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How to cite this thesis

Surname, Initial(s). (2012) Title of the thesis or dissertation. PhD. (Chemistry)/ M.Sc. (Physics)/ M.A. (Philosophy)/M.Com. (Finance) etc. [Unpublished]: University of Johannesburg. Retrieved from: https://ujcontent.uj.ac.za/vital/access/manager/Index?site_name=Research%20Output (Accessed: Date).

THE NATIONALIST DISCOURSES OF AN AFRICAN RULING PARTY: AN EXPLORATION OF ZANU-PF PRINT MEDIA ELECTION ADVERTISEMENTS FOR THE JULY 2013 ELECTIONS

Albert Chibuwe (201335899)

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of D’Litt et Phil in Communication Studies.

In the Faculty of Humanities

at the

University of Johannesburg

Supervisor: Prof. Colin Chasi

Co-supervisor: Prof. Nathalie Hyde-Clarke

Submission Date:

ABSTRACT

Post-2000 Zimbabwe has been characterised by massive political contestations mainly between the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The struggle for power has oftentimes been nasty and brutal. ZANU-PF largely accuses the MDC of being ‘puppets’ of the British and Americans whilst MDC accuses ZANU-PF of ‘dictatorship’. This rivalry has largely been more pronounced during election periods where it takes place through, among others, political advertisements, music and election rallies. Despite the centrality of political advertising in this contest, there has been little study of political advertising in Zimbabwe. Many of the studies of Zimbabwean elections and ZANU-PF discourse focused on media coverage of elections, official speeches, music and alleged use of violence by ZANU-PF to retain power. But these studies of ZANU-PF discourse have tended to either be uncritically pro-ZANU-PF or anti-ZANU-PF (Moore, 2012). This is a result of scholars’ abysmal and inappropriate application of Western theory in African contexts. It is equally a result of post-colonial theory’s re-inscription of that which it seeks to undo. The study proposes utilising a multi-theoretical approach that borrows from Western theory, post-colonial theory and decolonial theory in the study ZANU-PF advertisements. It employs thematic analysis, critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis. The study found out that ZANU-PF discourse is fluid and context-specific; borrows from the present, past and future and is not always about the liberation struggle. It also established that ZANU-PF only engaged the MDC-T and ignored smaller parties and refrained from attack advertising. Finally, Robert Mugabe, the ZANU-PF leader and presidential candidate, was a key component of ZANU-PF’s electoral product. Interestingly, from the findings, the study concludes that; the predominance of Mugabe’s images is not a sign of the personalisation and patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean politics; comparative advertising and negative advertising are central political advertising tactics in post-colonial contexts such as Zimbabwe as much as in established democracies. The study, some of whose sections have already been published (see Chibuwe 2013), suggests the need for a new theory in the reading of the ZANU-PF discourse.

DECLARATION I, Albert Chibuwe (201335899), declare that this dissertation is my original work and has not been previously submitted to any other university.

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DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Mildred Sibonile Konke and daughter, Tinotenda Thabiso Chibuwe.

For my brothers and sisters, the two people who gave birth to me (my parents) and all the Chibuwes. This is for you, vana Chihwa!

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many thanks to the Almighty God without whose mercy nothing is possible.

I came to Egoli in search of knowledge. I saw. And many a time the task at hand looked insurmountable. I almost quit. But thanks to the patience and guidance of my supervisors, Prof. Colin Chasi and Prof. Nathalie Hyde-Clarke, today you are reading this document. I will forever be grateful to my supervisors without whose guidance this thesis would not have seen the light of day. Thank you! Prof Chasi; many a time when the going got tough the temptation to pack my bags threatened to get the better of me but you encouraged me to keep going. Thank you!

I would also like to thank my wife Mildred Sibonile and daughter Tinotenda Thabiso who bore the brunt of my study-induced absences and late home-comings. You are my pillars of strength.

My gratitude goes also to my parents who taught me the value of education from a tender age. This was the greatest inheritance you ever bequeathed me.

To my siblings – Ereck and his wife, amainini amai Anesu; Mike and his wife, amainini amai Primrose; Andrew and Cashington – I say thank you for making me feel at home when I first ventured into Egoli in search of knowledge at the University of Johannesburg. You guys gave me a soft landing such that whenever I was in Jozi, it was home away from home. Keep up the spirit my brothers and sisters-in-law. May the Almighty Lord bless you abundantly!

To my younger brother Patson, I say thank you for always holding the fort whenever I was away from home; and to my sisters Sencia and Linda and brother George (Baba Kiki), I say thanks for the moral support. It is most appreciated.

To my mzaya Darlington Chingosho and his wife amai Nashe, I say thank you vazaya for always giving me a roof over my head and logistical assistance on the several occasions I came to Harare for the visas and on many other occasions.

And to mukoma CK, I knew I could always count on you whenever I needed your assistance to make things happen during the course of my study. Thank you.

To my employers Midlands State University (MSU), I say thank you for granting me permission to study while retaining the job.

My sincere and heartfelt gratitude go to my colleagues in the Department of Media and Society Studies at MSU, especially Dr. Lyton ‘A’ Lakat’ Ncube and Oswelled Ureke who usually acted as my sounding boards and initial readers of my chapters before submitting them to my supervisors for marking. Your incisive comments were always invaluable. Thank you Cdes! Ngazvirambe zvakadaro!

Thank you to the chairperson of the Media and Society Studies department, Mr Mugari, for always granting me the permission to travel whenever study called. To my colleagues; Prof. Nhamo Mhiripiri, Mai Muromo, Mai Ndawana etc., thank you for the moral support and the critical reflections on Zimbabwe – you were always ready to share with me in many a conversation. To the rest of my colleagues in the department, I say thank you a lot, colleagues!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ...... iii DEDICATION...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... v CHAPTER ONE: THE NEED FOR POLITICAL...... 1 ADVERTISING RESEARCH IN ZIMBABWE ...... 1 1.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.2 POST-2000 ZIMBABWEAN POLITICAL CONTEXT...... 7 1.3 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION STUDIES ...... 11 1.4 LESSONS FROM ZIMBABWE POST-2000 ...... 14 1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ...... 16 1.6 CONCLUSION ...... 19 CHAPTER TWO: MEDIA AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN COLONIAL AND POST- COLONIAL ZIMBABWE – A LIBERAL, CRITICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POST- COLONIAL CRITIQUE...... 22 2.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 22 2.2 THE MEDIA, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND DEMOCRACY: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE ...... 23 2.3 THE MEDIA AS POLITICAL ACTORS: A CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL VIEW OF MEDIA’S ROLE IN DEMOCRACY ...... 31 2.4 THE MEDIA AS POLITICAL AND/OR IDEOLOGICAL TOOLS OF THE ELITE: A CRITIQUE ...... 36 2.5 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ZIMBABWEAN MEDIA: FROM COLONIAL TO POST-COLONIAL ...... 39 2.5.1 The pre-independence media ...... 39 2.5.2 The post-independence media: From 1980-1999...... 42 2.6 THE PRIVATE PRESS AND OPPOSITIONAL DISCOURSE; EMERGENCE OF MDC AND THE ENACTMENT OF DRACONIAN MEDIA AND SECURITY LAWS ...... 47 2.7 CONCLUSION ...... 50 CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS AN AFRICANTHEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 52 3.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 52 3.2 POLITICAL CONTESTATION AND DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE ...... 54 3.3 POLITICAL ADVERTISING THEORY ...... 58

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3.4 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND THE SYSTEM OF SIGNS IN WHICH IT IS LOCATED ...... 61 3.5 ON THE NEED FOR AN AFRICAN THEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ..... 74 3.6 ON POST-COLONIALITY AND DE-COLONIALITY: LESSONS FOR THE NEW THEORY OF AFRICAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION ...... 84 3.7 CONCLUSION ...... 88 CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY ...... 89 4.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 90 4.2 CASE FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH/INTERPRETIVISM ...... 90 4.3 SAMPLING THE ZANU-PF ELECTION ADVERTISEMENTS ...... 99 4.4 COLLECTING THE ADVERTISEMENTS FOR ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .... 103 4.5 USING THEMATIC ANALYSIS TO MAKE SENSE OF THE ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS: CONCEPTUAL NOTES ...... 105 4.5.1 Why augment thematic analysis ...... 111 4.5.2 Semiotic analysis as a supplementary method of analysis ...... 112 4.5.3 Critical discourse analysis as a supplementary method ...... 115 4.6 STEPS IN THEMATIC ANALYSIS TO MAKE SENSE OF THE ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS: PRACTICE NOTES ...... 120 4.6.1 Data Reduction and description ...... 122 4.6.2 Identifying emergent themes ...... 123 4.6.3 Analysis and Interpretation of themes/data ...... 125 4.6.4 Concluding Discussion ...... 126 4.7 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND ISSUES OF VALIDITY, OBJECTIVITY AND RELIABILITY ...... 126 4.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ...... 129 4.9 CONCLUSION ...... 129 CHAPTER FIVE: DESCRIPTION OF THE TEXTS ...... 131 5.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 131 5.2 ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS AND THEIR PLACEMENT IN THE SELECTED NEWSPAPERS ...... 134 5.2.1 Placement ...... 135 5.2.2 Frequency ...... 137 5.3 CLUSTER 1: SELLING THE MUGABE AND ZANU-PF BRANDS ...... 138

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5.3.1’ Our manifesto has excited everyone’ ...... 138 5.3.2 ‘Council Bills Cancelled’ ...... 142 5.3.3 29 January 2009-Multi-currency ...... 143 5.3.4 ‘We will compensate you’ ...... 145 5.3.5 ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’ ...... 146 5.3.6 ‘Gushungo 8’ ...... 149 5.4 CLUSTER 2: REGARDING NATIONALISM...... 150 5.4.1 ‘The people’s constitution’ ...... 151 5.4.2 ‘Lest we forget’ ...... 152 5.5 CLUSTER 3: ECONOMIC DEVLOPMENT AND INDIGENISATION ...... 156 5.5.1 How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment ...... 156 5.5.2 Previously discussed advertisements relevant to this cluster...... 158 5.6 CLUSTER 4: PEACE ...... 159 5.6.1 ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ ...... 159 5.7 HISTORICAL CONTENT ...... 162 5.8 CONCLUSION ...... 163 CHAPTER SIX: THEMES ...... 164 6.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 164 6.2 ‘BHORA MUGEDHI-IBHOLA EGEDINI’ (SCORE THE BALL) ...... 167 6.3 THE USE OF NATIONAL FLAG COLOURS IN ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS ...... 168 6.4 MDC-T THE MAJOR THREAT TO ZANU-PF’S RULE? ...... 168 6.5 NEW DISCOURSES AND TACTICS EMPLOYED BY ZANU-PF ...... 169 6.6 ZANU-PF, A CARING PEOPLE AND POLICY ORIENTED PARTY ...... 171 6.7 ZANU-PF AS PATRIOTS AND MDC-T AS PUPPETS OF WHITES AND HOMOSEXUALS ...... 174 6.8 MUGABE AN EXPERT IN STATE CRAFT AND ‘A GREAT MAN’ OF A ‘GOLDEN MIND 175 6.9 THANKING ZIMBABWEANS FOR A PEACEFUL VOTE: ZANU-PF’S PRE-EMPTIMVE STRIKE ON ITS CRITICS? ...... 177 6.10 CONCLUSION ...... 179 CHAPTER SEVEN: SYNTHESISED FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ...... 180 7.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 180

7.2 ZANU-PF’S MEDIA STRATEGY: DEBATING THE PLACEMENT OF ADVERTISEMENTS 182 7.3 MUGABE, AN INDIGENE AND A MAN OF UNPARALLED WISDOM AND EXPERTIESE IN STATECRAFT ...... 191 7.4 ZANU-PF, A CARING PEOPLE AND POLICY ORIENTED PARTY VERSUS A DISHONEST AND POLICY BANKRUPT MDC-T ...... 217 7.5 THANKING ZIMBABWEANS FOR A PEACEFUL VOTE: ZANU-PF’S PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE ON ITS CRITICS? ...... 223 7.6 INDIGENEITY, DIVINE RULE, PUPPETS, PATRIOTS AND HOMOSEXUALS ...... 233 7.7 ZANU-PF, AN ECONOMIC INDIGENISATION AND DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED PARTY 251 7.8 USE OF NATIONAL FLAG COLOURS: REBIRTH AND REVERBERATIONS OF PATRIOTISM AND INDIGENEITY (AGAIN!) ...... 259 7.9 ‘BHORA MUGEDHI-IBHOLA EGEDINI’ (SCORE THE BALL) ...... 267 7.10 VOTER SEGMENTATION, NEW TACTICS AND DISCOURSES EMPLOYED BY ZANU- PF ...... 276 7.11 CONCLUSION ...... 280 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION ...... 282 8.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 282 8.2 ZANU-PF DISCOURSE IMAGINES A HYBRID IDENTITY ...... 288 8.3 ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS AS SIMULATION ...... 295 8.4 DIFFERENCE AND CONTEXT IN ZANU-PF’S STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE ...... 297 8.5 DEMOCRACY, CULTURE AND RELIGION: STRANGE BED FELLOWS? ...... 299 8.6 IS A MULTIMODAL THEORY THE WAY TO GO IN STUDY OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ADVERTISING? ...... 300 8.7 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY ...... 303 REFERENCES ...... 304

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIPPA Access to Information & Protection of Privacy

ATR African Traditional Religion

BA Broadcasting Act

COPAC Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee

ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

GALZ Gays & Lesbians of Zimbabwe

GPA Global Political Agreement

IMF International Monetary Fund

OSA Official Secrets Act

JOMIC Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee

LOMA Law & Order Maintenance Act

MIC Media & Information Commission

MDC Movement for Democratic Change

PIPPA Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act

RBC Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation

RPPC Rhodesia Printing & Publishing Company

SADC South African Development Committee

SAP Structural Adjustment Programmes

UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union

ZBC Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation

ZMC Zimbabwe Media Commission

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CHAPTER ONE: THE NEED FOR POLITICAL

ADVERTISING RESEARCH IN ZIMBABWE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The study looks at the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front’s (ZANU-PF) nationalist discourse as enunciated in the party’s advertisements for the July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe. The advertisements that the study focuses on were created and circulated in a post-2000 Zimbabwean period that has become known as the crisis years. The period was characterised by intense political contestation mainly pitting the ruling ZANU-PF against the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The disputes were around issues of land reform, democracy, good governance, human rights, economic indigenisation, patriotism and national identity, among others (Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Mazango, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009). These issues became the sites around which the struggle for hegemony in Zimbabwe revolved. They became sites of ideological struggle. Furthermore, with the imposition of sanctions on the country by the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU), these internal clashes assumed an international and/or global dimension. These foreign powers argued that the ruling elite perpetuated their dominance through undemocratic means, such as enacting draconian laws, political violence, the fast-track land reform (seizure of white-owned farms) and vote rigging (Compagnon, 2000; Lindgren, 2003; Dorman, 2003 & 2006; Raftopoulous, 2004; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Meredith, 2011). Arguably, the sanctions worsened the country’s economic and political woes.

The worsening political and economic crisis created intense debate and interest in scholarship and the media, both local and global. However, this scholarship has largely been uncritically polarised into pro-regime scholarship and anti-regime scholarship (Moore, 2012). From the foregoing, it is arguable that the imagined community (Anderson, 1991) that is the Zimbabwe has been characterised by increased dissension during the post-2000 period (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The anti-imperialism discourse of post-2000,

1 or what some critics call patriotic history, patriotic journalism, music nationalism or political journalism (Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Waldahl, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Thram, 2006; Chuma, 2008) is a manifestation of the intensified struggle for state power. In this discourse, ZANU-PF’s labelling of opponents as sell-outs before and after 2000 (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Kriger, 2005), is evidence of the contested nature of the post-colonial Zimbabwean nation. In opposition, ZANU-PF regime critics rejected ZANU- PF’s nationalist discourse as patriotic history, character assassination and nativism and also as narrow and exclusionary (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Ranger, 2004; Chitando, 2005). The opposition MDC also criticised ZANU-PF as anti-democratic (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). This post-colonial Zimbabwean political rivalry is made more complicated by Zimbabwe’s colonial realities. As Shaw (1986, p. 380) observes, Zimbabwe is a colonial invention or ‘artefact’ whose ‘…continued existence as an enduring nation…is not guaranteed by mere international recognition of juridical statehood’ (Shaw, 1986, p. 380). From this position, it is arguable that there are a lot of internal contradictions, some of which are a legacy of colonialism, which the post-colonial state has to grapple with if it is to survive. The political advertisements produced in this complex and contested post-colonial setting are the focus of this study.

The study on the political discourses of ZANU-PF is premised on the assumption that, given this post-colonial reality, understanding Zimbabwean political advertising entails understanding the context and culture in which messages are produced and circulated. As Kaid (2012, p. 37) notes, ‘…the study of political advertising outside the United States must confront a plethora of contextual and cultural concerns [such as] differences in governmental structures, political party organisations, media systems, regulatory constraints and above all, language and culture’.

This thesis argues that neither Western theory nor post-colonial theory is adequate for understanding ZANU-PF discourses and political advertising. The criticisms are that the Zimbabwe regime’s critics simply turn celebratory regime scholarship upside down (Moore, 2012), whilst Afrocentrists simply present Africa as ‘Europe upside down’ (Appiah, 2010). This is confirmed as scholars have failed to find a negotiable way between Western theory and theory from the South when dealing with Africa (see Mbembe 2001).

It is argued that due to the inadequacy of existing theories from the West or from the South, there is an abiding need to come up with a new theory of post-colonial political communication in Africa. Zimbabwe is a useful case to look at for developing an African theoretical account that will necessarily borrow from both the West and the South. The theory which the study suggests presents political advertising as a key promotional tool in a democracy; this is a way through which political contestants communicate with voters, largely through the mass media (Kaid, 2012). It also presents political advertising as part and parcel of the post-colonial sign system and borrows insights from indigenous ways of knowing in its attempt to understand the ZANU-PF advertisements. Finally, the suggested theory also takes into account the context and cultural specifics of Zimbabwe and Africa.

By carefully analysing existing secondary literature, the study argues that studies that have focused on political communication practices in Zimbabwe were handicapped by the failure to find what Mbembe (2001) calls a negotiable way between theory from the West and theory from the South. For example, Chitando (2005), Kriger (2005), Ndlovu- Gatsheni (2003) and Ranger (2004 & 2005) all tend to focus more on the perceived anti- democratic tendencies of ZANU-PF. From this perspective, ZANU-PF’s attack advertising and its use of fear appeal were dismissed as undemocratic (Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005), whilst its anti-imperialism discourse was dismissed as bankrupt (Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003) or nativism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). In this academic discourse, Zimbabwe is characterised as a mirror image of the colonial (Moyo, 2004). This phenomenon of reducing the post-colony to a mere mirror image of the colonial is what Chipkin (2007) characterises as post-colonial essentialism. It is a phenomenon that characterises most studies of the Zimbabwean media’s role in political communication (Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999; Chuma, 2008; Moyo, 2004 & 2005; Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Waldahl, 2004 & 2005; Mazango, 2005). However, these studies were not situated in political advertising theory, sign theory or decolonial theory. The studies were also as polarised as the Zimbabwean society (Moore, 2012; Thram, 2006). In the light of the foregoing, the study further acknowledges that, in attempts to understand ZANU-PF’s political communication discourses, ‘…like most black African nations, the boundaries of Zimbabwe – indeed its very existence as a state, correspond to no pre-colonial reality’

(Shaw, 1986, p. 380). It is on the basis of the scholarly work on post-colonial Zimbabwe that the study argues for a new theory of Zimbabwean political communication. It is in this light that the scholarly background highlighted above forms part of the context in which post-colonial Zimbabwean political discourses have to be understood.

The study therefore calls for an approach that situates all political communication acts within political advertising theory, post-colonial theory, decolonial theory and sign theory, while also taking cognisance of the peculiarities of the post-colony that make it different from the typical Western neo-liberal democracy. It is an approach that acknowledges that in political contests attack advertising, comparative advertising and advocacy advertising are all legitimate (Jasperson & Fan, 2002; Pinkleton, Um & Austin, 2002; Kaid, 2012; Meirick, 2002; Waldahl, 2005; Lilleker, 2006). The approach further acknowledges that advertising also works through the ‘salience framework’, in which ‘advertising works by standing out by being radically different from all other advertisements in the product class…’ (Strydom, Jooste & Cant, 2000, p. 357; see Sandicki, n.d). In addition to the above, the study acknowledges that fear appeal is the ultimate mobilisation tool for the status quo, even in Western democracies (Zizek, 2007). The study thus dismisses the argument that ZANU-PF’s threatening messages or ‘character assassination’ of opposition leaders (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005) is evidence of despotism. Instead, it argues that the sign is murderous or discriminatory (Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983). The sign and/or communication are war by other means (Sonderling, 2013, 2014). It is thus compelling to argue that political marketing, which is the general method of political communication (Maarek, 1995), is a civilised form of warfare (Jain, n.d). Political advertising is a key tool of political communication practice. Together with political branding, it is used to gain maximum positive differentiation over the competition (Downer, 2013; Porter, 1996; Jain, n.d) through negative advertising and comparative advertising, among other techniques. These advertising techniques are meant to sully the reputation of the opposition while positively branding the self. As Mazid (2008) aptly notes, dominance is justified through, among other techniques, employing the two complementary strategies of positive self-presentation (beautifying the self) and negative presentation of the opponent (uglifying the opponent) (Mazid, 2008).

The thesis argues that taking the above into cognisance in the analysis of ZANU-PF’s discourse undercuts the assertion that the post-2000 ZANU-PF discourse is divisive and undemocratic. The thesis is a call to a re-thinking of the study of African political communication, using a case study of ZANU-PF and the Mugabe regime’s political communication strategies. The study specifically focuses on ZANU-PF’s political advertising and/or discourses for the July 2013 elections in relation to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T). This thesis does not study ZANU-PF discourses in relation to the other smaller political parties, as ZANU-PF hardly pays attention to the smaller parties that emerge at election times, instead choosing to focus on the major threat to its hold on power; that is, MDC-T. Consistent with that tactic, ZANU-PF has rarely paid any attention to the smaller MDC-N faction and the now defunct MDC-99 faction, because they do not pose any threat. Post-2000, the party that has posed a serious threat to ZANU-PF’s stranglehold on power has been the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)1 (ZESN, 2002).

Apart from the above, it is also worth noting that political advertising in Zimbabwe is under- researched. Several scholars have studied ZANU-PF’s election strategies; for example, alleged use of violence, conflation of the party and state (Dorman, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Rotberg, 2000; Masunungure, 2004; Tafara, 2004; CCJP, 2009; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Meredith, 2011; Sklar, 1985), use of the land reform and food to buy votes, and constituency gerrymandering – that is, drawing up constituencies in a manner designed to favour one political party at the expense of the other(s) (Compagnon, 2000; Meredith, 2011; Lindgren, 2003; ZESN, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Dorman, 2006; Magaisa, 2008; Tarisayi, 2009, Masunugure, 2009). Others have studied the media’s coverage of elections and ZANU-PF’s cultural and music nationalism, patriotic history, and Mugabeism, among other discourses (see Ranger, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, 2003, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009; Chitando, 2005; Waldahl, 2005; Chuma, 2005,

1 The MDC split into two in 2005 and on the eve of the 2008 elections the bigger faction led by Tsvangirai adopted the prefix ‘T’ for Tsvangirai becoming MDC-T in a bid to distinguish itself from the other MDC which people popularly referred to as MDC-M after Mutambara and later MDC-N after Welshman Ncube who took over the party’s leadership from Mutambara Job Sikhala, a founding member of MDC, later broke away from MDC-N to launch his own MDC-99. The MDC-99 project crumbled and Sikhala is back in the Tsvangirai-led MDC. 5

2008; Kriger, 2005; Thram, 2006; Moyse, 2009). Of these works, only a few focused on political advertising but the scholarship is yet to be situated within political advertising theory (see Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005, Willems, 2004).

Uniquely, this study situates Zimbabwean advertisements, specifically ZANU-PF’s political advertisements, within sign theory, decolonial theory, post-colonial theory and political advertising theory. Political advertising is a key promotional tool in a democracy; a way in which political contestants communicate with voters, largely through the mass media (Kaid. 2012). Here, communication may be regarded as involving the interaction of parties in a process of exchange or as increasing ‘commonality or sharing’ of information where all act as encoders, interpreters and decoders (Schram, cited by Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 59; see also McQuail, 2010, p. 552). Political communication then appears as primarily concerned with the production and transmission of politically relevant message(s) from the creator(s) to the target audience (Graber, 2005). The study looks at ZANU-PF’s advertisements placed in paid-for space in Newsday, Daily News, The Patriot and The Standard during the July 2013 elections. It seeks to answer the following questions:

 To what extent are nationalistic discourses evident in the political advertisements?  In what ways, if any, does the ‘system of signs’ utilised in the advertisements express post-colonial Zimbabwean discourse?

The advertisements on which the study focuses are part of the ‘system of signs’ of post- colonial Zimbabwe, designed to maintain or to challenge the hegemony of the ZANU-PF elite. The study suggests and utilises a new multi-theoretical analysis that focuses on the signs, vocabulary and narratives produced (Mbembe, 2001), while understanding that ZANU-PF’s or its opponents’ (such as the MDC) advertisements are arguably part of what Chipkin (2007) calls the vulgar reproduction of sovereignty in the ‘absence of state power’. In doing this, the study holds that election advertisements should be regarded as tools of political communication. As a result, it is reasonable to think that African political

6 advertising should grapple with the view that attack advertising is as important as building up one’s credibility (see Waldahl, 2005) even though this is contrary to some scholars’ criticism of ZANU-PF’s name-calling of the MDC or its use of the fear appeal (see Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005). Failure to take note of the above fact results in researchers prematurely dismissing African political systems as mere reproductions of the violently repressive colonial state, without suggesting or establishing new theory about the political discourses that are in play and at stake. This study proposes the abandonment of post- colonial essentialism of post-colonial scholars who looked at the political discourses of ruling governments as evidence of their oppressive nature without grounding them in political advertising theory. The researcher also intends to show how the multi-theoretical approach proposed here – an approach that uses insights gleaned from Western theory (democracy, sign theory and political advertising theory), decolonial theory and post- colonial theory – can in significant ways challenge some of the abyssal analysis of ZANU- PF discourses, characteristic of post-2000 writings on Zimbabwe.The study thus seeks to suggest a new African theory of political communication.

1.2 POST-2000 ZIMBABWEAN POLITICAL CONTEXT

ZANU-PF has been in power since independence on 18 April 1980. However, the credibility of elections since then has been contested (Makumbe, 1990; Makumbe & Compagnon, 1996; Makumbe & Sithole, 1997; Compagnon 2000; Kriger, 2005; Dorman, 2005). For the elections to be credible they should be free and fair (see Dorman 2006; ZESN 2008) but ZANU-PF allegedly uses unorthox methods including violence to retain power (Masunungure 2004, 2008). The emergence of MDC in 1999 caused massive changes in the nature of political party contests in Zimbabwe (ZESN, 2008) that saw an escalation in election disputes. It was the first opposition in post-independence Zimbabwe to pose a real threat to ZANU-PF’s grip on power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; ZESN, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Moyo, 2005; Waldahl, 2005).

In response to this challenge, the ZANU-PF regime enacted a barrage of media and security laws, such as the Public Order Security Act (POSA), Interceptions of Communications Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and Criminal

Law (Codification and Reform) Act. These laws were dismissed by critics as designed to make it difficult for the MDC to win elections. Furthermore, since its formation, MDC has been castigated by ZANU-PF as agents of regime change and being Western imperialists’ puppets (Meredith, 2011; Ranger, 2005 & 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Kriger, 2005). ZANU-PF also resorted to nationalistic discourses of, among other things, equitable land redistribution and anti-imperialism in order to whip up anti-white and anti- British sentiments by raising the spectre of British re-colonisation (Mazango, 2005; Chuma, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Furthermore, ZANU-PF, in typical post-colonial African style, elevated their party leader to the position of a demigod who is to be worshipped for his role in the liberation struggle and in the defence of ‘the values of the liberation struggle’ and the country’s sovereignty (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). These discourses were circulated through the state-controlled media in the form of news, current affairs programmes and documentaries on radio and television, opinion pieces and editorials in newspapers and political advertisements, especially at election time (Ranger, 2005 & 2004; Mazango, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Chimedza, 2008). For example, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) news and ZANU-PF adverts continuously showed images of MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai receiving cash from white commercial farmers to support the former’s claim that Tsvangirai was an ‘imperialist stooge’ or a ‘teaboy’; The Sunday Mail and The Herald cartooned him serving tea to Tony Blair and George Bush. Furthermore, Tsvangirai was portrayed as a coward who had fled from the liberation war in Mozambique, was opposed to the land reform programme and had advocated for the imposition of economic sanctions on Zimbabwe by the USA and the EU. ZANU-PF was comparatively presented as a revolutionary party that has the interests of Zimbabweans at heart; a party dedicated to economically empowering the indigenous Zimbabweans, defending the sovereignty of the country and prepared to ‘fight until the last drop of blood’ to defend Zimbabwe’s national sovereignty and integrity.

The ZBC and the state-controlled national daily The Herald also sometimes reject opposition political parties’ paid-for advertisements (Chuma, 2008; Mazango, 2005). However, in other democracies, such as the USA, broadcasters may not place restrictions on political advertising content as long as they have a sponsor identification notice (Kaid,

2012). The opposition accused ZANU-PF of being dictatorial, whilst scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), among others, dismiss the regime’s version of nationalism as narrow and exclusionary and therefore bankrupt. It is apparent that the state media were used as ZANU-PF propaganda tools, a development that is contrary to scholars’ claims that the media should be a public platform and a watchdog of those in power (see Dorman, 2006; Windeck, n.d; Moyo, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Lilleker, 2006). On the other hand, the privately owned media were pro-MDC and were not even critical of their policies (Chuma, 2008; Moyo, 2005), such that in the end the media in Zimbabwe became an anti-democratic force (Mano, 2005). They became sites of ideological struggles between ZANU-PF and the MDC, and ZANU-PF and its alleged Western detractors. But for the purposes of this study, all the selected newspapers are privately-owned. The Daily News and Newsday are daily newspapers, whilst The Patriot and The Standard are weekly newspapers. Of these newspapers, The Standard and Newsday are owned by Trevor Ncube’s Alpha Media Holdings (AMH), and the Daily News is owned by Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ). These three publications are anti-ZANU-PF and pro- opposition (see Chuma, 2005, 2008; Moyo, 2005; Chari, 2008, Nyamanhindi, 2008). The Patriot is owned by the pro-ZANU-PF Heritage Trust and is pro-ZANU-PF and anti- opposition. Neither ZANU-PF nor the opposition placed advertisements in the state media during the July 2013 elections. These private media are still nevertheless sites for ideological struggle in post-2000 Zimbabwe as shown by the confrontational private press-state relations during this era (Chuma, 2005, 2008).

The struggle for power, at times nasty and brutal, culminated in the controversial June 27 2008 election run-off from which MDC-T’s Tsvangirai withdrew citing violence against his supporters, perpetrated by ZANU-PF and the government security forces (CCJP, 2009; Masunungure, 2009; Moyse, 2009; Meredith, 2011). The presidential run-off election was called after Tsvangirai defeated Mugabe in the 29 March 2008 presidential election, but he failed to garner 50 plus one percent of the vote to ascend to the Presidency (Meredith, 2011; Masunungure, 2009; CCJP, 2009; ZESN, 2008). The rejection of the presidential run-off election result by the international community led to a SADC brokered power- sharing deal signed in September 2008 by MDC-T, MDC and ZANU-PF. The Government of National Unity (GNU) was sworn-in in February 2009, but it was characterised by

9 disagreements over issues such as the drafting of a new constitution, media, security sector and electoral reforms that were to pave the way for democracy and the holding of free and fair elections.

It is in this context that the 31 July 2013 elections – where voters simultaneously selected the president, members of parliament, senators and councillors – were held. The study looks at the ZANU-PF advertisements for the July 2013 elections produced in the context sketched above. Furthermore, it is in this context, characterised by disagreements between ZANU-PF and the MDC and its alleged Western backers, especially the United States of America and Britain, who imposed sanctions on the Zimbabwe, that lots of books and research articles on the Zimbabwe crisis were authored (cf. Scholz, 2004; Kriger, 2005, Ranger, 2005 & 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Masunungure, 2009). It is these writings that have been largely characterised by post-colonial essentialism. The aftermath of the 29 March 2008 harmonised elections, the 27 June 2008 and the 31 July 2013 elections, provides a glaring example of how advertising is a neglected area of study, not only in Zimbabwe but also in Africa. The major talking points for critics and academia were largely centred on media freedom – vote buying, vote rigging, constituency gerrymandering, torture and intimidation, among other things – while political advertising was only mentioned in relation to the rejection of MDC adverts by the state broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) (cf. Meredith, 2011; Moyse, 2009; Masunungure, 2009; CCJP, 2009; Magaisa, 2008; ZESN, 2008; MMPZ, 2002; MISA, 2002). The same is true of the aftermath of the 2013 elections which was characterised by allegations of vote rigging against ZANU-PF by the opposition parties, especially the Morgan Tsvangirai-led MDC-T. Again, nobody seems to be interested in the political parties’ political advertising tactics and messages. Rather than focusing on the political communication of the key contestants in African elections, emphasis (even in scholarship) has largely been on whether the electoral process was free and fair. This can be viewed as a result of the inherent suspicions amongst opposition political parties, donor agencies and Western countries that elections in Africa are almost always not free and fair, as shown by their demands to observe the elections. As a result, political communication, particularly political advertising, has not been widely researched despite its centrality in

10 democracy. As Kaid (2012, p. 30) notes, ‘democracy and electoral politics…have [always] provided a need for political promotion’ or political communication. By focusing on political advertising in Zimbabwe rather than focusing solely on the free and fairness of elections in the country in particular and the continent at large, and how they are allegedly rigged by the sitting governments, the study is an attempt to address the glaring gap in scholarship on political advertising. The study proposes a multi-modal approach to interpreting African political advertising, an approach that takes into account political advertising theory and the specific context in which political advertising takes place. It is an approach that borrows insights from Western theory and theory from the South. It borrows from such theories as political advertising theory, sign theory, post-colonial theory and decolonial theory.

The study’s proposed theoretical approach, which is in effect one of the study’s contributions to knowledge, has already been acknowledged through the publication of sections of the thesis (see Chibuwe 2013).

1.3 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION STUDIES

The study argues that a look at political advertising in post-colonial Zimbabwe where ‘a specific system of signs’ is at play, ‘a particular way of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes’ is at stake (Mbembe, 2001, p. 102) may shed light on the need for a new Africa-specific theory of political communication (see Chibuwe 2013). Simulacra/simulacrum is a sign/image without an original/referent outside of itself, a hyperreal (Baudrillard, 1994). It is a result of simulation where the ‘liquidated referentials are resurrected artificially in the system of signs’ (Baudrillard, 1994, pp. 1-2). The study of the signs, vocabulary and narratives produced in the complex system of signs or official discourses which rulers create, institutionalise, make real, commonsensical – the system which they seek to embed and integrate into the consciousness of the period to hoodwink voters (Mbembe, 2001) – should be holistic and context-specific.

The post-colonial ‘system of signs’ is characterised by an anti-imperialism (anti-Western domination) discourse. This system is founded on the fact that nationalists at

11 independence were positioned as people who wanted to address the colonial wrongs of exclusion and alien rule through ‘de-racialisation internally and anti-imperialism externally’ (Mamdani, 1996). Thus, for example, in the post-colony, national leaders may also demand black empowerment and transfer of foreign-owned companies into the hands of the indigenous elite (Fanon, 1963). In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF adopted economic indigenisation policies epitomised by the transfer of land and foreign owned companies into the hands of the indigenous people. This drive was captured by their election slogan in 2000; ‘land is the economy - economy is the land’ (Mazango, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). However, scholars’ rejection of the ZANU-PF’s ‘system of signs’ such as the anti- imperialism discourse (see Kriger, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2010; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Chitando, 2005; Ranger, 2004 & 2005) shows that the system of signs is contested. These symbolic and political struggles in Zimbabwe intensified, post- 2000, largely due to the emergence of a strong opposition party, the MDC, in September 1999 (see Mazango, 2005; Moyo, 2005; Waldahl, 2005; ZESN, 2008).

This study focuses on a case study of specific discourses of the ZANU-PF print media campaign for the July 2013 elections. The study asks questions concerning political advertising tactics and discourses used in the context in which the advertisements were produced and circulated. Grounded in political advertising theory, decolonial theory, post- colonial theory and sign theory, while also taking note of the complexity of the post-colony, the study of ZANU-PF political advertisements may shed new insights into African political marketing and political communication practices.

It is understood that political marketing, the general method of political communication, is used for image building, branding and election campaigns (Maarek, 1995; Menon, 2008). It involves the expansion of marketing concepts into politics in ways that can enable people to make sense of modern democratic practices (Henneberg, 2004). Political advertisements are a key tool of political communication in a democracy used by the contestants in an election to inform and educate the electorate on their offers (see Kaid, 2012). This is because democracy and electoral politics require political promotion or the engineering/manufacturing of consent (see Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Kaid, 2012;

Lilleker, 2006; Bernays, 1947). For democracy involves people participating in governing themselves by freely choosing their leaders through free and fair elections (Eribo & Jong- Ebot, 1997; Ake, 2000; Hague & Harrop, 2004; Chipkin, 2007). It guarantees freedom of expression, information and association. Furthermore, all citizens of a legal age have a right to vote and to oppose the government or to run for elections (Chipkin, 2007). The citizens can only choose their leaders if information about the election contestants and their offers is freely made available. Political advertising should provide useful information to allow citizens to debate and deliberate their choices. Furthermore, in such a democratic scenario, no restriction on content must be placed on political advertising that has been purchased by the sponsoring person or party as long as it has the sponsor identification notice (see Kaid, 2012). The public sphere, the arena of public debate, should be free from both political and commercial constraints and should be characterised by rational debate (see Habermas, 1989; Curran, 2000; Gripsrud, 2002; McChesney, 1999). Whereas study of the role of the media in elections in Zimbabwe has shown that the state media are ZANU-PF propaganda tools (they even reject paid-for MDC advertisements), while the private media are pro-opposition (see Makumbe & Compagnon, 1996; MISA, 2002; Ranger, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Waldahl, 2004 & 2005; Chuma, 2008; Moyse, 2009), not much has been written about political advertising in particular in the country. Much of the writings have been on national identity, music and/or cultural nationalism, patriotic history, patriotic journalism and political journalism in post-2000 Zimbabwe (Thram, 2006; Chitando, 2005; Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009). But these have tended to rely more on Western theory and their work suffers from post- colonial essentialism. So it is important that, as already noted, this study argues that the study of post-colonial political advertising in Zimbabwe and Africa needs to produce context-specific theory. This study suggests such a theory.

The idealised function of political advertisements which is outlined above is in contrast with the way in which so-called Western democracy today finds itself in ‘the age of manufactured images’ as political advertisers are ‘image makers’ who attempt to win votes through manipulation of images and not through the substance of their offers (Newman in Falkowski & Cwalina, 2012, p.10). At the same time, political advertising is

13 becoming more like propaganda and commercial advertising which sell images only and not the product (Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001; Newman, cited by Falkowski & Cwalina, 2012). Part of the shift is arguably a result of the professionalisation of political communication, where professional marketers play a dominant role in political communication (Venu, 2008; Blumler & Gurevitch, 2007; Neveu, 2004; Norris, 2000; Novotny, 2000). Whatever the case, Baudrillard (1994, p. 88) argues from a post- modernist/post-structuralist point of view, ‘there is no longer any difference between the economic and the political, because the same language reigns in both…a society therefore where the political economy… is finally realised’. Yet, as Harris and McGrath (2012, p. 5) note, ‘Political exchanges are certainly different from commercial exchanges...but there are parallels’. The blurring of distinctions makes political advertising complex and contested as political products are produced as signs and signs are produced as political products. It becomes even more complex in a post-colonial setting where the post-colony, as Shaw (1986) observes, is an artefact without any link to pre-colonial reality. It is an artefact that is itself characterised by disagreements of a different nature from those that characterise the Western liberal state (see Kaid, 2012). In light of the foregoing, the study argues that any study of political communication in Africa should take into cognisance the complexities of the sign; this blurring of distinction between the political and the commercial where the political economy of the sign reigns supreme (see Baudrillard, 1994; Chibuwe 2013).

1.4 LESSONS FROM ZIMBABWE POST-2000

This study argues that it is worth studying ZANU-PF’s advertisements in post-2000 Zimbabwe to understand how ZANU-PF uses them as tools in a complex political play of signs (see Booysen, 2003; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2003; Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Mano, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009; Mugabe, 2013). As in any study which seeks to understand the uses and meanings of signs, it is worth paying attention to the context. In this case it is worth noting, for example, that Zimbabwe, like all nations, is an imagined community whose identity is contested (Anderson, 1991; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009) as shown by the dismissal of ZANU-PF’s nationalism discourse as bankrupt or as ‘the last refuge of a scoundrel’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, 2009; Ranger, 2005). It is argued

14 that the discourse is blind to the process of globalisation and is narrow and exclusionary (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, 2009). In contrast, the regime claims to be patriotic and democratic as it defends ‘our’ sovereignty and holds ‘free and fair elections’ regularly (see Booysen, 2003; Mazaranye, 2012). It further argues that democracy is a tool for Western re-colonisation and the West cannot lecture ‘us’ on democracy since they were ‘our’ oppressors (see Mazaranye, 2012; Herald Reporter, 2013). The foregoing exposes the complexity of ZANU-PF’s discourses. The alterity of the signs that are being investigated calls for a synthesis of theory or explosion and implosion of theory (see Kellner, 1995; Baudrillard, 1991) to the study of ZANU-PF election advertisements. In light of this alterity of the sign, the study suggests a new theory of African political communication that appreciates the peculiarities and complexity of African states which cannot be theorised in the same way as Western states.

From the approach proposed here, it is important that those who study political communication in post-colonial Zimbabwe take into account the choices of signs taken up in political advertisements. The study seeks to understand how these are designed to advance certain ideologies and how these ideologies function through various discourses. Understanding what discourse are and how they function entails focusing on relations of knowledge and power that emerge in a context (Foucault 1980). In this light, the study focuses on questions concerning the manner in which elites discursively claim the power to structure meaning in society, to define and distinguish right from wrong and how discourse is used in the service of the powerful. For example, in the case of Zimbabwe, studies of political communication should understand how ZANU-PF claims that only its supporters are Zimbabweans and patriots, the rest are sell-outs and Western imperialists’ puppets (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, p. 93). Furthermore, the study grapples with how such discourses are located, contested and take place through political advertising. For, as Fairclough (1995) states, discourse is a site for both ideological and linguistic processes where selection of words or pictures in a text is not innocent; it is ideological. Discourse also focuses ‘...on forms of representation in which different social categories, practices and relations are constructed from and in the interests of a particular point of view, a particular conception of social reality’ (Deacon, Pickering, Golding & Murdock, 2007, p.151). Understanding discourses at work in political advertising in Zimbabwe may shed

15 light on the hegemonic struggle, the struggle for rule by consent which, as Fiske (1992) argues, must be won and re-won. Discourse works through, among others, what Deacon et al. (2007) call re-lexicalisation and over-lexicalisation in which something or someone is renamed and situations in which certain words are continually repeated. It also works through de-limited appropriation and/or appropriation of discourse (Tomaselli, 1992; Mbembe, 2001). Political advertising manipulates (plays around with) discourse and signs in complex ways that result in complex and constantly shifting meanings leading to what Baudrillard (1994) calls a political economy of sign theory where products are produced as signs and signs are produced as products. The study hopes that such an analysis will shed light on how political advertising is used in the imagined community that is Zimbabwe (Anderson, 1991; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009), when the significance, meaning and centrality of so many things are shifting and changing constantly. This stands in contrast with how scholars (Scholz, 2004; Masunungure, 2004; Kaelemu, 2004; Tafara, 2004) have failed to acknowledge the complexity of Zimbabwe and have succumbed to forms of post- colonial essentialism, which as Chipkin (2007) understands the construct, present post- independence states as mere reproductions of the colonial state. The same approach that this study proposes may also be used in other African contexts.

The approach proposed here holds that if political communication in Zimbabwe is to be theorised in ways that better reflect everyday experiences and realities of Zimbabweans, it is vital that theorists reject the post-colonial essentialism of existing literature that focuses on ZANU-PF’s power retention strategies (see Lindgren, 2003; Dorman, 2003; Booysen, 2003; Masunungure, 2004; Scholz, 2004; Kaulemu, 2004; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005). Mindful of the inadequacies of previous studies, the study utilises a synthesis of theory that encompasses political advertising theory, post-coloniality, decolonial theory and sign theory in the study of ZANU-PF’s election advertisements. The approach may yield newer and richer data on political advertising, political communication and ZANU-PF discourses in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

 Chapter One-The need for political advertising research in Zimbabwe

This is the introductory chapter and it discusses the need for the study of political advertising in Zimbabwe. It explores how scholarship has tended to largely focus on alleged unorthodox ZANU PF power retention strategies such as violence and constituency gerrymandering whilst neglecting the study of political advertising. It also motivates for the need for a new approach to reading ZANU PF advertisements by arguing that existing scholarship is handicapped by the failure to find a middle of the road approach between western theory and theory from the south.

 Chapter Two-Media and political communication in colonial and post- colonial Zimbabwe-A Liberal, critical political economy and post-colonial critique This chapter discusses the regulations, origins, ownership and control patterns of the Zimbabwean media during colonial and post-colonial times and their impacts on media operations. It seeks to explore how ownership and control patterns of Zimbabwean media influence the practice and execution of [newspaper] political advertising in the country especially during the July 2013 elections. It discusses the possible link between editorial content and the placement or non-placement of advertisements in certain media houses. The chapter further argues that understanding the media context and its legal framework is significant to the full understanding of the ZANU PF advertisements.  Chapter Three- Towards an African theory of political communication The chapter suggests a new multi-theoretical approach to reading ZANU PF discourse. It simultaneously discusses the weaknesses associated with western theory, post-colonial and decolonial theory whilst demonstrating how a combination of insights gleaned from the same theories can generate newer insights in the study of ZANU PF discourse. The chapter argues that used independent of each other the theories do not lead to a full and measured understanding of ZANU PF advertisements. It explores the ways in which the proposed multi-theoretical approach can overcome; the western theory and post-

colonial theory’s abyssal (mis)reading of African phenomenon and; the simplistic celebratory tendencies of some decolonial scholarship. The chapter presents evidence that suggests a need for, and suggests, a new approach to reading ZANU PF discourse.  Chapter Four- Methodology The fourth chapter presents the study’s methodology. It discusses qualitative research specifically interpretivism and how my interest in understanding the meanings of ZANU PF advertisements influenced the selection of this research approach. It also discusses issues to do with archival research - the method of data gathering that I utilised. The chapter argues for the use of thematic analysis and the need for it to be augmented by semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis in the study of ZANU PF advertisements. It explains how I went about the process of thematic analysis, critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis. Finally, the chapter discusses ethical issues in the conducting of this study and issues to do with validity, objectivity and reliability in qualitative research.  Chapter Five- Description of texts The fifth chapter presents and describes the coded data. The chapter largely uses pre-identified thematic distinctions to code the data. In the coding process interpretation is kept to a minimum. The chapter also explains how, in the process of coding the data, semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis were used to identify which words, pictures or colours and/or discourse are similar to which pre- identified or emergent thematic distinction or category.  Chapter Six- Themes This chapter discusses how thematic distinctions emerging from data or emergent themes were used to code data in the study. It explains how the themes in the ZANU PF advertisements were identified on the basis of similarities, differences, odd things and novel things.

 Chapter Seven-Synthesed findings and analysis This chapter presents an analysis and interpretation of both the pre-identified and the emergent themes presented in Chapters Five and Six. The themes presented

and discussed in this chapter show the meanings of ZANU-PF election advertisements for July 2013. The chapter explains how the analysis involves theoretical interpretation, and researcher’s personal understanding. It also discusses how the analysis and interpretation includes a discussion of the study’s results in the context of literature reviewed (Anderson, 2010) and the research questions. The chapter combines analysis and interpretation of data with discussion of findings.  Chapter Eight-Conclusion This is the thesis’ last chapter and it presents the study’s concluding discussion. It presents the study’s conclusions; conclusions that are drawn from the analysis, interpretation and discussion of the themes and categories identified in Chapters six and seven. It also discusses the continuities and discontinuities in the ZANU- PF discourses. The chapter also examines the study’s contributions to existing literature and its strengths and weaknesses. It also discusses the study’s transferability to other settings whilst reflecting on researcher influence on the data (Anderson, 2010) and suggests areas for further research.

1.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has argued that political communication, specifically political advertising research, is lagging behind in Zimbabwe. It has also argued that those scholars who studied ZANU-PF, Mugabe and the government of Zimbabwe’s discourse have largely adopted an essentialist approach and the few that studied political advertisements failed to situate them within political advertising theory and/or sign theory (Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005). This failure by the scholars to situate their studies in political advertising theory, sign theory or decolonial theory led them to criticise ZANU-PF tactics, such as attack advertising, that are fairly legitimate from a political communication perspective (cf. Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon & Valentino, 1994; Pinkleton et al., 2002). Apart from the above, the critics also did not give due regard to the context in which the advertisements, the jingles, the music, the history and the journalism were produced and the utterances

19 made (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Ranger, 2004). The critics also simply dismissed the ruling ZANU-PF’s discourses as evidence of its undemocratic nature and its failing hegemony (Chimedza, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Ranger, 2004). However, these critics largely treated ZANU-PF and the regime’s discourses as evidence of, and as designed to conceal, a repressive system; consequently they viewed the discourses as propaganda (cf. Chitando, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Kriger, 2005; Ranger, 2004). These studies were not situated in political advertising theory and they did not take note of the complexities of political advertising, which according to Baudrillard (1994), is now more like commercial advertising. Political advertising, just like commercial advertising, now emphasises sign value rather than product utility value.

Political advertising in Africa is, just as Newman in Falkowski & Cwalina (2012) says about political advertising in the West now in ‘the age of manufactured images’. Furthermore, African political advertising takes place in a post-colonial context characterised by contestations. In Zimbabwe, these clashes have been more pronounced in the post-2000 period (cf. ZESN, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Moyo, 2005). In other words, the post-colonial system of signs is characterised by disagreements because it is ‘an imagined community’ just like any other nation (see Anderson, 1991). Moreover, the post-colony is what Shaw (1986) calls an artefact with no link to any pre-colonial reality and this makes it different from the Western state. In addition, the continent’s developmental and political challenges, coupled with its problematic relationship with the West, makes the ‘imagined community’ even more contested.

In light of the foregoing the chapter argues that new ways of studying political communication in Africa are needed. It argues that study of political communication in Zimbabwe can be a useful exercise for those interested in suggesting or producing capacious new theory on the genre of political advertising and advertising in post-colonial settings, shedding new insights on the nation building project in post-colonial Africa.

The next chapter presents a neo-liberal, post-colonial and critical political economy critique of the Zimbabwean media. The aim of the endeavour is to give clarity on how

20 ownership and control patterns of Zimbabwean media influence the practice and execution of [newspaper] political advertising in the country especially during the July 2013 elections.

CHAPTER TWO: MEDIA AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL ZIMBABWE – A LIBERAL, CRITICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POST-COLONIAL CRITIQUE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a critique of the mass media in Zimbabwe. It explores regulations, origins, ownership and control patterns of the media during colonial and post-colonial times in Zimbabwe and their impacts on media operations. The aim of the chapter is to give clarity on how ownership and control patterns of Zimbabwean media influence the practice and execution of [newspaper] political advertising in the country especially during the July 2013 elections. It seeks to explore the link between editorial content and the placement or non-placement of advertisements in certain media houses. This endeavour intends to expose how some Western ‘truths’ regarding relationships between media and the practice of political advertising may not be true in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Understanding the media terrain and its attendant legal framework is one of the contextual and cultural concerns that the study of political communication in a non-Western country such as Zimbabwe has to grapple with (Kaid, 2012). The practice of political communication is also subject to law and understanding these laws helps one to make sense of the ZANU-PF election advertisements. Laws regulate the sayable and the unsayable, the doable and the undoable in democratic political contestation.

The intention of the chapter is to explore the significance of media laws, of newspapers’ editorial content and of media practice generally for political advertising in Zimbabwe. It tries to theorise how this context bears on the meaning-laden practices of political advertisements and signs.

While there is a voluminous body of literature on the relationship between ownership and control of the media on the editorial content in state-controlled and private media in Zimbabwe (cf. Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999; Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Waldahl, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Moyo, 2005; Mano, 2005; Moyse, 2009), there is little on how funding, ownership, control and editorial content relate to the practice and execution of political

22 advertising in a post-colonial Zimbabwean setting. The scarce literature available on the subject just scratches the subject on the surface. For example, Willems (2004, p. 1768), in a study of the representation of land in the Zimbabwean press, fleetingly mentions how ‘ZANU-PF interestingly drew upon representations of the land question, as they appeared in the electronic or print media, in its parliamentary election campaign advertisements’. There is no attempt to critically engage with the ZANU-PF advertisements and examine them from a political advertising theory and/or a sign theory perspective.

But what is merely indicated from this scant scholarship is the state-controlled media’s tendency to sometimes reject opposition advertisements and ZANU-PF advertisements’ use of intimidation and attack advertising or character assassination of political opponents (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Chuma, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Moyse, 2009). Given this dearth in studies of ZANU-PF’s political advertising, the study seeks to explore ZANU-PF advertisements for July 2013 from a multi-theoretical perspective that encompasses decoloniality, political advertising theory, sign theory and post-colonial theory. But since the media system and its legal framework form part of the context of production and circulation of these advertisements, this chapter seeks to provide unique nuanced insights on how the legal framework, ownership and control of selected newspapers influence editorial content and the practice and execution of political advertising in the Zimbabwean media.

2.2 THE MEDIA, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND DEMOCRACY: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE

In the face of Western and local criticism of vote rigging, human rights abuse and dictatorship, the ZANU-PF government has always argued that it is democratic. It further argues that the West cannot lecture ‘us’ on democracy since they had to be militarily defeated in order for Zimbabwe to gain her independence. In the same context, critics of the regime (MMPZ, 2002; ZESN, 2002; Moyse, 2009) have always implied that media reform is a pre-requisite for Zimbabwe’s full democratisation. The assumption, from this liberal perspective, is that the media are central in the democratic project (Curran, 2000;

Lilleker, 2006). The media are not just important because they hold the elite to account or because they inform and educate the citizens in order to enable them to make informed political decisions (see Dorman, 2006; Windeck n.d). The media also present political parties and their candidates with the opportunity to present their offerings to the electorate through paid-for advertisements.

But since political advertisements are a key tool of political communication in a democracy used by contestants in an election to inform and educate the electorate on their offers (see Kaid, 2012), the media should ideally be a platform where advertisements by the various political parties and candidates in an election clash. It is implied that the nature of a country’s media system and its legal framework have a bearing on the practice of political advertising in any polity. It inevitably has a bearing on the discourses in the various advertisements placed in the various media. It is the same belief that influences government critics’ viewpoints regarding Zimbabwe’s media system and its role in the country’s democratic project.

