Read Ebook {PDF EPUB} The Eudemian Ethics by Aristotle Aristotle Eudemian Ethics. Thesis: Alexander at various times exhibited the only form of courage Aristotle outlines in the Eudemian Ethics – the virtue of the balance between rash and cowardice. Analysis of the model of virtue ethics and the doctrine of the Mean described in Eudemian Ethics allow to distinguish between difference forms of courage on the scale between rash and cowardice, with courage being the “golden mean” of human virtue. In his epos about Alexander Plutarch mentions many situations and descriptions of events related to Alexander’s life showing him from many perspectives; however, all of them can be classified as true courage according to Aristotle’s scale. Eudemian ethics of Aristotle is not so popular as his Nicomachean ethics partly because it describes an analytical model of virtue – concept of the Mean. However, this is a key concept in Aristotle’s model of virtue ethics. The virtues of being and ethical approaches to virtues have been considered by philosophers since early times. Courage is one of classical examples in ethical models, and Aristotle used courage as one of the best examples to describe his concept of the Mean. The purpose of this paper is to consider the interconnections between Aristotle’s model of mean, concept of courage and the manifestations of courage in Alexander’s life (according to Plutarch). Aristotle was the most influential teacher in Alexander’s life and had incredible impact to his personality forming. It can thus be assumed that Alexander exhibited the courage Aristotle outlines in his “Eudemian Ethics”. Evidences of this approach can be found throughout the texts of Plutarch. Aristotle’s considered courage to be one of human virtues. Usually, it is common to claim that this philosopher outlined several types of courage, according to reasons which raise it. However, this idea does not reflect the Aristotle’s doctrine of the Mean. According to “Eudemian Ethics”, the definition which might be used to determine the nature of courage is: “Courage is the mean between fear and recklessness” (Aristotle). In other words, courage can be explained as the optimal (virtuous) balance between fear and recklessness. Coward person is not able to act under the influence of fear, reckless person does not feel fear at all. On the other hand, courageous individual feels fear similarly to all other people, but he is still able to act voluntary with the confidence for honor and nobility. This is the core meaning of courage as the virtue for Aristotle (within the context of Eudemian Ethics). However, Aristotle also uses the term “courage” in situational context. Here is the list of the manifestations of courage (expressed differently on the courage scale): civic – the result of punishment cowardice transformed to forced feel of braveness; ignorance – “children and madmen face things rushing on them” (Aristotle); military, based on knowledge “not of what is formidable, but of ways of encountering what is formidable”; boldness, based on previous luck, which motivates one to face danger; passion – leading to heedlessness of the possibility to defeat (Aristotle). It is possible to determine that, according to Aristotle’s view, there can be different manifestations of courage (seen as a scale), but the true courage is the balance between the extreme ends of this scale. Other types of behaviour described above are also related to courage, but they are not achieving the Mean. The work of Plutarch describing events from Alexander’s life is incredibly valuable, since his presentation is clear and unbiased (without extra worship of Alexander, but written with deep respect). Using Aristotle’s ethic, it is possible to develop a totally new perception of Alexander’s true courageousness, and its consequent manifestations. However, in certain situations it is also difficult to judge whether it was true courage or rashness. For example, Alexander’s courage during some of battles can be perceived both as Aristotle’s virtuous balance between fear and recklessness, and as his courage of boldness, generated by too self-confident character. In my opinion, Alexander manifested true courage (according to Aristotle’s model), since he managed to balance between rashness and cowardice. Throughout the text of Plutarch, it is possible to trace the moments when Alexander exhibited the courage, not the cowardice (or similar reactions) and not rashness, but the golden middle between them. Below there are several examples of Alexander’s courageous behaviour, and the analysis of them. The scene with horse, from Alexander’s youth, is a good example of true courage as it was defined by Aristotle. When nobody could subdue recalcitrant stallion, Alexander said then: “What an excellent horse do they lose for want of address and boldness to manage him!” (Plutarch). Then, he bravely took control under the horse in few minutes just, risking to get wounds. Was the courage in his actions in fact? Managing very unbridled horse could cause serious harm to his health, thus, the answer is “yes”. Was this courage the manifestation of courageous child’s “ignorance” of character Aristotle wrote about? Obviously, not. Furthermore, Alexander’s skills of horse managing and the ability to tame the wild horse showed he was able to find the true balance – evidence of wisdom which enabled him to become the greatest conqueror. Thereby, the above-mentioned actions of the great General can be considered as the manifestation of true virtue which Aristotle defines in his “Eudemian Ethics”. The events related to Alexander’s entering the ruling of kingdom show another manifestation of true courage. “It seemed to the Macedonians a very critical time; and some would have persuaded Alexander to give up all thought of retaining the Grecians in subjection by force of arms, and rather to apply himself to win back by gentle means the allegiance of the tribes who were designing revolt, and try the effect of indulgence in arresting the first motions