Psicanálise Carlos Alexandre Henriques Peres Dias

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Psicanálise Carlos Alexandre Henriques Peres Dias A dialógica fenomenologia<>psicanálise Carlos Alexandre Henriques Peres Dias Orientador: Professor Doutor Michel Renaud Co-Orientador: Doutor Jorge de Almeida Gonçalves ___________________________________________________ Tese de Doutoramento em Filosofia, Especialidade em Filosofia do Conhecimento e Epistemologia JULHO/2014 1 Nº de aluno: 16920 Carlos Alexandre Henriques Peres Dias ___________________________________________________ Tese de Doutoramento em Filosofia, Especialidade em Filosofia do Conhecimento e Epistemologia Orientador: Professor Doutor Michel Renaud Co-Orientador: Doutor Jorge de Almeida Gonçalves JULHO/2014 2 Tese apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Filosofia, Especialidade em Filosofia do Conhecimento e Epistemologia, realizada sob a orientação científica de Professor Doutor Michel Renaud e co-orientação de Doutor Jorge de Almeida Gonçalves APOIO FINANCIERO DA FCT 3 Declaro que esta Tese é o resultado da minha investigação pessoal e independente. O seu conteúdo é original e todas as fontes consultadas estão devidamente mencionadas no texto, nas notas e na bibliografia. O candidato, ________ ________ Lisboa, 14 de Julho de 2014 Declaro que esta Tese se encontra em condições de ser apreciada pelo júri a designar. O orientador, ____________________ O co-orientador, Jorge de Almeida Gonçalves ____________________ Lisboa, 14 de Julho de 2014 4 Abstract Palavras-chave: «si»; fenomenologia; psicanálise; hermenêutica; simbólica do mal; psicopatia A nossa investigação doutoral consiste em articular a fenomenologia hermenêutica de Ricoeur, e (por inerência) Husserl com a psicanálise de Freud e Lacan, a fim de aferir quais as contribuições destas duas áreas do saber para a identificação da categoria, ainda não tematizada, do «si». Na nossa perspectiva, a tematização de Ricoeur, a saber, o «si-mesmo», a «ipseidade», o «cogito integral» (inter-alia) constituem aproximações epistemológicas ao «si». Tentaremos demonstrar, em filigrana, e no final da nossa reflexão, que a «topologia» formulada por Lacan constitui igualmente uma ‘gramática’ de aproximação ao «si». A Tese está dividida em duas partes distintas mas absolutamente complementares, a saber: a primeira parte é dedicada ao que intitulamos de ‘Prolegómenos teóricos e meta-teóricos do «si»’; a segunda parte corresponde à hipótese que inferimos da primeira parte, a qual denominamos de ‘Hipótese teórica do «si»’, na qual a «simbólica do mal» é problematizada através da análise fenomenológica formulada por Ricoeur, a qual irá permitir uma solução psicanalítica (Freud e Lacan) para as aporias da «simbólica do mal». Esta solução irá ser apresentada, em filigrana, através da ‘investigação de campo’ de dois psicopatas; por inerência, a «lei-do-pai» de Lacan reveste a delimitação topológica do «si» maligno, a qual traduz a nossa reflexão no seu argumento final, ou seja, delimitamos o constructo «si» não no seu início mas no seu limite, isto é, não pretendemos demonstrar o que é o «si» mas sim qual é o limite do que se poderá tematizar como «si». Keywords: «self»; phenomenology; psychoanalysis; hermeneutics; symbolic of evil; psychopathy Our doctoral research intends to articulate the hermeneutic phenomenology of Ricoeur, and (inherently) Husserl with the psychoanalysis of Freud and Lacan, in order to assess which are the contributions of these two areas of knowledge to identify the category, not yet thematized, of the «self». In our view, Ricoeur’s thematization, namely the «oneself», the «selfhood», the «full cogito» (inter-alia) constitutes an epistemological approach to the «self». We will argue, in filigree, and at the end of our reflection, that the «topology» formulated by Lacan is also a ‘grammar’ that approaches the «self». The thesis is divided into two distinct but fully complementary parts: the first part is devoted to what we have entitled the ‘Theoretical and meta-theoretical prolegomena of the «self»’; the second part corresponds to the hypothesis that we infer from the first part, which we call ‘Theoretical hypothesis of the «self»’, in which the «symbolic of evil» is problematized through a phenomenological analysis formulated by Ricoeur, which will enable a psychoanalytic solution (Freud and Lacan) to the dead-ends of the «symbolic of evil». This solution will be presented, in filigree, through the ‘field investigation’ of two psychopaths; inherently, the «law-of-the-father» of Lacan illustrates the topological delimitation of the «self», which translates our reflection in its final argument, meaning, we delimit the «self» not at its beginning but in its limit, i.e., we don’t intend to demonstrate what the «self» is; we intend to clarify what is the limit of what we can thematize as a «self». 