The importance placed on media’s role in democracy by the opposition and civil society in Zimbabwe is evidenced by the insistence on media reform before elections during the Government of National Unity (GNU) era, 2009-2013. Media reforms were part of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that brought about the GNU in February 2009, following the disputed 2008 presidential elections. Article XIX of the GPA talks about how the parties to the GPA agreed to ensure freedom of expression and communication. It specifically talks about the need for state-controlled media to provide balanced and equal coverage to all political parties in the land and the need for government to re-register media organisations that had been shut down and to register new ones. It is arguable that, as per the requirements of the amended Electoral Act Chapter 2, p. 13, paid-for advertisements were also part of this arrangement to ensure ‘equal coverage’ of political parties. It is in this context that the Daily News, which was banned in 2003 (Moyo 2005), was re-registered in 2011. The opposition and civil society in Zimbabwe believe that the media play a significant role in the winning of governmental power as shown by their demands for media reform – however, this is arguable. The belief is that media are central in the engineering or manufacturing of consent (Bernays, 1947; Herman & Chomsky,

1988; Fiske, 1992). Failure to access the media, including placing advertisements, is believed to have negative impacts on a political party’s or candidate’s chances of winning an election (cf. ZESN, 2002; Moyse, 2009).

It has been argued that the media constitute the fourth estate after the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and should therefore be given adequate space to perform their role in society. As the fourth estate, the media keep the other three arms of government – the executive, legislature and judiciary – in check (Lilleker, 2006). In essence, the media act as a watchdog which serves to expose any misdeeds by government and government officials (Curran, 1996; Waldahl, 2005; Lilleker, 2006). From this liberal perspective, the media keep those in power under surveillance. But both in colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe the state-controlled media have been labelled a lapdog of the ruling elite (Windrich, 1981; Frederikse, 1982; Moyo, 2004; Chuma, 2008; Moyse, 2009), while the private media were labelled oppositional (Chuma, 2005 & 2008). The media in Zimbabwe post-2000 have been heavily polarised (Chuma, 2008; Chari, 2008) and this has traceable consequences on the practice of political advertising in the country. For example, in political advertising theory and political economy of the media theory, advertisers do not associate with media whose content is incompatible with their ideologies (Herman & Chomsky, 1998; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Menon, 2008). It is thus arguable that editorial content and a media’s readership have a bearing on the political advertisements that they carry or that are placed on its pages. However, whereas editorial content is supposed to be objective, fair and truthful advertisements placed in paid-for space are under no such obligation and ideally they are supposed to be accepted as long as they have a sponsor identification notice (Kaid, 2012). This democratic ideal may not obtain in a post-colonial African context where conditions are radically different from the neo-liberal Western context.

There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the Western neo-liberal view that the media are the anchor of democracy as they provide a platform for competing ideas to fight it out with the strongest idea(s) carrying the day, does not hold water in an African context. From this neo-liberal view, the media ‘act…as the communicator of political views [or as the distributor of political advertising] from all groups in a state…’ (Lilleker, 2006, p.

4). The media play a critical role in political communication as they are a platform through which politicians present their offerings to the electorate. They are central in the engineering of consent (Bernays, 1947). However, in Zimbabwe it has been argued that the state monopolises the media and denies the opposition access (see Magaisa, 2008; Moyse, 2009). The import of this is that Zimbabwe’s media system does not conform to the Western neo-liberal conceptions of media’s role in a democracy. From the foregoing, it can be argued that for civil society and the opposition, liberal democracy is seen as the ideal whilst ZANU-PF argues that the country is already democratic (Mazaranye, 2013; Herald Reporter, 2013). From a ZANU-PF point of view, Zimbabwe, being a former colony, has its own kind of democracy different from the Western neo-liberal democracy which condoned the colonisation and exploitation of Zimbabweans. It is from this viewpoint that ZANU-PF argues that the West cannot lecture it on democracy. The implication of the foregoing is that any understanding of ZANU-PF’s political communication practices entails grappling with the reality that the Zimbabwean media system is radically different from what is considered ideal by the neo-liberal Western theory.

It is arguable that the differences between Western and Zimbabwean media philosophies can be best understood by Zimbabwe’s realities as a post-colony. As argued earlier, the country’s boundaries are a colonial product and the country’s existence does not lie in international recognition of its sovereignty (Shaw, 1986). For example, the developmental journalism adopted by the regime after independence (Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999) was influenced by the country’s colonial realities that left the African impoverished. This philosophy was at variance with the Western neo-liberal perspective which asserts that the media should resemble an ideal Habermasian public sphere characterised by equality, rationality of debate and freedom of entry and exit (Gripsrud, 2002). From this liberal perspective, freedom of expression can also be extended to the media and to political contestants in an election (Venturelli, 1998; Mill, 1860). It can be extended to political advertising.

Political advertising is one of the ways through which ideas clash in an electoral context (see Kaid, 2012). Enlightenment, from the liberal perspective, emerges from the free

26 clash of ideas in the public sphere with the dominant idea(s) carrying the day (Mill, 1860). As McQuail (1994, pp. 128-9) argues, ‘the nearest approximation of truth will emerge from a competitive exposure of alternative viewpoints and progress for society will depend on the choice of “right” over “wrong” solutions’. Political advertising involves a clash of the various viewpoints from the political parties and candidates in an election. In the context of an election, the media as a latter day public sphere (cf. Gripsrud, 2012) should treat all political contestants in an election equally. Political parties and candidates should be given similar conditions for the placement of paid-for political advertisements in the media. The ideas of the contestants should freely clash with the dominant idea carrying the day. It is from the free clash of ideas in the political sphere that progress for society emerges as leaders will be chosen on the basis of the strength of their ideas. It is argued that the media in Zimbabwe do not measure up to this democratic ideal (cf. Moyse, 2009; ZESN, 2002; MMPZ, 2002), as the state media sometimes reject opposition advertisements (Chuma 2005; Moyse, 2009).

The tendency by the state-controlled media to reject opposition advertisements goes against the belief that in a democracy ‘…there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered’ (Mill. 1860, p. 15). Ideally, the media in any democratic electoral contest should not reject any political advertisements on the basis of their contents or signs, as long as they have a sponsor identification notice (Kaid, 2012; Moyse, 2009). The situation in Zimbabwe is not as straightforward as this. For example, the Electoral Act Chapter 2, p. 13, Part XXIB Section 160G (1) states that a public broadcaster ‘shall afford all political parties and independent candidates contesting an election such free access as may be prescribed’. However, in Part XXIB 160H (1) the Act states that ‘a [private] broadcaster shall not be obliged, subject to section 160G, to publish any advertisement by or on behalf of a political party contesting an election, but if the broadcaster or publisher is prepared to publish any such advertisement, (a) it shall offer the same terms and conditions of publication without discrimination, to all political parties and candidates contesting the election…’ It is apparent that on one hand the public broadcasters in Zimbabwe are mandated to accept political advertisements from all political parties. The private media on the other hand are under no obligation to accept

27 advertisements from political parties or candidates. However, the law is silent on whether publicly owned but state-controlled print media are mandated to accept political advertisements.

Furthermore, despite demanding that political advertisements should be identified as such (S160H (1) (C), the Act provides under S160H S(2) that, Subsection (1) should not be read as requiring broadcasters or publishers to accept advertisements that are illegal or defamatory and are likely to lead to a ‘criminal or delictual penalty’. This Section is in line with the Advertising Media Association’s (ADMA) regulation that authorises media houses to reject advertisements that they consider illegal or unethical. ADMA is one of the voluntary bodies that regulate the practice of advertising in Zimbabwe. It is arguable that in Zimbabwe a media organisation can accept its favoured political party or candidate’s advertisements and conveniently reject the opponent’s on the basis of illegality. This legal framework, coupled with the ownership and control patterns of the Zimbabwean media system, has implications on the practice of political advertising. It is therefore not without merit to argue that understanding ZANU-PF’s election advertisements and their placement in an electoral context requires one to grapple with the laws and ownership and control patterns of the media in which the advertisements were placed or not placed. It enables one to understand the reasons for placement and non-placement of advertisements in certain media organisations; an endeavour that will help shed light on the meanings of the advertisements and their intentions.

However, at face value the Act provides equal opportunities to all contestants in an electoral context. The Act also implies that a free press (including free political communication) is an essential component of a free, rational and democratic society. The ability to choose right over wrong is made possible by the availability of a free, plural and diverse media; media that are allowed to freely distribute political communication in the polity (Mill, 1860; McQuail, 1994; Bernays, 1947). Cognisant of this, the Electoral Act, whose amendments were a result of the Thabo Mbeki-led political negotiations between ZANU-PF and the opposition MDCs prior to the March 2008 election, seeks to compel the media to give equal access to all political parties in an electoral context. The intention was to – among other things – make the media accessible to all political parties. It is

28 argued from a Western neo-liberal perspective that the media are central to ‘the process of dissemination of political views, information and knowledge’ (Lilleker, 2006, p. 5). It is this centrality to the democratic project that makes state interference in the media unwelcome and irrational.

From this neo-liberal perspective, critics have argued that the state’s control over Zimpapers and ZBC in Zimbabwe is anti-democratic (cf. ZESN, 2002; Moyse, 2009). This is because a free press is central to the engineering of consent (Bernays, 1947), whilst a state-controlled press, for example The Herald, is reduced to a mere propaganda tool of the ruling elite (Curran, 2000; ZESN, 2002; Moyse, 2009). From the liberal perspective, as McQuail (1994, p. 129) notes, ‘…control of the press can only lead ultimately to irrationality or repression, even if it may seem justifiable in the short term’. The media, and by extension political communication, as both cultural institutions and business entities, should be free from state interference. This is because ‘the distribution of wealth… [is] a matter that… [is] completely outside the competence of the state...’ (Miranda, 1974, p. 29). This philosophical position views state interference as anachronistic to democracy. From this perspective, state control of the media in Zimbabwe, especially its control of the Zimpapers and ZBC, has been viewed as an impediment to the democratic project. For example, it is assumed that government control explains state-controlled media’s rejection of opposition advertisements and its circulation of ZANU-PF advertisements equating voting for the opposition with death (cf. Moyo, 2002; Chuma, 2005; Chitando, 2005).

The state’s role in the media should be limited to protecting the media from each other. As Venturelli (1998, p. 28) argues:

Because the public interest is the private interest, the role of the state must be to further proprietary rights and private governance of public communications, mediate conflicting proprietary claims, and further competitive practices in the design of policies for the public communication networks of liberal democracies.

Left alone, the media could harm each other in the competitive marketplace. As Hobbes (1991), cited by Venturelli (1998, p. 43), argues, ‘human life comprises the perpetual

29 pursuit of desires and that man’s natural condition is one of incessant competition oriented towards a “war of all against al”’. In such a situation, Hobbes’ solution is to have ‘a government empowered to do all that is necessary to bring into being and keep a civil peace – but nothing more’ (Venturelli, 1998, p. 43). In the Hobbesian theory, government regulation is only welcome in so far as it prevents ‘a war of all against all’ in the marketplace. One of the criticisms of liberal ideology by neo-Marxists is that the global media conglomerates, and indeed all conglomerates, determine the rules of the game in the market place and in some cases they elbow out competitors through massive discounts and such other tactics (see Golding & Murdock, 1996). However, the neo- Marxists seem to concentrate more on the consequences of corporate control of the media without paying much focus on the disadvantages of government control over the media. This neo-liberal approach, as noted earlier, does not apply wholesale in post- colonial settings such as Zimbabwe.

From the liberal philosophical standpoint, media – and by extension political contestation – must be free from state control. The contestants in an election should freely communicate with the electorate through political advertising among other communicative tactics. The success or failure of political contestants should rest solely on the dominance or lack thereof of their messages/ideas. Freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of the media and freedom to receive and impart information among other freedoms are central to the democratic project (see Hague & Harrop, 2004; Ake, 2000), as people will be able to make informed decisions and society will progress as a result.

However, with regard to Zimbabwe, critics argue that, despite constitutional guarantees, the media are not free and there is lack of freedom for political contestants to freely campaign and/or express themselves (Moyse, 2009; ZESN, 2008; Booysen, 2003). The problems bedevilling Zimbabwe have largely been presented by critics of the ZANU-PF regime as problems that are a result of its democratic deficiencies, which include lack of media freedom, freedom of expression and free and fair elections (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; ZESN, 2008; Moyse, 2009). Given this background, there is a need to explore issues of media ownership and control, since it helps one to understand political communication practices in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Understanding the media ownership

30 and control patterns helps one to grapple with the discourses circulated or advertisements placed in these media by ZANU-PF, their meanings, targeted audiences and the ideological work that the discourses do.

2.3 THE MEDIA AS POLITICAL ACTORS: A CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL VIEW OF MEDIA’S ROLE IN DEMOCRACY

Newspaper political advertising, which is the focus of this thesis, takes place through the press as the name implies. Newspaper advertising is one of the tools that political contestants use to communicate with the electorate and is central in a democracy (Menon, 2008). It therefore follows that since, in modern democracies, political communication (one of whose key tools is political advertising) (Venu, 2008; Kolovos & Harris. n.d) is partially executed through the mass media, the media are not only political actors but are also tools used by political parties and politicians to reach their targets (Curran, 1996; Lilleker, 2006; Golding & Murdock, 1997). In this matrix, the media inform and educate citizens to enable them to make informed political decisions as they provide the public with a platform for (rational) discussion (Golding & Murdock, 1996; Gripsrud, 2002; Waldahl, 2005). It is a platform for political contestants to sell their ideas to the electorate through advertising, among other campaign tools. It can be argued that the media play a significant role in maintaining or challenging hegemony; they can be used in the process of winning and re-winning consent. The fluidity of hegemony or rule by consent means that it has to be constantly won and re-won (Fiske, 1992). It is on this rule by consent that Western neo-liberal democracy is premised. In neo-liberal democracy, elections are a means through which citizens choose their leaders (Ake, 2000; Hague & Harrop, 2004; Willems, 2012) and the media’s role in democratic elections is to help engineer consent for the various political groupings in society (Bernays, 1947; Lilleker, 2006).

The media’s informative and educative roles are indispensable to the democratic project as this enables the citizenry to make informed political decisions (cf. McQuail, 1994; Moyse, 2009). The media are, in the words of Bernays (1947), central in the engineering of consent. As Lilleker (2006, p. 4) notes: ‘the media act both as the communicator of

31 political views from all groups in a state and as a watchdog that calls political actors to account for their actions’. The centrality of the media in political contestation has led critics to note that, ‘the history of the modern communications media is…also a political history of their increasing centrality to the exercise of full citizenship’ (Golding & Murdock, 1997, p. 18). They are a platform that enables the citizenry to put in place a government of the people by the people for the people (cf. Ake, 2000; McQuail, 1994) and as the fourth estate they help to keep the elite in check (Lilleker, 2006). They make it possible for the politicians to interact with the citizenry through dissemination of political advertisements, amongst other political communications. The goods that the media manufacture ‘newspapers [political], advertisements [emphasis mine], television programmes, and feature films-play a pivotal role in organising the images and discourses through which people make sense of the world’ (Golding & Murdock, 1996, p. 11).

However, in Zimbabwe it has been argued that ownership constraints negatively affect the free practice of political communication (cf. Mano, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Waldahl, 2005; Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Moyse, 2009). The ownership and control constraints of Zimbabwean media have resulted in a polarised media environment post-2000 where state media are pro-ZANU-PF while private press is pro-MDC (Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Chari, 2008; Nyamanhindi, 2008). Apart from other issues, the study seeks to examine how ownership, control and editorial slant affect such things as the placement of advertisements and the discourse of the advertisements in Zimbabwe during an election period. It seeks to find out whether the placement of the ZANU-PF advertisements in certain newspapers and not others had a bearing on their discourse. Put conversely, the discourse in advertisements may determine their placement in certain newspapers and not others. Further, the media’s editorial slant may determine the placement of certain advertisements in specific media and not others. The media context has a bearing on the practice of political communication in Zimbabwe.

Whereas ownership and control dynamics negatively impact the media’s role in democracy in Zimbabwe, in the neo-liberal West, the centrality of the media in democracy has been heavily undermined by corporate takeover of the media (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 1996; Curran, 1996 McChesney, 1999). As Golding

32 and Murdock (1996, p. 16) argue, ‘media production…has been increasingly commandeered by large corporations and moulded to their interests and strategies’. These interests and strategies are not necessarily in tandem with the public interest. For example, corporate control of the media has obstructed them from investigating and exposing the misdeeds of their parent companies and other conglomerates in such issues as dictatorship and environmental degradation (Sussman, 1997; Curran, 1996). ‘In exceptional cases, parent companies have even stepped in to suppress criticism of their interests’ (Curran, 1996, p. 86; see also Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 1999). The desire not to antagonise their parent companies and funders (advertisers) has resulted in media sticking to tried and tested formats at the expense of innovation and alternative viewpoints (Murdock & Golding, 1996; see also Curran, 1996). The media as a public sphere have thus been pulverised by commercial imperatives (Habermas, cited by Gripsrud, 2002). It is also arguable that this emphasis on the bottom line may have an impact on the practice of political communications.

However, on the eve of the 2013 elections, Zimpapers indicated that, in accordance with the Electoral Act, political advertisements will be given two weeks before elections to avoid the crowding out of their corporate partners (Matambanadzo, 2013). At face value, Zimpapers’ position creates the impression that media treasure commercial advertising more than political advertisers. It also creates the impression that the relationship between commercial advertisers and the media, or media’s hunt for profit, has traceable consequences on the practice of political advertising. This is because under the Electoral Act, media charges for political advertisements are supposed to be pegged at the lowest rate that they charge commercial advertisers. However, with regard to editorial content, it is arguable that bottom line considerations are at the heart of the private press’ pro-MDC, as they are likely to benefit materially from its neo-liberal policies, were it to come to power (Chuma, 2005). Put conversely, the private press, especially the Daily News’ anti-regime stance, sells the paper (Chibuwe, 2016).

Political considerations have pulverised the state-controlled media (ZESN, 2002; Moyse, 2009; Chibuwe, 2016). These differences are a result of control and ownership constraints which have, according to Mano (2005), resulted in media polarisation in

Zimbabwe. Polarisation has negatively affected journalistic professionalism and ethics. The radical differences in the state-controlled and the privately owned media content may have a bearing on the placement of political advertisements during elections. The foregoing is indisputable, especially when one considers political advertising theory and political economy of the media theory claims that advertisers do not associate with ideological enemies (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Menon, 2008). The publicly-owned but state-controlled media’s habit of rejecting opposition political advertisements (cf. Chuma, 2005; Moyse, 2009) also lends credence to the assumption that the differences in ownership, control and editorial content have a bearing on the practice of political advertising. Therefore, there is a need to locate the analysis of the ZANU-PF advertisements in the polarised Zimbabwean media context if one is to fully grasp their meanings. This polarised environment is central to understanding the placement of ZANU-PF’s advertisements and their meanings because advertisements are contextual (Deacon et al., 2007). They reverberate with the conditions of their production and circulation; as a result understanding the context of production and circulation, including the media in which they were placed, is important to unpacking their meanings. It is arguable that the media’s editorial content influenced the placement of certain advertisements in certain newspapers and not others.

In the case of Zimbabwe, evidence suggests that on one hand ZANU-PF goes against political economy thinking by associating with its ideological enemies – the privately owned press (see Willems, 2004; Chuma, 2005). For example, Willems (2004) writes that in the 2000 elections ZANU-PF placed an advertisement in the Daily News which showed a picture of Tsvangirai – taken from a CNN news clip – receiving money (in form of cheques) from white commercial farmers. She states that, ‘a few days before the June 2000 parliamentary elections, the private newspaper The Daily News carried a ZANU-PF advert which included a still image of a CNN news programme that had shown white farmers signing donation cheques to ZANU-PF’s main contestant in the elections, the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)’ (Willems 2004, p. 1768). However, while Willems (2004) is interested in media framing of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, the study is interested both in the discourse of the advertisements (which are tackled using other theories) and how the media context –

34 namely, the pro-opposition Daily News, Newsday, The Standard and the pro-ZANU-PF The Patriot – influenced the discourse, practice and execution of the ZANU-PF advertisements.

Considering the foregoing is significant, especially given the adversarial relationship that characterises private media–state relations post-2000 (cf. Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Chari, 2008; Nyamanhindi, 2008). This antagonism reached boiling point in 2003 when the ZANU-PF regime used the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) to shut down the Daily News and the Daily News on Sunday for having failed to comply with the Act’s requirements to register with the Media and Information Commission (MIC), which is now the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) (see Moyo, 2004; Chuma, 2005). The Daily News’ coverage is still largely anti-ZANU-PF and anti-Mugabe (Chibuwe, 2016). In the analysis of ZANU-PF advertisements, I infer the influence that this anti- ZANU-PF and pro-opposition editorial content had on the placement and discourse of the advertisements for July 2013. This media environment is part of the context of production and distribution of the ZANU-PF advertisements and it helps the researcher to make sense of the advertisements.

Similarly, in previous elections, opposition political parties went against political economy thinking by placing and attempting to place advertisements (sometimes the adverts were rejected) in the pro-ZANU-PF state media and the publicly owned but state-controlled media (see Chuma, 2005; Moyse, 2009). For example, during the March 2008 elections, the opposition political parties placed their advertisements in the state-controlled media even though ‘…the news contents of these institutions remained as biased and distorted as they have ever been against ZANU (PF)’s political challengers’ (Moyse, 2009, p. 53). The state media have always been anti-opposition and pro-ZANU-PF, even during elections (Mazango, 2005; Waldahl, 2005, Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Moyse, 2009), and yet the opposition placed their advertisements there. The opposition and ZANU-PF’s decision to place advertisements in newspapers whose ideologies are at variance with theirs is a contradiction of political economy of the media (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988) and political marketing theory (cf. Menon, 2008). It goes against the belief that the distribution

35 function of political marketing (of which advertising is a key component) ‘includes…placing the candidates in right channels, making sure that medium of distribution fits the ideology of the party [emphasis mine], etc.’ (Menon, 2008). In political economy thinking, placing advertisements in channels that are not ideologically compatible with an organisation’s goals interferes with the buying [voting] mood (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Political communication practice in Zimbabwe contradicts this claim, as both the ruling party and opposition parties place advertisements in hostile media.

Unsurprisingly, allowing ‘too much’ space for MDC-T to place advertisements on ZBC television and radio in the run-up to the March 2008 elections cost the broadcaster’s General Manager and CEO their jobs. They were fired by the regime as it was allegedly felt that this had resulted in Mugabe’s defeat in the first round of elections. It is also said that an official in The Chronicle’s Marketing department was fired after authorising the placement of an MDC-T advertisement in the newspaper. It is unsurprising that in the run- up to the presidential election run-off, ZBC rejected MDC-T advertisements (Moyse, 2009). The study seeks to interpret the phenomenon above; that is, if it was repeated in 2013 in the context of the practice of political advertising in Zimbabwe. It seeks to understand the context of production, placement and circulation of the advertisements, as this will assist in the interpretation of the ZANU-PF advertisements for July 2013. The editorial slant of the media organisation may yet assist me to make sense of the advertisements placed in certain organisations and why they were placed there.

2.4 THE MEDIA AS POLITICAL AND/OR IDEOLOGICAL TOOLS OF THE ELITE: A CRITIQUE

It has been argued that the state-controlled media in Zimbabwe are used as propaganda tools by the ZANU-PF regime (ZESN, 2002; Willems, 2004; Ranger, 2005; Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Moyse, 2009). This control by the ZANU-PF regime is also said to have negatively affected the state-controlled media’s role in electoral contexts. Whereas state-controlled media’s editorial content is said to be pro-ZANU-PF during elections (ZESN, 2002; MMPZ, 2002; Chuma, 2008; Moyse, 2009), the ZANU-PF advertisements they flight carry threatening messages (Chuma, 2005; Chitando, 2005). The ruling ZANU-PF regime has

36 been accused of manipulating the state media to carry advertisements that likens voting for the opposition parties and candidates to voting for death (Moyo, 1992; Chuma, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005). Ironically, the private press also carry ZANU-PF advertisements (cf. Willems, 2004).

It is arguable that the media are not only political actors (Hall, 1997) but they are also tools of both the economic elite and the political elite. Political control of the media has the same, if not worse consequences as corporate control on the media’s role in a democracy (cf. Curran 1996). As Watson (1998, p. 87) observes, ‘in some countries, totalitarian in nature, government decides what the media are for’. Governmental influence over the media can be exerted through legislation (cf. Murdock & Golding, 1996, p. 17 & 22-3; see also Curran, 1986) and/or direct ownership of media organisations (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Rusike, 1990; Moyo, 2004). More often than not, state control of the media results in the media becoming a faithful dog of the corporate sector and the political authority. As Curran (1996, p. 83) argues, ‘once the media becomes subject to public regulation, it will lose its bite as a watchdog and may even be transformed into a snarling Rottweiler in the service of the state’. Thus, state control of the media, together with corporate control, leads to ‘responsible’ opinions that do not threaten the status quo in any way (Herman & McChesney, 1989).

But what remains unanswered is: If, in the case of Zimbabwe, the state media were manipulated to carry ZANU-PF’s threatening advertisements – as state enterprises they are controlled by the ruling ZANU-PF (Moyo, 1992; Chuma, 2008) – can the same be said about the pro-opposition privately owned newspapers the Daily News, Newsday, The Standard and the privately owned pro-ZANU-PF The Patriot? In the July 2013 electoral context, in what ways could the discourse of the advertisements placed by ZANU-PF in the selected newspapers have been partially influenced by this media context? Given the foregoing, understanding the Zimbabwean media organisations’ operations enables one to understand the ZANU-PF discourse circulated through advertisements placed in these media.

The foregoing claim by Moyo (1992) that state media were manipulated to carry threatening advertisements by ZANU-PF implies that government control of the media

37 has negative implications for democracy. It also implies that the media in a democracy ought to reject such ‘immoral’ advertisements, but in this case the state media could not, since they were manipulated by government. However, that insinuation contradicts Kaid’s (2012) assertion that in a democracy the media should not reject any advertisement as long as it has a sponsor identification notice. It indeed contradicts one of the key tenets of democracy, which is free flow of information. Ironically, it is such arguments that led to the deregulation of the media across the world (cf. Curran, 1996; Hudson, 2009; Venturelli, 1998), specifically the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Africa. Confusingly, corporate control of the mass media, as shown by Western media, does not necessarily lead to a democratic media (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The ‘media conglomerates are not independent watchdogs serving the public interest, but self- seeking, corporate mercenaries using their muscle to promote private interests’ (Curran, 1996, p. 87; see also Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 1996). The desire to serve corporate interests may also have an impact on the placement or non-placement of advertisements in certain media – as the Zimpaper’s example mentioned earlier shows – at least at face value. However, since media and by extension political advertising can be used to rig public opinion in political contestation, it means that the placement of advertisements in certain media and not others is done deliberately with the intention to gain votes at the expense of the opposition.

The intention of this thesis is not to study the editorial content of the selected newspapers – Daily News, Newsday, The Standard and The Patriot. Rather, the thesis explores ZANU-PF advertisements that the newspapers carried for July 2013, so as to unpack the discourses that the party deployed in its struggle for electoral dominance. However, for one to fully the grasp the meanings of the ZANU-PF advertisements, one has to examine the operations of the media platforms in which they were placed. This is significant, considering that the media form part of the context of production and circulation of political communications (Kaid, 2012). This context of circulation is central to unpacking the meanings of the ZANU-PF advertisements. In other words, understanding the editorial content and political economy of the medium or media of placement helps to make sense of the advertisements placed therein. The aim of such a theorisation helps in

38 understanding the politics of media placement of ZANU-PF’s advertisements and it helps to expose the intentions of the advertisements and the targeted voter segment(s).

The section below explores the history of the media system in Zimbabwe with the intention of making sense of political communication practices in the country.

2.5 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ZIMBABWEAN MEDIA: FROM COLONIAL TO POST-COLONIAL

The sub-sections below discuss the history of the Zimbabwean media from the colonial to the present. They seek to examine the control patterns of the media and how this has traceable consequences for the practice of political communication in contemporary Zimbabwe. In this study, the media are considered part of the context of production and circulation of ZANU-PF advertisements; a context that is central to the full understanding of ZANU-PF discourses.

2.5.1 The pre-independence media For a thorough understanding of the current media system in Zimbabwe and its role in democratic contestation, one needs to understand its origins/history because history has a bearing on the present. For Harold-Barry (2004), in Zimbabwe the past is the future. The argument is that the colonial system remained intact. However, whether it remained intact or not is debatable, but what is indisputable is the assertion that the emergence of the local does not result in the total disappearance of the Western (Nakata, Nakata, Keech & Bolt, 2012). This is so because both the West and the local were tainted by the colonial encounter (Zeleza, 2006). From this standpoint, there is value in acknowledging that Zimbabwe’s colonial history has a bearing on the current media system in the country and its role in political communication. In effect, the history of the media in Zimbabwe is inextricably intertwined with the country’s colonial experiences.

The arrival of Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (BSA) in 1890 (Phimister, 1988) to colonise Zimbabwe marked the genesis and development of the press in the country (Rusike, 1990; Windrich, 1981). But instead of setting up a typical Western liberal 39 media system, colonialism spawned a racist media system. The media they established propagated colonial white supremacy and advanced colonial economic and political interests (Rusike, 1990; Moyo, 2004). The media became tools to smoothen the pillaging of resources from the South and were never meant as a platform for Africans. The media and/or civil society were a preserve of the Europeans whilst Africans were excluded (Windrich, 1981; Rusike, 1990; Mamdani, 1996); they were part and parcel of the repressive colonial establishment. Ironically, the supposedly liberal West spawned a repressive socio-political-economic and media system in the South. It is this repressive media system that newly independent African states inherited at independence, prompting Moyo (2004) to argue, in the case of Zimbabwean media, that the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe was change without change. For Scholz (2004), the liberation struggle was not a revolution but a rebellion that only resulted in the black elite supplanting the white minority whilst the repressive system remained intact. This system, it is argued, is anti-democratic and stifles democratic participation in the country.

Subsequently, it is arguable that understanding the role the Zimbabwean media play in the country’s politics entails understanding their history. This is especially important when one considers post-colonial theory claims that the post-colony is a mere reproduction of the colonial (Mamdani, 1994; Ahluwalia, 2001). For example, the Zimbabwean media system, despite having its origins in the neo-liberal West, is radically different from neo- liberal Western media. It has both traces of its repressive colonial past (Moyo, 2004) and the Western liberal ideology. The media system, especially the newspaper industry, is also reflective of the globalisation and de-regulation processes of the 1990s (Chuma, 2005). For example, the press was less regulated than the electronic media in the 1990s. The regime allowed the private press to flourish even though the state-private press relationship was adversarial (Chuma, 2005). The media system in Zimbabwe is reflective of the political system which post-2000 has been characterised by massive contestations (Rusike, 1990; Moyo, 2004; Chuma, 2005 & 2008). However, whereas the current media system is reflective of the colonial past and current global pressures on the regime to liberalise the media, the Rhodesian media was as racist as the political-social-economic system under which it operated (see Moyo 2004; Windrich 1981; Frederikse, 1982). For example, newspapers under the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC),

40 such as The Rhodesia Herald, were used as propaganda tools; as was the Ministry of Information-controlled Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) (now Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) (Windrich, 1981; Saunders, 1999). The only political communication the media were supposed to disseminate was the racist and anti-African nationalism discourse. For example, the RBC was under strict instruction not to give space to African nationalist leaders such as Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo (Windrich, 1981; Saunders, 1999). The political messages of the African nationalist parties were not given space.

As a result, newspapers that tried to give space to African nationalists were banned and the journalists were either arrested or deported (King, 1996; Saunders, 1990; Chuma, 2005). It was a discourse that was not given space in the mass media; a discourse that was censored and which led to the closure of several media houses and the deportation of several journalists by the Smith regime (King, 1996; Frederikse, 1982; Windrich, 1981). For example, the African Daily News, Dissent and Chapupu, among others, were banned (King, 1996; Chuma, 2005). The laws used to stifle African nationalist political discourse included the Powers Immunities and Privileges of Parliament Act (PIPPA), Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) of 1960 and the Official Secrets Act (OSA) of 1970 (Matyszak, n.d).

The above laws were meant to stifle the anti-colonialism, anti-racism and anti-imperialism discourse of the African liberation movements such as the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). For example, the LOMA criminalised subversive statements likely to cause alarm and despondence (such as African nationalism) and it was also used to shut down newspapers that were pro-African nationalism. The only political discourse that was freely distributed was the racist and anti-African nationalism propaganda produced by the Rhodesian army’s psychological unit and the Ministry of Information (Frederikse, 1981; Saunders, 1999). Furthermore, during the colonial era post-Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)2 from 1965 to 1980, the media were controlled and censored by the Rhodesian government through the Ministry of Information which directly controlled the RBC. It also exercised control, through

2 The Smith regime declared unilateral independence from Britain on 11 November 1965. 41 censorship, over the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC) newspapers (Windrich, 1981; Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999; Frederikse, 1982). The Rhodesian government, through the Ministry of Information, controlled the de jure monopoly RBC, which was a monopoly courtesy of the 1957 Broadcasting Act (BA) (Moyo, 2004; Windrich, 1981; Frederikse, 1982). The RBC was used to flight anti-African nationalist propaganda produced by the Ministry of Information (Windrich, 1981; Frederikse, 1982). As a result of these control mechanisms, the Rhodesian media system reflected the racist nature of the dominant political and economic discourse, as it was used as a weapon against the nationalists who were labelled as terrorists (Saunders, 1999). The dominant discourse was one that valorised the racist colonial system whilst at the same time denigrating African nationalism and African political parties (Windrich, 1981; Frederikse, 1982). As Saunders (1991) notes: the Ministry of Information was the main tool in the propagandistic attacks on African nationalism. This was the media system – a media system in which both editorial content and advertisements that propagated African nationalism were censored – that the new Zimbabwe regime inherited at independence in 1980.

2.5.2 The post-independence media: From 1980-1999.

Most newly independent African states, wary of leaving the media in foreign hands, either nationalised the media or the government became a direct player in the media (Rusike, 1990). Nationalisation, in other words, meant government and ruling party control of the media. Following this trend, at independence the new Zimbabwe government took direct control of the RBC and renamed it Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) (Moyo, 2004; see Zaffiro, 1992). The regime set about restructuring the media to reflect the new political dispensation and emphasis was put on developmental journalism (Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999; Chuma, 2005).

But ironically, in a move that justifies claims that the post-colony is an heir apparent of the colonial state (Ake, 1996; Ahluwalia, 2001; Moyo, 2004; Tekere, 2006), the government retained the Broadcasting Act (BA) which provided for the then RBC’s monopoly. It also retained other restrictive Rhodesian laws, such as Privileges Immunities and Powers of

Parliament Act (PIPPA), Official Secrets Act (OSA) and Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (LOMA) that were previously used against the nationalists by the colonial establishment (Saunders, 1990; Zaffiro, 1992; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Matyszak, n.d). The laws were utilised in exactly the same manner they were used by the colonial establishment, even though the content of the media was no longer racist. The laws have negative impacts on the practice of political advertising in particular and political communication in general in Zimbabwe.

However, the retention of repressive Rhodesian laws was at variance with the people’s expectations at independence. The struggle for independence in Zimbabwe was a struggle for democracy (Moyo, 1992; Chimedza, 2008) such that, ‘…at independence in 1980, there was legitimate expectation that the colonial state would be dismantled and with it the attendant institutions and laws that had served white minority rule. This was not to be so’ (Chimedza, 2008: 94). Instead, post-independence ZANU-PF simply adopted the undemocratic institutions that had served the colonial establishment so well – including the media system. As Tekere (2006, p. 10) argues, ‘…continuity rather than change is what characterised the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe…’ The inherited Rhodesian system was essentially undemocratic and it was repressive in nature as evidenced by laws such as the LOMA and OSA that the new government of independent Zimbabwe retained (Matyszak, n.d; Scholz, 2004; Tarisayi, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). The laws made it difficult for the media and opposition political parties to generate, receive and impart information freely. The regime’s retention of LOMA and the State of Emergency, among other repressive Rhodesian legal instruments, meant that the democratic space remained constrained in Zimbabwe. The same instruments had been used to stifle political discourse, especially African nationalism during the colonial era. The retention of these instruments meant that political discourse, especially oppositional discourses (including political advertisements), ran the risk of being labelled ‘subversive’ statements likely to cause alarm and despondency. Consequently, the racist anti-African nationalism Rhodesian discourse was replaced by the regime discourses of development, one-party state and dissidents. In this constrained environment, it is not surprising that the opposition were labelled as dissidents, sell-outs, white man’s whipping boys and their advertisements were rejected by the state-controlled media, while the ruling ZANU-PF’s

43 negative advertisements were given all the space (Moyo, 1992; Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Chuma, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005).

The state-controlled media reflected the development discourse and the dissidents’ discourse of the 1980s (Saunders, 1999; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2010), in which members of ZAPU-PF were labelled as murderous dissidents. Whereas pre-independence the media and laws had been used against the African nationalists, in the 1980s they were used against ZAPU (Saunders, 1999; Alexander et al., 2000). In the words of Zaffiro, the new regime became pseudo heirs to the colonial state’s repressive system; or as Moyo (2004) argues, it was change without change. Some of these laws, such as the Broadcasting Act (BA) and the LOMA, were only repealed in the late 1990s following constitutional challenges against the laws. As Matyszak (2009) argues, the 1990s witnessed a wave of challenges against the constitutionality of various statutes; a development that was inspired by the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe’s (GALZ) successful challenge against the constitutionality of the government’s move to bar them from exhibiting at the Zimbabwe International Book Fair (ZIBF) in 1996. GALZ argued that such a ban infringed constitutional guarantees on freedom of assembly and speech.

On the media front, the monopoly of the ZBC was only declared unconstitutional following a court challenge on the constitutionality of the ZBC’s monopoly by Gerry Jackson’s Capitol Radio. But the BA’s replacement, the Broadcasting Services Act of 2001, only succeeded in making ZBC a de facto monopoly rather than a de jure one since nothing really changed (Moyes, 2009). The ZBC at independence became a political tool for the new ZANU-PF government. As Moyo (2005, p. 112) argues, ‘While in name a public broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation has served essentially as a propaganda mouthpiece for the government of the day since colonialism’. Similarly, Moyes (2009) argues that in all elections post-2000, the ZBC has been used as a propaganda tool by ZANU-PF and it routinely rejects opposition advertisements. The publicly owned but state-controlled newspapers under the Zimpapers, such as The Herald, also sometimes reject opposition advertisements (Chuma, 2005). The state media do not just reject opposition advertisements; their editorial content is anti- opposition (ZESN, 2002; MMPZ, 2002; Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Moyse, 2009) and they

44 also carry ZANU-PF’s threatening advertisements and/or attack advertisements (Moyo, 1992). Despite this apparent hostility, the opposition still proceeds to place or attempt to place advertisements in the state-controlled media. It is therefore apparent that media’s editorial content whether hostile or friendly, has influence, although in a contradictory manner, on the type of political advertisements placed on its pages by political parties. In this light, understanding the operations of the Zimbabwean media system is central to understanding ZANU-PF election discourse.

The state-controlled media’s pro-ZANU-PF bias and their tendency to reject opposition advertisements are influenced by ownership and control. ZBC and Zimpapers are controlled by the state through the Ministry of Information – it is the same Ministry that hires and fires editors at these organisations (Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999; Chuma, 2005). The editors and managers at these state-controlled media organisations filter out discourse which is incompatible with their ideology. The dismissal of both the ZBC CEO and General Manager, Henry Muradzikwa and Robson Mhandu, in the aftermath of March 2008 elections shows that failure to filter out hostile content, whether editorial or paid-for advertisements, will lead to dismissal. Fear of dismissal, suspension and in extreme cases arrest, harassment, torture (as sometimes happens to private press journalists and editors) leads to conformity on the part of the journalists and editors.

Besides ownership and control, government regulations and laws also have an impact on political communication practice in any polity. For example, the Emergency Powers Act had a chilling effect on the media and political communication. As Matyszak (2009: 133) argues: ‘Prior to 1991, though independent media felt free to criticise government, the criticism was restrained and somewhat mute’. The threat posed by the Emergency Powers Act meant that the media were unwilling to write stories and/or carry political advertisements that might see them fall foul of the state. Implied here is that during the post-independence era of the State of Emergency, media did not freely disseminate political communication by ZAPU and other opposition parties. The discourse that got to be freely distributed unchallenged was the regime discourse of dissidents, development, one-party state and the nationalist historiography that glorified ZANU-PF’s contributions to the liberation struggle while undermining ZAPU’s contributions (Alexander et al., 2000).

The retention of the State of Emergency declared during the colonial era together with LOMA and OSA meant that the government was able to control information flow. The retention of these laws has led Muzondidya (2009, p. 176) to assert that ‘there was a strong continuity with the Rhodesian state, perpetuated through the application of its repressive laws, such as the Emergency Powers Act (Chapter 11, p. 4) and the 1960 Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, which were used to detain political rivals and silence critics’. The State of Emergency, which had been used to stifle oppositional discourses, was lifted in 1991 (Matyszak, 2009), about four years after the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU. As a result, the year 1991 has been characterised as a watershed year in Zimbabwe; apart from lifting the State of Emergency, the government also acceded to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, ‘probably to gain access to badly needed International Monetary Fund (IMF) balance of payments support’ (Matyszak, 2009, p. 133). It was also during the same period that the government adopted the IMF & World Bank Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) which required the regime to deregulate the market and to free up the political space (Chuma, 2005). More importantly, these developments saw Zimbabwe joining the global economy but with serious consequences for the Zimbabwean economy (Muzondidya, 2009; Chuma, 2005).

However, it was the lifting of the State of Emergency which ensured that for the first time after independence the Declaration of Rights in the then Constitution of Zimbabwe3 became operational (Matyszak, 2009). It opened up the democratic spaces in the country. These developments on the political and economic fronts had profound consequences on the political discourses in circulation during the period outlined above. The opposition, the private press and civil society became emboldened (Matyszak, 2009). As Chuma (2005) argues, in the 1990s private press filled the void left by the absence of a vibrant opposition. They opposed ZANU-PF’s wish to impose a one-party state, while actively supporting the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) because they thought they stood to gain from the liberalisation of the market (Chuma, 2008). But the state media continued to circulate pro-ZANU-PF political discourse that

3 Zimbabwe adopted a new constitution in 2013. 46 tended to vilify the opposition (see Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Saunders, 1999; Chuma, 2005).

2.6 THE PRIVATE PRESS AND OPPOSITIONAL DISCOURSE; EMERGENCE OF MDC AND THE ENACTMENT OF DRACONIAN MEDIA AND SECURITY LAWS

In order to retain power, ZANU-PF uses strict control of the practice of political communication and advertising in Zimbabwe (cf. Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Chuma, 2005; Muzondidya, 2009). It strictly controls the sayable and the unsayable (Foucault, 1980; Thompson, 1996) in political discourse in Zimbabwe. It can be argued that control of political discourse is therefore not limited to editorial content of media houses, but is also extended to political communications produced and circulated or intended for circulation by opposition political parties. However, in this context, understanding the nature of the relationship between the ZANU-PF government and the media will enable the researcher to make sense of the placement of advertisements by the party during elections. It will also lead to a better understanding of the meanings of the ZANU-PF advertisements placed in specific media. It is arguable that both the private press and state-controlled media constitute part of the context in which ZANU-PF advertisements should be understood. Thus, understanding the history of the Zimbabwe crisis, the nature of the country’s media houses’ editorial content and their relationship with the ZANU-PF regime are central to understanding the meaning of ZANU-PF’s advertisements executed through the same media. In other words, for a thorough understanding of ZANU-PF’s post-2000 election discourse and/or political communication practices, understanding the 1990s origins of the post-2000 nasty struggle for hegemony is necessary.

The 1990s, a period in which the regime adopted the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), was characterised by a deterioration of the state-private press relationship in a context of worsening political and economic conditions. The regime responded to these oppositional discourses in the 1990s with a series of arrests and torture of journalists (cf. MISA, 1999; Chibuwe & Mushuku, 2011). The deteriorating political-economic environment had a chilling effect not only on the media but also on the practice of political advertising. For example, some advertising agencies such as Barkers Ogilvy, aware of

47 the poisoned political environment in Zimbabwe, do not create political advertisements as a policy. The deteriorating political environment led to rising militancy and agitation with the deteriorating economy amongst civil society, labour, the student movement and others. The worsening economic situation resulted in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)-inspired mass job stay-away in 1997 and the 1998 food riots in which ordinary citizens took to the streets and looted shops in protest against price increases on basic food stuffs. The same period also witnessed sporadic land invasions by landless peasants and violent demonstrations by students (Chuma, 2005; Muzondidya, 2009). These struggles culminated in the formation in September 1999 of MDC, the first opposition political party to present a serious threat to ZANU-PF’s hold on power (Chuma, 2005; ZESN, 2008; Muzondidya, 2009). To contain this new political threat whose views were finding an outlet in the Daily News (2005), the regime re-arranged the state and enacted a series of repressive laws to stifle citizens, the press and the opposition (Mazango, 2005; Raftopoulos, 2009; Moyse, 2009). In addition, the ruling ZANU-PF party revisited its nationalist archives in order to gain voter appeal at the expense of the opposition (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Mazango, 2005; Chuma, 2008). It utilised discourses of land and liberation struggle (Mazngo, 2005) – or what Ranger (2004) calls patriotic history – to retain dominance.

As part of re-organising the State in post-2000, ‘repressive legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) [Chapter 11:17] and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) [Chapter 10:27] was passed in 2002 to restrict the activities of the opposition and civic forces in the public sphere and to control the independent press’ (Raftopoulos 2009, p. 214). The government also enacted the Interceptions of Communications Act (ICA) and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (CODE); laws that further restricted the democratic space. Moyse (2009, p. 44) argues that, post-2000 ‘a host of blatantly unconstitutional and repressive laws were enacted that effectively emasculated independent media and deprived the nation of its rights to freedom of expression, including the right to be informed’. The laws were thus designed to inhibit the private media’s role in political communication in post-2000. They were meant to control the range of discourse in the media; an institution that Curran (2000) argues is very central in the democratic project in any polity. This implies that the

48 laws were not only targeted at editorial content, but were also targeted at paid-for political advertisements placed by the opposition. It is in this context that state-controlled media routinely reject opposition MDC-T advertisements, sometimes on the basis that they are illegal.

It can thus be argued from the foregoing that, ‘…in the electoral domain, ZANU-PF uses the legality of constitutionalism to aid and veil unconstitutional, arbitrary and authoritarian means of maintaining power, and simultaneously garners the moral force of land and colonialism to create ‘political community’ (Booysen, 2003). Implied here is that discourses of land and anti-imperialism were deliberately designed as a campaign gimmick to legitimise ZANU-PF’s continued dominance while simultaneously delegitimising the opposition. The discourse was used to write ZANU-PF a ‘ticket to the future’ (Sylvester, 2003, cited by Chuma, 2008, p. 30; see also Mazango, 2005). ZANU- PF’s nationalist discourse, it is apparent, was for Booysen (2003) created to hide the ruling party’s dictatorship.

The foregoing further implies that the nationalist discourse as political communication is symptomatic of an undemocratic political system; a system that does not countenance any opposition to its rule. On one hand, the state media were central to the creation of a ‘political community’ through discourses of land and colonialism (Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Waldahl, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Chuma, 2008); on the other hand, the private press – specifically the Daily News – tried to deconstruct ZANU-PF’s anti-imperialism discourse (Chuma, 2008; Moyo, 2005). The state media practised patriotic journalism, while the private media practised oppositional journalism (Chuma, 2005). It can thus be argued that in an electoral context, state media editorial content acted as promotional communications for ZANU-PF, whilst private media – especially content of the Daily News – acted as promotional material for MDC (Chuma, 2008; Moyo, 2005; Moyse, 2009). This confirms Curran’s (2000) observation that the media constitute one of the platforms of political communication. As a platform for political communication, the media can and do influence politics while part of a party political communicators’ tasks involves positively influencing the media agenda; that is, news with the intention to rig public opinion (Fitzpatrick, Fullerton & Kendrick, 2013). It also entails placing advertisements in media

49 whose content is not hostile to a party’s ideology (Menon, 2008).

Given the tendency by the media in Zimbabwe to be partisan, the study explores the discourses produced and circulated by ZANU-PF in the privately owned pro-opposition Daily News, Newsday and The Standard, and the privately owned pro-ZANU-PF The Patriot. Following on Kaid’s (2012) argument that the media should not reject political advertisements as long as they have a sponsor identification notice, there is value in studying the placement of the advertisements in the private media as this may shed light on the meanings of the ZANU-PF discourse, its intentions and the targeted people. Noting that, as Lilleker (2006, p. 4) argues, ‘the media should act both as the communicator of political views from all groups in a state…’, the study looks at the advertisements produced and circulated by ZANU-PF through both media whose content is anti-ZANU- PF (Newsday, Daily News & The Standard) and pro-ZANU-PF (The Patriot). The study seeks to understand the discourses that ZANU-PF produced and circulated through these media whose content is hostile towards it. It also seeks to understand the discourse the party produced and circulated through the pro-ZANU-PF privately-owned The Patriot. The study thus seeks to, in part, understand the context of placement and distribution of the advertisements and whether placement had any impact on the range of discourses produced and circulated. The study considers the placement of the advertisements in the selected newspapers as part of the context of production and circulation that helps make sense of ZANU-PF’s July 2013 election advertisements.

Having explored the Zimbabwean media from neo-liberal, ‘critical political economy’ and post-colonial perspectives, the following chapter suggests a new theory of political communication that borrows from a multiplicity of theories. It is an approach that borrows from extant Western, post-colonial and decolonial theories in its attempt to understand the ZANU-PF nationalist discourse for July 2013 elections

2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The practice of political communication in Zimbabwe is subject to laws, media ownership and control. The state-controlled media, specifically The Herald and ZBC TV, sometimes reject opposition advertisements on legal grounds. But in complete opposition to political

50 economy theory and political marketing theory assertions, both the opposition and the ruling ZANU-PF party place advertisements in media outlets that are their ideological enemies. On one hand, ZANU-PF places advertisements in the pro-opposition privately owned press, while on the other hand the opposition places advertisements in the pro- ZANU-PF state-controlled media. Thus, it can be argued that whereas there is a lot of literature on political economy of the Zimbabwean media’s influence on editorial content, there is almost none on its influence on advertising content. Similarly, there is no literature on the kind of influence exerted by political advertisers on the media. It could be that the acceptance of ZANU-PF advertisements in the privately-owned but pro-opposition press is influenced by bottom line considerations. The media, however, do not have control over the contents of the advertisements. At the end of the day, the media’s autonomy to either reject or accept advertisements from various circles could be influenced by ownership, funding and legal considerations. Thus, any attempt to understand the practice and execution of political advertising in Zimbabwe calls for an understanding of the political economy of the media/platforms through which the political advertisements are distributed to the electorate. A neo-liberal, critical political economy and a post-colonial critique of the media carried out in this chapter enables one to understand the context of production and circulation of political advertising up to a point. To fully grasp the ZANU-PF election discourse, a multi-theoretical perspective that borrows from post-colonial, decolonial and extant Western theories (that includes democracy, sign theory and political advertising) is required. It is such a framework the next chapter sets out to present.

CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS AN AFRICANTHEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

If African history had been written by Africans and not Europeans, it is likely that it would have been written using different concepts, telling different stories and developing different theoretical explanations (Mafeje, 1971). The African reality continues to be treated as pathological, tribal and incomprehensible (Zeleza, 2006; Rwafa, 2012; see also Houtondji, 1997; Mbembe, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 2007). Furthermore, African realities continue to be looked at through Western theory which ‘has failed to understand post- colonial Africa…’ (Ahluwalia, 2001); it treats Africa as the ‘other’ (Mbembe, 2001; Houtondji, 1997; De Sousa Santos, 2007). Some attempts at presenting decolonial theory or theory from the South have tended to simplistically praise anything and everything from the South (Nakata, Nakata, Keech & Bolt, 2012) so that they have, in Appiah’s (2010, p. 50) terms, merely perpetuated a history of presenting Africa as ‘Europe upside down’ – the antithesis of Western theory.

From an African perspective, this chapter proposes a new theoretical account of African political communication by advancing a new multi-theoretical conceptual schema for understanding political communication to explain aspects of political communication in Zimbabwe. This entails, in significant part, re-appropriating a wide range of extant Western thought on political communication and intermeshing this with a variety of insights from post-colonial and decolonial literatures. It explores various notions to do with, among others, sign theory, political advertising theory, post-colonial theory and decolonial theory to explain their relevance to the study of political communication in contemporary Zimbabwe. This approach simultaneously entails exposing key inadequacies of extant theories in ways that enable presentation of an attractive approach to political communication in an African context. The intention is that this multi-theoretical

52 approach will go beyond the limited ways in which critics of ZANU-PF political communication strategies have, in the words of Moore (2012, p. 1), ‘often been as simplistic as the regime’s academic praise singers, and often simply turn celebratory scholarship upside down’. The intention is to go beyond perpetuating a trend, seen in scholarship on Africa which tends to fail to appreciate the complexity of the post-colony (see Mafeje, 1971; Appiah 1992; Mbembe, 2001; Zeleza, 2006).

It is important to note that this study acknowledges that claims to decolonialise intentions and practices have been (mis)used to position ZANU-PF as a champion of anticolonial battles. Such (mis)uses can be seen where, for example, Rwafa (2014, p. 108) calls Zimbabweans who are opposed to President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party ‘misguided…bootlickers who pander to the whims of Britain and America’. Rwafa’s view appears simplistic to the extent that it does not address the understanding that African realities continue to be described and acted out on the basis of Western conceptual schema. In other words, Rwafa does not contend with the viable view which Moyo (2004) articulates, with specific reference to media and media policy, when saying the change from Rhodesia to independent Zimbabwe is change without change.

In the sections that follow, I present and glean insights from various theories. I start with a discussion of democracy and how it has been (mis)used to interpret ZANU-PF discourses, before proceeding to discuss political advertising theory and sign theory and how they can be used in the analysis of ZANU-PF advertisements in ways that enable the researcher to gain newer insights into the practice of political advertising in Zimbabwe. Finally, I discuss the abyssal nature of Western theory before concluding by proposing a multi-theoretical approach as a way to overcome the weaknesses discussed. The intention of Sections 3.2 to 3.4 is to present evidence that supports the need for a multi- theoretical approach that uses insights gleaned from Western, decolonial and post- colonial theories; an approach that is presented in Section 3.5. It is an approach that will overcome the simplistic nature of regime scholarship and the abyssal nature of Western theory.