towards revolution. But he rejected this counsel as weak and timorous, and looked upon it to be more prudence to secure himself by resolution and magnanimity, than, by seeming to truckle to any, to encourage all to trample on him”(Plutarch). Was his attitude towards kingdom ruling courageous? Definitely! Being a wise and skilled strategist and a leader, Alexander understood potential dangers. However, honor became the reason not to accept compromises he was forced to and not to take side of cowards. Being the closest to real courage according to Aristotle, Alexander managed to go against the prevailing opinion. The scene of battle near the river Granicus also illustrated the courage of Alexander in Aristotle’s sense. Conditions of Alexander’s army and location were absolutely unfavorable. In addition, he had to deal with the common belief that Daesius month is not suitable for successful military performance. The incredible influence of prejudices in ancient times should also be considered. What was the Alexander’s response? Here are some quotes from Plutarch: “It was late, he told him that he should disgrace the Hellespont should he fear the Granicus”. The greatest victory followed the courageous decision of General. It cannot be said that Alexander did not feel fear at all. The quote illustrates that he found strength to get over it for the love of honor, nobility and greatest purpose. In general, the types of Aristotle’s courage do not have clear lines to get the only precise meaning. Multiply treated philosophical statements are even more disputable in the aspect of ancient historical events. However, it is stated that unbelievable courage of greatest conqueror is worth to be recognized the virtue of wisdom (the golden mean) in Aristotle’s ethical model. Numerous examples illustrate the nature of courage of Alexander the Great and it is the doctrine of the Mean and true virtue that enabled him to make an outstanding contribution in the world’s history. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics. Hide browse bar Your current position in the text is marked in blue. Click anywhere in the line to jump to another position: This text is part of: Search the Perseus Catalog for: View text chunked by: Table of Contents: After this we must take a fresh starting-point and discuss the subjects that follow. Now all goods are either external or within the spirit, and of these two kinds the latter are preferable, as we class them even in the extraneous discourses. 1 For Wisdom and Goodness and Pleasure are in the spirit, and either some or all of these are thought by everybody to be an End. And the contents of the spirit are in two groups, one states or faculties, the other activities and processes. Let these assumptions, then, be made, and let it be assumed as to Goodness that it is the best disposition or state or faculty of each class of things that have some use or work. The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text. Purchase a copy of this text (not necessarily the same edition) from Amazon.com. An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics. Hide browse bar Your current position in the text is marked in blue. Click anywhere in the line to jump to another position: This text is part of: Search the Perseus Catalog for: View text chunked by: Table of Contents: The man 1 who at Delos set forth in the precinct of the god his own opinion composed an inscription for the forecourt of the temple of Leto in which he distinguished goodness, beauty and pleasantness as not all being properties of the same thing. His verses are: “ Justice 2 is fairest, and Health is best, But to win one's desire is the pleasantest. ” About every thing and every natural species there are many views that involve difficulty and require examination; of these some relate only to our knowledge of the thing, others deal also with modes of acquiring it and of acting in relation to it. As to all those views therefore that involve only speculative philosophy, we must say whatever may be proper to the inquiry when the suitable occasion occurs. But we must consider first what the good life consists in and how it is to be obtained—whether all of those who receive the designation 'happy' acquire happiness by nature, as is the case with tallness and shortness of stature and differences of complexion, or by study, which would imply that there is a science of happiness, or by some form of training, [20] for there are many human attributes that are not bestowed by nature nor acquired by study but gained by habituation— bad attributes by those trained in bad habits and good attributes by those trained in good ones. Or does happiness come in none of these ways, but either by a sort of elevation of mind inspired by some divine power, as in the case of persons possessed by a nymph or a god, or, alternatively, by fortune? for many people identify happiness with good fortune. Now it is pretty clear that the presence of happiness is bestowed upon men by all of these things, or by some or one of them; for almost all the modes in which it is produced fall under these principles, inasmuch as all the acts that spring from thought may be included with those that spring from knowledge. But to be happy and to five blissfully and finely may consist chiefly in three things deemed to be most desirable: some people say that Wisdom 4 is the greatest good, others Goodness 5 and others Pleasure. And certain persons debate about their importance in relation to happiness, 1 Theognis (255 f. with slight variation, quoted also in Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1099a 27 . 2 Or 'Righteousness'; the term includes more than justice. 3 Or 'Well-being'; the Greek word is entirely noncommittal and does not necessarily denote a state of feeling, consciousness of welfare. 4 The Greek term here still retains the general sense that it has in Plato. In the Nicomachean Ethics it is limited to Practical Wisdom, prudentia, 'prudence,' as distinct from θεωρία , sapientia, 'speculative wisdom.' 