of immediate safety supervisor as well as for production. He is under pressure from management to f i l l both requirem ents. But the na­ ture of the contract system effectively strips him of much authority in the production sphere. Thus, the shift boss, who depends upon the con­ tractors to move the rock and thereby contribute to fulfilling one aspect of his role, cannot afford to risk the antagonism of the contrac­ tors by exerting authority over their activities.2* Finally, a third factor appears to be a certain conflict between organizational goals.

Certainly, one company goal is production. Just what other organiza­ tional goals exist is unclear; however, certain aims such as safety are supposed to be organizational goals, at least insofar as they are dicta­ ted by law. It is frequently charged that mining companies are derelict in this regard stressing production above alle l s e . 22 jt may be that the process by which contractors co-opt organizational authority stems, in part, from an organizational decision to pursue one goal to the neglect of others.

Within this section a number of issues have been raised . P articu­ lar attention has been focused on the physical structure of the mine, technology, and organizational needs in explaining the social organiza­ tion of the mine setting. The dual nature of the authority structure has also been discussed as have some of its related problems. In follow­ ing chapters where the data are analyzed, attention will again be paid these topics in assessing the relationship of the mine's formal system of organization and the particular occupational subculture of the set­ ting. Again, given the research focus, safety and danger will be a 7? major consideration.

The Union and the Government

This section is intended to describe two sets of organizations beyond the mining company that have direct influence in the mine settirg.

In some cases these influences are direct as in the case of labor con­ tracts which specify payment schedules, conditions of work, grievance procedures, and the like. In other instances the influence, at least for the miner, may be relatively indirect such as safety regulations for mine personnel specified by a governmental agency but which are mediated through the company's organizational structure.

The research site was unionized. All non-salaried mine personnel were required to be members of a local chapter of an international union.

The union was organized along in d u stria l lin es so th at personnel whose job descriptions might be reasonably classified as "crafts" were included in the union's ranks.^3 Union members elected a President, Vice Presi­ dent, Secretary-Treasurer, and seven grievance committeemen, with one committeeman from each of the six production crews and one member repre­ senting surface members. The union's major functions included negotiating the bi-annual labor contract, maintaining a formal grievance procedure for the employ­ ees, and providing an annual picnic fo r union members. In addition to the grievance procedures and general specification of wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions, the labor contract called for the union to participate jointly with the company in a Safety and Health

Committee. The purpose of the committee was to work toward the elimina­ tion of dangerous practices and conditions in accordance with state and 76 federal safety regulations. A regularly scheduled monthly meeting was to be held to work toward this end.

Information from the research site suggested that the union was relatively inactive. A grievance committeeman indicated that there were few formal grievances to process and that on the whole, labor-management relations were basically harmonious. The general tenor of his words was echoed by most all miners. Furthermore, the issue of mine safety was not one in which there appeared to be much union activity.

A relatively harmonious pattern of lBbor-management relations is not one that characterizes the mining industry as a whole, either pre­ sently or in thep a s t . 2^ one can only speculate just why this mining operation did not fit the usual pattern. However, two factors may be operative at the mine site. First, the relatively small size of the mining operation and, particularly, its subunits (e.g., production crews and groups therein) may contribute to a degree of employee satis­ faction that allows a more temperate union stance. There is some indi­ cation that organizational size, particularly its subunits, is positively correlated with labor disputes, grievances, and so forth.25 a second factor may be the organization's policy of selecting managerial per­ sonnel by promotion from the productionc r e w s . 26 There seemed to be a genuine climate of trust and respect for most of the supervisors on behalf of the miners. As the grievance committeeman indicated, there were few formal grievances, but when a dispute did arise, he was capable of "fixing it up by talking it over with Hank (shiftb o s s .)"27

The union, through i t s n eg o tiatio n s with management, makes a direct contribution to social life in the mine. Some unions are more 77

active than others* That the union at the research site vas, perhaps,

less militant or active than others, in no way detracts from the fact

that its actions, posture, and profile contribute to life underground.

Like the union, various governmental agencies, notably state and

federal bureaus of mines, have an input into the mine setting. With its

creation in 1910 the U. S. Bureau of Mines set forth as one of its main

provisions the followingi

That it shall be the province of said bureau and its director, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, to make diligent investigation of the methods of mining, especially in relation to the safety of miners, and the appliances best adapted to prevent accidents, the possible improvement of conditions under which mining operations are carried on, the treatment of ores and other mineral substances, the use of explosives and electricity, the prevention of accidents, and other inquiries and technologic in­ vestigations pertinent to said industries, and from time to tine make such public reports of the work, investigations, and information obtained as the Secretary of said department may direct, with the recommendations of suchb u r e a u . 2 8

While the Federal Bureau of Mines may be the largest, the various

states have similar agencies. At both levels of government these organi­

zations are involved in all aspects of mining from taking geological surveys with the hope of detecting new ore bodies to devising programs

of accident prevention. The major implication of these agencies, for

this study, is that they specify and enforce standards of safety. Per­

iodic inspections are made to determine whether the mine is meeting

safety standards. Backed with the power to close a mine or to impose

fines for malfeasance in this regard, these regulatory agencies have a

central role regarding conditions of danger at a mine site. However,

beyond any standards they may impose on the mining organization as a 79 whole, these agencies also impose regulations that apply to individual behavior. But, in these instances, the mining company is charged with

the responsibility of enforcement. As will be noted in the chapters concerned with data analysis, the role of the governmental regulatory agency is crucial to the overall pattern of mine danger and makes a sig­ nificant contribution to mine safety. At that time, the analysis will also view the miners' perspective of those organizations and their im­ pact in the mine s e ttin g .

Summary The four preceding sections of this chapter have attempted to des­ cribe and analyze the social organization of the mine setting. The firet discussion was aimed at delineating the syst9m of formal organization

and the activities of the different parties within the organizational

context. The second area investigated was the technological structure

and work flow in the mine s e ttin g . The th ird d iscu ssio n , and most im­

portant, tied the organizational structure to the technology and physi­

cal structure of the mine setting. Particular attention was directed at

how these factors combine in producing a dual system of authority - the

democratic contract system and the authoritarian system for men on day's

pay. Further discussion attempted to point out some of the organiza­

tional problems associated with this system of organization, particularly

those with a social origin. The final discussion presented a brief des­

cription of the miners' union and the governmental mine regulatory agen­

cies. In later chapters there will be a systematic attempt to tie the

issues and implications raised within this chapter into the context and analysis of the occupational subculture of the mine setting. 79

Notes: Chapter IV

1. Formal organization refers to a system jof rules and objectives which officially prescribe and allocate tasks, privileges, and responsi­ bilities, thereby specifying how the activity of a group is to be carried on. From Oeorge A. Lundberg et. a l., Sociology, Uth edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 7S\x* Informal organization refers to activities such as traditional (though unauthorized) work breaks, patterns of gambling, Joking, and other actions which de­ velop through social interaction within the organization and which are not formally prescribed or specified. See Eugene V. Schneider, Industrial Sociology, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 22U. 2. Whyte has suggested that studies of organizations draw a false di­ chotomy between patterns of organization labeled as formal and in­ formal. He suggests that the two patterns cannot be sharply distinguished since they are mutually interdependent. This study accepts the argument of mutual interdependence. However, the fonnal- infornal dichotomy.is used, not suggesting a polarized conflict between the forms of organization but to demark distinctions between activities formally specified and those that are not. See William Foote Whyte, Organizational Behavior: Theory and Application (Homewood, Illinois: infin-Dorsey, pp. 70-72.

3. It is difficult to specify in more detail the organization of the firm as a whole. Given tho research role, the researcher wa3 unable to obtain detailed information. The information presented here was gathered in conversations with mine officials and even they could not clearly delineate the details of the firm's overall organiza­ tional structure. li. The research role prevented the researcher from obtaining a copy of the organizational chart. The discussion and accompanying drawing of tho mino's formal organization is drawn from conversations with mine personnel. As such, it represents a view of the organization from the bottom up and may not be entirely complete or accurate.

5. A conversation with a state mine inspector reinforced this impression though the gentleman, interviewed at his home, could not substan­ tiate his remarks with any documentary evidence.

6. Considerations of the technology and organization of industrial organizations has divided these firms into four broad classifica­ tions: unit production such as hand-blown glass containers, small- batch production such as tool and dye manufacture, mass production such as mining or assembly line automobile production, and continuous-flow production such as oil refining. For a discussion see Joan Woodward, In d u s tria l O rganizations: Theory and P ractice (London: Oxford University fress, 196^ 80

7. For a discussion of the impact of technological change on the social organization of coal mining see E. L. Trist and K. W. Bamforth, "Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-Oetting," Human Relations U (February 1951), pp. 3-33; John H. Ooldthorpo, "Technical Organization as a Factor in Supervisor-Worker Conflict," British Journal of Sociology 10 (September 1959), pp. 213-230.

8. For a description of hardrock mining methods seventy-five years ago see Harry C. Freeman, A Brief History of Butte« Montana (Chicago: The Henry 0. Shepard Company, 1900), pp. 86-96.

9. Rachel Scott, "Yes Sir, This Has Certainly Been Considered a Safe Mine," The A tlantic Monthly 230 (December 1972), p.IOU j U. S ., Department "of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Final Report of Major Mine Fire Disaster, Sunshine Mine, Sunshine Mining Company, Kellogg, Shoshone County-, Idaho by Stanley MT jarrett, Health and Safety Report (Alameda, California: Metal and Nonmetal Mine Health and Safety Western D istrict, 1972), pp. L-5. 10. An early managerial philosophy referred to as "Taylorism," after it3 principal exponent, or "Scientific Mangement" viewed workmen as strictly motivated by economic concerns. As such, this school of thought strongly advocated piece-work systems of payment. For a capsulized discussion of this perspective see Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industrial Sociology, 2nd edition (New York: Harper and Row, 19610, pp. 6h7-656.

11. T rist, "Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-G etting," p. 6.

12. Woodward, Industrial Organization: Theory and Practice, pp. 52-53*

13. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Soott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1962), p. 16o. lii. For a discussion of some of the advantages and disadvantages of the contract system see "Social Problems in Mine3 other than Coal Mines," In tern a tio n al Labour Review76 (December 1957), pp. 527-539.

15. A condensed paraphrase of the definition and functions of formal organization. Miller, Industrial Sociology, pp. 11U-119. . 16. Clustering around the mean refers to a statistical phenomenon which notes that tho majority of scores will group around some arithmetic average and w ill then be d istrib u te d in p a ttern marked by a normal curve. See John H. Mueller, Karl F. Schuessler, and Herbert L. Costner, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology, 2nd edition (Boston: Houghton-Mi'fflin, 1970), pp. 1^7-173. 81

17- Students of industrial work groups frequently distinguish types of supervisory styles such as "general” versus "close," "democratic" versus "authoritarian." In general democratic supervision refers to a supervisory sty le characterized by the sharing of power and participative decision-making. Authoritarian styles concentrate power and decision making in the supervisor. For a general d is ­ cussion of these styles and their effects see Stephan M. Sales, "Supervisory Style and Productivity: Review and Theory," in Readings in Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, edited by L. L. Cummings and W. £. S cott (Homewood, I llin o is : Irw in- Dorsey, 1969), pp. 636-61:2.

18. The reference here is to latent dysfunctions. See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, I 968), Chapter 3*

19* A similar phenomenon is noted in the relationship between line and staff personnel. See Melville Dalton, "Conflicts Between Staff and Lino," in Readings on Economic Sociology, edited by Neil J, Smelser (Englewood C liffs , New Jersey: P rentice-H all, 1965)# pp. 215-225. 20. Federal, but, particularly, state laws are emphatic in this regard. In the s t3te where the study was conducted, mining companies were required to contribute to Workman's Compensation Fund.

21. For a discussion of the duties, responsibilities, and problems associated with the foreman's role (a position analogous to tho mine s h ift boss) see Donald E. Wray, "Marginal Men of Industry: Tho Foreman," American Journal of Sociology$h (19U9), pp. 298- 301j Fritz J. Roethlisberger, '*The Foreman: Master and Victim of Double Talk," Harvard Business Review 23 (Spring 19h5)# pp. 283-298.

22. John Bartlow Martin, "The Blast in Centralio No. 5»" Harpers Magazine 196 (March 19U8), pp. 193-220; Scott, "Yes, Sir, This Has Certainly Been Considered a Safe Mine," pp. 101-UU.

23. Clark Kerr, "Labor Markets: Their Character and Consequences," in Labor Problems: Cases and Readings, edited by George P. Schultz and John R. Coleman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 351-365.

2h. Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegal, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike — An International Comparison," in Industrial Conflict, edited by Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur- Ross (New York: McGraw-Hill, 195U), pp. 189-205; Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1 5 5 0 7 : ------25. Leonard R. Sayles, Behavior in Industrial Work Groups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958)# pp. 56-58;" Lyroan W, Porter and 82

Edward E. Lawler, "Properties of Organization Structure in Relation to Job Attitudes and Job Behavior," in Readings in Organizational Behavior and Hunan Performance, edited by L. L. Cummings and W. E. Scott^(Homewood, Illinois! Irwin-Dorsey, 1969), pp. I*15-U2U.

26. This policy appears to be changing. Recently the organization be­ gan hiring college trained personnel to fill supervisory positions.

27* This pattern of informally settling grievances is not peculiar to the mine s i t e . See M elville Dalton, "U nofficial Union-Management R elations," in Readings on Economic Sociology, edited by N eil J . Smelser (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 129-139'. 28. U. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Prevention of Explosives Accidents in Metal Hines, Miner's Circular No. 5b (Washlngton7 U. C.: Government Printing Office, 19U5)# p* H i. CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA

Introduction

In the opening chapter of this study, five major research questions were posed including:

.1. Are dangerous occupations characterized by some type of distinctive subculture which is adaptive for the occu­ pational participants in the face of recurrent occupa­ tional threat? But, more specifically, is the variable cf occupational danger of sufficient saliency to manifest its effects upon occupational participants in a complex of systematically interrelated traits that form an occupational subculture of danger?

2. What is the content of an occupational subculture of danger? That is, what are its elements and how are they interrelated?

3. How is the content of the subculture transmitted to new potential members of the occupation? Specifically, what is the so c ializ a tio n mechanism and how does i t operate?

b. How fruitful is the concept occupational subculture of danger in explaining human behavior in dangerous occu­ pations? For example, can accidents be explained^ at least partially, using this concept?

5. Is i t possible to construct a model of an occupational subculture of danger? That is, is it possible to abstract out certain variables which appear central to the development, maintenance, and operation of an occupational subculture of danger?

In this and the following three chapters, the research will attempt

to answer these questions by analyzing the data collected at the mine

site. The first two questions listed above are questions related to the

83 stuctural organization of the mine setting. They ask "What exists and in what degree?" In seeking to answer these questions the research will make use of a structural perspective.^- This perspective asks, "What is the nature and c h a ra c te ris tic s o f the s o c ia l phenomenon under study?"

A second perspective, processual in nature, will seek to answer the third question regarding how new members of the occupation are in­ ducted and integrated into the occupational subculture. Process analysis seeks to understand the social processes related to the occurrence of a social phenomenon and which sustain it over time. In this study process analysis is directed at exploring the processes of socialization by which new members are integrated into the occupational subculture of the mine s e ttin g .

A third perspective, functionalistic in nature, will also be applied to the dots. This phase of study works with the analytical question of what are the social consequences of the phenomenon under study. It is hoped that the fourth research quostion posed above might be answered here. The question seeks to determine how fruitful the con­ cept occupational subculture of danger is with regard to explaining human behavior in dangerous occupations. Thus, it is necessary to ex­ plore the consequences of this subculture on human behavior.

The final research question seeks its answer in the material pre­ sented in the prior analyses by abstracting relevant variables and con­ structing a model of an occupational subculture of danger. However, in building this model there is more than just a tying together of variables which appear to explain the phenomenon. At least by inference, the attempted model building w ill seek to illuminate the causal forces operative in tho subculture of danger's development.

The remaining portion of this chapter will initiate the structural analysis of the occupational subculture found at the mine setting. In part, this process has already begun with the material presented in

Chapter IV concerned, primarily, with the formal organization of the mine. To complete the analysis the research will now examine the infor­ mal social dimensions of the mine site. In an effort to insure clarity and cohesiveness in the presentation of the data, the opening remarks of the structural analysis will contain a description of the dimensions used to organize the data. These dimensions are viewed as the elements which constitute the structure of a subculture.

Structural analysis will continue in Chapter VI and will be com­ pleted in Chapter VII. Chapter VII will also contain examinations of tho data from processual and functionalistic perspectives. Chapter VIII will complete the data analysis with the construction of a model of an occupational subculture of danger.

Structural Analysis

The dimensions used to structurally analyze the occupational sub­ culture of the mine setting are drawn from four major sources: a dis­ cussion of culture provided by Williams,? a consideration of elements making up a d is a s te r subculture provided by Wenger and W eller,^ a specification of tho aspects and development of subcultures found in a variety of research studies and theoretical models,*4 and a review of the basic components of a social system provided by Lundberg.^ These sources have been combined in a structural model of the dimensions incorporated 86 in a subculture (see Figure 2).

The model premises that a subculture is located in and is part of an environmental context including physical, biological, cultural, psy­ chological, and social phenomena. The environmental context provides human actors with problems of adjustment as well as the resources, tan­ gible and intangible, used to meet or overcome such problems. The con­ cept of subculture used in this study explicity makes these assumptions.^

The components of the subculture are located in three systems.7

The systems include a normative- valuetive system, a position network, and patterns of behavior. The normative-valuative system specifies the goals of human action, outlines the rules by which these goals are to be reached, and indicates a reservoir of things known from which other elements of tho system are constructed. For this model four basic ele­ ments comprise the normative-valuative system. The first element is a set of beliefs. This is the basic category of material which specifies the nature of the environment and its constituent elements. Belief in this case refers to things reliably certified as true in the empirical world (i.e., knowledge) as well as that certified as true without proof

(i.e., pure belief). This latter dimension includes things yet subject to scientific test as well as that beyond the domain of empirical veri­ fication.^ The combination of knowledge with pure belief under one heading reflects an attempt to avoid errors in taxonoi^y. In many cases pure belief shades into the realm of empirical knowledge. In other in­ stances, social definitions are operative. Certain constructions are certified by a situation's participants as knowledge and acted toward

as if they were, even though empirical prcof may be non-existant. 87

FI3UE 2 Dimensions of a Subculture

Tho Environment

Physical, Biological, Cultural, Psychological, Social

Subculture

Behavior

7 \

Position Ilotwork

------M ------ilorma tiva-Va lua tiv e Syn tom

Values

^ Sanctions

B eliefs

Arrowed lin e s in d icate mutual interdependence and influence. 8B

A normative order is a second element of the system and consti­ tutes the rules of conduct for human behavior.9 A system of values or states of desireability make up the third component of the normative- valuative system.^ Values can best be viewed as goals or objectives toward which human activity is directed. A sanctioning system is the last component. Sanctions refer to the rewards and punishments meted out for conformity to or deviation from the normative order. ^ Each of these elements is related to all others in a pattern of mutual determina­ tion. Combined together they form an interrelated web which prescribes and specifies the requirements and expectations of human behavior. This system demarks the what, when, why, and how of human activity determined through shared human interaction.

The second major component of the subculture is the position n e t­ work. This term refers to a set of interconnected socially determined places in a group or organization.12 Positions are assigned individual actors or groups and Qre based upon personal characteristics, social activities, and institutional functions.*3 Each position has an affil­ iated role (duties and obligations) and status (rights and privileges).

The specifications and expectations outlined by the normative-valuative system are actualiaed through the roles and statuses attached to the positions of the position network.

The last component of the subculture is patterns of behavior. The specifications and expectations outlined by the normative-valuative sys­ tem and actualized through the roles and statuses attached to the posi­ tion network, manifest themselves in overt patterns of behavior. This system and the others, along with their component parts, make up an 89 interrelated and interdetermined social whole. Patterns of behavior emanate from the combined influence of the norm ative-valuative system and position network, but behavior also influences their development, structure, and processes as well. A subculture, from this perspective, is seen as a dynamic entity. Constant interaction between component parts and with the larger environment shape its structure, content, and processes.

While this research views a subculture as a dynamic entity, tho scope of the work will not allow a complete delineation of- this feature with the data collected at the mine. Rather, the data are largely organized to reflect the structure of the occupational subculture. This process begins with an examination of tho normative-valuative system and its constituent parts. The first component to be considered is the set of beliefs held by the miners. This discussion will be followed in

Chapter VI by examinations of the normative order, the sanctioning sys­ tem, and system of values. That these elements are discussed in a dis­ crete fashion does not reflect any attempt to minimize the importance of their mutual interrelationship. Rather, in seeking to clearly outline the structure of the occupational subculture, a consideration of each element as discrete phenomena will facilitate this natter.

Hormative-Valuative System: Belief

Belief refers, in this study, to expressions, opinions, attitudes, or facts that are reliably certified as true in the empirical world

(i.e., knowledge) as well as that certified as true without proof (i.e., pure belief).^ Thus, what follows under this heading includes a range of expression that is purely mythical in nature on the one extreme to 90 fa c tu a l knowledge on the other. However, In a l l cases, the b e lie f is a shared entity common to many if not all the miners.

The beliefs that will be discussed fall in three broad categories.

First, there will be an exploration of the beliefs regarding the nature of mining as an occupation. This focus will examine the miners' overall estimation of their job, the negative and positive aspects of the occu­ pation, and why the miners view their occupation in this manner. Second, the discussion will focus on beliefs affiliated with the socialization and training process involved in becoming a miner. Finally, the study will view the beliefs regarding the nature of mine danger and how it is to be treated. Intersperced within and between these major discussions there w ill also be a few short commentaries regarding other beliefs common in the mine setting. In the main, these latter discussions can be viewed as supportive or subsidiary beliefs to the three mBjor clusters of belief cited above.

The first major belief pertains to an assessment of mining as an occupation. There is a very pervasive belief that mining is a poor occupational choice particularly for a lifetime work career. As an overall assessment, and inelegantly put, mining is not a good occupation.

The first feature that distinguishes this assessment is the cognitive recognition that mining does not provide secure employment. As an ex­ tractive industry the ore is eventually worked out and the mines close.

Demand for mine products is variable and historical examinations of the industry reveals a cyclical pattern of boom and bust. Revolutions in mine technology have sharply c u rta ile d mine employment without loss of production, and mining is an industry that has had a long and embittered 91 history of pcor industrial-labor relations. ^

The constant fluctuation in the industry employment patterns has been partially responsible for the creation of a casual, irregular em­ ployment history for sizeable groups of miners. Some individuals are labeled "tramp" or "gyppo" miners. Their life style consists of a pro­ gression of moves from mine to mine working for a while and then moving on. Another large group of miners punctuate (or have done so in the p ast) th e ir mine employment w ith periods of work a t other types of Jobs.

At Mine A of the research site all the researcher's work mates had em­ ployment histories which included work outside the mining industry.

Half of the crew had prior mine experience with other firms.

The general pattern of insecure employment was evident at the research site, though perhaps to a lesser degree than might be found elsewhere. The mines of this area have operated almost continuously since the mid-1920's and proven ore reserves indicate that mining will be possible for another 20 years at a minimum, provided it is economically feasible. Nevertheless, the company has curtailed the size of its opera­ tions, Pour different mines run by the firm have closed and employment at those mines s till operating has been cut better than 50 percent from i t s e a rly 1960*3 high of over U00 men. The miners are aware of th is pattern. Conversations about lay-offs and strikes are common and a large la y -o ff a few years ago is quite w ell remembered. Commenting on the relatively few experienced miners on the crew, one 35-year veteran of the underground saidt

Don't have many miners here. The old ones all quit or re tire d and a couple of years ago the company la id o ff most of th e ir young m iners. Lots o f them were real good too and they never came back. 92

Another miner, laid off on that occasion and subsequently rehired, re­ counted his own experience.

Vo didn't know nothing was going to happen. I camo out of the mine a t noon to get some more prim ers and there it was on the bulletin board. A list of all the men with less than seven years seniority all through the coming Friday. I didn't even wait to finish the shift. I got right in my car and went over to Mining City and hired on that afternoon.

The insecurity of employment based upon historical knowledge of the Industry and personal experience at the mine site was mitigated to some degree by current conditions within the industry and firm. The miners were aware that there was a shortage of experienced miners. Lo­ cal newspapers frequently carried advertisements from mining companies seeking m iners. The company was also in the process of h irin g men in numbers greater than it had in the recent past. Shortages of products made from the mineral being mined had recently developed and the company was endeavoring to expand production. Furthermore, the relatively good state of industrial-labor relations was a major security factor. A number of miners indicated that they chose to work where they did because it was felt that the work was more steady than with other firms. One miner stated; I used to work fo r them (another company) .... Old so for three years. Then that big strike came along and we were out for months. I went to work up in Idaho for a while but I came back after the strike was over. I no sooner got back on the job than the bastards laid me off. Then they called me back. I worked for a few days then zapt Laid off again. That went on half a dozen times. Finally, I said, "fuck it." Quit them altogether and came down here. "How the hell is a god- dammed guy supposed to make a living when you ain 't working half the time?" 93

Another m iner's comments!

They t e l l me you can make more money working over in Mining City. The contracts are supposed to be better and day's pay is a couple of bucks more. I don't know. I've never worked over there. But, it ain't worth it. They're always on strike. If it ain't a regular strike, it is a wildcat. You don't never know if you're going to work o r not.

Another factor contributing to the low estimation of mining as an occupation is the realization that it is a dead end Job. The possibili­ ties for Job advancement are low. At best, a man might be promoted to shift boss or possibly foreman, but highor levels of responsibility are reserved to those with college or technical training.^ Accumulation of seniority enables men to move to "better" Jobs such as surface mainten­ ance crews. However, this type of mobility is more horizontal than up.

The increase in income and Job prestige is relatively small, but the improvement in work conditions is sig n ific a n t and contributes to the desirability of such positions.

While mining may bo an acceptable occupational alternative in the short run, most miners do not believe that it i3 a worthwhile choice for a lifotime occupational commitment. This attitude finds its clearest expression when miners are asked whether they would go mining again i f given their life to live over and whether they would recommend it as an occupational choice for a young man, son, nephew, or whatever. One miner oftor hearing that the researcher was returning to college said:

You're smart, John. 3o back to school so you don't get stuck in a place like this. It's OK for o guy like me but you're young. I am an old man and I am not going to do much with the rest of my life.

A conversation with another miner about the same oge as the re­ searcher but who had been mining for seven years brought these remarks. 9U

Researcher: Why do you nine? Miner: For the money. Researcher: Yeah, but do you lik e the job? Miner: Not p a rtic u la rly , but I lik e the money. Before I came to work hero I was working on the railroad and at the sawmill. W inter was coming and I d id n 't want to be out in the cold so I came up here. I make more money now than I did working those two Jobs at once (currently about $ 80.00 a day). Researcher: But suppose you could make the same dough at a job on the surface, would you stay mining? Miner: No, I 'd work on the su rface.

A similar conversation with the shift boss, a 30-year veteran in the mines.

Researcher: Given the opportunity to go mining again, would you do it? Shift Boss: I don't know, but I've done alright at it. One year I made 5?,200. That's like $20,000 now. Researcher: Hbvo you always worked in the mines? Shift Boss: Mostly. I took a couple of years off to run a bar but I came back mining. Researcher: Would you want your son to be a miner? Shift Boss: No'.

The arduous nature of mine work contributes to its undesirability.

Even if accidents are avoided, the physical demands of the job are debil­ itating and recognized as such by the miners.

I don't care what they say, this mining is the toughest job there is. You're always in some unnatural position and having to lift somothing about four times what a man ought to .

Frequently remarks are made about how "mining makes a man old before his time" and that "it doesn't toko long to burn a man out in this racket."

One miner commenting on the difference between mine jobs offered th is an alysis: Stoping is hard on a man. Most stopers are between 20 and 35. Reggie is the oldest stoper here (1*2 years old). He's been at it ll: years. He's still good but he's slowin'; down and he won't keep it up much longer .... Drifting is for older guys. They still want to mine and not go day's pay but they h av en 't got the stu ff to run a stops any more. Lots of the day's pay jobs go to guys like Oscar. They're burned out but they can handle-a tugger or a tram.

Another miner presented his reasons for being on a day’s pay Job.

I quit that working in the stope3 years ago. It's too hard on me. Working up there is fo r young, husky bucks who got the wind to do the work. I ain't got no wind now.

Despite the generalized belief that mining is not a worthwhile

occupational choice, minors believe that the occupation has certain vir­

tues. Their estimation of mining is not entirely negative. As a short

term endeavor, mining receives fairly high marks. A number of miners

pointed out that mining has been a stepping stone on the path of careor

advancement. This ha3 prim arily occurred by young men working fo r a

period of time as minors before stepping into other jobs or by financ­

ing higher education from their earnings as miners. The personnel diroctor indicated that his sons had worked as miners before taking jobs with government agencies. The shift boss related a similar tale about his nephew.

My nephew is a lawyer now. He still talks about his days mining. Always said it was a good experience. He probably wouldn't have ever got through school if it wasn't for his job in the mine.

A number of the miners felt that the company's policy of hiring college

students during the summer was beneficial.

Old Jack (personnel d irec to r) is a p re tty good guy. During the summer he always puts on a lot of kids. Most of them work out p re tty good and i t gives them a few bucks to go to school on.

The educational function of a mining experience was also favorably re­ viewed. In some cases the negative aspects of the job were stressed.

An ex-miner, now a high school teacher examined his own experience. 96

I spent nine years in the holes off and on during the 30's, I worked with this Finnish kid and we were doing OK making about $13<00 a day when day's pay was $3.50. But I was involved in two cave-ins and figured the third would be the charm, so I got out and finished my degree.

Favorable dimensions were also explored.

It's a good experience. If nothing else you'll appre­ ciate how a lot of men have to spend their entire lives.

Other respondents suggested that mining contributed to the building of character and self discipline. A comment and another conversation are illustrative in this regard.

Mining teaches you a lot* If nothing else, it teachos you how to get along with other people.

Miner: What a miner needs is a bit of intelligence to do the work right and a tough enough hide not to let the job beat him. Shift Boss: That's right. .There were lots of times when I was stop- ing I'd go in there and think, "Christ, there's no way in hell we'll get a round in." But, we'd just put our heads down and get her out. We could've loft it for the next day but that wouldn't have accomplished anything.

Other favorable dimensions of mine work are: it3 re la tiv e ly open entry requirements, the potential for a relatively independent work sit­ uation, and the potential for relatively high earnings. Educational requirements are few, ond if a man can pass the required physical exam­ ination, he can hire on as a miner (provided there are job vacancies),^7

Job training is done at work and there is little need for preparation out3ide the work context. The major factor which appears to contribute to a positive estimation of the low entry requirements of mining is that few miners possess the education or marketable skills which allow them to engage in occupations other than those classed as unskilled or semi­ s k ille d .18 97

Conversations with the miners revealed that few had educational training exceeding a high school diploma, possessed specialized techni­ cal skill, and/or had any interest in acquiring further education or training,For these men, the low entry requirements of the occupation provided an opportunity to work and, moreover, work at an occupation where the pay scales exceeded comparably skilled occupations. .