3.2 POLITICAL CONTESTATION AND DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE

Democracy is a highly contested term. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that democracy entails governance of the people, by the people, for the people (Ake, 2000). It is arguable that, since ‘the core principle of democracy is self-rule’, (Hague & Harrop, 2004, p. 36), people in a democracy should be free to choose their government and to remove it if it fails to perform. As Eribo and Jong-Ebot (1997, p. xiii) note, ‘Democracy… (is) the right of people to participate in governing themselves, particularly by electing and voting out their leaders’. Free and fair elections are a key cornerstone of democracy. Such elections should take place in ways that allow political parties and candidates to freely communicate with the electorate, whilst the electorate ought to freely choose candidates of their choice. Further, political parties and candidates should freely communicate in such ways that the electorate is able to make informed judgements about how representative governance should take place. Democracy should thus be characterised by freedom of association, freedom of the press, freedom of expression and freedom for any adult to run for political office (see Bernays, 1947; Chipkin, 2007). Put conversely, political communication in a democracy should be uninhibited (Bernays, 1947). As Kaid (2012) notes, political advertisements placed in paid-for space should not be rejected as long as they have sponsor identification notices. The implication is that however irrational an advertisement or political communication may be, in a democracy such communication should be allowed to freely circulate (Mill, 1860). It is from the free circulation of ideas that enlightenment emerges (Mill, 1860; McQuail, 1994). From this perspective, it is apparent that it is through political communication including political advertising that political parties and their candidates present their offerings to the electorate in an electoral context (Lilleker, 2006; Kaid, 2012). From that free presentation and circulation of ideas, citizens are able to make informed political decisions (Lilleker, 2006) and consent is engineered (Bernays, 1947). It is arguable that political advertising is part and parcel of the process of winning and re-winning consent (Fiske, 1992) in a democracy. It is part and parcel of electoral democracy.

On the basis of views consistent with the above basic understandings, critics have argued that Zimbabwe is not a democracy. Some have argued that Zimbabwe is a dictatorship in

54 which the state-controlled media rejects opposition’s advertisements and the political elite harasses, tortures and sometimes murders opposition political candidates during elections (Reeler, 2004; ZESN, 2008; Masunungure, 2009; CCJP, 2009; Moyse, 2009; Meredith, 2011). It is argued that Zimbabwe’s dictatorial political leadership generally practises politics and political contestation in ways that limit freedoms, including freedom of the media, to such an extent that Masunungure (2009) was driven to characterise the Zimbabwe of the March 2008 post-election period as a Hobbesian state of nature in which life had become nasty, brutish and very short, courtesy of the ZANU-PF pogroms. Reeler (2004) argues that in many cases, during political contestations no one is safe unless they support ZANU-PF.

There is much evidence that in Zimbabwe the private media are harassed whilst the public media are reduced to mere ZANU-PF propaganda tools which deny the opposition space (see ZESN, 2008; Moyse, 2009). The nominally public, but state-controlled media, especially the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) and The Herald in extreme cases, even reject paid-for opposition advertisements on political grounds (see Moyse, 2009; Chuma, 2005) when it appears that such advertising would be typically accepted in Western democracies provided suitable sponsor identification notices are issued (Kaid, 2012).

In pursuit of more relevant theoretical insights, I intend to go against the tendency to – in the context of political contestation in Zimbabwe, which is characterised by evident democratic deficiencies – dismiss ZANU-PF’s nationalist discourse as symptomatic of its dictatorial tendencies, bankrupt and as character assassination (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). This is to say that, despite knowing all the above and more about how Zimbabwe has been characterised a dictatorship, it is not my intention to begin with labelling as ‘dictatorial’ the political communication of the ruling party, ZANU-PF. Starting with such judgement can easily lead to simplistic arguments and counter arguments that yield no new insights into practices and meanings of ZANU-PF’s political communication. For the same reasons of wishing to avoid taking on a priori views and assumptions that can (un)intentionally bias and limit the observations that can be made, I also go against the trend to headily praise ZANU-PF as a party that champions freedom and emancipation.

A nuanced and unfettered reading of practices of political communication is needed if one is to present an attractive African theory. Such a reading also should not begin with presuppositions and biases that hastily and ineloquently pitch democracy and dictatorship as opposites that do not share conceptual grounds. While they may appear as opposites, it is important to note that democracy and dictatorship are not antitheses. Dictatorship, which thrives on terror, ‘is democracy’s underlying mode of functioning…’ (Zizek, 2007, p. xxvii) and it has been argued that democracy is the dictatorship of the majority (Zizek, 2007; Mill, 1860) which deserves to be feared. As Mill (1860, p. 4) notes;

the will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions are much needed against this, as against any abuse of power…in political speculations ‘the tyranny of the majority’ is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.

The point, which is difficult to contest, is that all political communication, democratic or dictatorial, takes place and is achieved to gain and sustain political power. As Menon (2008) notes, ‘though political marketing is increasingly used in democratic political systems in which mass support is significantly important to sustain power, military rulers also use marketing strategy to build their branded image’. Whatever the nature of a form of political rule – and to understand the nature of such rule – political communication practices need to be studied with great care.

ZANU-PF attempts to rebut criticism against its political communication. It dismisses criticism that it is dictatorial. It argues that the country is a democracy since it holds free and fair elections as and when they are due. However, the protestations appear to trivialise democracy or at least to reduce it to observance of minimal procedural requirements that can be easily manipulated and achieved (Chikumbirike, 2013).

Meanwhile, critics argue that in Zimbabwe, elections are just an embedded ritual (Willems, 2012), and democracy

…has been trivialised to the point at which [sic] it is no longer so threatening to political elites around the world, who may now embrace democracy and enjoy democratic legitimacy without subjecting themselves to the notorious inconveniences of democratic practice (Ake, 2000, p. 7).

Whereas ZANU-PF critics argue that the party operates a dictatorship (Mazaranye, 2013; Reeler, 2004; Scholz, 2004; Booysen, 2003; Makumbe & Compagnon, 1996), the party itself argues that the West, with local ‘stooges’, is the source of the criticism. ZANU-PF then attempts to buttress its arguments with references to history and to the idea that Westerners cannot lecture Zimbabweans on democracy, since Westerners were the oppressors yesterday. ZANU contends that Western powers, which are intent on re- colonising Zimbabwe, use democracy as a Trojan horse (Herald online, 20 April 2013). This appeal to fear of neo-colonisation or recolonisation is credible, even for many who would otherwise be critical of ZANU-PF (see Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2003; Axtmann, 2007) but cannot ignore the need to read political communication in Zimbabwe within a historical context characterised by anticolonial struggles and sentiments (see Shivji, 2003; Rwafa, 2012 & 2014).

Dismissing ZANU-PF discourses as propaganda, nativism or as signs of bankrupt nationalism or as character assassination (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009) can be as simplistic as celebrating such discourses as symptomatic of valorised patriotism and Pan Africanism attributed to the party. Such simplistic interpretations can fail to locate and grapple with how the party’s political communication arises within complex post-colonial settings and within complex global dynamics and inequalities (Moore, 2012). It is important to think about how ZANU-PF’s political communication arises in a world in which, as Axtmann (2007) suggests, good governance and human rights are used as a pretext to assault the sovereignty and integrity of third world countries.

In the following sections, I will discuss post-2000 ZANU-PF political communication, which has been characterised as nationalistic, nativist, propagandist, undemocratic and as involving character assassination (see Moyse, 2009; Thram, 2006; Ranger, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009) in terms of well-established notions of political advertising. This is an important step that enables me to appropriate key insights from

57 political communication theory as I seek to make sense of ZANU-PF’s political communication from a multi-theoretical perspective that specifically addresses the work of political advertising.

3.3 POLITICAL ADVERTISING THEORY

Advertising professionals often create both commercial advertisements and political advertisements. As Norris (2003, p. 3) observes, ‘the coterie of professional consultants expert in advertising, public opinion, marketing and strategic news management has become more co-equal actors with politicians, assuming a more influential role in government’. The relationship between politics and professional marketers ‘has affected the working style of political parties’ (Venu, 2008, p. 2). This scenario is particularly pronounced in American politics where political marketing consultants are ubiquitous and constitute an industry worth millions of dollars that employs lots of people (Novotny, 2007). The political marketing services industry is characterised by firms that ‘offer all of the consulting services under one roof, combining public opinion research, advertising and strategy into a form of consulting that has come to dominate contemporary American politics’ (Novotny, 2000, p. 17). The professionalisation of politics has resulted in politics being characterised by a ‘…greater use of advertising…’ (Lilleker, 2006, p. 310). In Zimbabwe, for example, in 2008 ZANU-PF is said to have contracted the advertising agency Imago Young and Rubicam (Ndlela, 2008) to craft its messages while the MDC- T’s campaign messages were created by Gary Thompson and Associates. However, due to the sometimes violent nature of political contestation in Zimbabwe (Reeler, 2004; Masunungure, 2009), advertising agencies such as Barkers Ogilvy do not manage political campaigns. The case of Barkers Ogilvy notwithstanding, it is arguable that the foregoing buttresses Baudrillard’s (1994) claim that the same language reigns in politics and business. It also confirms McGrath and Harris’ (2012) assertion that there are parallels between political and economic exchanges. The link between politics and marketing which gave rise to political marketing/advertising (see Menon, 2008) means that any study of political advertising has to employ theories borrowed from both politics and commercial advertising. In that vein, the study utilises political advertising theory and

58 sign theory as part of a multi-theoretical approach to the study of ZANU-PF nationalist discourses in their July 2013 election advertisements.

There is value in adopting political advertising theory in the study of ZANU-PF advertisements, since political advertising which is ‘a means through which parties and candidates present themselves to the electorate, mostly through the mass media’ (Kaid, 2012, p. 29) is a key component of democracy and electoral politics (Lilleker, 2006; Kaid, 2012; Bernays, 1947). Adopting political advertising theory enables the researcher to overcome the simplicity of regime critics who used democratic theory to denounce ZANU- PF discourse as character assassination (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003) without subjecting the advertisements to political advertising theory. Political advertising can be classified into attack or negative/mudslinging advertising, advocacy advertising and comparative advertising (Pinkleton et al., 2002; Lilleker, 2006). Negative political advertising is one- sided, it draws the voter’s attention to the opposition candidate’s undesirable traits and is designed to instil in voters hostility towards the target (Pinkleton et al., 2002). For example, ZANU-PF labels Tsvangirai a coward and sell-out because he ‘fled’ from the liberation war. Negative advertising is widely used, but scholars are not agreed about its effectiveness or its negativity (Jasperson & Fan, 2002; Pinkleton et al., 2002; Kaid, 2012; Meirick, 2002). In addition, there is comparative advertising in which the originators present what they view as their desirable traits, as opposed to the opponent’s undesirable traits. It is viewed by others as a sub-component of attack advertising (Pinkleton et al., 2002; Jasperson & Fan, 2002; Meirick, 2002; Lilleker, 2006; Kaid, 2012). For example, Robert Gabriel Mugabe is comparatively labelled a nationalist and Pan-Africanist liberator, compared to the sell-out and Western imperialists’ puppet, Morgan Tsvangirai; ZANU-PF is named/branded a liberation party which is positioned against the ‘puppet party – the MDC-T. ZANU-PF creates binaries of ‘us’ – patriots, liberators, nationalists, etc – and ‘them’ – British puppets, white farmers’ stooges, sell-outs, etc. This political naming/branding or product differentiation is intended to gain voter appeal (Downer, 2013; see also Dickson & Ginter, 1987; Butler, Collins & Fellenz, 2007) as it ‘…leads to a build-up of demand…’ (Dickson & Ginter, 1987, p. 2).

Besides the above, there is issue advocacy advertising which can be used in both electoral and non-electoral settings (Lilleker, 2006). It is used to ‘influence public opinion on the issue in question’ and it helps to raise the salience of issues involved (Kaid, 2012, p. 37). The focus in issue advertising is to influence public opinion on a particular contentious issue; for example, the controversial land reform and economic indigenisation policies in Zimbabwe.

Finally, Falkowski and Cwalina (2012, p. 9) differentiate between hard-sell advertising and soft-sell advertising, where the former ‘was based on repeating persuasion broadcast several times so as to “cram” it into potential voter’s minds...’ whilst the latter seeks to use emotional appeals. Ideally, political advertising is a key tool that is used mostly in an election to inform and educate the electorate about political products on offer; namely, parties, their candidates and policies. Even though dictatorships can also use political advertising (see Menon, 2008), it still remains a key component of democratic life where contestants should freely express themselves and information should be distributed freely in order for the citizenry to make informed political decisions (see Bernays, 1947; Kaid, 2012).

Using insights gleaned from political advertising theory as part of a multi-theoretical perspective enables the researcher to classify ZANU-PF advertisements either as attack advertising, comparative advertising or advocacy advertising. This classification enables researchers to make sense of the signs and/or discourses used in the advertisements. In addition, the language used in the advertisements enables the researcher to classify the advertisements and to make sense of the signs used. It also enables the researcher to ground the analysis in context (political, economic, socio-cultural and textual, both local and global). In doing this, the study overcomes the simplicity of both regime critics and regime scholars who both tend to disregard political advertising theory in their analyses of ZANU-PF discourse.

The use of political advertising in post-colonial Zimbabwe and the intensification of its practice post-2000 confirms the indisputable observation that whether a form of political rule is characterised as a dictatorship or as a democracy, political communication (including political advertising) takes place in the body politic to gain and sustain political

60 power (see Menon, 2008). Political advertising is part of the ‘…distinctive ways identities are multiplied, transformed, and put into circulation’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 102) in the post- colony. It is part of the signs, the ‘constellations of ideas’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 102), that the elite create and circulate within the polity to maintain power.

Looking at political advertisements as part of postcolonial systems of signs (Mbembe, 2001) opens up new possibilities by which the researcher can make sense of how political products are produced as signs and signs produced as political products. As Baudrillard, (1981, p. 2) argues, production is ‘that immense process of the transmutation of economic exchange value into sign exchange value’. From a political communication perspective, it can be argued that ‘production is that immense transmutation of the political exchange value into sign value’. From this perspective, for example, it may even be argued that it is worthwhile examining how the act of voting is given varying sign values. For example, post-2000 voting for ZANU-PF is often equated to patriotism (see Freeman, 2005; Mazango, 2005); in contrast, voting for the opposition especially, MDC, is equated to being unpatriotic; a sell-out and a white man’s puppet (Mano & Willems, 2010; Chuma, 2008; Mazango, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005).

In the next section, I discuss political advertisements as part of the sign system of post- colonial Zimbabwe. I discuss the ways in which sign theory, as part of a multi-theoretical framework, can be used to make sense of ZANU-PF advertisements. Insights gleaned from the sign theory framework used in the analysis of commercial advertising can also be useful in the analysis of political advertisements; since the same professionals often create both commercial and political advertisements.

3.4 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND THE SYSTEM OF SIGNS IN WHICH IT IS LOCATED The science of signs has been widely recognised as offering important means to understand advertising practices (Stokes, 2003; Priest, 1996). Consequently, sign theory is a key framework in the analysis of all (political, commercial, social and/or public service) advertisements (see Stokes, 2003). Since it is the signs utilised in an advertisement that enable the researcher to classify it either as advocacy, negative or comparative

61 advertising, it is useful to analyse the ZANU-PF election (advertisements) discourses as part and parcel of a ‘system of signs’. It is useful to see acts of political communication as manifestations of a post-colonial set of symbolic orders that are often played out, designed and intended to maintain the hegemony of the elite.

Studying the system of signs involved in political communication focuses attention on ‘The signs, vocabulary and narratives that the commandement [the ruling elite] produces...’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 102) and circulates in such ways that contents, possible impacts on policy or audiences and production processes related to these systems of signs are examined (Franklin, 1995, cited by Kolovos & Harris, n.d; Norris, 2004; Kaid, 2012). From the perspective of what is discursively discharged by state officials in alliance with the political elite, post-colonial Zimbabwe is a production of ‘a specific system of signs, a particular way of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 102). With the direction and use of systems of signs, rulers institutionalise, make real and commonsensical, embed and integrate into the consciousness of the period an official discourse designed to hoodwink the voters to keep them in power (Mbembe, 2001). In these official practices, anti-imperialism and indigenisation discourses are a key component or ‘sign system’ that seeks to make colonial history, prevalent poverty and global political machinations a means to achieve and maintain power and domination in local or national spheres.

As observed by Mamdani (1996) at independence, African nationalists discursively claimed to be addressing colonial injustices of exclusion, internal racialisation and external imperialism. Typically, such de-racialisation and anti-imperialism discourses are characterised by national leaders’ ‘demands… [for] the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period...[and the insistence] that all the big foreign companies should pass through [their] hands...’ (Fanon, 1963, p. 122). These discourses manifest and are propagated through a wide range of media and communication practices that include and are not limited to the press, music, political advertisements, poems and political speeches (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Ranger, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Thram, 2005; Chimedza, 2008).

Where these discourses are grounded on good governance, human rights and democracy, one inevitably reaches the same conclusions as the ZANU-PF regime critics who say these practices are often smoke screens or capillaries for character assassination and propaganda among other anti-democratic tendencies. In such instances the critic is justified to say the post-colonial orders that are produced are mere reflections of the colonial (see Moyo, 2004).

The centrality of semiotics or the manipulation of signs in all advertising (including political advertising) calls for the utilisation of sign theory to unpack the meanings of the ZANU- PF election advertisements for July 2013. The theory could be useful in unpacking the meanings of commercial and political advertisements by specifically examining how commodities are produced as signs and signs are produced as commodities (see Goldman, n.d). In a society where ‘... there are parallels’ between political and commercial exchanges (Harris & McGrath, 2012, p. 5) or where ‘there is no longer any difference between the economic and the political, because the same language reigns in both…’ (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 88), sign theory is very useful in understanding the signs that pervade both these fields. In other words, to understand the ‘…linguistic “goods” [that] may enter the [political] marketplace as objects of exchange’ (Irvine, 1989, p. 248; see also Baudrillard et al., 1976, p. 111), sign theory is required. Analysing ZANU-PF advertisements from a sign perspective not only helps the researcher unpack the meanings of the advertisements, but it also helps in understanding the context in which the advertisements were created and circulated. It enables the researcher to understand how advertisers plunder images from the past, detach them from things they once referred to, purify and turn them into signs attached to various goods and services (see Harris, 1996; Golding, n.d) and give them new meanings in the hunt for profits (for commercial advertisers) and votes (for political advertisers).

Looking at advertisements as signs enables the researcher to grapple with advertising itself; a practice that is not such a clear genre; it is slippery. For example, advertising has been characterised as a socio-cultural, political, and economic institution and it has been, on one hand, implicated by the neo-Marxists as an ideological tool used in the perpetuation of man’s domination by man in a capitalist society (Williams, 1993; Sandikci,

63 n.d.). On the other hand, free marketers argue that it is informative, educative, and promotes competition (see Strydom, Jooste & Cant, 2000) while post-modernists say it is the death of art and the individual (Badiou, 2005). This complexity is compounded by the fact that it is taking place in a complex and slippery post-colonial setting that has been argued to have elements of neo-liberalism and the colonial (see Matszak, 2009; Masunungure, 2004; Scholz, 2004), a façade of constitutionalism (Booysen, 2003) and to be democratic by ZANU-PF. In this post-colonial context, politics is personalised (see Mkandawire, 2013; Kebonang, 2012; Onslow, 2011; White, 2008; Hyden, 2006). In the case of Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF itself is complex; sometimes it postures as the guardian of Zimbabwean cultural and Christian values by opposing the MDC’s and their Western backers’ alleged attempts to ‘smuggle’ gay rights clauses in the GNU-era constitution- making process (see Tendai Mugabe, Herald 23 April 2013). But in other instances, it criticises Christianity for its role in the colonisation process while openly praising spirit mediums, Nehanda and Kaguvi. Confusingly, party officials sometimes appeal to Christian values. For example, in the rural areas, Mugabe appealed to voters [to] ‘take pride in African culture’, while in urban areas ‘he relied on his Christian identity as a devout Catholic’ (Chitando, 2005: 228). Adopting sign theory as part of a multi-theoretical approach enables the researcher to grapple with the slippery and complex nature of advertising, ZANU-PF and the post-colonial state in ways that bring out newer insights in the study of ZANU-PF’s election discourse.

The adoption of sign theory in the study of ZANU-PF advertisements enables the researcher to understand the ways in which signs are manipulated in political exchanges in the same way it enables researchers to understand the manipulation of signs in economic exchanges, where goods are valorised for their sign value rather than utility value, and exchange value is determined by sign value rather than by utility value. In the commercial exchange process, consumers exchange money for goods and services, whilst in politics citizens exchange their votes for some intangible products such as ideology, policy proposals, a party leader, candidates, party officials and party members in general (see Kolovos & Harris, n.d). The party leader is the core and unifying factor of the political product: party, candidate and policy (Downer 2013). However, some critics argue that political products and ‘the underlying exchange process’ that takes place in

64 politics remains ill-defined (see Henneberg, 2004, p. 4). However, what is not in dispute is that some form of exchange or consumption takes place in which, in exchange for votes, parties promise the ability to govern (Downer, 2013), among other things. For a researcher to understand the underlying political exchange process and the meaning taking and meaning making process that takes place in this exchange, he/she needs to ground the analysis of political advertisements in sign theory and political advertising theory. For example, adopting such theories enables one to understand the centrality of Mugabe, the ZANU-PF leader, as the core and unifying factor of the political product (see Downer, 2013) in the political exchange process in Zimbabwe in ways that significantly undercut the simplistic tendency to dismiss African politics as personal (see Hyden, 2006; White, 2008; Onslow, 2011; Kebonang, 2012; Mkandawire, 2013). It also enables the researcher to understand the political branding/naming process that parties engage in through manipulation of signs in a bid to achieve maximum possible positive differentiation.

Furthermore, adopting sign theory enables the researcher to pinpoint that which (the signs) political parties offer the citizens in exchange for their votes. Identifying the signs that are offered in the political exchange process and their meaning has the effect of exposing how, in political and/or economic exchange, goods are produced as signs and signs are produced as goods. As Baudrillard (1981, p. 1) notes, ‘in consumption generally, economic exchange value (money) is converted into sign exchange value (such as prestige), but this operation is still sustained by the alibi of use value’. It can be argued that just as in commercial exchanges, the ‘alibi of use value’ still sustains the operation through which political exchange (voting) is converted into sign value (such as patriotism and sovereignty). For example, voting for ZANU-PF is equated to patriotism, whilst voting for MDC-T is equated to selling out. This voting is still sustained by the promise of land and company ownership (ZANU-PF) and the creation of employment and better health services delivery (MDC-T), among other ‘use values’. Similarly, brands are worshipped for their communicative value rather than utility value; that is, a product may be valorised because it says something about the person who bought it. For example, a product may communicate that one is classy, a trendsetter, rich and powerful. As Goldman (n.d) argues:

A commodity-sign denotes the differentiated image attached to a product - e.g., images of affluent status (Rolex) or stylistic trendsetter (Swatch) supplement the functional utility of a watch. From this theoretical perspective advertisements constitute sites where an exchange of meanings can take place. The purpose of this exchange is to generate currency - the social form of value - for a commodity (see also Williams, 1993).

From the foregoing, it can be argued that there is value in adopting sign theory in the analysis of political advertisements, as it enables the researcher to explore the political exchange process in ways that expose how certain political signs come to attain the meanings they have. It enables the researcher to unmask the meaning making process in political exchanges; that is, how meaning is exchanged and the value attached to voting for a specific candidate or party. For example, in Zimbabwe post-2000, ZANU-PF election advertisements associated the party and its leader, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, with patriotism, the liberation struggle, sovereignty and national integrity. A sign theory approach to the study of ZANU-PF advertisements will therefore help expose how these signs accompanying the political products give them value and enable them to realise their ‘full exchange value’ (Irvine, 1989, p. 258). Patriotism and sovereignty, among other signs, gave value to ZANU-PF and its candidates, post-2000, as authentic Zimbabweans, whilst the signs they attached to MDC-T and its candidates (sell-outs and puppets) devalued it.

Sign theory exposes the arbitrariness of the relationship between the products and the signs that accompany them. There is no link between the signs and the product. For example, there is value in understanding that there is nothing that links ZANU-PF to its emblem the Great Zimbabwe monuments or to the First Chimurenga (war of liberation 1896-7) spirit mediums, Kaguvi and Nehanda. Furthermore, there is value in understanding that advertisers compete for the hottest sign in society or plunder the past for images (Harris, 1996) that they turn into signs; this enables the researcher to go beyond the simplistic criticism that post-2000 ZANU-PF revisited the past in order to write a ticket to the future (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Ranger, 2004; Chuma, 2005 & 2008). It is significant to understand that in both political and economic exchanges, the emphasis is in the commodity form and not in the utility value of the object. As Baudrillard et al.

(1976, p. 112) observe, ‘…the objectivity of material production reside[s] not in its materiality but in its form’. In this light, goods are produced as signs and signs are produced as goods. Emphasis is not on the utility value of the goods, but rather on the sign(s) attached to the product. As Baudrillard et al. (1976, p. 114) argue, ‘today, consumption…defines precisely that stage at which the commodity is immediately produced as a sign, as sign-value, and the signs (culture) as commodities [italics in the original]’. Through manipulation of signs, political goods are produced simultaneously with ‘their corresponding [false] “needs”…’ (Baudrillard et al., 1976, p. 112; see also Sandikci, 1989; Williams, 1993) and this makes advertising ideological (see Williamson, 1978). For example, Mugabe, the product, post-2000 was produced simultaneously with the corresponding needs; a bulwark against imperialism, a liberator, a champion of black empowerment and a patriot. The result of this process is that both the commodity and the sign (culture)

…have been abolished as specific determinations but not as forms [italics in the original], that object is perhaps, simply, the object, the object-form, upon which converge, in a complex mode which describes the most general form of political economy, the use value, the exchange value and the sign-value (Baudrillard et al., 1976, p. 114).

It can thus be argued that it is useful to appropriate – in the study of ZANU-PF advertisements – sign theory assumptions that indicate the object no longer refers to anything outside of itself; it has become a referent unto itself. The object or political product has become a communicator, since it is exchange value and the sign value that communicates a person’s social standing in society. Here, advertising is simulation; simulacrum, where the real (the product and its utility value) is substituted by ‘the signs of the real’ (Affluent status) (see Baudrillard, 1983; Goldman, n.d). It is these signs of the real that give the product its value. In the political exchange process in Zimbabwe post- 2000, ZANU-PF, political products; party, candidates, ideology and promises made to electorate during election and policy proposals (Dan & Hughes, 2008, p. 8, cited by Downer, 2013; Kolovos & Harris, n.d.) were substituted by the signs of the real: for

67 example, patriotism, anti-imperialism and sovereignty (Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Mazango, 2005; Chuma, 2008). The act of voting in this context was the moment when the utility value of voting (good policies, the ability to govern) was converted into sign value (for example, patriotism) but was still sustained by the alibi of use value (land and economic indigenisation) (see Baudrillard, 1981; Freeman, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003). From this perspective, ‘patriotism’, ‘sell-out’ and ‘sovereignty’ – among others – constitute what Baudrillard (1983) calls murderous signs that have the power to precede the original, to outlive and even to obliterate it such that what remains is a copy without an original (see also Baudrillard, 1994).

It can thus be argued that voting lost its original meaning courtesy of the new signs that it came to be associated with post-2000 and political advertising played a critical role in this process. Voting lost its meaning through the process of simulation; a process where the signs associated with voting gained precedence over the utility value of voting. As Baudrillard (1983, paragraph 5, lines 1-3) argues, simulation ‘is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory – Precession of Simulacra – it is the map that engenders territory’. Simulacra/simulacrum is thus a result of simulation; it is a copy without an original or a referent outside of itself – a hyperreal (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 21). In the political exchange process in Zimbabwe, voting no longer precedes the utility value of voting – that is, delivery of electoral promises and policies – or survives its utility value. It has been successfully obliterated by the signs of the real: patriotism, sovereignty, indigenisation and Mugabe – the idea, not the person. From this perspective, it is useful to appropriate, in the study of ZANU-PF advertisements, assumptions that the sign precedes the product and its utility value and it survives long after the product: the product is produced as sign; it is artificially resurrected ‘in the system of signs’ (Baudrillard, 1983, paragraph 5, lines 1-3; Baudrillard, 1994, pp. 1-2). For example, Mugabe post-2000 was produced as revolutionary, Pan Africanist and a devout Christian (Chitando, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). This process of simulation ‘threatens the difference between “true” and “false”, between “real” and “imaginary”’ (Baudrillard, 1983, paragraph 6, line 6). Advertising as part of the system of signs and as simulation blurs the distinction between the true (utility value) and the false (sign value). Goods are

68 valorised for their sign value rather than the utility value; the sign of the real replaces the original. For example, the sign patriotism is a real without an original; it is a referent unto itself and as part of images that accompany the ZANU-PF products (Mugabe, the party, candidates, election promises and policies); patriotism, sovereignty and indigenisation, among others, give the products value (Irvine, 1989).

The same signs that accompany goods and give them value – for example, patriotism and sovereignty – have murderous capacity. They (signs) are ‘murderers of the real, murderers of their own model as the Byzantine icons could murder the divine identity’ (Baudrillard, 1983). It is because of their murderous nature that simulacra or signs were forbidden by God, because they have the power to make people completely forget God (Baudrillard, 1983). The signs may end up replacing the real through blurring the distinction between signs of the real and God. People may end up worshipping the sign instead of God; that is, the signs may end up gaining precedence over God such that they may end up as referents unto themselves. In the study of ZANU-PF advertisements for July 2013, the study adopts these sign theory assumptions that signs have murderous capacity. It is useful, since it may shed newer insights into how the meaning making process takes place in Zimbabwean political discourse. It is arguable that, in the political realm, images or signs of Mugabe and ZANU-PF post-2000 gained precedence over the utility value of Mugabe; people had to vote Mugabe on the basis of sign value, a revolutionary and Pan-Africanist, and not on the basis of utility value. Similarly, Nehanda and Kaguvi were produced as ZANU-PF and vice versa, with the liberation struggle also being produced as ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF simultaneously produced as the liberation struggle. It is simulation where the distinction between truth and falsehood is threatened. As Baudrillard (1983, paragraph 16, lines 1-2) notes, ‘when the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality, of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity’. The same can be said of post-2000 Zimbabwe, an epoch that critics claim saw ZANU-PF revisiting their ‘Chimurenga’ (liberation war) history and creating signs designed to perpetuate its hegemony (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2010; Mazango, 2005; Freeman, 2005; Ranger, 2005 & 2004). Indeed, post-independence ZANU-PF’s nationalist historiography valorised the role of ZANLA and ZANU-PF during the liberation struggle while

69 downplaying ZIPRA and ZAPU’s roles (Alexander et al., 2000). Post-2000 ZANU-PF’s and Mugabe’s roles during the liberation attained mythical status, especially as Mugabe was being deified and valorised as a Messianic God-sent figure whose role was to save Zimbabwe from imperialism (Chitando, 20005).

From the foregoing, it can be argued that since the sign has gained precedence over utility value, in commercial exchanges the amount of money with which one parts in purchasing a product communicates that person’s wealth or lack of it, or power or lack of it, within a given society. It is the amount of money that one parts with, determined by the signs with which the product is invested, that gives the product its value. For example, parting with lots of money to purchase a Rolex watch invests the watch with its (communicative) value, but exchange value is determined by signs (affluent status) accompanying the product (Irvine, 1989; Golding, n.d). This is because consumption is also expenditure which is ‘wealth manifested and a manifest destruction of wealth. It is that value, deployed beyond exchange value and founded upon the latter’s destruction, that invests the object purchased, acquired, appropriated, with its differential sign value’ (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 1). In other words, everyone consumes but it is the amount of money that one invests in purchasing a product that enables the object to gain its real (sign) value that communicates that the purchaser has money and the purchased thing is truly special because it is expensive and not many people can purchase it. It is on the basis of expenditure that one is deemed part of the elite or the masses. Similarly, post-2000 in Zimbabwe, it was on the basis of one’s political allegiance and voting that one was either considered a sell-out or a patriot (Mazango, 2005; Freeman, 2005). Urban voters were considered sell-outs since they tended to vote for the opposition MDC, whilst the rural voters were considered patriots and true Zimbabweans since they tended to largely vote for ZANU-PF (Freeman, 2005). This could be because, as Baudrillard (1983, paragraph 15, line 1-2) argues, ‘when the real is no longer what it used to be…there is a panic- stricken production of the real and referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production…’ In the case of Zimbabwe, critics have labelled the post-2000 panic-stricken ZANU-PF produced real as character assassination, nationalist historiography, patriotic history, nativism, patriotic journalism, Mugabeism, cultural nationalism and music nationalism, among others (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Ranger, 2004 & 2005;

Chuma, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Thram, 2006; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009). Borrowing insights from sign theory in the study of ZANU-PF advertisements for July 2013 significantly helps us understand how signs are manipulated and come to mean what they mean in the Zimbabwean political context in ways that significantly undercut the above readings of ZANU-PF discourse as Mugabeism and patriotic history.

Exploring further the idea of expenditure, it can be argued that in the political marketplace casting one’s vote becomes expenditure. However, critics such as Harris and Lock (1996) argue that expenditure in mainstream marketing is different from expenditure in politics, since there is no cost associated with voting choice, unlike in mainstream marketing where there is a cost attached to a buying decision. They argue that whereas in mainstream marketing there is a cost (money) directly associated with a purchase; in politics ‘…there is no price directly or indirectly attached to voting…the choice of a party sharply differentiates it from a purchase’ (Lock & Harris, 1996, p. 15). Although there are differences between the political market and the commercial market, it is indisputable that there are parallels between political and commercial exchanges (Harris & McGrath, 2012). For example, in commercial exchanges, money = one gets the goods there and then, and in political exchanges, votes = one gets the goods at a later stage or may not get them at all. One votes for someone in the hope that they will fulfil their promise (see Lock & Harris, 1996; Kolovos & Harris, n.d.) In an electoral setting, in exchange for votes politicians offer, for example, the ability to govern, policy proposals and candidates (Downer, 2013). It is therefore arguable that, in the case of Zimbabwe post-2000, rather than the vote or expenditure investing the product or object ‘purchased, acquired, appropriated, with its differential sign value’ (Baudrillard, 191, p. 1), it was the purchaser who was invested with a differential sign by the purchased, whereby those who voted for Mugabe and ZANU-PF were viewed as patriots while opposition supporters were viewed as sell-outs (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Freeman, 2005).

The voter became both the subject and object as he/she took part in his/her oppression through a voting process that Willems (2012) describes as embedded ritual. Similarly, ZANU-PF and Mugabe as objects became communicators of revolutionary zeal, patriotism, sovereignty and territorial integrity. But as subjects and as the

71 commandement; both ZANU-PF and Mugabe are involved in the process ‘…of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes’ (Mbembe, 2001, p. 102). This fabrication of simulacra takes place through, for example, political advertisements, the media, the education system, music, Mugabe’s speeches, speeches by government and party officials (see Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Chitando, 2005 & Thram, 2006; Chimedza, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). From this perspective, looking at the differential signs that voting for ZANU-PF and that the party ZANU-PF and Mugabe, the party leader were invested with in the ZANU-PF advertisements for the July 2013 elections, enables the researcher to overcome the simplistic dismissal of ZANU-PF discourse as a sign of bankrupt nationalism, character assassination and patriotic history. It also enables the researcher to read the advertisements in ways that overcome the regime scholars’ simplistic praise of ZANU-PF discourse as evidence of patriotism and selfless dedication to Zimbabwe. It further enables one to understand the ideological work that advertisements do (see Stokes, 2003).

It is critical to investigate the differential signs used in ZANU-PF political advertisements, since, as Irvine (1989, p. 257) argues, it is the signs that are attached to goods that ‘give them value’. Signs that accompany goods authenticate the goods; that they are genuine and they give them value such that ‘when I pay for the gold necklace, I am paying not only for the necklace itself, but also for the chain of authoritative statements that accompanies it’ (Irvine, 1989, p. 257). As Van Leeuwen (2007) argues, it is the authoritative statements or testimonials by the experts or role models that legitimise a product. In this instance, as Van Leeuwen argues, the answer to the ‘why’ question – why the consumer should purchase the product – is because the expert says it is genuine. It is these statements or testimonials accompanying a product that enable it to realise ‘its full exchange value’ (Irvine, 1989, p. 258). For example, for ZANU-PF, its supporters and sympathetic academics such as Rwafa (2014) post-2000, it is the choice between ZANU- PF and MDC that determines or communicates whether one is a patriot or a sell-out/agent of regime change. Here, expenditure, the vote, invests the voter with the positive (sign) value ‘patriot’; the vote for ZANU-PF is produced as patriotism and patriotism is produced as the vote. Simultaneously, the vote for MDC from a ZANU-PF perspective invests the voter with the negative (sign) value or ‘sell-out’; the vote is produced as treason or selling

72 out. It is these signs that give voting ‘its full exchange value’ (1989, p. 258). These signs have gained precedence over the utility value of voting.

The testimonials or statements and images accompanying ZANU-PF or any other political party in Zimbabwe or elsewhere enables the party, the party’s policies or its electoral candidates as political products on the political market to realise their full exchange value. These statements, testimonials and images are the ones that enable the political party to achieve what in marketing strategy is called maximum positive differentiation between the corporation (political party) and the competition (Jain, n.d). It is the signs accompanying the product that determine its value and whether it will be ‘voted for’ at the expense of the competition. However, it is also the signs that the political party attempts to associate with the opposition (often negative) that increase its appeal or exchange value while diminishing that of the opposition. In [political] marketing strategy, gaining positive recognition from the customer/voter is not enough, the corporation/political party has to gain ‘maximum possible positive differentiation over the competition in meeting customer [citizens’/voters’] needs’ (Jain, n.d). To achieve this, parties use political advertisements, as they are a tool ‘…designed to garner positive feelings towards the sponsor’ (Lilleker, 2006, p. 147). It can be argued that a sign theory that utilises insights from both commercial and political branding practices enables the researcher to fully grasp the process of positively branding the self, while negatively portraying the competition through political advertising.

The foregoing is valuable if adapted to the study of ZANU-PF advertisements, since ‘…modern democracy has found itself in “the age of manufactured images” in which political advertisers are “image makers” who attempt to win votes through manipulation of images’ (Falkowski & Cwalina, 2012, p. 10). Understanding that in the process of this manipulation of images, ‘the rationality of the sign is based on the exclusion, the annihilation of all symbolic ambivalence in favour of a fixed and equational structure. The sign is a discriminator: it structures by exclusion’ (Baudrillard et al., 1976, p. 115); the sign is murderous (Baudrillard, 1983), enables one to read the ZANU-PF advertisements in ways that avoid simplistically castigating the discourse as bankrupt nationalism and as dictatorial (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Kriger, 2005). These insights, together

73 with those gleaned from political advertising theory where negative advertising is widely practised, enable the researcher to understand ZANU-PF’s positive self-presentation and negative branding of MDC. It also enables the researcher to avoid simplistically criticising ZANU-PF’s name-calling tactics as character assassination and undemocratic (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Chitando, 2005; Kriger 2005) or to, like Rwafa (2014), simplistically ape ZANU-PF’s labelling of MDC as local stooges of Western imperialists.

The next section proposes a need for a new theory of African political communication that borrows from extant Western theory, post-colonial theory and theory from the South. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of Western theory, post-colonial theory and decolonial theory, while proposing an alternative multi-theoretical approach to studying African political communication that uses insights gleaned from all these perspectives.

3.5 ON THE NEED FOR AN AFRICAN THEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

African identities, Africa and its histories (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) are complex, inconsistent and fluid, very difficult to define and, ‘impossible to classify or treat…with any amount of consistency’ (Mafeje, 1971, p. 253; see also Allen, 1995; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Appiah, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Hyden, 2006; Zeleza, 2006). This ungraspability of African sign systems stems from the fact that the idea of Africa is a construct (Zeleza, 2006; Hyden, 2006; Thompson, 2004; Allen, 1995; Appiah, 1992; Mafeje, 1971). Cognisant of this, my call to a new theory of African political communication by no means suggests that there is a homogenous African political system, as such a system does not exist (see Thomson, 2004; Hyden, 2006; Allen, 1995). It is, as Appiah (1997, p. 50) argues, ‘…preposterous to suppose that there is a single African culture…’ The call to a new theory is also by no means intended to reach, as Allen (1995, p. 301) observes of other case studies of African politics, ‘conclusions [that] automatically apply to all or most African states…’ The study recognises that there is no typical African polity (Allen, 1995; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Thomson, 2004; Hyden, 2006) and thus holds that ‘there is certainly no substitute for studying every African country on its own terms’ (Thomson, 2004, p. 3). It holds that the

74 differences amongst African politics and political systems and the trajectories they followed after independence make generalisation impossible (Allen, 1995). It is these complexities, even at the level of the individual state, that make analyses that characterise Zimbabwe in particular and Africa in general as a mirror image – a reflection of the colonial system – flawed (see Allen, 1995; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997). The study proposes a new theory of African political communication that is context-specific; that takes note of the individual country’s historical, cultural, political, economic, local and global contexts (see Ahluwalia, 2001; Zeleza, 2006). Acknowledging that the connection between context and consequence ‘is the only clue to naming an action’ (Mamdani, 2009, p. 3; see also Ahluwalia, 2001), the thesis holds that to fully grasp the meaning of the ZANU-PF discourses entails reading them in the local, regional and global contexts in which they were produced and circulated. In turn, locating the analysis within its holistic context calls for the adoption of multi-theoretical schema borrowed from Western theory, post-colonial theory and decolonial theory.

The suggested new theory’s point of departure is that to understand political communication in an African context, one must learn to not other Africans. This is to say, one needs to overcome the tendency of theorists to fail to know or recognise Africans as people (Mbembe, 2001) on account of relying on Western conceptual schema that abysmally divides ‘social reality into two realms the realm of ‘“this side of the line”’ and the realm of “the other side of the line”’ (De Sousa Santos, 2007, p. 1). The Western theory’s abyssal (mis)reading or ‘… analysis of African politics is peculiarly full of blind alleys’ (Osaghae, cited by Allen, 1995, p. 302) as it is characterised by the ‘…tendency… to deal in stereotypes, to reduce its [African] politics to typifying adjectives-communist, clientalist, patriarchal, paternalist…’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997, p. 129), personalised and politics of chaos (Allen, 1995; Hyden, 2006; White, 2008; Onslow, 2011; Kebonang, 2012; Mkandawire, 2013). African politics is also reduced to ‘military coups, one party states, corruption, [and] ethnic politics, etc.’ (Allen, 1995, p. 302). Such (mis)readings of post-colonial politics lead critics to characterise the post-colonial African state in general and the Zimbabwean state in particular as a mirror image or ‘simulacrum’ of the colonial state (Kebonang, 2012, p. 32; see also Ahluwalia, 2001). It is such (mis)readings of the post-colony that Chipkin (2007, p. 38) characterises as ‘post-colonial essentialism [which]

75 treats the post-colony as a mere phenomenon of colonial power’. Put conversely, it is such analyses that drove critics such as Ahmad (1992), cited by Ahluwalia (2001, p. 2), to cynically remark that, ‘…post-colonial theory merely re-inscribes the very forms of domination which it seeks to deconstruct’. This is because Western and post-colonial theories’ abyssal (mis)readings of African politics are not only selective, inaccurate (Thomson, 2004), simplistic and pejorative (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997), but they also result in the abandonment of theorisation (Allen, 1995) in favour of focusing only on empirical evidence which supports the recurrence of certain common characteristics in African politics, such as military coups.

The new theory that I suggest in this thesis holds that the Western tradition’s well documented denial of the existence of other knowledges apart from its own (Mbembe, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 2007) makes Western theory alone inadequate to explain the Zimbabwean phenomenon, as it tends to ‘other’ the ‘Other’. It privileges negative readings of the ‘other’ over positive readings or more balanced readings of the ‘other’ (see Thomson, 2004; Rwafa, 2012). It is weariness with Western theory’s negative readings of the African and African phenomena that led Mbembe (2001, p. 2) to observe that,

…as a general rule, the experience of the Other, or the problem of the ‘I’ of others and of human beings we perceive as foreign to us, has almost always posed virtually insurmountable difficulties to the Western philosophical and political tradition. Whether dealing with Africa or with other non-European worlds, this tradition long denied the existence of any ‘self’ but its own.

Bearing the foregoing in mind, there is value in acknowledging that the attempt to understand African phenomena from a Western theoretical lens is flawed. From this perspective, Onslow’s (2011, p. 3) assertion that ‘…calculations of what is rational in an African context may not be deemed equally rational in a West European political context’ is revealing. Therein lies the problem where the ‘other’ is viewed as sub-human (see Mbembe, 2001, p. 2), requiring European ‘domestication and training’ to become fully human. It smirks of the colonising discourse of civilisation (see Mafeje, 1971; Zeleza, 2006) and the Western discourses of good governance, democracy and human rights (see Szeftel, 1998; Ahluwalia, 2001). It is radically flawed to always look at Africa ‘in

76 relation to master references – Europe, whiteness, Christianity, literacy, development, technology (the comparative and colonising tropes mutate continuously [emphasis mine]) - [it is a tendency that] mirrors the reflect, indeed the refract Africa in peculiar ways, reducing the continent to particular images, to a state of lack’ (Zeleza, 2006, p. 16; see also De Sousa, 2007, p. 1; Mafeje, 1971, p. 253). Inevitably, such juxtaposition of African politics with the racist Western discourses concludes that African politics is irrational (Allen, 1995; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Zeleza, 2006), yet ‘the politics of Africa are rational’ (Thomson, 2004, p. 3).

In broad terms, adoption of Western conceptual schema involves negating African perspectives. It involves an ‘abyss-mal’ form of thinking that says beyond the horizon of Western thought there is an abyss on the other side of which no merit worthy truths, knowledges, subjective understandings or methods of enquiry can be ‘discovered’ (De Sousa Santos, 2007, pp. 4 & 7; see also Houtondji, 1997; Connell, 2007; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012). The implication is that African phenomenon gets to be examined or looked at through a Western theoretical lens because for Western theory, Africa is not the home of theory but is viewed as a consumer of Western theory (Ahluwalia, 2001; see Mbembe, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 2007). The adoption of Western conceptual schema has the effect of placing outside of the law efforts of colonised to decolonise themselves (De Sousa Santos, 2007). From this perspective, Africa is located on the epistemic margins of discourse and the new multi-theoretical theory proposed here is an attempt at overcoming the abyssal analysis of Western theory and the simplistic celebratory scholarship of decolonial scholarship.

The foregoing shows that, despite there being so many critics who have written about Zimbabwe, both Zimbabweans and non-Zimbabweans, Mbembe’s (2001, p. 3) observation that, there is ‘hardly ever any discourse about Africa for itself, in the very principle of its constitution, in its language, and its finalities, narratives about Africa is always pretext for a comment about something else, some other place, some other people’ remains true. Their analyses are grounded in Western neo-liberal traditions and there is still that ‘howling absence of theoretical work’ observed by Houtondji, (1997, p. 2). This accounts for the tendency by these Western academics and their African

‘converts’ (see Rwafa, 2014, p. 111) to treat the post-colonial condition as pathological (Zeleza, 2006; see also De Sousa Santos, 2007). Their discussions on African problems are distorted because they use a theoretical framework that treats Africa as the ‘other’; as ‘beyond the pale of humanity, let alone rational explanation’ (Zeleza, 2006, p.1). Academic discourse that tends to look at the African phenomenon from a Western perspective will tend to mirror racist media discourses of Africa as a dark continent plagued by civil strife, natural disasters, tribal conflicts and disease, among other socio- politico-economic ills (see Rwafa, 2014; Thomson, 2004). To overcome this abyssal form of scholarship, there is ‘need for more balanced debate and commentary, to put African conflicts in both global and historical perspectives’ (Zeleza, 2006, p. 1; see also Nakata, Nakata, Keech & Bolt, 2012). From this perspective, the thesis holds that the study of African phenomena should be grounded in a multi-theoretical approach that takes cognisance of the post-colony’s realities; historical, global, local, traditional and economic. It should also acknowledge the complexity of the sign that is Africa.

Despite Western conceptual schema’s efforts to ‘other’ Africa, the thesis holds that since in the colonial and the ongoing decolonial encounters, both cultures (of the West and the South) were or are tainted or defiled (see Zeleza, 2006; Ahluwalia, 2001), there is value in borrowing insights from decolonial theory and combining them with insights from Western theory as part of a multi-theoretical approach to the study of ZANU-PF discourse. Regardless of their supposed mutual exclusion, insights from decolonial and Western theories form part of the broader contextual and theoretical framework in which ZANU- PF discourses should be understood. The thesis locates ZANU-PF discourse in its historical, local, regional and global contexts.

It is indeed the duty of African studies to place Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, ‘within its socio-economic, historical and cultural perspective while recognising that the amorphous nature of imperialism has entailed a globalisation which has penetrated virtually every part of the continent’, (Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 49; see also Zeleza, 2006; Mamdani, 2009). This in part entails recognising that Western theory holds that ‘the colonial is the state of nature where civil society’s institutions have no place …the colonial zone is par excellence, the realm of the incomprehensible beliefs and behaviours which

78 in no way can be considered, whether true or false’ (De Sousa Santos, 2007, pp. 7-8). This abyssal form of reading is evident in the works of critics such as Booysens (2003) who argues that ZANU-PF uses the veil of legalism to mask its dictatorial tendencies. The ZANU-PF regime, it has been argued, does not respect the rule of law. This perspective is self-evident in, for example:

 Kebonang’s (2012) characterisation of the post-2008 election period as anarchical;  Masunungure’s (2009) argument that in the run-up to the 2008 run-off election pitting Mugabe against Tsvangirai Zimbabwe was in a Hobbesian state of nature where life was short, nasty and brutish;  Reeler’s (2004) observation that in Zimbabwe no one is safe unless they support ZANU-PF.  Masunungure’s (2004) assertion that the philosophy of Gukurahundi is the buckle that connects the violent side of the liberation struggle to the violent side of post-independence Zimbabwe;  The assertion that the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was not a revolution but a rebellion since post-independence, the despotic system remained the same and what only changed was the skin colour of the rulers (Scholz, 2004; Masunungure, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003);  The claim that the ZANU-PF regime, ‘failed dismally to make a break with tradition of nationalist authoritarianism and guerrilla violence as well as colonial settler repression’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; see also Tekere, 2006; Onslow, 2011); hence post-independence Zimbabwe is an heir apparent of the colonial state. Independence was, as Moyo (2004) notes in relation to the media industry, change without change.

I am not arguing that Western theory is totally irrelevant in trying to understand ZANU- PF’s political communication. What I am saying is that such theory struggles to grasp key issues at stake, because it cannot countenance the perspectives from which these are imagined and acted out. It does not even have a basis for contending with the idea that a state in Africa – for example, Zimbabwe – did not follow the Hobbesian path followed by

79 the Western state (see Held, 1996). Zimbabwe, the post-colony, is an artefact that has no correspondence to any pre-colonial reality (Shaw, 1986). This makes Zimbabwe in particular and Africa in general a very slippery sign that is very difficult to grasp (see Mafeje, 1971; Zeleza, 2006), particularly from alienating Western perspectives that African ‘accomplices’ of the Western thinking often adopt (Rwafa, 2014, p. 111) in regulating what is and what is not knowledge; which states are democratic and which ones are ‘rogue states’ (Rice & Waugh, 2001, p. 219). In this context, to understand political communication and contestation with regard to the State, for example, requires the theorist to extricate her or himself from colonial discourses with their power to determine who can say what, how and when (cf. Foucault, 1980; Descombes, 1994; Thompson, 1996; Rice & Waugh, 2001).

The above bears noting, as it is arguable that academic discourse on Zimbabwe’s political discourse post-2000 has tended to largely rely on Western theory as the instrument of analysis. This is arguably the case as Western discourse has indeed achieved and maintained hegemonic status when it comes to examining African phenomena (Ahluwalia, 2001). Many African scholars become ‘converts’ or ‘accomplices’ of the Western discourse (see Mafeje, 1971; Zeleza, 2006; Rwafa, 2012) in order to be able to be given the barest of recognition by publishing in Western-dominated media-spheres. This is not surprising considering Nakata, Nakata, Keech and Bolt’s (2012) observation that Western liberal discourse sets up institutions to train people in epistemic obedience. It is also not surprising when one considers that those who do not conform to Western epistemology risk being marginalised as mad men whose discourse is not in currency with that of rational men and women (see Foucault, 1980; Descombes, 1994; Thompson, 1996; Rice & Waugh, 2001). In this regard, in relation to political communication in African settings such as Zimbabwe, there is an abiding need to challenge the ways in which, as Mignolo (2011) argues, liberal doctrine and Western scholars attempt to break the code of non-Western scholars.

A consequence of failing to see things from the perspective of Africans, or of failing to interpret political communication from a view that recognises African people and their experiences, is that often political communication practices, issues and debates are mis-

80 framed, misunderstood and deformed by theorists. This is such a problem that Zeleza (2006) observes what is considered rational in an African context may not be considered rational in a European context or amongst non-Africans who even label it irrational or incomprehensible. For example, with regard to the land reform programme in Zimbabwe, Kalaora (2011) argues that many Western critics viewed peasant blacks’ demands for land as incomprehensible and as madness in ways that suggest that they could not present their theories from the perspective of Africans for whom colonial dispossession of land is a burning concern. For such Western critics of land reform in Zimbabwe, political communication that focuses on this issue is likely to be similarly (mis)read as incomprehensible madness. These (mis)readings of African phenomena are a result of the West’s pervasive cynicism regarding Africa (Szeftel, 1998), as ‘…the continent-least- likely-to-democratise-itself…’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997, p. 125).

The upshot is that one is justified to be weary of Western-inspired scholarship that labels ZANU-PF political communication bankrupt, on account of a view that African nationalism is bankrupt (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Ranger, 2004 & 2005). One is justified to think carefully about some of the abysmal and overreaching criticism (De Sousa Santos, 2007) that says post-independence ZANU-PF failed to transform into a ‘proper governing party’ (Masunungure, 2004; Scholz, 2004) and that Mugabe is a dictator (Meredith, 2011; see also Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). At their worst, some such accusations against ZANU-PF are reflective of an abyssal type of thinking that persists amongst some European scholars and their African counterparts; a pattern of thinking that is a result of colonialism despite the occurrence of significant political and economic changes on the continent (Mafeje, 1971; Zeleza, 2006; Rwafa, 2012). A good example of such persistence is Lindgren’s (2003) insistence on calling Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe by its colonial name, Salisbury, 23 years after independence. It could be because for these scholars, ‘colonies do not cease to be colonies simply because they are independent’ (Benjamin Disraeli, quoted by Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 52).