5 ÍNDICE Introdução ……………………………………………………………...……... 7-8 Capítulo I: O «si» em Ricoeur: uma tentativa de tematização …………………..………... 9-60 Capítulo II: Prolegómenos teóricos do «si»: a dialógica fenomenologia<>psicanálise …… 61-120 Capítulo III: Prolegómenos meta-teóricos: a arqueologia do «si» em Ricoeur e Freud …...... 121-165 Capítulo IV: Hipótese teórica do «si»: a escatologia do «si» maligno em Ricoeur e Lacan ... 166-193 Conclusão …………………………………………………………………….. 194-199 Bibliografia …………………………………………………………………… 200-228 6 Introdução A nossa investigação doutoral consiste em perscrutar a natureza escondida do cogito ilustrando a relação entre sujeito e objecto tematizada por Ricoeur, a qual constituirá o desnudamento/«desbravamento» [Durchbruch] fenomenológico do cogito: uma «redução» fenomenológica que permite surpreender o topos psicanalítico e o logos fenomenológico. A nossa reflexão consiste em articular a fenomenologia hermenêutica de Ricoeur, e (por inerência) Husserl com a psicanálise de Freud e Lacan, a fim de aferir quais as contribuições destas duas áreas do saber para a identificação da categoria, ainda não tematizada, do «si»1. Na nossa perspectiva a tematização de Ricoeur, a saber, o «si- mesmo», a «ipseidade», o «cogito integral» (entre outros constructos) constituem aproximações epistemológicas à categoria do «si». Tentaremos demonstrar, em filigrana, e no final da nossa reflexão, que a «topologia» formulada por Lacan constitui igualmente uma ‘gramática’ de aproximação à categoria do «si». Esta «apresentação» da reflexão lacaniana procura, em concreto, delimitar (topologicamente) a categoria do «si» (a qual é inerente à temática psicanalítica por nós aqui desenvolvida), enquanto a análise detalhada que aqui efectuamos de Ricoeur reveste a dinâmica filosófica já tematizada. A Tese está dividida em duas partes distintas mas absolutamente complementares, porquanto a primeira permite o edificar da segunda, a saber: a primeira parte é dedicada ao que intitulamos de ‘Prolegómenos teóricos e meta-teóricos do «si»’ (Capítulos II e III); a segunda parte corresponde à hipótese que extraímos justamente da primeira parte, a qual denominamos de ‘Hipótese teórica do «si»’ (Capítulo IV), na qual a «simbólica do mal» é problematizada através da análise fenomenológica formulada por Ricoeur, a qual irá permitir uma solução psicanalítica (Freud e Lacan) para as aporias da «simbólica do mal». Esta solução irá ser apresentada, em filigrana, através da ‘investigação de campo’, efectuada por nós, de dois psicopatas; por inerência, a «lei-do-pai» de Lacan reveste a delimitação topológica do «si» maligno, a qual traduz a nossa reflexão no seu argumento final, ou seja, delimitamos o constructo de «si» não no seu início mas no seu limite (esta dinâmica não é de todo linear, porquanto partimos da concepção ricoeuriana da «escatologia da consciência como uma repetição criadora da sua arqueologia»), daí a expressão que 1Todas as vezes que nos referimos à categoria (ainda não tematizada) do «si» iremos, no corpo do texto e notas, substantivá-la exactamente desta forma: «si». 7 utilizamos: delimitação do «si», ou seja, não pretendemos demonstrar o que é o «si» mas sim qual é o limite do que se poderá tematizar como «si». Com efeito, nesta investigação Ricoeur, Husserl, Freud e Lacan serão os principais autores trabalhados, os quais desdobram o embrião epistemológico no que concerne à dialógica fenomenologia<>psicanálise; «dia-logos», no(s) qual(is) o logos da linguagem e o locus do corpo revestem a relação sujeito-objecto que desenvolveremos em detalhe: um desnudamento/«desbravamento» [Durchbruch] fenomenológico do cogito, porquanto o logos fenomenológico e o topos psicanalítico revestem a ossatura epistemológica que constitui o ponto de Arquimedes para a nossa reflexão, a qual edificará, em pormenor, o diálogo supra-referido: fenomenologia<>psicanálise; dialógica que pretende ilustrar a dinâmica subjacente à categoria do «si», a qual, apesar de se constituir como uma problemática transdisciplinar, padece ainda de ambiguidades várias que inibem a sua efectiva tematização. A nossa investigação pretende contribuir para que a tematização do constructo «si» se concretize. 8 Capítulo I O «si» em Ricoeur: uma tentativa de tematização A estrutura ontológica e simbólica da compreensão do «si» [soi] representa o horizonte fundamental de toda a obra de Ricoeur2, mas apenas nas conclusões de Tempo e Narrativa é possível surpreender o propósito explícito de constituir uma hermenêutica da ipseidade3. Apesar da permanente reflexão ricoeuriana sobre a natureza do cogito, encontrava-se (até à obra agora referida), no entanto, ausente uma tematização da diferença capital que separa o conceito universal de subjectividade – mesmo que assumido enquanto
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