From the organization's perspective, and one can only speculate in this regard, there is little need for high entry requirements. The tech­ nological processes are relatively standardized and the product is mass produced in a rough, unpolished form. As such, there is only a require­ ment th at the minors be physically capable of doing the work and th at they be willing to learn the necessary skills on the Job.

Anothor favorable dimension of mine work is that it offers a rela­ tively independent work situation, at least for the contractors. The discussion in the preceding chapter pointed out that mine production crews possess a dual system of authority.The contract system expli­ citly provides for an autonomous, self regulating work situation in which the members of the contracting groups are relatively independent to determine their own work style provided they meet a minimum production quota. The independence provided by the contract system appeals to many.

An ex-miner reported*

I always liked contracting better than day's pay. You had to work harder but the boss w asn't always on your ass.

On one occasion the researcher commented to one of the experienced miners that the stope had been slushed so much that it was tough moving around up by the face and even more d if f ic u lt to s e t up and d r i l l . In 98 typically independent form the miner responded:

If he (the shift boss) wants all that slushing, tell him to go to hell. You’re running the stope. I know if some shifter wanted me to slush more than I wanted, I’d tell him that I was running the stope and if I wanted the muck in there, it would stay or I ’d get out.

Another time this comment was overheard.

I told old man Jones (the foreman) that the face was muck bound and we wanted half and half (half a shift paid at contract rates and half at day's pay). He didn't seem to like that too well, so I told him that if he didn't give it to us, I'd either dump all of next week or he wouldn't see a bit of rock in those cars below for a week.

Questioning another miner about such expressions of independence, this explanatory remark was made:

Those shifters have to take care of guys like Pete and Rodney th a t are breaking a lo t of rock. They make th a t shifter look good. If they (the miners) want day's pay, they'd better get it.

While the contract system provided an opportunity for a relatively independent work situation, not all individuals chose to work at contract­ ing. Hen on day's pay often bitterly complained about "having to bust ass running around here so the boss or the contractors don't get pissed off," or that "the prick (boss) ain't never happy, always hounding you about something." Nevertheless, these individuals often refused oppor­ tunities to take a contract. Some didn't feel the required extra work offset the increased earnings or work independence. Others believed that contracting was too dangerous. S till others didn't want the re­ sponsibility of running a stope or drift. While mining offers an attrac­ tiv e p o te n tia l fo r an independent work s itu a tio n , I t was not acted upon by all who worked at the mine. 99

Perhaps the major attractive feature of mining is the potential for relatively high e a r n i n g s .21 A contractor can earn up to $100.00 per day though the average is closer to $55.00. Compared with other occupa­ tions of similar skill, this level of payment is clearly superior. A number of miners insisted that the money was the only thing that kept them mining. The remarks of one miner mentioned previously about being able to earn more by mining than he could working in a sawmill and on the railroad are instructive. Other miners made similar comments.

I'd go back logging in a minute if I could make the money out there that I can here.

I don't like mining but I got to do it. If I could, I 'd lik e to work on a ranch and run c a ttle or be a vet (veterinarian). Gut I got to earn a living some way .... Once you start making that dough, you won't ever want to quit. You can't hate it (mining) any more than I do, but the money sure is nice.

The emphasis on money as a desirable feature of the occupation appears to emanate from a number of sources. First, mine employment is insecure. The mines may close or go on strike. Second, the working life of the miner, by which is meant the period of time he will be able to contract, is relatively short—from 15-20 years. The arduous nature of the job takes its toll and a man becomes physically incapable of with- ) standing the rigors of contracting. And, there is always a high risk of accident resulting in disabling injury or death.22 These features appear to combine in providing a context revealed in a certain class life style emphasizing "make the money and live today; tomorrow isu n c e r t a i n ."23

Again, not all individuals were attracted to the big earning potential of contracting and they stayed on day's pay jobs where earnings were approximately $33*00 a shift. 100

It is Important to note that miners feel they work for themselves.

There is little commitment to the company.^ An attitude of "damn the company" p re v a ils. The miner works fo r him self or as p a rt of a sm all group and he seeks to promote those interests, not those of the firm.

It is suggested that this attitude is clearly connected to the contract system. Production and, ultimately, wages depend upon what the contract­ ors do for themselves. The tie to the formal organization is made prin­ cipally through coordination activities. As such, a localized perspect­ ive appears to develop in which the miners see their personal and group needs but do not relate them to the organization as a whole.^5

The preceding pages have outlined that miners do not believe that mining is a worthwhile occupational choice though it has certain positive aspects. This does not mean ipso facto that all miners are dissatisfied with their work. Many will state that "mining is all right" or that

"mining has been good to them." Studies that have dealt with job satis­ faction indicate that miners are relatively satisfied workers compared with other groups at a similar occupational level.^ The independence of the work, the earnings, and other factors weigh heavily in this assessment. However, current job satisfaction does not mean that the individual would recommend the job to another or that he would make the same occupational choice i f given the chance anew.2? The miners in th is study did not highly evaluate their occupation even though many Indicated that they were satisfied with their own status quo.

There is also a belief among miners that appears to contradict their own overall assessment of mining as a less than worthwhile occu­ pational choice. In its usual form the belief is phrased that "mining 101 gets Into the blood." Other researchers have noted this belief.**® The belief has two aspects. First, it denotes that mining runs in families with succeeding generations following their family predecessors to Jobs as miners. Secondly, there is also a current of thought which holds that miners become deeply committed to their occupation and choose mine work in preference to all others.

The first aspect appears to have some historical validity.At the mine site at least five miners on the crew (22 men) had fathers who had mined fo r ten or more y ears. One man had a son who had been a miner until his death in a cave-in. However, the majority of the crew members indicated that their fathers had never been miners. It appears that if

"mining gets Into the blood" at least in terms of family members becoming miners, the answer must be sought in a review of the occupational alter­ natives of a particular area. The research site was not a "mining area" per se. A number of occupational alternatives were available. Thus, for the research site, it appears that mining does not "get into the blood" any more frequently than for other classes of occupations,30

The second contention that "mining gets into the blood" in terms of a deep commitment, attraction to, or love of the Job is not supported by th is d a ta . In discussing work h isto rie s i t was c le a r th a t fo r most men there was no deep commitment to mining. Financial o b lig ations,

« families to support, a lack of other marketable skills, and other factors appear to bo the dominant reasons for mining, not an attraction to or love of the Job. One miner suggested that men start and stay with mining because of a type of psychological self entrapment. 102

You start out mining and you tell yourself that you're only going to do it for a little while. Pretty soon you realize that you've been with it half a dozen years and then you start telling yourself that it's all you know, it's all you can do. So you stay with it, afraid to try something else.

However, the idea th a t mining engenders a deep commitment to the occupation was repeatedly raised by the miners, particularly in their

teasing of younger miners. An illustrative conversation with a miner of

16 years experience brought these remarks:

Miner: You get going in here (a stope) and you won't quit. It'll get into your blood pretty soon. Researcher: Did i t get into your blood? Miner: Not y e t.

A similar conversation, teasing the researcher.

1st Miner: You know, after you've been stoping for ten years, you get so you wouldn't do anything else but stope. I'd go nuts on any other job. 2nd Miner: Yeah, but those first ten years are the toughest. After that, it's easy. Researcher: Is stoping in your blood? 1st Miner: Hell Not

It is interesting to note that while the miners teased the younger men about mining getting into their blood, they almost universally denied any deep commitment to the occupation* Their appears to be a compart­ ments lization of the beliefs associated with the nature of the occupation.

First, there is a general belief that mining is not a worthwhile occupa­ tion. Second, in all fairness, the occupation is seen as having certain positive, redeeming features. And, third, while recognizing that the job has a multitude of poor features, the belief exists that men become deep­ ly committed to or like the occupation though the particular respondent offering the evaluation is always an exception. The emerging picture is one of: 103

I know this is a lousy occupation. It's insecure, not much possible advancement, and it's hard on a man. But, I like being pretty much my own boss and the money isn 't bad. However, I sure hope tny kid goes to school or does something else othor than mine. I know that if I could, I'd do something else* But then again, I am different. This mining has never gotten into my blood like it has with some of those other fellows.

Another widely disseminated belief was that mining is an occupa- tion for a responsible individual. Most miners would term mining a

"man's job." Within society at large there exists a certain conception of the maie role,31 actualized in the work setting with the participants of certain occupations predominantly male. Mining is an occupation em­ ploying very fewfe m a le s .32 However, there is nothing inherently d if f e r ­ ent in mining vis a vis other occupations predominantly characterized by male employees. * This issue is raised because other social scientists who have studied miners have tied the occupation, particularly its dangerous nature, to themes of m asculinity. Chapter I I contained a number of ex­ amples and illustrations.33 The data do not support such a contention and suggest, as already indicated, that mining is not intrinsically different from other male occupations. An individual does not have to prove his masculinity by actions within the mine nor were there attempts by other miners to force him to do so. It was assumed that if an indl- dual came to work at the mine he was a "man" or, more accurately put, an adult - a responsible individual. A conversation between two experienced miners regarding a recently hired young man is instructive:

1st Miner: Did that boy come back from the waste drag? 2nd Miner: Yeah, he's here. You're going to offend him calling him a boy; h e 's a miner now. loli

Furthermore, mining does not require masculine actions. It re­ quires responsible, adult actions. Among the worst charges that could be leveled against an individual was that he was a "fuck-off" and thus did not act in a responsible way. The individual's masculinity was not called into question. The miners did not attempt to test an individual's courage or ability to manage uncertain situations. When a new man was hired, there was no effort made to scare him or test his mottle by re­ counting horrible stories of death and mutilation underground or by putting the individual into special situations where he would have to exhibit his courage, poise, or ability to take it. Just the opposite was the case. Conscious of the fact that men bring into the mine situa­ tion certain stereotypes, particularly those concerned with danger, the miners were unilaterally reassuring and supportive. When a new man came to work, there were frequent comments to tho e ffe c t:

First time in a mine? Don't worry; it ain't that bBd. You'll do all right.

Attempts to explain the behavior of miners by drawing on the mas­ culinity theme is to oversimplify the issue. Miners act as they do not from anything uniquely masculine about mining but from a combination of factors including role definitions for men, for miners, for participants within a work group, and so forth.

Miners believe or know that mining must be learned on the job. It is an occupation in which the individual learns by participating and sharing in the social life of the mine and its work routines. Further­ more, learning to be a miner goes beyond merely acquiring the ability and skills to perform necessary tasks and learning the social roles and 105 expectations of the group. It also encompasses how to manage an environ* ment, often a very threatening environment.

I t was often sta te d th a t "a green man (Inexperienced) had no chance." That is, he had no chance of properly doing the required work and constantly risked injury from his own ignorance. The oral tradition of the mine was replete with illustrations of this belief. Its usual mode of presentation was in stories of how a new man came to work, floundered in the difficulties of the job, and was finally rescued and became a successful miner under the tu telag e of an experienced man.

1st Miner: I hear your kid, Johnny, came back to work. 2nd Miner: Yeah, he got married and he didn't like school (college) so he quit and came back. 1st Miner: How's he been doing? 2nd Miner: Oh, he was over in Mine C with a couple of other young fellow s. They were up in one of those f l a t stopes always fucked up. Lucky if they were getting out two rounds a week. But old Wilson (an experienced man) went in there with them and brought them rig h t along. They're knocking down $50.00-$55.00 a day now.

The miners were uniformly consistent in their belief that a man needed the guidance and wisdom of an experienced man if an individual was to become a good miner. The usual method by which men are trained and socialized to be miners follows this pattern, and the men view it p o sitiv e ly . However, d islocations often re s u lt ana men are not always given benefit of an experienced man's direction. Such was briefly the esse fo r the researcher. One miner commenting on the resea rch e r's situ a ­ tio n said:

That (paring the researcher with another novice miner in the stope) was the worst thing Hank (shift boss) could do. You should be with an old timer for a couple of months to learn tho short cuts. Otherwise you're in there working twice as hard as you have to and getting nothing done. . .. When I started mining, they put me 106

on a tugger in a stope w ith two other guys* I 'd get the slushing done in four or five hours and then I'd go up and help out at the face* I did that for Bbout 5 months before I went stoping on my own. But when I finally did go stoping, I already knew a lot and it wasn't so hard.

When the researcher started stoping, the shift boss explained that he needed contractors but, unfortunately, there were just not enough experienced men available to give the researcher benefit of an exper­ ienced man's guidance* The boss attempted to mitigate the situation by providing special attention and assistance*

I (shift boss) will try to get in thoro and help you all I can, but it's mostly up to you. I know you're going to get fucked up in there a lot and you're going to bust your ass for a while.

This latter phrase again reiterates the theme that not having been taught the skills of a miner, the inexperienced man could expect to flounder in difficulty and not properly do the work.

Another theme which frequently cropped up was the belief that the inexperienced man was especially liable to accidents. Not possessing the requisite knowledge and skills, he was open to injury. Thus, it was constantly assumed that a man had to learn how to work in a way in which accidonts could be avoided, learn how to recognize potentially dangerous situations, and how to cope with such situations. The researcher's first stoping assignment was followed with the shift boss's admonition to "do what you can and don't get hurt."

Throughout the entire period at the mine, there was continual repetition of the belief that ignorance and lack of skill resulted in injuries. During those initial days in the stope, situations would crop up such as misfired holes that demanded competency beyond that possessed 107 by the researcher and his partner. Often these situations were des­ cribed to the older miners to solicit their advice on how to proceed.

Hather than providing some verbal explanation) the usual reply was to

"Stay away from that)11 "Oo do something else until Hank comes up, looks it over, and shows you what to do." This was done when, in the Judgment of the researcher and his partner, a dangerous situation existed. There was never any criticism for such action. In fact, the boss and other miners complimented such acts.

Shift Boss* I sure appreciate your attitude. (In reference to not working under some loose rock.)

Miner: You're smart. You let him (the boss) handle those misses till you know what you're doing.

The shift boss, who was also the immediate safety supervisor as well as that for production, indicated that one of his prime worries was that an inexperienced man might be injured. Probing other miners who had worked for other supervisors indicated that Hank (shift boss) was not an unusual case. Most all the miners concurred in the belief that the shift bosses were intently interested in the safety of the crew.

Researcher: How are Hank and the other shifters about safety? Do they Just want ore? (e.g., production over safety) Miner: They care about the men.

Despite the pervasity of the belief that the inexperienced man was especially liable to accidents, actual events and behavior demanded other explanatory beliefs because experienced miners had accidents. These phenomena were explained by resort to the doctrine of carelessness. That is, the novice was believed to be a victim of ignorance while the ex­ perienced man was a victim of stupidity and carelessness. One miner summed up accidents with the remark th at "Most accidents are caused by 1 0 8

Ignorance and stupidity." Other miners suggested, at least for the ex­ perienced man, carelessness was the main cause. "Those contractors get in a hurry and then they get hurt." This theme was repeated by a state mine inspector. You start taking short cuts. Doing things you know damn well you shouldn't, but you do. I know when I was mining I used to take some awful chances. When I think about it now, I did a lot of things I had no business doing, but I did and got by. Of course, other guys weren't so lucky.

The doctrine of carelessness was applied almost strictly to the experienced man. It was the belief that these individuals possessed the requisite skills and knowledge but that other considerations entered the picture resulting in careless work behavior. In assessing these beliefs an interesting picture emerges. The novice is not considered truly responsible for his actions. The man is not faulted for having an acci­ dent because of ignorance. The experienced man is also relatively blame­ less though is often admonished because he is supposed to know better.

Fault is ascribed, however, to certain individuals if they have an acci­ dent. This class of individuals is predominantly made up of miners who have some degree of experience but who are not yet considered truly capable miners. Here the assessment made is that these individuals over­ estimate their abilities and engage in behavior or actions that they are not certified to perform. Variously labeled "wise guys," "fuck offs," or "know-it-alls," this class of individuals is held accountable for their actions (informally if not formally as well). In discussing the characteristics of other miners, critical remarks are often leveled against this type of individual and his propensity for accidents. 109

Thai asshole thinks he knows it all. One of these days w e 'll have to pack him out.

That goddamn Ned. He sure lik es th a t powder (dyna­ mite). Always fucking around with it. He wants to blow this| wants to blow that. Any goddamn thing th a t comes alongt he wants to blow i t . 1 won't be the least bit fucking surprised if he don't blow his fuckin head off.

The negative assessment ascribed these individuals and their be­ havior relates to the belief that mining is an occupation for a respon­ sible individual. By not upholding the normative requirements that stem frcm this belief, the "wise guy" is a threat not only to himself but others as well. Even if other men are not directly injured by someone's irresponsible behavior, assisting the injured or retrieving the body might force someone into a dangerous situation where his own safety would be in peril.

A final belief affiliated with the idea that mining is an occupa­ tio n learned by p a rtic ip a tio n and sharing in mine lif e and work is a belief thot the individual's personal disposition to learn is the most important ingredient in becoming a miner. That is, beyond having a cer­ tain minimum of Intelligence and physical well being, the important fea­ ture is that a man display an attitude which includes a willingness to learn from personal experience, his peers, and superiors. Also,a man must demonstrate a willingness to try to do the job as well as possible, pitch in and assist others, ana get along reasonably well with the other men. Experienced miners in recounting their own initiation to mining stressed what was believed to be the proper attitude.

I went in to a stope with two guys making money. They showed me how to run the machine and gave me till the week's end to be able to drill fifty thirds. . . . I 1 1 0

had to go like hell but I made it.

When I started mining you couldn't buy a contract. You practically had to wait till somebody died so you could get off day's pay. I started with a crew sinking a shaft and I went contracting steady-. . . . Things weren't like they are now. Christ, you have to prac­ tically drag the drill up to the face and turn it on .... In those days (in the past) you didn't have to kiss the miner's ass. I used to thank Qod and the company I had a job and I took care of i t .

The boss kept reminding the new men what he expected in terms of attitude. "Keep your.ass up and your head down and have at it."

The minors did not emphasize physical size, strength, or in telli­ gence as key factors in becoming proficient miners. It was assumed that virtually any man could fill the occupational role if he showed the pro­ per disposition. Occasionally a man who tries mining fails at filling it3 role requirements because of personal idiosyncracies such as claus­ trophobia or borderline intelligence. Men who leave the occupation before achieving proficiency at the craft have a myriad of reasons for doing so and the miners recognize this. They will often state that

"Sam would have been a good miner but he was only working here until he could go back on construction," or "Henry never had his heart in itj he didn't like working underground." The miners make a distinction between those who leave the occupation and those that fail. In the first case any number of reasons are acceptable. In the latter instance poor atti­ tude is usually the ascribed reason. A man fails because "he's lazy,"

"doesn't want to get off his ass," or "has to be packed" (i.e., doesn't do his share of the work). In the first instance there is little depre­ ciation in a man's statusj in the latter case, there is.

Another major belief of the miners is that mining is a dangerous 131 occupation. In this respect, the men at the research site were consis­ tent in their estimation of the dangerous character of mining with what has been suggested by other sources. Examination of this issue in

Chapter II revealed that both miners and non-miners considered the occu­ pation dangerous, a point substantiated by statisticalovidence.3b

However, this collection of.data is not quantitative. There is no way to statistically enumerate how many of the miners felt the occupation, was dangerous though their comments and actions suggested the vast majority. But, these comments tended not to be of tho nature reflecting a direct assessment of the dangerous nature of the occupation as a whole.

In the opening days of the field work the researcher attempted to draw out the miners' assessment of the danger of the job. One conversation is illustrative:

Researcher: People tell mo that the mines are dangerous. Bo you feel that way? Miner: Yeah, especially from the oldor folks. I guoss to some people they are. Some people don't like being underground; some get scared when they'ro in tight places like tho stopes. All you got to do when you're mining is keep your head out of your ass, look around, and you'll bo all right.

Other conversations elicited equally ambivalent answers. The general g is t was:

Well, I would say they (mines, mining) are, and they aren't. At times it's very dangerous; othor times, less so; and on other occasions, not at all.

The lack of direct assessment of tho occupation as a whole would seem to imply either a compartmentalization process whereby the parts are separated from each other and/or the whole, or that the miners had come to some accommodation with their occupation and its environment 112 such that they were not threatened by Its entire spectrum of hazards.

Because, while there were a few comments directly characterizing the entire mine situation as dangerous, thore were a multitude of remarks and actions focused at particular parts of the setting. For example:

Do what you can and don't get hurt.

Make sure you tighten that haulback pin in real good, and then stay the hell away from it. If it comes loose, you don't know what way it's going to go. It'll tear you in half if it hits you.

Don't ride those timber skips. If that cable breaks, you don't stand a dog's chance in hell of gotting off.

Jesus Christ, whatever you do, don't tamp the powder with a drill steel. That's the fastest way on earth of getting killed.

You should always test the hanging before you get under it to drill. (Otherwise you might bo under loose rock which will fall.)

Beyond the admonitions cited above there was also a large body of stories about accidents, dangerous situations, and how these situations were handled. Those stories were constantly reiterated to other miners.

Three illustrative examples are cited below:

Researcher: Davy, have you ever been injurod in the mine? Miner: Yeah, a couplo of times. Researcher: How did th B t happen? Miner: Tho first time I busted up my hands from thot stuff you're sitting under (cap rock). I wasn't paying any attention to where I was at, startod drilling, and tho vibration shook the rock loo3e. I had casts on both hands for about three weeks.

New Miner: How dangerous are blasting caps? 2nd Miner: I had a friend in Mining C ity who was digging in his yard and he hit one with a shovel. New Miner: Did he get hurt bad? 2nd Miner: Just bad enough to blind him. 113

Miner: Do you know how I got the name Fearless? Researcher: No, how? Miner: We were working in 69 (a stope), heard it start to go, and got the hell out. When it was done caving, nobody* wanted to go back in to get our lunch buckets, so 1 d id . Researcher: Why did you do that? Miner: I was hungry. Closely affiliated with the general belief that mining is a dan­ gerous occupation is a complox of subsidiary beliefs and facts which contribute to the broader estimation of the dangerous nature of mining.

In the first instance there is an estimation of the character of the mining environment. This estimation is relatively idiosyncratic. Be­ yond the recognition that being underground is a somewhat atypical work environment, miners evaluate the situation differently. Thoro is no one definition of tho situation. Some miners regard the mine in relatively neutral terms. It is a work situation different from others, has a cer­ tain flavor of its own, but is nothing more than an inanimate work en­ vironment. Other miners view the mine as having a distinct physical personality. To some this personality is relatively positive. They recognize tho dangers of the environment but hold there is a kind of natural justness in the mining environment. This theme is often seen in an evaluation of cue3 to danger. The idea that "before she caves in, she'll tell ya," illustrates a positive view. Nature plays no tricks bat it is up to the man to be able to read her and act accordingly.

The other belief is that the mining environment has a malevolent personality. The idea here is that tho mine is out to get the miner or at least make things difficult for him. Thus, the mine becomes a kind of battleground where miners armed with their tools, skill, and know­ ledge jou3t with nature and its vile machinations. This theme is not na commonly articulated though it surfaces on occasion: Christ, 1 wish I would have stayed home today. I am in no mood to go up there and fight with that son-of- a-bitch (the stope).

Many miners convey the impression that their Jobs are a form of combat with nature. Miners continually talk to their environment, often in the vilest terminology. A d rill steel jammed in a drill hole and which requires tremendous effort to free is not treated as just another inanimate object. That steel becomes the "goddamnedest, fuckin, son-of- a-bitch" that ever existed. It becomes a personal representation of the malevolent forces operative in the mine. Some individuals would prob­ ably interpret such actions as merely releasing penned up anxiety or some form of denial mechanism whereby the miner personalizes the object and shifts blame for his own activities to the object. This may be partially the case. However, it does not abrogate the fact that to many miners the mine has an evil nature which must be constantly watched for, treated with respect, and confronted with their personal skills.

In observing the miners, certain of these beliefs seemed to char­ acterize some more than others. Some did combat, some just worked in a hole in the ground, and others worked in a give and take environment.

Situational exigencies also brought forth different characterizations.

A man who normally referred to fighting the rock, wrestling tho d rill might come up with a statement about the positive, ju3t character of the mine after avoiding a cave-in. All three beliefs or any combination thereof might be operative in a given situation.

Beliefs about the nature of the mining environment and the danger of the occupation are related to things known. Miners have a well H 5 developed catalogue of mine dangers. They know what the dangers are, know the approximate cause or contingencies of the threat* know the cues and predictors which tip off a dangerous situation* and know the approxi­ mate level of frequency at which these dangers occur* Mine dangers might best be viewed as falling along a frequency continuum. Some dan­ gers are a daily occurrence. Falls* slips* machinery related dangers* and rock falls are ever present. Misfired explosives* cap rock* and hung up chutes occur less frequently. Major cave-ins and fires rarely occur.

As the saliency or frequency of these dangers increases* so does the frequency with which they are watched for and guarded against. The new minor iB immediately instructed about frequent hazards. Dangers that occur less frequently receive correspondingly less attention. Often* nothing w ill bo said about these dangers until they manifest themselves in sp e c ific s itu a tio n s . Thus* every person entering the mine is broadly instructed about tho common dangers and the appropriate defensive action.

For examplei

To be in the dark is to be in danger. Turn on the lamp when entering the mine and keep i t on. I f a lamp should go dim o r off* immediately go to and stay w ith someone e lse who has a lamp. I f th a t is impossible* get down to the drift and hitch a ride out with the trammer.

Every shift begins and ends with a mantrip to and from the work place on the tram . When rid in g the tram* keep your head down and all parts of the body inside the car. Exposed portions of the body may strike tho walls or roof of the drift or chutes resulting in in ju ry . Within the mine* job specialization takes place. Accordingly* dangers are specialized. Trammers learn the dangers associated with 1 1 6 tramming} men in the stopes learn their particular hazards* Misfired holes are a threat to the stoper; derailment to the trammer* In the course of moving from job to job, a man becomes knowledgeable about the vast array of potential threats and how to deal with them with the same basic principle in operation. Those dangers that are common receive the bulk of attention.

It might be logically assumed that along with a frequency continr uum, miners would rate dangers with regard to their severity. This distinction is made to some degree; however, miners view most mine dan­ gers as having the potential to produce very serious injury or death.

This lethal potential is quite important. It makes all types of dangers, phenomena to be treated with respect. To one unfamiliar with miners it would p'robably be assumed that the "big dangers" such as cave-ins, fires, or explosions would receive the bulk of the miners' attention. After all, these hazards result in almost certain death. But when virtually everything is viewed as severely dangerous, attention is directed at that which is most common. The big cave-ln is a rarity} so is the fire.

Being relatively remote possibilities, the miner is less concerned with protecting himself from such phenomena than with those dangers that frequently exist.

Knowledge of the approximate frequency of mine hazards results In an estimation of their predictability. Relatively common dangers are generally viewed as being predictable} those which rarely occur are usually considered unpredictable. Two related beliefs emerge at this point. Miners believe that most mine dangers, being predictable, are also controllable. Likewise, other dangers are unpredictable and 117 unoontrollable. Defense mechanisms, as previously alluded to, are rela­ ted to the predictable dangers of the environment. These beliefs have been noted by other social scientists in their studies of miners.^

Miners possess a complex of knowledge about their environment.

Each hazard has an associated set of predictors or cues which the miners use to recognize the hazard, its probability of occurrence, and which sets the stage for potential amieliorative action. Some of these cues are idiosyncratic, each miner possessing his own.^ However, a relative­ ly large body of these cues are diffused throughout the entire group and are passed on to novice miners. For example, cave-lns are seen as being caused by a number of factors, a partial list would Include:

1. Open ground - large unsupported spans of rock.

2. Heavy ground - heavy, dense rock requiring support.

3. Drilling into the hanging - the blast cracks and fractures the rock. Knowledge of any of these types of conditions would alert a miner to the potential for a cave-in. More specialized cues would include cracks or fractures in the rock) a dull, thud type of sound when the rock i3 strick by a scaling bar) a sharp, cracking sound; crushed or cracking timbers; and the dribbling of bits of rock from above. These cues are more immediate and specialized. Open ground indicates a general potential for cave-in; dribbling rock indicates almost certainty. The intensity of the cues dictates the type of necessary remedial action. Perhaps all that is needed is to bar down the loose rock. In other cases, immediately vacat­ ing the area to let the rock cave-in naturally would be required.

Hazards which commonly occur have a clearly defined set of cues and predictors and the required remedial action is also clearly 1 1 8 delineated. As the frequency of the hazard diminishes, so does the clarity of the cues. Idiosyncratic variations become more common and remedial action becomes more amorphously defined.

Dangers which are termed improbable events do not exhibit the com­ plex of knowledge associated with the more frequently appearing hazards.

There are few predictors of such hazards and those that do exist are not clearly defined. The causal nature of the danger is not understood either in fact or belief and guides for effective a.-nlelioratlve action are either non-existent or very general. Some of these improbable dan­ gers are sudden, unpredictable events. They strike without warning, do their damage, and impart little knowledge to those who might experience the event. What is more, the unpredictable event is generally so massive that it defies being effectively dealt with by the individual miner or the small group.

A case in point is the mine flood. Some years ago three men driv­ ing a drift in Mine B narrowly escaped death when they drilled into an unsuspected underground lake. Even if this hazard were to have been discovered before it activated itself, that small group of miners would have been powerless to deal with the phenomenon. Being a relatively massive hazard, effective remedial action could only be constructed by drawing upon the resources of the mining company. Consequently, the massive and/or unpredictable danger is ignored, so to speak, by the individual miner and his immediate work group. Knowing that such events are improbable and that the miners are relatively powerless to do any­ thing should such dangers materialize, a type of stoical attitude develops. "Don't worry about it. There's nothing you can do anyway." 119

This point was brought home to the researcher during an early phase of

the field work.

Researcher: Oscar, have you ever been in a mine during an earthquake? Miner: Yeah, I was working over at Gold Town when that big one hit Paper Pusher's City a few years ago. Researcher: What happened? Miner: It shook the piss out of us. As this conversation progressed, a number of equally nondescript remarks were elicited but a message was finally hammered out, the gist of it

being:

Look, kid, there are lots of real dangers to concern yourself with in a mine. Don't go getting excited about things that rarely happen. There is nothing you can do anyway.

Despite the belief in the controllability of certain mine dangers

and the elaborate complexes of knowledge, systems of interpretation, and

plans for remedial action that contribute to this belief, miners recog­

nize that nothing is absolute. There is always some degree of uncertain­

ty present in every dangerous situation. The miner may miss the cues or

not correctly interpret them and thus expose himself to danger. Or, the cues that indicate immediate danger may not be forthcoming. For example,

it's commonly stated that before an area caves-in "she'll tell ya."

That is, certain cues will be issued such as the cracking of rock. While

this is usually the case, it does not apply across the board. Sitting back, taking a brief rest on one occasion, the researcher and his exper­

ienced partner watched a slab of hanging wall about Hi feet long, 5 feet wide, and a foot thick peel off and fall to the floor of the stope. The

experienced man remarked, "Well I 'l l be goddamned, I would've never

guessed that was coming." 1 2 0

Because there is always some degree of uncertainty present, miners place some stock in divine providence or luck* This varies with the extent of the uncertainty and the miner's skill. An inexperienced man who escapes or successfully deals with a dangerous situation is con­ sidered lucky. An experienced man operating in the same conditions and who is also successful receives the accolades of his peers for demonstra­ ting his skill. Luck enters the picture for the experienced man when he successfully avoids a dangerous situation without taking positive action to do so. One experienced miner, currently having divorce problems, related his mining experiences to those of marriage. The theme of luck shows through.