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, some insights gleaned from Western theory remain relevant in the analysis of the post-colony because the rise of the indigenous does not in any way lead to its disappearance or destruction (see Nakata et al., 2012; see also

Ahluwalia, 2001). In any case, ‘decolonisation…cannot be equated with “after colonialism”…decolonisation is a dynamic, on-going process which affects both the culture of the colonised and the colonisers’ (Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 50). Following on this, in the study of ZANU-PF advertisements, I do not treat Western, post-colonial and decolonial theories as mutually exclusive. It is useful to use insights gleaned from these theories in analysing ZANU-PF discourse. It is also important to acknowledge that the politics of post-independence Zimbabwe are influenced by ‘…the pre-colonial, the colonial, the armed struggle and ZANU-PF’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, p. 102; see also Rwafa, 20112). It is also influenced by global politics in which the weakened African state tries to maintain its power and sovereignty in the face of NGOs and supra-national pressure (see Ahluwalia, 2001; Barrow, 2005). It is a context whereby the globalisation process is characterised by inequality and the imposition of Western concepts of democracy, human rights and good governance on countries of the South by the economically, technologically and militarily powerful countries of the North (see Axtmann, 2007; Barrow, 2005; Ahluwalia, 2001). In this African context, democracy is, as Comaroff and Comaroff (1997, p. 127) note, a decontextualised idea that leaves Africans ‘with a dangerous dilemma: to accept… this “unAfrican” model of the state or to adopt an “anti- modern”, ethnically based, pluralist political community...’ With this in mind, this study seeks to take what can be repurposed from Western theory and to draw on African perspectives to suggest a new way of theorising African political communication that does not view these as mutually exclusive. In so doing, this study seeks to advance an approach that borrows from a multiplicity of theories both Western and local; one that also acknowledges the fluidity and inconsistency (see Mafeje, 1971; Allen, 1995; Ahluwalia, 2001; Thomson, 2004; Hyden, 2006; Zeleza, 2006), and indeed the complexity of the post-colonial African reality. It is an approach that acknowledges that the ‘geographical, historical, cultural and representational [boundaries of the reality or construct that is Africa are fluid and shift constantly in response to the obtaining] conceptualisations and configurations of global racial identities and power, African nationalism, including Pan- Africanism’ (Zeleza, 2006, p. 14).

Analysis of post-2000 Zimbabwean political communication also requires appreciation of the fact that democracy is a contested terrain. Fully understanding post-2000

Zimbabwean political communication requires one to acknowledge that democracy, human rights and good governance involve a sustained assault on the sovereignty of third world countries, including Zimbabwe, by the West (see Axtmann, 2007). As Zeleza (2006, p. 14) notes, globalisation and projects of African integration are also influencing the ‘maps, and meanings of “Africa” and “Africanness”’. From this perspective, there is value in acknowledging that, ‘…the amorphous nature of imperialism has entailed a globalisation which has penetrated virtually every part of the continent’ (Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 49). In the process of globalisation and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-led (Western neo-liberal) demands for de-regulation, the African state is ‘identified…as ‘the problem’, and liberalisation and democratisation as ‘the solution’ to that problem…’ (Szeftel, 1998, p. 221). In other words, democratisation and liberalisation mean a weakening of the state (see Ahluwalia, 2001; Barrow, 2005; Axtmann, 2007). The liberalisation that takes place largely through adoption of IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) entails the state withdrawing from active involvement in the market and also cutting back on expenditure on social services. As the state withdrew, the void it left was filled by NGOs, through which donor aid was channelled, thus weakening the state’s allocative powers (Ahluwalia, 2001). Acknowledging that such radical weakening of the state led to a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ where the state is not only unable to provide for its citizens, but is also under immense pressure from, externally, multi-lateral institutions, and locally, from increasingly political foreign funded NGOs that advance the neo-liberal agenda (Ahluwalia, 2001; Szeftel, 1998) is a key requirement of the approach proposed here.

It is worthwhile noting that any analysis of ZANU-PF discourse should borrow from extant Western theory, since Zimbabwe in 1990 adopted IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (Muzondidya, 2009), which entailed adopting Western neo-liberal policies of de-regulation and democratisation. However, in borrowing from Western theory and grounding the study in the global context, I am cognisant of the controversies around globalisation; a process that Barrow (2005, p. 125) says, ‘…in its current form, is actually a new form of American imperialism’. Noting that the global circulation of ideas of democracy, human rights and good governance is a key characteristic of globalisation (Thussu, 2000), it is useful to locate the analysis of ZANU-PF discourse within its global

83 socio-economic-political (discourse) context. Locating the analysis of ZANU-PF discourse firmly within this context of contestation, pitting the African state against local NGOs, their foreign funders, supra-national bodies such as IMF/World Bank and Western governments, has the potential to generate newer insights into ways that the ahistorical and abyssal (see Shivji, 2003; De Sousa Santos, 2007; see also Houtondji, 1997; Connell, 2007; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001) western theory does not.

In the section that follows, I explore post-colonial discourses’ abyssal (mis)readings of African politics in general and Zimbabwean political discourse post-2000 in particular. The intention is to show the inadequacies of their (mis)readings, as they did not engage with the sign systems of post-colonial Zimbabwe in ways that acknowledge its complexity. I intend to show how a multi-theoretical approach that uses insights gleaned from Western theory, de-colonial theory and post-colonial theory can in significant ways challenge some of the abyssal analyses of ZANU-PF discourses characteristic of post-2000 writings on Zimbabwe.

3.6 ON POST-COLONIALITY AND DE-COLONIALITY: LESSONS FOR THE NEW THEORY OF AFRICAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Post-colonial theory holds that the effect of the African state’s inheritance of the colonial system was that the state ‘rapidly degenerated and became a simulacrum of the colonial state in which absolute power was vested’ (Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 56; see also Ake, 1996). This post-colonial theory’s abyssal reading of African politics is a result of its re-inscription of the colonial forms of domination that it seeks to challenge (Ahmad, 1992, cited by Ahluwalia, 2001; see Mafeje, 1971; Zeleza, 2006; Rwafa, 2014). Such re-inscriptions are self-evident in Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2009) characterisation of ZANU-PF discourse as nativism and racism; a characterisation that echoes Western accusations of Mugabe practising reverse racism during his fast-track land reform programme.

The thesis argues that such abyssal readings of African political phenomena give credence to the argument that post-colonial theory is essentialist (Chipkin, 2007) in so far as it reduces Africa to a mirror image of the colonial state and treats its problems as pathological (see Mkandawire, 2011; Van Onslow, 2011; Zeleza, 2006). Bearing in mind

84 post-colonial and Western theories’ shortcomings, the study suggests a new theory of African political communication (specifically political advertising), through examining the ZANU-PF election discourse for July 2013 from a multi-theoretical perspective that borrows from sign theory, political advertising theory, post-colonial theory and decolonial theory and grounds the analysis of the discourse in its holistic context. As Homi Bhabha (1995, p. 50) argues, ‘Post-colonial critical discourses require forms of dialectical thinking that do not disavow or sublate the otherness (alterity) that constitutes the symbolic domain of psychic and social identifications’. Thus, in this thesis, I am trying not only to ‘render visible all that has been submerged, excluded or overwritten’ (Nakata et al., 2012, p. 130), but am trying to do it in a way that does not also treat the indigenous as the antithesis of Western theory. Such an approach will enable me to avoid the reductive tendencies of decoloniality; a tendency that, as Nakata et al., (2012, p. 127) observe, although is

…ideologically powerful in terms of the indigenous sense of autonomy and distinctiveness…runs the danger of reifying colonial binaries…More importantly, political resistance that demands the routine dismissal of the Western, as colonial and the singular original source of Indigenous struggles, when coupled with the quick reclaiming and re-naming of the Indigenous, inhibits fuller, more measured examination of the complex layers of meaning that circumscribe what it means to be indigenous and how indigenous social conditions and concerns are understood.

It will enable me to avoid the simplicity of both regime critics and regime praise singers (see Moore, 2012) who treat the indigenous and the Western as mutually exclusive; yet both the indigenous and the Western were equally tainted by the colonial encounter (see Zeleza, 2006; Ahluwalia, 2001).

To overcome post-colonial theory’s flawed tendency to reduce Africa, and Zimbabwe in particular, to a mere mirror image or heir to the colonial state, a ‘more measured and complex analysis’ (Nakata et al., 2012, p. 127) of Zimbabwe’s political communication is required. This complex analysis requires a multi-theoretical approach that not only repurposes insights from Western theory and post-colonial theory, but also re-purposes insights from decolonial theory. As Appiah (1992, p. x) observes, ‘…ideological

85 decolonisation is bound to fail if it neglects either “tradition” or exogenous “Western” ideas, and…many African…intellectuals have failed to find a negotiable middle way…’ The failure to strike a balance between Western theory and Indigenous Knowledge forms of analysis has seen, on one hand most writings about Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF by critics being characterised by post-colonial essentialism. This is largely because the Western neo-liberal discourse (or theory) has acted as guard to the prison gates of this discourse that no one is allowed to break free from (see Mignolo, 2011; see also Mafeje, 1971). On the other hand, those critics who challenged the Western theory-inspired analyses have tended to merely uncritically praise ZANU-PF while trashing its critics as ‘misguided imperialist stooges’ (see Rwafa, 2014, p. 108).

Mindful of the failure by both Western and African intellectuals to adequately theorise about the African political phenomenon (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Houtondji, 1997; Mbembe, 2001), the thesis argues that the study’s adoption of a multi-theoretical approach is an attempt to overcome Western theory’s, post-colonial theory’s and decolonial theory’s simplistic reading of African political communication. The multi- theoretical approach to African political communication suggested in this thesis is not just a calling for ‘epistemic disobedience’ (Mignolo, 2009, cited by Nakata et al., 2012, p. 124) that calls for a de-link from Western epistemological assumptions that there is a ‘detached and neutral point of observation through which to interpret and know the world’ (Nakata et al., 2012, p. 124). It is not just contesting a ‘destructive and imposed Western framework’ (Nakata et al., 2012, p. 125); neither is it just dispelling ‘the myth that there are global needs but only one (diverse) center where knowledge is produced to solve the problems of everybody…’ (Mignolo, 2011, p. xvi). The approach I am proposing is an explosion and implosion of theory that borrows both from Western theory and Indigenous Knowledge Systems and/or Southern theory. It is perhaps an attempt to find Appiah’s (1992, p. x) ‘negotiable middle way…’ between endogenous and exogenous Western ideas. Or maybe, put conversely, am doing epistemic disobedience of both Western theory and indigenous theory rather than the simplistic epistemic disobedience of the Western theory and obedience of indigenous theory (see Nakata et al., 2012, p. 129). This engagement with both Western theory and indigenous analysis (theory from the South) or call to a new theory of African political communication

…rests on understanding the positioning effect of knowledge or claims to know, as well as the practices that order, privilege, and operationalise some claims to know by excluding or silencing others. The will may be to overcome the Western but to pretend its presence disappears when the Indigenous re-asserts its epistemic conditions is a dangerous delusion (Nakata et al., 2012, p. 131).

I therefore do not intend to exclude Western theory, but also intend to borrow from it in this new theory of African political communication. The intention is not to simplistically embrace indigenous theory and oppose the Western theory and treat it as the antithesis of the indigenous as it raises other own ‘epistemic concerns… [The intention is to engage in a] more measured and complex analysis’ that the epistemological conditions of both the Western and the indigenous theories demand (Nakata et al., 2012, p. 127; see Zeleza, 2006). Such an approach requires one to engage both theory from the South and Western theory, even though Western theory tends to deny the existence of other knowledges.

The approach I suggest here seeks to overcome the simplistic (mis)readings of ZANU- PF discourses which are both a result of post-colonial theory and Western theory’s’ abyssal nature and de-colonial theory’s celebratory nature. As a strategy to achieve this, the multi-theoretical approach I suggest here acknowledges: African politics and Africans as rational humans (Mbembe, 2001; Thomson, 2004; Zeleza, 2006); that Africa is not homogenous but complex; and that individual African nations such as Zimbabwe are also very complex (Allen, 1995; Thomson, 2004). Indeed, to acknowledge that Africa is complex – it had complex colonial and post-colonial histories and there is no unitary African identity (see Allen, 1995; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Hyden, 2006; Zeleza, 2006 – is to begin to question the abyssal nature of not only Western theory, but also post-colonial theory. It is the beginning of theorising about African political systems and not political system, since there is no typical African political system (Allen, 1995; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Thomson, 2004). In this vein, there is value in rejecting post-colonial theory’s simplistic re-inscription ‘of the very forms of domination that which it seeks to deconstruct’ (Ahmad, 1992, cited Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 2); a re- inscription that implicitly confirms the claim that ‘colonies do not cease to be colonies simply because they are independent’ (Benjamin Disraeli, cited by Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 52). It is a re-inscription that wrongly identifies the colonial as the centre and the post-

87 colonial as its reflection.

Through analysis of ZANU-PF advertisements for July 2013, the study seeks to address the absence and/or the abandonment of theorisation in favour of reducing African politics to some ‘typifying adjectives-communist, clientalist, patriarchal, paternalist, and the like…’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997, p. 129; see also Houtondji, 1997) and to common characteristics that are ‘identified by the frequency of their appearance: military coups, one party states, corruption, ethnic politics, etc.’ (Allen, 1995, p. 302). It seeks to debunk such (mis)readings of ZANU-PF discourse by situating the analysis firmly within context and interpreting it using insights re-purposed from post-colonial theory, decolonial theory and Western theory. Such a multi-theoretical approach hopes to overcome the (mis)use of Western theory and post-colonial theory to simplistically dismiss ZANU-PF discourse as dictatorial and decolonial theory’s tendency to uncritically hail ZANU-PF’s discourse as symptomatic of its patriotism and Pan Africanism (see Moore, 2012; Rwafa, 2012). It is an approach that seeks to address in significant ways the lack of theorisation regarding African political communication; what Houtondji, (1997, p. 2) has described as a howling absence of theoretical work.

The deployment of such a theory that privileges neither the Western and post-colonial abyssal thinking, nor the celebratory Pan African and decolonial frameworks of regime scholars, would enable the study to avoid the simplicity of regime critics who uncritically simply turn regime scholars’ celebratory scholarship upside down (see Moore, 2012) and regime scholars who uncritically celebrate ZANU-PF discourse without paying due regard to the complexities of Zimbabwe. The starting point of such a multi-theoretical theory should be that neither Western, post-colonial nor decolonial theory used independent of each other is adequate in the analysis of ZANU-PF discourse. To do that is to begin to overcome the simplicity characteristic of regime praise singers and regime critics’ works. It is also to begin theorising about African political communication.

3.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY

In attempting to understand the ZANU-PF nationalist discourse, one should be cognisant of the inadequacy of Western theory, decolonial theory or post-colonial theory if used

88 independently of the others. Any attempt to analyse ZANU-PF advertisements should be grounded in a multi-theoretical approach that uses insights borrowed from extant Western theory, post-colonial theory and decolonial theory. This is because merely looking at African political communication from a Western perspective is inadequate, given the tendency by Western theory to treat Africa as the other. Merely looking at it from a decolonial perspective is also inadequate since it may end up being an endeavour aimed at simplistically valorising the previously marginalised. Furthermore, adopting a post- colonial approach is inadequate since this approach is essentialist and tends to treat the post-colony as an heir apparent of the colonial; a mirror image of the repressive colonial state. Consequently, in light of the foregoing, the study seeks to borrow from Western theory, de-colonial theory and post-colonial theory in its attempt to interpret Zimbabwean political communication as a strategy of overcoming the weaknesses associated with each of the theories discussed above.

Having presented the conceptual framework, the next chapter discusses the research methodology employed in this study. It presents and discusses the qualitative specifically the interpretive research paradigm utilised in data gathering, presentation and analysis in the study.

CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Methodology enables the researcher to plan and evaluate the research methods and designs, providing a means to demonstrate their ability to generate new knowledge. It includes the systematic steps taken by the researcher in conducting a study (Krippendorf, 2004). For the purposes of this study, I use the qualitative research approach, specifically the interpretive paradigm (Tutwane, 2010; Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011) to investigate the meanings of the ZANU-PF election advertisements. The interpretive paradigm is interested in how messages are understood (Willig, 2001).

I operate within the hermeneutic circle, where to understand the part one has to understand the whole and vice versa (Krippendorf, 2004; Deacon et al., 2007). In the hermeneutic circle, the context in which the advertisements were produced is central to the interpretation of the advertisements. This is to say that in my interpretive approach, the political advertisements that are the subjects of this study are understood as part and parcel of a bigger political-economic and socio-cultural context and also part of a specific sign system. The study thus seeks to answer the following questions:

 To what extent are nationalistic discourses evident in the political advertisements?  In what ways, if any, does the ‘system of signs’ utilised in the advertisements express post-colonial Zimbabwean discourse?

As will be elaborated below, the above questions can best be answered by utilising qualitative research approaches of critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis.

4.2 CASE FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH/INTERPRETIVISM

The choice of the qualitative research approach, especially interpretivism, is indicative of my epistemological (the nature of knowledge) and ontological (my world view) assumptions regarding the ZANU-PF’s nationalist discourse (see Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011; Tutwane, 2010; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Willig, 2001). I argue that reality is subjective and that contexts affect the meaning of texts. Thus my epistemological position

90 is interpretivism which is interested in finding out the meanings of phenomena (Schwandt, 2003). My positioning in the interpretivist paradigm which underlies qualitative research (Hennink et al., 2011; Tutwane, 2010) has implications for the end result of the study. Because of this positioning, I am reflexive. This shall be discussed in detail further below. However, it is, argued that ‘when the epistemological approach is right, the research design will be right and the end product will be right’ (Tutwane, 2010, p. 65). In this case the epistemological position is correct since the study is interested in meanings of the ZANU-PF election advertisements’ nationalist discourse. It is that desire to study meanings of the ZANU-PF election advertisements that necessitates the use of archival research for purposes of data collection and thematic analysis augmented by semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis for purposes of data analysis. The above- mentioned methods of data gathering and data analysis were influenced by the research question (Flick, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Tutwane, 2010). The research question itself flows from my ontological position which in turn is the basis of my interpretivist epistemology (Tutwane, 2010). The correctness of the research methods ensures validity and reliability of the study’s findings.

However, qualitative research is not easy to define, as it ‘covers a wide range of techniques and philosophies’ (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011, p. 8). It lacks an underlying philosophy, theory or methodology (Schwandt, 2003; Nudzor, 2009) and is characterised by many ‘-isms’ such as ‘interactionism, feminism, postmodernism, constructionism’ (Nudzor, 2009, p. 118; see also Hennink et al., 2011; Flick, 2006; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Furthermore, it also borrows from literary theory, British Cultural Studies and Marxism (Schwandt, 2003; Krippendorf, 2004; Hennink et al., 2011), but it is generally agreed that qualitative research and/or qualitative content analysis emerged as a critique of positivism (Schwandt, 2003; Nudzor, 2009; Hennink et al., 2011). Therefore, it is the limits and constraints of quantitative research that are usually used to justify qualitative research (Flick, 1996; see Deacon, Pickering, Golding & Murdock, 1999; Nudzor, 2009). Quantitative research, which falls under the positivist paradigm, emphasises objective facts and shuns researcher influence and as a result experimental research and quantitative surveys are some of its methods (Hennink el al., 2011; Tutwane, 2010; Nudzor, 2009). Positivist methods also deny contextual influences on research

91 participants or on content and they also deny them their ‘humanness’ (Hennink et al., 2011, p. 14). But qualitative research is reformist as it rejects positivism’s rejection of research participants’ agency and it believes that audiences are active (cf. Tutwane 2010; Nudzor, 2009; Schwandt, 2003). It also values the subjectivity by which people encounter realities and achieve meanings; thus it looks at phenomena from the point of view of the people under study and in the context in which it takes place. As a result, qualitative research techniques are also sometimes labelled ‘interpretive’, (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 17) because their main concern is to find the meaning of phenomena in the context in which they take place.

In addition to the above, qualitative research is ‘fluid, evolving, and dynamic…’ less structured and less rigid than quantitative research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 13; see also Tutwane, 2010). The approach also generates ‘novel and provocative insights’ (Deacon et al., 2007, p. 7) that provide opportunities for further research.The other advantage of qualitative research is that replicability is of little concern (Krippendorf, 2004). In effect, it is not unusual for researchers to reach different meanings on phenomena, because emphasis in interpretive paradigm is on interpretation (cf. Hennink et al., 2011; Schwandt, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Analysts never reach a final and correct interpretation (Schwandt, 2003) since interpretation is the researcher’s ‘impressions of…data…’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 49). It is also because media texts have multiple meanings; they do not have fixed meanings, ‘that could be “found”, “identified”, and “described” for what they are…’ (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 22). Texts mean different things to different people, even those from the same sub-culture. However, that that does not mean that the text can be read any how and has an infinite number of readings (Deacon et al., 2007). This is because, in the process of encoding the text, the author or encoder attempts to close off other unintended readings (Thompson, 1996). Despite the encoder’s attempts to close off other readings, audiences are heterogeneous and active and thus they bring to bear on the text their own horizons of understanding (Gripsrud, 2002). In their encounter with the text, audiences (including discourse and semiotic analysts) bring forth their prejudices influenced by their age, religion, education, race, gender, political inclination, norms and values, among other variables. As a result, the meanings that, for example Chitando (2005), as outlined in Chapter One, reached

92 with regard to ZANU-PF’s nationalist discourse might not necessarily be similar to those that I reach.

Bearing in mind the fact that researchers bring to bear on texts their horizons of understanding (cf. Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Tutwane, 2010), I operate within the hermeneutic circle (Schwandt, 2005; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). In the hermeneutic circle, the researcher recontextualises, reinterprets and redefines the research problem continuously ‘until some kind of satisfactory interpretation is reached’ (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 87).

Context is a key feature of qualitative inquiry/analysis which reduces instances of misrepresentation and distortion of meaning (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The meaning of media texts is relative to specific contexts (circumstances in which the texts were created), discourses and the reason(s) for which they were created (Krippendorf, 2004). As Hodder (1994), cited by Deacon et al. (1999, p. 30) notes, texts ‘are indelibly shaped by the pressures, possibilities and temptations generated by the political and cultural contexts in which they are embedded’. Consequently, grounding the text in context enables the researcher ‘to gain a better grasp of their omissions, biases and peculiarities’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 30). In other words, in the hermeneutic circle, for one to understand the part one has to understand the whole and vice versa (Schwandt, 2005). Therefore, if one is to understand the meaning of a text then one has to understand the context in which the text was produced; that is, the context in which the text is meaningful (Deacon et al., 2007).

The context in which the advertisements under study were created is unique. It is different, for example, from the contexts in which the other nationalist discourses studied by other scholars were created (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, 2009 & 2011; Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Mazango, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Freeman, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Thram, 2006; Ndlovu- Gatsheni & Willems, 2010). The study thus seeks to give due regard to the context in which the ZANU-PF discourse and/or advertisements were created. For instance, some of the scholars mentioned above failed to acknowledge that in an electoral contest, questioning an opponent’s credibility is as important as building up one’s own credibility (cf. Waldahl, 2005). In other words, the scholars failed to ground their scholarship within

93 political advertising theory (cf. Willems, 2004; Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003) where attack or negative and comparative advertising are legitimate political communication techniques in an electoral contest (cf. Pinkleton, Um, & Austin, 2002; Jasperson & Fan, 2002; Meirick, 2002; Lilleker, 2006; Kaid, 2012). In most of the scholarship there was no attempt at all to be reflexive, to engage with how researcher subjectivity influenced the study (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009), something that would have given the studies more credibility and validity (Krippendorf, 2004; Tutwane, 2010). In other words, researcher subjectivity is intrinsic to the research context and should be critically engaged with (Hennink et al., 2011; Corbin & Strauss 2008; Fine, Weis, Weseen & Wong, 2003).

As a result of the importance of context in analysis and interpretation of data, the context in which the ZANU-PF election advertisements for the 31 July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe were produced and placed or circulated will be significant in understanding the advertisements. As Kaid (2012, p. 37) observes ‘…the study of political advertising outside the United States of America must confront a plethora of contextual and cultural concerns [such as] differences in governmental structures, political party organisations, media systems, regulatory constraints and above all, language and culture’. In the interpretation of the election advertisements, I am mindful of the fact that the elections were conducted in the context of a Government of National Unity (GNU). The GNU was born after the signing of the Southern African Development Committee (SADC) brokered Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the major political parties, ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and the then Arthur Mutambara-led smaller MDC, that contested the disputed March 2008 election. In this GNU, the major political protagonists, President Mugabe of ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC-T, plus Welshman Ncube of the smaller MDC faction and their respective political parties, were in government. I am also mindful of the fact that the elections were conducted in a context of relative political and economic stability, even though unemployment was very high. In this context, the GNU had a National Healing and Reconciliation Organ which actively campaigned for a peaceful pre- and post-election period. It also had a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) which was put in place to prevent incidences of political violence and to ensure the implementation

94 of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). All the three political parties in government seconded members to these organs.

The environment was also characterised by the use of a multiple-currency system (the US$, South Africa Rand, and the Botswana Pula), the adoption of a new constitution just before the elections and the highly publicised marital problems faced by Morgan Tsvangirai of MDC-T. The government, through the ZANU-PF-controlled Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, was also implementing the 51% local shareholding policy in the mining sector. Besides the above, the environment was also characterised by the regional Southern African Development Committee’s (SADC) diplomatic efforts to ensure a peaceful, free and fair election in Zimbabwe. It was also characterised by demands by the usual Western countries, the USA, Britain and Australia, among others, for the government – specifically ZANU-PF – to ensure a peaceful, credible, free and fair election. In the context sketched above, the analysis grapples with the fact that post-colonial Zimbabwe is an ‘artefact’ that has no correspondence to any pre-colonial reality (Shaw, 1986). The newspapers in which the advertisements appeared and the actual placement of the advertisements on specific pages, as discussed in Chapter Two, also forms part of the context in which the advertisements were produced and circulated, bearing in mind that the private press have been characterised as pro- opposition MDC-T (cf. Chuma, 2008; Nyamanhindi, 2008; Moyo, 2005). Finally, the MDC- T election advertisements for the 31 July 2013 election in Zimbabwe also form part of the context in which the ZANU-PF advertisements are understood. For example, the ‘Our Manifesto has excited everyone’ ZANU-PF election advertisement can only be understood in relation to the MDC-T’s advertisement which sought to mock its manifesto. In other words, the advertisement was a direct response to an MDC-T advertisement. The analysis takes note of the fact that the advertisements were created during an election setting. Taking cognisance of the context sketched above ensures that the analysis and interpretation of the ZANU-PF advertisements is grounded in context, thus enabling it to go beyond mere description of the advertisements to capture the complexity of the issues under study (see Tutwane, 2010). It enabled me to avoid distortion and misrepresentation in the analysis of the advertisements (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

In addition, I am reflexive in the analysis and interpretation of the ZANU-PF election advertisements for the 31 July 2013 elections since in interpretivism, researchers operate within the hermeneutic circle. Interpretivism acknowledges the fact that a researcher’s being, that is, his ‘background, position and emotions’ are a central component in the research process (Hennink et al., 2011, p. 18; see also Nudzor, 2009). Researchers should thus approach their work from a particular point of view that is part of their being and disclose their position and ‘prior knowledge of the context of given texts’ (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 88). It is this reflexivity that makes the study credible, confirmable and transferable (Krippendorf, 2004). Consequently, I acknowledge and scrutinise how my subjectivity impacts the research process (Hennink et al., 2011; Fine, Weis, Weseen & Wong, 2003). In the context of this thesis, a key consequence of my reflexivity is the use of the first person ‘I’. It is an acknowledgement that my being as a Zimbabwean has a bearing on my interpretation of ZANU-PF discourse. In the interpretation of ZANU-PF advertisements, I operate in the hermeneutic circle. This is because for the qualitative researcher, operating in the hermeneutic circle brings the self into the process of interpretation, as interpretation is the impressions a researcher makes of data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). As Schwandt (2005, p. 302) observes, ‘…reading and understanding is not a matter of setting aside, escaping, managing or tracking one’s own standpoint, prejudgements, biases or prejudices. On the contrary, understanding requires the engagement of one’s biases’. I believe we cannot deny the researcher his subjectivity as it is impossible for the researcher to divorce himself/herself from their study (Willig, 2001). As Schwandt (2005, p. 301) argues, ‘we cannot shake off tradition at will’. It is ‘a living force that enters all understanding’ (Gallagher, 1992, cited by Schwandt, 2005, p. 301; see Nudzor, 2009). Instead of trying to shake off my subjectivity – my humanness – I am instead reflexive, as reflexivity legitimises or validates and lends credibility to the research (see Krippendorf, 2004; Hennink et al., 2011).

My subjectivity as a Zimbabwean who has lived and is living through ZANU-PF (mis)rule is bound to affect my interpretation of its advertisements no matter how hard I try to divorce myself from the study and despite my adoption of a multi-modal theoretical framework. Consequently, I do not support what Willig (2001, p. 3) calls the ‘correspondence theory of truth… [positivism, that] suggests that phenomena directly

96 determine our perception of them and that there is, therefore, a direct correspondence between things and their representation’. I do not concur with positivism’s obsession with objective facts and issues of replicability (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Tutwane, 2010) because reality is subjective. Meaning of texts, works of art, aesthetics, religion and faith are some of the areas where science/positivism cannot discover answers (Descombes, 2002, cited by Nudzor, 2009). Since reality is always subjective, it is what we make it (see Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009) and researcher subjectivity may result in different researchers reaching different interpretations of the same document (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The same researcher may also reach different readings of the same text at different times (Hennink et al., 2011; Schwandt, 2003). It is this belief in the subjective nature of reality that directly influenced my choice of the interpretive critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis (cf. Stokes, 2003; Priest, 1996; Krippendorf, 2004). This method of analysis, just like the method of data collection that is used in the study, is influenced by the research questions presented earlier. In all qualitative research, it is the research question that dictates the research methods that will be used (Tutwane, 2010; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Flick, 2006). The interpretive paradigm I utilise in this study was influenced by the desire to unpack the meanings of ZANU-PF’s election advertisements for July 2013.

In the analysis of the advertisements, I try to understand the author’s intentions and also try to identify the target audience. The author’s intentions and his target audience obviously dictate his choice of theme, medium, pictures, colours and words, among others. As a result, I try to figure out the intentions of ZANU-PF in creating specific advertisements and using specific media, themes, words, colours and pictures. I also ground the analysis and interpretation of the advertisements in the specific political, socio- cultural and economic context in which they were produced and circulated, a context that I sketched above. This contextualisation is significant since the meaning of signs is in the context in which they were produced and circulated (Deacon et al., 2007). In other words, meaning does not reside in texts but in context in the society in which the sign is meaningful. I also look at the rules governing the language such as identifying the signs in the advertisements, the codes under which the signs fall, syntagmatic analysis, the denotative and connotative meaning of the texts and their ideological work (cf. Mick, 1986;

Stokes, 2003; Krippendorf, 2004; Bertrand & Hughes, 2005; Berger, n.d; Deacon et al., 2007). To achieve this, semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis are used. Finally, I analyse and interpret the data at the same time since interpretation is part of everyday life. I provide researcher gaze; that is, my own interpretation of the data, and I am reflexive since interpretation is the ‘researcher’s impression of…data…’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 49). These impressions of data may be influenced by my being, by tradition or my beliefs, biases and values (Schwandt, 2005) with regard to the ZANU-PF election advertisements.

However, in analysing political texts, it has been said that one also has to understand ‘rules of the game’ rather than how the game is played (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 136) but in this study I am interested in both. The rules of the game and how the game is played constitute part of the context in which I seek to understand ZANU-PF’s nationalist discourses. There are several scholars who have written about ZANU-PF’s nationalist discourses and have concluded that it uses character assassination, bankrupt nationalism, patriotic history and land as its key election hook (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Chitando, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Thram, 2006). However, these scholars did not heed Waldahl (2005)’s assertion that in political contestation, destroying an opponent’s credibility is as important as building up one’s credibility. Thus grounding the ZANU-PF discourses within political advertising theory, decolonial theory, post- colonial theory and sign theory within context is an attempt to understand ‘the rules of the game’. Furthermore, I also scrutinise ‘the underlying structure of the text and how this determines the functioning of the text’ as this is central to the study of media texts (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 136). Consequently, I also seek to find out what is similar and what is different; that is, the continuities and discontinuities in the ZANU-PF discourse. It is the differences that I am interested in as they provide room for the generation of a new theory of African political communication (see Eisenhardt, 2002).

The aim of this study, as pointed out in the introductory chapter and Chapter Three, is to suggest a new approach or theory of African political communication – thus the choice of qualitative research methods for purposes of answering the research questions. The general objective of qualitative research is developing new theory (Flick, 2006; see also

Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Hennink et al., 2011). The study’s desire is to answer the following questions: To what extent are nationalistic discourses evident in the [ZANU-PF] political advertisements? In what ways, if any, does the ‘system of signs’ utilised in the advertisements express post-colonial Zimbabwean discourse? Since research methodology is determined by the research questions (Tutwane, 2010; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Flick, 2006), the study utilises archival research for data gathering, and thematic analysis augmented by critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis for the analysis and interpretation of data.

4.3 CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN

The study utilises the qualitative case study research design. Research design is a plan of action-‘a logical structure of the inquiry’ (de Vaus 2001, p.9). The case that the study focuses on are ZANU-PF print media election advertisements for July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe. The individual ZANU-PF newspaper advertisements for July 2013 constitute the study’s units of analysis or case. As de Vaus (2001, p. 220) observes, ‘ä case is the ‘object’ of study. It is the unit of analysis about which we collect information’. I opted for the qualitative case study research design because my study has a theoretical dimension and is also interested in the context of the advertisements’ production and circulation. My intention, as stated elsewhere in this thesis, is to suggest a new theory in the study of African political communication specifically ZANU-PF election discourse. It is therefore arguable that, since a case study ‘must have ä theoretical dimension’ (de Vaus 2001), it is the right research design for this particular study. The case study, it has been argued, is useful in theory building (de Vaus 2001; Baxter & Jack 2008). I also selected the case study research design because it enables the researcher to explore an event or a case in the context in which it occurred (Baxter & Jack 2008, p. 544). The study seeks to understand ZANU-PF print media election advertisements in the context in which they were produced and circulated. In effect the study seeks to understand the ZANU-PF advertisements in context and from a multi-theoretical approach with a view to suggesting a new theory of African political communication. As de Vaus (2001) also argues, we seek to understand cases in the context that they exist. In this study. I examine ZANU-PF print

99 media election advertisements for July 2013 in their context of production and circulation; a context sketched in this chapter under Section 4.2.

4.4 SAMPLING THE ZANU-PF ELECTION ADVERTISEMENTS

All copies of the ZANU-PF advertisements for the 31 July 2013 elections placed in the Daily News, Newsday, The Standard and The Patriot were purposively sampled. The aim of purposive sampling [also known as relevance or judgement sampling] is to select all textual units that can be used to answer all the research questions (Krippendorf, 2004; see Tongco, 2007). This type of sampling is part of non-probability sampling techniques and the sample for the study is determined by the research problem (Krippendorf, 2004; Tongco, 2007). The choice of purposive sampling, just like the research methods, was influenced by the research question (cf. Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Tongco, 2007). The desire to study the ZANU-PF election advertisements’ nationalist discourse influenced the choice of the purposive sampling technique. Generally, samples for interpretive studies use purposive sampling because the concern is not about sample representativeness or statistical validity of inferences and replicability of study, but answering the research questions (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Palys, 2008; Tongco, 2007; see also Krippendorf, 2004).

As a result of the fact that the advertisements started appearing in the press on 21 July 2013, all copies of the Daily News, The Standard, The Patriot and Newsday between 21 July and 30 July 2013 that carried ZANU-PF election advertisements for the elections were purposively selected. The sample for the study consists of all the ZANU-PF election advertisements that appeared in the Daily News, The Patriot, The Newsday and The Standard between July 21 and July 30 2013. The newspapers for 31 July 2013 were not selected, since ZANU-PF did not place any political advertisements in the media on the actual day of voting. The units of analysis for the study are the individual advertisements. However, it is worth noting that whereas in quantitative content analysis the ‘physical linguistic units’ such as words, colours, ‘images, words and other observables [in all the ZANU-PF election advertisements] that are of interest to an analysis’ (Krippendorf, 2004; p. 83) constitute the units of analysis, in qualitative interpretevist studies, it is the theme

100 or an expression of an idea that is the unit of analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Nevertheless, for purposes of this study, both the ZANU-PF advertisements and the themes constitute my units of analysis.

Initially, my intention was to study advertisements placed in the state-controlled weekly newspaper, The Sunday Mail, and the daily newspaper, The Herald. Zimpapers, the parent company of the two newspapers, is controlled by the government through the Ministry of Information and it is used to advance ZANU-PF’s discourses (cf. Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999; Waldahl, 2004; Ranger, 2004; Waldahl, 2005; Ranger, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Chuma, 2008; Moyse, 2009). However, during the 31 July 2013 elections, ZANU- PF did not place any advertisements in the state-controlled press. Instead, they placed all their advertisements in the private press. However, the advertisements only started appearing on 21 July 2013. Interestingly, Zimpapers had indicated that, in accordance with the Electoral Act, political advertisements would be given two weeks before elections to avoid the crowding out of their corporate partners (Matambanadzo, 2013). It is arguable that ZANU-PF decided to place their advertisements in the private press so as to target those readers supposedly sympathetic to the opposition, as the private press are allegedly pro-opposition (cf. Moyo, 2005; Chuma, 2008; Chari, 2008, Nyamanhindi, 2008). ZANU-PF sometimes refers to the private press in Zimbabwe as ‘the opposition press’ or the ‘Western -sponsored media’. The Daily News is often labelled the ‘Daily Lies’ by state-controlled media and ZANU-PF officials. As a result, I settled for the major privately owned national newspapers, The Patriot, the Daily News, Newsday and The Standard.

Below is a breakdown of the number of newspaper copies and advertisements that I purposively selected: Newspaper Title & Advert Title Number of Number of Date Newspaper copies Advertisements collected The Standard

101 a) 21-27/07/13 Our manifesto has 2 2 excited everyone, p. S12 b) 28 July-03 August Gushungo 8, p. 9 2013 Daily News a). 22/07/13 Our manifesto…, p. 5 1 b) July 25 How indigenisation & 1 economic…, p. 3 c) July 26 Chamisa’s secret 4 1 Mugabe praise note, p. 9 d) July 30 i) Councils Bills 2 Cancelled, p.9 ii) What a peaceful campaign! P.14 3. Newsday a). 22 July 2013 Our manifesto…, p.32 1 b). 25 July 2013 How indigenisation & 1 economic ,p. 9 c) 26/07/13 Chamisa’s secret 5 1 Mugabe praise note, p. 6 d) 27/07/13 i). Gushungo 8, p. 27 2 ii). 29 January 2009- Multi-currency 3

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e) July 29 i) We will compensate you, p. 8 ii) Councils Bills Cancelled, p.33 iii) The people’s constitution, p. 34 4. The Patriot

a) 26 July – 01 i) Lest we forget, p. 5 1 2 August 2013 ii). Our manifesto…, p. 25 Total 12 17

After taking note of similar advertisements, the actual number of unique advertisements placed across the selected issues of the four newspapers by ZANU-PF is ten. The study’s use of descriptive statistical analysis here and later in the findings and analysis chapters does not necessarily mean that I use statistics to answer the research questions. Instead, I use the numbers to make my analysis more incisive. For me, since I am operating in the interpretivist paradigm, the use of numbers or frequency of the advertisements is ‘…a source of questions, a springboard for further investigation and analysis’ (Deacon et al., 2007, p. 8). Indeed, in interpretivism numbers are, contrary to positivist practice, not used to answer research questions but they are used as a springboard for further analysis of data (Deacon et al., 2007).

4.5 COLLECTING THE ADVERTISEMENTS FOR ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

I gathered newspapers during the course of the election campaign, building my own archive for archival research. As Murchison (2010, p. 165) notes, ‘building a collection of cultural artefacts, such as newspaper articles, produced during the course of the ethnographic research amounts to building a sort of cultural archive representing the particular historical circumstances of the ethnographic research’. I started media

103 monitoring, specifically newspapers, immediately after the announcement of the election dates by President Robert Mugabe on 13 June 2013. The Media and Society Studies Department at Midlands State University where I am based subscribes to all the major daily and weekly newspapers in Zimbabwe, so I would look at all these, waiting for the day the political advertisements started appearing. The advertisements started appearing on 21 July 2013 and that was the day I started gathering the newspapers. But, realising that there were no ZANU-PF advertisements in the state-controlled The Herald and The Sunday Mail on that day, I decided to gather copies of all the major daily and weekly state-controlled and privately-owned newspapers (The Herald, the Daily News, the Daily News on Sunday, The Independent, The Standard, Newsday, The Patriot, and The Sunday Mail). I collected all these newspapers till the day of the election on 31 July 2013.

The archive that I built reflected my interest in studying ZANU-PF’s election advertisements for the 31 July 2013 elections placed in paid-for space in the selected newspapers. An archive, it is argued, always reflects the interests of the archivist (Murchison, 2010; McKemmish, Gilliland & Ketelaar, 2005). It is this interest that ‘influence[s] what is remembered and what is forgotten, what is preserved and what is destroyed…’ (McKemmish et al., 2005, p. 1). From these archived newspapers, I purposively selected the Daily News, The Standard, Newsday and The Patriot after realising that ZANU-PF did not place any advertisements in the state-controlled Zimpapers’ flagship daily and weekly, The Herald and The Sunday Mail respectively, during the entire election campaign. The research question whose intention is to study ZANU-PF’s election advertisements placed in paid-for space in newspapers influenced the selection of the archival research method (cf. Tutwane 2010; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Tongco, 2007; Flick, 2006). The four newspapers that I selected, that is, the Daily News, The Standard, Newsday and The Patriot, are from the major privately owned newspaper stables in the country. The fact that ZANU-PF did not place any paid-for-political advertisements in the state-controlled Zimpapers’ The Herald and Sunday Mail was corroborated by the Sunday Maily Deputy Editor in an informal conversation sometime in February 2015.

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4.6 USING THEMATIC ANALYSIS TO MAKE SENSE OF THE ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS: CONCEPTUAL NOTES

The media monitoring that I embarked on was some kind of analysis that assisted me in my concept development. The process of analysis usually begins during data collection when the researcher will be moving forth and back ‘between concept development and data collection’ and this directs him towards sources that are more useful for answering the research questions (Miles & Huberman, 1994, cited by Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, pp. 2-3). This process of media monitoring helped me to collect a sample that helps me to answer my research questions. It enabled me to gather newspapers that I initially had no intention of studying, as these were the sources with the data that I was interested in. It is from the four selected newspapers that I purposively selected all the ZANU-PF advertisements and the MDC-T advertisements that they spoke to. I subjected the advertisements to thematic analysis, specifically using semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis to unpack their meanings.

In pursuit of the advertisements’ meanings, prescriptive thematic analysis specifically making use of themes derived from previous related literature was utilised (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Anderson, 2010). The data analysis is also inductive and takes a grounded approach where themes emerging from the data are utilised to code data. As argued by Zhang and Wildemuth (2009, p. 3) in the qualitative analysis of texts, ‘categories and a coding scheme can be derived from three sources: the data, previous related studies, and theories’. I utilise the first two categories (the data and related literature), but the process, as shall be discussed further below, is also augmented by critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis. Mindful of the study’s interest in interpreting or finding the meanings in ZANU-PF advertisements, I selected textual analysis approaches whose purpose is to discover ‘the “ideology” or “system of beliefs” underlying a message… to find the hidden meanings and values which may not be explicit at a first reading’ (Stokes, 2003, p. 77). Textual analysis, specifically semiotic analysis, and critical discourse analysis enabled the researcher to expose the ideological contestations behind the creation of those ZANU-PF advertisements. However, I operate within the hermeneutic circle (Krippendorf, 2004; Schwandt, 2005; Corbin & Strauss,

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2008). In the analysis I pay attention to who produced the text, the context of production, the target audience and the message’s intention or purpose (cf. Murchison, 2010; Krippendorf, 2004). As Murchison (2010, p.166) argues, in the analysis of documents, newspapers, magazines and historical artefacts, the researcher’s ‘rule of thumb should be to evaluate authorship, context, audience, and purpose’. In the analysis of the ZANU- PF advertisements, I look at the intention of the party, the context in which the advertisements were produced and distributed and the intended targets of the advertisements. I also provide my own interpretation of the advertisements, since interpretation is part and parcel of analysis (Blumler, 1969, cited by Corbin & Strauss, 2008). It is part of the everyday and ‘it is a very condition of being human’ (Schwandt, 2005, p. 301)

Furthermore, since the study relies on interpretivism and its aim is proposing a new theory of African political communication/advertising, I use both inductive and deductive reasoning/inferences. This is because I use both themes emerging from the data and literature review (emergent and apriori themes) to code the data. Inductive reasoning involves ‘grounding the examination of topics and themes, as well as inferences drawn from them, in the data’; the themes emerge from the data (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 2) while deductive reasoning is hypothesis testing (Nudzor, 2009). I use both themes emerging from the data and themes based on literature review to code the data; that is, identifying information in the data that is related to each theme or that speaks to a particular theme (Murchison, 2010; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). However, a unit of text can be simultaneously assigned to more than one category (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Boyatzis (1998), cited by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006, p. 4), states that coding is seeing or recognising an important aspect in the data ‘and encoding it (seeing as something) prior to a process of interpretation’. It is the process of encoding information that orders/arranges ‘the data to identify and develop themes from them’ (Fereday & Muir- Cochrane, 2006, p. 4; see Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). During the process of coding, I compare the categories and the texts within them so as to unravel the differences and similarities between the codes and ‘to fully understand the theoretical properties of the categories’ (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 3). I draw my conclusions from the coded data by interpreting the themes and the categories generated in the data. However, my

106 personal and theoretical understanding guides my interpretation of the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).

For example, I also ground the themes generated in my review of related literature and inferences drawn from them in the data to find out the continuities and discontinuities in the ZANU-PF nationalist discourse. The intention is to find out what is related to each theme and what is different from what has already been found out. Unlike the hypothesis testing deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning is theory generating (Nudzor, 2009; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Krippendorf, 2004) and thus the most appropriate for this study. However, since I utilise both apriori and emergent themes in the analysis of the data I indisputable that the study utilises both inductive and deductive approaches even though it is more biased towards the former.

However, in interpretivist forms of analysis, the analysis is never finished and there is no correct interpretation, as the same analyst or a different one can reach different interpretations (Schwandt, 2005; Strauss & Corbin, 2008) using the same data. The interpretive paradigm is appropriate for this study because the aim is to study a limited number of advertisements that were placed in the newspapers by ZANU-PF between 21 July and 30 July 2013 (see Stokes, 2003; Deacon et al., 1999). The concern here, unlike in quantitative content analysis, is not about looking at a large body of text and counting phenomena (Stokes, 2003; Deacon et al., 1999; Deacon et al., 2007) but looking at meanings. The aim is to produce thick descriptions about the organisation of meanings in those limited ZANU-PF advertisements (ten only), rather than statistics about ‘their basic contents’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 17). Quantitative content analysis, a quantitative research method, makes use of counting of words and measurement of inches/columns occupied, say, by stories on a given subject (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). As Deacon et al., (2007, p. 119) point out, ‘the purpose of content analysis is to quantify salient and manifest features of a large number of texts, and the statistics are used to make broader inferences about the processes and politics of representation’. The main weakness of quantitative content analysis is its tendency to count textual features, since it misses ‘syntactical and semantic information embedded in text’ (Weber, 1990, cited by Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 1; see Nudzor, 2009). It was developed to enable academics and

107 politicians to monitor the mass media specifically for propagandistic tendencies (Deacon, Pickering & Murdock, 2007). However, some critics dispute the quantitative-qualitative content analysis dichotomy, arguing that text and reading of all text is always qualitative (Stokes, 2003; Krippendorf, 2004). Yet others argue that quantitative and qualitative techniques are not mutually exclusive (Nudzor, 2009; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). However, for purposes of this study, I use the interpretive semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis rather than quantitative content analysis since my intention is to look at the meanings underlying the ZANU-PF election advertisements (see Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).

In the light of the foregoing, this study looks at all the ten different advertisements placed by ZANU-PF in the selected newspapers during the July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe. The advertisements might appear few in number, but the intention of this study is to explore the underlying meanings of limited sometimes single case messages (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Deacon et al., 1997). Interpretive methods of analysis, such as semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis, require ‘close reading of relatively small amounts of textual matter’ (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 17; see also Stokes, 2003). These methods involve interpretation or rearticulation of texts and the analysts work within the hermeneutic circle (Krippendorf, 2004; see Schwandt, 2003). Specifically, critical discourse and semiotic analysis (which is hermeneutic in form) will be used because they enable the researcher to expose the meanings of texts and the ideological work that texts do. The study is equally interested in the meanings of the ZANU-PF election advertisements and the analysis will be grounded in the post-2000 Zimbabwean context specifically the GNU period.

I use prescriptive thematic analysis where I impose themes generated from the review of related literature on the data gathered, in order to find out what is similar and what is different. The process of generating themes or concepts from theory or previous studies is significant especially at the beginning of textual analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). This is important since textual analysis is interested in ‘unique themes that illustrate the range of meanings of the phenomenon…’ (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). But this analysis involves theoretical interpretation which is more in-depth as it digs beneath the surface.

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As Corbin & Strauss (2008, p. 50) note, ‘It presents description that embodies well- constructed themes/categories, development of context, and explanation of process or change over time’. They further claim that concepts/themes, which are the basis of qualitative research, emerge from the research data and they provide a way of categorising the data that the researcher is working (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). In other words, the emerging pattern/themes become the classifications or categories for analysis. In ’interpretive approaches to textual analysis…you need an argument before you begin analysing…you need to know already what you are going to say before you find out what you are going to say’ (Stokes, 2003, p. 55). The researcher gets this argument from the literature review or theory (Eisenhardt, 2002; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009) and from emerging themes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). In this study, I use the themes identified through my literature review and impose them on the data to find out what is similar and what is different. The following themes are used:

 Regarding nationalism;  Economic development and indigenisation;  Selling the Mugabe brand;  Peace.

The continuities and discontinuities in the ZANU-PF discourse are of interest to my data analysis. According to Daly, Kellehear & Gliksman, (1997), as cited by Fereday and Muir- Cochrane (2006, pp. 3-4), thematic analysis involves searching for themes emerging as significant in ‘the description of phenomenon’. The themes are identified through meticulously reading the information repeatedly (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, cited by Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). I look for recurring themes in the texts under study but I keep interpretation to a minimum until later in the discussion (Anderson 2007). Furthermore, I anchor the analysis in the theoretical framework used to approach the text (Willig, 2001). In the study I approach the ZANU-PF print media election advertisements for the 31 July 2013 elections from a multi-modal theoretical approach that borrows from sign theory, decolonial theory, political advertising and post-colonial theory. Critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis are used for purposes of analysing the advertisements because epistemologically the study is grounded in interpretivism. 109

As part and parcel of the analysis I also delineate the context of the study. Furthermore, I operate within the hermeneutic circle. As Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 57) contend, in the analysis of text, the researcher should delineate the context in which the text is produced or an action takes place as this is as ‘important as coming up with the “right” concept…’ They further argue that contextualising the analysis enables the researcher to reduce instances of distortion of meaning and misrepresentation of the text’s intentions. The meaning of a sign resides in its context; it resides in a specific sign system within which it is meaningful (Deacon et al., 2007). Other texts produced within the same period constitute part of this context. For example, to grasp the full meanings of some of the ZANU-PF advertisements, I also make reference to some MDC-T advertisements that were produced during the same election. In the analysis, the coding, that is, ‘taking raw data and raising it to a conceptual level’ (Strauss & Corbin 2008, p. 66) precedes conceptual ordering of the data. As Krippendorf (2004, pp. 99-100) observes ‘recording/coding units are units that are distinguished for separate description, transcription, recording or coding…recording units are distinguished to be separately described or categorised’. The categories that emerge from the coded/recorded data are called thematic distinctions which are ‘motifs, imagery, thoughts, combination of categories’ (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 107).

Apart from the above, since interpretive approaches are best suited for theory building, I compare the emerging concepts with the literature in order to figure out what is different and what is similar. As Eisenhardt (2002, p. 24) states:

An essential feature of theory building is comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, or hypotheses with the extant literature. This involves asking what is this similar to, what does it contradict, and why…Conflicting literature represents an opportunity. The juxtaposition of conflicting results forces researchers into a more creative, frame-breaking mode of thinking than they might otherwise be able to achieve…Literature discussing similar findings is important as well because it ties together underlying similarities in phenomena normally not associated with each other.

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I seek to account for the similarities and differences between my findings and interpretation and that of scholars whose literature I reviewed. I am hoping to be able to suggest a new theory especially from the differences while the similarities will enable me to identify continuities in the ZANU-PF nationalist discourse. It is the differences that I am mainly interested in even though the similarities are not ignored. In addition, I explain the reasons for the differences whether they are a result of researcher subjectivity or a difference in research theoretical approaches. However, since I am mainly interested in proposing a new theory of African political communication, I am more interested in finding out whether the differences that may be noted are a result of differences in theoretical frameworks.

The section below expands and elaborates on how, as part and parcel of thematic analysis, critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis are used in the study to make sense of ZANU-PF’s advertisements for the July 2013 election.

4.6.1 Why augment thematic analysis As stated earlier, the study utilises semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis as part of thematic analysis of the ZANU-PF advertisements for the July 2013 election. These methods are used to augment the process of thematic analysis which is discussed above. Thus, the methods of semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis are brought to bear on the pictures, words and colours utilised in ZANU-PF advertisements. The use of these methods is determined by the questions the researcher asks (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). This implies that I am making use of methodological freedom and creativity in a manner that accords with the call of scholars such as Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), and Corbin and Strauss (2008) for more methods to be used creatively in pursuit of answers to research questions.

Bringing to bear principles from semiotic analysis and discourse analysis on the advertisements is important because: 1) as Kracauer cited by Deacon et al. (2007) notes, in discourse, words reflect the reasons for their production and the conditions or context in which they were produced. 2) Deacon et al, (2007, p. 7) also note, ‘…cultural texts - newspapers… advertising images…are seen as frozen moments in a continuous stream

111 of social interactions, which embody the values and meanings in play within public culture in a particularly clear and compact way’. One must bear in mind that this research uses thematic analysis to address the following questions, which clearly do relate to discourse practices and to the use of systems of signs:

Thus, the research questions dictated the choice of critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis as part and parcel of thematic analysis (cf. Stokes, 2003; Flick, 2006; Tongco, 2007; Corbin & Strauss 2008; Mazid, 2008; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Tutwane, 2010). I make use of semiotic analysis and critical discourse to tease out meanings that are then fed into the thematic analysis. In some respects, this means that I go beyond what I see as a tendency to not explain how discourses and signs are understood when thematic analysis is carried out.

4.6.2 Semiotic analysis as a supplementary method of analysis This study employs semiotics – the ‘science of signs’ (Priest, 1996) – as a supplementary method in the thematic analysis. This is justifiable since, as Fairclough (2001, p. 122) argues, ‘every practice [including advertising] has a semiotic element… [and] all practices are practices of production’. Thus semiotics is relevant since it exposes the ideologies underpinning the practice of production of the advertisements.

