COLLOQUIUM 3

ARISTOTLE ON MORAL CONSIDERABILITY

SUSANNE FOSTER

Aristotelian ethics begins with and focuses on the welfare of the moral agent. Aristotle assumes that an agent will pursue what she considers to be best for herself. She will pursue her conception of happiness as her ulti• mate end. Hence, one of his arguments that an agent should pursue theoria as the ultimate good is that theoria is truly the best thing for the agent (Nicomachean Ethics I 7, X 7 -8). Likewise, Aristotle frequently appeals to self-interest to justify the practical excellences. For example, the reason why an agent should consider the needs of others when disposing of her wealth is that it is to her own benefit to be liberal. She will not over-value money, thereby distorting her own conception of the good (EN IX 7, 1167b28-68a5), and those she benefits will be-to some extent-her products, thus enriching her (EN IX 7, 1167b31-68a9). Why should an agent share political power with those of equal virtue? There is of course the threat of reprisal from one's fellow citizens. And, Aristotle argues, it is detrimental to one's self to refuse to share political power with those of equal virtue, since one could only continue to hold office by behaving vi• ciously (Politics VII 3, 1325bl-2), and vicious action is not in the agent's own interest. Even Aristotle's justification of friendship contains reference to the welfare of the agent. Friends are the greatest external good; they are the best objects of our beneficence; we are social animals and should not be alone; it is easier to contemplate our friends' actions than our own; and the existence of his friends is desirable to the good person (EN IX 9, 1169b3-70bl9). Notice that, even from the perspective of self-interest, Aristotle is able to provide compelling reasons for an agent to act in ways that are benefi• cial to her community. Good Aristotelian agents are generous, good tem• pered, friendly, witty, just, courageous, temperate, and truthful. Little more could be asked of an agent. Nonetheless, even an egoistic ethic, one that considers only self-interest to be a motivation for an agent, which can provide sufficient reason to act virtuously is lacking, since friendship and, perhaps, justice presuppose that the good agent considers the patient's welfare in its own right. The harm or benefit suffered by the patient seems to be a central concern of a just agent, not merely the harm the agent may do to himself by grasping after more than his fair share. Likewise, friend• ship is a reciprocal relationship in which each party is concerned about the welfare of the other. And, as Aristotle acknowledges, insofar as that con- 76 SUSANNE FOSTER cern is motivated by self-interest, the friendship is incomplete. If, for ex• ample, an agent wants his business partner to fare well so that she will contribute to the flourishing of his own business, he is not her friend in the true sense. Both justice and friendship, then, seem to presuppose that oth• ers are morally considerable-that the welfare of others provides reason for the agent to act.

I

Fortunately, though Aristotelian ethics is self-centered, elements in the Eudemian Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Politics indicate that Aristote• lian ethics is not egoistic. Unlike the egoist, who considers only his own welfare as reason for acting, an Aristotelian agent considers the welfare of others independently from her own good (EE 124la7-8; Rhet. 1380b36- 8la3). For Aristotle, there seems to be no contradiction between being self-centered and being motivated by the welfare of others. In this paper, I intend to show that Aristotle thinks good agents will consider the welfare of others for the sake of the others. The best evidence that Aristotle con• siders others to be morally considerable is found in his discussions of pri• mary friendship. 1 As Aristotle says in the Eudemian Ethics, a friend is one who wishes what he thinks is good to someone, not for his own sake, but for the sake of the other. "For a man seems to us a friend, who wishes the good or what he thinks to be such to someone, not on his own account but for the sake of that other (E:n:ivou £v£Ka)" (EE VII 6, 1240a22-25). Aristotle repeats the claim at EN VIII 2, 1155b31; VIII 3, 1156b9-10, VIII 7, 1159a8-12, and IX 4, 1166a2-4. He also claims that a virtuous person will even give up his own life or the opportunity for virtuous action for the sake of his friend (EN IX 8, 1169a30-b2). It is true that it is only in the case of primary friendship that Aristotle claims that friends act for the sake of the other's welfare, but even the lesser forms of friendship are called friendships because of their similarity to primary friendship (EN 8.6 1158b5-11). Insofar as an agent wishes the other well, she may be called a friend. Insofar as her well wishing is moti• vated by considerations of self-interest, her friendship is incomplete.

1 In this section, I will draw upon the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. I should, then, say a word about their relationship. I take the Eudemian Ethics to be signifi• cantly earlier than the Nicomachean Ethics. One sign of this is that the discussion of friend• ship in the Eudemian Ethics is less developed and less well organized than the discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics. Fortunately, the differences in the doctrine of friendship are rela• tively minor between the two works. What differences do appear can be explained as ad• vances and clarifications of earlier thinking.