I've been in three different stopes that caved within a short period of time. But no stope ever treated me as bad as o woman . . . (Stopo 61) We loft work five minutes early and when wo got to the drift she came down . . . (Stopo lh5) Stone and I went outside for timber. When we got back the drift was full of dust and Davy (working in Stope 11*3) was running a ll over. She came down while we were outside.... I f I was as lucky with the women as I am in the mine, I'd be OK.

Another belief characterizing the miners is that dangers must be faced and dealt with by the miner's immediate work group. This belief is contingent upon the structural layout of the mine and the role expecta­ tions of the miner. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the miner works in small groups isolated from fellow workmen. Assistance in dealing with danger­ ous situations is not immediately available. Dangers that arise often require immediate action and even if outside support were warranted, the structural character of the mine prohibits such activity. Furthermore, the miner is expected to move the rock. Dangers which develop in the course of the work process must be handled as they arise so that 1 2 1 necessary work tasks can be completed. The mining process Is not ex­ pected to stop just because the hanging wall contains loose slabs of rock. The mirier is expected to appropriately deal with the hazard and get on with the job. Thus, the role requirements of the miner stipulate that he face and handle dangerous situations in the regular course of the job.

Despite the fact that facing danger is part of the miner's role, there are limits. One of the most salient beliefs is that a man should not work alone. Working alone is believed to be a very dangerous prac­ tic e .

A man shouldn't be in there alone. That (being exper­ ienced) don't prevent a man from having an accident.

1st Miner: It's against safety regulations for a guy to be alone. 2nd Miner: T h at's rig h t. There is always supposed to be somebody within feet or hollaring distance.

There are no regu lations th a t p ro h ib it general mine work from being done alone. Nevertheless, many miners believe there aro such regulations.

The important point is that miners believe that a man alone is in a very hazardous situation. Many men refuse to work alone and either demand a work p artn er or go home.

There are no hard and fast normative requirements about facing mine hazards. A man is not expected to confront threats that are clearly be­ yond his capability. Working alone is considered especially dangerous • because a man's capability to successfully confront threat is linked to the presence of other men who are to act as sources of support and assistance. This belief appears conditioned by the mine's physical structure and social organization. With long distances separating the 1 2 2 men and little supervision, a man working alone may find himself in a dangerous situation without recourse to extra assistance. The second man is viewed as crucial in this respect.

The miners know that hazards must be faced, primarily, by the

immediate group. The company has institutionalized routines for dealing with threats but these are primarily routines geared for the big and relatively uncommon threats such as fire. Moreover, miners do not look

to outside agencies for assistance with the hazards of their occupation.

They may be suspicious of the company's interests in safety as Lantz37 suggests, but they are also not in the vanguard of those who look to federal or state agencies to insure mine safety. Safety is considered primarily the task of the company and the miners, particularly those in

the immediate work group.38 E fforts to Inspect mines and s e t safety regulations are viewed as relatively impotent. The miners are aware

th a t the company has devices to thw art an adequate mine in spection.

Furthermore, the general estimation of mine inspectors is low. The miners tend to feel that these Individuals fail to do a conscientious

job. One miner offered this assessment:

Safety inspectors come here all the time. They'll, walk right under the biggest, loosest slabs, look to see if you've got a rope on the drill and give you a reprimand if you don't. They only look for three things: a rope on the drill, drill steel in front of the slusher, and safety glasses. They don't care about anything else.

Despite the belief that dangers must be dealt with by the immediate group, miners know that they are not entirely alone. Someone is always watching out, if not immediately, at least by shift's end. Miners are

required to sign in and out going to and coming off shift. The men also watch for one another's presence. If a man fails to show up when he 123 should, immediate searches are organized. This knowledge is a reassuring element in an environment of danger and uncertainty.

Researcher: VJhat would happen, for instance, if we were at the face and it caved-in and trapped us? Minor: Ace (the trammer) would either notice that you didn’t come out or they'd miss you at the dry.

Such a case happened during the research period. Two men, trapped behind a muck pile when a chute gate busted loose, failed to report to the dry when the shift ended. The boss conducted a search and a rescue crew brought the men to safety. Probing one of the trapped miners about his feolings while being trapped, he remarked:

I wasn’t worried. I know Hank would miss us and come find us. Vie tried to dig ourselves out but couldn’t do it, so we just sat down and waited.

These ore essentially the major beliefs held by miners about their occupation and its environment. This is by no means a complete exposi­ tion of the miners' set of beliefs. Throughout the analysis other be­ liefs will be cited, though of a relatively minor nature. In outlining the structural model of a subculture it was indicated that the set of beliefs constitutes a reservoir of things known about the environment.

From this reservoir spring the materials that are fashioned together through social interaction to form the other structural elements of the subculture. However, before proceeding w ith those discussions, b rie fly recapped in outline form, the major beliefs held by the miner include:

1, Mining is believed to be a poor or less than worthwhile occupational choice. A. It is an economically insecure occupation. Layoffs, s trik e s , and shutdowns are common. B. It is an occupation within which there is little chance for personal advancement by promotion. C. It is an arduous occupation. The work is hard and dangerous, and it ultimately hurts a man's health. Despite the generally negative assessment given mining, the occupation is also believed to have certain positive features* A. It can be an occupation providing a stepping stone to better Jobs principally through financing higher edu­ c a tio n . 6. It can be an educational experience in itself where a man learns how to work, get along with people, learns to appreciate how some men spend their entire lives, etc. C. It is an occupation with low entry requirement providing an avonue to work for those without tho interests or capabilities to secure other types of Jobs* D. It is an occupation structurally organized in such a way th at i f a man d esires a work s itu a tio n in which he is relatively autonomous and self-regulating, the po­ tential for this prospect is available through the contract system. E. The co n tract system, s tru c tu ra lly a p a rt of the mine setting and hence, the occupation, provides the potential for relatively high earnings visa vis other occupations of a similar skill. ” Mining is believed to be an occupation learned while parti­ cipating in the social and work routines of tho mine. A. Mining is best learned under the direction of an - experienced man. This is considered the usual and proper method of socialization. (1) Without the d ire c tio n of an experienced man, a novice miner will flounder in difficulty and p o ril. B. Mining req u ires th at a man learn more than Ju st so c ia l roles and the skills of a Job. It also requires that a man learn to manage danger. (1) An inexperienced man is especially prone to injury because of accidents, whereas experienced men are injured because of carelessness. C. The key ingredient necessary fo r a man to learn how to mine is that he exhibit the proper attitude and dispo­ s itio n . V irtu ally any man can become a miner i f he is willing to learn from his own experience, his peers, and superiors. Mining is believed to be a dangerous occupation. A. Miners exhibit a range of belief concerning the nature of the mine's physical environment. Some believe it to be a positive environment) still others see it as male­ volent; and others regard it in neutral terms - an inanimate object. B. Mine dangers are viewed as varying in their frequency of appearance. C. Mine dangers are viewed as varying in their severity though most all mine dangers are considered lethal. D. Most mine dangers are viewed as predictable and 125

controllable though some hazards are considered unpredictable and uncontrollable. E. Control of mine danger is based upon knowledge. (1) There are ways of recognizing danger from certain predictive cues. (2) Patterns of amieliorative action can be actuated based upon these cues. (3) The control of mine danger is never absolute. Some uncertainty always exists because the pre­ dictive cues may not be forthcoming, the miner may miss or misinterpret the cues, etc. (li) Control of mine dangers re s ts upon combinations of skill and luck. Successfully confronting a predictable danger is considered skill while an unpredictable danger also handled successfully is an indication of luck. F. Mine dangers must be faced by the immediate work group given the structure and organization of the mine. (1) A man should never work alone because he lacks the protective context of the group. (2) Agencies outside the mine setting render little help either because they are uncaring and/or impotent.

Summary

In this chapter the major dimensions of a subculture have been specified--a normative-valuative system, a position network, and patterns of behavior. A structural perspective has been applied to the data in initiating a structural analysis of the miners' occupational subculture.

To this point the analysis has considered the miners' belief system, a constituent element of the normative-valuatlve system of the subculture.

This element constitutes the reservoir of things known and serves as the foundation for other elements of the subculture such as norms, sanctions, and values. The next chapter will continue the discussion of the normative-valuatlve system with a consideration of the miners' normative order, sanctioning system, and set of values. Later chapters will com­ plete the structural analysis as well as that from the processual and functionalistic perspectives. Since this chapter has just initiated data analysis, summarizing comments w ill be delayed until the analysis is completed. 127

Notes: Chapter V

1. For a discussion of the types of sociological analyses see Marvin E. Olsen, The Process of Social Organization (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Chapter ll*.

2. Robin M. Williams, American Society, 3rd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 25-36.

3. Dennis E. Wenger and Jack M. Weller, Disaster Subcultures: The Cultural Residues of Community Disasters, Preliminary Paper No. 9 (Columbus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, 1973).

1*. David 0. Arnold, The Sociology of Subcultures, edited by David 0. Arnold (Berkeley, California: The Glendessarry Press, 1970).

5. George Lundberg et. a l., Sociology, l*th edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 11*5.

6. See Chapter I, p. 9.

7. The systems are created from material located in the sources cited in Notes 2-5.

8. Williams, American Society, p. 27.

9. Williams, American Society, p. 28.

10. Williams, American Society, p. 27.

11. Williams, American Society, pp. 33-35*

12. Lundberg, Sociology, pp. 11*6-11*7.

13. Lundberg, Sociology, p. 11*6.

11*. Williams, American Society, p. 27.

15. For a discussion of these aspects see Harry M. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands (Boston: L ittle, Brown and Company, 1963).

16. In the past, the mining company operating the mines where the research was conducted had a policy of promoting men to supervisory positions from the ranks of the production crews. This pattern appears to bo changing* The more recent additions to supervisory positions are college trained and have not worked for the company as miners. However, even if this transition were not being made, the span of control is large and there are few openings for promotion. 128

17. The open entry requirements facilitated this research since it was possible for the researcher to become a miner. This is not the case with all dangerous occupations such as fire fighting or con­ struction where formal testing procedures, union apprenticeships, etc. make it difficult to become a participant observer, especially from the role of the complete participant.

18. Edward E. Knipe, "Occupational Ingress and Egress: A Survey of Appalachian Coal Miners," (unpublished research report: Virginia Commonwealth University, 1973)» p. 20. 19. The research role prohibited access to personnel files making it difficult to statistically specify the miners' level of educa­ tional attainment or other types of occupational skills.

20. See Chapter IV, pp. 68-7?.

21. This feature has also been noted in studies of coal miners; see Knipe, "Occupational Ingress and Egress: A Survey of Appalachian Coal Miners," p. 61*.

22. One journalist estimated that one miner in twelve is either killed or seriously injured in mine accidents each year. "The Bleak Life of Skilled Diggers," Fortune 03 (January 1971), p. 63*

23. Albert K. Cohen and Harold M. Hodges, "Characteristics of the Lower Blue Collar Class," Social Problems 10 (Fall 1963), pp. 330-331) Herbert H. Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes," in C lass, S tatu s, and Power, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset (Hew York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 1*80-1*99.

21*. These findings contradict those found by Knipe in a study of coal miners. Knipe, "Occupational Ingress and Egress: A Survey of Appalachian Coal M iners," pp. 7l*-86.

25. This feature has been suggested as characterising the "world view" of lower class participants. See Leonard Schatzman and Anselm Strauss, "Social Class and Modes of Communication," American Journal of Sociology 60 (January 1955)* pp. 329-338* 26. Robert Blauner, "Work Satisfaction and Industrial Trends in Modern Society," in Class, Status, and Power, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour U p set (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 1*73-1487.

27. On the surface this data would appear to contradict Knipe's findings. However, he notes that the reasons most men gave for choosing coal mining as an occupation was that it was the best or only occupation­ al alternative available. Knipe, "Occupational Ingress and Egress: A Survey of Appalachian Coal Miners," pp. 57-62. .129

28. Rex A. Lucas, Men In Crisis (New Yorks Basic Books, 1969), P« 38* Joel Seidman e t. a l . , The Worker Views His Union (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958)» P* 20. 29* Knipe, "Occupational Ingress and Egress: A Survey of Appalachian Coal Miners," p. 27.

30. William J. 3oode, "Family and Mobility," in Class, Status, and Powor, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset (New York: The i'reo Press, 1966), pp. 582-601.

31. Judith M. Bardwick and Elizabeth Douvan, "Ambivalence: The Socialization of Women," in Women in Sexist Society, edited by Vivian Gornick and Barbara K. Moran (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 1L7-159. 32. There were no women employed at the mine in occupations other than clerical at tho mine office though one female was subsequently hired as a miner after the research had been completed.

33. See Chapter II, pp. 27-29.

3k. See Chapter II, pp. 16-19.

35. See Chapter II, pp. 19-20.

36. Seo also Lucas, Hon in Crisis, pp. 25-27.

37. Herman it. Lantz, People of Coal Town (Hew York: Columbia U niversity Press, 1958), p. 1U1.

38. Seo Chapter II, pp. 21-25. CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA

Introduction

This chapter continues the structural analysis of the normative- valuative system of the miners' occupational subculture. The chapter will begin with a discussion of the normative order, the sanctioning system, and conclude with a consideration of tho subcultural values.

Structural Analysis Continued

Nornative-Valuatlve System; Norms Norms are the rules of conduct of a socLal situation. Every social situation is characterized by some normative framework.1 Some norms are developed within a particular setting and apply strictly to that area.

Other norms are more broadly diffu sed and are app licable to a m ultitude of social actors, groups, and settings. A mine is a social setting characterized by a wide range of norms. State and federal agencies regu­ late mining activities. Standards and rules of conduct are imposed by these agencies upon the mining organization and the m iners. The company and union also issue normative deorees in the form of labor contracts, policy.directives, and work requirements. Again, some of these norms pertain to the organization as a whole; others to the individual miner.

Finally, the miners themselves establish rule3 of conduct. Unlike the aforementioned organizations, the norms s e t fo rth by the work group are i 3 0 131 not usually formalized in written documents. These norms exist in a body of social expectations and must be analyzed through the words and actions of the miners.

Like the previous treatment of the miners’ beliefs, it is impossible to specify every norm held by the work group. Some norms are very spe­ cific in nature; others are mere repetition of requirements set by other agencies. What will be discussed are the major, informally developed normative elements of the work group. These norms are relatively broad in nature and are applicable to a diversity of situations in the mine.

The nortra to be discussed have three general foci. Tho first four norms to be presented tend to specify requirements necessary for inclusion in tho group and how all miners are to behave. A second general focus is found in a second set of three norms. While applicable to the group as a whole, those norms tend to be more s p e c ific a lly aimed a t so c ia l in te r ­ actio n between working p a irs of m iners. The th ird focus is on norms related to danger and how tho miners are to act in its presence. While the norm3 have these three broad foci, there is considerable overlap.

As such, oach norm will be discussed as a relatively discrete entity.

The first normative requirement is an insistence that a man "do his share." A man is required to fu lfill his end of whatever needs to be done, be it work, assisting with injuries, facing dangers, restricting output, or whatever. Miners work in small groups. A man not doing his portion of whatever is expected is a detriment to the group as a whole.

3y failing to fu lfill his obligations, the group may not function satis­ factorily, other men may be required to do more than their share, or the group may be threatened. When coming to work, a new man is immediately 132

instructed as to his place within the division of labor and his inter­ relationship with other miners.

desearcher: How am I supposed to run that place? (a dragway) Miner: Just make a few short passes with the bucket so you get the muck out of tho pit. Make sure you keep that pit clean. If you don't, you'll hold up those drifters cause they won’t be able to dump their waste. They'll get pi3sed off and get on your back.

When the researcher was being trained to operate the tram, he wa3

again instructed as to what was expected.

When those contractors want something, do it as fa3t as you can. They can't do much in the stope until you pull tho chutes or got them what they need.

Learning and doing one's share is important in the process of be­ coming and being a miner. Contracting is very arduous work and i t is paid by piece rate. A man who fails to do his share of the work shifts an additional burden to the other men. This may also contribute to loss of earnings. This activity is not tolerated. Sanctions are imposed to bring about behavioral conformity, usually by deriding the offender for being lazy or by refusing to work with him. If a guy has a reputation as a guy who has to be packed (have to do his work fo r him), he c a n 't get a p a rtn e r.

A man who fails to do his share is also a threat to safety. Taking short cuts in the work process because of laziness may lead to accidents.

Failing to properly tighten a drill pin, properly bar down loose rock, or engage in some other action may leave a dangerous situation uncor­ rected or create one anew. When a man is trained to perform the miner's

tasks, he is constantly admonished in this regard.

Make sure those drills pins are tight. If they come loose, somebody is going to get h u rt. 133

A second basic norm is to reciprocate social obligations. The give and take between the trammer and the contractor clearly illustrates this norm. The contractor depends upon the trammer to deliver needed supplies and remove the broken rock so that the contractor will have room to work.

Contractors are often forced to compete for the trammer's services. In some cases this competition results in situations of bribery whereby the contractor makes some payment to the trammer for special services. One miner recounted his own experience.

When we were working on the 5600, we told the trammer we'd kick him an extra $10.00 a piece each week if he'd pull our chutes first. The other guys (contractors) thought we were nuts, but it was worth it to us. V/e were making big money cause we got our drilling going first. That went on for quite a while. Then we got a new trammer. !fe started out pretty good but pretty soon ho got sloppy and wanted to jack up the price. He wo3 screwing U3 so we told him to go to h e ll.

A similar situation prevails between the miner and the shift boss.

The shift boss will ofton "mortgage the stope;" that is, fudge on the contract measurement so that the miner's earnings are increased. In response to this consideration, the boss expects that the miner will increase his work output.2 Most of the time this normative give and

take works without difficulty. However, if one party attempts to short chongo the other, the whole deal is called off and sanctions are imposed,

if possible.

Reciprocating social obligations is also related to occupational danger. It was previously noted that the miners knew that when they faced aparticularly dangerous situation or were involved in an accident,

they could count on the other miners to lend assistance. Other social scientists have noted the normative element of thi3 belief which Lucas 13U has called the miner's c o d e ;3 that is, miners are required to assist a man in peril. This is a very strong normative requirement. It takes a reciprocal form because each man knows that he is always a potential victim and may require the assistance of others.

Another major norm is to be a balanced worker. Don't overdo any­

thing, be it safety, work, or laziness. It has already been noted that

the lazy individual, one not doing his share, violates group norms. The opposite is also true. A man who works too hard, the rate buster, also f a lls to adequately liv e up to group norms. However, ra te busting in the mine is not viewed as a major group threat, at least if done by the contractor. If a man is breaking a lot of rock and is earning far above

the daily average, the miners do not consider this a threat to their earnings by potential cuts in tho piece rates.

There is a considerable body of folklore concerning the miner who works vory hard to raise his earnings only to find that the company cuts his piece rate. Old-time miners continually assured the researcher that

this wa3 the cose.

When that Finnish kid and I started working togethor, he was a re a l go rretter. I kept te llin g him to slow down or they'd (the company) cut the price on the rock. Well, one week we averaged about $16.00 a day and sure as hell the next week the rate was cut. When Malone (the Mine Superintendent) came around, I busted up a lot of equipment and asked how a man was to do any work when all the equipment was faulty. He got the message and we got our old rate back, but we never went much above $13.00 a day after that.

I f Hank to ld you he was making $10,000 a year when he was stoping, he's probably lying. In those days a man got his ra te cut i f he sta rte d making too much money.

The interesting thing about rate cuts is that they were usually not applied to all miners across the board. If the earnings for one group went up, that group got it3 rate cut, not everybody. Thus, every stope, drift, raise, or shaft had its own piece rate. This payment system takes

into account varying mine conditions as well as the work output of the m i n e r s .^ Some stopes require elaborate systems of artificial support or have very hard ground. The price per cubic foot of rock increases with the difficulty of excavation. The opposite is also true. Thus, rate cutting always has a kind of logic behind the action. A miner may feel

that the only reason his rate was cut was because he worked too hard.

The company always claims the cut is warranted because of changing min­

ing conditions. The miners do not accept the company's explanation and set normative limits as to what constitutes an adequate day's work so

that the miner will not bo short-changed on the contract.

At the research s ite ra te cu ttin g was not p racticed by the company u n ila te ra lly . The lab o r co n tract was somewhat unique in th a t i t sp eci­ fied a fixed rate per cubic foot of rock up to a certain point. Beyond

that point (the change point or breaking point), the price per cubic foot

fell. The change point was $51.00 per day. In some stopes the price per cube was about 10 cents up to an average of $51.00 per day. Hock broken

in excess of that average was paid at about 7 cents a cube. If a man broke a lot of rock, he cut his own rate and had to do mor^ work for each dollar earned. Thus, a man earning much above the daily average of

$50.00-$55.00 is a rate buster and considered a fool by the other miners.

He's viewed as "working for the company" or "giving them the money" and not working for himself. In the labor contract the company retains the

right to adjust the piece rates but did not do so without negotiating 136 w ith the union. Again* there was the recognition th a t mine conditions are variable and that rates could be varied to fit those conditions.

However* if the earnings for a group increased* it was not axiomatically assumed that rates would be cut for the involved group or the entire labor crew. ThU3* rate busting was not considered a major group threat though labeled as foolish.

For men working on day's pay the requirement to be balanced and not over o r under work was more c a re fu lly circum scribed. The pay ra te wa3 the same regardless of output. Nevertheless* the miners expected that a certain minimum of lobor be performed, at least as much as necessary so that others would not be hindered in their work activities. A maximum level of work was also set. An individual exceeding either of those limits was sanctioned for not fulfilling the normative demands of the group. One miner recounted the animosity he received from the exper­ ienced miners whon he first come to work and labored in excess.

They (the experienced miners) were always telling me to take i t easy. They kept saj'ing, i f Hank comes in here and seeks you going at it* we're going to be in trouble. I said, "You mean you're going to be in trouble for sitting on your ass* not me . . .." (Later) When we'd go down to the doghouse for lunch and they'd want to sleep or play cards, they'd say to each other* "I wonder if we should do this; I don't know if he can be trusted not to toll Hank." They'd say that right to my face.

On another occasion the researcher was working as a trammer on a mine level well away from most of the other work activity of the mine.

There the maximum work lim it was considerably lower than elsewhere in the mine. Cutting short the hour-ond-a-half dinner break because the re­ searcher couldn't get to sleep* he loadod an additional train full of 137 rock. When rejoining the other men, an explanation was required.

Miner: What did you do, pull another train? Researcher: Yeah. Miner: Why'd you do that? Researcher: I couldn't get to sleep and was getting cold just lying there. Miner: Ohl You do th at a few more tim esj and I'd get to thinking you were a company man.

The normative requirement to be balanced applies to 3afety as well.

A man who works to excess, just as the man who works too little , is viewed os a- threat to the safety and well being of himself and others.

Men were always reminded: "Don't try to do it all; you're going to hurt yourself," and "Those contractors get in a hurry, then they get hurt."

A devotion to safety, an insistence that conditions always be safe, or strict adherence to safety regulations is also frowned upon.5 The miners fool that going strictly by the safety rule book is inimical to complet­ ing the tasks of the job. One miner commented that strict adherence to safety regulations would drastically affect the earnings of contractors.

You co u ld n 't moke a dime i f you'ro always going to be sa fe . You've got to do some dangerous things.

Even relatively simple safety regulations are ignored becauso the miners believe that it interferes with the work process. Blasting caps are always supposed to be kept apart from the explosives. Evory agency, be it federal, state, or the mining company itself, has a safety regula- to this effect. Miners almost universally ignore this rule. Following a safety inspection during which the boss scrambled from one work area to anothor ahead of the inspector to tip off the men to make the place sa fe, a number of comments were made about keeping explosives and blasting caps together. 139

We always toss the primers (blasting caps and fuse) in the powder box. It's the only dry place in tho stope. (Wet primers may not ignite properly and the blasting operation may go astray.)

I don't know what they're getting all excited about. Whon you've got to load holes, you want tho primers right there. Why should we keep the powder one place and the primers in another? All you'd do is run around.

Tho normative requirement to be balanced in one's activities has many facets ranging from how much work should or should not be done to how c lo sely safety regulations w ill be follow ed. This norm demands th at the miners conduct their activities at work in line with some mean or average. Moving beyond the limits of this mean range is considered aberrant behavior and sanctions to correct the behavior are imposed.

A fourth major norm of the miner's work group is to be responsible.

Act in a mture manner, "don't get excited," "play it cool." Every norm is partially based upon the belief that mining is an occupation for a responsible individual. This particular norm has been set aside because it pertains to a range of activity not directly treated by other norma­ tive requirements. A man may be doing his share, reciprocating social obligations and generally fulfilling the othor normative requirements of the Job in line with that expected of a responsible individual. That is not enough. Tho individual is also expected to regulate his personal conduct in a way that demonstrates he is not a victim of his own emotions.

The clearest place this norm is demonstrated is in confronting the frustration of the job. Mine work is not only difficult, it can also be terribly frustrating. Bits break, steels jam, slusher cables snap, ex­ plosives m isfire and bootleg. Each of these breakdowns slow up the work process and add to its difficulty. The frustration thus created finds 139 expression in tremendous outbursts of anger often accompanied by expressions of resignment or defeat. Within limits this activity is tolerable. Outbursts of profanity and even a little destructive damage to the equipment with the all purpose axe is acceptable. But when it becomes evident th a t a man has lo s t his cool or has become overly ex­ cited, the normative requirement to act in a mature manner steps in.

Look, when you get fucked up and you can't straighten it out right away, don't fly off the handle or quit. S it down, take fiv e , and get up and try i t again.

Beyond this type of direction given to novice miners, the other miners remind the individual that he is not acting in the prescribed way.

What and the hell are you beating on that for? (a jammed steel) That's not going to do any good. See if you can twist it loose with tho wrench.

Stories, a major element in the oral tradition of the mine, are frequently used as a socialization mechanism to illustrate norms and their consequences. One miner recounted that he had a partner who got so mad on one occasion that he took an axe and destroyed almost every bit of equipment that he possibly could. Other men were reported to be angered to such o degree that they just went home without finishing the shift. Cases of this type are normally punished by the company. Tho activity in itself is also punishing since the damaging of equipment or going home cuts into a man's earnings. The miners also impose sanctions for violation of this norm by deriding tho offender and by making him correct his actions. On one observed occasion a miner heaved a d rill down the stope into the muck pile. Since the work could not progress without the machine, it had to be retrieved. When the offender asked for assistance, he was told to "go to hell" and was forced to lug that U j O

unwieldy, 100-pound machine back up the h ill, slipping and sliding on

the broken rock. * Keeping one's cool, acting responsibly also applies to dangerous

situations. Prior to a fire drill these instructions were issued.

If you ever smell this stuff (the stench from the warning system), don't panic. Just get out as fast as you can, but don't lose your head*

Cn instructions concerning cave-ins.

(If you're ever trapped by a cave-in). Get over next to the rib or by the pipe line. Those are the best places. Try to get out if you can, but don't go crazy. Somebody w ill find you.

A fifth major norm might best be titled, "Look out for tho othor

man." This norm is also broadly based. Looking out for the other man

covers a range of expectations from doing one's share to instructing

novice miners as to the tasks of the job, to warning others about dan­

gerous situations. Within this normative construct there is a hierarchy

of obligations. One is expected to first look after his partner, then

the novice miner, the rest of the crew members, and finally other miners

on different shifts and crews*

Looking after one's partner is the strongest and most immediate re­

quirement. After all, the entire shift is usually spent solely within

his company. His problems are your problems and vice versa. Every act

that the miner takes part in is expected to reflect his own and his

partner's interest in the situation. There is a continual process of

putting oneself in the place of the other. Partners are dependent upon

each other. Failure by one is inimical to both. Men working together

engage in a constant dialogue of words and actions aimed at protecting l!il the interests of each other. These interests run the gamut from point­ ing out hazards to deciding how much work should be done or money earned.

This normative relationship often exhibits itself in many ways. Ken consult one another about dumping s h if ts so th a t the other is not harmed by the action. The researcher noticed that two drifters always seemed to miss work on the same day. Probing one of the men about this activity, he stated.

Miner: If I am going to miss work, I always tell Ole. Then he decides whether or not to dump. P.esearcher: Why do you do that? Miner: If I don't show up, he might have to work with somebody he d o esn 't want to . Researcher: I imagine that also prevents one of you from getting short-changed on the contract. Miner: Uh, huh.

The normative demand to look out for the other guy is strongly 8d- hered to. This does not mean that work partnerships are without conflict.

Often, perception of failure to uphold this norm is the source of such conflict. But, while miners may conflict with one another over this norm in many spheres, the conflict ends when it comes to danger. One may despise his work partner, but the other is always warned about loose rock in the hanging wall or misfired holes in the face.? A threat to one is a threat to both. Though there may be strong differences of opinion about any number of things, the group is united in the face of a common adversary - occupational danger. « Another strong manifestation of this norm is the requirement that miners look out for the greenhorn. The belief that mining is a learned, dangerous occupation finds fruitation in the belief that the greenhorn has no chance of doing proper work and th a t his ignorance puts him in peril. As such, he must be protected by those of greater experience. 1U2

This norm exhibits itself in a range of activities from the other men merely watching out for his presence to actually instructing the indi­ vidual on hovr to do his job. Older, more experienced miners continually

instruct the novice on how to be a miner whether the novice asks for the

instruction or not. The instruction has a varying content. For example:

When you're talking to another guy, don't shine your light in his eyes. That's kind of a natural thing to do, look at someone when you talk to them, but you've got to kind of learn to look away. Those older guys don't like you doing that.

Be careful when you move that steel around by the spiter cord after its strung (attached to the explo­ sives). All you have to do is hit that stuff against the rock and it'll light .... There won't be enough of us left to put in a lunch bucket .... Ace (the trammer) w ill have to put a screen over the grizzley to catch our I.D. tags.

The importance of this norm is often illustrated in cases of acci­

dents. Here is one in which the norm was violated*

The worst accident I ever saw was when I was working up a t the Mongoose (another mine). This young kid, I would guess he was about 18, ju s t sta rte d to work at the mine. He was up in a stope with some other follows and they sent him down to pull down the chute so they'd have room for their round. The kid fell down the chute somehow and knocked himself out. The other guys lit their round and came down. They didn't see the kid around and they didn't check. They just figured he'd gone out. Well, when they got outside, he wasn't there* A bunch of us went back in to find him. It took a while but we finally found him in the chute and got him out. He took an awful beating, busted bones and his head was beaten to a pulp from being hit by all that rock. The poor kid never did recover. He lived, but that beating left him kind of funny in the head.