Consequently, semiotics helps to expose the ideological struggles characterising the practice of production and arena ‘in which life is produced, be it economic, political, cultural, or everyday life’ (Fairclough, 2001, p. 122). It helps to expose the ideological contests that characterised: the production of the ZANU-PF advertisements; the media platforms in which the advertisements were placed; the economic context in which they were produced – for example, the multiple currency GNU context; the political context – for example, the GNU context; and the global context in which the advertisements were produced – a for example, SADC and the International Community’s direct interest in the

112 elections. However, just like all texts, the advertisements are characterised by polysemy and are context-specific (Deacon et al., 1999). As Metro-Roland (2011, p. 2) notes, ‘the meaning(s) of any object in the world is multivalent, richly contextual and our understanding of these meanings is best explained by sign theory which treats explicitly the epistemological problem raised in the cognition’ (Metro-Roland 2011, p. 2). In other words, the highly contextualised and polysemic nature of the advertisements makes semiotics a key analytical tool to expose their meanings. As Deacon et al. (1999, p. 136) point out, for Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of semiology, ‘…the meaning of a word exists within a language system, only in differentiated relations to other words within that system’. For example, the word ‘poor’ is meaningless without the word ‘rich’. In my study, it can be argued that the meaning of the ZANU-PF advertisements exists within a language system and in ‘differentiated relations’ to other advertisements, utterances and discourses by its political opponents such as the MDC-T and others. Consequently, semiotics is employed since advertisements can also be conceived as objects and since it also grounds these objects in specific contexts and/or language (sign) systems. The language system ‘itself provides rules for its use, for using words in relation to each other, just as, when playing poker, you can play your hand in whatever way you want (parole) but you have to do so within the rules of the game (langue). It is in this sense that the term “language games” is meant’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 136). It can thus be argued that political advertising, together with the language from which the utterances (parole) made in the advertisements comes from, forms part of the complex language system (langue) from which the ZANU-PF advertisements were produced. Consequently, their language games, that is, the utterances they made in their advertisements (parole), were also influenced by the language rules (langue) of political advertising and English language among others in that complex language system. It is the ZANU-PF political language games produced in a contested post-colonial and GNU Zimbabwean context and what they mean that this study is interested in.

Semiotics is a form of hermeneutics that is useful for analysing the meaning of texts (Stokes 2003). Furthermore, it ‘breaks down the content of texts into their component parts and relates them to broader discourses’ (Stokes 2003, p. 72; see also Deacon et al., 1999). However, Bertrand and Hughes (2005) note that there is no one agreed method

113 or generally agreed methods of doing a semiotic analysis of texts: researchers have to generate their own methods from the basic principles. Regardless of the absence of one agreed method of semiotic analysis, it is argued that ‘what have always to be identified are the structural components of texts and for semiotics the fundamental component, both of language and of written texts which are made up of language, is the sign’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 136). The sign is a combination of the signified and signifier. But post- modernists argue that there is no transcendental signified as any attempt to locate it ends up in a circularity of signifiers (cf. Baudrillard, 1994; Descombes, 1994; Kellner, 1995; Pietila, 1995). It is arguable that signs have no absolute meaning and no ‘definitive interpretation’ but this does not mean that the text can be read anyhow (Deacon et al., 1999, pp. 137 & 140-1). Thus, for purposes of this study, I identify signs in the advertisements in accordance with the themes chosen, the codes under which the signs fall (both technical – a for example, camera work) and cultural (relating to cultural values) and their meanings, the relationship between the words in the adverts and how they affect meaning (syntagmatic analysis, such as narrative), the denotative (surface) and connotative (implied/hidden) meanings of the signs, the context (intertextuality – other texts within and without the genre produced at the same time, macro political, economic and social environment) and discuss the ideological purposes of the advertisements (Mick, 1986; Stokes, 2003; Bertrand & Hughes, 2005; Berger, n.d; Deacon et al., 2007).

The semiotic analysis approach I suggest here is central to the process of generating categories of coding scheme from the data in thematic analysis. It is also central to the process of identifying which signs speak to a particular pre-identified or emergent theme. It is indisputable that semiotic analysis is part and parcel of thematic analysis. In this semiotic analysis process, the ‘interdiscursivity of a text which is a part of its intertextuality, a question of which genres, discourse and styles it draws upon, and how it works them into particular articulations’ is also central to the full understanding of its meaning (Fairclough, 2001, p. 124). For purposes of this study, the genres, discourse and style that ZANU-PF draws upon in its political advertisements are looked at. I also focus on the MDC-T discourses and advertisements that ZANU-PF sought to rebut. Furthermore, the international or global discourses that it also sought to rebut or appropriate are examined.

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These, together with the political advertising practice and elections form the context or the language system (langue) from which ZANU-PF drew its utterances (parole) from.

However, since ideology is an illusion, a representation (Strinati, 1997) and people’s imaginary relationship to their real conditions of existence, semiotics is required to expose it. Semiotics is useful since ‘more often ideology is implicit and one has to read into the text in order to find the ideology at work’ (Stokes, 2003, p. 76). The use of semiotics in studying the ZANU-PF advertisements exposes socio-political-economic struggles such as class struggles, gender struggles and racial and ethnic struggles in society and the link between texts, ideologies and power as the sign is a site of struggle (Fairclough, 1995; Clark & Ivanic, 1997; Deacon et al., 2007). As Deacon et al. (2007, p. 141) further argue, ‘semiotics helps us to think analytically about how such texts work and the implications they have for the broader culture in which they are produced and disseminated’. Semiotic analysis of the ZANU-PF advertisements helps me to expose the intentions of ZANU-PF and the current socio-economic-political struggles in Zimbabwe. However, ‘…semiotic analysis…is very interpretive, and different readers do not always share the same interpretation’ (Stokes 2003, p. 54). As a result, generalisability and replicability are of little concern in semiotic analysis (and qualitative research in general), thus making it ‘appropriate for studying a limited number of texts’ (Stokes, 2003, p. 72; see also Deacon et al., 1999; Krippendorf, 2004). Stokes (2003, p. 73) further notes: ‘Advertisements make excellent subjects for semiotic analysis’. This study looks at a limited number of ZANU-PF advertisements (ten only) that were placed in the privately- owned the Daily News, Newsday, The Standard and The Patriot newspapers in Zimbabwe between 21 July and 30 July 2013.

4.6.3 Critical discourse analysis as a supplementary method

Critical discourse analysis, an interpretive method of analysis, will also be used to look at dialogue, argumentation (Priest, 1996; Krippendorf, 2004) and at how ZANU-PF’s nationalistic discourses were presented in the party’s advertisements for the 31 July 2013 elections. However, there is no single way of doing critical discourse analysis since ‘paradigms, philosophies, theories and methods may differ in these many approaches…’

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(Van Dijk, 1993, p. 297). For purposes of this study, I operate in the ideological square where I utilise legitimation and de-legitimation analysis (Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk,, 1993). The critical discourse analysis that I use here is not the more linguistically inclined one where the emphasis is on structure of language. I utilise a more informal type of critical discourse analysis that is usually associated with journalism and media studies (Van Dijk, 20 January 2015)4. However, the arrangement of text, the specific words and pictures used in the adverts are studied to establish the meaning(s) being conveyed. Critical discourse analysis exposes how power is used and dominance exerted, inequality and injustice enacted, initiated, confirmed, maintained, legitimated, concealed, reproduced and transformed within specific economic, historic and political contexts (Van Dijk. 1993; Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; see Krippendorf, 2004). It also exposes how ‘everyday’ talk or texts can do ideological work or can ‘enact and reproduce’ dominance, as selection of words is never neutral but is ideological; is always a political act (Fiske, 1987; Van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 1995; Clark & Ivanic, 1997; Mhiripiri, 2009). ‘Discourse does ideological work’, is historical, explanatory and interpretive (Fairclough & Wodak, cited by Van Dijk, n.d; Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). I examine what Van Dijk (1993, p. 250) calls the ‘top- down relations of dominance rather than the bottom-up relations of resistance, compliance and acceptance’. As Kress (1996) notes, the intention of CDA is to bring a crisis into the system of oppression through an analysis of texts to unsettle and transform the system into one that is beneficial to all and less harmful. The study focuses on the ZANU-PF election advertisements for the 31 July 2013 elections, not how the people resist, comply with or accept the discourses. I examine the various strategies that ZANU- PF uses to justify/legitimate dominance, to reproduce dominance, to conceal dominance and to deny dominance (Van Dijk, 1993). As Van Dijk (1993, p. 263) argues,

…the reproduction of dominance in contemporary societies often requires justification or legitimation: it is ‘just’, ‘necessary’ or ‘natural’ that we have privileged access to valuable social resources. Another strategy of the production of dominance is that of denial: there is no dominance, all people in our society are equal, and have equal access to social resources.

4 Email communication in a discussion about a paper I had submitted to Discourse and Communication. 116

By using CDA, my intention is to expose the various strategies that ZANU-PF uses to reproduce, conceal, justify and deny its dominance over the Zimbabwean society.

Apart from operating in the hermeneutic circle as noted earlier, I also operate within the ideological square (see Mazid, 2010). I look at how ZANU-PF employed delimited appropriation and/or appropriation of discourse (cf. Tomaselli, 1992; Mbembe, 2001) and re-lexicalisation and over-lexicalisation in which something or someone is renamed or new words are created and a situation in which certain words are repeated over and over again (Deacon et al., 1999 & 2007). I also examine how ZANU-PF used these tactics to legitimise itself, while at the same time delegitimising the MDC-T and simultaneously seeking to distance itself from the MDC-T. In other words, I look at the ZANU-PF’s process of legitimation, delegitimation and proximisation (Chilton, 2004; Cap, 2008 & Van Leeuwen, 2007, cited by Mazid, 2010). As Van Dijk (1993, p. 263) notes, ‘the justification of inequality involves two complimentary strategies, namely the positive representation of the own group, and the negative representation of the others’. In addition to the above, I also look at how ZANU-PF used differentiation ‘to contrast ‘themselves with their opponents [the MDC-T], their views with an opponent’s views…to make ‘both alliances and distinctions’ (Meyer, 2000, cited by Mazid, 2010, p. 450). It is important to use CDA, especially the ideological square noted above, since dominance can be reproduced through the following modes of discourse: ‘overt support, enactment, representation, legitimation, denial, mitigation or concealment of dominance among others’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 250). In the analysis of the ZANU-PF advertisements I explore all the above so as to expose how the party reproduces its dominance. This is significant because, as Van Dijk (1993, p. 254) argues, ‘modern and often more effective power is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one’s own interests’. CDA’s job is to expose how everyday text and talk can be used to reproduce relationships of dominance (Van Dijk, 1993).

However, I also examine the persuasion tactics/moves through which the statements that seek to reproduce, conceal, justify and deny dominance seek credibility. I focus on how

117 the following moves identified by Van Dijk (1993, p. 264) were used by ZANU-PF in its advertisements:

 Argumentation: the negative evaluation following from the facts;  Rhetorical figures: hyperbolic enhancement of ‘their’ negative actions or ‘our’ positive actions, euphemisms, denials, understatements of ‘our’ negative actions;  Lexical style: choice of words that imply negative (or positive) evaluations  Story telling: telling above negative events as personally experienced and giving plausible details above negative features of events;  Structural emphasis of ‘their’ negative actions, for example, in headlines…transactivity structures of sentence syntax (such as mentioning negative agents in prominent topical positions);  Quoting credible witnesses, sources or experts.

I look at the use of argumentation in ZANU-PF advertisements; that is, how it used double speak or the shield and weapon strategy (Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk, 1993). In other words, I examine how ZANU-PF sought to legitimise (beautify) itself while at the same time delegitimising (uglifying) the MDC-T on the basis of ‘facts’ (see Mazid, 2008. Within the same strategy of argumentation, I examine what the party does not say, as the unsaid is equally significant and sometimes even more significant than the said. The unsaid or ‘incompleteness’ is part and parcel of argumentation, concealment and positive self- presentation (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 276). The credibility of ZANU-PF’s legitimation, concealment, and denial of its dominance and its delegitimisation of the MDC-T rests on this argumentation, based on the ‘facts’ and ‘incompleteness. I also look at the choice of words and how hyperboles were used in the ZANU-PF advertisements to portray a positive image of itself and a negative image of the opposition. As Clark and Ivanic (1997) contend, writing is always a political act. Implicitly, the choice of words or even pictures in any advertisement is a political act. It is designed either to enhance oneself or to harm the opponent in the eyes of the voters. It is part of the political branding process in which the politician or political party seeks to achieve maximum possible positive differentiation

118 over the opposition (Jain, n.d). Finally, I examine the prominence given to the MDC-T’s negatives by ZANU-PF in its images or text. I also look at whether ZANU-PF makes reference to any source(s) in its advertisements which would assist in lending credibility to its positive portrayal of the self and negative portrayal of the opponent.

Mazid (2008, p. 438), however, also identifies the following strategies as necessary for the legitimation of a group’s dominance: awareness and/or assertion of the target audiences’ needs and wants, the ‘reinforcement of global and indisputable ideological principles, charismatic leadership projection, boasting about one’s performance, positive self-presentation’. These strategies are what Van Dijk (1993, p. 264) calls the persuasion moves that lend credibility to the ‘semantic “content”: statements that directly entail negative evaluations of “them”, or positive ones of “us”’. I examine whether and how ZANU-PF used awareness or assertion of the target voters’ needs and wants. I look at how they sought to reinforce their patriotic and indigenisation and economic empowerment ideology. The ways through which they sought to sell the ZANU-PF brand and the Robert Gabriel Mugabe brand is also be explored. Finally, I examine the ways in which ZANU-PF sought to direct voters’ attention towards its achievements rather than its failures and how it sought to portray itself positively. This kind of analysis exposes how ZANU-PF sought to manipulate discourse and signs in order to maintain its dominance in Zimbabwe. As Fairclough (2001, p. 126) points out ‘…discourse is ideological in so far as it contributes to sustaining particular relations of power and domination’.

A combination of semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis has been selected because visual images and linguistic features are legitimate objects of both semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis. It is indisputable that a combination of CDA and semiotic analysis captures both the linguistic and non-linguistic features of the political advertisements under study such as written text, pictures and colours. As Mazid (2010, p. 434) argues ‘a discursive-semiotic, multimodal version of CDA seems to be necessary in handling many modern and contemporary media texts…’ It is arguable that CDA and semiotic analysis are most appropriate for studying political advertisements since these constitute a platform in which symbolic contestations take place between the competing political parties. These contestations can only be captured through a critical perspective

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(Mazid 2010) such as CDA, but only a combination of semiotics and CDA can capture the non-verbal and the interaction between the verbal and the non-verbal (Mazid 2010). However, rather than viewing CDA and semiotics as mutually exclusive, Fairclough (2001, pp.121 & 122) argues that CDA is both ‘a theory and method; a theory on language that also generally encompasses semiosis (emphasis mine), that is, all forms of meaning making- visual images, body language as well as language’. Thus, in this study I use semiotics to analyse the visual images and the written texts while CDA is used to analyse the written word in the ZANU-PF advertisements. I consider the written texts, colours and all pictures in the ZANU-PF as signs.

In the analysis of the text, I take the position that the ZANU-PF advertisements should be grounded in political advertising theory, sign theory, decolonial theory, post-colonial theory and in context. I am reflexive and critical and I will take the position of a citizen of Zimbabwe who has experienced the economic and political turmoil that the country went through, post-2000. Finally, I seek to expose how ZANU-PF reproduces, conceals, justifies and legitimates its dominance while at the same time delegitimising its political opponents. This is important since ‘the point of critical discourse analysis is to take a position… [it] is not and cannot be neutral’, critical scholars cannot afford to be aloof (Van Dijk, 1993, pp. 2 & 250; see also Kress, 1996).

4.7 STEPS IN THEMATIC ANALYSIS TO MAKE SENSE OF THE ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS: PRACTICE NOTES

As noted above, in the data analysis, I utilise my own innovative version of thematic analysis that is augmented by semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis, which I utilise from the first stage to the third (the last) stage of the thematic analysis. This is significant since it is indisputable that the process of thematic analysis involves use of both elements of semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis. In effect, it is problematic to view the three as mutually exclusive or as indisputably distinct from each other. For example, CDA is both a theory and method: a theory on language that also generally encompasses semiosis; that is, ‘all forms of meaning making – visual images, body language as well as language’ (Fairclough, 2001, pp 121 & 122). Every text is a

120 sign and every sign is a text that can be subjected to either semiotic analysis or critical discourse analysis or both (see Mazid 2010). Semiotic analysis and CDA are central to the process of coming up with a coding scheme or categorising the data. For example, as I explained under Section 4.5.2, in augmenting thematic analysis with semiotic analysis I will first identify the signs in the advertisements in accordance with the themes and/or codes/categories under which they fall, before proceeding to analysis.

Thus, it is incontestable that the two methods are also central to the process of identifying which signs speak to a particular pre-identified or emergent theme and in identifying what is similar to what else in the data. The process of identifying emerging thematic distinctions and/or of assigning signs to pre-identified themes in qualitative research is premised on CDA and semiotic analysis. As noted above, since all texts are signs, it is misleading to treat thematic analysis as mutually exclusive from semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis. There is value in adopting this approach since ‘a discursive- semiotic, multimodal version of CDA seems to be necessary in handling many modern and contemporary media texts…’ (Mazid, 2010, p. 434). The two are inseparable and their use to complement thematic analysis is also inevitable. It is through this discursive- semiotic analysis that, in the case of pre-identified themes, I identify signs in the adverts that are in accordance with or that speak to the pre-identified themes. And in the case of emergent themes, the process enables me to categorise the data into themes. Overall, this combination of semiotic analysis and CDA enables me to make sense of the signs and themes identified in the study. However, since there is no one agreed method or generally agreed methods of doing a semiotic analysis of texts, researchers have to generate their own methods from the basic principles (Bertrand & Hughes, 2005). As highlighted in Section 4.5.2, I generate my own method of doing semiotic analysis. The same is also true of CDA; in this case I use a more informal approach to CDA. It is an approach that is widely used in Media and Journalism Studies (Van Dijk, 2015). However, I also operate within the hermeneutic circle where I largely use legitimation analysis. The three-step thematic analysis approach I utilise is a result of borrowing key principles from thematic analysis, semiotic analysis and CDA but with thematic analysis as the overarching method. This process is evident in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight. It is a process that starts from the data reduction process to analysis and interpretation.

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In employing thematic analysis I adopt a three-step approach which is presented in the next three chapters. The first is data reduction and description in Chapter Five, followed by identification of themes in Chapter Six. Finally, Chapter Seven presents an analysis and interpretation of the findings. Both semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis are key tools in this three-step process.

4.7.1 Data Reduction and description It is said that after defining the object of analysis and gathering texts, the researcher moves on to the description of the texts (Stokes, 2003). Chapter Five codes the data in line with pre-identified thematic distinctions identified above and below. I also used thematic distinctions emerging from the data. However, for purposes of clustering the advertisements under the various thematic distinctions for purposes of description, I examined the signs and discourse in the advertisements, identifying what is similar and speaks to a particular pre-identified or emergent thematic distinction (see Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).

In line with thematic analysis procedures suggested by Murchison (2010) and Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), the data reduction and/or coding that I carry out in Chapter Five relies on thematic distinctions derived from the literature review. Chapter Five, which is the first of two data coding chapters, presents and describes the coded data. The coding or arrangement and description of data gathered that I carry out in Chapter Five precedes interpretation, drawing out cultural codes, generalisations and conclusions in semiotic analysis (Stokes, 2003) and thematic analysis. Coding is seeing or recognising an important aspect in the data ‘and encoding it (seeing it as something) prior to a process of interpretation’ (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 4). The ZANU-PF advertisements are grouped into four clusters but, since a unit of analysis can simultaneously be assigned to more than one category, some of the advertisements appear in more than one cluster (see Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009), The advertisements are clustered around the following four thematic distinctions generated from the literature review:

 Selling the Mugabe and ZANU-PF brands;

 Regarding nationalism;

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 On economic development and indigenisation;

 On peace.

Since I use both thematic distinctions emerging from the data and literature review to code the data, the data described in Chapter Five is also reduced into the following codes:

 ZANU-PF advertisements and their placement in the newspapers;  Historical Content.

4.7.2 Identifying emergent themes The process of coding, explained in Chapter Five, enabled me to arrange the ‘data to identify and develop themes from them’ (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 4) in Chapter Six. In coding or arranging the data, I looked for emerging or recurring themes in the advertisements under study. These emerging themes provide a way of categorising the data the researcher is working on and they become the classifications or categories for analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The themes identified and developed from the coded data are subjected to analysis or theoretical interpretation (Willig, 2001) in Chapter Seven. The process of identifying emerging themes is augmented by the study of signs (semiotic analysis) and critical discourse analysis, where I arranged the data on the basis of the meanings of the signs and discourse utilised. For the researcher to be able to code or arrange the data, some preliminary or rudimentary semiotic and critical discourse analysis is required. The ability to identify that this sign speaks to this or that theme is itself analysis. Therefore, semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis are part and parcel of the process of thematic analysis and I use them to identify which signs and/or text speak to which particular theme. I utilise semiotic analysis to explore the meanings of colours and pictures utilised by ZANU-PF while simultaneously subjecting the written text to critical discourse analysis specifically legitimation analysis.

Since in Chapters Five and Six my intention is to code and describe the data, I keep analysis and interpretation to a minimum until later in the discussion in Chapter Seven (see Anderson, 2007). In addition, the analysis or theoretical interpretation that I carry out

123 in Chapter Seven is anchored on personal understanding and in the theoretical framework (Willig, 2001; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009) presented in Chapters Two and Three. I interpret the findings through a multi-theoretical approach presented in Chapter Three; an approach that borrows from sign theory, post-colonial theory, political advertising and decolonial theory. In other words, I draw my conclusions from the coded data by interpreting the themes and the categories generated in the data.

In the process of describing and/or coding the advertisements or data (Chapters Five and Six) and analysis and interpretation (Chapter Seven), I am reflexive and contextual. The context of production of the advertisements is relevant since the meaning of media texts is relative to specific contexts, discourses and reasons for which they were created (Krippendorf, 2004). Therefore, grounding the advertisements in context enables me (the researcher) ‘to gain a better grasp of their omissions, biases and peculiarities’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 30). Apart from the context, I also look at the authorship, authors’ intentions, ‘beliefs, desires, thoughts’, and audience (Schwandt, 2005, p. 297; see also Murchison, 2010). As part of the context, I also present in the description chapter the MDC-T advertisements to which ZANU-PF advertisements sought to speak back to or to rebut. These MDC-T advertisements are clustered together with the ZANU-PF advertisements that were a rebuttal of their claims.

The descriptive Chapter Five is followed by Chapter Six, in which I identify the themes in the advertisements on the basis of similarities, differences, odd things and novel things. However, unlike the foregoing chapter in which coding was based on both pre-identified and emergent thematic distinctions, this chapter relies on themes emerging from the data to code the data. The coding or ‘encoding of information’ that I carry out in Chapter Six orders/arranges ‘the data to identify and develop themes from them’ (Fereday &, Muir- Cochrane 2006, p. 4; see Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). In this coding process I compared the categories and the texts within them so as to unravel the odd things, the differences and similarities between the codes and ‘to fully understand the theoretical properties of the categories’ (Zhang & Wildemuth. 2009, p. 3). The themes I developed from this process are used to identify information in the data that is related to each theme or that speaks to a particular theme (Murchison, 2010; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). However,

124 some texts that have already been presented in Chapter Five will be presented again in Chapter Six whilst others are presented under more than one theme in this chapter again (see Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). The process of coding and developing themes, identifying similarities, differences and odd things in the data, that I carried out in Chapter Six also relied on semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis, specifically legitimation analysis. The two methods of analysis enabled me to identify that this information or sign is similar or different to this code or that theme.

4.7.3 Analysis and Interpretation of themes/data The categories for analysis, that is, the pre-identified themes and the themes developed from the coded data are analysed and interpreted in Chapter Seven. But the analysis involves personal understanding and the more in-depth theoretical interpretation which digs beneath the surface (Willig, 2001). This process, as Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 50) observe, ‘…presents description that embodies well-constructed themes/categories, development of context and explanation of process or change [in ZANU-PF discourse] over time’. Consequently, as highlighted above, I look at the continuities and discontinuities in ZANU-PF discourse. I deliberately combine analysis and theoretical interpretation of the themes with a discussion of the findings. As Anderson (2010, paragraph lines 5-6) argues: ‘It is common practice to include some discussion within the results section of qualitative research and follow with a concluding discussion’. However, I present this discussion of findings ‘…in the context of [the research questions and]…similar previous research and or theories’ (Anderson 2010, paragraph 26 lines 1- 2). This is geared towards showing the process and change in ZANU-PF discourse in different circumstances (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Anderson, 2010) and the extent to which the discourses reflect post-colonial Zimbabwean discourses. The overall goal is answering the research questions presented in earlier chapters. In other words, the analysis, interpretation and/or discussion of the data are guided by the desire to answer the research questions. The analysis and interpretation carried out in Chapter Seven explores the extent to which nationalistic discourses are evident in ZANU-PF discourse for the July 2013 elections and the ways in which the discourses express post-colonial Zimbabwean discourse. The chapter answers the following research questions:

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The thematic analysis process described above is augmented by semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis which are used to explore the meanings of text or signs (for example, written words, colours and pictures) utilised in ZANU-PF advertisements. It is the signs and/or text that make up the pre-identified and the emerging themes that I also subject to critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis. But in the presentation of qualitative research findings, one selects those statements that are the most representative of the findings (Anderson, 2010) and this is what I do under the various themes in Chapter Seven.

4.7.4 Concluding Discussion The concluding discussion is presented in Chapter Eight, the last chapter of the thesis. The conclusions presented in the last chapter are drawn from the analysis, interpretation and discussion of the themes and categories identified earlier (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). The last chapter presents the study’s conclusions and also discusses the continuities and discontinuities in ZANU-PF discourses. It also examines the study’s contributions to existing literature and its strengths and weaknesses. It also discusses the study’s transferability to other settings whilst reflecting on researcher influence on the data (Anderson, 2010). Finally, the chapter suggests areas for further research.

4.8 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND ISSUES OF VALIDITY, OBJECTIVITY AND RELIABILITY My adoption of interpretivism and reflexivity means that I

reject the framework of validity that is commonly accepted in more quantitative research in the social sciences…[whose] basic realist assumption is that their (sic) is a reality external to our perception of it. Consequently, it doesn't make sense to be concerned with the ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ of an observation with respect to an external

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reality (which is a primary concern of validity) (Trochim, 2006, paragraph 1, lines 1- 6).

The implication of this is that replicability and reliability are of little concern in qualitative research (Krippendorf, 2004). Qualitative research believes in the polysemic nature of texts (Kripperndorf 2004); a characteristic that makes it common for various researchers or the same researcher to reach different meanings on the same text. In other words there is no correct and final reading of a text (Schwandt, 2003) since researcher being or personal understanding is crucial to interpretation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). This is because emphasis in the interpretive paradigm is on interpretation (cf. Schwandt, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Hennink et al., 2011). Texts mean different things to different people, even those from the same sub-culture, but that does not mean that the text can be read anyhow and has an infinite number of readings (Deacon et al., 2007). In contrast, quantitative research considers a study reliable only if the study can be replicated under similar circumstances with similar results.

Although qualitative research rejects the quantitative framework of reliability, it is suggested that the study should be dependable (Trochim, 2006). This entails describing the ever-changing context and how the changes impacted on the study (Trochim, 2006). Detailed description of phenomena under study and their contexts gives the study credibility, while credibility gives the study dependability (Shenton, 2004). The acceptance of thick descriptions as a key marker of dependability and credibility means that, as noted above, qualitative research accepts the subjectivity of reality and rejects quantitative claims to objectivity (Schwandt, 2003; Krippendorf, 2004; Nudzor, 2009; Tutwane, 2010). As a result, I offer thick descriptions of phenomena under study and am reflexive; I acknowledge that my being as a Zimbabwean who has lived under ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s long (mis)rule has a bearing on my understanding of ZANU-PF discourse. My reflexivity makes the study credible, confirmable, transferable and dependable (Krippendorf, 2004; Trochim, 2006).

The implication of the foregoing is that, credibility, confirmability, dependability and transferability are some of the properties that should be used by social scientists to judge the rigorness of their research (Lincoln & Guba, 1994, cited by Krippendorf, 2004; see

127 also Shenton, 2004; Trochim, 2006). This set of criteria are viewed as preferable in qualitative research than the quantitative research inspired properties of rigor which are internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity. For the qualitative researcher, credibility is the extent to which the study’s findings are believable to the researcher and this is akin to internal validity in quantitative research (Shenton, 2004; Trochim, 2006). However, transferability which is akin to external validity refers to the extent to which one’s study findings apply or are transferable or generalisable to other contexts (Shenton, 2004; Trochim, 2006). The researcher’s duty is to describe as best he can the research context and assumptions, but it is the duty of the one doing the transferring to judge the extent to which the transfer makes sense (Shenton, 2004; Trochim, 2006). Implied here is that the researcher ‘cannot make transferability inferences’ (Shenton, 2004, p. 70). The researcher should ‘provide sufficient detail [or thick descriptions] of the context of the fieldwork for a reader to be able to decide whether the prevailing environment is similar to another situation with which he or she is familiar and whether the findings can justifiably be applied to other setting’ (Shenton, 2004, p. 63). In this study, I tried as best I could to describe the context of the study, the 2013 elections and the central assumptions of the study in the paragraphs and chapters above. I also describe how my being as a Zimbabwean has traceable consequences on my reading of ZANU-PF advertisements for July 2013.

Finally, ‘confirmability refers to the degree to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated by others’ (Trochim, 2006, paragraph 6, line 2). It is the term that some qualitative researchers prefer to objectivity that quantitative research talks about (Shenton, 2004). For the enhancement of confirmability, dependability, credibility and transferability of the study, in sections above – especially Sections 4.5 and 4.6 – I clearly laid out the procedures in the data analysis and interpretation that I carry out in this study. I demonstrate in the methodology chapter that ‘findings emerge from the data and not [from my] own predispositions’ (Shenton, 2004, p. 63). Demonstrating this clarity in the thought processes in data analysis and interpretation, together with acknowledging my own biases, are central to the study’s credibility (Noble & Smith, 2015). It is arguable that my adoption of interpretivism and reflexivity to the study of ZANU-PF advertisements makes the study dependable, credible, confirmable and transferable (Krippendorf, 2004;

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Shenton, 2004; Trochim, 2006). The credibility of the study is further reinforced by the reflective commentary or evaluation that I provide in Chapter Eight on the effectiveness of the research methods I utilised.

4.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

To avoid bias and prejudice, I am reflexive. I approach my study from the viewpoint that there is need for a multi-modal study that allows for an interrogation of theory in order to adequately explain the post-colonial ‘system of signs’. As Krippendorf (2004, p. 88) notes, researchers should approach their work from a particular point of view that is part of their being and to disclose their position and ‘prior knowledge of the context of given texts’. It is this reflexivity that makes the study credible, confirmable, transferable and dependable (Krippendorf, 2004; Shenton, 2004; Trochim, 2006). I also acknowledge sources of information (provide adequate citation); ensure accuracy of findings – namely, avoid fabrication of findings even if they do not support my expectations – and I do not omit data that is difficult to interpret (Keyton, 2010). The process of seeking out and handling data that do not support one’s expectations contributes to the rigorness of this thesis. As argued by Anderson (2010, paragraph 7, lines 6-8), ‘Contradictory evidence, often known as deviant cases, must be sought out, examined and accounted for in the analysis to ensure that researcher bias does not interfere with or alter their perception of the data and any insights offered’. It is indisputable that accuracy, honesty and genuineness of research findings not only make the study ethical but also make the research findings valid (credible and transferable), reliable (dependable) and objective (confirmable) (Anderson, 2010). It is worthwhile to note that, even though I am subjective and objectivity, in the quantitative sense of the word, is not a key concern of this study, I do not deliberately set out to be biased.

4.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter presents the research methodology and methods that are utilised in this study. The study utilises the qualitative research approach, specifically the interpretive paradigm which is interested in meanings. This approach has been chosen because the

129 study is interested in the meanings of the ZANU-PF print media election advertisements for the July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, thematic analysis has been selected, but due to the study’s interest in suggesting a new theory of African political communication, interpretivist approaches of critical discourse analysis and semiotic analysis are used (Flick, 2006; see also Hennink et al., 2011). Semiotic analysis and discourse analysis are used to expose the ideological contestations in Zimbabwe, the intentions of ZANU-PF, how power is used and exerted, and the targets of the advertisements. As Stokes (2003) notes, the purpose of most textual analysis is usually to find out the hidden meanings and values of texts; the ideology beneath the text. In the analysis of the advertisements I operate within the hermeneutic circle. As a result, I am reflexive, since it is virtually impossible for the researcher to remove the self from the study. Reflexivity lends credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability to the study (Krippendorf, 2004; Shenton, 2004; Trochim, 2006).

In the following chapter, I do data reduction by identifying the similarities, differences and odd things in the advertisements.

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CHAPTER FIVE: DESCRIPTION OF THE TEXTS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

After defining the object of analysis and gathering texts, one moves on to the description of the texts (Stokes, 2003). In line with thematic analysis procedures suggested by Murchison (2010) and Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), the data reduction and/or coding that I carry out in this chapter relies on themes derived from the literature review. The first of two data coding chapters, this chapter presents and describes the coded data. However, as noted above, the chapter largely uses pre-identified thematic distinctions or codes identified in Chapter Four to code the data. Coding, or arranging and describing gathered data precedes interpretation, drawing out cultural codes, generalisations and conclusions in [thematic and] semiotic analysis (Stokes, 2003). Coding is seeing or recognising an important aspect in the data ‘and encoding it (seeing it as something) prior to a process of interpretation’ (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 4). In this coding process, interpretation is kept to a minimum. The process of coding the data in this study also makes use of semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis to identify which words, pictures or colours and/or discourse are similar to which pre-identified or emergent thematic distinction or category. As part of coding the data, ZANU-PF advertisements have been grouped into four clusters, but since a unit of analysis can simultaneously be assigned to more than one category (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009), some of the

131 advertisements appear in more than one cluster. The advertisements are clustered around the following four thematic distinctions generated from the literature review:

 Selling of the Mugabe and ZANU-PF brands;

 Nationalism;

 Economic development and indigenisation;

 Peace.

I also coded the data for the purposes of describing it under two emergent thematic distinctions which are:

 Placement of ZANU-PF advertisements and the frequency in the selected newspapers;  Historical content.

In the first emergent code, I describe the placement of ZANU-PF advertisements and their frequency of appearance in the selected newspapers. As noted earlier in Chapters Two and Three, looking at the media in which the advertisements were placed and how often they were put there helps to unravel the meaning of the advertisements and the intentions of ZANU-PF. It also helps in the identification of the targeted audience. The study’s use of descriptive statistical analysis, here and in the methodology chapter, does not necessarily mean that I use statistics to answer the research questions. Instead, I use the numbers to make my analysis in Chapter Seven more incisive. Since I am operating in the interpretivist paradigm, the use of numbers or frequency of the advertisements is ‘…a source of questions, a springboard for further investigation and analysis’ (Deacon et al., 2007, p. 8). In interpretivism, contrary to positivist practice, numbers are not used to answer research questions but they are used as a springboard for further analysis of data (Deacon et al., 2007).

I also describe the historical content utilised by ZANU-PF. Under this code or thematic distinction I describe the data that specifically focused on the liberation struggle. However, this process of describing the data coded on the basis of emergent thematic distinctions

132 is further carried out in Chapter Six. The process of coding enabled me to arrange the ‘data to identify and develop themes from them’ (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 4). In coding or arranging the data, I looked for emerging or recurring themes in the advertisements under study. The themes identified and developed from the coded data are subjected to analysis or theoretical interpretation (Willig, 2001) in Chapter Seven. However, because the goal of this chapter is to describe the coded data, I keep interpretation to a minimum until later in the discussion in Chapter Seven (Anderson, 2007). Further, the analysis or theoretical interpretation is anchored in my personal understanding, literature review and the theoretical framework (Willig, 2001) presented in Chapters Two and Three; a framework that borrows from sign theory, post-colonial theory, political advertising and decolonial theory.

In the description of the advertisements, I am reflexive and contextual. The context of production of the advertisements is relevant since the meaning of media texts is relative to specific contexts, discourses and reasons for which they were created (Krippendorf, 2004). Therefore, grounding the advertisements in context enables the researcher ‘to gain a better grasp of their omissions, biases and peculiarities’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 30). As part of the context, those MDC-T advertisements to which ZANU-PF advertisements sought to speak back to or to rebut are also presented in the description in this chapter. These MDC-T advertisements are clustered together with the ZANU-PF advertisements that were a rebuttal of their claims. This description of the context enhances the study’s credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Swenton, 2004; Krippendorf, 2004; Trochim, 2006).

The chapter begins by presenting a description of the placement of the advertisements and the frequency with which they appeared in the four selected newspapers: Newsday, The Standard, The Patriot and the Daily News. This is followed by a presentation of the clusters identified above. A description of the conduct of the election campaign, and the context in which it occurred, since context enables the researcher ‘to gain a better grasp of their omissions, biases and peculiarities’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 30) follows. Because meaning is contextual (Deacon et al., 2007, p. 141), describing the context also enables the researcher to understand the language games played by ZANU-PF; ‘to understand

133 the rules that govern…the system of meanings’ (Schwandt 2005, pp. 296-7). Understanding the system of signs enables the researcher to describe and understand the tactics that were used by ZANU-PF in its print media election advertisements for the 2013 elections. These tactics are interpreted on the basis of the theories pointed out above. In other words, I operate in the hermeneutic circle (Krippendorf, 2004; Schwandt, 2005; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

The chapter concludes by describing historical content used in the ZANU-PF advertisements and the ruling party’s apparent duel with the MDC-T.

5.2 ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS AND THEIR PLACEMENT IN THE SELECTED NEWSPAPERS

Understanding the media context in which the advertisements appeared assists in making sense of ZANU-PF’s discourses. The frequency of placement and when and where the advertisement was placed constitutes part of the context of production and execution of an advertising campaign. The use of numbers here does not necessarily mean that I use statistics to answer the research questions; instead I use them to ask questions on the practice of political advertising in Zimbabwe and the ZANU-PF advertising strategy to make my analysis more incisive. As Deacon et al. (2007, p. 8) argue, unlike positivism which uses numbers to answer research questions interpretivism sees them ‘as a source of questions, a springboard for further investigation and analysis’. In the analysis chapter, the numbers will be used as a ‘springboard for further analysis’ of data; for example, what does the placement of the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone’ advertisement in all selected newspapers tell us? What does the non-placement of a single advertisement in the state-controlled media by ZANU-PF tell us about its strategy? What was the reason behind such a move, especially considering the GNU context? And was the placement of certain advertisements in particular newspapers and not others influenced by their editorial content? For example, was the placement of the ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ advertisement in the Daily News influenced by its anti-ZANU-PF content? Overall, how do all these issues affect the meaning of the ZANU-PF advertisements?

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5.2.1 Placement The study revealed that ZANU-PF only took out full-page advertisements and it preferred to place its advertisements on the right hand pages of newspapers; that is, on the odd- numbered pages. Of the 17 advertisements that appeared in the selected newspapers, 10 were placed on odd-numbered pages. Perhaps this is because in advertising practice, it is believed that the right hand page (odd-numbered page) is advantageous. It is held that the eye usually strays first to the right hand side when someone is browsing through a newspaper (Hansen, 1994 & Kupper, 1989, cited by Holmqvist & Wartenberg, 2005). As a result, in Zimbabwean newspapers, the odd-numbered pages (namely, pages 3, 5, and 7) are more expensive than the even-numbered pages.

However, it emerged that in Newsday the majority of the ZANU-PF advertisements were placed on even-numbered pages; that is, on the left hand side. It could be because ZANU- PF did not have adequate funds as there were mixed press reports in the run-up to and after the election regarding ZANU-PF’s financial state and election campaign budget. But if ZANU-PF had the money, then it could be that the anti-regime and anti-ZANU-PF Newsday preferred to put other material on the odd-numbered pages. Out of a total of eight ZANU-PF advertisements that appeared in the newspaper during the campaign, five were on the left hand side, while only three were on the right hand side. Of a total of five advertisements that appeared in The Daily News, four were on odd-numbered pages, whilst only one was on an even-numbered page. However, with regard to The Patriot, both ZANU-PF advertisements that it carried appeared on odd-numbered pages (Pages 5 & 25). Finally, of the two ZANU-PF advertisements in The Standard, one was on an odd-numbered page (Page 9) and the other was on an even-numbered page (Page 12). Overall, ten of ZANU-PF advertisements were placed on odd-numbered pages, whilst the remaining seven were placed on even-numbered pages.

The table below illustrates the placement of the advertisements in the four newspapers:

Newspaper Title Odd Numbered Pages Even Numbered Pages The Daily News 4 1 The Patriot 2 0

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The Standard 1 1 News Day 3 5 Total 10 7

As discussed in Chapter Two, the placement of advertisements in certain newspapers constitutes the context of production and circulation of the advertisements and may thus help in understanding ZANU-PF discourse. The placement of most ZANU-PF advertisements on the right hand pages in the Daily News may suggest that indeed advertisers, even those that are ideological enemies, wield power over the media. It may also suggest that the Daily News is simply sticking to the neo-liberal ideals that it advocates (cf. Moyo, 2005; Chuma, 2005) by, in typical neo-liberal practice, not rejecting any advertisement as long as it has a sponsor identification notice. Confusingly, the placement of most of ZANU-PF’s advertisements on even-numbered pages in Newsday appears to contradict the idea that advertisers wield power over the media. It suggests that ZANU-PF either had no money to place the advertisements on the right hand pages or maybe Newsday preferred to put other content on those pages. Furthermore, the placement of all ZANU-PF advertisements on the advantageous odd-numbered pages in The Patriot suggests that both owners and advertisers influence the media; it is most likely because The Patriot is pro-ZANU-PF.

Five advertisements appeared only once in one newspaper; three advertisements – ‘29 January 2009-Multicurrency’, ‘The people’s constitution’ and ‘We will compensate you’ – appeared only once in the Newsday and ‘What a peaceful campaign’, and ‘Lest we forget’ appeared once only in the Daily News and The Patriot, respectively. ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone’ appeared once in each of the four selected newspapers. The ‘Gushungo 8’ advertisement appeared once in both The Standard and Newsday. But the remaining three, ‘Council bills cancelled’, ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’ and ‘How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment’ appeared only once in both of the Daily News and Newsday. The private press in Zimbabwe is well known for its pro-opposition stance (cf. Moyo, 2005; Chuma, 2008) and the placement of these advertisements in the pro-opposition privately owned press and not in the state-

136 controlled media could have been a tactical manoeuvre on the part of ZANU-PF. It was probably part of its strategy. This shall be interpreted on the basis of neo-liberal, post- colonial and political economy of the media theories in the analysis chapter.

5.2.2 Frequency It emerged that of the ten unique advertisements that ZANU-PF (Team ZANU-PF) placed in the selected newspapers, only one, ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone’ appeared in all the four newspapers. This advertisement was a direct response by ZANU-PF to MDC- T’s ‘Move to more’ advertisement that appeared in the selected newspapers that sought to pour scorn on its manifesto. The ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone’ advertisement also appeared in billboard form in Harare. The three advertisements, ‘Council bills cancelled’, ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’, and ‘How indigenisation & economic empowerment will create employment’, appeared twice each in the Daily News and the Newsday. The other advertisement that appeared twice is the ‘Gushungo 8’ advertisement- it appeared once each in The Standard and the Newsday.

Perhaps the appearance of the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone’ advertisement in all the selected newspapers shows the importance ZANU-PF placed on the party brand. In other words, there was so much emphasis on ZANU-PF, which post-2008 was what Downer (2013) calls ‘a damaged brand’. It had been damaged by the economic crisis and the post-election violence of 2008, therefore placing its advertisement in all the selected privately-owned newspapers was a concerted effort to re-brand. Furthermore, the appearance of ‘Council bills cancelled’, ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’, and ‘How indigenisation & economic empowerment will create employment’ twice each in Newsday and the Daily News could have been a strategy aimed at neutralising the newspapers’ anti-Mugabe and anti-ZANU-PF editorial stance. In other words, if the Daily News and Newsday, which were known to be the staunchest critics of Mugabe amongst the private press, were carrying ZANU-PF advertisements their anti-ZANU-PF, anti-economic indigenisation editorial content may pass off as hypocrisy since they were accepting ZANU-PF’s supposedly ‘dirty money’. The two newspapers had also roundly criticised the slashing of Council bills by then Local Government Minister, Ignatius Chombo, arguing that it was an election campaign gimmick that was meant to hoodwink voters but which

137 would in the long run affect service delivery in the urban centres. In this context, placing the ZANU-PF advertisements in these newspapers was meant to appeal to the same voters, supposedly sympathetic to the same opposition with which these newspapers sympathised. It is a practice that goes against political economy of the media theory and political marketing theory wisdom of not associating with ideological enemies (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Menon, 2008). The practice is analysed in the analysis chapter on the basis of the foregoing theories. It helps the researcher to make sense why, unlike in all previous elections, ZANU-PF avoided placing advertisements in the state-controlled media.

5.3 CLUSTER 1: SELLING THE MUGABE AND ZANU-PF BRANDS

The advertisements under this cluster have been grouped together because they all intend to sell the ZANU-PF brand and the Mugabe brand. The authors’ intention was to portray ZANU-PF and Mugabe in a positive light, as compared to the opposition. Even though all ten advertisements could be classified under this cluster, the six clustered here specifically make it their intention to gain Mugabe and ZANU-PF maximum possible positive differentiation. They also question the credibility of the opposition political parties and presidential candidates. Some of the advertisements that fall under this cluster were a rebuttal of MDC-T campaign messages. Grouped or arranged together with the advertisements, and with the intention of capturing the context in which the advertisements were produced, are the opposition MDC-T advertisements which they sought to rebut.

5.3.1’ Our manifesto has excited everyone’

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This is a full page advertisement that was placed in all the four selected newspapers: the Daily News, Newsday, The Standard and The Patriot. The people seated are the MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai, in red cap and the party’s then Secretary-general, Tendai Biti, in black beret. The booklet Biti is holding is a Team ZANU-PF election manifesto for the July 2013 elections. The person behind Tsvangirai and Biti who is wearing a red beret and Jacket and is pointing at something on the pages of the ZANU PF manifesto in Biti’s hands is then MDC-T organising secretary Nelson Chamisa. The three others behind Chamisa, Biti and Tsvangirai are MDC-T officials since this picture was taken at an MDC- T rally just before the July 31 2013 elections (see Lloyd Mbiba, Daily News, 29 March 2014, p. 2). The three pictures of Team ZANU-PF’s manifesto appearing underneath the phrase, ‘Vote ZANU-PF’ are written ‘# Team ZANU-PF’ at the top. On the right hand side of the title is a football and beneath the title is the ZANU- PF election campaign slogan ‘Bhora Mugedhi Ibhola egedini’ (score the ball) in bold yellow. The slogan or payoff line is in capital letters and between ‘bhora mugedhi’ and ‘ibhola egedini’ is the image of a football. The football is red and white: these are the colours of the MDC-T.

However, the yellow (gold), red and black lines that appear beneath the slogan on the manifesto together with the black, green and white that appear elsewhere in the advertisement constitute the colours of the national flag. The colours green, red and black

139 also constitute the colours of the ZANU-PF flag. The Great Zimbabwe Ruins – also known in Shona as ‘Masvingo eZimbabwe’ – that appear beneath the three lines and on the white background, is the source from which the country got its name Zimbabwe (Dzimba dzamabwe – house of stones). Beneath the Great Zimbabwe Ruins are the words ‘Unity, Peace and Development’. Below the words, in black bold capital letters and bigger font is the phrase, ‘The People’s manifesto 2013’. This is followed by a table with four columns. The picture in the third column of the four column table at the bottom of the manifesto picture is that of the ZANU-PF’s presidential candidate President Robert Mugabe. President Robert Mugabe looks younger in the picture. The four column table resembles the ballot paper where people were supposed to put their vote ‘X’. Below the column in bold black capital letters are the words, ‘Taking back the economy’ and under these words are the words ‘Indigenise, empower, develop and create employment’ in bold black capital letters. These words ‘indigenise, empower, develop and create employment’ constituted ZANU-PF’s campaign theme for the 31 July 2013 elections.

The bottom part of the image of the manifesto has the following coloured lines as the borders: green, yellow, red, black and green. These colours together with white, as noted above, constitute the colours of the Zimbabwe flag; and they have specific meanings associated with them in the Zimbabwean context. For example, the colour black represents black majority rule while red represents the blood that was shed during the liberation struggle; the second Chimurenga. Written on the black strip is ZANU-PF’s website, email address, twitter handle, Facebook account and telephone numbers. The picture in the two ballot paper resembling columns in the advertisement is the image of a younger looking ZANU-PF presidential candidate, now President Robert Mugabe. The picture of a younger looking Robert Mugabe, the ballot paper resembling column and the standing/contact details that appear at the bottom of this advertisement appear at the bottom of all the ZANU-PF advertisements. The sponsorship identification notice for all ZANU-PF advertisements is ‘# Team ZANU-PF’. The Great Zimbabwe Ruins, with the words ‘Unity, Peace, Development’, also appears in all the ZANU-PF advertisements.

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The advert was based on the premise that even the opposition leaders were excited by the majority party’s manifesto. It was targeted at MDC-T supporters and the authors’ intentions were to persuade MDC-T supporters to follow their leaders in accepting the ZANU-PF manifesto and eventually vote for the party whose manifesto had excited even their main rivals, Tsvangirai (MDC-T president), Biti (then MDC-T secretary general) and Nelson Chamisa (then MDC-T organising secretary), among other party officials.

This advertisement will be read in conjunction with an MDC advertisement which sought to pour scorn on the ZANU-PF manifesto.

In this MDC-T advertisement, which appeared in the Daily News of 23 July 2013, the same picture of the MDC-T used in the ZANU- PF advertisement above was used. In this picture, Tsvangirai is saying ‘Haiwawo! Musapedzerwe nguva nenyaya dzazuro’ (Nonsense! Don’t allow them to waste your time with history). The other official in red (Nelson Chamisa) is asking ‘Ko, maona here manyepo aya?’ (Did you see these lies?), and Biti is saying: ‘ZANU yazopererwa manje…’ (ZANU has run out of ideas).

The MDC-T advertisement, just like the ZANU-PF advertisement, also has three images of its manifesto superimposed on top of each other. The statement ‘It’s time to move forward instead of taking the economy backwards’ appears to have been a play on ZANU-

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PF’s post-2000 mantra of ‘Taking back the economy’, a statement that appears on the manifesto that the MDC officials are holding. It was an attempt to weaken ZANU-PF’s economic empowerment and indigenisation discourse. Below the headline ‘Move to More’ and on the extreme left of the page are the MDC-T’s website address, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook accounts. The table with three columns at the bottom of the advertisement resembles a ballot paper.

By analysing these adverts together, it is possible to deduce the meanings of the words and pictures used in the ZANU-PF advertisements. The MDC-T advertisement provides context (textual) which enables the researcher to make sense of the signs used in the advertisement. Context is significant because meanings of advertisements, indeed of all media texts, are relative to specific contexts, discourses and reasons for which they were created (Krippendorf, 2004). The MDC-T advertisement also enables the researcher to make sense of the ZANU-PF discourses in the advert above in the context of the discourses to which they were responding. Furthermore, it also provides us with the reason(s) for which the advertisement was created and enables the researcher to grasp the ‘omissions, biases and peculiarities’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 30) of the ZANU-PF discourses.

5.3.2 ‘Council Bills Cancelled’

This is another ZANU-PF full-page advertisement that appeared in the Daily News and the Newsday. A few days before the elections, the then Minister of Local Government and National Housing, Ignatius Chombo, directed all local authorities to cancel all outstanding bills owed by residents. Chombo was in charge of the parent Ministry of all urban and rural local councils. This advertisement was targeted at both consumers (mostly urban residents) of water and electricity. In Zimbabwe provision of water in urban areas is handled by the respective city councils and residents pay for this water. However, electricity is provided by the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), a parastatal that is in charge of the provision of electricity in Zimbabwe. It is the only company that does so.

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Elton Mangoma, the then MDC-T deputy treasurer, was the Minister of Energy during the GNU and he is the one who is being accused for refusing to cancel the bills because ZESA fell under his Ministry.

The classification of this advertisement under this thematic distinction (see Krippendorf, 2004) was necessitated by its attempt, just like all the others, to portray ZANU-PF and Mugabe in a positive light whilst negatively portraying the opposition. The language games played in this advertisement; that is, positive self- presentation and concealment of self’s undesirable traits (namely, Mugabe brand and the ZANU-PF brand and its policies), negative presentation of the opposition brands (Tsvangirai, MDC and its policies) are similar to those utilised in the others under this cluster. The aim is to figure out the various ways in which Mugabe and ZANU-PF were branded in the advertisements.

The advertisement should be understood in the context of the GNU in which ZANU-PF, MDC-N and MDC-T shared Ministerial portfolios. MDC-T and ZANU-PF had the largest number of Ministries,. Whereas Mugabe presided over the swearing-in of all minsters, he only appointed ZANU-PF ministers to those portfolios that had been reserved for ZANU- PF, while Tsvangirai did the same for those portfolios reserved for MDC-T. But across the ministries, where the minister was from ZANU-PF, the deputy was from MDC-T, and vice versa.

5.3.3 29 January 2009-Multi-currency This is a ZANU-PF full page advertisement that appeared in the Newsday. The smiling person appearing beneath the word ‘fact…’ is Patrick Chinamasa, the then Justice Minister and Acting Finance Minister, holding forth a briefcase. The picture was taken as

143 the Finance Minister arrived at Parliament for the budget presentation. The briefcase he is holding contains the budget he was going to present on that day. The multiple currencies is a policy whereby Zimbabwe adopted foreign currencies (US dollar, the British Pound, the Euro, South African Rand and Botswana Pula) as legal tender after the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar due to the political and economic crisis-induced hyperinflation. These currencies were adopted in 2009 at a time when even vendors were rejecting the worthless Zimbabwe dollar and instead opting to sell their wares in foreign currency. Not only was the Zimbabwe dollar worthless at that time, it was also very difficult if not impossible to withdraw one’s salary and savings from the banks due to shortage of money.

The person appearing in the midst of the people in the picture underneath the word ‘fiction’ is Tsvangirai. His posture, where his left hand is covering the left side of his face including the left eye whilst his right eye is tightly shut and is tilting his head backwards as if he is dozing, is widely associated with stress and confusion in Zimbabwe. In most cases, if people come across a person striking that posture they usually ask the person if anything is wrong.

The advertisement states that on 29 January Patrick Chinamasa put in place the multiple currencies policy whilst the MDC-T became a member of government on 11 February 2009. It then asks rhetorically, ‘So how come the MDC wants to claim credit for a ZANU-PF policy that was put in place before it joined government?’ The advertisement goes on to say: ‘After five years in government characterised by absence of policy, the MDC now claims that it brought about multiple currencies’. It proceeds to command: ‘The facts are clear, ignore the fiction’. And to MDC it rebukes: ‘Be honest, it

144 was ZANU-PF’s idea’. It should also be understood in the context of MDC-T campaign messages in which they claimed to have brought about the multiple currencies policy. The advertisement was aimed at sprucing up the ZANU-PF brand, while at the same time rebutting MDC-T claims and attacking it as a dishonest party devoid of any meaningful policy.