5 It must always be remembered that the Greek term is less limited in meaning than 'virtue,' and may denote excellence in any department, not only moral goodness. The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text. Purchase a copy of this text (not necessarily the same edition) from Amazon.com. An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system. Introduction. The opening line of the Nicomachean Ethics introduces one of Aristotle’s best-known contributions to philosophy: ‘Every skill and every enquiry, and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to aim at some good.’ This captures an inspiring and optimistic view of human nature, as does the equally famous opening of the Metaphysics , ‘All human beings by nature desire to know.’ Striving for the good and striving for knowledge are two of the key elements of Aristotle’s profound view of what is significant in the life of human beings. Less well known is the emphasis Aristotle places on the role of pleasure, healthy pleasure at least, in a good human life. And that view is featured in the opening sentences of his other major work on happiness and successful human living, the Eudemian Ethics . Aristotle criticizes the wise old poet Theognis for driving a wedge between what is pleasant and what is fine and good. ‘We should not agree with him. For happiness, being finest and best, is the most pleasant of all things.’ Aristotle’s unexpected focus on the pleasantness of the happy life is just one of the many significant, though often subtle, differences between Aristotle’s two authoritative books on ethics, distinguished since antiquity by the epithets ‘Nicomachean’ and ‘Eudemian’. These labels allude to his son Nicomachus and his famous student Eudemus of Rhodes. The reason why these two labels were chosen to designate Aristotle’s two works on ethics, Aristotle’s motivation for writing two different books on the topic, and the relationships between them are all issues mired in uncertainty and controversy. Each of these questions demands proper discussion, but at the outset we want to draw attention to some important basic facts about Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics which make it eminently worth reading and indeed studying with as much care and attention as we routinely devote to the Nicomachean Ethics . First and foremost, it is important to recognize that the Eudemian Ethics is a complete treatment of happiness and the good human life, and in our view it was probably the first one Aristotle wrote. And if this is so, then it clearly demands our attention as a discussion of fundamental human values written by one of the great philosophers of the western tradition. But the nature of the work has been controversial, and so we should begin with a bit of background. Eudemian Ethics. of the topics is different but there is perhaps no striking discrepancy of view. E.E. VIII. notices the epistemological aspect of Virtue (treated in N.E. I., ix., but differently); and discusses the ethical bearing of Good Luck (more fully dealt with in a different connexion in c. iii. of N.E. VII.= E.E. VI.). There follows an essay on Kalokâgathia, Moral Nobility (a virtue merely alluded to without analysis in N.E. , as a necessary quality of the Great-spirited man, 1124 a 4 and 1179 b 10); it is treated as the consummation of the particular virtues. In conclusion there is a glance at Theoria, the activity of Speculative Wisdom, as the highest life of man; at Book II. init. this was coupled with Moral Conduct as constituting happiness. There is nothing corresponding to the full treatment of Theoria as the consummation of human well-being that is given in N.E. X. vii., viii., or to the transition from ethics to politics (glancing at the importance of public education) which concludes that work. IV. Text, MSS. and Editions. The Eudemian Ethics is not contained in the two best mss. of. Aristotle, the 10th c. Laurentianus (denoted by the sign K b ) and the 12th c. Parisiensis (L b ); we derive it chiefly from Vaticanus (P b ), a 13th c. copy of K b , and the early 15th c. Marcianus (M b ), not so good a text as P b but an indispensable adjunct to it—according to Jackson, who refers to the text of these two mss. as ‘the Greek tradition.’ Other later copies certainly contain more errors and are of little value as actual traditions of a sound text—some of their variants may be mere conjectural. Eudemian Ethics. corrections; their readings are only occasionally given in this edition. The 13th c. Latin translation attributed to William of Moerbeke follows the Greek very closely, and is almost equivalent to another ms. ranking in value next to Vaticanus and Marcianus; it is occasionally adduced in this edition either in Latin or in its original Greek when this can be inferred with certainty. There is an old Latin version of Book VIII. c. ii. with Magna Moralia Book II. c. viii., entitled De Bona Fortuna, printed in a Latin Aristotle of 1482, which indicates an independent Greek text of that passage. The earliest printed edition of Aristotle is the Aldine, Venice 1498. The foundation of all modern work on the text is the monumental Berlin edition, with a Latin translation, scholia and indices, published by the Academia Regia Borussica in 1831 and the following years. The text, edited by Bekker, forms Volumes I. and II. which are paged consecutively, the Eudemian Ethics occupying pp. 1214–1249; the Berlin pages, the columns (indicated by a and b ) and the numbering of the lines are shown in the margin of the present text. Fritsche’s edition of the Eudemian Ethics (Ratisbon 1851) has an introduction on the authorship and contents, a text with explanatory notes, illustrative quotations and critical notes, a Latin translation and a Greek index. The Teubner text of Susemihl (Leipzig 1884) has useful critical notes, collecting the corrections of other scholars published in the learned journals. Henry Jackson contributed a valuable study of the text and contents of Book VII. cc. i., ii. to The Journal.