As the miners are increasingly separated in space and time, the

norm to look out for the other guy becomes considerably more relaxed. 11*3

It becomes so relaxed as to be easily and unconsionably overridden by other normative requirements. Men working on the same crew take care of one another's interests. You work with the men, you don't want them fouled up or them fouling you up. A kind of relaxed give and take pre­ vails among members of the same crew. But, other men working on other shifts and crews are another matter. Beyond the strong normative re­ quirements that miners assist one another in cases of extreme danger or emergency, looking out for the other man diminishes in importance. It retains 3ome strength with regard to danger.

When looking after yourself and your partner is better served by not looking out for the man on the other shift, then the strength of the first obligation outweighs that of the latter. Contractors want to get their round out; broken rock is wages. When the miners suffer equipmont breakdowns that can't be immediately repaired or need additional equip­ ment, they simply steal what they need from the work places of men on other crews. While this action facilitates their own interests, it negates those of the other men. The missing equipment may be necessary for the work process and the thievery cycle repeats itself.

At the research site practices of this nature wore not common. The bosses frovrned upon i t and attempted to discourage the a c tiv ity . However, the miners viewed it a routine, acceptable activity. Men that had work experience in mines elsewhere reported the practice existed at other mines.

When I was working over in Mining City, you had to hide your tools at the end of every shift or they'd be gone the next day.

The norm to watch out for the other man is variable in its focus. Hill

It applies most strictly to those closest to the miner and the inex­ perienced man. As social distance increases, the strength of the norm diminishes though emergencies and danger unite the group under this normative heading.

A sixth major norm is that a man should not attempt actions boyond his level of skill. That is, experience determines the limits of acceptable and proscribed behavior. The researcher was introduced to this norm the first day at work. The shift boss climbed into a timber skip and ordered another miner to hoist him to the next level. Safety regulations clearly prohibit such oction* Before being hoisted, the boss said: I am now going to do something I'd better not ever catch John doing. If a safety inspector, foreman, or supe saw mo doing this, they'd raise hell.

Nevertheless, what was prohibited the researcher at that time was not so later on when some experience had been attained. In observing the behavior of the miners it became clear that performing certain acti­ vities was dependent upon a man's skill and experience. This distinction applied to all mine activities but was most apparent when a situation was defined as dangerous. As has been proviously mentioned, the novice miner was instructed to stay away from misfired holes or loose slabs in the hanging wall until an experienced man evaluated the situation and taught the novice the appropriate action. Riding the skip and each of the other cases bring out a simple rationale.

I am a knowledgeable, skilled, and experienced man. If something goes wrong, I 'll be able to handle it or at least have a better chance to do so.

The norm to attempt actions within one's level of skill is often subtle. It manifests Itself most clearly in what the novice miner is allowed to do vis £ vis the experienced man and in emergency situations.

Day to day work routines involving experienced miners do not clearly demark this norm. However, certain occasions arise such as a poor blast­ ing operation which leaves the face ragged, full of bootlegs and mis­ fired holes, large expanses of cap rock, and ragged hanging wall, at which time experienced men w ill stop work until they received an opinion or advice on how to proceed* The shift b03S is considered the usual resident expert on such matters. An action of this type is not simply deference to authority. The miner is under no obligation to solicit the shift boss's advice on such motters. After all, the contractor runs the immediate work area, not the boss. But, the miners recognize the extent of their abilities and are compelled to stay within those limits so that they do not Jeopardize the work process or the health and safety of the men.

Emergency situ a tio n s also demonstrate the norm to attem pt actions within one’s level of skill. When the two men were trapped behind the muck pile caused by the broken chute, the rescue crew included exper­ ienced as well as relatively inexperienced miners. The experienced men took care of the actual rescue operation; the novices were assigned to stand by and support activities. In conversation with the boss who directed the entire operation, this individual revealed that he assigned tasks based upon the men's experience and, thus, how useful they would be in performing the necessary task3. Studies of coal mine disasters frequently point to the, crucial role of the "draegermenj" experienced, specially trainod crews that conduct the actual rescue operation.^ JJ;6

Again, the less experienced men are prohibited from actual rescue work where their skills are not considered adequate to perform the tasks or deal with the dangers of the situation.

A seventh major norm is that a miner is expected to respect the fears, wishes, and personal hang-ups of others. This norm, like the others, is interrelated with other normative requirements. By doing one's share or by reciprocating social obligations, one partially ful­ f i l l s th is norm. The researcher f i r s t became aware of th is norm in attempting to test the masculinity concept that other researchers had linked to mining. The particular interest wa3 in determining whether or not men were labeled as cowards for not wishing to exposo themselves to danger. Conversations with two different miners are illustrative,

Resoarcher: Do minors think a guy is a coward if he doesn't want to do something he thinks is dangerous? Miner: No, the doy that cap rock hit my fingers, Loo and I wero working together. When it started to slab off, ho lo f t the face and I sta rte d to d r i l l . I f a guy doosn't want to do something cause he thinks it is dangerous, they don't make him.

Researcher: Given a situation like a bad slob of cap rock whore a man doesn't want to d rill under it, will his partnor demand that ho does or try to toase him into doing so? Miner: No, all these minor's have hang-ups. I've seon guys who won't go near cap rock. Myself, I don't like to load holes with prell. It scares me.

In observing the miners, the thrust of the above conversations was borne out in their bohavior. While it is incumbent in the miner's role that he face and deal with dangerous situations, it is not expected that every miner face each and every dangerous situation. A certain latitude in behavior is offered and if a man wishes to retreat from a particular hazard, that is acceptable and the issue is set aside. The researcher U j 7 never heard another man labeled a coward, a "chicken," or "gutless."

It would appear that the behavioral latitude offered an individual in reference to dangerous situations has limits. That is, if the indi­ vidual backed off from too many different types of hazards, his behavior would be called into question. However, cowardice is not a major theme.

A man retreating from dhngerou3 situations would probably have his be­ havior interpreted as laziness or not willing to do his share rather than lack of courage. While miners acknowledge the presence of uncertainty and fear within themselves and others, they also hold the assumption that if a nan i3 afraid of mine dangers, ho will either not attempt employ­ ment or will quit shortly after ho hB3 been exposed to the hazards underground.

Inspecting the fears, wishes, and hang-ups of others applies to situations other than danger. Some men do not wish to load explosives, operate slusher3, or load supplies. Some men prefer to work hard during the first part of the shift and tBpor off their activity toward quitting time. Others prefer the opposite. This norm is one that demands flexi­ b i l i t y and accommodation betwoon workers. Each is expected to bend a little so that the other can have his own needs and desires fulfilled.

A man who is considered obstinate, unflexlblo, or set in his ways has a difficult time working amiably with another and frequently has difficulty in holding a work partner.

Another major norm is to respect a dangerous situation. For one familiar with the behavior of miners, this statement is almost a contra­ diction in terms. Miners continually violate formal safety regulations.

For example, it is not unusual for a minor to sit on a case of dynamite Dj8 and smoke a cigarette. Asked about this, one miner gave this explana­ tio n .

You want to s i t down, take fiv e , and have a smoke. But everything is wet. So you sit on the only dry thing around, a case of powder.

It was previously pointed out that miners have a well developed catalogue of dangers and that most of these dangers are believed to con­ tain a lethal potential, nevertheless, hazards are defined differently.

Things, events, and practices which the safety manual defines as danger­ ous are not n ecessarily seen in the same lig h t by the miners. Each threat or potential threat is evaluated within its particular context, based upon the minor's beliefs, knowledge, skill, normative, and valua- tive obligations.

The manner in which explosives are treated illu s tr a te s th is phenom­ ena. To the outsider ignorant in the actual use of explosives,t dynamite is defined as being extremely dangerous. A new miner echoed the standard feelings about dynamite.

Aesearchor: What do you think about this mining? Plan to go sloping? Minor: I don't know. I don't like that powder; it scares mo.

This individual commonly stated that he was afraid of the explo­ sives. Perhaps he was. But his actions started to betray his word3 as he was socialized into the occupational subculture. Just before ending the fie ld work the researcher worked with th is man and observed him standing on l£0 pounds of explosives smoking a cigarette as he handed equipment up to another miner working up above. What this miner had learned and what all miners learn is that the explosives "are not all that dangerous." That is, it is not the explosives ger ae that Ui9 constitute the hazard but their context. If anyone had told the re­ searcher prior to the field work that he wouldn't feel threatened by dynamite, he would have scoffed at the idea. Yet, a month and a half after starting work he sat in a poker game with two other miners using a 50-pound case of dynamite for a card table. After watching a case of powder tumble 200 feet down a stopo, splatter against the wall and not explode, one tends to become convinced that explosives are indeed f,kind of hard to set off."

However, explosives are not always treated as the innocuous objects the illustrations above suggest. As one miner suggested:

I t takes a lo t of force to make the powder go o f f, but it only takes one cap (blasting cap).

Armed with this knowledge, most miners s till store explosives with the blasting cap3. The assumption always operative is that something must first make the cap detonate before the powder w ill explode. When explo­ sives are hauled to the face of the stope in the slusher bucket, the caps do not travel with the powder. They are carried up by the minor.

Transportation of the explosives in this manner is defined as a poten­ tially dangerous situation and one to be respected. The bucket bounces over loose rock and slams into the ribs of the stope. A crushing blow to a blasting cap will set it off. This is less the case with dynamite.

Here, the situation is defined as potentially dangerous and the explo­ sives are treated differently than in a "non-dangerous context."

Each mine hazard carries with it some definition as to its hazard­ ous potential. The intensity of the definition varies with the immed­ iacy of the threat, its size and scope, and what can be done to correct 150 the situation. Something defined as dangerous Is expected to be treated with respect. The novice is admonished to stay clear of virtually every hazard. He isn't capable of correctly defining the situation. That judgment is left to those with experience. However, there are a class of hazards which are always defined as dangerous. The misfired explo­ sive is one example; cap rock another.

Failure to respect a dangerous situation is a gross normative vio­ lation. To do so constitutes a threat not only to the offender but also to the group. Deliberate violation of this norm is most often ascribed to the "smart ass." The novice may violate the norm out of ignorance, the experienced man by errors in judgment. Violation of this norm is always sanctioned to some degree.

The last major norm that merit3 attention might be seen a3 a sub­ category of respecting a dangerous situation. This norm holds that confronting a dangerous situation always requires at least two men. The company safety manual form alizes th is norm. The norm demands th a t a man not attempt to deal with a dangerous situation alone, that he always have back-up support and assistance. Again, not all situations are defined as being equally dangerous. Operating a slushor has its dangers, somo of which are quite severe. But, this type of Job is not equated with that of freeing obstructions in ore chutes. In the first case, one man can do the job. The latter situation always requires two men. Freeing ore chutes illustrates the need for two men because of the danger the task involves. Ore chutes are steeply constructed so that the broken rock can pas3 through under the force of gravity. Occasion­ ally, obstructions develop requiring that a man enter the chute and 151

break up the jam. This is very hazardous work. The obstruction may

suddenly collapse, crushing the man. The design of the chute is such

that once inside, it is impossible to get out without a rope or some

other typo of assistance. And, finally, if someone below opens the chute

gate, the rock will suck a man down and bury him. In situations of this

type one man is always posted to tend a life line, help the man get out

of the chute, and keep others from opening the chute gates.

A similar situation prevails with other hazards. One man works;

the other acts as a supportive element. Miners believe that routine mine dangers exist in sufficient quantity that a man should never be left

entirely alone. Especially dangerous situations will rarely be touched

unless there is support. The miner's role demands facing danger but not when that action is considered tantamount to suicide. This norm is not

frequently violated but when it is, the results are often tragic. A miner provided a narrative of his close shave with death in a chute, a case in which th is norm was v io la ted .

I went up to clear the chute. I just got inside when the muck p ile broke loose. Somehow 1 managed to grab the bell cord and it wrapped around a stu ll.I was completely buried except for my hand holding the cor'd. I used it to uncover my head and I started yelling my head off. My partner wa3 down in the drift and didn't hear mo, but when I didn't come back, he came up looking around. A fter he saw what had happened, he dropped a nine down to the drift so the trammer wouldn't pull the chute .... They got help and started digging me out but they had to go real slow. There was another big pile of muck right up above my head ar.d chunks of it kept coming off. I t took them about four hours to get mo out. I was scared to death and kept saying to Hank, "I am going to quit. I am not staying in the mine." He said, "Go ahead, I don't blame you at all." After I was out, Hank h it the sid e of the manuay with a drill 3teel and that muck pile came right down. I'd have been a goner if it had come loose when I was in th e re . 1 5 2

This essentially ends the discussion of the normative order of the miners. The intent has been general dealing only with those norms that are relatively broad in scope and which are major behavioral imperatives.

In this discussion the norms have been treated as discrete elements.

In reality they are closely interrelated to one another as well as the belief structure and valuative elements of the group. To briefly recap in outline form, the major norms of the miner's occupational subculture are eight in number and include:

1. A requirement to do your share of whatevor is or needs to be done, be it facing danger, work, restricting pro­ duction, etc. 2. A requirement to reciprocate social obligations. A miner is expected to return the help, favors, and assistance he receives from others. 3* A requirement to be a balanced worker. Nothing is to be done to excess. b. A requirement to a ct responsibly. "Keep a cool head; don't get excitea." To do so avails you nothing and may cause difficulty. 5. A requirement to look out for the other men. Protect the interests of all parties involved, be it with re­ gard to production, safety, or whatever. 6. A requirement to attempt actions only within one's level of skill and experience. To do otherwise may create hazards or difficulties for the offender and/or others. 7. A requirement to be accommodating. Respect the fears, wishes, and hang-ups of others. 8. A requirement to respect a dangerous situation. Treat danger with vigilance and caution. A. A requirement to always face a dangerous situation with at least two men* A second man is always necessary for support and assistance.

Normative-Valuatlve System: Sanctions

Sanctions consist of the rewards and punishments meted out for up­ holding or violating normative requirements.? Sanctions contribute to the maintenance of a socio-cultural system by insuring behavioral con- « fortuity. The social constructions of the miner's work group contain 153

a well developed complex of sanctions. In this section the focus is

primarily upon the informally developed sanctions of the work group

though formal sanctions w ill also be touched on.

Some of these sanctions have already been mentioned. An individual who violates group norms may be chided for his activity, ostracised, or

formally reprimanded. The type of negative sanction imposed varies with

the severity of the transgression, the consequences of the action, the

frequency of the violation, and the individual's relative social defini­

tion. A novice miner usually receives nothing more than a mild admon­

ishment. An experienced man generally pays a more severe penalty.

Frequent normative violations result in increasingly severe sanctions

until the offending behavior is corrected. Severe normative breaches,

particularly those which result in property damage or personal injury,

are heavily penalized.

Negative sanctions are arranged in a continuum from mild admonish­

ment to teasing and chiding to labeling the offender to ostracism.

Occasionally, physical sanctions are imposed. This usually takes the

form of some type of horseplay in combination with teasing. One man was

sanctioned for his zealous approach to the Job by filling his work boots with water so that the miner would be uncomfortable in his work. In

other instances a man might be forced to physically correct his action

such as in the previously mentioned case where a miner lost his cool,

heaved the drill down the stope, and was forced to retrieve it. Threats

of violence are also made but rarely acted upon.

The mining company also supplied sanctions in the form of formal

reprimands, work suspensions, and discharge. Company sanctioning efforts 15k were not made to directly uphold the informal norms of the work group.

Rather, if transgressions of the informal normative structure resulted in damage to company property, personal in ju ry , or v io lated company standards, formal negative sanctions could be and were imposed. Thus, formal negative sanctions indirectly upheld informal normative require­ ments.

Positive sanctions or rewards were usually issued as compliments.

Again, this was variable depending upon the persons and situations in­ volved. New men received more compliments for their actions than those with more experience. The compliment was viewed as a m otivating mechan­ ism necessary for the proper training of the novice miner. Many miners explicitly made statements to this effect such as: "You give a man a little incentive if he knows he's doing good." A job well done, a demonstration of sound judgment were complimented with the intent of motivating further like activity. Once a man demonstrated his commit­ ment to group norms, the compliments decreased in frequency though wero forthcoming fo r unusual or sp ecial a c ts . Once the commitment to group norms was demonstrated, a man was labeled as being "OK," trustworthy and dependable. He rose in esteem and his social position was assured.

Other positive sanctions primarily included special favors or not applying negative sanctions. One man reported that when he was tramming, the contractors used to reward his work each pay day at the bar. After shift a group of miners used to regularly congregate at a tavern. The miner reported that he "never had to buy a drink." "My money was no good. Those miners (contractors) always took care of me." In other cases negative sanctions which might normally be forthcoming were IS? ignored. One experienced miner, a very skilled one, would sometimes get mad and go home without finishing the shift. This individual's partner made no attempt to sanction the activity. Ho merely ignored it and went o k as best he could by him self. These two men had forgeda very accomr modating relationship in which they just lived with each other's aberrant actions without resorting to the negative sanctions at their disposal.

Also, when this individual wont home, the shift boss did not apply the negative sanctions at his command. The offender was always paid for the shift and no formal reprimands were issued. But, this miner and his partner moved a lot of rock. They were valuable commodities to the boss who did not wish to jeopardize his relationship with the miners and per­ haps alter their work habits. By not applying a negative sanction the actual offending act was not being rewarded. Rather, the reward was for past and hopefully fu tu re performance.

The company al3o possesses a set of positive sanctions though thoy are few in number and of re la tiv e ly l i t t l e importance. T ransfers to other jobs, promotions, and bonuses are the mainstays of this system.

These sanctions are relatively ineffectual. The labor contract specifies procedures for job transfers and they cannot be simply handed out as re­ wards. Promotions aro few in number, often contingent ori job seniority, and aro not determined solely on the basis of merit. A company official might dispute this latter point. However, the miners tend to view pro­ motions os being rewards for "sucking around," "kissing ass," being related to the right person, or "having connections," The enticement of promotion is a relatively ineffectual sanction. The men do not see pro­ motion as being tied to the upholding of normative requirements, formal 156 or informal.

The company a lso offered a safety bonus. Each accident free month earned a man safety points which could be converted to cash. An acci­ dent free year earned a man an additional $15.00. The researcher asked a number of miners whether they felt that the safety bonus had any effect on their own actions or of others. The universal answer was "no,11 but they were pleased about the monetary handout. The shift boss was emphatic in this regard.

A man avoids accidents because he wants to. If he's not i-oing to be safe, no amount of money is going to change his ways.

Positive sanctions from the formal organization wore also indirect in their action. With the exception of the safety bonus, there was no clear correspondence between the formal rewards issued by the company and the normative requirements of the situation. The safety bonus was corsidercd a handout, a welfare check for doing what was done anyway.

This particular effort may have bolstered adherence to safety norms but that could not be directly ascertained.

Two other points also need to be mentioned about sanctions. First, sanctions issued within the work group are very sharp and immediate, particularly verbal sanctions. Miners are a very outspoken and candid group of men. When a man commits an offense, he is generally told about it immediately and in no uncertain terms. If this direct admonishment fails in soliciting the desired response, higher level sanctions are im­ posed. Even these latter sanctioning mechanisms are characterized by a harsh bluntness. A man being teased about his rate busting w ill be to ld point blank th a t he is a "damned fool" or a "company man." An 157 individual being ostracized will be told to "get the hell out of here; we're not going to put up with some lazy bastard." The miners are direct and candid and expect others to be so. Going behind a man's back or squealing to the boss is severely frowned upon. It indicates that a man doesn't have the guts, courage, or strength to stand up for his con­ victions and it often earns him the title of "phony," or "suckhole."

A second thing about sanctions in the mine is that many situations are self-sanctioning. This is part of the self-discipline and indepen-, dence of the miner's role. A man not doing his share may earn the en­ mity of others but a major sanction is tnat by acting in such a manner, he may cut his own earnings. A similar situation prevails with the violation of norms in respect to danger. Not respecting a dangerous situation may be paid for by the loss of a limb, broken bones, or the ultimate sanction - death. Interpersonal sanctions provent the imposi­ tion of negative consequences that mBy issue from hazards in the environ­ ment. As such, interpersonal sanctions often combine with other elements as protective devices to insure the health, welfare, and safety of the ind iv idual and the group.

To briefly recap this section, sanctions are issued by both the work group and the formal organization. Informal sanctions used to pun­ ish normative violations inolude admonishment, teasing and chiding, labeling, ostracism, and physical punishment. Formal punishments in­ clude reprimands, work suspensions, and discharge from employment. In­ formal rewards were primarily issued as compliments, indications that a man was held in high esteem, and in special favors including the with­ holding of punishments. Formal rewards were job transfers, promotions, 158

and monetary bonuses.

In each case, the sanctions were applied to seek normative conform*

ity either to informal or formal normative requirements. Formal sanc­

tions were not used extensively and, particularly the rewards, were considered relatively ineffectual since they were often contingent upon specifications set -forth in the labor contract or other conditions with­

in the mine sotting. Formal punishment was usually superceded by that

from the informal sphere oven when the norm involved was formally speci­

fied and the sanctioning agent was an officially designated representa­

tive of the formal organization. Not wishing to offend the miners, particularly the contractors, the shift boss would withhold formal pun­

ishments and seok to handle the situation informally. Serving princi­ pally as an advisor and coordinator of mine servicos, the shift boss's

role placed him in a position of having to enforce formal authority he did not truly possess. As such, the informal sphere, based upon friend­ ships and social obligations, provided a context to bring about the desired conformity.

Like the normative requirements they seek to enforce, sanctions

(formal and informal) not only contribute to the smooth flow of work and harmonious work relations but also make a direct contribution to the health, welfare, and safety of the miners by insuring that their behavior met certain standards designed to achieve those ends.

Normative-7alua11ve System: Values The final element to be discussed as part of the normative-valuative system of a subculture is values. Values are defined as states of 159

desirability.10 They might best be viewed as goals toward which human

action is oriented. Every socio-cultural system has values. Such con­

structions represent states toward which human actors strive, limited

and guided by the beliefs, norms, sanctions, and natural conditions

present in the situation.

The m iner's subculture illu s tr a te s three major valuest making the

money, taking it easy, and safety. The first value is "making the

money." The income p o te n tia l of a l l occupations is important but the

saliency of this value varies with the occupation. Not all workers or

work groups are centrally interested in monetary remuneration,^ This

is not the case with the contract miner. The potential to earn more money mining than he can in similarly skilled occupations is a major

attractive feature of the occupation and one vety highly valued. It was

previously indicated that the income potential of mining was a major

factor which started and held men to the job. Furthermore, the relative

ly high earnings bring a certain measure of security to an often economi

cally insecure occupation and serve to override the uncomfortable,

arduous, and dangerous character of mine work.

A central question forever posed in mine work is "Will it pay?"

Men won't contract if it doesn't pay them to do so. Shifts are often dumped because the miner can't get his rock out and make the money. The researcher engaged in a series of interesting conversations with exper­

ienced miners covering this point.

Researcher; I noticed that Reggie didn't show up today. Miner: Yeah, he's a foxy one. If we've got dead work to do, h e 'l l miss every time. (Dead work consists of things like making repairs, transporting equipment, or putting up pipe. It is paid at a day’s pay rate at this mine. This is not the case at all mines.) 1 6 0

Researcher: Why does he do that? Miner: He doesn't figure it's worth his while. * These two miners are used to making $50.00 a day o r more. Working a full shift for day's pay ($3b*00) isn't considered worth the effort.

But, they are not atypical. An attitude prevails that a man should be practically paid $3U.OO "just for showing up and changing his clothes."

It is felt it is nonsense to actually engage in the hard labor of mine work and put up with the conditions underground unless one can make it worth his while by earning more than is possible on day's pay.

Researcher: If you're so goddamned money hungry, why not make all the shifts. Even if you don't do anything but lay on your ass, you've made 33k.00 for jU B t showing up. Miner: Those few dollars don't make much difference at the end of the week. What's the difference if you gross $5b0.C0 or $520.00? You don't notice the $20.00 that much. But, you always notice a day off. A day off is worth $20.00 to me.

The last sentences of this statement pay homage to another value in the mine culture, that of taking it easy, which will be discussed later.

But, the salient point is one of making it pay. If one cannot earn more than day's pay for his work efforts, there is no sense in working at all, even if it costs you a few dollars in the end.

Miners will go to great lengths striving to "make the money." The standard method is to put in the hard labor necessary to break the rock and receive the appropriate payment. Dumping shifts to avoid dead work is another. Scheduling vacations is a third. One miner's comment about his partner is illustrative.

He does it every year. He figures out when w e'll finish the stope and schedules his vacation for that time. He gets out of all of that dead work we've got to do to set up the new stope, and he d o e sn 't have to work with some­ body in their stope while we're waiting for our new one .... He never misses $50.00 a day. 1 6 1

A fourth method to make the money is to change partners until a man is found with whom one can amiably work. There are a number of reasons why men change partners but a central concern is money. A man interested

in making $50.00 a day does not team well with one interested in working

for the ultimate maximum.

A f i f th and very in te re stin g way of making the money is called spad mining. Spad mining is an institutionalized way of cheating the company on the contract to increase the miner's earnings. A spad is the point from which contract measurements are made. This point is demarked by a metal tag attached to a stull, pipe, or wedge. Spad mining can be done

a variety of ways. One of the easiest is to simply hold a couple feet of the measuring tape in one's hand. Thus a five foot advance of the face is counted as seven feet. If a stope is sufficiently large, the

increase in earnings is significant. In the researcher's stope, cheat­

ing one foot on the advance would add an additional j>20.00 a week to the earnings of each man.

Another way to mine the spad is to drill and blast deeply right in front of the spad and then taper off on the depth of the drilling as one proceeds away from the measuring point. This creates a crescent shaped

face, saves the miner considerable labor, and earns him a few dishonest dollars by being paid for rock not actually mined. If the advance of tho face is 10 feet in front of the spad, the miner gets paid for 10 feet

all across the face, even though the actual advance in some places may be only eight or nine feet. Other cases could also be documented*

Within limits the miners tolerate spad mining. However, a man with a reputation for being a spad miner is looked down upon. Making the 1 6 2 money is of central importance, but it is also expected that a man will do so relatively honestly. This is not a question of honesty or loyalty to the company. The contractor feels that he works for himself. The company can "go to h e ll." Because, in the long run, "They (the company) will screw ya." The company's interest and those of the miner are not perceived as being the same. The spad miner is frowned upon because he does not demonstrate his personal responsibility or his balance. Money is important but so are other things. A quest for tne dollar so acute that it results in continual spad mining indicates that the miner is not fulfilling the obligations of his role. He's a con man, not a true man of skill. He's foolish, irresponsible, and lazy. The company also tolerates a certain amount of spBd mining. The men doing the measure­ ment aro wise to the tricks of the miner. But so long as the spad min­ ing is not pushed too far, ^oo often, sanctions are not imposed and the matter is forgotten.

Making the money is a topic which continually pervades the conversa­ tion of the miner. The first question asked a contractor is whether ho is "making any money." How much money a man is making is an important variable in his social definition and self concept. A good miner makes money. He is committed to this goal and develops the requisite skills, possesses the necessary knowledge, and conducts himself in such a manner that the money is made. One who fails to make the money is evaluated less highly. But again, while making money is important, it is a goal that must be tempered by other considerations such as taking it easy and safety.

The training process for the new miner clearly exhibits the 1 6 3 importance of the monetary value. It is not automatically assumed that all new miners want to work for the big check. This is a learned value.

Novice miners are instructed in the tricks of the trade which enables them to more e a s ily increase th e ir earnings.

Set the drill pins up tight. The money is made at the face.

Make every move count. If you need a sack of prell from one side of the stope, take something you don't need with you, and put it away. It saves you making all those extra trips lugging equipment.

Keep the machine (drill) going. The money is made with the drill.

Besides theso work tips, special incentives are offered the novice to motivate his attachment to making the money. Measurements are falsi­ fied and pay scales shifted so that tho novice will quickly see the fruit of his efforts with tho big pay chock. By doing this it is hoped that the young worker w ill become committed to the value of money as well a3 contracting a series of social debts which must be paid off through in­ creased production. The researcher's shift boss did this routinely and would openly state that he was "trying to instill a little incentive."

However, the valuo of making tho monoy was not successfully incul­ cated to all. The shift boss and many of the older minors often ex­ pressed their lament in this regard. Stories circulated about how tough it was in the old days and how the men used to want to work for the money.

When I started mining, it was tough to get a contract. When you got one, you took care of it. Nowadays you can't find many who want to work for the money. You have to practically kiss those contractors' asses to get them to do anything. They d id n 't hand out the day's pay when you got screwed up. It was straight contract all the time and you had to go to make the money .... Why I had a partner one time who used to work day shift in the sawmill and nights at the mine. When ho got drilling, he'd never stop, not even for lunch. Course^ he was good enough to l e t me do so . You d o n 't see that ‘anymore. Nobody wants to work.

As part of this example illustrates, many of the old timers tie making the money to an appreciation for hard work. The focus of their lament is upon the "new breed" of miner who d o e sn 't have a commitment to the work ethic.^ That is partially true, but it's impossible to know i f the miner of today is any more or les3 committed to the work eth ic than his predecessors. C urrently, there is no g reat commitment to the work eth ic in the context of the mine* A man contracts for the money, not the love of the work. One miner rather aptly summarised the miners' work e th ic . If you can mBke your money standing up or lying down, then l i e down.

The second major value of the miners' subculture is to "take it easy." Actualizing this goal is almost a contradiction in terms when placed alongside that of making the money. By contracting, the miner is forced to sacrifice part of one or both of these goals. It is impos3iblo to take it "real" easy and still make the money. But, not all men are attached to tho goal of making the money. That is a value for tho con­ tractor, not the man on day's pay. This latter individual works for a fixed hourly wage regardless of his output (provided it's high enough to prevent being discharged). While wages are important, they do not have the same meaning in the work situ a tio n to the two d iffe re n t groups of men. Taking it easy might best be thought of as a goal in which one does 16$ the absolute minimum of activity for the greatest possible return. For the contract miner this means working at a comfortable pace* taking the short-cuts* and developing a work rhythm which enables him to make the money and do so with relative ease. As one learns to mine* harmonizing the values of the situation with task requirements becomes increasingly easier. Some of these tricks of the trade have already been mentioned.

Others include:

Drill a hole in the hanging right in front of the face before you blast each round. That way when you need to put up pipe you don't have to drag the drill down the stope and back up again to d rill holes for tho wedges you'll need to support the pipe.

Always check the cables on the slusher for wear. If you see a bad spot, fix it right up. That way you prevent it from breaking. If it breaks up in the stope* you've got to crawl back up there dragging the cable.

There is a whole host of such tricks of the trade. Some consist of preventive maintenance to halt the possibility of having to do larger* more demanding repair Jobs. In other cases* organizing the work load in a particular way allows the miner to take it easy.

There are also institutionalized routines to take it easy* The miners at this oporation started each shift by going to their work place and sitting down for 15 minutes to have a cup of coffee and a smoke.

Lunch hours were another place where taking it easy could be actualized.

The labor co n tract provided fo r a 30-minute dinner hour. This was a l­ ways variable. Some took more time; others took less. In some cases it stretched to an hour and a half. Lunch breaks were timed to fit the schedule of the shift boss. Certain work places were visited early in the shift. These men took lunch after his visit. Those men visited 166 later in the day started lunch early so they could extend it at will without being caught. There were no fixed periods for eating meals.