5.3.4 ‘We will compensate you’ ‘We will compensate you’ is a full-page advertisement that was placed in the Newsday. The target audiences are ordinary depositors who lost their bank savings due to the adoption of the multiple currencies. The MDC Finance Minister being referred to in the advertisement is Tendai Biti, the then secretary-general of the MDC led by Tsvangirai. He was the Minister of Finance during the era of the Government of National Unity (GNU).

This advertisement has two pictures of a younger looking Robert Mugabe at the bottom. Unlike in the other advertisements where his picture only appears in the ballot paper resembling a four or five column table at the bottom, here the bigger picture appears beneath and on the left hand side of the call to action. The advertisement partly reads ‘when we changed currencies, your bills carried over, your debts carried over and were converted into US Dollars. It’s only fair that you get some money for your old currency. This is what we want to do but the MDC’s Minister of Finance is refusing to compensate people for the money they lost’. The advert is targeted mostly at urban dwellers who were the most affected by the adoption of the multiple currencies system, as their water bills, electricity bills and telephone bills, among others, were exorbitantly converted into US dollars.

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Read with the other advertisements on Council Bills and the multiple currencies advertisements, ZANU-PF’s omissions, biases, desires, thoughts, intentions and targeted audiences become clearer. The advertisements, for example, show that while claiming ownership of the multiple currencies policy and its benefits, ZANU-PF sought to disown the same policy’s disadvantages. It instead it sought to shift the blame for the suffering brought about by the policy onto MDC- T. ZANU-PF identified itself and its policies and differentiated itself from the competition, the MDC, with the intention of finding favour in the eyes of the voters. Positive self- presentation and negative presentation of the other is a political branding and product differentiation technique designed to gain voter appeal (see Downer, 2013, p. 4; Dickson & Ginter, 1987; Butler et al., 2007, p. 97).

5.3.5 ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’ This was another ZANU-PF full-page advertisement that was placed in the Daily News and Newsday. Nelson Chamisa is the MDC-T Organising Secretary and former Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Minister in the Government of National Unity (GNU). Beneath the headline is the picture of a note Chamisa allegedly wrote. The note states that ‘when greatness shall be measured, the man in the chair (referring to President Mugabe who chairs cabinet) shall be one among a few. I am impressed by his wisdom and deftness in dealing with matters and affairs of the state. I wonder who, among the aspirants, possesses even a quarter of what he possesses. He is a great man; a man

146 of a golden mind - agile and special in many ways. Meetings are different with him. It explains why I have not attacked him for a long while. My bone is with ZANU-PF now’.

The handwritten note is legible but the name of the note’s addressee is deleted.

On the right hand side of the picture of the note is a picture of Nelson Chamisa. These words written in the note are the ones that are repeated, with minor additions, below the pictures of the note and Chamisa. Where the note talks about the man in the chair, the edited statement has in brackets the phrase ‘referring to President Mugabe who chairs cabinet’ to qualify the statement. And where the note says ‘’PF” the edited statement puts “ZANU-PF”.

The advert should be understood in a context in which during the GNU and the July 2013 election campaign, opposition parties and the private parties delegitimised Mugabe on the basis that he was too old (89 years at the time), incompetent and had presided over Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis. The opposition and the private press claimed Mugabe was not feeling okay due to old age. The advert was therefore a defence of Mugabe and his candidature in the July 2013 elections. It was also an attack on Mugabe’s challengers. The advert justifies Mugabe’s continued rule and using a note written by and a picture of Nelson Chamisa served to lend credibility to ZANU-PF’s claim that Mugabe’s leadership qualities were unrivalled. The ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’ advertisement which appeared in both the Daily News and Newsday of 26 July 2013 could have been a response to the MDC’s ‘“Never Again!’ advertisement which appeared in the Daily News editions of 23 and 25 July 2013.

The MDC’s ‘Never again!’ advertisement is a full-page picture montage. In the background of the words ‘33 years of desperate leadership’ is the picture of barefooted ZANU-PF Ministers Kembo Mohadi then Home Affairs Minister (third from left), Sydney Sekeramayi of Defence (fourth from left), the State Security Minister Didymus Mutasa of (wearing green hat) and other ZANU-PF and government officials. Superimposed on the

147 picture on the extreme right hand side of the page is the picture of a woman. The woman is a sangoma/n’anga (traditional healer) Rotina Mavhunga, also known as Nomatter Tagarira5 but now popularly known as the ‘diesel n’anga’. It is important to point out here that the picture was taken in 2007 at the height of the Zimbabwe crisis when the n’anga fooled President Mugabe and government ministers6 that she had found diesel oozing out of a rock at Chinhoyi. She claimed that ancestors had responded to Zimbabwe’s shortage of fuel and thus miraculously provided diesel. It is important to also note that in ZANU-PF folklore, Chinhoyi is valorised as the site of the first battle of the second Chimurenga. The battle was fought on 28 April 1966 when seven ZANLA guerrillas engaged in a fierce battle with the Rhodesian forces. Superimposed under the headline ‘Never again!’ is the image of President Robert Mugabe (foreground: second from left and bespectacled) at a Johanne Marange apostolic sect church gathering at Bocha, near Mutare in the Manicaland Province. The President and ZANU-PF presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe, is in the foreground and third from right, holding a staff in right his hand. The Johanne Marange apostolic sect is one of the

5 Daily News (2013). Bizarre cases of our time, Retrieved from http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2013/05/20/bizarre-cases-of-our-time 6 allAfrica.com (2012) Zimbabwe: ‘Diesel n’anga’ release from prison, Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/201204080226.html 148 biggest African apostolic sects that openly support President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The biblical verse in the advertisement is taken from Proverbs 29: 18. The images used by MDC-T to discredit the opponent show the opponent’s (ZANU-PF’s) strong beliefs in the supernatural; that is, both African traditional religion and Christianity.

The MDC advertisement thus tries to discredit the Mugabe brand by presenting a narrative of Mugabe’s lack of viable ideas to take Zimbabwe forward. The advertisement implies that Mugabe believes in supernatural solutions to the very practical political and economic challenges facing Zimbabwe and should therefore not be given another mandate to lead the country. On one hand, the MDC-T advertisement is a counter- narrative to the post-2000 ZANU-PF narrative of’ Mugabe Chete’ (Mugabe only) and including it here enables the researcher to make sense of the signs and words used in the ‘Chamisa’s Secret Mugabe praise note’. It is part of the context and reason why ZANU-PF created the advertisement and it helps us understand references to Mugabe’s mental state, his ‘wisdom and deftness in dealing with affairs and matters of the state’. On the other hand, the ZANU-PF advertisement was a rebuttal of opposition attacks on Mugabe and Mugabe’s leadership.

5.3.6 ‘Gushungo 8’

This is a full-page advertisement that appeared in The Standard and the Newsday. The montage is made up of eight pictures of ZANU-PF candidates for eight Harare constituencies. Harare is the capital city of Zimbabwe which has, since year 2000 when the 1999 founded MDC contested its first elections, consistently voted for the opposition MDC. Beneath the picture of each of the candidates is their name, age and the

149 constituency that they were going to contest. There are six men and two women, and their ages range from 25 years to 40 years.

The bespectacled person in the picture right at the bottom of the advertisement is a younger looking Robert Gabriel Mugabe.

Private media and opposition narratives have always characterised ZANU-PF as a party of ‘geriatrics’, very old man and women who cling to power despite their advanced ages. So this advert is attempting to highlight that ZANU-PF is a party for the youth. It is an attempt at rebutting opposition narratives by highlighting that people as young as 25 years are also given the opportunity to contest elections on a ZANU-PF ticket and to assume leadership positions in the party. The advert could be read as another attempt to rebut the ‘Mugabe is too old’ narrative of the opposition that characterised the elections.

The advert should also be understood in a context in which ZANU-PF had repeatedly lost the urban constituencies to MDC. It could be that the old politicians who were worried about being humiliated by the youthful MDC-T candidates had retreated into the relatively safe rural constituencies where ZANU-PF largely holds sway. For example, the current Vice President and Justice Minister, E.D. Mnangagwa, is thought to have abandoned his Kwekwe Urban constituency for rural Zibagwe-Chirumhanzu after losing consecutive elections to MDC-T’s Blessing Chebundo in 2000 and 2005. It could be that ZANU-PF put youthful candidates in Harare because they did not expect them to win. The inclusion of the two women candidates should be understood in a context in which women’s groups have always complained that women are marginalised in politics. It could have been meant to appeal to the women voters. However, considering that women outnumber men in Zimbabwe the number two is still little.

5.4 CLUSTER 2: REGARDING NATIONALISM

The advertisements in this cluster have liberation war discourse and imagery of sell-outs, racism and oppression reverberating through them. They have been clustered together, since categories or thematic distinctions are made up of units of analysis that have certain patterns in common.

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5.4.1 ‘The people’s constitution’ ‘The people’s constitution’ is a full-page advertisement that was placed in the Newsday of 29 July. Appearing below the headline are three pictures of ‘The final draft constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe’. On the cover page of the images of the constitution is the Parliamentary Constitutional Select Committee (COPAC) emblem and in bold black capital letters, the words ‘The final draft constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe’.

Below these words on the cover page is the image of the Zimbabwean flag with the words ’31 January 2013’ below the flag.

The drafting of the new constitution was one of the key agreements of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). The three parties in the GNU agreed that the GNU was supposed to draw up a new constitution before the holding of free and fair elections, as it was felt that the old Lancaster House constitution was part of the Zimbabwean problem. Soon after the inception of the GNU, the three parties in government – namely, the two MDCs and ZANU-PF – set up the Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC). All three political parties seconded members to the COPAC. However, the whole process, beginning from the constitutional outreach programme through which they gathered the views of Zimbabweans, to the drafting of the document, was characterised by accusations and counter-accusations. The MDCs accused ZANU-PF of manipulating the process to suit its needs. Regardless of these conflicts, on 16 March 2013, Zimbabwe voted overwhelmingly for the adoption of the draft constitution with all political parties in the GNU campaigning for a ‘YES’ vote

The advertisement should also be understood in the context of allegations and complaints of marginalisation by certain regions and ethnic groups in Zimbabwe, 151 especially the Matabeleland region. People from Matabeleland have always argued that they are marginalised in Zimbabwe with some calling for devolution of the state power, whilst others called for outright secession. The discourse of empowerment of marginalised groups and communities should be read in this context and it should also be read in a context where the MDC-N, a member of the GNU whose leader, Welshman Ncube, hails from Matabeleland was promising devolution once elected into office. Ncube also concentrated his campaign in the provinces that allege marginalisation; Matabeleland provinces.

The advertisement is the only one of the ten ZANU-PF advertisements that specifically made reference to the liberation struggle. It claims that ZANU-PF saw to it that the people’s desire to safeguard ‘the values of the liberation struggle’ were realised by ensuring that the new constitution guarantees it. It is also the only advertisement that makes use of the word ‘sell-out’, pointing out that because ZANU-PF ensured that the constitution guarantees ‘the values of the liberation struggle, a sell-out cannot be President of Zimbabwe’. In addition to the above, it is also the only advertisement that makes reference to homosexuality, arguing that ZANU-PF also ensured that the constitution rejects homosexuality in respect of the people’s views expressed during the constitutional outreach programme.

5.4.2 ‘Lest we forget’ This is another full page advertisement placed by ZANU-PF in The Patriot newspaper in the run-up to the July 2013 elections.

The picture of a black man crossing a stream carrying a white man on his back is black and white and blown up, suggesting that it is an old picture. It suggests that it is a genuine picture that was taken during the colonial era. The picture is superimposed on a white background with a faded image of the Great Zimbabwe Ruins. Zimbabwe got its name

152 from the ruins when it became independent in 1980. In fact, during the liberation struggle, the nationalists referred to the country as Zimbabwe rather than Rhodesia.

It is important to note that the information presented in this advertisement is presented again in a double page advertisement by The Heritage Trust on 31 July 2013 in the Newsday (pp. 22-3). The advertisement by The Heritage Trust is a combination of two ZANU-PF advertisements, namely; ‘Lest we forget’ and ‘How economic indigenisation and empowerment will create employment’. The creators’ intention is to encourage people to vote ZANU-PF. It uses the exact words and picture used in the ZANU-PF advertisements.

Apart from the above, it is important to note that this ZANU-PF advertisement which appeared in The Patriot of 26 July to 01 August 2013 was a response to an MDC-T advertisement with the same headline, ‘Lest we forget’ that appeared in the Newsday of 25 July 2013 and The Daily News of 26 July 2013. The MDC-T’s ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement is a full-page advertisement that tells through pictures the economic woes and violence experienced during Zimbabwe’s crisis years.

The picture of people lying on hospital beds with drips tells the story of 2008 when a cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe, especially Harare, left thousands of people dead. That picture also tells the story of the collapse of the health delivery system post-2000 when the hospitals were crippled by a ‘brain drain’, shortage of drugs and incessant strikes by health workers against poor salaries and working conditions. The image of the burning hut tells the story of the man-made destruction caused by Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 and the pain it caused amongst the people is captured by the man in the picture holding his hands behind his head. The posture by the man is widely associated with someone wailing or ‘at wits’ end’ in Zimbabwe. ‘Murambatsvina’ was the code name for

153 a government operation carried out in 2005 to rid the towns of shacks and unapproved structures in urban areas and growth points. The picture also tells the story of the post- 2000 elections violence in which some families’ were burnt to ashes by alleged ZANU PF militias (see CCJP).

The picture of a person with a bandaged head and a badly bruised back also tells the tale of post-2000 election violence. The bandage has become red presumably from the bleeding wounds inflicted on the person’s head. It is alleged that post-2000 Zimbabwe ZANU-PF largely used violence against the electorate and the opposition MDC to retain power (see Lindgren, 2003; Masunungure, 2009). It is important to point out here that in 2008 Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the presidential run-off election, citing violence against his supporters by ZANU-PF youths and the security forces. Thousands were affected, whilst others lost their lives in the mayhem that followed Mugabe’s defeat by Tsvangirai in the 29 March 2008 election. Tsvangirai failed to garner an outright majority of 50 plus 1 per cent, thus leading to 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election from which he subsequently withdrew.

The motif of violence continues with the picture of uniformed Zimbabwean policemen beating up defenceless citizens. Critics argue that post-2000 the security establishment in Zimbabwe has been used as a tool to harass the private media and opposition MDC (see CCJP 2009). Tsvangirai, Nelson Chamisa and Lovemore Madhuku are amongst opposition politicians and civil society activists who have fallen foul of the security establishment.

The picture of the home-made coffin partially covered by a blanket and being pushed in a cart continues the narrative of suffering, violence and death. Presumably, there is a corpse inside the coffin. In 2008, due to fuel shortages and lack of money, people resorted to this mode of transport to ferry their dead relatives from the hospital to home or from home to the graveyard. The shortage of fuel in 2008, captured by the coffin in the hand- pushed cart is reinforced by the many people and many haphazardly parked vehicles in the next clip. These vehicles are queuing for fuel at a BP service station since a BP signpost is half visible in the advertisement. The haphazard nature of the vehicles helps to show the desperation of the motorists to get fuel. The coffin also conjures up images

154 of possible causes of death, perhaps it was because there were no drugs at the hospital or the person was a victim of political violence or cholera or even starvation. The statement ‘A 33 year ride – never again!’ refers to the number of years President Mugabe and ZANU-PF had been in power by 2013. He became the country’s Prime Minister in 1980 after ZANU-PF won the independence elections. He became the country’s first executive president in 1987 when the post of Prime Minister was abolished.

Reading the ZANU-PF advertisement together with the MDC-T advertisement helps us understand the signs that they used in the advertisements. It enables us to understand the reasons for their use, the context in which they were produced and the discourses that they sought to counter. It enables us to deduce the message creators’ omissions, biases, peculiarities, intentions, beliefs, thoughts and desires (Schwandt, 2005, p. 297; Murchison, 2010, p. 166). The analysis of these will follow in the next chapter.

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5.5 CLUSTER 3: ECONOMIC DEVLOPMENT AND INDIGENISATION

5.5.1 How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment This is a full page advertisement that appears as a landscape in the Daily News of July 25 2013 and Newsday of 25 July 2013.

The flow chart shows the indigenisation and economic empowerment process and how it will create employment. On the extreme left is a white table titled, ‘Assets to be indigenised’ and these foreign-owned assets have a monetary value of US$14.3 billion. In the box is a list of sectors to be indigenised, the number of the organisations, their value in US$, and the US$ equivalent of 51% shareholding per each organisation. Amongst the sectors to be indigenised are Mining, Communication, Finance and Agriculture. The next box’s headline is ‘Assets monetised 4-fold’ indicates ‘$7.3 Billion representing 51% of 14.3% billion’. This box is linked by arrows to four other yellow boxes and the arrows show the amount of money allocated to each of the four which is:

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 US$3 Billion to Physical infrastructure (energy, roads, tourism, railways, telecommunications etc), which is supposed to generate US$12 Billion;

 US$2 Billion for Social Infrastructure (health, education, housing, water and sanitation) which is supposed to generate US$8 Billion;

 U$2 Billion to ‘stimulate agricultural productivity to ensure food security’, which is supposed to generate US$8 Billion;

 US$300 Million to be allocated to Small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) for women and youth projects,' which is supposed to generate US$1.2 Billion.

The above four boxes are connected to the next table (box) by arrows. The table indicates the total number of employment opportunities created by each of the indigenised sectors. The total adds up to 2.265 million employment opportunities. The headline of the table is thus ‘2.265 Million employment opportunities created’.

Beyond the last table are three pictures of a woman and two men placed in descending order. In that descending order is a long statement fractured by the images of these three youthful people. Above the picture of the woman are the words ‘The next ZANU-PF government will create value through the indigenisation of 1,138 foreign firms’. The statement continues immediately beneath the lady but above the first man and it reads ‘The government will generate $7.3 billion representing 51% of $14 billion of assets from 1,138 to unlock valued at least $29, 2 billion underwrite the cost development through the stimulation of agricultural productivity, youth and… [The second picture, the picture of the first man, appears here and the statement continues beneath the picture] women driven ICT initiatives, the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure (economic enablers such as power/energy, roads, railways, telecommunications, dams, irrigation systems etc) and social infrastructure (health, education, security and safety, urban housing etc) to create employment for at least 2, 265 million indigenous Zimbabweans over the next five years’. The last picture, the picture of the second man appears at the bottom of the statement.

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It is important to note that the information presented in this advertisement is presented again in a double page advertisement by The Heritage Trust that appeared on 31 July 2013 in the Newsday (pp. 22-3). The advertisement by The Heritage Trust is a combination of the two ZANU-PF advertisements: ‘Lest we forget’ and ‘How economic indigenisation and empowerment will create employment’. However, it does not say anything about ZANU-PF even though it is very clear that the message creators’ intention is to encourage people to vote ZANU-PF. It urges the electorate ‘Lest we forget…Don’t let them take you for a ride, again’. These are the exact words that were used by ZANU- PF in its advertisements as well.

5.5.2 Previously discussed advertisements relevant to this cluster The People’s Constitution advertisement presented above under the cluster ‘Regarding nationalism’ also falls under this section, since it makes reference to ‘indigenised land’ and empowerment of ‘marginalised groups and communities in Zimbabwe’. As Zhang & Wildemuth (2009) note, a unit of analysis can simultaneously be assigned to more than one category. The ‘Gushungo 8’ advertisement also simultaneously falls under this category since it implies that ZANU-PF empowers the politically and economically marginalised youth, both male and female, by putting them in leadership positions. It also implies that by having youthful candidates for Harare, it was empowering Harare youths since it was ‘giving Harare back to the Youths’. Implied here, is that since they were youths, once voted into Parliament, they would also work towards youth (both male and female) empowerment.

The advertisements above should be understood in a context of heightened unemployment and economic ruin, an environment in which the MDC-T’s payoff line was ‘It’s time to move to more’, presumably more jobs, more food and more social services. It was also a context in which the MDC-T’s advertisements and other campaign messages sought to pour scorn on the ZANU-PF’s manifesto and its economic indigenisation programme. For example, the MDC-T advertisement in which Tsvangirai, Biti and Chamisa feature, pouring scorn on the ZANU-PF manifesto, partly provocatively reads ‘it’s time to move forward instead of taking the economy backward’. This was a thinly veiled attack on ZANU-PF’s land reform programme and economic indigenisation policy

158 which critics blame for the political and economic malaise that befell Zimbabwe post- 2000. It is in this context and for the reason of rebutting opposition claims that the above advertisements were created.

5.6 CLUSTER 4: PEACE

5.6.1 ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ The ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ is a full-page advertisement that appeared in the Daily News of 30 July. The picture covering almost half the page of the advertisement shows a ZANU-PF campaign rally held at Aerodrome at Sakubva at Mutare on 23 July 2013. The picture was not photo-shopped and it can be found at http://www.herald.co.zw/zanu-pf- star-rally-mutare-live-updates/. The advertisement however, does not indicate that the picture was taken at the Mutare rally but I know the place because I grew up there. I went to college a few metres from the Aerodrome, the venue of the campaign rally. In the background on the picture are the Dangamvura-Fern Valley Mountains and the ZANU- PF green campaign truck. The branded truck was a key feature of ZANU-PF’s rallies addressed by President Robert Mugabe across the whole country. I attended their rally in Gweru on 26 July 2013, a few days before the elections, and the truck was there. The crowd in the picture is clad in the ZANU-PF campaign regalia of predominantly green and yellow tee-shirts and caps. Those other two clips at the bottom of the picture also show ZANU-PF rallies, as the people are clad in ZANU-PF’s campaign gear. However, the clip with red borders and people with red caps and red tee-shirts shows MDC-T supporters at a rally. MDC-T’s colours are red and white but for the July 2013 election they predominantly used red. They are also thanked as part of ‘Zimbabweans’ who voted in peace.

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The advertisement exclaims ‘What a peaceful campaign’ and it goes on to say ‘Thank you Zimbabwe for heeding our call for tolerance and brotherliness’. The emphasis on peace which, as noted above, was a break with the past, should be understood in the context of a GNU where all the parties were preaching peace and tolerance in the elections. It was also a context in which the international community was keenly watching the elections, especially given the violence that marred the heavily disputed 2008 elections. In this context, the advertisement could be viewed as a strategic move by ZANU- PF designed to forestall any likely rejection of its victory by the Western countries on the basis of violence against opponents.

While MDC-T had an advertisement prematurely celebrating victory (which appeared in the Newsday of 29 July), ZANU-PF instead thanked Zimbabweans for voting in peace. The MDC-T’s premature celebration of victory implies that indeed the elections were free and fair. Contrastingly and strategically, ZANU-PF thanked Zimbabweans for a peaceful election. It could be that it had learnt its lesson from the 2008 election debacle. The 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election results were rejected by the opposition MDC, civil society and the international community, including SADC, on the basis of torture, violence, murder and intimidation. Apart from the ordinary voters, this advertisement was probably strategically targeted at civil society, the opposition and the international community (some of whom had sent election observers), as these had in previous elections rejected ZANU-PF’s

160 legitimacy to rule on the basis that it rigged elections and employed violence. ZANU-PF was accused of using youth militia, the police, intelligence and the military to intimidate, beat up, torture and murder opponents. Post-2000, some military Generals openly swore allegiance to ZANU-PF and vowed never to salute anyone without liberation war credentials; a move interpreted by critics and the opposition MDC as targeted at Tsvangirai.

Further, to fully grasp the meaning of the ZANU-PF advertisement, one needs to locate it also within the context of a press conference held by President Mugabe at State House on 30 July in which, as reported by the Daily News and Newsday of 31 July among others, he promised to hand over power to the opposition if he lost the election. He also dispelled fears that the Army Generals would stage a coup should he lose, saying that the Generals, not the army, were expressing their personal views and were bound by military discipline and would do no such thing. Mugabe is quoted by Newsday as having said, ‘If you go into a process and into a competition where there are only two outcomes-a win or a loss-if you lose you must surrender and those who have lost must also surrender’ (Mpofu & Nleya, 2013, p. 3). In this context, the advertisement could thus have been targeted at both the local and international audience.

The advertisement, which was placed in the Daily News on 30 July, a day before the elections, was designed to show that the campaign was peaceful and therefore the elections will be free and fair. And if the elections were peaceful, then they were free and fair; this meant that ZANU-PF’s legitimacy to rule was incontestable and it would be the legitimate winner. It was an attempt to pre-emptively legitimise ZANU-PF’s expected victory. Reading the advertisement in the context sketched above and together with the MDC-T advertisement, enables the researcher to make sense of the meanings of the signs used. It is in this context that the advertisement makes sense.

To further understand the discourses in the ZANU-PF advertisements presented above requires the researcher to ground them in the context of distribution as well. In other words, the researcher needs to identify the newspapers in which the advertisements appeared and their placement and frequency of appearance in the selected newspapers. Such a context enables the researcher to get a better understanding of the signs used in

161 the advertisements since meanings are also contextual (see Krippendorf, 2004; Schwandt, 2005).

5.7 HISTORICAL CONTENT

The only advertisement that specifically made reference to Zimbabwe’s colonial past appeared in The Patriot newspaper and its headline was ‘Lest we forget’, whereas in The Patriot of 26 /January to 1 August 2013, the advertisement had a Team ZANU-PF sponsor identification notice; the same advertisement appeared on 31 July in The Daily News with The Heritage Trust’s sponsor identification notice. The Heritage Trust advertisement was a combination of two ZANU-PF advertisements, namely the ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement and the ‘How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment’ advertisement. It is also worthwhile to point out here that The Heritage Trust owns The Patriot newspaper. It is also the same organisation that sponsored a number of attack advertisements directed against MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai that appeared on Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation’s Zimbabwe Television (ZTV) during the course of the campaign. These advertisements featured a number of women with whom Tsvangirai had affairs and they were basically designed to question his morals as a leader. Whereas The Patriot showed open support for the ZANU-PF in its pages and the editorial, the Daily News was clearly pro-MDC-T as shown by its content and a series of editorial cartoons in which it urged voters not to vote for ZANU-PF.

The MDC-T (MDC-Team) also had an advertisement with a similar ‘Lest we forget’ headline. However, whereas ZANU-PF sought to remind people of white oppression in its ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement, the MDC-T’s ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement sought to remind people of the crises that the ZANU-PF government had presided over. The study also revealed some of the ZANU-PF advertisements such as ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’, ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’, ‘Lest we forget’ and ‘29 January 2009-Multi-currency’ advertisements were a rebuttal of MDC-T’s campaign messages. Consequently, these will be read in conjunction with the MDC-T’s advertisements, such as the advertisement which poured scorn on ZANU-PF’s manifesto, the ‘33 years of

162 desperate leadership’ advertisement, its version of the ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement and its campaign messages regarding the adoption of multiple currencies.

Of the ten ZANU-PF advertisements, only one specifically made reference to the liberation struggle. ‘The people’s constitution’ advertisement makes reference to the fact that ZANU-PF saw to it that the people’s desire to safeguard ‘the values of the liberation struggle’ were realised by ensuring that the new constitution guarantees it. It is also the only advertisement that makes use of the word ‘sell-out’, pointing out that because ZANU- PF ensured that the constitution guarantees ‘the values of the liberation struggle’, ‘a sell- out cannot be President of Zimbabwe’. In addition to the above, it is also the only advertisement that makes reference to homosexuality, arguing that ZANU-PF also ensured that the constitution rejects homosexuality in respect of the people’s views expressed during the constitutional outreach programme. Finally, the study revealed that the words ‘the people’ attained a higher level of importance in ZANU-PF campaign discourse.

5.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

It is clear from the foregoing that ZANU-PF took out only full-page advertisements and it preferred the right hand pages of the newspapers. The key commodities that the advertisements sought to sell were the party and its presidential candidate. The pictures of the party’s presidential candidate, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe, appeared in all the advertisements. The party largely avoided selling individual parliamentary, senatorial and council candidates. It also sought to sell indigenisation, peace, employment creation, development, economic empowerment, introduction of multiple currencies and safeguarding the values of the liberation struggle (patriotism). In addition, the phrase ‘the people’ gained heightened significance in its advertisements. Unlike in previous years, the word ‘sell-out’ only appears once in all the ZANU-PF advertisements.

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CHAPTER SIX: THEMES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Following on the foregoing chapter in which I categorised the advertisements into thematic clusters for purposes of describing them, this chapter identifies the themes in the advertisements on the basis of similarities, differences, odd things and novel things. However, unlike the foregoing chapter in which coding was largely based on pre-identified themes, this chapter relies on thematic distinctions emerging from the data to code/categorise the data. The coding process involves seeing or recognising an important aspect in the data ‘and encoding it (seeing it as something) prior to a process of interpretation’ (Boyatzis, 1998, cited by Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 4). It is the process of encoding information that orders/arranges ‘the data to identify and develop themes from them’ (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 4; see Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). During the process of coding, utilising semiotic analysis and CDA, I compared the categories and the texts within them so as to unravel the odd things, the differences and similarities between the codes and ‘to fully understand the theoretical properties of the categories’ (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 3). The themes I developed from this process are used to identify information in the data that is related to each theme or that speaks to a particular theme (Murchison, 2010; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). However, since a unit of text can simultaneously be assigned to more than one category (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009), some texts that have already been presented in Chapter Five will be presented again here. In carrying out the process of coding and developing themes, identifying similarities, differences and odd things in the data, I relied on semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis specifically legitimation analysis.

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In the process of coding the data I identified the written texts, pictures and colours as signs and then determined the code(s) under which they fall; that is, thematic distinctions. Regardless of the absence of one agreed method of semiotic analysis, it is argued that ‘what have always to be identified are the structural components of texts, and for semiotics the fundamental component, both of language and of written texts which are made up of language, is the sign’ (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 136). Thus, for purposes of this study, I identify signs in the adverts and the cultural and technical codes under which they fall. However, even though I keep interpretation and analysis to a minimum, I examine the meanings of the signs in order to determine which theme(s) they speak to. The process enabled me to identify emerging patterns or thematic distinctions in the data; that is, through identifying similarities and differences in data. I encoded the data under these emerging recurring patterns. However, I discuss the ideological purposes of the advertisements (Mick, 1986; Stokes, 2003; Bertrand & Hughes, 2005; Berger, n.d; Deacon et al., 2007) later in Chapter Seven. The thematic analysis process is also augmented by critical discourse analysis. Here, critical discourse analysis is utilised in conjunction with semiotic analysis. I operate in the ideological square where I utilise legitimation and de-legitimation analysis (Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk, 1993). The critical discourse analysis that I use here is not the more linguistically inclined one where the emphasis is on structure of language. I use an informal type of critical discourse analysis that is mostly common in journalism and media studies (Van Dijk, 20 January 2015)7. I study the arrangement of specific words and pictures used in the advertisements to establish the meaning(s) being conveyed. But I do not study arrangement of all texts; I only select those that are representative of a specific theme. This enabled me to code/classify the data or to identify the emerging patterns which I then used to draw up categories or thematic distinctions presented below. These categories that emerge from the coded/recorded data are called thematic distinctions which are ‘motifs, imagery, thoughts, combination of categories’ (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 107). I keep interpretation to a minimum until later in Chapter Seven.

7 Email communication with the researcher in a discussion of paper I had submitted to Discourse and Communication. 165

The chapter starts by presenting some novel issues in the ZANU-PF campaign since I am equally interested in ‘unique themes that illustrate the range of meanings of the phenomenon…’ under study (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). The theoretical interpretation or analysis of these categories will be done in the following chapter on data analysis. The themes generated from the literature review (see Eisenhardt, 2002; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009) and those emerging from the data become the categories or classifications for analysis (Stokes, 2003). The categories presented in this chapter are made up of units of analysis or advertisements with the same themes.

The chapter starts by describing the use of football discourse and the manipulation of colours in ZANU-PF advertisements. This is followed by a description of ZANU-PF’s use of national flag colours. The section that follows describes ZANU-PF advertisements’ engagement with the opposition, specifically the MDC-T. In the following five sections, the chapter proceeds to present a description of: new discourses in ZANU-PF’s campaign messages; the party’s omissions and selective memory, especially its positive self- presentation as a caring policy oriented party; the party’s discourse of patriots and puppets, homosexuals and heterosexuals; Mugabe’s expertise in handling matters of state; and finally, the discourse of peace. Since it is impossible to code the data without interpreting it, interpretation in this chapter, as in the previous chapter, will be kept to a minimum until later in the discussion in Chapter Seven (Anderson, 2007). The process of interpreting the themes and categories generated in the data and presented in the current and previous chapters will be carried out in the next chapter. Interpretation will be based on my personal and theoretical understanding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). The analysis or interpretation of the themes and categories presented in Chapters Five and Six will be guided by the literature review and theoretical framework presented in Chapters Two and Three. The following chapter on interpretation tries to demonstrate how the multi-theoretical approach to the reading of African political advertising specifically, ZANU PF discourse that the thesis suggests may work. The interpretation will help shed light on the practice of political advertising in Zimbabwe, while the discontinuities in ZANU-PF discourse will assist in the study’s attempts to suggest, or call for, a new theory of African political advertising (Eisenhardt, 2002).

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6.2 ‘BHORA MUGEDHI-IBHOLA EGEDINI’ (SCORE THE BALL)

It is important to point out here that the 31 July 2013 elections were hailed as peaceful by everybody, even though there were disagreements over whether this meant that they were free and fair.

In the political campaign itself in July 2013 in Zimbabwe, football discourse dominated (Ncube, 2014). The political parties constituted themselves into football teams. ZANU-PF referred to itself as #Team-ZANU-PF, while MDC-T referred to itself as MDC-Team. Consequently, the sponsor identification notice for ZANU-PF was #Team ZANU-PF. Furthermore, its campaign slogan or payoff line was ‘bhora mugedhi ibhola egedini’; literally translated it means ‘score the ball’. The MDC-T had its own football discourse that it appropriated and used, such as the use of the red card and its ‘game over’ slogan. It is also worthwhile to note that at his last rally in Harare on 29 July 2013 billed ‘crossover rally’, Morgan Tsvangirai, as reported by Fungi Kwaramba in the Daily News of 30 July 2013 (p. 2), kicked a soccer ball into the crowd to signify that 31 July 2013 was ‘game over’ for Mugabe and ZANU-PF.

The MDC-T also placed a full-page advertisement in the Newsday of 31 July 2013 with the headline ‘VICTORY’ in red. The MDC-T’s football discourse was a response to ZANU- PF’s ‘bhora mugedhi-ibhola egedini’ campaign slogan.

On the previous day, 28 July 2013, President Robert Gabriel Mugabe had also kicked a ball at a rally at the National Sports Stadium in Harare. The Daily News of 29 July reports that the goalkeeper dressed in red to signify MDC-T, was supposed to allow the ball kicked by President Mugabe to go in but he ended up catching it. Thus, the 31 July 2013 elections were practically a battle between ZANU-PF and the MDC-T, even though there were also other smaller parties which contested the elections. This apparent duel is evident in the ZANU-PF advertisements.

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6.3 THE USE OF NATIONAL FLAG COLOURS IN ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS

The study also revealed that ZANU-PF’s dominant colour for the campaign was green. The background of the advertisements was largely green, even though white was used to a lesser extent. It also largely used white, black and yellow for its text in advertisements. The colour red was used only sparingly. It is important to note that these colours make up the colours of the Zimbabwean flag. It is also important to note that MDC-T’s campaign colour was red, while ZANU-PF’s colours were largely green and yellow and to a lesser extent, white. The study also revealed that the picture of the ZANU-PF presidential candidate, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, and the Great Zimbabwe Ruins appeared in all the advertisements. The calls to action, ‘Vote Cde Robert Gabriel Mugabe for President’ and ‘Vote ZANU-PF’ also appeared in all the advertisements. The colour red appears as part of a red and white soccer ball on all ZANU-PF advertisements. It is part and parcel of the slogan ‘bhora mugedhi ibhola egedini’ where the ball appears in between ‘bhora mugedhi’ and ‘ibhola egedini’. The colour red is also associated with the MDC-T and is one of the MDC-T’s corporate colours, the other colour being white. The words ‘Unity, Peace and Development’ also appear in all advertisements as part of the ZANU-PF emblem; they appear beneath the Great Zimbabwe Monuments. In addition, all the ZANU-PF advertisements have a table with four or five columns resembling a ballot paper at the bottom of the advertisement.

6.4 MDC-T THE MAJOR THREAT TO ZANU-PF’S RULE?

A look at the advertisements also reveals that ZANU-PF did not pay any attention to the smaller political parties that contested the elections, instead choosing to directly engage with its perceived main challenger to power, the MDC-T. A closer analysis of the advertisements shows that in nine of the ten ZANU-PF advertisements, the party explicitly or implicitly engaged with the MDC-T. It sought to simultaneously rebut certain claims by the MDC-T and attack it in the following advertisements: ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’, ‘Council Bills cancelled’, ‘We will compensate you’, ‘Lest we forget’, ‘29 January 2009’, ‘Gushungo 8’, ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’, ‘The people’s constitution’ and ‘How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create

168 employment’. In the remaining, ‘What a peaceful campaign’ advertisement, ZANU-PF included MDC-T as part of the Zimbabweans it thanked for heeding the call to peace during the campaign. It did not explicitly mention the MDC-T, instead choosing to use a clip of MDC-T supporters amongst clips of ZANU-PF supporters among the image of the Zimbabweans it was thanking for the peace that prevailed during the campaign period.

6.5 NEW DISCOURSES AND TACTICS EMPLOYED BY ZANU-PF

For the first time since 2000, ZANU-PF acknowledged MDC-T members as Zimbabweans. There was a deliberate attempt by ZANU-PF to target the youths, women and the workers. Of the ten advertisements that the party created and placed in the selected newspapers, two were about youths. For example, in the advertisement ‘Gushungo 8’ the party deliberately wanted to project itself as a party that is progressive as it accommodates youths. Furthermore, in its ‘How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment’ advertisement, the party deliberately makes an effort to talk about youth and women empowerment. It also targets the youths and workers in this advertisement by deliberately pinpointing the exact number of jobs that the indigenisation and economic empowerment drive will create. This was created in a context of high unemployment which resulted from the ESAPs of the 1990s and the economic meltdown of the post-2000 era.

In addition to the above, ZANU-PF sought to portray itself as a caring party through showing its concern for the depositors, the majority of whom are businesses, business people and workers, by promising to compensate them for the loss of their deposits due to the switch from the Zimbabwe dollar to the multiple currencies in 2009. However, its targets were the ordinary depositors who were hardest hit by the adoption of multiple currencies and who constitute a significant number of voters. In its advertisement ‘We will compensate you’, the party was targeting the workers as they were the hardest hit by the introduction of multi-currencies. This concern for the workers and by extension the urban dwellers that are thought to be largely pro-MDC, is evident again in the ‘Council Bills Cancelled’ advertisement. It is the urban dwellers and workers who were once again hardest hit by the change of Zimbabwe dollar debts into US dollar debts by local

169 authorities and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). ZANU-PF, through the minister who was then responsible for local government, Ignatius Chombo, a member of ZANU-PF, directed all local authorities to cancel all residential bills and not commercial bills. It is apparent that in the three advertisements mentioned above, ZANU-PF sought to appease the urban voter and to capture the elusive urban vote which has since 2000 consistently gone to the MDC.

Another new tactic observed was the use of the discourse of empowering marginalised persons, groups and minorities. This is apparent in the people’s constitution advertisement. The study also observed that whereas ZANU-PF sought to shift the blame onto the MDC-T with regard to the negative effects of the introduction of the multiple currencies, it remained silent on the suffering that Zimbabweans endured prior to GNU in 2009 when it was solely in charge.

The study also observed that three out of the ten ZANU-PF advertisements mentioned the introduction of the multiple currencies. The ‘Council bills cancelled’ advertisement and the ‘We will compensate you’ advertisements sought to portray ZANU-PF as a caring party and the MDC-T as an uncaring party. However, the third sought to rebut MDC-T claims that it had introduced the multiple currencies. It was also aimed at questioning the credibility of the MDC-T by comparing the ‘fact’ that ZANU-PF had introduced multiple currencies before the GNU on 29 January 2009 and the ‘fiction’ by the MDC-T in their campaign messages that they had introduced multiple currencies. It is clear from the advertisements that ZANU-PF sought to attack MDC-T’s performance in GNU as opposed. It paid little attention to the discourse of sell-outs, as shown by the fact that only one advertisement uses the word ‘sell-out’. It is clear that ZANU-PF used attack or negative advertising in its print media election advertisements even though the tone was not as vicious as in previous elections. All the ZANU-PF advertisements were placed in the privately-owned press and none were placed in the state-controlled press. The foregoing shall be subjected to theoretical interpretation or analysis in the following chapter.

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6.6 ZANU-PF, A CARING PEOPLE AND POLICY ORIENTED PARTY

Breaking with post-2000 tradition, ZANU-PF advertisements generally refrained from attacking the person of MDC-T leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, or the party’s candidates even though they did use attack advertising. It sought instead to portray itself as a people oriented, policy implementing and caring party. It also, unlike in previous elections, largely refrained from the fear appeal or intimidation that it has come to be associated with by critics. ZANU-PF also largely resorted to rebutting MDC-T claims through appropriating their discourse and turning it on its head to ridicule them. The rebuttals were quickly turned into attacks on the MDC-T. For example, in the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ advertisement, ZANU-PF used the picture of the MDC’s president, Morgan Tsvangirai, and Secretary General, Tendai Biti, and other officials holding a ZANU-PF manifesto to claim that ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ The MDC-T had produced an advert with the same picture ridiculing the ZANU-PF manifesto, but ZANU-PF strategically turned that negative (attack on their manifesto) by using the same picture to claim that its manifesto had even impressed the opposition MDC-T.

In another advertisement, ZANU-PF turned MDC-T’s campaign messages claim – that it had implemented the multiple currencies policy – on its head and accused the MDC-T of dishonesty and failure to draw up policy during its time in government. In this advertisement, ZANU-PF used argumentation to legitimise itself while simultaneously delegitimising the MDC-T (see Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk, 1993). It argues that it is ‘fact’ that the multiple currencies system was put in place by ZANU-PF and MDC-T’s claims that they implemented the policy were ‘fiction’. ZANU-PF’s negative evaluation of the MDC-T as a dishonest party that failed to implement policy during five years in government follows from the ‘fact’ that it was ZANU-PF that had implemented the multiple currencies policy, contrary to MDC-T’s claims. The MDC-T’s dishonesty and failure to implement policy was the reason ‘why’ (see Van Leeuwen, 2007) Zimbabweans had to vote ZANU-PF because it had implemented the multiple currencies policy that alleviated their suffering. In the same move, ZANU-PF is differentiating and creating distance (proximisation) (see Van Dijk, 1993; Mazid, 2008) between itself – a party that came up with a policy that alleviated people’s suffering – and the MDC-T, a dishonest party that failed to come up with policy

171 during five years in government. The choice of words such as ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ was designed to widen the gap between the ZANU-PF (us), an honest party and MDC-T (them), a dishonest party. It is precisely on the basis of this distinction (between honesty and dishonesty; fact and fiction) that people should vote ZANU-PF and not MDC-T. As Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 99) notes, ‘comparison in discourse almost always have a legitimatory or de-legitimatory function’. The same techniques and tactics of differentiation, argumentation and proximisation were used in two advertisements: ‘Council bills cancelled’, and ‘We will compensate you’. Here, ZANU-PF used positive self-presentation and boasting about one’s performance among others to legitimise it.

ZANU-PF sought to shift the blame for the suffering brought about by the multiple currency onto the MDC-T. Ironically, in their ’29 January 2009’ advertisement, ZANU-PF ridicules the MDC-T for claiming that it had introduced the multiple currencies, arguing that it was ZANU-PF which had done so before the swearing in of the Government of National Unity (GNU). In the ‘Council bills cancelled’ and ‘We will compensate you advertisements’ ZANU-PF again positively presents itself as a party that ‘cares’ and negatively portrays the MDC as an uncaring party. It urges voters to vote for a government that cares and understands the plight of the people, unlike the MDC-T whose ministers were allegedly refusing to compensate people’s loss of bank savings and to cancel the people’s unfair electricity bills, accumulated as a result of the adoption of multiple currencies. This incompleteness in the ZANU-PF discourse, where they do not acknowledge their own role in the suffering that Zimbabweans have been going through, is one tactic they use to legitimise their rule.

In both advertisements, they do not mention the negatives associated with the multiple currencies, but instead dwell on the positives. They strategically expose the positives in two other separate advertisements where they accuse the MDC-T of dishonesty in claiming to have introduced the multiple currencies system. Thus, they used concealment (ignoring the negatives) and/or selective omission. ZANU-PF concealed/omitted the factors that led to the adoption of the multiple currencies; that is, the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar due to a political and economic crisis-induced hyperinflation. It concealed the fact that it had presided over the economic collapse that brought about the

172 suffering in the first place. At the same time it absolved itself of the negative impacts of the introduction of the multiple currencies – such as high electricity and water bills. In the ‘Council bills cancelled’ and ‘We will compensate you advertisements’, ZANU-PF again positively presents itself as a party that ‘cares’ and negatively portrays the MDC-T as an uncaring party. It urges voters to vote for a government that cares and understands the plight of the people, unlike the MDC-T whose ministers were allegedly refusing to compensate people’s loss of bank savings and to cancel the people’s unfair electricity bills accumulated as a result of the adoption of multiple currencies.

ZANU-PF opted to assassinate the character of the MDC-T party and not its candidates, by delegitimising it as a dishonest and uncaring party that is not concerned about the plight of the urban poor and the generality of the Zimbabwean populace. Contrastingly, it legitimised itself as a caring party. While delegitimising the opposition on account of its dishonesty and uncaring attitude towards the people, ZANU-PF legitimised itself by identifying the needs of the people, including marginalised persons, groups and communities (see Mazid, 2008, p. 438). This was a new tactic where it claimed that it had ensured that the new constitution guarantees that measures shall be taken to empower the marginalised persons, groups and minorities. It is a discourse that should be understood in the context of contestations around Zimbabweanness, ethnicity and complaints about marginalisation by various ethnic groups. Apart from the above, the choice of the word ‘people’ in some of the advertisements is intended to create emotional attachment between ZANU-PF and the people. In the ‘The people’s constitution’, ‘Council bills cancelled’ and ‘We will compensate you’ advertisements, ZANU-PF creates the impression that it is a party of the people and that that they care deeply about the people, whilst the MDC-T does not. It nevertheless used terror of being ruled by a dishonest party to eliminate the MDC-T from the language game. This was a shift from its alleged tendency to assassinate the characters of opposition leaders as imperialist stooges (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003).

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6.7 ZANU-PF AS PATRIOTS AND MDC-T AS PUPPETS OF WHITES AND HOMOSEXUALS

ZANU-PF used pinpointing to identify whites as the enemy. In its ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement, it pinpoints the former white colonial masters as the enemy by using a colonial era picture of a white man crossing a river carried/riding on the back of a black man. It advises ‘Don’t let them take you for a ride, again’. It deliberately uses ‘them’ to refer to the whites, but does not mention them because it is obvious who ‘them’ are. It creates the impression that it is common sense that the whites are behind the MDC-T and this makes the connection all the more powerful. ZANU-PF relied on memory to delegitimise the MDC-T as a puppet party. It also uses the word ‘ride’, both literally (white riding on the back of a black man across a stream) and figuratively. Also, without the need to mention it explicitly, ZANU-PF implies a link between the MDC and the former white colonial oppressors which makes the connection all the more powerful because it is taken as common sense. By so doing, ZANU-PF successfully uglified the opponent while beautifying the self (see Mazid, 2008) without necessarily resorting to the crude fear appeal tactics of previous elections. It also uglified the MDC as sell-outs while beautifying itself (ZANU-PF) as the patriots.

The ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement, for example, implies that the MDC-T is a front for the former colonial masters, the whites, while ZANU-PF is implied to be the patriots. Again in ‘The people’s constitution’ advertisement, ZANU-PF negatively portrays (this is implied) the MDC-T’s Tsvangirai as a sell-out and Mugabe as a patriot. The party boasts that it had ensured that the new constitution does not recognise homosexuality and guarantees the values of the liberation struggle, meaning that ‘a sell-out cannot be president’. It also boasted that 80% of the views contained in the new constitution came from ZANU-PF (see Mazid). Here, ZANU-PF used positive self-presentation (we are a revolutionary and patriotic party) and negative presentation of the MDC (implied – homosexuals and sell- outs) (see Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk, 1993). ZANU-PF also used analogies (ZANU-PF = Patriots; MDC-T = Sell outs) to legitimise itself while de-legitimising the MDC-T. In addition, in the same advertisement, ZANU-PF ridicules the MDC-T’s claim to be a democratic party urging voters to, ‘vote for a party that knows that “democracy” is not a

174 word but a way of life’. The implied meaning, especially by the placement of the word ‘democracy’ in quotes, is that the MDC-T is not a democratic party but it only uses the word to fool voters. It is an attempt by ZANU-PF to delegitimise the MDC-T’s democracy discourse by presenting itself as a more democratic party. The MDC-T is thus negatively presented as pretenders and this ties in well with the ZANU-PF’s argument that they were the ones that brought democracy to Zimbabwe and thus cannot be lectured on democracy by the MDC-T and the West.

By implying a link between MDC-T and homosexuals, ZANU-PF created the impression that as soon as the MDC-T gets into power, it will legalise homosexuality. It used moral evaluation to legitimise itself while de-legitimising the MDC-T. As Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 97) notes, ‘legitimation [may be] based on moral values… [and may be asserted by phrases such as “good” and “bad” but can also be done through] adjectives such as “healthy”, “normal”, “natural”, “useful” and so on. These adjectives are then the tips of a submerged iceberg of moral values’. In Zimbabwe, the submerged icebergs may be the biblical and traditional views that regard homosexuality as abhorrent. Associating MDC- T with gays and lesbians was a blow meant to eliminate MDC-T from the language game. It was aimed at de-legitimising MDC-T, while simultaneously legitimising ZANU-PF as the guarantor of African tradition and Christianity which both regard homosexuality as abhorrent and sinful.

6.8 MUGABE AN EXPERT IN STATE CRAFT AND ‘A GREAT MAN’ OF A ‘GOLDEN MIND ZANU-PF also ‘quoted credible sources’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 264) and ‘charismatic leadership projection’ (see Mazid, 2008, p. 438), or what Van Leeuwen (2007) calls expert authority to legitimise its dominance. In the ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’ advertisement, it rebutted opposition and private press claims that Mugabe was too old and frail to rule. ZANU-PF turned the attack on its head; it remained silent on claims that Mugabe was too old, claiming instead that he is a ‘great man’ of a ‘golden mind – agile and special in many ways’ whose challengers (the aspirants to the Presidency) do not possess a quarter (quarter) of the ‘wisdom and deftness’ he possesses ‘in dealing with matters of the state’. The defence of Mugabe is in the same movement turned into an

175 attack on his opponents. ZANU-PF used denial [Mugabe is not too old to rule], language as shield [he is a great man of a golden mind] and weapon [the aspirants do not possess even a quarter of the wisdom and deftness he possesses in dealing with matters of the state] to legitimise Mugabe’s continued rule of Zimbabwe. His continued rule is justified on the basis of the positive evaluation that he possesses superior wisdom and is more special in many ways than his opponents. In other words, ZANU-PF used a combination of expert authority (Mugabe is an expert in dealing with matters of the state) and analogy (comparing his superior wisdom to that of his challengers who did not even possess a quarter of what he has) to legitimise Mugabe’s continued dominance.

The legitimisation of Mugabe’s continued rule on the basis of expertise dovetails nicely with ZANU-PF discourses of ‘Mugabe chete’8 (Mugabe only). These discourses created the illusion that there is no one, either within ZANU-PF or the opposition, with the leadership credentials to replace Mugabe. It is a discourse that creates the impression that the history of independent Zimbabwe starts and ends with Mugabe’s leadership. It is indeed a discourse that has been used to perpetuate Mugabe’s rule and one that in 2013 was continued through the ‘bhora mugedhi’ (score the ball) discourse. Mugabe’s expertise in running matters of the state is unparalleled and consequently he has to rule forever.

To lend credibility to their claims, ZANU-PF quoted Nelson Chamisa, the then MDC’s National Organising Secretary and Minister of ICTs in the GNU. Quoting credible sources is a technique of reproducing dominance (Van Dijk, 1993), and ZANU-PF wanted to convince the MDC-T supporters that even their leaders acknowledge that Mugabe is a special leader: ‘This is what Chamisa says and you know what? We agree’. As Van Leeuwen (2007) observes, in advertising celebrity endorsements by and/or role models also act as a means of legitimising a product. Following on the above, Nelson Chamisa’s

8 Upon his return from a state visit in China at the beginning of September 2014, President Mugabe was greeted by placard waving ZANU-PF supporters who were allegedly not pleased about the election rigging that had taken place during the party’s Youth and Women league conferences. Some of the placards read ’Mugabe chete’ (Mugabe only). 176

– a role model and celebrity amongst the MDC-T’s supporters – alleged endorsement of Mugabe was intended to legitimise Mugabe in their eyes.

The advertisement was obviously targeted at the MDC-T supporters and was intended to convince them that even MDC-T Tsvangirai’s closest confidants acknowledge that Mugabe’s wisdom and expertise in state craft is greater than Tsvangirai’s. The advertisement should also be understood in the context of media reports where WikiLeaks cables revealed that Nelson Chamisa told the American ambassador that Tsvangirai was an indecisive leader. To authenticate that indeed Chamisa had said that of Mugabe, ZANU-PF included in the advertisement a picture of the very legible note that Chamisa allegedly authored, praising Mugabe. However, the addressee is deleted but the salutation is ‘Hon’ [Honourable], which creates the impression that it was during a cabinet meeting chaired by Mugabe (who is the only one who chairs cabinet meetings) that Chamisa authored the note, because it refers ‘…to the man in the chair…Meetings are different with him’. Thus, the ‘Hon’ was undeniably a fellow cabinet Minister as Members of Parliament and Cabinet Ministers usually address each other as Honourable. ZANU-PF used differentiation and proximisation, as it claims Mugabe is different from the others since ‘meetings are different with him’. This claim put a huge distance between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, who chaired the Council of Ministers meetings during the GNU era. It also put a distance between Robert Mugabe and all the other opposition candidates since none possesses a quarter of the wisdom and deftness he has in dealing with state matters.

6.9 THANKING ZIMBABWEANS FOR A PEACEFUL VOTE: ZANU-PF’S PRE- EMPTIMVE STRIKE ON ITS CRITICS?

Finally ZANU-PF tried to co-opt MDC-T and its supporters in its reproduction of dominance. In the ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ advertisement, ZANU-PF thanks Zimbabweans for ‘heeding our call for tolerance and brotherliness’. In this advertisement, amongst a picture montage of ZANU-PF rallies, is also a clip of an MDC-T rally. The inclusion of a clip of an MDC-T rally implies that they were also part of the Zimbabweans

177 that were being thanked. This was a total break with the past, where post-2000 ZANU- PF characterised the opposition MDC-T and its supporters as sell-outs and not ‘authentic Zimbabweans’, while the ZANU-PF supporters were patriots and Zimbabweans (see Freeman, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The exclamation mark in the headline is meant to show that the statement is an emphatic one that betrays strong emotions of gratitude. It is intended to leave no room for doubt and objection as to the peacefulness of the campaign. The exclamation mark provides ‘structural emphasis’ (see Van Dijk, 1993, p. 264) to the phrase, ‘What a peaceful campaign!’. Furthermore, the use of the statement, ‘heeding our call for tolerance and brotherliness’ is meant to reinforce the headline. It is an attempt to show that, unlike in previous elections that were characterised by violence and intimidation, in the July 2013 elections Zimbabweans chose to agree or disagree in peace and brotherly love. The phrase ‘our call’ is meant to give ZANU-PF credibility for preaching the gospel of peace, as previously they had been accused of intimidation and violence. The phrases were intended to achieve legitimation through positive self- evaluation.

The emphasis on peace which, as noted above, was a break with the past should be understood in the context of a GNU where all the parties were preaching peace and tolerance in the elections. It was also a context in which the international community was keenly watching the elections, especially given the violence that had marred the heavily disputed 2008 elections. In this context, the advertisement could be viewed as a strategic move by ZANU-PF designed to forestall any likely rejection of its victory by the Western countries on the basis of violence against opponents. While MDC-T had an advertisement prematurely celebrating victory, ZANU-PF instead thanked Zimbabweans for voting in peace. It could be that it had learnt its lesson from the 2008 election debacle. The 27 June 2008 presidential run-off election results had been rejected by the opposition MDC, civil society and the international community, including SADC, on the basis of torture, violence, murder and intimidation. Apart from the ordinary voters, this advertisement was probably strategically targeted at civil society, the opposition and the international community (some of whom had sent election observers) as these had in previous elections rejected ZANU-PF’s legitimacy to rule on the basis that it had rigged elections and employed violence. The advertisement, which was placed in both the Daily News and

178 the Newsday on 30 July, a day before the elections, was designed to show that the campaign was peaceful and therefore the elections will be free and fair. And if the elections were peaceful, then they were free and fair which meant that ZANU-PF’s legitimacy to rule was incontestable; it would be the legitimate winner. It was an attempt to pre-emptively legitimate ZANU-PF’s expected victory.

6.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The foregoing shows that ZANU-PF refrained from using crude fear appeal and attack advertising. However, its minimal use does not mean that ZANU-PF avoided using attack advertising. They did indeed use attack advertising but they avoided assassinating the character of the MDC-T leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, or any of the party’s top officials. Instead, ZANU-PF largely resorted to attacking the MDC-T as a dishonest party that lacked policy initiative. Interestingly, the attack was not as vicious as in previous elections where they bordered on insults against the person of Tsvangirai. It did not use any intimidation or threats of reprisals against perceived opponents in its advertisements. It largely utilised comparative advertising where it cast itself as a better party than the MDC- T. Furthermore, most of the ZANU-PF advertisements were a rebuttal of MDC-T advertisements and campaign messages. ZANU-PF, unlike in the past, strategically sought to pre-empt any rejection of its expected electoral victory by thanking all Zimbabweans, MDC members included, for heeding the calls for peace and voting in peace. It also utilised football discourse and national flag colours, even though green was the dominant colour in the advertisements. Finally, ZANU-PF sought to sell the Mugabe brand by tactfully obscuring his advanced age and focusing on his mental state and expertise in running matters of state. The foregoing will be subjected to theoretical interpretation in the following data analysis chapter.

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CHAPTER SEVEN: SYNTHESISED FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an analysis and interpretation of both the pre-identified and the emergent themes presented in preceding chapters. The themes presented and discussed in this chapter show the meanings of phenomena under study (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009); that is, ZANU-PF election advertisements for July 2013. But this analysis involves theoretical interpretation which is more in-depth, as it digs beneath the surface and includes my personal understanding or interpretation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). The personal interpretation is influenced by my being a Zimbabwean who has lived under ZANU-PF’s (mis)rule all his life. In the interpretation, as discussed in Chapter Four, I operate within the hermeneutic circle where context is central to understanding a phenomenon (Krippendorf, 2004; Schwandt, 2003). The process of analysis and interpretation that I carry out in this chapter ‘…presents description that embodies well-constructed themes/ categories, development of context and explanation of process or change over time’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The analysis will thus expose the continuities and discontinuities in ZANU-PF discourse. In effect, the foregoing is central to qualitative research as corroborated by Anderson (2010, paragraph 2, lines 5- 6) who observes that qualitative research ‘…looks at X [ZANU-PF discourse] in terms of how X [ZANU-PF discourse] varies in different circumstances…’.

The analysis and interpretation of the themes I carry out in this chapter also includes a discussion of the study’s results in the context of literature reviewed (Anderson, 2010) and the research questions. I combine the analysis and interpretation of data and discussion of findings. This strategy is useful for this study, considering data analysis, as noted in Chapter Four, involves interpretation (Anderson 2007). I therefore decided, for purposes of avoiding repetition, to treat theoretical interpretation and discussion of findings on the basis of literature as one, since the approach that I utilised combined theoretical discussion and literature review. In any case, ‘it is common practice to include some discussion within the results section of qualitative research and follow with a

180 concluding discussion’ (Anderson, 2010, paragraph 26, lines 5-6). This is geared towards showing the process and change in ZANU-PF discourse in different circumstances (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Anderson, 2010). It is also geared towards establishing the extent to which:

(i). (post-2000) nationalist discourses are evident in the advertisements;

(ii) the discourses reflect post-colonial Zimbabwean discourses.

It is self-evident that the process that I carry out in this chapter is designed to answer the research questions below:

The study’s findings are drawn from the process of analysis and interpretation. The thematic analysis and interpretation carried out in this chapter is augmented by semiotic analysis and critical discourse analysis; specifically legitimation analysis. These tools are used to make sense of ZANU-PF’s manipulation of signs; that is, pictures, colours and written words/discourse.

The chapter is broken into nine thematic distinctions and first discusses the relationship between the placement of the ZANU-PF advertisements in specific media and the possible impact of this on the discourse. This is followed up by a discussion of the strategies employed by ZANU-PF to rebrand itself and its presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe, during the July 2013 elections. A discussion of how ZANU-PF appropriated peace discourse in the elections to rebrand itself follows. This is discussed in the context of the widely rejected Mugabe presidential election run-off victory of June 2008. The chapter also discusses how ZANU-PF utilised nationalism, indigenisation and economic development to induce the populace to vote for it. Sections 7.7; 7.8 and 7.9 discuss the use of colour, football discourse, voter segmentation and novel issues in ZANU-PF discourse for July 2013.

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The analysis, interpretation and discussion are carried out in the context of the questions that the study seeks to answer.

7.2 ZANU-PF’S MEDIA STRATEGY: DEBATING THE PLACEMENT OF ADVERTISEMENTS

As pointed out in Chapters 4 and 5, ZANU-PF did not place any advertisements in the state-controlled media. It placed all its advertisements in the pro-opposition Daily News, The Standard and Newsday, and the pro-ZANU-PF, The Patriot. It can be argued that ZANU-PF places its advertisements in some media houses whose ideologies are not compatible with their own and also those whose ideologies are compatible with theirs. This practice is both a confirmation and a contradiction of both political economy of the media and political advertising theory (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Menon, 2008). It was perhaps influenced by ZANU-PF’s intention to target opposition supporters. In political marketing and advertising in general, the selling message is influenced by, among other things, the political party or candidate’s intentions, the target audience which in turn influences the medium/media of placement (Menon, 2008). However, in this case, the anti-ZANU-PF editorial slant of the newspapers attracted the people the party was interested in. Rather than viewing the hostile editorial content as having the potential to interfere with the buying mood as argued by Herman and Chomsky (1988), the hostile content was viewed as good since it delivered the right prospects. In this case, it is arguable that the placement of political advertisements is generally also influenced by target audience/reach, editorial slant and the media/medium’s ideology but in ways different from those envisaged by political economists and political marketing theorists (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Menon, 2008). There is compelling evidence that shows that in Zimbabwe the placement of advertisements is influenced by these factors but in ways that are significantly different from neo-liberal Western political communication practices. From this perspective, it is arguable that some of these Western theories need to be revisited as they are short-circuited by political realities in countries like Zimbabwe.

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For example, ZANU-PF’s placement of advertisements in the anti-ZANU-PF private press contradicts both political economy of the media and political advertising theories’ argument that advertisers do not associate with ideological enemies whose content interferes with the buying mood (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Menon, 2008). During the campaign period The Standard, Newsday and the Daily News were openly anti-Mugabe and anti-ZANU-PF. For example, on 31 July 2013, the day of the election, the Daily News led with a story titled ‘89 reasons why Mugabe must go’. The publication was openly campaigning for the MDC-T, yet ZANU-PF placed its advertisements there. Ideally, ZANU-PF should have placed its advertisements in the state-controlled media which, as critics argue, is used as a propaganda tool by ZANU-PF (cf. ZESN, 2002; Chuma, 2008; Moyse, 2009). In other words, it should only have placed its advertisements in media whose ideology is compatible with theirs. But ZANU-PF did not do that and the state-controlled media, apart from not carrying ZANU-PF advertisements, also did not carry any opposition advertisements. As pointed out in Chapter Four, the Zimpapers had indicated that political advertisements would only be accepted in their publications two weeks before the elections. They argued that they did not want their corporate partners to be crowded out by political advertisements. But they accepted no political advertisement at all for the entire duration of the campaign period. This was in line with the Electoral Act 2:13 S160H (1), which stipulates that a broadcaster or print publisher is under no obligation ‘to publish political advertisements by or on behalf of a political party contesting an election…’

However, while at face value both MDC-T and ZANU-PF were denied the opportunity to present their offerings to the electorate through the Zimpapers stable, it is worth noting that the state-controlled media have no power to reject ZANU-PF advertisements. There is compelling evidence which shows that ZANU-PF wields extensive control over the state-controlled media (cf. Rusike, 1990; Moyo, 2004). The state controlled media, as noted in Chapter Two, are directly controlled by ZANU-PF through the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting services. The minister, who is himself appointed by the President, appoints the boards of directors, senior managers and the editors at all state-controlled media organisations. The current Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services is also President Mugabe’s spokesperson.

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Given these control patterns, it is conceivable that the state-controlled media were merely putting up a show for the public so that they could reject the opposition advertisements without causing an outcry. It is said the decision not to accept ZANU-PF advertisements in the state-controlled media was taken by the permanent secretary. This decision, it is arguable, was influenced by the realities of the 2008 elections in which Mugabe lost to Tsvangirai in the March election.

Following on the foregoing, it is arguable that the post-2000 crisis of legitimacy that ZANU- PF faced and the reality of the 2008 loss to MDC-T’s Tsvangirai influenced their political communication strategies for July 2013. For example, in previous post-2000 elections ZANU-PF was accused of using the advantage of incumbency to abuse state-controlled media to advance its electoral hegemony (cf. ZESN, 2002; Chuma, 2008; Magaisa, 2008; Moyse, 2009). The state media were accused of rejecting opposition advertisements (cf. Chuma, 2005; Moyse, 2009) and this was partially used to question the legitimacy of the electoral outcome, given that political parties were not given equal access to state- controlled mass media as per the requirements of the Electoral Act (Electoral Act, Chapter 2: 13; ZESN, 2002). Given this background and the international gaze on Zimbabwe, it is conceivable that ZANU-PF’s decision not to place advertisements in the state-controlled media was influenced by a desire to deny the MDC-T, its major challenger for state power, space in the state media. Perhaps they wanted to do it in a way that would not attract condemnation from the civil society, the opposition and the international community. There was nothing illegal with the state media rejecting political advertisements as the Electoral Act gives them that power. But if they had accepted ZANU-PF advertisements while rejecting MDC-T advertisements this would have been illegal. It would also have been viewed as anti-democratic as it would have given ZANU-PF unfair advantage over the MDC-T. The strategy, it is arguable, was designed to create the illusion that even ZANU-PF had been denied the right to place advertisements in the state-controlled print media. In that scenario, if the MDC-T were to complain that the Zimpapers rejected their advertisements, ZANU-PF would also claim to have been denied the right to advertise in the same. Both parties placed advertisements in the privately-owned press. It is arguable that whilst ZANU-PF had access to MDC-T’s supporters and sympathisers, the MDC-T

184 did not have access to ZANU-PF’s supporters and sympathisers who read the state- controlled press.

From this observation it is plausible that ZANU-PF’s non-placement of advertisements in the Zimpapers was motivated by a desire to lock out the MDC-T without creating a furore about how undemocratic it is. They probably reasoned that since state-media editorial content actively campaigns for ZANU-PF in elections, not placing advertisements in them would not have much of an impact on their electoral fortunes. Whereas, critics such as Booysen (2003) would use this evidence to argue that ZANU-PF uses constitutionalism to veil dictatorship, the thesis argues that this strategy is evidence that they are meticulous in their political communications. It is also evidence that ZANU-PF’s strategy and discourse in elections are not static but fluid and context-specific. They do not leave anything to chance. For example, where in June 2008, in attempts to retain power, they did not leave anything to chance by denying MDC-T access to state-controlled media, beating, torturing and murdering opponents (Masunungure, 2009; CCJP, 2009) in 2013 they shut the MDC-T advertisements out of the state-controlled press legally. They executed their media strategy legally. For example, the state-owned and controlled ZBC accepted advertisements by both ZANU-PF and MDC-T as per the requirements of Part XXIB S.160G (1) of the Electoral Act which makes it mandatory for state-owned or controlled broadcaster(s) to provide all political parties and independent candidates free access.

However, the publicly owned but state-controlled Zimpapers is under no such obligation and as noted earlier it did not accept any advertisements for July 2013. ZANU-PF’s strategy here was, it is arguable, perfectly legal and democratic. The thesis further holds that considering that the Electoral Act was a result of the Thabo Mbeki led negotiations between ZANU-PF and the opposition prior to the 20008 elections, Booysens’ (2003) argument is disputable. This law was not crafted by ZANU-PF alone and given this fact, it is not without merit to argue that the old argument that the Electoral Act law was crafted in a way that ensures that ZANU-PF continues to cling to power is obsolete. The opposition agreed to the changes to the Electoral Act because they felt the changes made the Act democratic. It is therefore arguable that in 2013 ZANU-PF meticulously studied

185 the law and crafted its political communication strategy by the book (the law). The absence of crude fear appeals and ‘hate’ speech in its language of advertising is evidence of this. This shall be discussed in later sections of the chapter.

The media strategy by ZANU-PF shows that in Africa and in Zimbabwe, political advertising and political economy of the media’s assertions that advertisers do not associate with ideological enemies, is not a hard and fast rule; at least in so far as political communication is concerned. It becomes even more plausible when one considers that even in previous post-2000 elections both ZANU-PF and MDC-T, apart from placing advertisements in friendly media, also placed advertisements in hostile media. In some cases MDC-T advertisements were rejected by the state-controlled media but the desire to place advertisements in the anti-MDC-T and pro-ZANU-PF state media was there. For example, after the March 2008 election and in the run-up to the presidential run-off election, the government, through the Ministry of Information, fired the ZBC’s General Manager, Robson Mhandu, and C.E.O, Henry Muradzikwa, allegedly for giving MDC-T too much space. In that election, the MDC-T was allowed to flight advertisements on ZBC and in newspapers under the Zimpapers. From this perspective, it can be argued that not placing advertisements in the state media was a deliberate ploy by ZANU-PF, meant to shut the opposition out of the state media. It was a strategy to deny them access to people who were potentially sympathetic to ZANU-PF. It is a strategy that perhaps was influenced by the disastrous consequences of the March 2008 election in which Mugabe lost to Tsvangirai in the first round. These lessons learnt by ZANU-PF in 2008 were to have a profound effect on its election strategy and/or discourse for July 2013. The ZANU PF discourse, as shall be discussed later, revealed this interest to tap into the opposition urban stronghold. This probably explains the placement of the advertisements in the pro- opposition private press.

It is arguable that in July 2013 in a context where the pro-ZANU-PF Heritage Trust and the state-controlled media were producing advertisements and editorial content that attacked Tsvangirai for his moral blameworthiness; placing advertisements in the private press was aimed at harvesting the fruits of this hatchet job. They probably thought that by allowing the MDC-T to place advertisements in the state-controlled press in 2008 – at

186 a time when discontent with ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s rule was at its peak – had enabled the opposition to reap the benefits of that discontent. If that was the case, perhaps placing their advertisements in the private media while denying the opposition space in Zimpapers was a way of trying to harvest the discontentment with Tsvangirai induced by the state media’s expose of his infidelity and The Heritage Trust’s negative advertisements. From this observation, it is arguable that in the July 2013 election ZANU- PF decided to play it safe by denying the MDC-T the chance to talk directly to its supposed sympathisers. It arguably did not want to risk a repeat of the 2008 scenario.

Besides the foregoing, the thesis argues that since state media’s pro-ZANU-PF tendencies are well documented (cf. Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999; Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Moyse, 2009), the party saw no need to place advertisements in the state-controlled media. The state media content could easily pass off for ZANU-PF political advertisements or political public relations. This is because there is a blurring of distinctions in the state-controlled media between editorial content and ZANU-PF promotional material (political communications), especially during electoral periods. The opposite is true for privately owned media (cf. Chuma, 2008; Moyo, 2005). Placing the advertisements in the state-controlled media could possibly have had the effect of having them being dismissed as mere propaganda by those sympathetic to the opposition, whilst placing them in the private press, a press that is known to be highly critical of ZANU-PF, probably had the effect of giving the advertisements some credibility in the eyes of the ordinary voters. The acceptability of a message may also sometimes rest on the credibility of the source. Placing the advertisements in the private press would perhaps have the effect of undermining the anti-ZANU-PF content in the privately owned newspapers; that is, if the party was so evil, why were they accepting its advertisements?

From the evidence, it is compelling to argue that in a post-colonial Zimbabwean setting placing one’s political advertisements in hostile media is more attractive than in friendly media. This then shows that in an African context some of the Western media theory and political communication theory assertions do not apply. In Zimbabwe, given the polarised media and societal environment, it is arguable that placing advertisements in hostile media is more rewarding than placing them in friendly media because it delivers the

187 undecided voters and those inclined towards one’s opponents. Thus, placing advertisements in the media with hostile editorial content becomes an effective way of targeting such voters. Further, it is arguable that because numbers matter in politics, the main goal of political advertising is to target those sitting on the fence and those inclined towards the opposition. However, this does not mean to say that a party’s supporters are also neglected.

From the foregoing, it is arguable that apart from the desire to lock the opposition out of the state-controlled media, especially the Zimpapers, ZANU-PF placed its advertisements in the private media because it wanted to tap into the opposition support base. This is plausible when one considers that there were reports that the private press, especially the Daily News, in some electoral contexts post-2000, were prevented from circulation in certain ZANU-PF strongholds. The paper is viewed by ZANU-PF as an ‘opposition mouth-piece’. In that context, probably the assumption was that the majority of those that read the state-controlled press were sympathetic to ZANU-PF and thus more likely to vote for it, whilst those that read the private press were sympathetic to MDC-T and thus more likely to vote for it. If that was the case, then placing the advertisements in the private press and not the state-controlled media was a sound strategy. The thesis holds that in an African electoral context, political parties target both swing voters and those who are loyal supporters of the opponent. From a political marketing perspective, it is argued that marketers should target swing voters; namely, those that are undecided and are sitting on the fence. However, by only placing advertisements in the private press, ZANU-PF was probably also targeting those opposition voters disillusioned by their party, the MDC- T. The discourse of some of the advertisements seems to confirm this. The target audience, opposition supporters and sympathisers influenced the choice of media and these together influenced the discourses circulated through the advertisements by ZANU- PF. The message is determined by the target audiences and the advertiser should create a unique selling proposition (USP) that is delivered to the right prospects through appropriate media. The signs that were produced and circulated by ZANU-PF in its July 2013 election advertisements were partially influenced by the choice of media and the target audience. They were also influenced by the political-economic and socio-cultural

188 context in which the elections were happening. These shall be explored further under subsequent sections.

As noted earlier, ZANU-PF also placed advertisements in the pro-ZANU-PF newspaper, The Patriot. This newspaper is published by the pro-ZANU-PF ‘The Heritage Trust’. It is this organisation that sponsored the pro-ZANU-PF attack advertisements that I mentioned above. The placement of advertisements in this newspaper by ZANU-PF is in tandem with the political economy of the media and political advertising theories. That ‘The lest we forget’ advertisement was only placed in The Patriot newspaper was not a coincidence; its theme of patriotism was in tandem with not only the newspaper’s name, but also its editorial slant. The newspaper is anti-MDC-T and its publishers, The Heritage Trust, were the sponsors of a series of television advertisements placed on ZBC TV that attacked Tsvangirai for his sexual escapades and his views on homosexuals. However, placing the advertisement in this paper and not the state-controlled media was also intended to reinforce the illusion that ZANU-PF had also been denied the chance to place advertisements in the newspapers under Zimpapers. ZANU-PF was simply playing diversionary tactics here; concealing its well-known power over the Zimpapers to create the illusion of an equal media playing field during the campaign.

The strategy was significant, given that the MDC-T had made media reform one of its key result areas during the GNU. This media reform was also captured in the GPA’s Article XIX. The opposition political parties argued that ZANU-PF’s control over the state media and the restrictive media laws that it enacted post-2000 gave it an unfair advantage over opponents in an election. The argument was that the media environment in the country was anti-democratic. In light of this context, the non-placement of advertisements in the state-controlled media (specifically the Zimpapers stable) by ZANU-PF was meant to obfuscate the unfair media advantage that it had over the opponents. It was meant to prevent the opposition rejection of a likely ZANU-PF victory on account of its control over the media. The non-placement – ostensibly because the Zimpapers had refused to accept political advertisements – was meant to create the illusion of a level playing field. These were just diversionary tactics. This tactic was influenced by the context of the elections – the global gaze on Zimbabwe and the lessons ZANU-PF learnt from its humiliating defeat

189 to MDC-T in March 2008. It was also a result of the lessons learnt in 2008 when the SADC and the international community rejected Mugabe’s presidential run-off election victory as illegitimate.

The foregoing observation shows that ZANU-PF’s discourse is partly influenced by history, the present and the future. Looking at the present ZANU-PF was looking into the future – trying to ensure a future free of the crisis of legitimacy that characterised Mugabe’s rule post-2000. ZANU-PF discourse is fluid and it is influenced by the context of its creation; a scenario that makes the characterisation of its discourse as nativism, grotesque nationalism and as patriotic history (cf. Ranger, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009 & 2011) problematic. It is characterisation that creates the illusion of a static discourse where there is a centre or a transcendental signified whose roots lie in ZANU-PF’s liberation history. It is a characterisation that fails to recognise the sophisticated nature of ZANU-PF’s discourse; a discourse that does not only mine the past for images but also mines the present and the future.

The placement of advertisements on specific pages in the newspaper is also significant. In The Patriot both ZANU-PF advertisements that were placed there; the ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement and the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ advertisement were placed on the advantageous uneven-numbered pages. They were placed on Pages 5 and 25, respectively. It is arguable that this was because The Patriot is pro-ZANU-PF. However, in the case of the anti-ZANU-PF Daily News, the placement of the majority of ZANU-PF’s advertisements (four out of five) on odd-numbered pages could have been a result of commercial considerations. However, in the case of the Newsday, the majority of the ZANU-PF advertisements (five) appeared on the left hand pages, whilst three appeared on the right hand pages. Finally, in The Standard, the two advertisements were placed both on the right and left hand pages. Overall ZANU-PF placed ten advertisements on the right hand pages and seven on the left hand pages. The party, it appears, favoured the right hand pages probably because it is considered advantageous in business to place advertisements on the right hand pages. In the practice of advertising in Zimbabwe, as pointed out in Chapter Five, the right hand pages are more expensive than the left hand pages. From this perspective, it is arguable that the practice of political communication in

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Zimbabwe specifically the placement of advertisements in the print media borrows heavily insights from commercial advertising. In this regard, the thesis agrees with Baudrillard’s (1994) observation that the same languages reign supreme in both politics and business.

The placement of certain advertisements was influenced by the discourse and target audience. Indeed, it is arguable that the general placement of the advertisements in the private press was influenced by the targeted audience in the same manner the discourse of the advertisements also influenced the media selection. This shall be discussed further under segmentation.

The following section discusses ZANU-PF’s strategies to rebrand itself and its presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe, on the backdrop of opposition and private media attacks on Mugabe’s advanced age and ZANU-PF’s disastrous rule.

7.3 MUGABE, AN INDIGENE AND A MAN OF UNPARALLED WISDOM AND EXPERTIESE IN STATECRAFT

The study shows that ZANU-PF advertisements re-branded the party, its virtues, policies and Robert Mugabe, the presidential candidate, as the main products and presented them to potential voters. It is arguable that in the July 2013 electoral context, ZANU-PF used the Mugabe brand to sell the party. The picture of a younger looking Mugabe appears in all the ten ZANU-PF advertisements. However, a bigger picture of a ‘younger’ Mugabe appears on the left hand side of the call to action in three of the ten advertisements. Three of the ten advertisements have two pictures each of President Robert Mugabe; one on the left hand side of the call to action and another in the four or five column table (the column resembles a ballot paper) at the bottom of the advertisement. His name also appears in all the advertisements. In fact the picture of Robert Mugabe is part of the call to action ‘Vote Cde Robert Gabriel Mugabe for President; Vote ZANU-PF’ and is an integral part of the advertisements. The name of the party and its presidential candidate are inseparable. This confirms the claim that the ‘party leader is the core and unifying factor of the political product: party, candidate and policy’ (Downer, 2013, p. 5). However, critics argue that African politics is personal (Mkandawire, 2013). In the post-colony as Mbembe (2001) argues, the commandement fabricate simulacrum and in this process the

191 party leader is deified. Mugabe is thus a key element of post-colonial Zimbabwean discourses of development, peace and anti-imperialism identified in thematic distinctions in the foregoing chapters. However, it is arguable that political communication produced in the context of an election that focuses largely on the party leader and the party cannot be used to justify assertions that African politics is personal. Instead, it confirms that African political communication borrows some insights from political communication practice in Western neo-liberal democracies where, as observed above, the party leader is the key component of a political product (see Downer, 2012).

It is however undeniable that Mugabe is part of the simulacrum of post-colonial Zimbabwe in the same manner that it is indisputable that he is the core of the ZANU-PF product. His charisma partly explains ZANU-PF’s dominance in post-independence Zimbabwean politics. It is arguable that Mugabe’s images are ever present in ZANU-PF advertisements because they give the party a competitive advantage over the competition. From the foregoing observation, the thesis argues that understanding Mugabe’s omnipresence in ZANU-PF election advertisements entails looking at the phenomenon from both a political advertising perspective and a post-colonial perspective. It is thus arguable that Mugabe may be a father figure in Zimbabwean (Kebonang, 2012) politics, but even in the neo- liberal Western democratic practice, the political leader is a key component of the political product (Downing, 2013). Merely looking at his predominance from a post-colonial perspective privileges the school that believes that African politics is personal while obfuscating the fact that in electoral contests the party leader is a key component of the political product that encompasses the party and its policies (Downer, 2013). It is a positioning that ultimately leads to the conclusion that Mugabe is a dictator or is anti- democratic, but without scrutinising his political communication practices through the same democratic political communication lens. The thesis neither argues that Mugabe is a dictator nor that he is a democrat, but it holds that understanding ZANU-PF political communication practices entails examining its discourses through a multi-modal theoretical approach. It is an approach that does not treat the post-colony as an heir of the colonial or as the ‘other’; neither is it an approach that simply turns Western theory on its head into celebratory African scholarship (cf. Mbembe, 2001; Appiah, 2007; Moore,

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2012). It is an approach that utilises an analysis that is deliberately sober and measured (Nakata et al., 2012). From this analysis, Mugabe’s images are ever present in ZANU-PF advertisements, because he gives the party competitive advantage. He is their unique selling proposition (USP) and reinforces whatever promises they make to the electorate. The signs attached to him, as shall be discussed below, make Mugabe valuable; they invest him with (sign) value at the expense of the competition; namely, Tsvangirai and the MDC-T.

Besides the centrality of the party leader in any political advertisements during an electoral campaign, the use of pictures of a younger looking Mugabe should be understood in the context of opposition political parties and the private press discourses of Mugabe as too old and frail and ZANU-PF as a party of geriatrics. ZANU-PF thus intended to repair the Mugabe brand by using images of a younger Mugabe. Since brands are ‘knowledge about a particular object that is held in the memory of consumers’ and knowledge made up of fragments or pieces of information (Smith, 2009, p. 211) the images were intended to conjure in voters’ minds images of Mugabe in his heyday as a young, vibrant and physically fit President. It was a rebuttal of opposition claims that he was too old and ill to rule. The images were meant to create the illusion that Mugabe was still fit.

However, there are other incidences in which the name of the ZANU-PF presidential candidate appears – not as part of the call to action but as part of the main product being sold in the advertisement. There are advertisements in which the party sells Robert Mugabe’s qualities as a presidential candidate. For example, in the ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’ that appeared both in the Daily News and Newsday of 26 July 2013, ZANU-PF sells its presidential candidate’s greatness, his special and agile golden mind, wisdom and deftness “in dealing with matters of state” as observed by none other than the then MDC-T’s organising secretary and parliamentary candidate, Nelson Chamisa. He was also the Minister of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the GNU. To lend credibility to their claim that Chamisa indeed authored a note in which he was praising Mugabe, they included a picture of the said note in the advertisement. For

193 the avoidance of doubt in the target audiences’ minds they also included Chamisa’s picture. This advertisement could have been targeted at MDC-T supporters.

Although the advertisement was meant to rebut claims of Mugabe as too old to rule, it also implied that his old age and longevity in power were the source of his expertise and wisdom. In African moral philosophy old age is associated with wisdom and expertise. The advertisement does not deny that he is very old, but it denies that he is unfit to rule by instead pointing out his mental state and wisdom. To validate its claim, ZANU-PF used images of a younger looking and physically fit Robert Mugabe in its advertisements. The use of pictures of a younger looking Mugabe, Chamisa’s picture and the note he allegedly wrote confirms Harris’ (1996) observation that advertisers plunder the past for images, lift them from their contexts, purify them into signs and attach them to new objects with new meanings. In this advertisement, the pictures and the note were lifted from their original contexts. The note that Chamisa allegedly authored was never meant to be part of this advertisement when and if he authored it; neither was Mugabe’s picture. It is conceivable that the picture – and indeed all pictures in the ZANU-PF advertisements – were not taken with the intention to use them in political advertisements. The note and picture were bastardised and this bastardisation of images is a key process in the manipulation of images in political advertisements. The images that are turned into signs constitute what Baudrillard (1983 & 1994) calls the signs of the real. These precede and outlive the real. In the ‘Gushungo 8’ that appeared in the The Standard of 21-27 July and Newsday of 27 July 2013, the Mugabe brand is used to sell youth. It is used to appeal to the youth by ‘giving Harare back to the youth’. The advertisement presents eight youthful ZANU-PF candidates who were to contest seats in Harare, an area known to be largely pro-MDC- T. The youths, the so-called born frees, have been criticised for lacking knowledge of the country’s and/or ZANU-PF’s history. They have also been labelled as lost since they are thought to be sympathetic to the opposition, allegedly due to their lack of revolutionary knowledge. This assumption led to the introduction of compulsory [patriotic] history in schools by then education Minister Aeneas Chigwedere (Ranger, 2004; Chimedza, 2008). This focus on the youths and other market segments is further discussed below

194 under the section; ‘Segmentation and Novel Issues in the ZANU-PF Campaign Advertisements’.

Ironically, residents of Harare and all urban areas have been regarded as not authentic citizens in ZANU-PF discourse post-2000, as they have been labelled as sell-outs due to their consistent voting for the MDC-T (cf. Mazango, 2005 & Freeman, 2005). This confirms observations by Fanon (1963) and Mamdani (1996) that the end of colonialism did not result in the end of the exploitative colonial system. In the 2013 electoral context, ZANU-PF sought to give Harare residents back their citizenship. It is a citizenship that the urban dwelling African has always been denied from the colonial period. The Africans in the urban area were neither catered for under the Roman Dutch Law that applied to the colonists in the urban areas, nor were they subject to the customary law that obtained in the rural areas (Mamdani, 1996). The African middle class was in limbo, but post-2000 it was this previously marginalised middle class that was also now marginalising other Africans. However, in 2013, by courtesy of lessons from previous elections in which it always lost the urban areas to the opposition MDC-T, ZANU-PF sought to make the urban dweller a citizen once again. This was something that independence in 1980 was supposed to have achieved but ZANU-PF being a ‘revolutionary’ party gave itself the power to give or take away citizenship. This shall be discussed later. What is indisputable is that ZANU-PF as a sign is slippery and keeps changing its discourses to suit the here and now of an electoral campaign. Its discourse is not static as implied by the usual labelling of the party’s discourse as nationalist historiography, nativism, grotesque nationalism, Mugabeism and patriotic history (cf. Alexander et al., 2000; Ranger, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009 & 2011).

The power to give or take away citizenship that ZANU-PF gave unto itself is again evident in the ‘Gushungo 8’ advertisement. For example, in this advertisement ZANU-PF gives itself the power to ‘give back Harare’ to the youths. Implied here is that the party has done the youths a favour by giving them back which all along had been in the hands of opposition MDC legislators. Instead of the youths, as voters, having the power to give Harare back to ZANU-PF, it is ZANU-PF which inverts expectations by claiming to be

195 doing the opposite when in effect it did not have the power to do that. It was an attempt by ZANU-PF to hoodwink the youths and all the other voters to vote for its candidates.

It is also important to note that ‘Gushungo’ is Mugabe’s totem and in Zimbabwe foes and allies alike affectionately or mockingly call him ‘Gushungo’. In Zimbabwe calling someone by their totem is a sign of respect, so using ‘Gushungo’ was a way of showing respect to the ‘dear leader’. But the use of Mugabe’s totem ‘Gushungo’ could be understood in the context of persistent post-2000 opposition claims that Mugabe was not an indigenous Zimbabwean; that he was of Malawian origin (cf. Mapuwei, 2009). In this context, using his totem was not just a sign of respect, but was a way of underlining his indigeneity as an authentic Zimbabwean and not an ‘alien’. Indeed, the totem (mutupo) ‘Gushungo’ connects Mugabe directly to ancient times and to the Great Zimbabwe (whose significance is discussed in later paragraphs). The totem is an identity marker that also talks about origin. The totem is as follows:

Maita Gushungo (Thank you Gushungo) Vokwanzungunhokoto (Those of Nzungunhokoto)… Tatenda varidzi venyika (We thank you owners/rulers of the land) Vakabva Guruuswa (Those who came from Guruuswa9)… Maita vokwaZvimba10 (Thank you descendants of Zvimba/Thank you those from Zvimba) Vazere muChakona (You who populate Chakona)… Vakapangura nyika ino (Those who took over this country) Ichakatsikwa nezamu (When it was still full of milk)… Aiwa mwana waZvimba… (Child of Zvimba) (Adapted from: http://www.pindula.co.zw/Tsiwo_Gushungo).

9 Guruuswa was the area around Great Zimbabwe. Historical accounts say the people of Guruuswa were the builders of Great Zimbabwe and in present day Zimbabwe’s Masvingo the area around Great Zimbabwe is ruled by the Mugabes. President Mugabe has often referred to this area as the place of his uncles and forefathers. It is a place of origin and the most prominent of pre-independence Zimbabwean states; the Torwa state, the Mutapa Empire and the Rozvi Empire trace their origins back to Guruuswa. 10 President Mugabe comes from Zvimba in Mashonaland Central 196

President Mugabe’s Gushungo totem thus links him to ancient societies of this land. It proclaims that not only is he an indigene, but his forefathers were the legendary people of Guruuswa who constructed the Great Zimbabwe Ruins whose majestic architecture confounded even the white colonialists. Guruuswa is a place of origin and great ancient Zimbabwean states, such as Torwa state, the Mutapa state and the Rozvi state, trace their origins back to Guruuswa or Great Zimbabwe. In this light, Mugabe is thus not just an indigene but he is a descendant of ‘varidzi venyika’ (the owners of the land). Given this myth of origin (cf. Baudrillard, 1983) Mugabe’s right to rule is therefore his birth right and is by divine right/intervention. Probably, his descendants also have the right to claim the ‘throne’ (the presidency) not through democratic processes, but through heredity. Gushungo’s rule is given the illusion of being dynastical since he traces his origins back to Guruuswa and he is a descendant of the owners of the land.

Given the contestations around citizenship in Zimbabwe post-2000 in which the ZANU- PF regime stripped descendants of migrants from Malawi and Mozambique of their citizenship and with it their voting rights, the totem Gushungo is an identity marker. The descendants of foreign migrant workers became aliens and their national identity cards were labelled as such. They were not authentic Zimbabweans or authentic Malawians or Mozambicans. They became stateless and their citizenship was only restored by the new Zimbabwe constitution that was adopted in March 2013. But this stripping of citizenship gave rise to opposition claims that Mugabe himself was of Malawian origin and his surname belonged to his maternal uncles. In this context, ‘Gushungo’ was arguably a way of rebutting the discourse of Mugabe as a foreigner. It became a way of legitimising Mugabe’s Presidency. ‘Gushungo’ became a way of proclaiming that the ZANU-PF candidate was an indigenous Zimbabwean, a descendant of the ancient rulers of Guruuswa and consequently his leadership of ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe was legitimate. This discourse of indigeneity and authenticity that shall be discussed at length in later sections of the thesis reverberates through the ZANU-PF advertisements.

‘The Gushungo 8’ advertisement also has connotations of the ZANU-PF discourse of Mugabe as Father or ‘vaMugabe ndibaba’; in other words saying ‘The Gushungo 8’

197 creates the illusion that the eight ‘youths’ are Mugabe’s own children; they are themselves little Gushungos. It is intended to legitimise Mugabe’s leadership of ZANU-PF and the country as he is ‘the father’. Post-2000, ZANU-PF Mugabe is referred to as ‘Baba’ (father) and his wife is referred to as ‘Amai’ (mother), even by men old enough to be her father; they even kneel before her. Deploying Mugabe as father and his wife as mother was a way of managing internal ZANU-PF divisions in the same manner it was intended to induce people to vote for Mugabe. It is a strategy that appears to confirm scholars’ claims that African politics is personalised and is characterised by father figures (White, 2008; Kebonang, 2012; Mkandawire, 2013). However, such a reading misses the religious- cultural significance of the sign Mugabe as ‘father’. Society and/or culture presents advertisers, both political and commercial, with valorised symbols which they raid and attach to their products (see Williams, 1993; Harris, 1996). ‘Baba’ (Father) is one of these valorised cultural-religious symbols that advertisers utilise in their selling messages.

It is often claimed that Zimbabwe is a Christian nation and in election campaigns ZANU- PF people often quote the bible and prophecy to justify Mugabe’s rule. Voters are often encouraged to vote and respect Mugabe, as leaders come from God. Furthermore, they are often told that an ancient prophet and founder of one of Zimbabwe’s biggest Independent African Churches, Johanne Masowe, prophesied long ago that Mugabe would one day rule independent Zimbabwe. That this claim of Mugabe’s rule as God- ordained and not citizen-ordained obfuscates the significance of the vote in a supposedly modern and democratic post-colonial state is a matter for later discussion. From this perspective, the thesis argues that the use of culturally and religiously significant signs ‘gushungo’, ‘baba’ (father) and ‘amai’ (mother) confirms the claim that cultural domination paves way for political domination. It induces consent and/or gets people to vote for Mugabe and ZANU-PF in the same way that signs are used in commercial advertisements to lure people into consumption of goods (cf. Williams, 1993; Strinati, 1995; Harris, 1996; Goldman, n.d). Mugabe and his wife become religious-cultural symbols in ZANU-PF discourse. This is because culturally and religiously, children are supposed to respect ‘thy father and thy mother’ so that their days on earth could be

198 blessed and increased. It is implied here that those who are loyal to Mugabe will have plenty.

The focus on Mugabe should thus be partially understood in the July 2013 electoral context, in which Mugabe as leader was also viewed as ‘baba’, both literally and metaphorically. As shall be discussed in-depth later under the section; ‘Bhora mugedhi- Ibhola egedini’ (Score the ball), ZANU-PF political communication’s focus on Mugabe was an attempt to avoid the ‘bhora musango’ (kick the ball out) campaign of 2008. In this regard, the advertisement was a continuation of the ‘vaMugabe chete’ (Mugabe only) discourse of post-2000. In this discourse, Mugabe was the only person who was competent and had the legitimate right to rule Zimbabwe. Opposition to Mugabe was thus treated as unwelcome, even sinful, since Mugabe was God-chosen. The advertisement was a sign of respect and loyalty to Mugabe, as it was also a way of rebutting opposition jibes that he was not an authentic Zimbabwean. It was also a way of appealing to the urban youth who are perceived to be largely sympathetic to the opposition.

The discourse of Mugabe as father implied in the advertisement also has connotations of African moral philosophy as noted earlier. In the run-up to the March 2008 election, I was based in rural Manicaland which also happens to be my place of origin. I had the privilege of witnessing campaigning first-hand in Chimanimani West Constituency. I also had the privilege of listening to discussions between opposition MDC-T and ZANU-PF supporters daily. In response to opposition jibes that Mugabe was too old to rule, ruling party supporters responded by saying that one cannot reject one’s father just because he was very old. From this perspective, one deduces that in ZANU-PF moral philosophy age is not an issue, as long as one is still fit and interested in continuing to lead. The discourse of Mugabe as father thus justifies Mugabe’s continued stay in power and it also delegitimises any opposition to him since (implied) we all become his children. If we are all Mugabe’s and the First Lady’s children, challenging him becomes unacceptable, since children are not supposed to challenge their parents or to reject them because they are old. It is considered shameful, unAfrican and unchristian even to question one’s parents. It is from this moral philosophy that it is considered unAfrican and unbecoming for one to

199 commit his/her parents to an old people’s home. Furthermore, in indigenous Shona cultures a person has to respect their elders, even those that are not one’s relatives. Well- mannered persons (‘munhu ane hunhu’) are those who respect elders, irrespective of their gender. In this context, old age is associated with wisdom; rather than discard the elderly, the younger generation is always encouraged to tap into their wisdom – no wonder the ‘Chamisa’s Mugabe secret praise note’ advertisement talks about Mugabe’s expertise and wisdom. This thinking, including political advertising theory’s focus on the party leader as the core and unifying factor of the political product (Downer, 2013), partly explains the ZANU-PF advertisements’ pre-occupation with selling Mugabe, the party and party policies. It also partly explains why they paid no attention to the party’s parliamentary, senatorial and council candidates.

Because of the focus on ‘Mugabe chete’ (Mugabe only), ZANU-PF did not pay particular attention to its parliamentary, senatorial and council candidates. These were supposed to benefit from associating with the Mugabe brand, the ZANU-PF brand and its policies and promises to the electorate. In other words, the mere presence of the image of Mugabe ‘will activate from memory other associations’ such as (Smith, 2009, p. 212) ZANU-PF, the liberation struggle, the party’s council, parliamentary and senatorial candidates, the party’s indigenisation and economic empowerment policies and the fast-track land reform programme. Of the ten ZANU-PF advertisements that appeared in the selected newspapers, only the ‘Gushungo 8’ advertisement directly mentioned its parliamentary candidates. However, it only featured eight of the two hundred and ten (210) ZANU-PF parliamentary candidates and did not mention any of its senatorial candidates. Furthermore, in the advertisement that featured the eight parliamentary candidates, the emphasis was on youth not on the individual candidates. In the remaining advertisements, there was no mention of parliamentary, senatorial and council candidates. The advertisements tended to largely sell the party, its presidential candidate Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the party policies and virtues, with Mugabe the unifying factor. This is because a brand is one of an organisation’s assets and it is how well the brand is accepted by the target market that determines its profitability (cf. Smith, 2009). Mugabe as party leader is ZANU-PF’s key asset in the same manner Morgan Tsvangirai is MDC-

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T’s key asset; successfully damaging these brands or key assets ultimately leads to their chances of winning an electoral contest being dashed (cf. Smith, 2009; Downer, 2013).

In light of the above observation, the thesis rejects the tendency by critics to only interpret the centrality of Mugabe in Zimbabwean political discourse from the perspective of African politics as patriarchal and personal (cf. White, 2008; Kebonang, 2012; Mkandawire, 2013). While acknowledging that the discourse may be patriarchal, the thesis also confirms political advertising theory’s assertion that in political contestation the party leader is the core and ‘unifying factor of the political product: party, candidate and policy’ (Downer, 2013, p. 5). The Mugabe brand was a key asset of the ZANU-PF 2013 election campaign. The fortunes of the leader are closely linked to the party’s fortunes. Furthermore, it is arguable that if the patriarchal discourse or the use of Mugabe as a sign gains ZANU-PF votes at the expense of the opposition political parties, then it is logical that they should utilise the discourse in electoral contexts. The reality that Mugabe still commands widespread support amongst the voters in Zimbabwe makes him ZANU-PF’s key asset – especially considering that in Zimbabwe elections winner takes all.

It is because of the party leader’s centrality to the fortunes of the party that ZANU-PF actively sought to divert voters’ attention from Mugabe’s advanced age by using images of a younger-looking Robert Mugabe. It plundered the past for images of a younger Mugabe, lifted them out of their original context, and purified them into signs attached to new objects (cf. Harris, 1996). Consequently, in all the advertisements the picture of a black suit clad and bespectacled younger and physically fit looking Mugabe was used by the party. Using pictures of a younger looking Robert Mugabe was an attempt to rebut opposition political parties’ attacks on his advanced age. It was an attempt to produce Mugabe as youth and youth as Mugabe (cf. Goldman, n.d). In the political production process of Mugabe as ZANU-PF product, the party’s advertisements simultaneously produced ‘Mugabe’ the product as the sign ‘youth’ and the sign ‘youth’ was produced as the product ‘Mugabe’. The thesis holds that the sign Mugabe is violent, discriminatory and murderous; it delegitimises other presidential candidates and opposition political parties (Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994; Sonderling, 2013 & 2014). Its mere

201 presence automatically displaces other signs such as Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube; the opposition presidential candidates in the July 2013 election.

Since it was impossible for ZANU-PF to reject that Robert Mugabe was very old, they instead tried to undermine ‘the Mugabe is too old’ discourse by creating the impression that age is just but a number as Mugabe was still ‘as fit as a fiddle’. The old but recent looking pictures of a younger-looking Mugabe sought to confirm that he was still physically fit. To further buttress this illusion the pictures were not photoshopped. If ZANU-PF had used an old recent looking but photoshopped picture, it would have inadvertently confirmed opposition claims that Mugabe was too old to rule. ZANU-PF simply raided the past or the archives for an image of Mugabe, lifted it from its original context, purified it and turned it into a sign (cf. Harris, 1996) attached to ZANU-PF in a new context characterised by new promises to the electorate. It was an attempt to legitimise Mugabe’s continued leadership and thus enable him and ZANU-PF to reproduce dominance and maintain it. They also deliberately did not directly address the issue of his advanced age, instead choosing to use pictures of a younger-looking Mugabe, since it is believed that a picture communicates a thousand words.

The use of the old but recent looking picture could also have been intended to use nostalgia and/or sense of roots to sell Mugabe (cf. Packard, 1957). Pictures of old are a source of nostalgia about the good old days gone by. The use of images of a younger Mugabe could have been meant to evoke nostalgia in the voters; that is, memories of the good old days when Mugabe was still relatively young, very popular and an orator of note. The intention was to make people vote with their emotions and not reason. The image of a younger-looking Mugabe was meant to conjure up past images of a physically fit Mugabe to dispel current opposition discourses about Mugabe’s alleged old-age induced frailty.

The use of these pictures is a confirmation of Baudrillard’s (1983 paragraph 15, lines 1- 2) argument that, ‘when the real is no-longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of second-hand

202 truths, objectivity and authenticity’. From this viewpoint, the thesis argues that creating the impression that Mugabe was still younger and fitter than he actually was in 2013 is second-hand truth. It was an illusion intended to hoodwink the voters to think that Mugabe, the ZANU-PF presidential candidate, was still the same energetic Mugabe of old. It was meant to bring forth associations of Mugabe in his heyday as an energetic age-defying president. This manipulation of signs confirms Baudrillard’s (1983 paragraph 15, lines 1- 2) further argument that, ‘when the real is no-longer what it used to be…there is a panic- stricken production of the real and the referential…’. In this case, the image, as argued earlier, murders the reality that Mugabe is very old while also discriminating against the opposition candidates by focusing on his state of mind and expertise in handling matters of state. The real has been murdered by simulation and as Baudrillard (1983 paragraph 6, line 6) argues simulation ‘threatens the difference between “true” and “false”, between “real” and “imaginary’.

The ZANU-PF advertisements threaten the difference between truth that Mugabe is old and the falsehood that he is still very fit. It also threatens the difference between the real- Mugabe the person – and the imaginary – the image of Mugabe that appears in the advertisements. The image of Mugabe looks like Mugabe but is not Mugabe and in the context of July 2013 it had the effect of creating a distorted image of how old Mugabe was in the minds of the voters. It was simulation since it broke the link between the image (picture of a younger-looking Mugabe) and the referent (a very old Mugabe). This confirms Falkowski and Cwalina’s (2012, p. 10) observation that ‘…modern day democracy has found itself in the age of manufactured images’. From this observation, it is arguable that simulation is a key tactic in political branding and/or advertising. This is because through simulation, political parties seek to influence brands, namely, ‘memory about a particular object [candidate, policies, and the party itself] that is held in the memory of consumers [voters]’ (Keller 1993, cited by Smith, 2009, p. 211). In the political production process in Zimbabwe in 2013 ZANU-PF engaged in simulation. For example, it sought to divert voters’ attention from Mugabe’s advanced age by using images of a younger-looking Mugabe and by focusing on his expertise and mental agility. It is plausible to argue that ZANU-PF’s simulation neither shows that it is a dictatorship nor a

203 democracy; it is a just a means to an end. It is a means to eliminate the opposition from the language game. It is a means to retaining power; to winning the consent of the electorate especially considering that language is central to this process of retaining power (Deacon et al., 1999 & 2007). Simulation is part and parcel of the process Bernays (1947) calls the engineering of consent.

To further buttress the idea that Mugabe was fit, the party murdered reality by focusing on his mental acuteness and craftiness in handling matters of state. In doing this, the party discriminated against the opposition. It sought to debunk opposition claims that he was too old and tired to lead. The opposition attacks sought to portray the President as approaching senility and as losing grip on power in the country. The MDC-T, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, took out an advertisement that ridiculed Mugabe’s 33 years in office as ‘33 years of desperate leadership’. The MDC’s advertisement implied that Mugabe’s leadership had no vision, as shown by the tendency of Mugabe and his ministers to resort to the spiritual – both Christian and traditional – to try and solve problems confronting the state. In response to these attacks, ZANU-PF took out the ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’ advertisement. This advertisement should be understood in a context where opposition political parties and critics of Mugabe had de-campaigned Mugabe on account of his advanced age; 89 years old in 2013. It had been argued that at 89 years Mugabe no-longer possessed the energy to run the country. The advertisement was a rebuttal of the opposition political parties’ attacks on Mugabe and the other old ZANU-PF leaders. It was also a not-so-veiled attack on the opposition leaders, as Chamisa questions the other presidential aspirants’ ability to match Mugabe.

On account of the foregoing, the thesis shares the belief of Baudrillard et al. (1976) and Baudrillard (1983) that the sign by its very nature is discriminatory and is murderous. In these ZANU-PF advertisements, the sign of Mugabe and images of Mugabe discriminated against opposition presidential candidates and parties. In the same manner, they also murdered the reality that Mugabe is old. As Baudrillard (1983) argues, the Byzantine gods threatened the existence of God. Further, the reference to Mugabe’s totem and state of mind confirms Rice and Waugh’s (2001, p. 179) observation that, ‘…identities are events in language and are articulated in differences’. Mugabe is

204 presented as different to the other contestants because he is of the ‘Gushungo’ totem; ‘varidzi venyika’ (rulers of the land Zimbabwe); he has a golden mind, has incomparable wisdom and is deft in state craft. It is these differences that legitimise the product Mugabe. Legitimation, as Mazid (2008) argues, also works through differentiation and proximisation.

Because the sign is murderous, it is arguable that it can be used – as Mazid (2008) notes – both as a weapon and a shield. During the 2013 electoral contest ZANU-PF, just like the MDC-T, used language both as a shield and a weapon. This was the case, for example, in advertisements such as the ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’, ‘Lest we forget’ and ‘Council Bills Cancelled’. The ‘Chamisa’s secret Mugabe praise note’ advertisement sought to legitimise Mugabe’s continued leadership as ‘natural’ and commonsensical through ‘denial’ (cf. Van Dijk, 1993, p. 263) of his old age by using images of a younger-looking Mugabe. This is one of the techniques through which hegemony operates namely, presenting a person’s dominance or class leadership as natural and commonsensical. In this regard, the advertisements sought to naturalise and reproduce Mugabe’s leadership by creating the impression that even opposition politicians acknowledge that he is great. Chamisa is alleged to have written: ‘When greatness shall be measured, the man in the chair shall be among a few…He is a great man; a man of a golden mind – agile and special in many ways’. For the avoidance of doubt as to who ‘the man in the chair’ was, ZANU-PF added, in front of the word chair and in brackets, the phrase ‘referring to President Mugabe who chairs cabinet’. This was an attempt at legitimising his leadership as natural while at the same time weakening the ‘Mugabe is too old discourse’ by placing emphasis on his ‘golden mind’ which is said to be ‘agile and special in many ways’. The use of the word ‘agile’, which is associated with mental alertness, was aimed at weakening the opposition discourses which sought to portray him as becoming senile and too old to run the state. To further weaken opposition claims that Mugabe was no-longer fit to rule, and opposition presidential candidates, ZANU-PF, claimed in the advertisement that Chamisa stated that the President was ‘deft’; namely, skilful and clever in dealing with matters of state.

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The use of the adjectives: ‘great’, ‘deft’, ‘special in many ways’ and ‘a man of a golden mind’ was meant to set Mugabe apart from the rest; to create product differentiation in a manner that was intended to gain voter appeal. Product differentiation is, from commercial advertising and political advertising and/or political branding perspectives, a strategy of not only inducing consumption and reproducing dominance, but also a way of justifying consumption and/or dominance (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1981, 1983 & 1994; Downer, 2013; Jain, n.d). It is arguable that these adjectives were meant to create the impression that Mugabe is a distinctive political product; he is exceptional and thus positively different from the rest of the contestants in the July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe. The adjectives were meant to advance ZANU-PF’s argument that Mugabe is special and one of a rare breed of African leaders that selflessly liberated the continent from colonial bondage. It is a discourse that mentions Mugabe in the same breath as Julius Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana amongst other founding fathers of independent Africa and the Organisation of African Union (OAU), now the African Union (AU).