Each group set its own meal time and for the length of time desired.

The contract miner ty being committed to the value of making the money is always forced to temper his commitment to taking it easy.

This is not so much the case for the man on day's pay. Beyond meeting some minimum standard of output necessary to retain the Job, this class of workers is not encumbered by any commitment to the monetary value and is relatively free to indulge it3elf in efforts to take it easy. The rationale for this action is simple. "It all pays the same." It makes no sense to work diligently. One gains nothing by the action, so you might as well take it easy. The new miner quickly learns to:

Finish your Job and go hide some place so the boss can't find you and give you another Job.

Don't do too much. Thoy (the bosses) come to expect i t .

Learning how to restrict production and take it easy is a central feature of the training process. A man must learn how to take it easy in the correct way. It is not Just a matter of lying around. Taking it easy has to be coordinated with the work. One has to be able to account for his non-work as well as his work. Some interesting patterns of be­ havior result. The new miner is immediately tipped off as to what the boss and other miners want and is expected to adjust his behavior accordingly. In the researcher's personal case, afew days after he joined the mine crew he was warned th a t the boss was "rock hungry" and that "he pushes a new man as far as he can to see how much h e'll do."

These comments were followed by advice to "work slow and easy," and 167

"Don't let the boss know your upper lim it; keep something in reserve."

The ways in which miners strive to take it easy have a myriad of forms. One of the most common is "getting lost." Work is avoided by taking a walk to where you won't be found. Certain problems with thi3 method demand protective mechanisms. One needs an excuse for not being presen t, and because i t i s dangerous to roam around too much, somebody should always know your whereabouts. It's very easy to "get lost" in the mine. One merely steps out of the main traffic patterns and shuts off the headlamp.

Another way to take it easy with an air of legitimacy is to have an equipment breakdown. There are a number of normal equipment breakdowns.

However, if the equipment doesn't fall when the man is in the mood for it to do so, the situation can be quickly remedied by tho all-purpose axe. The researcher had occasion to know a couple of miners who struc­ tured a work break by busting the handle off tho d rill. The machine was thus useless and no further work could be done. When equipment is damaged, It is always done in such a way to appoar as if it could have legitimately happened in the course of the work. It is also desirable to time the breakdown so that there is insufficient time to make neces­ sary repairs. When the equipment isn't operating, the men can do little but take it easy.

Safety is also a way to take it easy. Some miners use safety as a crutch enabling them to rest. The first miner tho researcher worked with was a master In this art. This individual could always find a haz- zard that needed immediate correction or a situation "so dangerous" that work had to stop until outside advice could be solicited. In either 168 case we took it easy* The necessary work to co rrect the hazards was always much lighter than the regular work tasks. This individual was not unusual. Other miners also indulged in the practice, depending on their mood. On one occasion two experienced miners spent two days seal* ing down some loose cap rock that they could have remedied in a couple of hours. The hazards "found" may be real, but they are treated in an exaggerated fashion. The real intent of the miner's action is not to merely correct the hazard, but to take it easy. The safety issue is a very convenient way of dodging hard labor and one which lends the activ­ ity an air of legitimacy.

Taking it easy, be it by the contractors or day's pay miner has lim its. The men have definite normative requirements in this regard as does the boss. One can only "get lost" so often. The same is true for equipment breakdowns and the safety related rest period. Over commit­ ment to this value gets a man in trouble for violating group norms. He's expected to do what is required by the job. He doesn't have to diligent­ ly labor, just meet a certain minimum. Some shirking of duty is accept­ able, but the miner is not expected to be a "charity case" by relying on others to do his work.

Within the mining environment there are certain days informally institutionalized as holidays when tho whole crew takes it easy and does

* so relatively openly. At the research site these days were labeled

"Cousin Jack Day" and were the last work day preceding a major holiday.

The title Cousin Jack Day is taken from the nickname of the Comishmen, a group with a very prominent history in Amorican mining. The title reflects an ethnic slur. On Cousin Jack Day "all you do is fuck off 169 like a Cousin Jack.'* On Cousin Jack Day work grinds to a virtual stand­ still. Prior to Thanksgiving there was a six-hour pinochle game in the doghouse near stope 33 involving two well respected contractors, some day's pay personnel, and even the shift boss sat in for a few hands.

Prior to Christmas hBlf the crew came to work inebriated. While the re­ searcher didn't know of any man taking a bottle of liquor into the mine, the miners managed to retain their state of drunkenness by quitting the pretense of work three hours early, returning to the dry, and re-opening the whiskey.

Inebriation or drinking on the job is rare. Cousin Jack Day prior to Christmas is the major exception. The company takes a dim view toward liquor on the premises and it's not overly pleased with Cousin Jack Day.

The shift bosses are far more tolerant. Prior to Christmas the company insisted the men work a full eight hour shift. They were lucky if they got an actual hour of labor and the men left the underground early des­ p ite o f f ic ia l warnings to do otherw ise. The company could severely sanction the men for their Cousin Jack Day activities, but it apparently chooses not to force the issue.

The th ird and f in a l major value is sa fe ty . In the m iner's own way this is a very salient value. To the outsider this would not appear the case. The miner appears almost nonchalant about safety. He smokes a cigarette sitting on a case of dynamite, consistently engages in horse­ play with injurious potential, and Ignores safety rules with impunity.

To view these actions as a disregard for safety is to misinterpret the behavior in the context of the mine setting because, while they are formal breaches of what is considered safe behavior, informally this is 170

4 not the case. It is an old adage that nobody likes accidents. This is especially

true in the mine. Most mine accidents are minor in nature, cuts and bruises. But unlike other situations, mine accidents always have a very seriously injurious potential which is frequently manifested in horrible accid en ts.

At an earlier point in this chapter a miner was quoted as saying one couldn't make a dime if he followed safety regulations. But this

individual's actions betrayed his words. He made a lot of money as a

$75.00 a day stoper. And, while he may not have followed the safety manual to the letter, ho followed the necessary informal safety norms

and strived to work in a safe manner. After hearing comments about how

the contractor gets in a hurry and has an accident, the researcher scru­

tinized the contractors making a lot of money to see if monetary consid­

erations overrode safety. One day a blast went badly and the face

contained a half dozen misfired holes. There was no need to work in that

area that day, so the misses were left alone* Coming off shift the misses were discussed.

Researcher: Do you always wash out the misses? (rendering them harm less). Miner: I always try. Some of them are frozen off and you can't clean them out so I d rill around them.

Money was being made that week and the researcher was aware of this

individual's comment about not making a dime being safe as well as some

other instructions. When you've got money made Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, you've got to go like hell the rest of the week to keep it.

(Pointing to the results of a poor blasting operation). See thatt One bad round, Christ, one bad hole and you can 171

lose i t a l l . (Meaning the money made during the week). That's why, if you've got it made, you've got to go like hell to keep it.

Following the conversation about washing out the misfired holes, the field notes contain this notation.

I am s till guessing that when Davy smells the money, taking time out to clean the misses goes to the way­ sid e . Tomorrow w e 'll see.

The researcher guessed wrong. Davy spent a considerable amount o f time making the misfired holes safe.* The money went to the wayside, momentarily, and safety took predominance. If those misfired holes hadn't been cleaned out, it would have been possible to d rill out another

10 to 1$ feet of face and raise the week's wages a bit. But It was also possible that one or both miners could have been seriously injured or killed if one of those misses had detonated.

Davy is an illu s tr a tiv e b u t by no means an unusual c ase . When a hazard becomes apparent, it is treated as such. Safety is always in the forefront of the miner's mind. But the concern with safety doe3 not take the formalized channels of strict adherence to safety regulations.

Safety regulations, like the dangers they encompass, also have a social definition. Some rules are considered worthless and not obeyed. The sitaations they deal with are either not defined as dangerous or the hazard is so infrequent that it is assumed not to exist. A case in point, already discussed, is the rule about storing blasting caps with explosives.

Other safety regulations are followed not so much because the regu­ lation per se is considered worthwhile but because the value of safety and its supportive norms demand it. Few miners are familiar with the 172 content of the safety manual. Their actions are not in response to those g u id elin es. Safe work is demanded by the so c io -c u ltu ra l context of the work group. That those demands p a rtia lly correspond with those of formal organizations is in c id e n ta l. The demands of the work group take precedence over tho3e of the formal organization.

Researchers who have studied miners have often linked mine danger to an attitude of fatalism .^-3 These data do not support such a conclu­ sion if the mine setting is being considered alone. Miners are fatalis­ tic to some degree. They reflect a certain fatalism about life in general. This is not unusual for groups of their socio-economic status.

Sociologists have frequently documented an attitude of powerlessnesc, alienation, and fatalism among groups on the lower end of the social class continuum.^

Whatever fatalism the minor may hove about life in genoral, it stops at the door of the dry whon mine dangers are involved. That a miner doesn't worry about the earthquake which may cave-in the mine, hardly constitutes fatalism. It is a very rational adjustment to their environment. Earthquakes ere rare. Even if they weren't, nothine can bo done to prevent them. Earthquakes aro also of such magnitude and suddenness that protective measures are useless. Other mine dangers are more common and they are guarded against. Safety is always a viable con­ cern with these hazards. You don't see a miner ignore cap rock or mis­ fired explosives because "when your number is up, it is up." That type of thinking does not exist when there is a preventable or correctable hazard. The m iner's a ttitu d e is one of;

Old man death will dog your trail for quite a spell. There's no way you can beat him. He'll get you sooner 173

or later.B u t there's no sense making things easy fo r him. ^ Miners, in their own way, constantly push for safety. There is no

resignation or fatalism down in those holes when dangers exist that can be prevented or rectified. To call a miner a fatalist is a misnomer.

He is much more a gambler who does everything possible to put the odds

in his favor. There is always some uncertainty in every dangerous sit­

uation. Using their fund of knowledge, skills, and experience the uncertain is made as cortain as possible and remodial action proceeds

from tho re. Miners are not in f a llib le . They make m istakes, commit errors of judgment, and take chances. But none of these actions is taken with a fatalistic flair.

The value of safety is not always made manifest in tho words and actions of the miner. When a new man is being trained for his future role, tho old hands give him a steady stream of advice, tips, and warn­

ings. As previously illustrated, some of these instructions pertain to

teaching him how to make the money, take it easy, or be safe. Depending on the circumstances, different aspects w ill be stressed. When a hazard

is salient, the safety value can be seen directly in tho content of some of these instructions. At other times safety appears in camouflaged form. For instance, "Make sure you tighten that haulback pin in real good."

By doing this task properly a man strives toward achieving a ll three values. If the pin is tight, it won't fall out. This enables tho minor to more quickly finish the task and go on making the money. If the pin pulls loose, he's held up and must sacrifice some time taking it easy to 171* effoct a repair often with considerable physical exertion. Finally, a tight pin is a safe pin. If it pulls loose, it may strike an individual and do him harm.

Safety is always a viable goal for the miner. In some cases it is a value that is consciously deliberated and acted upon. At other times the goal is more subtle, being realized in the proper performance of work d u tie s . The normative order of the work group demands adherence to this value anti it is usually so achieved.

In analyzing the values of the miners a balanced pattern emerges.

For the co n tracto r th is p a tte rn is tria n g u la te d . Making the money, tak ­ ing it easy, and safety fit together in a relatively harmonious pattern.

Cne might picture this pattern by thinking of a triangular object being balanced on the end of a staff. Each point of tho triangle represents one of the three major values. Over indulgence in any one or two of the three values upsets equilibrium ,^ The normative order, belief pattern, and sanctioning system act in concert to sustain a balanced state where­ by the miner achieves all three major values.

For the day's pay miner, the picture is more simplified. Making the money is of littlo relevance. One might picture this value pattern by thinking of a teetertotter balancing safety on one end with taking it easy on the other. Again, the desired state is one of equilibrium.

Each value is achieved in concert with the other.

The normative order, belief pattern, and sanctioning system allow the achievement of each value without sacrificing any particular one.

The miners' subculture is an equilibrating mechanism acting in response to the needs of the group, its members, and the demands of the work 175 environment. This does not imply, however, that each individual miner conducts himself in a perfectly balanced manner. The rate buster, for example, sacrifices something from one or more group values in order to make a little more money. Provided this individual meets certain mini* mum requirements for sustaining the other two values, his action is allowed. The same is true for the miner more personally oriented toward safety or taking it easy. The equilibrium state is not rigid. Variation is allowed within lim its. When those limits are exceeded, corrective action takes place.

To briefly recap, the major values held by the miners were "making the money," "taking it easy," and "safety." Each was interconnected with the others in a state of relative balance. A miner or group of miners was to achieve each of the three values by their actions within the mine. Attempting to achieve one or a combination of two values to the exclusion of the others was viewed unfavorably and resulted in the imposition of sanctions to correct the activity. However, the equili­ brium state was not delineated by any hard and fast definition. There were limits to the state of balance and within those parameters a range of behavior was acceptable.

Summary

In this chapter the process of analyzing'and presenting the data collected at the mine site has been continued. At the opening of the structural analysis, a model constituting the dimensions of a subculture was presented. The model divided the components o f a subculture into three basic systoms: a normative-valuative system, a position network, 176 and a system of patterns of behavior. The content bf this and the pre­ ceding chapter examined the normative-valuative system and its component partst a set of beliefs, a normative order, a sanctioning system, and a set of values.

Thus far the analysis of the subcultural dimensions or, more speci­ fically, the dimensions of the subculture's normative-valuative system has proceeded relatively discretely. Each belief, norm, sanction, and value has been examined almost as if it were an entity unto itself. In the subcultural context this is not the case. Each element is related to the others. In some cases the link is strongly forged, less so at other places. If one looks at these elements, this interrelationship can be seen. For example, a complex of beliefs about mining as a dan­ gerous occupation ties strongly to a normative fabric that requires the miner to be responsible, balanced, look out for the other man, and respect a dangerous situation. Sanctions are imposed for supporting or failing in these normative obligations. The state to be achieved is sa fe ty . The Important point to be drawn from this analysis is the general pattern of interrelationship of parts which constitute a whole. The sub­ culture of the mine setting rests upon a complex of things known and believed about the occupation, its sooial actors, and environment. The interactive process works with these basic components to form a norma­ tive order, a set of sanctions insuring conformity to that order, and a set of valued states to be attained. A constant give and take prevails in which each element contributes to the formation and sustenance of each other and the whole. Mine safety does not exist In a vacuum. It is closely tied to "making the money" and "taking it easy." It ultimate­ ly pertains to how the miners view the occupation, each other, and their environment.

In starting the analysis of the miners' subculture, but not yet quite completing that endeavor, an attempt to answer the research ques­ tions posed at the outset of this study and again in the opening pages of Chapter V would be premature. Following further discussion con­ tained in Chapter VII, there w ill be an assessment of those questions in view of the analyzed data. 178

Notesi Chapter VI

1. Robin K. Williams, American Society, 3rd edition (New Yorkt Alfred A. Knopf, 1970y, "pp.- 2$-}6.

2. It is also possible to view this process of reciprocation from a perspective that miners are motivated solely by economic con­ cerns. For a discussion of this perspective see Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industrial Sociology, 2nd edition (New Yorkt Harper end Row, 196b), pp. 6U7-6$6.

3. Rex A. Lucas, Men in Crisis (New Yorkt Basic Books, 1969), p. 6.

b. The price of rock like the social organization of the mine setting is closely affiliated with physical and technological considera­ tio n s .

5* The reference here is to what is informally frowned upon and this is not necessarily the same perspective outlined formally.

6. When a contract miner misses a shift, it is not counted against the contract. At week's end the earnings are divided by the total number o f s h if ts worked. I f $b$0.00 are earned and both men work a full week, ten shifts are counted against the contract with each miner earning $b5.00 per day. If one; man misses a shift, the money total is usually divided by nine shifts for a $$0.00 a day average. One man makes $250.00 for the week, the other earns $200*00. If both men miss one day, the earnings are divided by eight shifts for a daily average of about $$6.00 and both earn a weekly total near $225.00. Of course, missed shifts can reduce the total amount of rock broken and lower earnings, but that does not happen in all cases.

7. This is a theme of unity in the face of common adversity. See Georg Simmel, Conflict (New Yorki The Free Press, 196b).

8. Lucas, Men in C risis, p. 12) National Opinion Research Center, Human Reactions in Disaster Situations, vol. 3* Report on the West F rankfort, I l l i n o i s , Mine Explosion, December 21, 1951 (Chicagot National Opinion Research Center, 195b), pp. 62-63.

9. Williams, American Society, pp. 33-35.

10. Williams, American Society, p. 27*

11. For a discussion of the role of financial remuneration in relation to work satisfaction see Miller, Industrial Sociology, Chapter lb.

12. Comments of the old tine miners suggest that there was once a view among miners that the occupation was a "calling." See Max Weber, 179

The Proteatant Ethle and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York* Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

13* See Chapter II, pp. 27-29.

1U. A lbert K. Cohen and Harold M. Hodges, "C h a ra c te ristic s of the Lower Blue Collar Class," Social Problems 10 (Fall 1963)i pp. 303-33U. 15. A paraphrase taken from the comic strip character Hipshot Per­ cussion. Stan Lynde, "Rick O'Shay," The Montana Standard (October 5, 1973). 16. Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspec­ tives (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), Chapter 2. CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA

Introduction

This chapter continues the analysis of data initiated in the pre­ ceding two chapters. At the conclusion of Chapter VI the structural analysis of the occupational subculture was largely completed. An exam­ ination of the subculture's normative-valuative system had been made.

Within that examination the structure and content of the miners' beliefs, norms, sanctions, and values were delineated. The model specifying the dimensions of a subculture located at the beginning of Chapter V indi­ cated that a subculture consisted of a normative-valuative system, a position network, and a system of behavior.

To complete the analysis of the structural characteristics of the subculture, this chapter will begin by analyzing the subculture's posi­ tion network. It is through the roles and statuses attached to the structural positions that the content of the normative-valuative system is actualized and manifested as behavior. At the conclusion of this analysis an overall summary of the structure of the subculture w ill be made in attempting to answer the research questions posed for this re­ search. No specific effort is made to delineate all the patterns of behavior encountered in the miners' occupational subculture. The scope of that endeavor is too large to be accomplished. However, throughout the analysis, numerous examples have been cited which reflect the 180 1 8 1 impact of the occupational subculture on the miners' behavior.

Following the completion of the structural analysis, the chapter moves on to an analysis of the data from a processual perspective.1

The focus of this endeavor is to examine the socialization process found at the mine setting by which new members are inducted and integrated in- to the occupational subculture. This is perhaps the major area where the patterns of behavior within the subcultural context are tied together in a system atic form v is a v is the more random presentation of these behavioral patterns presented elsewhere in the analysis.

The final section of the chapter w ill again review the collected data. This examination will ascertain the consequences of the occupa­ tional subculture and w ill be accomplished using a functionalistic pers­ pective. Given the focus of this research, an examination of the effect of occupational danger on an occupation's participants, the aim of the analysis is more closely tied to examining the consequences of the occu­ pational subculture with regard to danger.

Structural Analysis Continued

Position Network

The final structural element to be discussed is the position net­ work of the mine. Each organized group has a myriad of positions to which are ascribed certain rights and duties, privileges and obligations.2

Each position is thus accorded a place in the entire structure of the group, required to fu lfill certain tasks and obligations for the mainten­ ance of the group and to fu lfill its purpose, and for which it is accord­ ed certain rights and privileges. The position may be occupied by a 1 8 2 social actor or group depending on the unit of analysis. In the nine positions are given to individual actors or small groups*

The position network is dual in nature. One set of positions is formally organized by bureaucratic rules and union-management negotia­ tion. This set of positions is revealed on the organizational chart and in the labor contract. There are 33 recognized positions in eight dif­ ferent pay grades for non-salaried personnel alone. The number increases when salaried supervisoiy and staff positions are included.

There is also an informal position network. This network is in part based upon that which is formally organized. But, the distinctions between positions are not so many and the criteria differentiating these positions are more diffuse. The formal position network is pri­ marily based upon institutional requirements. The informal system uses these distinctions but also includes such things as personal character­ istics (e.g., age, skill) and social activities (e.g., leader, follower).^

Both position networks start with a distinction demarked by differ­ ent methods of payment. One group of positions is salaried, the other by hourly wages or contract piece rate. The line between these two groups is not hard and fast but movement of individuals from one group of positions to the other is limited contingent upon promotion or de­ motion. Informal position networks exist on both sides of the salary line. Informal positions are more distinctly defined within its own sphere. Those positions across the salary line are viewed amorphously and show a tendency to be lumped together. For the supervisor, the salaried positions are more clearly delineated while positions on the other side tend to become lumped together as the "men" or the "crews." 183

For the miner the opposite Is true with salaried positions falling under

the broad titles of the "brass," "big shots," or "them." The shift boss

occupies a middle area. He is part of the salaried group yet spends moat of his work hours with the miners. This individual has a place within both informal position networks.

The data gathering techniques of this stud/ prohibits detailed dis­ cussion of the salariod employee's position network. The miners' infor­ mal position network is considerably more circumscribed than that out­

lined by the labor contract. Distinctions by job title and pay grade are made but not with the exactness detailed formally. The major infor­ mal positions are eight in number and includei

1. Underground general labor 2. Novice miners . 3. Regular day's pay personnel U. The old miner not currently contracting 3. Timbermen and mechanics 6. The miner 7. The good miner 8. The shift boss Each of these positions is described by a number of criteria, pri­ marily job responsibility and tasks, personal skill and experience, adherence to the informal normative order and commitment to subcultural values, and personal characteristics including age, disposition, maturity, and so forth. Positions are not merely differentiated, they are also stratified. The "good miner" is a position which confers upon its occu­ pant more status, responsibility, and earnings than do those lower in the hierarchy. Consistent with its rewards are certain obligations.

Rescue work, for example, falls to the individuals in this position. 18U

Thus, the positions outlined above form a hierarchy of increasing status

ranging up from general labor on the low end to the shift boss on the

high. Status is stressed as the key differentiating factor in terms of

system rewards. Income, working conditions, independence, and responsi­ bility are also considerations, but their variable content makes them difficult to uniformly apply. The case of the timberman is illustrative.

The job is contracted. Each chute or timbered installation has a price

and the timberman earns a variable amount of income depending on how much he accomplishes. Work conditions are generally considered to be

good. Timbermen do the m ajority of th e ir work in the d r if ts where there

is room to stand, move around, and where the ventilation is good. But,

the timbeman's contracts aren't as good as those for the miners. The

pay rotes are structured in such a way that a virtual ceiling is put on wages. Unlike tho miner, the timberman can't significantly raise his

earnings if he desires to earn a little extra money. More importantly,

the timberman does not mine and that is what mining is all about. He's

not in the mainstream of "what's happening." He is a skilled craftsman

necessary in the mining operation, a spoke in the wheel of the mine, not

its hub. That area is the province of the miner. Consequently, the

position of timberman is lower than that of tho miner, even though by

some criteria he has a better job.

Central to the entire position network and the hierarchical nature

in which it is arranged is a key, core ingredient. This core is a social

estimation of an individual. Certain minimum requirements must be met

in order to hold a place in the informal position hierarchy. It is 1 8 5 possible for a man to be a trammer, a regular day's pay job, by company definition. This doesn't automatically place him in the Informal net­ work. If he falls to meet the core requirements, he is socially out even if the job title he holds says that he is in.

The core requirements are simple: do your job, do it easy, and do it safe. Put another way, participate in and adhere to the values and norms of the work group. Falling to meet these requirements places the individual outside the informal system. Being outside the system is broken into two classifications. Supervisory personnel (the shift boss to some extent) are outsiders and they are expected to be. This is not a< classification the work group makes unaided nor is it one to which negative definitions are attached. The other olass of outsider is viewed negatively. This class contains the "smart ass" and the "phony."

Added to this central core are other differentiating criteria.

Skill, knowledge, work experience, age, health, personal disposition, type of work done, earnings, and other factors contribute to a miner's place on the informal hierarchy. Unquestionably, of these other factors, skill and type of work done are the more salient factors. For example, day's pay miners never occupy the top positions on the hierarchy. Those spots are reserved for the miners, the artisans of the underground.

Examination of the informal position network reveals three cate­ gories which are not labeled strictly in accordance with mine job titles.

They are: the novice miner, the old miner, and the good miner. The novice rates his position because he is entering the craft. He may be unproven, but he is showing the right attitude. The old miner currently holding a day's pay job rates a higher position than those day's pay men 1 8 6 who have not mined. The old miner is a repository of wisdom. He

doesn't possess the status of a current practitioner of the craft, but

he is recognized as a man of skill who can be drawn on when necessary.

The good miner is at the informal pinnacle. The shift boss rates a bit

higher by virtue of his authority but only if it is combined with the

estimation of being a good miner. The good miner makes his money, makes

it easy, and does so safely. This is the man whose judgment counts

above a l l o th ers, who can be depended on i f anyone can, and whose work

excels that of his peers.

A final point about the informal position network is that movement between positions is dependent both on informal social definitions and

formally prescribed definitions. A man may change his relative social

status by being transferred from one job to another such as from trammer

to timberman. Provided ho is meeting core requirements and strives to fill the requirements of tho new job, his informal social definition is

raised accordingly. New men entering tho mine begin at the bottom of

the hierarchy but they are in the hierarchy even though they have not proven themselves. There are no requirements to be mot before entry

into the miners' social hierarchy is allowed. The hierarchy has posi­

tions for the ignorant and inexperienced. While these positions are

occupied, the man is expected to learn the rules of the game and then pass on to other positions.

To briefly summarize this section, the informal position network

of the mine setting has been outlined. The positions are eight In

number and include: 187

1. Underground general labor 2. Novice miners 3. Regular day's pay personnel U. The old miner not c u rre n tly contracting 5. Timbermen and mechanics 6. The miner 7. The good miner 8. The shift boss

Each of the positions has an attached role and status and is hier­

archically arranged. Positions near the top of the hierarchy (e.g., the good miner) confer great status and responsibility upon its holder.

Likewise, those st the bottom of the continuum have an opposite situation.

The informal position network is based upon that formally organized by the social organization of the mine and negotiations with tho labor union. To this are added criteria such as personal charaoteristics (e.g., age, skill) and social activities (e.g., leader, follower) with the

resulting formation of the informal position network. »

Summary of Structural Analysis

In the preceding two chapters and in the section of this chapter that has just been completed, the structure of the miners' occupational subculture contained within the mine setting has been analyzed. The informal position network, values, norms, sanctions, and beliefs have been described. In doing so the content of the miners' subculture has been illustrated not only in form but also in how it affects the miners' action. In the opening chapter of this study and again in Chapter V a number of research questions were po3ed to be answered by data analysis.

It appears that two of these questions have been answered.

The question, is the variable of occupational danger of sufficient saliency to manifest its effects upon occupational participants in a 198

complex of systematically interrelated traits that form an occupational

subculture of danger, requires an answer of yes. The question, what is

the content of an occupational subculture of danger, indicates an answer

in a complex of beliefs, norms, sanctions, values, and positions which

focus upon occupational danger and which enables the miners to adjust to

such phenomena. The answers to these questions arc interrelated. In

analyzing the occupational subculture of the mine se ttin g i t became

apparent that danger had a significant input into its character.

Previous research indicated that this might be partially expected.

However, research d eficien cies fa ile d to d elin eate the scope of th is

issue. It Is now apparent that the presence of occupational danger has

a sizeable and important effect upon the subcultural constructions of a work group. Occupational danger is taken into account, and it is done

so in a detailed and systematic manner. For the miner occupational dan­

ger is more than Just a peripheral concern which might lead to the forma­

tion of certain maxims and cliches. An office worker might be told not

to drop a typewriter on his toes, but that does not constitute an ele­

ment in an occupational subculture of danger. In such a case the maxim

is a discrete element and not a central or systematically interrelated

part of social life in the office environment. This is not thec b s o

for the miner. Danger is ever present} it is part of the job and must

be dealt with routinely. It isa central issue in the mining environ­

ment and one which manifests itself in a complex of social constructions

devised to successfully handle this problem.

It should not be inferred by statements indicating that miners are

part of an occupational subculture of danger that danger is the sole 189 concern of the subcultural constructions. As has been shown, miners are concerned with other issues, but danger is always a major issue. In labeling mining as an occupation characterized by an occupational sub­ culture of danger, the attempt is not to ignore other aspects but merely to stress that which has been a major focus of the research. There is probably no occupation nor group whose subcultural life is framed solely by one concern. Certainly this is not the case for the miners. Danger is one salient element and is treated accordingly.

Proce33ual Analysis

Processual analysis seeks to study the social processes through which so c ia l phenomena occur. I t is a question of how does th e e n tity operate. In illustrating the structure of the occupotional subculture of the mine attention has already been given to some processual activity.

For example, it was noted how the miners sanction one another, define mine hazards, spad mine, and so forth. In this section what has been initiated will be continued though its focus becomes more specific. The major concern w ill be the socialization mechanism, that is, how new miners are inducted into the occupational subculture, learn its mechan­ ic s , and become functioning members of tho system.

The socialization of the new miner begins not with the miners* work group but with the formal organization of the mining company through its personnel office. Companies differ in this regard but all have some type of pro-employment interview or meeting during which certain aspects of company policy are revealed to the inductees. The content of these meetings is variable but generally includes instructions about mine 1 9 0 safety, the hours of work, work conditions, systems of payment and fringe benefits, and disciplinary action. This meeting begins a process of spelling out expectations. At this point it is a matter of broadly out­ lining what the miner can expect from the company and whBt the employee is expected to return. These expectations have a dual quality. Some are expectations of fact (i.e., you can expect to be discharged if caught pilfering company property; you can expect to receive your paycheck on

Friday). Others are expectations of hope (i.e., we expect that you'll work safely; we expect that you'll deliver a fair day's work for a fair day's pay). The pre-employment interview is important only insofar as it begins the socialization process. The specific content of this meeting is so standardized and general that its impact carries into the work situation in a very limited sense. It is not like the initial interview given a convict upon induction into prison. There, the rules and regulations of the institution are precisely outlined, and there is a pronounced carry­ over effect for the convict if he attempts to live by what he learned in the opening interview while residing in the midst of a prison population.

This is not the case for the miner. The formalized opening of the socialization process is one of dealing in generalities about standard­ ized situations. The aspects discussed are not those which will bring the miner into conflict with the work group. That comes later, primarily from the shift boss, who interprets company policy and brings it home to the miner. Reporting to work continues the socialisation process. The new miner reports to the shift boss who in turn passes on further 1?1 standardized instructions such as where, when, and how to get his head­ lamp, change his clothes, etc. The shift boss also passes out the work assignment. This involves sending the new miner to work in the company of other, more experienced men. Initial Job assignments are those of general labor. Cleaning track, loading and unloading supplies, and housekeeping chores of various types are routine introductory tasks. It is in the company of the other miners that the socialization process begins in earnest. The new man is merely expected to tag along, do what he is told, and follow the example of the other miners. He is not ex­ pected to venture out on his own nor is he allowed to. The new miner is also uneasy in this situation. He does not know what is specifically expected and refrains from any action until so directed.

The -first step in the socialization process conducted by the miners

Is conversational in nature. The men attempt to "feel out" the new man with questions about himself. The responses to these questions set the parameters of social definition and ultimately the kind, typo, and amount of socialization the group will mete out. If a new miner is from the lo c a l community, the p attern may be somewhat abbreviated since eith er he o r his fam ily may already be known. As such, he has a p a rtia lly formed social definition becauset

He's Charlie's kid brother or Harry's son.

Your Dad works a ranch up on Squaw Creek, doesn't he?

I remember you. You played tackle fo r the Rattlesnakes a couple years back.

When certain things are already known about the miner, a level of expectation already exists. If Harry is known as a good old guy, there 192 is a transfer process whereby Harry's son is expected to have those sane qualities. The social stature or lack thereof that a new miner may possess because of a known family biography is not a fixed reality. The new miner must still prove himself though, at times, the local boy re­ ceives certain considerations that would not be given the outsider. The researcher saw certain instances of this type, but the issue involved was so small that it would be difficult to label it favoritism or, perhaps, "community nepotism." Two miners, however, narrated a case which illustrates the idea of "taking care of the local boy." Their synthesized remarks appear below:

He's a p re tty good miner now, bu t he w asn 't always th a t way. The reason he's working over here is because they got fed up with him over a t Mine B. He was the biggest screw-off tney ever had and the boys over there put up with it for as long as they could. Nobody wanted to get him canned. He had it pretty rough as a kid. His parents d id n 't tr e a t him rig h t. They took good care of his sisters, but they crapped all over Davy. Instead of having him get the axe, they got him moved. He's shaped up pretty good since he's been working over hero.

The conversational process which begins the socialization process seeks to determine the new miner's past history, his attitude toward the job, why he came to work, how long he expects to stay, and so on. For the individual from outside the community this process is considerably more detailed than is usually the case for the local boy. Information gleaned in these conversations set a baseline for expectations. It broadly informs the miners how much the new man will need to be taught and what they can expect from him in terms of work attitude and output.

A man with previous mine experience does not get the: fu ll socialization treatment. It is expected that he already knows the general mine 193 routine but will have to be filled in on specific details such as the boss's disposition or specific mine hazards. An individual mining for the first time receives more attention, usually beginning with a support­ ive comment, "Don't worryj y o u 'll do a l l rig h t."

The conversational feeling-out period continues for the first few days of work and is periodically reinstated as the miner changes work groups or jobs. In each case the intent of the transaction is to set parameters of social definition and socialization.

Following the introductory conversational phase, the socialization process shifts to teaching the new miner the tasks of his job, the dan­ gers of the mine environment, the expectations of the company, its for­ mal representatives, and the other miners. This second phase begins in a general and simplified fashion. Detailed introductions or explanations ore not given. The new miner is given enough information to get him through the shift and a few standard everyday "rules-of-thumb." There is no effort made to describe the entire mining operation, its compon­ ent parts, their system of interrelation, or provide a detailed exposi­ tion of mine dangers* The man is told what is expected for each task assignment, how to accomplish it, and what to watch out for. He learns, for example, that cleaning track requires that one shovel loose rock away from tho rails, that the boss expects 100 yards of track completed each shift, and that he must stay well away from moving trams. Oeneral rules-of-thumb have already been mentioned such as keeping the headlamp on at all times. As job tasks increase in complexity or dangers appear, the indivi­ dual receives further information on how to handle these situations. 19k

However, information is ra re ly imparted to the new miner about s itu a ­ tions in which he is not involved. But a social osmosis takes place through overhearing other miners converse. Thus, while learning one job directly, the individual is always gathering additional information about other aspects of mining.

Two things should be noted about the socialization process. First, there is no attempt to frighten the new miner or test his mettle by recounting the horrors of the underground. Miners recognize that the new man brings certain beliefs about the mine to work from the outside.

The underground experience in itself is threatening enough without hav­ ing it compounded by playing upon a man's fears. Miners expect that a new man will have a certain apprehension about the job. They try to either alleviate these fears with supportive comments or ignore the whole situation and provide, by example, an illustration that there is nothing to be upset about. I t must be remembered th a t there is a degree of self-selection among prospective candidates for mine employment.

Those afraid of the mines tend to stay away. While new men are not totally without apprehension, it is not overpowering. Each of the nov­ ice miners with whom the researcher had contact indicated that they were

"not afraid of being underground" or that if they were, it had quickly vanished. These statements are also indicative of ignorance. New miners are not cowered by fear but they also do not know the nature of mine hazards. Older miners almost uniformly respond that they are more afraid of the mines now than when they started to work because they know what to fe a r.

A second feature of the socialization process and which bears 195 repetition is that socialization is a step-by-step activity. One learns about things as the need arises. Furthermore, conversation among miners is clearly tied to situational exigencies. Cave-ins or accidents are not typical topics of discussion unless triggered by some incident.

Following the accident which trapped the two miners behind the muck pile, stories about related events increased in number. Prior to that period, references to such matters were more scattered.

Conversation or verbalization is an integral part of the socializa­ tion process. But in the mine verbal communication is of less importance than in other situations where adult socialization takes place. Much of what passes through the socialization process is done by example and demonstration. That is, physical activity (non-symbolic) is the instruc­ tive device. There are five major ways in which the new miner is taught the role expectations and behavior of the miner. Three of these methods are verbalt advice, direct instruction, and stories. The other methods are physical: example and demonstration.

Advice is given freely or when requested. Its content relates to all matter of things. Some examples have already been illustrated such as "Stay away from those missed holes}" "Tighten those pins in good}" and "Don't shine your light in another man's eyes." Advice carries no social obligation that the recipient accept or act upon it. However, advice is sometimes a mild form of admonition. If not accepted it be­ comes more strongly worded and Is given as a warning or command.

Direct instruction differs from advice by its obligatory nature and by the speaker's intention. The content of advice and direct instruction is generally the same but the context shifts. In these situations the words "Tighten those d rill pins" have the strength of obligation behind them. The recipient is not just being told how or how not to do some­ thing, he is expected to comply. The speaker who offers the instruction also has a social Investment in the situation. It is his duty to offer the instruction and see that the novice learns from the experience.

This duty may stem from the authority of the boss who orders the miner to in s tru c t the novice. More commonly, however, i t emanates from sub­ c u ltu ra l normative demands which require the miner to look out fo r the other man.

Direct instruction and advice are immediate and direct methods of socialization. Through their verbal context the miner is instructed about the expectations and demands of h is job. S to rie s , ta le s , and legends are forms of verbal socialization which provide instruction in a relatively indirect manner. They do so by illustrating a case in which certain things happened and provide an interpretive context to draw out a meaning. It is a case of reading between the lines. Old time miners do not play the part of the wise old sage reciting parables for the eager students to decipher. The message that comes across in their stories is rarely the effect of a conscious effort to serve in an instructive capacity. It sometimes happens that a miner may wish to emphasize a piece of advice or direct instruction by relating it to some sto ry , but th is is not the usual case. Most s to rie s crop up in the course of everyday conversation. In the preceding chapter a story was recounted about how a miner narrowly escaped death when he entered a hung-up chute and was buried by a sliding muck pile. The miner telling the tale was not attempting to instruct those present on the normative 197 order of the mine or the dangers of mining* The story entered the dis­ cussion as a verbal sidelight to a talk about the mechanics of shrinkage stoping* That the miner is capable of abstracting a lesson from these stories is important but not the usual intent of the communication.

The story is a major mechanism of continuity in the miners' occupa­ tional subculture. They provide a historical synopsis of the wisdom of previous generations of miners* Particularly from the story, but also from the other forms of communication, the new miner learns the reasons why certain things are done. The story is part of the oral bible of the underground. It ties present prescriptions to past actions and pro­ vides a raison d'etre for the occupational subculture.

Examples are the physical counterpart to advice. They c o n sist of activities and events which provide learning experiences yet do not obligate the miner to profit from the experience. New miners are shorn examples of how faults affect ore bodies, what causes chute obstructions, and so forth. While there is no specific obligation to learn from an example, it is assumed that the information being imparted is necessary for the development of a good miner.

Demonstrations are the physical counterpart to direct instruction.

Indeed, they consist of direct instructions in a non-verbal sphere.

Demonstrations are used to teach the novice how to do something by phy­ sically going through procedural techniques and then allowing the trainee a chance to imitate. Demonstrations are frequently used in tandem with direct verbal instruction. However, the demonstration focuses on how to do things with its verbal counterparts emphasising why things are done as they are. The demonstration is well suited to the concrete world of 190 the mine. Virtually anything that can be talked about with relation to the job can also be shown*

Socialization in any situation is imperfect. It is a dual process.

There is the matter of instructing the prospective member of the group about the expectations and behavior it requires, and the inductee must accept that instruction by making it a part of how he views the world and acts upon it. For any one or both of these processes there may be partial or total failure. The new miner enters mining by choice. As such, the socialization process starts on a relatively positive plane.

It's assumed that the individual wants to be at the mine and is willing to accept the socialization process. This does not indicate that the socialization process will be uniformly effective. It is impossible for any one or even a small group of miners to instruct a man on all the aspects of the occupation. The men may not have the knowledge or mine conditions may not lend themselves to instruction on all aspects of the

Job.

Furthermore, there are differences in emphasis. One instructor may stress the dangers of the mine and how to guard against them. Others focus on tech n ical d e ta ils of the work procedure. S t i l l others aim a t social relationships. Also, the content of the subculture is variable.

There is wide agreement on the norms, values, sanctions, and positions of the work group. Beliefs and knowledge are more amorphously defined.

This complex is characterized by certain group universale (e.g., drib­ bling rock equals impending cave-in) but there are also a lot of idio­ syncratic elements diffused throughout the structure.

This theme was noted after the researcher heard another miner 19? recount the effects of a cave-in. This individual insisted that cave- ins exert a pronounced suction which will draw a nan under the falling rock. This answer didn't seem correct in the researcher's mind so he started asking other miners about the effects of a cave-in. The most common response was that, if anything, a cave-in creates a minor blowing of air away from the site of the rock fall. One miner, however, strad­ dled the fence. It does both, depending on where you are. It sucks from the sides and top and blows toward the bottom.

The point of this discussion is to illustrate that the socializa­ tion mechanism deals with a content variable and often contradictory.

There is always some misinformation being passed around. This makes socialization somewhat problematic. From a diverse content the new min­ er must internalize the necessary requirements for filling the role of minor. This is also not uniformly done. The beBt instruction does not axiomstically imply learning. The new man may not catch all the infor­ mation thrown h is way* he makes m istakes, he has to tr y again, and he finds himself sanctioned. The process of socialization is fraught with difficulty. It is not always imparted systematically nor is it internal­ ized uniformly. Perhaps the single most salient point about socialization of the new miner is that verbal communication, by itself, is totally inadequate for the training process. Mining is largely a physical skill and one that requires considerable practice. There is a tremendous disparity between talking about the mechanics of mining and actually performing the work. Verbal communication tends to broadly outline situational 200 requirements but it is physical example and demonstration that brings out specifics. The miners recognize this. When a new man asks an old timer a question about something with which the novice is not familiar, the answer received is usually short and followed with the phrase,

"They'll show ya." It is not so much the case that the experienced man cannot provide a detailed answer but that the answer would mean little .

Certain things cannot be communicated verbally. It is impossible to loarn how to drill properly, load and time explosives, set timber, recognize bad hanging, and so forth without having the physical object or situation present.^ Physical examples and demonstrations are the core of the socializa­ tion process. The new man is shown how to do something and then given a chance to imitate and practice the activity. Verbal communication fills in supportive gaps in the physical teaching-learning process. The use of words explain why things are done. The demonstrations and examples explain how they are accomplished.

The dichotomized socialization process works well in most cases.

The verbal aspects support the physical dimensions and vice versa.

There are certain dislocations from time to time but generally the pro­ cess works smoothly. The mannor in which socialization takes place appears to admirably fit the setting. Changing mine conditions often make it difficult to convey instructions with the use of symbols. As such, a socialization process that makes extensive use of non-verbal communication is well suited to the setting.

One final point about the socialization process needs to be men­ tioned. The miners have certain expectations and beliefs about how the 201 process should be completed* It was previously mentioned that the miners feel a new man should be taught the rudiments of the trade by an experienced man. This was usually the case. However, i t is not ju s t a matter of having an experienced man instruct the novice, the right man must do it. This requirement entails that the experienced man have an amiable disposition.

You can't send a green man up with Ole. He’s kind of cranky and set in his ways. He gets to ordering them (new miners) around and they don't like it. Pretty soon you get trouble.

There is also a requirement that the man not be a rate buster.

Nothing discourages a man faster than going into a stope with some guy that is always in a hurry or who wants to use that fifth. (A fifth steel, indicating that the minor is drilling for depth to make big money.)

Green guys sh o u ld n 't be in a stope with somebody th a t's money hungry. He'll run their asses off doing work they don't know how to do and all they end up with is sore muscles. It kills their desire to stay in a stope.

The instructing miner is not to be a "show-off" or "wise guy."

1st Miner: Davy is a natural teacher. He loves to perform for an audience. 2nd Miner: Not him, he just likes to show off. A good teacher shows you the fundamentals, answers your questions, helps you when you get really screwed up but lets you go a t i t on your own and fig u re things o u t.

The appropriate instructor is to be a balanced man. He's skilled, know­ ledgeable, patient, and moderate. He's capable of passing on what he knows to a new man and represents a model to be copied.

Summary of Processual Analysis

At the outset of this study and in the beginning of Chapter V, a question was posed about how the occupational subculture is transmitted to new potential members. This concerns the socialization process. As has been pointed out, socialization begins with a formalized introduction to the mine conducted by the personnel office. This is continued by the miners at work. They converse with the new man to determine his back­ ground, general attitude, and experience. Using information from these conversations a baseline of expectations is set from which the actual socialization proceeds. The process of inducting the new miner into the system proceeds in steps first general in nature and then more specific as the complexity of the work situation increases. The novice is taught the tasks of his job, the informal social system, and safety. This is accomplished both verbally and by non-verbal modes of communication, par* tic u la rly by dem onstration and example* Sanctions are meted out as necessary. Finally, socialization is expected to proceed from contact with an experienced miner who acts as the major tutor for tho greenhorn.

While all members of the work group contribute to the socialization pro­ cess, one experienced man is given the burden of bringing the novice into his role.

There was no attempt in this discussion to separate socialization for mine safety from other components of the occupational subculture.

The mechanism is, in all cases, the same. The content varies with the men and situations involved but the entire process follows the same procedure. At certain times the inductee w ill receive information about safety, at other times the Information may deal with making the money, taking it easy, and so forth. Mine danger is an important concern for the miner but not the sole concern. Danger is treated in the same fashion as other elements of the environment. Knowledge, skills, and 203 behavior patterns are inculcated about danger as the need arises. This is no different from the vay mine technology or other aspects of mining are handled. So, while there is a socialization process for the miners' occupational subculture, there is one and only one mechanism for all parts of the subculture. Danger does not get special consideration.

Functional Analysis

Functional analysis seeks to explain the social consequences of the phenomena under study. This research has studied a so c ia l s e ttin g . In doing so it has focused its attention on the occupational subculture of the miners. These steps were necessary to determine the effect of occu­ pational danger on an occupation's participants. Following Moore's^ lead, it was assumed that if occupational danger had any effect on an occupational group, it would manifest Itself at the subcultural level.

* Thus, the occupational subculture is being viewed as a response (at least partially) to environmental conditions. The theme of subculture as response is not without precedent. Lewis,^ Oans,? and Wallace^ have all used this theme with varying degrees of emphasis. The previously c ite d work of Moore,9 Osborn, 10 Wenger and W ellerU follow th is p a tte rn in their studies of disasters. This research has already established that occupational danger has a pronounced effect on the content of an occupational subculture and how considerations of occupational danger manifest themselves within this subculture.

At this point the tables will be turned, so to speak, so that the effect of the occupational subculture upon the miners can be assessed.

That in, what are the consequences of an occupational subculture of 20h danger? Is it a functional or dysfunctional response to occupational danger? In making this examination it was necessary to consider the social setting and occupational subculture in its totality so that the benchmarks of the relationship between occupational danger and an occu­ pational group could be established. That has been done in the structu­ ral and processual analyses of the mine and its subcultural constructions.

At this point a more discrete focus is required. It is desirable to assess the consequences of subcultural constructions which deal with occupational danger.

Taken as a whole, the complex of subcultural constructions related to danger and which have been singled out by the researcher as marking the miners as part of an occupational subculture of danger is a func­ tional device. These subcultural elements are an adaptive and insulative mechanism which protects the miner from the dangers of his job. Safety is a major subcultural value. The system of norms, beliefs, sanctions, knowledge, etc. which make up the subcultural content support this value and motivate the miners to achieve same. Host dangerous situations are met by the miner and successfully conquered. Armed with knowledge, skills, and behavioral prescriptions, the miner can overcome most of the hazards of his work place.

It is difficult to specifically pin-point the functional aspects of the occupational subculture. Its successes do not go on public exhibi­ tion. Only the failures, the accidents, make it to the statistical annals and/or public attention. Miners make distinctions with regard to the nature and types of danger, and for those common, routine hazards there exists a complex of knowledge and behavioral patterns guided by 205 normative and valuative considerations which allow the miners to make the danger manageable and enjoy relative safety. If it were possible to statistically document the kinds and frequency of mine hazards and com­ pare those figures with accident data, the true effectiveness of an occu­ pational subculture of danger could be realized. One familiar with the mining environment will recognize that certain hazards are pervasive.

Hock falls, slips, equipment related threats fall in this category.

Considering the number of times that these dangers appear and compared with the actual number of injuries from these sources, the resulting danger frequency to accident ratio would be minute. In gross aggregate terms, rock falls are the number one killer of miners. But when the potential and/or occurrence of this threat is considered, the number of men injured by the phenomenon is very sm all.

The occupational subculture of danger has its greatest strength in protecting the miner from the common, routine, and frequent forms of mine danger. In doing so it recognizes the reality of mine danger. The hazards are usually small and localized though carrying a lethal poten­ tial. Moreover, mine work is isolated in nature. The occupational sub­ culture of danger protects the separated groups of men by insisting that

6Bch man and group become relatively self-sufficient in coping with mine dangers. The occupational subculture of danger makes danger manage­ able and brings a degree of certainty to an otherwise uncertain situation.

With its focus on the small danger, the common and routine danger, the occupational subcultural of danger carries safety beyond the capa­ bilities of formal organizations. The content of tho subculture is specific. It deals with a multitude of concrete situations in very 206 detailed terms. The formal organization, be it the company, union, or public regulatory bodies cannot achieve this end. At best, they can set standards and rules for dealing with generalized situations. But, in a mine, dangerous situations are not standardized. Oeneral rules may be a starting point for action but are not complete enough to guarantee suc­ cess throughout the process of confronting and remedying mine hazards.

The occupational subculture of danger deals with the subtle nuances of a situation, the things that are difficult to formally specify.

If one were to view the respective contributions to mine safety made by the occupational subculture of danger in party with that contri­ buted by formal organizations, a continuum emerges. On the one end there is the public regulatory agencies. These organizations set gen­ e ra l standards fo r the mine as a whole. They in s is t upon such things as disaster and evacuation plans, set standards for types of acceptable mine equipment, and so forth. Rules of personal conduct are specified to some degree but this activity shades toward the middle of the con­ tinuum and is more preeminently handled by the mining company. The company, through its safety manual and safety offlco, issues rules and procedures for working in dangerous conditions. For example, it insists that warning signs be posted so that miners entering the area w ill know that a hazardous situation exists, requires that miners load explosives with non-sparking equipment, and that only trammers operate the under­ ground locomotives. The content of these rules tend to be general and job specific. They outline basic safety requirements for the men to follow but do not encompass the range of subtle situational exigencies.

The rules cannot cover every situation that exists. Even if they could, 207 i t would be impossible to enforce them. The company s i t s a strid e the safety contributions of the public regulatory agencies and that provided by the men. I t takes the more global demands of the outside regulatory agency and transmits them into more specific requirements. The occupa­ tional subculture goes one step further by providing for the small, un­ regulated situational exigency. The safety continuum is one of increas­ ing spocificness. The standards set by the regulatoiy agencies are broad, the company narrows these standards to more specific safety rules, and the occupational subculture carries the matter of mine safety into realm of specific detail.

The occupational subculture of danger's greatest asset is its a b ility to serve as a p rotective mechanism fo r the th rea ts th a t commonly occur in the occupational context. Since most mine dangers fall within the purview of the subculture, its overall contribution to mine safety is immense. But, th is focus on the common, routine mine danger is porhaps the subculture's greatest liability. It was previously indicated that as mine hazards grow in scope and/or recede in frequency, the occupational subculture diminishes in importance. That is, subcultural constructions become less specific, remedial actions are more amorphously defined, and the protective ability of the subculture declines. The. subculture deals only with those dangers that are defined as controllable. The earth­ quake induced cave-in is outside the parameters of the subculture since this is an unpredictable and uncontrollable hazard. There are other hazards, however, which are predictable and controllable but which occur so infrequently that the subcultural constructions are not outlined. A case in poin t is the mine f i r e . 208

A fire is one of the most hazardous events that can happen under­ ground. Even if the flames are held to a relatively small area, the potential for damage is immense. Carbon monoxide* a deadly gas emitted in all types of combustion* quickly reaches toxic levels in the confined spaces of a mine. As the Sunshine Mine disaster illustrates* the human toll of mine fires is often catastrophic. The naive outsider might assume that fire would be one hazard with which the miners would concern themselves. This is not the case despite an almost certain calamitous outcome if the event should occur. The occupational subculture pays little attention to the mine fire. Fires are consiaered to be very rare events. Not much is truly known about mine fires among production work­ ers. There is the standard safety manual knowledge of reporting fires and evacuating the mine* but the specific details which outline a man's behavior in other situations are absent. The key element to survival in a mine fire is avoiding the smoke and carbon monoxide. This can be done by not being "inby" o r downwind from the f i r e . The v e n tila tio n system moves the air through the mine following certain paths. Smoke and carbrn monoxide travel with those air ourrents. Yet miners* on the whole, are ignorant of the ventilation system. Safety is equated with the nearest mine portal and this may not be the case.

Mine A of the research site had two major exits* both of which served as exhaust portals for mine ventilation. A fire in the workings of Mine B or C which were interconnected with Mine A could have disas­ trous consequences. Men trying to evacuate Mine A by the usual routes would be caught in an exhaust of toxic gas. This one fact was univer­ s a lly unknown by the m iners. They knew where th e e x its were but did not 20? realize that safety in the case of fire does not rest solely on that knowledge.

The occupational subculture with its emphasis on the common, routine danger does not extend to dangers that rarely occur, even if those dan­ gers are potentially controllable. This is perhaps the major dysfunc­ tional characteristic of the miner's occupational subculture of danger.

It is limited. It prepares for the usual, not the unusual case. In doing so it guards the miners from the common threats of the work place and leaves them relatively defenseless in the face of calamity, evon If that calamity could be partially avoided.

Another dysfunctional feature of tho occupational subculture is that its requirements often supercede those of the formal organization.

This is often the case with formalized safety regulations. Safety regu­ lations are general in nature. They provide the baseline for human action not a specific blueprint from which to work. The occupational subculture is considerably more detailed and more situation oriented.

Thus, a conflict often arises over adherence to formalized rules or those of tho work group. Attachment to the subculture usually allows subcultural demands to dominate those of the formal organization. With­ in the subculture there are certain definitions about what constitutes a hazard and what forms of remedial action to be taken. These definitions

* and the action they require do not always fit the requirements spelled out by the formal organization. Thus, while the occupational subculture of danger acts as a protective device with many hazards, it also serves to create others. Mine housekeeping is an example. The company safety manual insists that the miners keep their work places free of trash and 210 debris. Trash is a fire hazard among other things. Among miners the link between housekeeping and safety is not made. In the researcher's stope a closed off, wooden ore bin served as the garbage can into which went soda pop cans, damaged blasting caps, cigarette butts, paper of all types, etc. Nothing over happened, but the potential for accident was ever present.

A similar illustration can be drawn from the treatment of explo­ sives. It was pointed out that miners believe that something must strike a blasting cap to make it explode. Therefore, storing caps with explo­ sives was not considered a dangerous practice. But, there was always the possibility that a rock might dislodge from the hanging wall, hit the caps, and booml

The two cases presented here are extreme. The statistical proba­ bility of an accidept occurring in those ways is extremely low. But in other instances, adherence to the occupational subculture versus the prescriptions of the formal organization leads to hazards and accidents.

Horseplay is a good example. It's a common, almost ritualistic, activity among miners and it's formally forbidden as a safety hazard. One of the favorite activities of the researcher's partner was to surf down the muck pile in the stope on a powder board. A lot of the younger miners in­ dulged in this activity and it was taught to new men. It was not de­ fined as dangerous within the occupational subculture. But, its hazard­ ous nature became m anifest one afternoon when the su rfe r h it his head on the hanging wall and was knocked flat. Cases of this type could be illustrated almost endlessly. The point to be made is that while tho occupational subculture of danger 211 acts as a protective device in many situations, its own mechanics, prin­ cipally those which define a dangerous situation, fall to spell out all the potential hazards or make the linkage between elements which add up to danger* In many cases the formal organization through its safety rules treats the situations which are skirted by the occupational sub­ culture. However, the admonitions of the formal organization count for less among the men than do the demands of the work group. Consequently, while the occupational subculture is protective on the one hand, it is also potentially dysfunctional. That miners can break formal safety rules with relative impunity and still work in relative safety is a credit not only to the effectiveness of the occupational subculture but also good fortune. Sometimes the latter element runs dry.

The occupational subculture of danger is a Janis headed phenomenon.

It is a protective, insulative device which allows tho miner to success­ fully adapt to most of the dangers of his environment by providing him with a blueprint for remedial action. At the same time, the subculture's focus on the common danger leaves the miner unprepared for the relatively rare hazard, even if that hazard is potentially catastrophic. Moreover, a combination of attachment to the occupational subculture versus the formal organization and the process by which the occupational subculture dofines danger results in the creation of hazardous situations and be­ haviors. On balance, the occupational subculture of danger is a positive fo rce. I t manages those dangers which are reasonably expected. The formal organizations are left with the responsibility of meeting the large and/or infrequent dangers. Hazardous situations and behaviors created by the subculture occasionally manifest themselves in accidents 212 but the statistical probability of these events Is relatively low.

Summary of Functional Analysis

One of the questions posed to guide this research was, how fruitful la the concept occupational subculture of danger in explaining human behavior in dangerous occupations. In the second chapter of the studya body of literature was cited that discussed the human contribution to mine dangers. ^ At that point it was noted that the most common pers­ pective suggested that human activity tended to intensify mine hazards.

Moreover, the perspective suggested that it was individual rather than group processes that resulted in what was termed "reckless," or unsafe behavior. This is the fertile area for the concept occupational sub­ culture of danger. With sufficient understanding of the occupational subculture of danger, it becomes possible to better understand accidents and safety, problems in disaster planning, and problems of safety engi­ neering and enforcement. When a mine accident occurs, the standard explanations of careless­ ness, human error, or an act of God are not always sufficient. To be sure, explanations of this type have some degree of validity in certain situations. Miners make mistakes, take chances they shouldn't, and meet situations they are incapable of handling. But, more is involved. A man may be injured in a situation in which he has broken formalized safoty regulations, but the explanation is not always found in a simple label such as carelessness, a malevolent disposition to thwart safety regulations, immaturity, or whatever. In many cases the activity lead­ ing to the accident is routinely prescribed as safe within the 213 occupational subculture of danger. The occupational subculture is not without its deficiencies and it. never promises complete certainty or success. It is an informal protec­ tive device. It goes beyond each individual miner. The subculture is a social whole to which each man makes an input, yet it is greater than the sum of its participants. The subculture teaches the miner how to define and act toward dangers. This blueprint for action is not always complete nor always correct, but it is the best there is in a world where the threats are innumerable, severe, and frequent.

Perhaps the greatest gap In safety research and its applications has been a lack of appreciation for group processes. It appears that officials whose concern is occupational safety have a penchant for themes of motivating safe behavior, safety enforcement, and so forth.

This effort is partially misdirected. A change of view illustrates that workers, by and large, work safely but the worker does so in his terms, those of his occupational group, and not by standards set from above by s formal organization. So, yes, the concept of an occupational subcul­ ture of danger has a utilitarian aspect. It can definitely contribute to a better understanding of behavior in dangerous settings and the consequences contained therein, be it accidents or safety.

Summary Within this chapter four of the five research questions posed to guide this research were answered. The structural analysis concluded that danger is a variable of sufficient saliency to manifest itself in a systematically Interrelated complex of subcultural traits. Those 21U

traits included an interrelated set of beliefs, norms, values, and positions focused toward danger* The processual analysis discussed the dimensions of the socialization process and outlined how new members were inducted and integrated into the occupational subculture. The

functionalistic analysis discussed the social consequences of an occupa­

tional subculture of danger. While possessing certain dysfunctional features, an overall assessment suggested that the subculture was a functional entity and served to protect the miners in their work environ­ ment. Finally, it was suggested that the concept occupational subculture of danger had a fruitful and utilitarian purpose by providing a perspec­

tive of human behavior in dangerous situations thBt takes social inter­ action into account. 215

Notest Chapter VII

1. Marvin E. Olsen, The Process*of Social Organization (New York: Holt, Rinehart, andTtfinston, 1968), Chapter lit.

2. George Lundberg e t.a l., Sociology, Uth edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. U|6-Hi7.

3* Lundberg, Sociology, p. Uj6. U. The use of the superlative is not absolute. It is used to make a point. One can learn much about mining from verbal communicative techniques but mastery of the craft depends upon practice and physical skill.

5. Harry E. Moore, And the Winds Blew (A ustin, Texas: The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, 1955), Chapter 10.

6. Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanches (New York: Vintage Books, 1961). 7. H erbert J . Oans, The Urban V illag ers (New York: The Free P ress, 1962).

8. Samuel E. Wallace, Skid Row as a Way of Life (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965).

9. Moore, And the Winds Blew, Chapter 10. 10. Charles E. Osborn, The Disaster Culture Concept: A Study of Elements Which Comprise the Notion o f a Separate C ulture Which Is Unique to Hurricane Prone Areas (MA Thesis, Mississippi State College, 19?C).

11. Dennis E. Wenger and Jack M. Weller, Disaster Subcultures: The C u ltu ral Residues o f Community D isa ste rs, Prelim inary Paper No. 9 (Columbus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, 1973)*

12. See Chapter II, pp. 25-27. CHAPTER VIII

AN OCCUPATIONAL SUBCULTURE OF DANOER

Introduction

This chapter has a dual purpose. In the first Instance it continues the analysis of data initiated in Chapter V and seeks, primarily to abstract from the data the variables which appear to contribute to the formation, maintenance, and operation of an occupational subculture of danger. These variables will then be related to construct a model of an occupational subculture of dangor. Secondly, the chapter will seek to make some generalizations about this type of subculture with regard to o th er occupations. This aspect is somewhat lim ited in scope since the research was directed at one dangerous occupation and must rely on data from other sources in an effort to move beyond the sphere of the mines.

A Model

The fifth question posed in this research endeavor asked if it were possible to construct a model to explain the development, maintenance, and operation of an occupational subculture of danger. By analyzing one dangerous occupation in depth, it was assumed that certain relevant variables which contribute to this type of subculture's existence could be abstracted and set forth as the building blocks for a model. In the previous discussion it was pointed out that miners are part of an occu­ pational subculture of danger. That is, the occupational subculture 216 217

contained a well developed, systematically interrelated complex of

elements which allow the miners to insulate themselves from, adapt and

respond to threats and hazards found in their occupational context. The

structure, processes, functional and dysfunctional characteristics of

this occupational subculture were delineated.

Before proceeding with the model building one further point should

be stressed about subcultures in general. It has always been implicit

in this work that a subculture is a human product created through social

interaction in response to certain conditions. These conditions can be

physical, biological, psychic, cultural, social, or a combination of such

factors. The occupational subculture of danger is viewed, primarily, as

a response to physical conditions (e.g., a potential for cave-ins because

of geological factors) and soclo-cultural conditions (e.g., hazards in­

cumbent in technological developments and social behavior such as unsafe work practices). The response to these, or other, conditions is contin­

gent upon social interaction. Wallace,1 in his study of skid row, makes

this point as does Cohen's work with delinquent gangs. Cohen notes:

The crucial condition for the emergence of new cultural forms is the existence, in effective interaction with one another, of a number of actors w ith sim ila r problems of adjustment.^

A simplified version of the previously presented model of a subculture3

indicates that a subculture has a core of social interaction which

responds to particular problems and conditions (see Figure 3)< The

larger environmental context also has an input into subcultural develop­

ments by providing certain problems of adjustment as well as contributing

a reservoir of resources used to meet such problems. The subcultural 2 1 8

FXGUttE 3

The Development of a Subculture

Environmental Context Environmental Context

Conditions and Problems of Adjustment

/

\ f Social Interaction Subc u ltu re

vv

Arrowed lines indicate mutual influence and determination. 219 content and form Is the result*

Subcultures of all types rest upon social interaction* That sub­ cultures take different forms and encompass different attributes is contingent upon the type and scope of social interaction, the conditions which require adjustment, and the larger parameters of the environmental context. Arnold has offered a model of subcultures which considers these exigencies. Titled A Process Model of Subcultures,^ Arnold suggests four elements in the development of a subculture. The first element, social structure, is viewed as facilitating and/or setting limits on social interaction. The second stage is differential interaction.

Actors sharing the same structural position tend to interact more with persons of similar positions than with persons in other positions. The third element is called the segment related subculture; that is, the subculture that results from the differential interaction. The content of the subcultural sogments is contingent upon interaction, structural dimensions, and conditions which require response. The fourth dimension of this model is the manifestations of the subculture. This includes patterns of bohavior, attitudes, beliefs, and so forth.

In applying this generalized model to the miners, two major varia<- bles stand out as the main contributors to the formation, maintenance, and operation of an occupational subculture of danger. Tho major struc­ tural element leading to differential interaction is isolation, with danger the major condition or problem to be confronted. These variables are not without some qualification. Both isolation and dangor vary in degree. Some occupations are more isolated than others; some are more 220 dsngerous. There is also variation in type. Danger can be lethal or relatively mild. It can be predictable or unpredictable, controllable or uncontrollable. Isolation can be special, socially defined, or a combination of both. Actually, isolation, danger, and their qualifying attributes fall along a continuum ranging from low to high. When com* bined together these variables result in the formation of highly cohe­ sive, self-sufficient work groups, sharing a systematically interrelated complex of elements, termed here an occupational subculture of danger.

(See Figure U.) Isolation is a key factor in the development of an occupational subculture oT danger. Ranging from low to high, this variable sets the structural parameters which facilitate and lim it differential interaction.

Isolation is grounded in two major sources, physical space and social definitions. In the first case physical space separates human popula­ tions into segments and "the greater the segregation in physical space, the greater the tendency to be divided by social space."5 That is, physical space acts as a barrier to communicative and interactional pro­ cesses creating a situation where the spacially separate populations, through confined In te ra c tio n a l p o s s ib ilitie s , become s o c ia lly bound to g eth er.

Socially defined isolation is that in which populations are sepa­ rated because of socially created barriers. This form of isolation has two aspects. It may be created by a set of human actors wishing to set itself apart from other groups and the population-at-large. In the occupational context this occurs with professional groups wishing to facilitate their claims to higher occupational status and to create a 221

FIGURE U

A Model of an Occupational Subculture of Danger

Occupational Subculture of Danger

Danger

Social Cohesion ^ ^ Self-Sufficiency

0 Iso la tio n

Arrowed lines indicate mutual influence and determination. 222 situation where role requirements demanding unbiased, rational decision making can be met.^ Other groups engage in similar actions for a variety of reasons* Mltford's? polemic directed toward undertakers and morti­ cians suggests a theme of trying to separate the occupation through

"professionalization" in an effort to keep the public unaware of the true (unprofessional and, perhaps, corrupt) nature of the business.

Socially defined isolation mayb I s o emanate from the population-ot-large which defines certain groups as being separate and apart from others.

An illustrative case from the annals of history would be that of the

"hangman" or "executioner" where moral stigma is attached to the occupa­ tion and its participants. Some occupations reveal strong currents of both forms of socially defined isolation. Police officers are a good example. Role requirements require separation: "If the policeman is too much involved in community a ffa irs and lo y a ltie s , he lacks the im­ partiality required of an authority figure."® Moreover, as authority figures, policemen are also set apart by the community, be it from fear, respect, resentment, or whatever.9 But, to repeat what was said earlier,

Isolation, regardless of its type, sets structural parameters for social interaction.

For the miner isolation begins on the surface. A general review of the geographical dispersion of mining operations w ill reveal that most mining is conducted in relatively unpopuloted areas away from large metropolitan areas and major communication arteries. Minos also tend to be located in or near communities with populations of less than 5,000 in h ab itan ts. "Mining towns" the siz e of Beckley, West V irginia, (1970 population - 19,861*)^ and Butte, Montana, (1970 population - 23,360) 223 are the exception rather than the rule. While the communicative media and changing modes of transportation may have contributed to a certain modification in this type of isolation, opportunities for faco-to-face interaction with people other than miners and their families is s till circumscribed. Moreover, within mining communities there are patterns of social class, or perhaps, occupational isolation.^- As Oouldner,^

Seidman,13 and others have pointed out, there is a negative stigma attached to being a miner, resulting in a form of occupational Isolation and manifested in a defensive group solidarity.

Whatever isolation (physical and socially defined) the miner might be subject to on the surface, the situation is compounded at work. For miners, as for most all occupational groups in an Industrialized society, the factory system separates places where work related roles are per­ formed vi3 a vis o th er ro le s Buch as fa th e r , church member, e tc .1^ The ph y sical s tru c tu re of the mine compounds the is o la tio n of a separate work place. Separated into small work groups and dispatched into the darkness of their work areas, the miners labor in a situation of intense spacial isolation. Their nearest work mates, aside from those in the immediate group, may be located distances of one-half mile or more away.

Communicative media such as telephones do not bridge these distances.

Only the occasional visit of a trammer or supervisor may punctuate the

« isolation encounterod while being in a stopo, raise, drift, or whatever.

As such, mining is an occupation in which social interaction takes place almost exclusively with other miners employed at the mine and, within that category, the immediate work partners.

The miners' isolation is linked with the development of a 22b re la tiv e ly homogeneous occupational category. A ll occupations display some degree of homogeneity at least insofar as the participants share similar job skills, training, and an occupational label. Moreover, all occupations possess a certain homogeneity from participation in an occu­ pational subculture. These subcultures may be related to a narrow occu­ pational definition such as "subculture of sociologists" or more broadly defined in terms of an "academic subculture," or perhaps the "employee subculture of Company X." It is suggested, however, that miners form a more homogeneous c o lle c tiv ity th a t do most other occupations.

The miners homogeneity begins on the surface. Isolated from other groups and populations, physically and by social definition, they inter­ act largely within their own or similar groups of people.*5 As such, they share a common life experience as well as that encountered a£ work.

Studies of industrial-labor relations have often noted the homogeneity of certain occupational groups such as miners and have tied it to a dis­ position or militancy reflected in chronic labor conflict.^ The occu­ pational boundaries set miners apart and within those boundaries there is shared re la tiv e ly homogeneous l if e s ty le .

The homogeneity factor is also carried to the selection of mine personnel. Miners are no longer the "luckless" fortune seekers that rushed to the gold and silver finds of the 19th century only to end up taking jobs in the mines owned by others.*7 Mining is also not an occu­ pation characterised by the large blocks of immigrants that once started their American work and life experiences underground.^ The immigrants and fortune seekers are gone. Their descendants who may have remained are part of a second and third generation of people indigenous to the 22$ mining areas. Mine workers are predominantly drawn from areas adjacent or similar to the mine's location.^ As such, they are part of a rela­ tiv e ly homogeneous group th a t has shared a s im ila r l i f e experience.

Their levels of educational attainment are sim ilar^ as are their occu­ pational alternatives with mining usually constituting the best or only occupational avenue.21 Finally, mining is hard, dirty, dangerous work.

Those that enter and stay with the occupation tend to be those who are willing to accept it3 many liabilities as well as any amenities the job might offer. Thus, the selection process refines the occupational par­ tic ip a n ts in to a re la tiv e ly homogeneous mass.

The homogenization of miners initiated on the surface through their common life experiences and refined by the selection process, is modi­ fied further by the organizational .and technological structure of the mine. In the first instance the men are lumped together as a mass of workmen. Despite slight differences in negotiated pay scales, job titles, and differentiation between contractors and day's pay personnel, the formal organization does not stress differentiation among its produc­ tion employees. Be they the best contractor or the lowliest laborer, the men dress alike, use the same bath facilities, largely receive the same fringe benefits, work the same hours, have the same amount of formal authority over other workmen (none), and so forth. There is differentia­ tion within the work crews but it is almost entirely informal.

The leavening of the miners in to a homogeneous, mass o f employees by the organizational structure is reinforced by mine technology. The pro­ duct (broken rock) is mass produced by relatively standardized technology*

Once this technology is mastered, a man becomes interchangeable with 226 o th er men. The technology may demand a degree of judgment on the p a rt of the miner depending upon situational exigencies, but on the whole, once a certain level of skill is reached, the miner is part of a homo­ geneous work force in which a l l members possess the same approximate level of skill. Functional specialization is not required in mine work except for a few maintenance personnel. Given the nature of mine work - constant repetition of the standardized technology - once a skill level has been attained, it is difficult to go beyond or Improve that level.

The structure and tools of the trade do not allow it. The miner may be able to decide whether or not to timber an area or when to eat lunch, but he is not capable of developing a specialty or differentiating skill that formally raises him above his peers. The miner is one skilled man among a skilled mass. Again, what differentiation that may exist is largely informal and is not capable of being transferred with the miner should he seek work in another occupational setting or context.

Finally, the mine environment, particularly its dangers, has a homogenizing effect. Miners at the research site often pointed out that the underground world is a "society of equals." While not entirely accurate, the theme Indicates the knowledge that mine hazards do not respect social rank. All miners are alike when the roof caves-in or the mine catches fire. Thus, while there is a certain amount of informal differentiation, there is also the recognition that "miners are all in the same boat" wnen certain hazards are manifest.

The miners* isolation and its concommitant homogeneity, a feature facilitated by the mine’s organizational and technological structure, combine together in setting interactional parameters. Within the 227 limits set by the miners' Isolation and facilitated by their homogeneity, social interaction produces two major ingredients of the occupational subculture of danger - strong social cohesion and self-sufficiency.

Iso lated in sm all, homogeneous work u n its , the miners form tig h tly integrated, cohesive groups. The isolation forces the miners to inter­ act with one another since there are few other alternatives. Further­ more, the small size of the work groups facilitates interaction. With a relatively few number of interactional partners, the potential for fre­ quent interaction increases with a potential concommitant increase in social attraction and, ultimately, social cohesion.22 Homogeneity facilitates the quality of the interactional process with like supporting like in a mutually reinforcing relationship.23 Finally, the threats of the environment force the social groups to an integrated and cohesive posture in the face of a common adversary. ^ As Oouldner notes:

The miner had to rely on his co-workers to warn him of loose rocks, impending falls, or to dig him out speedily in the event of a cave-in. These were dangers which had no counterpart, in kind or intensity, on the surface .... A3 one old miner said, in the mine "Friends or no friends, you got all to be friends."25

This quote also illustrates a major characteristic of cohesion among miners. Though there is always a certain current of social attrac­ tion operative in the development of cohesive groups, the cohesion exhibited by miners appears to be a "unity against rather than a unity within."26 That is, the integrative force is something which threatens or creates problems for the miners and to which the miners respond "against" as a unified collectivity. Lantz27 alluded to this aspect of the miners cohesiveness when he noted the friendships of tho coal miners' 228

"buddy system," despite their positive elements, were easily terminated.

Other researchers have also drawn on this aspect in suggesting that much

of the miners' solidarity is in defensive reaction to the stigma attached

to the occupation.*^ In stating that the miners' cohesiveness is char­ acterized by "unity against rather than unity within," it is suggested

the miners are integrated by the force of some common adversary to a

larger degree than by the solidarity formed through positive elements of

affectivlty.2? The adversary may be the larger population who negatively

stigmatizes the miners, the mine operators with whom the miners contest

over wages and working conditions, the threats and hazards of the job, and/or a combination of these or other factors.

For the miner, the isolation, socially defined and by physical

space, at home and at work, with its affiliated homogeneity, creates a

situation where interactional alternatives are relatively circumscribed.

But, within those parameters social interaction is frequent, reinforcing,

and necessary in the face of common problems and threat. Thus, the min­

ers isolated structural position leads to the development and maintenance

of tightly cohesive work groups.30

Self-sufficiency also characterizes the miners' work groups. This

aspect is also linked to the isolation of mine work and its affiliated

dimensions. In the first instance, the physical structure of the mine

and its related social organization - the contract and day's pay systems -

builds into the miner's role the need for self-sufficiency. As indi­

cated in Chapter IV ana also pointed out by Trist andBaroforth33 in

their discussion of the "hand-got" method of coal mining (a contract

system), the contractors form autonomous, self-regulating work groups. 229

These groups contain virtually all the requisite skills and knowledge

♦ needed to complete their work tasks supplimented by the organizational

coordination of needed supplies, removal of broken rock, and advice.

The Iso la tio n of mine work demands th a t the contracting groups be r e la ­

tively self-sufficient. The spaclal distances of the mine do not allow

a work situation where work groups can tightly integrate their functions

with other personnel nor does the neture of mining require tight inte­

gration. Mining only requires that the work group be capable of perform­

ing the requisite tasks. Even day's pay personnel, whose activities

are much more closely coordinated and supervised, are required to be

relatively self-sufficient. The isolation prohibits assistance from

sources outside the work group. If a trammer derails an ore car or if

a contractor needs to timber a loose slab of hanging wall, the necessary

skills to complete the job must be located within the work unit, be it a

contracting group or one of day's pay miners.

The requirement to be self-sufficient is also bolstered by the pro­

cesses of work flow. That is, even though the technology is relatively

standardized, mine conditions alter radloally. On one day a stops may

be considered "perfectly safe," but a poor blasting operation may leave

the face ragged, full of misfired holes, the hanging wall cracked and

loose such that the area becomes exceedingly dangerous. The need to

continue the work processes combined with the absence of outside assist­

ance fosters a self-sufficient work group - one that can meet situation­

al exigencies. The homogeneity factor also contributes to self-sufficiency. With

each member of the group possessing the same approximate level of sk ill, 230

there is always a duplication of the requisite skills and knowledge of

the job* As such, problems that arise which may tie up the efforts of

one man can be successfully confronted by combined action. There is no need to look outside the immediate work group for additional support.

Finally, the nature of mine dangers adds to self-sufficiency. Many

of the hazards miners face crop up suddenly and must be met immediately.

These situations are, by way of analogy, similar to certain problems faced by police officers. An armed felon may start shooting at an

officer and even if assistance is available, the need for response is

immediate and cannot be delayed. As such, the officer is required to

possess the skills needed to confront the situation. The miner also confronts problems requiring immediate response. A rock fall may bury a man. Time does not allow the gathering of outside support. The group must immediately meet the problem and have the ability to do so success­

fu lly .

The miners’ isolation prohibiting secondary assistance, their role

requirements as iso lated workmen, and the need to respond to s itu a tio n a l exigencies, be they hazardous or not, add up to a demand that the miners* work groups be relatively self-sufficient. The homogeneity of work skills and membership in a tightly cohesive work unit facilitate this need. The group possesses the necessary skills for self-sufficiency and * they are bound together where the interests of one are the interests of

a l l .

Thus far the discussion has focused on the effect of isolation in setting interactional parameters. Moreover, it has been indicated thot

the interactional process leads to the formation of strongly cohesive, 231 s e lf-s u f fic ie n t work groups. The f in a l element to be tie d to th is model is the problem requiring adjustment - danger.

There is probably some degree of calculable danger in all occupa­ tions. For the miner, danger is a common day-to-day, potentially lethal occurrence. Danger, in its multitude of forms, varieties, and inten­ s i t i e s , permeates the mining environment and the work routines of the job. It is an ever present, serious entity faced throughout the working hours. While danger permeates the mining environment, there are differ- ing types and degrees of danger. Some hazards are predictable, othors are not} some threats controllable, others are not} and some types of danger are lethal while others are not. The data suggest that in order for the miners to adjust to the danger of their occupation, the hazards must be prodictablo. As such, it becomes partially controllable through the development of amieliorative patterns of behavior based upon know­ ledge of predictive cues, frequency of appearance, severity, and so forth. Furthermore, being predictable implies a certain level of fre­ quency. The hazard must present itself often enough for the miners to develop some base of predictive knowledge that can be acted upon when needed. As the data illustrated, those hazards such as fire, though predictable and controllable to some degree, fall outside the parameters of the occupational subculture of danger because they do not present themselves in sufficient frequency for the miners to develop the requi­ site base of information from which to draw patterns of amieliorative action. Finally, it is suggested, the hazard must be defined as lethal.

In the mine virtually a ll forms of danger carry this definition and possess the resultant protective patterns of action. It may be possible 232

that "non-lethal11 hazards also require a systematic adjustment on the part of the occupational participants but that cannot be answered with

this material.

Isolated in their work area, the threats of the mine must largely be met by the miners1 group. To insure some degree of control over

these hazards, the work groups draw upon their own resources to make the hazards manageable. As this research has indicated, a systematically

interrelated complex of beliefs, norms, sanctions, values, and positions

is informally created through the Interactional processes within work groups and within the larger mining environment as men change jobs and partners. The elements form a shared, socially created mechanism which

protects, insulates, and allows the miners to adjust to the hazards of

their Job. Actuated through the behavior of the miners1 cohesive, self-

sufficient work groups, these elements provide the miners with a measure of security in the face of recurrent occupational threat and, addition­

ally, allows them to transcend the isolation that set the structural

parameters from which the socially created protective elements emerged.

The Isolation, the danger, their qualifications, Bnd effects add up to

the formation of an occupational subculture of danger.

To briefly recap this discussion, isolation sets the structural

parameters resulting in differential interaction. Homogeneity is close­

ly affiliated with isolation in that differential interaction creates a

shared life experience for an isolated group and thus separates the

group from others. Isolation and its affiliated homogeneity combined with the effects of occupational danger lead to formation of cohesive,

self-sufficient work units. Within these work units, the problems of 233 danger are net by drawing upon group resources and give rise to a systematically Interrelated complex of elements, socially created and shared, termed here as an occupational subculture of danger.

G eneralisation from the Model

This model, though drawn from one case study, appears applicable to a number of dangerous occupations. However, the body of literature and research which has examined other dangerous occupations is relatively small. This makes it difficult to specify in detail occupational situa­ tions that might be characterized by an occupational subculture of danger. But, certain occupations seem to exhibit the necessary and sufficient conditions of high isolation and danger that contribute to the development, maintenance, and operation of the miners' occupational subculture of danger. A review of accident statistics Indicates a hand­ ful of occupations that might be reasonably classified as dangerous, including police work, fire fighting, construction, lumbering, marine transportation, andm i n i n g32 . Furthermore, these occupations, or at least certain groups within the occupational category, are subjectively defined as highly dangerous by the participants and the public-at-large.33

Common stereotypes portray these definitions* For example, police officers are seen as putting their lives on the line as they encounter armed, combative felons; firemen enter burning buildings to rescue trapped occupants; sailors and fishermen brave the North Atlantic gales; construction iron workers balance precariously on iron beams hundreds of feet in the air as they rivet buildings together. The stereotypes of these occupations, while frequently exaggerated, draw on the 23U relatively accurate estimation of these occupations as being highly dangerous.

Moreover, the occupations listed above also exhibit a relatively high isolation factor, be it socially defined and/or physical. In the midst of a populous city, the policeman is isolated. His role defini­ tions, both from within the group and the larger populations, set him apart.3U The police officer Interacts with countless members of people, yet his occupational role as an authority figure sets him apart and largely isolates him within his own occupational category and group.35

And, there is also a degree of spocial isolation working within a patrol car or station house. The logger ex h ib its a p a ttern of iso la tio n sim ila r to the m iner.36

Logging is largely done in relatively uninhabited areas such as the

Pacific Northwest or the forests of Maine. Logging communities are usually small and the work is done isolated in a forest by small groups o f men. Fishermen and s a ilo rs are iso lated on th e ir ships a t sea, and often, by a negative stigma while ashore.37 Firemen are separated in their work environment by the role requirements and skills of their job though there does not appear to be muoh, if any, socially defined iso- tion from the population-at-large. A similar situation seems to exist for the construction worker though physical isolation can often parallel that for the miner and logger if a particular job is located in a rela­ tively uninhabited area. Finally, each of these occupations is organised in such a way that the tasks of the occupation are performed by relatively small groups of men working relatively independent of and isolated from their peers,3® 235

Policemen usually work alone or in small groups on their beats either afoot or in patrol cars. Firemen work in small groups and attack a blaze from a number of divergent points.39 the men of engine companies bring in the hoses while the ladder companies ventilate the fire and per­ form rescue work. Loggers work alone or in small groups in assigned areas of the fore6t felling the trees and seeing to their removal. Con­ struction workers usually work in small units with iron workers perform­ ing certain functions in one area vis a vis pipefitters, carpenters, electricians, bricklayers, etc. working elsewhere.

It is suggested that the isolation of these work groups combined with the hazards the/ face in their occupational context, will result in the development and maintenance of an occupational subculture of danger.

Like the miners, the isolation of these groups will set interactional parameters which when combined with the influence of occupational danger, w ill lead to the formation of cohesive, self-sufficient work groups shar­ ing an occupational subculture possessing informally created protective mechanisms.The content of these occupational subcultures of danger will vary since each group faces a different set of hazards and differ­ ent degrees and types of occupational isolation. But, each is expected to reveal a systematically, interrelated complex of elements that com­ bine to form the protective, insulative, adaptive mechanism that charac­ terizes an occupational subculture of danger. As in the miners case, examination of these subcultures should cast a new perspective on why the occupational participants behave as they do. The miners' occupation­ al subculture explains, to some degree, why miners violato formal safety reg u la tio n s, why they are o ften powerless in the face of phenomena such 236

as the mine f i r e , and how th e / manage to work re la tiv e ly safely in the

face of a multitude of hazards. Applying this concept to other occupa­

tions may explain a number of phenomena. It may shed light on why and

how police officers define and act toward "riotous crowds;" perhaps ex­ plain why firemen engage in "courageous acts of heroism" without a supposed thought to their own personal safety; or explain how iron work­ ers feel comfortable perched on an iron beam hundreds of feet in the air.

While it is expected that the aforementioned occupations w ill exhi­ bit the systematic development of an occupational subculture of danger,

there are also a myriad of occupations which possess, to some degree,

the major variables of isolation and danger required for the subculture's development, yet are not expected to possess the subculture. As indica­

ted earlier, isolation and danger vary in type and degree. Holding with the assumption suggested by this research that predictable, frequent, anc^ perhaps, lethal danger is required for the subculture's development,

the variation in the degree of isolation and danger may be sufficient to explain the subculture's formation in the occupational context. Fitting

the major variables together it appears possible to draw out an explana­ tion of the subculture of danger's formation. (See Figure$.)

The model suggests that as isolation and danger increase, so does the propensity for an occupation to manifest the occupational subculture of danger. Box number one marked absent denotes occupations such as sales personnel, secretaries, accountants, and so forth. These occupa­ tions illustrate a low degree of isolation, be it physical or socially defined and a low degree of danger. Interactional possibilities are relatively open and danger is not an occupational consideration. As 237

FIGURE $

The Formation of Occupational Subcultures of Danger in Varied Occupational Settings

Degree of Occupational Danger

Low High

1. ABSENT 3. HIGH MODERATE

Subcultural elements Partial development of oriented toward the the subculture of danger. protection of human act­ Some protective norms, ors are non-existant. beliefs, values, etc. Low Workers aro not isolated exist but are not system­ and there is little dan­ atically Interrelated. ger which requires Danger may be high but adjustment the lack of isolation does not require the work group Degree to bear the burden of of adjustment to danger. Occupational

Iso la tio n * 2. LCW MODERATE U. STRONG

The subculture of dan­ Systematic development ger is In its social of a complex of inter­ infancy consisting pri­ related subcultural marily of maxims and elements which are or­ High cliches applicable to iented toward protecting the few occasions when workmen from the threats danger appears. of their occupation. Danger permeates the work environment and is re­ sponded to accordingly. 2 3 6 such, it is expected that these occupations will fail to manifest the development of subcultural elements designed to protect the worker*

Box number two labeled low moderate covers occupations lik e th a t of the forest ranger. Occupational isolation is high but the danger is low.

This class of occupations is labeled low moderate because the formation of an occupational subculture of danger is incomplete* In this class of occupations, the occupational subculture of danger is in its social infancy consisting primarily of maxims and bits of advice about how to treat occasional dangerous events. There is no complete complex of sub­ cultural elements which deal with danger. The high Isolation of these occupations fosters the requisite group cohesiveness and self-sufficiency but the problem requiring response is largely absent.

Box number three titled high moderate encompasses occupations such as those encountered in metal fabricating where men work with machinery and molten metal. Low on isolation yet high on danger, these occupa­ tions should illustrate a higher degree of development of the occupation­ al subculture of danger than others, but do not quite reach complex systematic development of subcultural elements. In these cases the dan­ ger is high and requires response but the lack of isolation does not require the occupational group to bear the major burden of adaptation* Here, group cohesiveness and self-sufficiency with regard to danger is not a key occupational requisite. Secondary support is considerable and diverse. As such, the occupational subculture contains adaptive ele,- ments but not in a unified and integrated form. Box four marked strong indicates an occupation such as mining. The fectors of isolation and danger are both high. Social interaction 239 within the parameters specified by these variables results in cohesive, self-sufficient work groups sharing a systematically interrelated complex of beliefs, norms, sanctions, values, positions, and patterns of behavior that serve to protect and insulate the occupational participants from the threats of their occupation.

Using a two-by-two model is perhaps not the most accurate way to portray the dimensions leading to the formation and maintenance of an occupational subculture of danger. It is suggested that the subcul­ ture, like the variables which spawn its existence, is continuous. It moves through phases of d evelopment ranging from the absence of the sub­ culture to simple safety maxims and finally to a systematically, inter­ related complex of protective elements. The model presented here, like the preceding discussion of occupations which appear analogous to mining in terms of isolation and danger, is tentative. Existing research has not c le a rly demarked the e ffe c ts of danger on p a rticip a n ts in occupa­ tions such as fire fighting, lumbering, fishing, etc. However, this research has illustrated that miners possess an occupational subculture of danger and has delineated its content, scope, and functions. The variables which appear to create this construction in the mines are also evident in other occupations though their context or content may vary.

As such, the research premises or, perhaps, infers by analogy that other occupations w ill also be characterized by an occupational subculture of danger or significant parts thereof. A delineation of these subcultures will provide, as it did with the miners, a new perspective in under­ standing the behavior of the occupation's participants. 2 l|0

Summary

This chapter began with the intent of seeking to answer the res research question of whether it was possible to construct a model of an occupational subculture of danger. Starting with the assumption that a subculture is an interactional response to problems faced by a given population and working with Arnold.'s^l process model of subcultures, the data were reviewed to abstract the relevant variables that appear to contribute to the development, maintenance, and operation of an occupa­ tional subculture of danger. Isolation was viewed as the major struc­ tural variable contributing to differential interaction. Danger wa3 seen as the major problem to be confronted. Combined together the vari­ ables result in the formation of cohesive, self-sufficient groups that share a systematically, interrelated complex of social elements that form the occupational subculture of danger.

The second portion of the chapter made some tentative generaliza­ tions with regard to where and wliy a subculture of danger might be found. This activity was largely inference by analogy since this re­ search did not examine occupations other than mining nor does the exist­ ing occupational literature clearly demark the influence of danger in other occupational settings. It was concluded, however, that the strong parallels between certain occupations such as police work and fishing with mining indicated the possibility of an occupational subculture of danger within those occupational settings. Furthermore, paralleling the case of mining, it was suggested that an understanding of the content and form of these subcultures would facilitate an explanation of why an occupation's participants behave in a given manner. 2hl

Notest Chapter VIII

1. Samuel E. Wallace, Skid Row as a Way of Life (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), p. ll*9

2. Albert K. Cohen, "A General Theory of Subcultures," in The Sociology of Subcultures, edited by David 0. Arnold (Berkeley, California! The Qlendeasaiy Press, 1970), p. 102.

3* See Figure Two, Chapter V, p. 87.

It. David 0 . Arnold, "A Process Model of Subcultures," in The Sociology of Subcultures, edited by David 0. Arnold (Berkeley, California! The Glendessaxy Press, 1970), pp. 112-120.

5. Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industrial Sociology, 2nd ed itio n (New York: Harper and How, 196U), p. 1U1.

6. A. M. Carr-Saunders, "Professionalization in Historical Perspective," in Professionalization, edited by Howard M. Vollmor and David L. Mills (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ha11, 1966), pp. 2-9} Ernest Greenwood, "Attributes of a Profession," Social Work 2 (July 1957), pp. UU-53. ------

7. Je33ica Mitford, The American Way of Death (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett, 1963).

8. Michael Benton, The Policeman in the Community (New York: Basic Books, 196U), p. lfld.

9. Jerome Skolnick, "Why Cops Behave the Way They Do," in Deviance, ed ited by Simon D in itz, R ussell R. Dynes, and Alfred C. Clarke (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. L0-U7} Banton, The Policeman in the Community, Chapter 8.

10. All population statistics from The 1972 World Almanac (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1972), pp. 158-19U*

11. Thomas Ooldwasser, "C o b I Mining: Benton, Illinois," The Atlantic Monthly 22b (November 1969), pp. 28-38.

12. Alvin V}. Gouldner, Pattorns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois! The Free Press, 195U), pp. 127-131.

13. Jo e l Seidman e t . a l . , The Worker Views His Union (Chicago: University of Chicago fress, 1950), pp. 1U-23. li*. Miller, Industrial Sociology, pp. 28-39. 21*2

15. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, pp. 127-131; Qoldwasser, "Coal Mining! Benton, Illinois," pp. 28-38.

16. Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegal, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike - An International Comparison," In Industrial Conflict, edited by Arthur Komhauser, Robert Dubln, and Arthur H. Ross (New York: McOraw-Hlll, 195U), pp. 189-205. 17. Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict (Ithaca, New York* Cornell University Press, 195(5 J7Chapter-1. 18. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, Chapter 1; Harry M. Caudill, Night mrr.Cones ------to the Cumberlands (Bostont L ittle, Brown and Company, 19. Idaho, Bureau of Mines and Qeology, Community Perceptions In the Coour d'Alene Mining D is tr ic t by Lawrence £. Ellsw orth, PampKlot Ho. 152 (Moscow, Idaho: Idaho Bureau of Mines and Qeology, 1972), p. 5} Edward E. Knlpe, "Occupational Ingress and Egress; A Survey of Appalachian Cool Miners" (unpublished, research report: Virginia Commonwealth University, 1973), PP* 2U-36.

20. Ellsworth, Community Perceptions in the Coeur d'Alene Mining D istrict, p. 5; Knipe, "Occupational Ingress and Egress; Asurvey of Appalachian Coal Miners," p. 28.

21. Knipe, "Occupational Ingress and Egress: A Survey of Appalachian Coal Miners," p. 57.

22. Oeorge C, Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950), p. lETj Stanley Soashoro, Group Cohoslvenoss in the Industrial Work Group (Ann Arbor, Michigan! Institute for Social Research, 195U). 23. Leonard R. Sayles, Behavior of Industrial Work Oroups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pp. 59-6(5.

21a * Georg Simmel, Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1955).

25. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, p.13 !*. 26. Jeremy Tunstall, The Fishermen (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962), p. 126.

27. Herman R. Lantz, People of Coal Town (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. Ji*3-li*U. 28. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, pp. 127-131; Seidman, The Worker Views His' iJnio'n, pp. 18^23.

29. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, Chapter 1. 21*3

30. Isolation has been linked with high group cohesiveness by a number of authors see Seymour M. U p se t e t . a l . , Union Democracy (Glencoe, Illinois* The Free Press, 1956); Kerr, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike - An International Comparison."

31. E. L. Trist and K. W. Bamforth, "Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal Getting," Hunan Relations 1* (February 1951)* PP* 6-7. 32. National Safety Council, Accident Facts (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1972); U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor S ta tis tic s , Handbook of Labor S t a ti s t i c s , B u lletin No. 1735 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), Table 163.

33* Studs Terkel, "Danger as a Career," Harpers Magazine 21*8 (February 197k), p. 61. 3k. Banton, The Policeman in the Community, Chapter B; Skolnick, "Why Cops Behave the Way They Do,11 pp. k0-k7.

35. Skolnick, "Why Cops Behave the Way They Do," pp. k0-b7.

36. Kerr, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike - An International Comparison," pp. l8k-20$.

37. Tunstall, The Fisherman, Chapters 3-5*

36. Fishermen are perhaps the major exception. When the nets are cast the entire crew works together. Tunstall, The Fisherman. Chapters 2 and $. 39. For a discussion of firemen's work activities see Dennis Smith, Report From Engine Co. 62 (New York* Pocket Books, 1973)* kO. The cohesiveness of these groups is partially documented. See Ellwyn R. Stoddard, "The Informal Code of Police Deviancy," in The Social Dimensions of Work, edited by Clifton D. Bryant (Englewood C liffs, New Jersey* Frentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 527- 5k8; Skolnick, "Why Cops Behave the Way They Do," pp. k0-k7; Tunstall, The Fishermen; Smith, Report From Engine Co. 82. kl. Arnold, "A Process Model of Subcultures," pp. 112-120* CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter will contain an overall summary of the research re­ viewing the research problem, the methods of data collection and analysis, and the research findings. A second section of the chapter will attempt to tie together the broad themes, facts, findings, and

Implications suggested by preceding authors which were reviewed in

Chapter II with the findings of this work. Finally, a section of the chapter w ill be devoted to suggesting some further lines of research th a t can bu ild upon th is work.

General Summary

This research was initiated to explore the effects of occupational danger on occupational participants. Drawing on previous examination of the disaster subculture concept, studies of occupational groups, and research regarding subcultures, it was suggested that the participants of dangerous occupations adapt to the threats, stresses, and strains of their occupational context by creating and sustaining a protective social mechanism which was termed an occupational subculture of danger. Data collection by participant observation utilizing the role of the complete participant, sought to capture the totality of social life within the setting of one dangerous occupation - underground mining. From this

21 *1* 2U5 material the content and form of the occupational subculture was delin­

eated. It was assumed that if danger were to have an effect on an

occupation's participants, this effect would be manifested in the occu­

pational subculture.

Five major research questions guided this endeavor*

1. Are dangerous occupations characterized by some type of distinctive subculture which is adaptive for the occu­ pational participants in the face of recurrent occupa­ tional threat? But, more specifically, is the variable of occupational danger of sufficient saliency to manifest its effects upon occupational participants in a complex of systematically interrelated traits that form an occu­ pational subculture of danger?

2. VIhat is the content of an occupational subculture of danger? That is, what are its elements and how are they interrelated?

3. How is the content of the subculture transmitted to new potential members of the occupation? Specifically, what is the so c ializ a tio n mechanism and how does i t operate?

U. How fruitful is the concept occupational subculture of danger in explaining human behavior in dangerous occu­ pations? For example, can accidents be explained, at least partially, using this concept?

5. Is it possible to construct a model of an occupational subculture of danger? That is, is it possible to abstract out certain variables which appear central to the development, maintenance, and operation of an occupational subculture of danger?

Answers to the first two questions were sought in the application

of a structural perspective to the data* The analysis indicated that

that occupational danger is a variable of sufficient saliency to mani­ fest itself in the occupational subculture as a systematically inter­

related complex of beliefs, norms, sanctions, values, positions, and patterns of behavior which is oriented toward occupational danger and 21x6 acts as a protective mechanism against these threats. Though danger

i was seen as a major element in the content of the miners' occupational subculture, it was only one of an interrelated set of influences which are manifested in this social construction.

The operation of the occupational subculture is one of balance.

Values serve as primary goals to be achieved. The other elements of the subculture contribute to realizing each of these states of desirability concommitantly. Safety is a major value but it is realized in concert with other values. Over emphasis on one value versus the others throws the subcultural mechanism out of balance and corrective action, primarily through normative restraints and sanctioning devices, seeks to readjust the situation to harmony.

A processual perspective was also applied to the data in seeking to answer the third research question concerning the socialization mechanian and how now members were Integrated into the occupational subculture.

Socialization was seen as being performed by the more experienced miners.

Formal socialization by the mining company was nil. Socialization pro­ ceeded in a step by step process in which each new miner was gradually introduced to and taught the skills of the occupation, social relations, and protective measures. Safety was a major concern of the socialization process but this concern was not manifested in new or different methods of instruction. Both verbal and non-verbal techniques were used to im­ part the information making up the socialization process.

The fourth question inquiring into the fruitfulness of the concept occupational subculture of danger, was answered by a functional analysis of the data. It was pointed out that the occupation subculture of 2 l|S self-sufficient work groups sharing a socially created, systematically interrelated complex of elements forming the occupational subculture of danger. Further analysis suggested that the subculture increases in complexity as the variables of danger and isolation also increase.

Generalization to other occupational settings suggested that the occu­ pational subculture of danger might be reasonably expected in those settings analogous to mining in terms of being highly isolated and dangerous.

In answering the research questions of this study tho importance of occupational danger as a significant variable affecting human popu­ lations has been indicated. Furthermore, the resoarch has illustrated that non-tangible social constructions havo a central role in the pro­ tection of human life. Safety is not Just formulating protective rules or designing better equipment. Safety proceeds creatively from the group. Even the most uncertain of situations can be partially controlled and made safe by social interaction. The miners illustrate this point.

Their occupational subculture of danger enables them to work and func­ tion safely in a dangerous environment. Protection is built into the situation through social interaction.

The Research Contribution i In Chapter II of this study a body of literature was reviewed that had touched upon the topic of occupational danger in some fashion.

Throughout the analysis the major themes suggested in this literature were noted in relation to the material presented here. The analysis indicated that the commonly held perspective of mining as a dangerous 2h9 occupation,^- was also evident among miners* Furthermore, the previous research which considered the size, scale, and predictability of mine hazards^ was also largely substantiated by this work. Unlike the general public which often has a view of mine hazards as massive phenom­ ena, the miners are aware of the true nature of mine hazards - usually small, isolated but lethal events. Moreover, this research, in support of its predecessors, noted that miners differentiate mine dangers in terms of its predictability and, based upon the knowledge of predictive cues, are able to co n tro l mine hazards.

The literature also exhibited a great amount of controversy over who or what has the responsibility to control mine dangers.3 Studies of miners indicated that those men look to themselves and their work groups for this control, a point substantiated by this research. A considera­ tion of the human factor with regard to mine danger brought a mixed response in the literature.^ There was the suggestion that human action proceeds from individual motives and, moreover, this action intensifies or contributes to mine danger. A smaller body of literature suggested

* group processes as making both a negative (e.g., intensifying hazards) and positive contribution (e.g., mitigating hazards). This research suggests that group processes are dominant and, these processes tend to mitigate rather than intensify conditions of mine danger. The occupa­ tional subculture of danger is a product of the group and it seeks to protect the miners from the hazards of their environment though it has certain dysfunctional attributes.

The f if th major theme found in the lite ra tu re illu s tra te d attem pts to assess the effects of occupational danger on the occupation's 2 5 0 participants.^ This literature revealed a varied set of implications.

A number of studies have suggested that miners adapt to t]ie hazards of their occupation by becoming fatalistic. As this research has indicated, the occupational subculture of danger is the miners' response to the threats of their occupation* The idea thBt miners are fatalistic be­ cause of their occupational threats bears re-examination since it is suggested that some confusion is present between a fatalistic world view grounded in a social class life 3tyle and a view of mine hazards.

Miners may be fatalistic on the surface, but not so underground when conditions of threat exist.

A similar situation appears to exist with regard to conceptions of masculinity. Again, a number of authors have suggested that mine dan­ gers aro, in some way, related to conceptions of masculinity. As this research has attempted to illustrate, there is nothing inhorent in min­ ing that separates it from other predominantly male occupations. Miners act as they do, not from any unique conception of masculinity grounded in mine danger, but from role definitions for men, miners, members of a work group, and so forth.

The literature also suggested that miners exhibit greater group solidarity because of the danger of their occupation. This point was substantiated in this research and it was suggested that the group solidarity has a central part in the formation and maintenance of an occupational subculture of danger. Following the lead of Paterson and

W illett,6 this research has stressed the central importance of group processes in protecting the miner at work.

While the literature Illustrates a wide range of findings and 2 5 1 implications concerning occupational danger and its effect on occupa­ tional participants| it lacks a central conceptual core. This research endeavor may have substantiated or suggested modification of previous research findings but its contribution is much larger. The concept occupational subculture of danger provides a perspective of human be­ havior in dangerous situations which takes into account the fact that human actors are part of an environment, including a social environment, which shapes their action. As such, a consideration of how that envir­ onment shapes behavior must account for the processes of social inter­ action. The occupational subculture of danger provides the requisite perspective to consider the social dimensions of a dangerous occupation, and perhaps, with modification, dangerous situations in general.

Directions for Further Research

The findings, model, and methodology of this research suggest some future directions of inquiry. The constructed model of an occupational subculture of danger drew on the elements of isolation and danger as the key to the formation, maintenance, and operation of this type of sub­ culture. But, the data consisted of one case study of one dangerous occupation. Future research should seek to examine other occupational settings. This effort should include an assessment of the occupational subculture to determine the extent to which the concept occupational subculture of danger is generalizable. Second, it should seek to deter­ mine if there are other variables in addition to isolation and danger which create the occupational subculture of danger. Third, an examina­ tion should be directed at the dimensions of cohesiveness and self- 252 sufficiency to determine their impact upon the occupational subculture*

This research has worked with an occupation in which cohesiveness and self-sufficiency strongly characterize the work groups. It would be interesting to note if changes in either of these conditions alter the content and form of the occupational subculture of danger. Fourth, some effort should be made to assess whether the type of danger and iso­ lation affect the subculture's dimensions. This research has worked with an occupation in which virtually all forms of danger were consid­ ered lethal. Perhaps this is not a requisite feature. Also, miners exhibit both physical and socially defined isolation to a high degree.

Future research should attempt to demark if either of these conditions of isolation is more salient in the development of the subculture.

Future research should also endeavor to test whether the degree of iso­ lation and danger is as important as these data suggest. Perhaps the degree of danger and isolation la not as important as their types.

In a related matter future research should consider in more detail than was possible here the effect of organizational variables upon the occupational subculture of danger. This research has examined an organi­ zational setting in which the participants were split into small work groups* Perhaps the size of the work unit may be of particular relevance to the subculture of danger. Alsc^ organizational policies and programs such as safety incentives touch upon the occupational subculture of dan­ ger. The research role prohibited a detailed examination of this aspect and it should be more thoroughly explored. Also, there should be an attempt to examine the effect of occupational danger on the organization as a whole. This research has concentrated its focus on 253 production employees and their informal occupational subculture* Per­ haps there are organizational subcultures of danger. Comparative analy­ sis using different types of organizations with differing degrees and types of danger would facilitate analysis and should be done.

Examination should also be made of the impact of an occupational subculture of danger on the occurrence of accidents. It has been stated that the occupational subculture of danger is a protective mechanism in some cases yet capable of inducing potential hazards or injury in other situations. This area should be systematically examined. The method­ ology of this study nor its particular focus enabled the research to systematically examine the cause and effect relationship between the occupational subculture of danger and accidents. Detailed case studies and statistical surveys would enable this relationship to be more accu­ rately specified. As such| the full effect of the social dimensions of occupational accidents and safety could be ascertained.

In a related matter there should be an examination of how the occu­ pational subculture of danger conflicts and supports the safety activity of formal organizations. It was noted that formal organizations and the occupational subculture of danger often work at cross purposes with one another. Safety regulations were often viewed by the miners as imprac­ tical and/or worthless and were often ignored. Research is necessary to see how these two e n titie s can be more productively accommodated so that the goal of work safety can be more effectively promoted.

Finally* research should also be directed in attempts to strengthen the occupational subculture of danger with regard to predictable yet rare hazards. A particular focus with regard to the mines is that of 25U the mine fire. The content of the subculture is such that uncommon hazards like the fire are ignored. Strengthening the subculture in this area could serve to prevent or mitigate disasters. 255

Notes: Chapter IX

1# See Chapter II, Theme One, pp. 16-19.

2. See Chapter II, Theme Two, pp. 19-20.

3. See Chapter II, Theme Three, pp. 21-25*

U. See Chapter II, Theme Four, pp. 25-27.

5. See Chapter II, Themo Five, pp. 27-29* 6. T, T. Paterson and F. J. W illett, "An Experiment in the Reduction of Accident in a C olliery ," Sociological Review o .s . b3 (Winter 1951) i pp. 107-123i T. T. Patersonand F. J. W illett, "An Anthropological Experiment in a British Colliery," Human Organization 10 (Summer 1951)i PP* 19-25* APPENDIX APPENDIX A

A Glossary of Mining Terminology^

* Abstracted, in part, from Montana, Bureau of Mines and Geology, Practical Guide for Prospectors and Small Mine Operators in Montana by Koehler S,‘ £icufc, Miscellaneous Contribution tJo. 13 (Butte, Montana: Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology,19$$)* 2$B

Adit—A horizontal gallery or opening driven from the surface which gives access to the ore body* The term "tunnel*1 is frequently used in place of adit, but technically, a tunnel is open to the surface at both ends. Apex (vein)—This term is used in mining law to denote the outcrop of a vein which is exposed on the surface, or the uppermost limit of a blind vein which does not outcrop.

Back—A term having different meanings underground according to the min- ing "district. Usually means the overlying roof of a stope or drift.

Bar, Mining or scaling—A Dong steel bar (usually 5 feet) with a sharp point on one end and a chisel point on the othor end. Used to pull down loose rocks.

Bit—The part of a d rill that comes into contact with and actually cuts or chips rock. Bits may be formed directly on the drill steel or they may be detachable.

Blast—An explosion or violent detonation caused by the discharge of dynamite or some other explosive.

Cave-ln—The partial or complete collapse of a mine working. Cap, Explosive or blasting—Small shells, closed at one end, and loaded with a charge of highly sensitive explosive. It detonates the dynamite charge and is highly sensitive to shock and heat.

Chute—An opening in the ground where ore is allowed to pass from one level to another. It is a structure built to load cars from a stope or ore pass.

Collar—Tho immediate surface at the top of a shaft, or the start of a drill hole.

Crib—A system of timbering where the memhers are laid upon one another to form a rectangular opening in the center. Crosscut—A horizontal level driven at a large angle to the strike of a vein.

9 Dip—The maximum angle of inclination downward that a vein or bed makes with a horizontal plane.

Dragway—A location used to transfer material, principally ore or waste rock, from one level to another by dragging or scrapping the material in a specially designed, winch powered bucket. Drift—A horizontal underground opening driven along the course of a vein. It does not have to be driven in the vein. 259

Driving—The process of advancing a mine working, usually a d rift or ra is e .

Dry—A changehouse or bath house.

Fault—A fracture in the earth, with displacement of one side of the fracture with respect to the other.

Firing or blasting—A term used to indicate the detonation of a charge of explosive.

Footwall—The bottom or lower enclosing wall of a vein.

Hanging wall—The top or upper enclosing wall of a vein.

Hlghgrade ore—An ore that yields a large margin of profit per ton.

Level—All the connected horizontal mine openings at a certain elevation. (Generally, levels are 100 to 200 feet apart and are designated by their distance from the collar of a shaft or some other point of reference.

Low-grade ore—Ore that yields a low margin of profit per ton.

Manway—An underground passage, vertical or inclined, for the accommoda- tion of ladders, pipes, or timber slides.

Misfire—The failure of a dynamite charge to explode.

Muck—A common term for any broken ore or waste underground.

Mucker—A shoveler or one who handles muck.

Ore—A mineral aggregate of sufficient value, both in quantity and quality, which can be mined at a profit.

Ore body—The part of a vein that carries ore. Generally, all parts of a vein are not ore.

Pillar—A portion of ore or waste left in-place in the ground to give support to the wall.

Powder—A miner's term for dynamite.

Prell—Hitrocarbo-nitrate (NON), an explosive.

Pull (a chute)—To lift a chute gate and empty rock from the chute.

Raise—An excavation of restricted cross section driven upward, either vertically or at an angle, from a level in the mine.

Rib—The side wall of a stope, raise, etc. 260

Roof.-The overhead p art of a mine working.

Round—The pattern of d rill holes in a face to insure complete breakage of the ore rock when the holes are blasted.

Shaft, vertical—A vertical excavation, commonly from the surface, of limited area compared to its depth made for mining or finding ore, draining water, ventilation, lowering or hoisting men, and lowering m a te ria ls.

Shaft, inclined—A shaft that is not vertical. It usually follows the dip of the vein.

S ill—The floor or bottom of a passage in a mine.

Slush or slushing—The act of operating a slusher or tugger.

Slusher, tugger, or dragger—A small hoist (winch) used underground for hoisting timber or mine supplies and used to scrape broken rock into ore chutes•

Spit or spitting—To ignite spitter cord, a fuse tied between explosive charges and which is used to time and detonate the blasting operation.

Steel change or d rill steel—The different lengths of steel, needed when drilling a hole. Tho common steel-length difference when using a stoper drill is 16 inches.

Stope—Any excavation underground to remove the ore other than tho development works. The outlines of a stope are either determined by the limits of the ore body or by raises.

Stull—A timber used to support loose rocks or slabs.

Suno—A hole used to collect water on a level or at the bottom of a sKafr.

Tamping—The gentle forcing and compaction of dynamite and stemming in to a d r i l l hole.

Timberman—One whose main job re sp o n sib ility is the construction and maintenance of underground timbered installations.

Tram or motor—An underground rail locomotive.

Trammer—One who operates the trams.

Vein—A well defined tabular mineralised zone which may or may not con­ tain valuable ore bodies. Waste—Barren rock or mineralized material which does not have enough value to be classified as an ore. 261

Winze-*-A shaft like opening sunk from a level in a mine to develop, dewater, and ventilate the ore2 ones.

Working face or face—Any part of the mine where work is under way such as the face of a drift, stope, or raise. APPENDIX B

Examples of Three Days' Field Notes

262 263

October 3, 1973 6:00 PM—2:00 AM

The shift was spent slushing waste rock from the 1:800 level to the

1:700 at the waste drag. Willie took me in, gave me a little instruction,

and left me to finish the job. The important thing is to get the pit

above clear so the drifters can empty their cars. This necessitates

making three or four short passes over the pile before pulling the load

down. Since you can't see what you're doing, you develop a sense of

touch for the handles on the tugger (e.g., light pressure and a return­

ing bucket equals little muck). Must also watch the cables for slack­

ness and jams to tell whether the bucket is doing the job.

After slushing out the waste, I spent some time repairing the

timbers holding the slusher in place. The vibration shakes the timber

loose and it must be periodically tightened up with the ever indispens­

able wedge driven between the rock and the timber. Keeping the slusher

tight is important. Otherwise, it might turn over and go down the raise with one's body attached. Also, if those timbers pull loose,

you're bound to get flattened.

Comments from Oscar: "Most of the cave-ins are caused by stopers who get careless and don't timber it (the stope) right." His answer

was in response to my question about the cause of cave-ins. "When she's

going to go (fall) sometimes she cracks or grinds or groans, then look

out." Also, "If you see a large crack like that one there (pointing), sta y c le a r o f i t and t e l l somebody who knows how to take care o f i t . "

And, "If you see fine little pieces of rock and dust coming down out of

a crack, get the hell out of there cause she's gonna go. Sometimes 26U

thousands of tons drop." His answers were in response to my questions

about how to spot bad ground.

Questiont "Does water make it ceve-in more easily?"

Oscar: "Ya, usually where you got a lot of water dripping

through, the rock is looser and she might cave. You got to watch those

places and timber them.

Oscar'8 comments on tramming: "You got to be careful when you run

that thing so you don't derail her. Setting back on can be a bitch. If

it's full of ore, you got to jack it. If it's empty, you can use planks

or a derailer along with the motor to put her on. Be careful when you

come in the mine for the first time on shift. If the shift before blasted, there is liable to be rock on the track beneath the chutes.

That's what usually throws her over." His comment emerged after Ace,

the trammer, mentioned that he nearly derailed*

Oscar's comments about the motor and derailment had little to do with safety. The main thrust was to be cautious and save yourself a lot

of work. Also, the contractors don't appreciate having the trams tied up that way. In order to work at the face, they need to have so much

rock mucked out so they can bring in their timber and set up to blast

the next round. A mess of that nature (e.g., a derailment) not only

costs the trammer a lot of work, but also the contractors money and the company production. However, nobody seems to worry too much about the

"damned company."

When you load cars you have to be careful so that you don't get hit by rocks or rocks that splatter as they come down the chute. Some of

those rocks are as big as basketballs and weight 30 lbs. etc. The 265 splatter of chips can put out an eye* Loading cars takes a little practice. You've got to handle that chute gate in such a manner so that the rock doesn't lodge in the gate while the finer stuff sifts by on the sides and bottom down to the track, requiring hand mucking. You open a chute quickly and slam it closed forcefully.

Impression: Mining is a confining occupation in the sense that you don't roam around, even if you don't have work to do. You have to stay in a given area so others can find you. Going off on your own is hazard­ ous. If you lost a lamp, you'd be up a creek without a paddle. Can also get lost, get into an area where the air is bad, injure yourself, or find yourself under bad ground. If bored, twiddle the thumbs} you don't roam around.

Impression: Mining is also a lonely occupation. Slushing or tram­ ming are done alone. The c o n tra c to rs work in p a ir s . You may spend an entire shift in a rock nook with nothing but rock for compaqy.

Oscar, on cutting drifts: "All you do is follow the lead. They

(the drifters) get paid by the foot of advance." This answer emerged in response to my question, "How do they know where to put the drifts?"

Oscar: "I quit that working in the stopes years ago. It's too hard on me. Working up there is for young, husky bucks who got the wind to do the work. I ain't got no wind now." * Oscar can probably run any machine in the hole, but he fakes igno­ rance if asked to run something. Yesterday he said he couldn't run the motor, so we didn't go in for quite a while. Today it was a skip in a stope. Running it would have necessitated his climbing out of the ore c ar. 266

November 2, 1973 6:00 PM—2*00 AM

Worked in 99 w ith Davy and Alex. Poor day data-w ise sin ce we did a lo t o f wort: and not much ta lk in g . I asked Davy i f h e 'd ever known of anyone beir.g hurt by a slusher.

Reply* "Yes, me."

Question: "What happened?"

Reply* "I was crawling over the slusher bucket and right at that moment my partner turned it on and dragged me down the stope."

Question: "Get hurt bad?"

Reply* "Mo." Davy a lso reported th a t Hank was h it by a shiv th a t broke loose.

Maybe that is why Hank is always cautioning us about the houlback pin.

Davy also said that Wilson was hit in tho faco by a cable that snapped and lost a few teeth.

Drifting: Each man is supposed to take half the drift. Each man gets o rail (i.e., responsible for clearing the drift and laying track on the one side). According to Davy, to be a successful drifter you

"need a big belly so you can lay down on the d rill (jackleg) and hold it in place." Same applies to the mucking machine.

Davy to Alex* "Be c a re fu l when you move th a t s tu f f ( e .g ., equip­ ment, drill steel) so that you don't hit that spitter cord with tho steel. It might set it off." I borrowed a pro11 gun and hoso from 115 today and also took time to look up in 121. The air line is cracked open there to ventilate the stope since they have no ventilating fan. Seems to work very well. 267

They blasted during the previous shift and you could hardly smell the

/! burnt powder. We left the haulback pin in place, tightened it in real goody and hoped that the blast wouldn't blow it out. If it holds, it will save a lot of work. We won't have to crawl up the stope to set it up for slushing and to haul up supplies.

The chute and bin was pulled dry by the trammer. You have to keep the chute gBte full of rock so that the blasted rock doesn't fall through to the track or bust the gate out.

Alex is a standard miner—always talking about going home and get­ ting some "pussy." Davy said he was going out this weekend to pick up a gal and Alex had a whole set of names, phone numbers, and addresses in

Mining City for just such activities. For example, "Call U£6-lUllj» that's Leanna. She'll give you some. Clean too."

Davy'8 big motivation is money. We drilled and blasted 103 holes today cause Hank told him he'd make a few bucks if he got that face blasted. Davy did it. Alex describes him as "one drilling muthafucker."

Davy isn't satisfied with day's pay. He keeps on saying, "If I have to live on that, I am going to be damn hungry."

Attached to the next sheet are a series of do' 3 and don'ts for the handling of dynamite. Each box of powder has one inside. The miners never look at it. It must be reviewed to see how well "we" miners do with the rules.

Observation on self: The big money doesn't motivate me. I'd Just like to go to work and do the job when things went OK and you weren't constantly in a jam. I was under the impression that as experience was 268

gained with the job tasks, one was better able to avoid difficulty, but

after watching Davy and Reggie at work, it appears that even they are

constantly hampered with work problems. I'd like a little mental satis­

faction from this work instead of just being constantly tired. Perhaps

the money replaces mental satisfaction.

December 3, 1973 8*00 AM~U:00 PM

Asked Hank about the disaster plan. He said that in addition to the map of emergency exits, each shift boss had a short blurb on notifi­ cation procedures to use in case of emergencies. Asked Hank if the company had any agreements with any other companies to supply men or get men from others, etc. in case of emergencies. He said he didn't know and

that I'd have to ask Jack.

Asked Hank if it was usual for all men in a stope to stay with the man doing the spitting.

Reply: "Oh, it varies with the men. Nobody is supposed to loave the stope until everybody does, but they don't have to stay with the man doing the spitting. When I stoped, sometimes one of us would go down first and then signal the guy above on the water pipe. But, tho guy spitting was always in the manwoy. That way he couldn't fall down in some dead end hole" (e.g., get caught some place in the stope).

The pipe and rapped signals, etc., are an important part of the communication network in the mine. Signal lights are also important.

Many times these are the only methods of communication.

Jerome, new in the stope today, slushed. He thought we were tapping a nine on the pipes when we were hooking up the hoses. I thought the 269

same thing the other day when Davy and Alex were doing the same thing.

Don't know why but it seems natural for men when hammering to hit the

object nine times and then pause.

Question: "Hank, do those high-rolling contractors get careless

when they are in a hustle to make a buck?”

Reply: "Some do and some d o n 't. I t depends on the man. Some

are always carelessj some never are.”

Question: "Hank, who has the most accidents, the contractors or

the men on day's pay?"

Reply: "I'd guess that 75 percent of the accidents happen to

men on day's pay and new miners (e.g., those learning to contract). A

good contractor doesn't have many accidents. Ya know, most of the acci­

dents are preventable. About 50 percent of them are the man's own

fault. He's got his head in his ass."

Question: "Hank, do you think that the independence of these min­

ers is due to the danger in the work or because they work contract?”

Reply; "Both, but you know there aren't many of the old-time

contractors left. Lots of guys think they're miners, but they're not.

You don't see thBt rugged, rough type any more."

Hank uses the term "miner” in a special sense. A miner is not just

a man who works in the mine. A miner is a man who knows his craft, one who can do it all, a man who breaks that rock and lots of it. I am a miner because I work in a mine, but I am not a miner's miner.

Jerome said: "Drilling when you got misses in the face is the most dangerous work you can do." He then went on to recount the story about how Charlie made the great beyond. Pete had said that Charlie was 270 drilling when he hit the miss. Jerome said Charlie was drilling an easer and inserting a second steel in the lifter, and it was the lifter that blew. Pete said that if that was the case, then Charlie must have ignited the fuse when he collared the hole. "Sticking a steel in wouldn't do it. Hell, I've loaded holes with l*th steels lots of times and nothing happened."

Jerome claims that slushers are to be screened in. If that was the case, almost every slusher in the mine is not in compliance. I think he's incorrect on this matter but will check the safety regulations.

Today I barred down. I've got a slab of cap rock, 1 foot thick and about twice the size of a double bed up near the face. Set two pins underneath and drilled out. I was quite nervous about drilling under there and set Clarence off to the side to watch and listen for any move­ ment in the rock. But, that ended shortly and Clarence had to climb under there with me to brace the drill stinger since it was slipping off the drill board.

Some guys running the slusher don't like the protective bars set in front of the machine for some reason. I remember W illie's telling me that he always tore them out because they got in his way. Davy did the same on a couple of occasions.

Asked Hank what he thought was the most dangerous place in the mine

(e.g., on a tram, stoping, drifting, running a raise, etc.):

Reply: "Probably a stope, but the worst accident I ever saw was in in a drift over at the Lonesome Star. A couple of guys hit a missj one had his head beaten to hell and the other guy lost a leg." BIBLIOGRAPHY 272

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