These tactics, together with the use of pictures of a younger-looking and physically fit Mugabe, were also designed to conceal and deny that Mugabe was too old to lead the country and to create unassailable distance (proximisation) between Mugabe and the other presidential aspirants (cf. Van Dijk, 1993; Mazid, 2008). In these advertisements, ZANU-PF used political branding to create maximum possible positive differentiation (cf. Jain, n.d; Downer, 2013) for Mugabe and the party while trying to inflict harm on opposition brands. The intention was to ‘differentiate itself effectively from its competitors, capitalising on its distinctive strengths to deliver better value to its customers’ (Jain, n.d). ZANU-PF’s distinctive strength was Mugabe who, as even some of his critics concede, still commands popular support amongst voters, especially the rural electorate. In this electoral contest, the sign Mugabe became a weapon to damage the opposition political parties and candidates. The sign’s (Mugabe’s) distinctive qualities were intended to differentiate him and ZANU-PF from the competition. This is the essence of political marketing strategy and/or branding. The thesis thus argues that in as far as Mugabe’s predominance in ZANU-PF electoral discourse is concerned; it is by no means evidence

206 of the personalisation or the patriarchal nature of African politics. It is common political marketing (political advertising) practice to utilise one’s strengths to gain customer or voter appeal at the expense of the competition. Political branding and by extension political advertising is also the essence of democratic contestation.

It can be argued that ZANU-PF used Mugabe’s attributes (Mugabe is deft, agile, great, and possesses a golden mind) as both a shield from opposition attacks and a weapon (none of the aspirants match him) against opposition candidates. Furthermore, quoting MDC-T’s Organising Secretary, Nelson Chamisa, praising Mugabe was meant to give credibility to the advertising message, while rebutting opposition claims that Mugabe was too old. Quoting credible sources and/or role models is one of the tactics which is used by advertisers to justify why their goods should be purchased (Van Dijk, 1993). In this instance, quoting Chamisa was a tactic designed to expose the MDC-T as dishonest in their attacks on Mugabe’s ability to run the state. The advertisement creates the impression that the MDC-T had been impressed by him during their stay in government as part of the GNU. In advertising theory, role models are used to positively brand products. The intention is to tap into the role model’s support base (Van Leeuwen, 2007). In this case, the answer to why people should vote Mugabe is because the role model – Nelson Chamisa – says Mugabe is special and a great man of a golden mind. Chamisa is considered a role model amongst the youth, especially those in the MDC-T, and during the GNU Mugabe praised him as one of the hardworking cabinet ministers. It is therefore plausible that the advertisement was targeted at MDC-T youth and the opposition party’s general membership, since he was also a high ranking official in the party.

Furthermore, the advertisement was a veiled attack on MDC-T’s Morgan Tsvangirai and all opposition presidential candidates for the 31 July elections. For example, Chamisa is quoted as having said ‘I wonder who, among the aspirants, possesses even a quarter of what he [Mugabe] possesses’. In this production process Mugabe is produced as ‘skilful’, ‘golden mind’, and ‘special’ (Mugabe = ‘skilful’, ‘special’, ‘golden mind’, ‘wisdom’) and the attributes are produced as Mugabe (‘special’, ‘golden mind’ ‘skilful’, ‘wisdom’ = Mugabe). Here, the product Mugabe is produced simultaneously with its false need; the ability to

207 rule (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983). In this instance, the differential signs and/or adjectives employed by ZANU-PF gave value to Mugabe, the political product, and ZANU-PF (cf. Irvine, 1989, p. 257; Goldman, n.d), while simultaneously giving the vote for Mugabe and ZANU-PF ‘its full exchange value’ (Irvine, 1989, p. 258). In this regard, when Zimbabweans were voting for Mugabe and ZANU-PF they were not only voting for Mugabe and ZANU-PF but they were also voting ‘for the chain of authoritative statements’ that accompanied the political products (Irvine, 1989, p. 257). On the basis of the foregoing discussion on how signs were manipulated by ZANU-PF, it is arguable that the party’s electoral discourse or the signs it produces in an electoral context are just a means to achieve electoral hegemony. The signs do not always translate to what will happen after the election. They are also not a window through which we can determine the true nature of the party. The signs are simulation and just a way of maintaining ZANU-PF’s grip on power, as events post-2013 show. They are also influenced by the realities or the context in which the election will be happening. ZANU-PF discourse is not static but fluid.

It is also compelling to argue that the statements accompanying Mugabe – for example,- the political product, great, wisdom, golden, special, agile and deft – invest the product with positive value and also answer Van Leeuwen’s (2007) ‘why’ question. They justify why people should vote for Mugabe and ZANU-PF and not the opposition. Furthermore, the picture of a younger-looking Mugabe and the statements constitute ‘the signs of the real’ (Baudrillard, 1983). Goldman (n.d) calls them the ‘commodity-sign’, whilst Mbembe (2001) calls them simulacra or reforming stereotypes produced by the elite. The goal of these signs is to justify elite dominance. The signs or images produced by ZANU-PF were, as argued earlier, not only meant to positively brand Mugabe but were also a deliberate attack on the opposition candidates specifically MDC-T’s Morgan Tsvangirai who was Mugabe’s main challenger in the election. For example, the use of a note allegedly written by Chamisa in the advertisement under discussion was a tactical move designed to show that even Tsvangirai’s closest subordinates and confidants did not have confidence in his leadership qualities. The advertisement uses comparison (none of the aspirants possess a quarter of the wisdom he has) and expert authority (he is deft or skilful in state craft) to justify Mugabe’s continued rule. This expertise and deftness is thus

208 simultaneously used to legitimise Mugabe and delegitimise or discriminate against the opposition.

The motif of opposition leaders being excited by ZANU-PF’s political products, for example, Mugabe and the election manifesto, is also evident in the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ advertisement. The intention was to justify ZANU-PF’s dominance and to appeal to opposition supporters to take a leaf from their leaders’ books and vote for Mugabe. By using images of MDC-T leaders in the advertisements endorsing Mugabe and ZANU-PF, the ZANU-PF’s intention was to erase the distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘false’, between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ (Baudrillard, 1983, paragraph 6, line 6). It was definitely ‘imaginary’ and ‘false’ that the MDC-T leaders were excited by ZANU-PF’s manifesto. It was also ‘imaginary’ and ‘false’ that Chamisa was referring to Tsvangirai and other opposition leaders when he allegedly said none of the aspirants to the Presidency possessed a quarter of the wisdom and expertise Mugabe has in managing state affairs. This was simulation (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994; Mbembe, 2001).

Whereas in Western neo-liberal democratic theory lying or exaggerations may be unacceptable in political contestation, Shona moral philosophy justifies, in certain circumstances, lying as a means to an end. In indigenous Shona ways of knowing, lying is morally justifiable under certain circumstances. For example, the following Shona proverbs inadvertently justify lying:

 ‘Rume risinganyepi hariroori’ (literally: a man who does not lie to a woman when proposing love should not expect to marry);  Rinyonyenga rinohwarara rinozosimudza musoro rawana (he who proposes love lies only to reveal his true colours after marrying the woman);  Muromo kapako kekuhwanda nako (the mouth is a tool for concealing one’s true intentions).

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In the context of the foregoing, lying is permissible if not doing so may result in one losing out. For example, in the context of relationships, lying may be permissible if not doing so will result in one losing the girl he is pursuing. It is arguable that political advertising is a key tool of relationship management in politics. From this perspective, the political products that parties and candidates present to the electorate are akin to a proposal whose acceptability by the electorate lies in a candidate or a party’s ability to convince the electorate that they stand to benefit from the relationship. Failure to convince the majority of the voters that one intends to take society in a direction that is not only beneficial to the dominant group, but that is beneficial to all, will result in them voting for the competitor. Hegemony thus relies on the ability of a group to convince the subordinate groups that it intends to take them in a direction that is beneficial to them (Strinati, 1997). However, in politics the electorate make their voting decision in one day and in this context – from a Shona moral stand point – lying may be permissible. In effect, political parties always gain votes on the basis of a promise to deliver once they are in office. The promise may never be delivered. But even if the voters realise that they were lied to, as in the case of the promise to create 2.265 million jobs by ZANU-PF, they will be powerless to change anything. The voters will have to wait until the next election at which the political party may come up with excuses for not delivering and newer promises.

In the July 2013 election, ZANU-PF’s impractical promise to create 2.265 million jobs in the ‘How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment’ advertisement was a means to an end; a means to power retention. In this instance, the end justified the means and the means in no way shows whether ZANU-PF is democratic or dictatorial. It is mere politicking. But the complexity of Shona moral philosophy is also evident in the contradictory saying; ‘Rina manyanga hariputirwi’ (a lie can never be eternally hidden). From this contradictory perspective, one has to persuade ethically in order to avoid problems in future when the deceit is eventually revealed. However, in the context of politics the deed would have been done and voters would have to wait for another election. Indeed, in 2015, in a context of a worsening economic crisis and accelerated job losses and company closures, ZANU-PF’s critics were calling on it to deliver on its promise of 2.265 million jobs. The foregoing shows that African moral philosophy is one of the context specific things that the study of political advertising has 210 to confront in Zimbabwe. This is because in the neo-liberal Western democratic context, lying or misleading the voters may have serious repercussions on the guilty candidate when the lie is eventually exposed. Public opinion will definitely turn against the guilty candidate or party, but the same may not be true in Africa.

In light of the above, the study agrees with Kaid’s (2012, p. 29) argument that outside the USA, the study of political advertising has to grapple with different contextual and cultural concerns that include ‘differences in governmental structures, political party organizations, media systems, regulatory constraints and, above all, language and culture’. This is because signs, including political advertisements, are contextual (Deacon et al., 1999; Fairclough, 2001; Metro-Roland, 2011) and any attempt to grasp their meanings should be located in the appropriate context. The socio-cultural-political beliefs of a society are part of this context so is the broader sign system that includes indigenous knowledge systems.

The context in which the ‘Chamisa’s Secret Mugabe Praise Note’ should be understood also includes the WikiLeaks cables released during the GNU era. The cables revealed that Nelson Chamisa, among other members of the MDC-T leadership, had told then US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, James McGee, that Tsvangirai was an inept leader. To expose the ineptitude of Tsvangirai and his unsuitability for office of president, ZANU-PF used specifics, clearly indicating that none of Mugabe’s challengers possessed ‘even a quarter of what he possesses’. In commercial advertising, whose language is the same as that of political advertising (Baudrillard, 1994), specifics are preferable to generalities. In this advertisement, ZANU-PF used a comparative attack advertising in ways that confirm critics claims that it is a sub-type of negative/attack advertising (see Pinkleton et al 2002; Jasperson and Fan 2002; Meirick 2002; Lilleker 2006; Kaid 2012). It sought to build a case for its candidate while at the same time questioning the credibility of the opposition. This emphasis on Mugabe’s mental agility and deftness in dealing with matters of the state was necessitated by the opposition’s attacks on his advanced age and his alleged ill-health which in private media narratives allegedly causes him to fall asleep in important meetings at international forums.

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To lend credence to their claims and thus legitimise Mugabe, ZANU-PF used a legible image of the said note that Chamisa allegedly authored; it also included Chamisa’s picture. The acceptance of a message usually depends on source credibility and in this respect, ZANU-PF sought to provide it (cf. Van Dijk, 1993). ZANU-PF sought to legitimise Mugabe while at the same time de-legitimising the opposition presidential candidates, especially Morgan Tsvangirai, whose then party’s Organising Secretary was in this advertisement quoted as praising Mugabe and saying amongst the aspirants to the Presidency that none possessed a quarter of what Mugabe had in terms of wisdom and deftness in handling matters of state (cf. Chilton, 2004, Cap, 2008 & Van Leeuwen, 2007, cited by Mazid, 2010). As Van Dijk (1993, p. 263) notes, ‘the justification of inequality involves two complimentary strategies; namely the positive representation of the own group and the negative representation of the others’. In this advertisement, there was the positive representation of Mugabe and the negative representation of the other aspirants to the Presidency. Again, in this advertisement ZANU-PF raided the past for images – the picture of the note Chamisa allegedly wrote and Chamisa’s picture. These images were lifted from their contexts of production, purified and attached to new products – Mugabe and ZANU-PF – and given new meanings in new contexts.

Firstly, Chamisa, if indeed he authored the note, could have been referring to the aspirants to Mugabe’s position in ZANU-PF. He could have been referring to the alleged factions within ZANU-PF that were/are fighting to succeed Mugabe. But even though the addressee in the note is deleted, the use of the salutation ‘Hon’ [Honourable] creates the impression that it was during a cabinet meeting chaired by Mugabe (who is the only one who chairs cabinet meetings) that Chamisa authored the note as it refers ‘…to the man in the chair…Meetings are different with him’. Thus the ‘Hon’ was undeniably a fellow cabinet minister as members of parliament and cabinet ministers usually address each other as ‘Honourable’. Furthermore, considering that Tsvangirai chaired the Council of Ministers meetings during the GNU, it is arguable that when Chamisa said ‘meetings are different with him’ he was comparing Mugabe to Tsvangirai. In this case, ZANU-PF used differentiation and proximisation, as it claims Mugabe is different from the others since ‘meetings are different with him’. The intention was to put a huge distance between Robert

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Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai and opposition candidates, since none possesses a quarter of the wisdom and deftness he has in dealing with state matters.

Secondly, the picture of Chamisa was plundered from somewhere and used in the justification of Mugabe’s continued rule. It was not taken with the intention of using it in the ZANU-PF advertisement. It is possible that given the highly publicised alleged factional fighting in ZANU-PF where factions jostling to succeed Mugabe were allegedly embroiled in a bitter fight, Chamisa could have been referring to those aspirants to Mugabe’s post within ZANU-PF and not opposition political leaders. It could be that this image, which was obviously lifted from its original context, was purified and detached from what it once referred to. It could have been referring to the then two alleged factional leaders in ZANU-PF. It is highly probable that the image, that is, Chamisa’s secret note, could have been bastardised by ZANU-PF in an attempt to legitimise Mugabe while delegitimising Tsvangirai and other opposition presidential candidates. The images of Chamisa and the note he allegedly wrote became weapons in the hands of the ZANU-PF to eliminate the MDC-T, Tsvangirai and other opposition presidential candidates from the political game. Rather than using the ZANU-PF electoral discourse to argue that the post- colony is a mirror image of the colonial or to argue that ZANU-PF is dictatorial, it is arguable that the sign is murderous by its very nature (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1973; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994). As Sonderling (2013 & 2014) argues, communication by its very nature is violent; it is like war and in political contestation, attack or negative advertising is legitimate (cf. Waldahl, 2005). From this standpoint, it is arguable that arguing that the post-colony is a mirror image of the colonial on the basis of the ruling elite’s messages and symbols obfuscates the fact that language and/or the sign is violent by its very nature and it works by difference.

From the foregoing, it can also be argued that ZANU-PF used what Mazid (2010, p. 450) calls ‘differentiation’, where it contrasts Mugabe with the other aspirants to the Presidency. This differentiation tactic is similar to negative comparative political advertising where one party presents themselves as better than the opponent (cf. Mierick, 2002; Pinkleton et al., 2002; Jasperson & Fan, 2002; Lilleker, 2006). In comparative

213 advertising one party presents their positive attributes, compared to the opponent’s undesirable traits. For example, Mugabe possesses wisdom, a golden mind and deftness in dealing with matters of the state that is greatly superior to that of all the aspirants to the Presidency. This tactic is justified even in indigenous Shona ways of knowing, where it is argued that he who does not lie should not expect to marry. Language is thus a weapon for winning and retaining consent in relationships – be they love or political ones. The negative or attack advertising and all forms of political advertising and communication in general expose the violent, discriminatory or murderous nature of the sign (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994; Sonderling, 2013 & 2014). It is the sign’s violence or discriminatory nature that simultaneously justifies a party’s political products, while delegitimising the opponent. From this perspective, the thesis argues that apart from negative advertising being a legitimate political advertising tactic, the criticism of ZANU- PF’s political communications as character assassination (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003) fails to acknowledge the murderous or discriminatory nature of the sign. The sign is by nature violent and because of this, communications can never be used to claim that a party is dictatorial or democratic or nativist since it is war by its very nature.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is compelling to argue that the legitimisation of Mugabe’s continued rule on the basis of expertise dovetails nicely with ZANU-PF discourses of ‘Mugabe chete’11 (Mugabe only). These discourses created the illusion that there is no one, either within ZANU-PF or the opposition, with the leadership credentials to replace Mugabe; Mugabe is irreplaceable. It is a discourse that creates the impression that the history of independent Zimbabwe starts and ends with Mugabe’s leadership. It is indeed a discourse that has been used to perpetuate Mugabe’s rule and one that in 2013 was continued through the ‘bhora mugedhi’ (score the ball) discourse (This football discourse shall be discussed later in the chapter). The justification for Mugabe’s continued rule is that Mugabe’s expertise in running matters of the state is unparalleled; consequently he has to rule forever. Mugabe, the political product, is invested with so

11 Upon his return from a state visit in China at the beginning of September 2014 President Mugabe was greeted by placard waving ZANU-PF supporters who were allegedly not pleased about the election rigging that had taken place during the party’s Youth and Women league conferences. Some of the placards read ‘Mugabe chete’ (Mugabe only). 214 many valorised attributes; attributes that justify his continued rule and give him value (cf. Irvine, 1989; Goldman, n.d). As a result of the signs attached to the political product Mugabe, he comes along in ZANU-PF discourse as indispensable in Zimbabwe’s political life. He, together with ZANU-PF, is presented as the alpha and omega of Zimbabwean politics with the liberation struggle and indigeneity as the foundation upon which Robert Mugabe’s claim to legitimacy is laid upon. However, as argued earlier, this should not be used to justify claims that Zimbabwean politics is patriarchal or personal. Discussion of discourse related to indigeneity shall be presented in later sections of the chapter.

Apart from the foregoing, ZANU-PF’s advertisements, as part of murdering the reality of Mugabe’s old age, sought to portray the party as offering opportunities to the youth. In the ‘Gushungo 8’ advertisement, the party sought to divert attention from and conceal its presidential candidate’s advanced age by focusing on how the party was giving the youth a chance in the parliamentary elections. This again was an attempt to deny the opposition and privately owned media, discourses of ZANU-PF as a party of geriatrics who do not want to retire and give an opportunity to younger members. A picture of a younger-looking Mugabe and eight other pictures of ZANU-PF candidates whose age ranged from 25-40 years were used in the advertisement. The combination of youths and pictures of a younger-looking Mugabe was an attempt at debunking the opposition’s ‘Mugabe is too old discourse’. Whereas all the eight candidates’ ages are given in the advertisement, Mugabe’s age is not given and this was an attempt at positive self-presentation, concealment and denial of Mugabe’s advanced age (cf. Van Dijk, 1993) with intention to gain voter appeal. Including Mugabe’s age in the advertisement was not in the party’s best interest. In this advertisement the products ZANU-PF and Mugabe are again simultaneously produced as ‘youth’ (ZANU-PF and Mugabe = ‘Youth’) and ‘youth’ is produced as ZANU-PF and Mugabe (‘Youth’ =ZANU-PF and Mugabe) (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983; Goldman, n.d).

Youthfulness in the July 2013 electoral context in Zimbabwe – a context in which the opposition comparatively presented the ‘energetic’ and ‘youthful’ Tsvangirai (60-years- old at the time) against an old, allegedly tired and frail Mugabe (89-years-old at the time) – became a ‘hot’ or profitable sign that political parties competed for. ZANU-PF

215 deliberately associated Mugabe and ZANU-PF with youths and youthfulness in order to sidestep opposition criticisms that Mugabe was too old and ill to continue ruling Zimbabwe. The advertisement could have been targeted at the youths, specifically Harare youths, who are believed to be largely pro-MDC-T because of the high rate of unemployment and the alleged lack of opportunities for youths to ascend to leadership positions in ZANU-PF. The headline of the advertisement, ‘Gushungo 8’, suggests that the eight young candidates are Mugabe’s protégés. The headline implies that they are ‘Gushungo’s’ children or disciples. ‘Gushungo’ is Mugabe’s totem and in Zimbabwe amongst the Shona, addressing someone by their totem is a sign of both respect and affection. The advertisement was aimed at creating the impression that the ZANU-PF leader and presidential candidate was committed to empowering the youth, which was one of its campaign promises. I shall return later to the use of the totem ‘Gushungo’ later.

On the basis of the findings, it is compelling to argue that the appearance of Mugabe’s name in all the advertisements as part of the call to action ‘Vote R. G. Mugabe, Vote ZANU-PF’ creates the impression that Mugabe is ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF is Mugabe. This is because the level of importance that is placed on the party as the product is similar to the importance accorded to Robert Mugabe, the presidential candidate, as a product. This seems to confirm the claim that the political party leader is the core component of the political product (cf. Downer, 2013). Even though it is plausible to argue that Zimbabwean politics is personal, there is also compelling evidence which suggests that, in the context of an electoral campaign the predominance of Mugabe in ZANU-PF, messages cannot be used to argue that politics is personal (cf. Kebonang, 2012; Mkandawire, 2013). It is standard political communication practice that the party leader image takes centre stage in electoral campaigns. The same is also true of African political communications, considering that in the African political context the party leader’s popularity and charismatic leadership determine the fortunes of the party he leads in an electoral context. This is also true of Western politics where, if the party leader is damaged goods, the fortunes of a political party might also plummet (cf. Downer, 2013). From this perspective, the thesis disputes post-colonial theory’s tendency and Western neo-liberal democracy’s tendency to use the predominance of images of the African leader in the system of signs to argue that African politics is personal and patriarchal. 216

7.4 ZANU-PF, A CARING PEOPLE AND POLICY ORIENTED PARTY VERSUS A DISHONEST AND POLICY BANKRUPT MDC-T

ZANU-PF advertisements compared the party with the MDC-T. They positively branded the party a people-oriented, caring and policy driven party, while negatively branding the MDC-T as an uncaring, dishonest and policy bankrupt party. But breaking with post-2000 tradition, ZANU-PF advertisements generally refrained from attacking the person of MDC- T leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, or the party’s candidates even though they did use attack advertising. It is arguable that the party realised that directly attacking Tsvangirai in advertisements with a ZANU-PF sponsorship identification notice had the boomerang effect of popularising his brand. ZANU-PF left the business of attacking Tsvangirai to proxies such as The Heritage Trust, the state-controlled media and the privately-owned The Patriot. Unlike in previous elections, they largely refrained from the fear appeal or intimidation that they have come to be associated with by critics (cf. Moyo, 1992; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005). ZANU-PF also largely resorted to rebutting MDC-T claims through appropriating their discourse and turning it on its head to ridicule them. The rebuttals were quickly turned into attacks on the MDC-T. For example, in the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ advertisement, ZANU-PF used the picture of the MDC-T’s president Morgan Tsvangirai, then Secretary General, Tendai Biti, the then Organising Secretary, Nelson Chamisa, and other officials holding a ZANU-PF manifesto to claim that ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’. The MDC-T had produced an advert with the same picture ridiculing the ZANU-PF manifesto but ZANU-PF strategically turned that negative (attack on their manifesto) by using the same picture to claim that its manifesto had impressed even the opposition MDC-T. The intention was to convince MDC-T supporters and sympathisers and all voters to cast their votes for ZANU- PF rather than MDC-T.

This tactic of appropriating the opponent’s discourse and turning it on its head to ridicule them employed by ZANU-PF is what Tomaselli (1992) calls de-limited appropriation of discourse. It is a confirmation of Foucault’s (1980) observation that even though discourse

217 reproduces power, it can also expose power. Further, the apparent duel between ZANU- PF and MDC-T confirms the claim that all forms of marketing, including political marketing and communication, are a civilized form of warfare (cf. Jain, n.d; Sonderling, 2013 & 2014). It is also a confirmation of Baudrillard’s (1983) observation that the sign is discriminatory. In the political duel presented above, the signs used by both ZANU-PF and MDC-T were intended to eliminate the other from the political game. The signs were meant to invest the self with positive signs while investing the other with negative signs.

In another advertisement, ZANU-PF turned MDC-T’s campaign messages’ claim that they had implemented the multiple currencies policy on its head and accuses the MDC-T of dishonesty and failure to draw up policy during its time in government. In this advertisement, ZANU-PF used argumentation to legitimise itself while simultaneously delegitimising the MDC-T (cf. Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk, 1993). It argues that it is ‘fact’ that the multiple currencies system was put in place by ZANU-PF and MDCT’s claims that they implemented the policy were ‘fiction’. ZANU-PF’s negative evaluation of the MDC-T as a dishonest party that failed to implement policy during five years in government follows from the ‘fact’ that it was ZANU-PF that had implemented the multiple currencies policy, contrary to MDC-T’s claims (cf. Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk, 1993). The MDC-T’s dishonesty and failure to implement policy was the reason ‘why’ (cf. Van Leeuwen, 2007) voters had to vote ZANU-PF, because it implemented the multiple currencies policy that alleviated their suffering. In the same move, ZANU-PF is differentiating and creating distance (proximisation) (cf. Van Dijk, 1993; Mazid, 2008) between itself – a party that came up with a policy that alleviated people’s suffering from the MDC, a dishonest party that failed to come up with policy during five years in government – and the MDC.

The foregoing scenario shows that negative evaluation of the other and positive evaluation of the self – a process that might involve what others criticise as character assassination (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003) – is the essence of political advertising in an electoral context (cf. Waldahl, 2005; Jain, n.d). It is indeed the main endeavour of political branding whose goal is gaining voter appeal at the expense of the competition (cf. Downer, 2013; Jain, n.d). Given this background, it is not without merit to argue that criticism of ZANU-PF’s discourse as character assassination is simplistic and fails to

218 grapple with how the game is played in an electoral context where the intention is to gain maximum possible positive differentiation over the competition (cf. Downer, 2013; Jain, n.d). It also fails to grapple with the reality that the sign by its very nature is discriminatory and violent (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983; Sonderling, 2013 & 2014). All forms of text and/or writing do ideological work and are inherently political (cf. Van Dijk, 1993; Clark & Ivanic, 1997; Mhiripiri, 2009).

In critical discourse analysis, everyday text does ideological work (Van Dijk, 1993) and in this case, the choice of words such as ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ was designed to widen the gap between ZANU-PF (US), an honest party and MDC-T (THEM), a dishonest party. It is precisely on the basis of this distinction (between honesty and dishonesty; fact and fiction) that people have to vote for ZANU-PF and not MDC-T. As Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 99) notes, ‘comparison in discourse almost always have a legitimatory or de-legitimatory function’. This legitimation–de-legitimation process is akin to comparative advertising and/or negative advertising. In political advertising theory, comparative advertising is considered by some as a sub-type of negative or attack advertising (Mierick, 2002, p. 49). The purpose of comparison is to show that one is better than the opponent. This comparative process is at the heart of political branding, where the intention is to identify and differentiate from competition to gain voter appeal (cf. Downer, 2013, p. 5; Jain, n.d). In this regard, during the July 2013 election ZANU-PF identified the MDC-T, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, as the major threat to their hold on power; hence their major thrust was to differentiate themselves from the MDC-T. They did not pay attention to the other smaller and insignificant parties and their candidates.

The foregoing is understandable when one considers that, post-2000 the MDC-T has been the biggest threat to ZANU-PF’s hold on power (ZESN 2002) with Tsvangirai, the major threat to Mugabe’s continued rule. In this context, ZANU-PF’s negative labelling, or what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003) calls character assassination of Morgan Tsvangirai, makes political marketing sense. Failure to damage the opponent’s credibility might result in more people voting for the opponent; yet in any marketing campaign the intention is to gain voter or customer appeal at the expense of the competition. One of the strategies of achieving that goal is through questioning the credibility of the opponent (cf. Waldahl,

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2005). Character assassination is thus a legitimate tactic in any democratic election, and is even utilised in neo-liberal Western democracies (see Pinkleton et al., 2002; Jasperson and Fan, 2002; Meirick, 2002; Lilleker, 2006; Kaid, 2012)..

The same techniques and tactics of differentiation, argumentation and proximisation explored above were used in two other advertisements; ‘Council Bills cancelled’, and ‘We will compensate you’. Here, ZANU-PF used positive self-presentation, and boasting about its performance among others to legitimise it. The tactics were meant to positively brand the self, while negatively branding the MDC-T – an uncaring party. These tactics and/or signs used by ZANU-PF only make sense in differential relation to the MDC-T advertisements and campaign messages they sought to speak back to. The word ‘fact’ only makes sense in opposition to ‘fiction’, but these two also make sense in the context of the election campaign and the MDC-T’s campaign claim that it introduced the multiple currency policy during the GNU. It is therefore arguable that ZANU-PF electoral discourses are partially influenced by the context in which the election is being held and thus are not entirely about looking back in the past (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Chuma, 2005 & 2008). The here and now also influences ZANU-PF political discourse.

In the 2013 electoral context, for example, ZANU-PF strategically claims ownership of the multiple currencies policy, while shifting onto the MDC-T the blame for the suffering brought about by the multiple currency policy. It is arguable that given its post-2000 insistence that the economic crisis was caused by Western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe at the behest of the MDC-T, this advertisement simply relied on memory of that discourse. ZANU-PF was probably taking it as common sense that the voters knew that the economy and the Zimbabwe dollar collapsed due to these sanctions. In this contest, ZANU-PF’s adoption of the multiple currencies system is presented as messianic as it alleviated the suffering of the masses. In this vein, in their ‘29 January 2009’ advertisement ZANU-PF ridicules the MDC-T for claiming that it had introduced the multiple currencies, arguing that it was ZANU-PF which had done so before the swearing in of the Government of National Unity (GNU). In the ‘Council Bills cancelled’ and ‘We will compensate you’ advertisements ZANU-PF again positively presents itself as a party that ‘cares’ and negatively portrays the MDC-T as an uncaring party. It urges voters to vote

220 for a government that cares and understands the plight of the people, unlike the MDC-T whose ministers were allegedly refusing to compensate people’s loss of bank savings. They were also allegedly refusing to cancel the people’s unfair electricity bills accumulated as a result of the adoption of multiple currencies. This incompleteness in the ZANU-PF discourse, where they do not acknowledge their own role in the suffering that Zimbabweans have been going through, is one tactic they use to legitimise their rule. Incompleteness is lying by omission and it is another way through which politicians seek to hoodwink the electorate in keeping them in power. The foregoing tactic employed by ZANU-PF is also an example of comparative advertising, where it positively branded the self while negatively branding the MDC-T. Simultaneously concealing one’s weaknesses and trumpeting one’s achievements is a legitimation tactic that even in Zimbabwean Shona societies is acknowledged as discussed earlier.

Ironically, despite claiming ownership of the multiple currencies policy ZANU-PF, did not claim ownership of the woes visited upon the masses by the policy. For example, in the ‘29 January 2009’ advertisement mentioned above, they do not mention the negatives associated with the multiple currencies, instead dwelling on the positives. They also accuse the MDC-T of dishonesty for claiming to have introduced the multiple currencies policy. But they strategically reveal the negatives in two other separate advertisements, ‘Council bills cancelled’ and ‘We will compensate you’, where they accuse the MDC-T of being an uncaring party. Thus, they used concealment (ignoring the negatives) or the political advertising tactic of card stacking or selective omission. ZANU-PF concealed/omitted the factors that led to the adoption of the multiple currencies; namely, the collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar due to a political and economic crisis-induced hyperinflation. It concealed the fact that it had presided over the economic collapse that brought about the suffering in the first place. It claimed ownership of the positives of the policy, while absolving itself of the negative impacts of the introduction of the multiple currencies, such as high electricity and water bills.

It is arguable that the advertisements, as shall be discussed later in the chapter, were targeted at urban voters. The urban areas have been MDC-T strongholds post-2000. In effect, the city councils were controlled by the MDC-T and by moving to cancel the council

221 bills, ZANU-PF struck two birds with one stone. First they managed to portray the MDC- T councils as uncaring and heartless since they had converted residents’ Zimbabwean dollar bills into inflated or exorbitant USA dollar bills. By cancelling these bills through the then Local Government Minister, Ignatius Chombo, ZANU-PF once again cast itself as a saviour. Second, cancelling the bills financially crippled the MDC-T and the largely MDC- T led urban councils. Probably ZANU-PF reasoned that if it cancelled the bills, the residents would vote for its candidates in these urban centres. Furthermore, given endless reports of corruption in the MDC-T councils, the move was probably aimed at crippling them financially to make campaigning very difficult for them.

The foregoing confirms the earlier observation that ZANU-PF opted to assassinate the character of the MDC-T party and not its candidates. It did this by delegitimising MDC-T as a dishonest and uncaring party that is not concerned about the plight of the urban poor and the generality of the Zimbabwean populace. Contrastingly, it legitimised itself as a caring party. While delegitimising the opposition on account of its dishonesty and uncaring attitude towards the people, ZANU-PF legitimised itself by identifying the needs of the people including marginalised persons, groups and communities (cf. Mazid, 2008). This was a new tactic, where it claimed that it had ensured that the new constitution guarantees that measures shall be taken to empower the marginalised persons, groups and minorities. It is a discourse that should be understood in the context of contestations around Zimbabweanness, ethnicity and complaints about marginalisation by various ethnic groups. This shall be discussed further under the theme ‘indigenisation and economic empowerment’.

Apart from the above, the choice of the word ‘people’ in some of the advertisements is intended to create emotional attachment between ZANU-PF and the people. In the ‘The people’s constitution’, ‘Council bills cancelled’ and ‘We will compensate you’ advertisements, ZANU-PF creates the impression that it is a party of the people and that they care deeply about the people whilst the MDC-T does not. It nevertheless used terror of being ruled by a dishonest party to eliminate the MDC-T from the language game. The signs it utilised were designed to murder the MDC-T and its policies (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994). The strategy was to harm the MDC-T brand which would,

222 in turn, harm the party’s candidates. This was a shift from its alleged tendency to assassinate the characters of opposition leaders as imperialist stooges (cf. Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003). Given the global interest in the election, it is a strategy that was perhaps influenced by the desire to avoid being accused of intimidating the opposition. The discourse of peace, discussed below, that the party utilised during the election campaign seems to confirm this reading or interpretation.

7.5 THANKING ZIMBABWEANS FOR A PEACEFUL VOTE: ZANU-PF’S PRE- EMPTIVE STRIKE ON ITS CRITICS?

As mentioned earlier, ZANU-PF ‘refined’ their ‘routine’ election discourse from ‘violence’ and intimidation to peace. It is compelling to argue that this discourse of ‘peace’ was novel and yet old at the same time. It was old in the sense that critics have argued that previously ZANU-PF used to threaten citizens to vote for it if they wanted peace and to vote for the opposition if they wanted war or death (cf. Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005; Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). The choice between ZANU-PF and the opposition was presented as a choice between death and peace. In the run-up to the 2008 presidential run-off election ZANU-PF threatened to go back to war in the event of an opposition MDC- T victory. They also used violence to make sure the people voted for their candidate (CCJP, 2009, Masunungure, 2009a). However, prior to the 2013 electoral context, the word peace attained different meanings and importance in a different context. As highlighted in Chapter Five, peace in the 2013 election should, be understood in the context of previous elections, especially the violent run-up to the 2008 presidential election run-off and post-run-off election context. Tsvangirai not only withdrew from the election (Masunungure, 2009), but the international community, including SADC, condemned the election as not free and fair. That condemnation eroded the legitimacy of Robert Mugabe’s victory and it led to negotiations that culminated in the Government of National Unity (GNU). It is a period that saw the West tightening sanctions on Zimbabwe, resulting in the total collapse of the country’s economy and currency. Furthermore, the presidential run-off electoral context was characterised by local privately owned media and Western media images of alleged ZANU-PF’s pogroms, while the state media also accused the opposition MDC-T of being the chief architect of the violence. This context

223 helps the analyst to make sense of the discourses utilised in the ZANU-PF July 2013 election advertisements.

It is arguable that in the ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ advertisement mentioned above, ZANU-PF wanted to influence public opinion into accepting its claim that the election was peaceful and free and fair. To achieve this goal, they used a huge picture of overflowing ZANU-PF crowds at the Mutare rally. The intention was to show that people willingly attended the party’s rallies in droves and to imply that if they could command such huge crowds at rallies; their victory should not be questioned. The advertisement also has smaller inserts of the MDCs’ supporters and these served the purpose of acknowledging them as citizens with the aim of legitimising ZANU-PF’s envisaged victory. The smaller inserts of the opposition supporters also served to create the illusion that ZANU-PF was more popular than the MDCs. The opposition supporters were co-opted as Zimbabweans in order to justify ZANU-PF dominance and simultaneously weaken the post-2000 discourse that ZANU-PF’s nationalism is bankrupt and exclusionary (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Mazango, 2005; Freeman, 2005). In this advertisement, perhaps for the first time in ZANU-PF advertisements post-2000, MDC-T supporters are acknowledged as Zimbabweans and not as puppets or sell-outs. It is also perhaps an implicit acknowledgement by ZANU-PF that the MDC-T was not violent in the July 2013 elections. In the past, ZANU-PF sought to deny accusations that they are a violent party by instead accusing the MDC-T of fanning violence or faking the violence (cf. ZESN, 2002; MMPZ, 2002; Kriger, 2005). This was a significant break with post-2000 discursive practice but it was a deliberate one, influenced by the context in which the elections were being held – especially the SADC and global gaze on Zimbabwe. It could have been influenced by ZANU-PF’s desire to avoid another GNU. They were impatient to end the GNU – a position publicly stated by President Mugabe and a number of his top officials in the run- up to the election and after the election. It was also influenced perhaps by opposition and civic organisations’ accusations of clandestine intimidation of opposition supporters by ZANU-PF during the campaign period.

Following on the foregoing, it is arguable that the advertisement was used both as a shield and weapon; it was a weapon used to pre-empt the usual opposition and Western

224 accusations of violence, while simultaneously shielding ZANU-PF from the traditional accusations of violence and human rights abuse and legitimising its anticipated victory. The advertisement creates the impression that since the election was peaceful it was free and fair. It seeks to conflate the peacefulness of the election with the freeness and fairness of the election and it also implies that given this, any winner of the election would be the legitimate winner. Conversely, the peace discourse implied that the losers should accept the result of the election, since people voted in peace and were not coerced to vote for anyone. The impression created here is that the election result would be a true reflection of the free will of the people. It is further implied that if that was the case then Zimbabwe is a maturing democracy. It was an advertisement that was also meant to debunk the Western and local private media and opposition parties’ argument that the Mugabe regime is a dictatorship. It was meant to counter the opposition’s democracy narrative.

The exclamation mark in the headline is meant to show that the statement is an emphatic one that betrays strong emotions of gratitude. It is intended to leave no room for doubt and objection as to the peacefulness of the campaign. It could also have been meant to show relief on the part of ZANU-PF that the campaign period had been non-violent. The exclamation mark provides ‘structural emphasis’ (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 264) to the phrase ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ Furthermore, the use of the statement, ‘heeding our call for tolerance and brotherliness’ is meant to reinforce the headline. It is an attempt to show that unlike in previous elections that were characterised by violence and intimidation, in the July 2013 elections Zimbabweans chose to agree or disagree in peace and brotherly love. The motif of the opposition being Zimbabweans, of being one people, is again evident in this statement. Unlike in previous elections, where the opposition supporters were regarded as sell-outs and agents of regime change (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2005; Freeman, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Mazango, 2005), the phrase ‘brotherliness’ creates the illusion that all Zimbabweans are one people and are related. Similarly, the phrase ‘tolerance’ creates the illusion that Zimbabweans agreed to disagree; that is, Zimbabweans were able to peacefully appreciate each other’s political differences. This tolerance is reinforced by the inclusion of opposition supporters in the picture montage. The advertisement implies that Zimbabweans may hold different political views but they

225 are one people as shown by the peaceful campaign. Implied by the advertisement is that Zimbabweans have matured democratically; the elections were democratic and the result would be a true reflection of the free will of the people. One of the hallmarks of democracy is freedom of choice. The advertisement’s intention was to create the illusion that the regime resulting from the elections would be a government of the people, by the people, for the people (cf. Ake, 2000; Hague & Harrop, 2004; Chipkin, 2007). The phrases were intended to achieve legitimation through positive self-evaluation (cf. Mazid, 2008). The sign ‘peace’, utilised by ZANU-PF as a legitimatory tool here, brings with it associations of democracy and free and fair elections.

From a sign ‘theory’ perspective, it can be argued that in this advertisement ZANU-PF instead of raiding the past for images (cf. Harris, 1996), it raided the present (campaign rallies) for images which it simultaneously attached to ‘peace’ and the party; ZANU-PF. The rallies whose pictures it used in the advertisement were not peace rallies but campaign rallies by ZANU-PF and other political parties. The images were plucked from their original context; the ZANU-PF campaign rally for the July 2013 elections held at Aerodrome, Sakubva in Mutare and MDC-T rallies. The images were then attached to political products ZANU-PF and ‘peace’, in such a way that ZANU-PF was produced as peace and peace was produced as ZANU-PF (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983; Goldman, n.d). But the product ‘peace’ is given credibility by the pictures that accompany it – the images of ZANU-PF and opposition MDC-T supporters at rallies (cf. Irvine, 1989). By selling peace, the advertisement was intended to sell the legitimacy of an envisaged post-election ZANU-PF government. It was a change in tactics by ZANU- PF; a change that was influenced by the regional and global context in which the election was being conducted. They were merely selling peace by thanking Zimbabweans for voting in peace, without – as Kriger (2005) argues they do during elections – necessarily threatening the voters; namely, either they vote for ZANU-PF or it is war and/or death.

The advertisement can be classified under advocacy advertising which is designed to raise the salience of an issue and to rig public opinion in favour of the message originator (cf. Pinkleton et al., 2002; Lilleker, 2006). It can also be used to positively influence legislation. In advocacy advertising the political marketer identifies areas of interest or

226 potential crisis and takes pre-emptive action to try and prevent the issue from becoming a crisis. It tries to positively influence public opinion and in some cases, policy, before the issue becomes a crisis. Cognisant of the rejection of its past victories by NGOs, the opposition and Western governments, ZANU-PF probably took out this advertisement as a pre-emptive action against any rejection of its electoral victory on account of violence and lack of freeness and fairness of the poll. It can be argued that since advocacy advertising is said to be useful in influencing policy at national level and in public diplomacy at international/global level, ZANU-PF wanted to influence both local and global public opinion towards the election result. It probably wanted to influence other nation states’ foreign policies towards it. If not to influence the removal of Western imposed sanctions, the move may have been meant to create the impression that continued Western sanctions on Zimbabwe after the election would be unjustified since the election was violence free.

From this observation, it can be argued that political advertising in Zimbabwe and Africa in general is influenced by both local and global considerations (cf. Zeleza, 2006). In some instances, the signs produced by the commandement (Mbembe, 2001) in a post-colonial sign system are meant to not only gain the ruling elite local acceptance but global acceptance as well, given the increased interconnectedness of the world that is a result of the globalisation process. Put conversely, the post-colony is not merely a reflection of the colonial as argued by post-colonial theory, but it is also influenced by its local and global realities (cf. Zeleza, 2006; Nakata et al., 2012). It is instead a constellation of a myriad of forces that include the colonial, the global, the pre-colonial, the here and now, amongst others. From this perspective, the assertion that post-colonial Africa is a mere reflection of the colonial appears simplistic and without merit. Similarly, the tendency by Afrocentrists to view Africa as ‘Europe upside-down’ (Appiah 1997), appears simplistic and without merit.

However, given the contestations that characterise global relations, the ‘“What a peaceful campaign!’ advertisement could be read as ZANU-PF’s triumphalism; where the party was jubilantly declaring to the world that the campaign period was peaceful and therefore the elections would be free and fair. It was a pre-emptive declaration of the indisputability

227 of the legitimacy of Robert Mugabe’s and ZANU-PF’s expected victory. Given the football discourse that pervaded this election, it can be argued that the advertisement was proclaiming that the playing field was even; the political game pitting Team ZANU-PF against the MDC Team and other smaller parties was peaceful. From this perspective, a ZANU-PF victory would be legitimate. The result would be decided at the ballot and there will be no need for it to be decided in the boardroom, as in the 2008 scenario where SADC intervened and brokered a power-sharing deal between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. It could be that the advertisement implied that Africans can solve their own problems and do not need the West, as shown by the peaceful election. It was an election where the West was barred from observing because of their alleged imperialist tendencies and imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe post-2000.

The advertisement was meant to forestall the de-legitimation of a likely ZANU-PF victory by the party’s critics. The peace discourse was intended to legitimise ZANU-PF’s envisaged victory, while at the same time delegitimising likely opposition parties’ and Western rejection of a ZANU-PF victory. The advertisement was targeted at the opposition political parties, the international community which was represented by election observers, civic society which has always been critical of ZANU-PF’s electoral victories post-2000 (cf. ZESN, 2002; MMPZ, 2002) and the West which was denied the right to observe the elections, although they have embassies in Zimbabwe. The advertisement was also designed to show that ZANU-PF actively campaigned for a peaceful election as it took credit for preaching peace. By using the possessive ‘our’ (emphasis mine) call for tolerance and brotherliness’, ZANU-PF took credit for the peace that prevailed during the campaign period. The intention was to prevent the usual criticism that the party uses threatening language or intimidation against the opposition (cf. Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005). The party sought to positively rebrand itself a peaceful political party.

Positive self-presentation or beautifying the self while uglifying the opponent is one of the ways in which dominance is legitimised or justified (Mazid, 2008). In the political market place, political branding requires one to positively brand the self at the expense of the opponent (Waldahl, 2005; Jain, n.d). Similarly, ZANU-PF was beautifying the self, that is,

228 they were positively branding the self as a peaceful party. The intention was to undo the damage of previous post-independence elections where they were accused of using violence and intimidation to win elections (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005). It was also to create the illusion that if they actively campaigned for a peaceful campaign period then if they won, they would have been legitimately elected.

The ‘What a peaceful campaign advertisement’ obscures the fact that all parties to the GNU had agreed through the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation to campaign for a peaceful election. In this vein, all parties campaigned for a peaceful election. The advertisement should also be read in the context of a press conference by President Mugabe on 30 July 2013, the day the advertisement appeared in the Daily News. At the press conference, the President indicated that if he lost the election, he would hand over power to the winner and also urged those who would have lost to accept the result. The press conference provided a stark contrast to the press conference held by military generals on the eve of the 2002 presidential election, in which, in a move believed to have been targeted at MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai, they threatened not to salute a President without liberation war credentials. President Mugabe’s press conference and the ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ advertisement were meant to demonstrate a total break with the violent electoral past. It is thus arguable that in this context the advertisement was part of a broader campaign to pre-emptively legitimise Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s envisaged victory. It was intended to make it difficult for the opposition, the West and civil society to reject the election outcome since the campaign period was peaceful.

The placement of the advertisement in the Daily News (on 30 July 2013), an anti-ZANU- PF publication (cf. Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Moyo, 2005) and a publication which carried as its lead, a story on 31 July, the day of voting, titled ‘89 reasons why Mugabe must go’, was a strategic move by ZANU-PF. The placement of the advertisement in the publication is a development that both political advertising theory and political economy of the media do not explain adequately. It was perhaps a move designed to deliver the message specifically to opposition MDC-T sympathisers, supporters, the civic society, election observers and the West who most likely also relied on the privately owned press including the Daily News on election news since its anti-ZANU-PF stance is well-documented. For

229 most critics of ZANU-PF, the state media do not represent a credible source of news especially on issues to do with ZANU-PF, elections and governance (cf. MMPZ, 2002; ZESN, 2002; Moyse, 2009). For example, Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) (2002, p. 9) year 2000 election report argues that private press, including Daily News’ coverage of the 2002 presidential election, was lauded for having played a ‘critical, sceptical role, scrutinising ZANU (PF)’s lies that the MDC was a violent party’. Perhaps it is precisely because of its anti-ZANU-PF stance which makes it credible in the eyes of the party’s critics that the advertisement was placed there – a move that is at variance with political economy theory’s assertions that advertisers do not associate with ideological enemies (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 1997). It is also at variance with political advertising theory which holds that political advertisements should not be placed in media whose content is not compatible with one’s ideology (cf. Menon, 2008). In the July 2013 electoral contest in Zimbabwe, hostile media delivered the right prospects to ZANU-PF.

From the foregoing observation, it is arguable that the theory of African political communication suggested in this thesis rejects Western theory assumptions that political advertisers do not associate with political enemies. Political advertising practice in Zimbabwe has shown that both the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition political parties, such as the MDC-T, place their advertisements in media whose content is hostile to their ideology (cf. Willems, 2004; Moyse, 2009). Indeed the state-controlled media’s refusal to accept political advertisements including ZANU-PF advertisements was informed by the knowledge that the opposition would want to place advertisements in the pro-ZANU-PF state-controlled media. It was influenced by the knowledge that state-controlled media’s anti-opposition stance does not deter the opposition from placing advertisements in state- controlled media. The placement of the advertisement in the Daily News could also have influenced – or could have been influenced by – the peace discourse. It was perhaps designed to give the message more credibility; namely, if the peace message had been placed in the state-controlled media, its credibility would have been eroded by the mere fact that the state-controlled media’s pro-ZANU-PF stance is well documented (cf. Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Mazango, 2005; Chari, 2008). Placing the

230 advertisement in the anti-ZANU-PF Daily News gave it credibility even though it was a paid-for message.

The foregoing observations debunk Western theory’s views that African politics is irrational, incomprehensible and is the politics of chaos (cf. Houtondji, 1997; Mbembe, 2001; Ahluwalia, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 2007; Onslow, 2011). ZANU-PF’s placement of the ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ advertisement in the Daily News was a well thought out move; it was a rational decision influenced by the political realities of post-2000 and specifically 2013. It is a political reality that was characterised by media and indeed societal polarisation largely into bitterly opposed pro-ZANU-PF and pro-MDC-T camps. It can be argued from the foregoing that in Zimbabwean political communication practice it is considered more worthwhile to place advertisements in media organisations whose ideology is incompatible with one’s ideology. The assumption here could be that those who read and listen to media organisations that are sympathetic to one’s cause are most likely one’s loyal supporters or sympathisers. The political communicator should thus target both those sitting on the fence and the ones opposed to his/her party ideology. The best way to ‘capture’ them is to place advertisements in oppositional media. In this case ZANU-PF wanted to ‘capture’ opposition sympathisers and supporters while strategically denying the opposition the opportunity to capture its own voters by not placing advertisements in the state media under the guise that the state media rejected all political advertisements. In this situation ZANU-PF would not be criticised for denying the opposition an opportunity to place advertisements in the state-controlled press.

In addition to pre-empting likely opposition and Western rejection of a ZANU-PF victory, the advertisement was also intended to veil the presence of non-physical forms of violence. In other words, the absence of physical violence does not mean the election was non-violent and free and fair. It has been argued that in the July 2013 election ZANU- PF relied on memory of the 2008 violence to win the election; it harvested the fruits of the 2008 pogroms. In other words, it relied on memory of violence to instil fear and compliance in voters. The elections have been termed ‘harvest of fear’ (Phiri, 2013; Beta, 2013). But the advertisement shows, as noted by Raftopoulos & Phimister (2003) that, ZANU-PF discourse is not founded entirely on falsehoods. It also shows that the

231 discourse is not irrational, as there was indeed no violence during the election and there was no widespread intimidation. In other words, ZANU-PF discourse is not mere propaganda or untruths but is truth that is presented in a strategic way designed to gain ZANU-PF maximum possible positive differentiation over the competition (cf. Jain, n.d). In any case, it would be politically unwise to expose one’s weaknesses either by design or by default. It could be politically disastrous. Indeed the whole goal of political advertising and/or political branding is to gain maximum possible positive differentiation over the competition, because without that, winning governmental power through elections becomes impossible.

It is arguable that, after being consistently labelled a violent and dictatorial party – especially in the aftermath of the contested 2008 election – ZANU-PF sought to rebrand itself as a peaceful party. This rebranding is a form of renewal and in political contestation where consent is not constant; rebranding becomes one of the ways through which consent is won and re-won (cf. Bernays, 1947; Fiske, 1992). In the context of the July 2013 elections, political advertising enabled ZANU-PF to re-invent itself as a democratic and peaceful party. This motif of rebirth or re-invention is consistent with the extensive use of the colour green in most of ZANU-PF’s advertisements. This shall be discussed later.

Apart from the foregoing, the advertisement shows that ZANU-PF was confident of victory. The implied confidence in winning the election in the ZANU-PF advertisement can be read in two ways. First, it could be viewed as a strategy designed to demoralise the opponents by creating the illusion that ZANU-PF was so popular such that it was a foregone conclusion that it would emerge victorious. Boasting about one’s capability is one of the techniques that can be used in a contest, be it an electoral or military contest, to instil doubts and fear in the opponents and to demoralise them. Indeed, the prominence or bigger space given to the picture of the Mutare rally, occupying the upper half of the full page advertisement with smaller inserts of the opposition supporters placed at the bottom of this picture, was designed to create the illusion that ZANU-PF had more support than all the opposition parties. This was strategic given that the advertisement was placed on the eve of the elections. Second, the confidence displayed by ZANU-PF in thanking

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Zimbabweans for voting in peace suggests that they were certain that they would win the elections. It could be because since it was argued that ZANU-PF was the most powerful of the three parties in the GNU and President Mugabe was the one responsible for setting election dates; they scheduled elections when Tsvangirai and MDC-T were at their weakest. The advertisement betrays the fact that perhaps ZANU-PF knew that the MDC- T were at their weakest, especially given Tsvangirai’s alleged shenanigans with women and the massive corruption in MDC-T-run urban councils. It could be that they dragged MDC-T to a match or a fight when it was at its weakest and they knew that victory was certain. In any case, nobody drags a person to a fight or provokes a fight when they are certain to lose.

The next section discusses the discourse of puppets, patriots and homosexuals in ZANU- PF advertisements for the July 2013 elections.

7.6 INDIGENEITY, DIVINE RULE, PUPPETS, PATRIOTS AND HOMOSEXUALS

This section discusses the nationalist discourse deployed by ZANU-PF during the 2013 elections. It focuses on the party’s discourses on whites, puppets, patriots and homosexuals. ZANU-PF used pinpointing to identify whites as the enemy. In its ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement, it pinpoints the former white colonial masters as the enemy by using a colonial era picture of a white man crossing a river, ‘riding’ on the back of a black man. And it advises ‘Don’t let them take you for a ride, again’. It deliberately uses ‘them’ referring to the whites but not mentioning them because it is obvious who ‘them’ are. It creates the impression that it is common sense that the whites are behind the MDC-T and this makes the connection all the more powerful. Here, ZANU-PF relied on memory to delegitimise the MDC-T as a puppet party. It also uses the word ‘ride’ both literally (white riding on the back of a black man across a stream) and figuratively. And without the need to mention it explicitly, ZANU-PF implies a link between the MDC-T and the former white colonial oppressors which makes the connection all the more powerful because it is taken as common sense. It is said the unsaid is equally important if not more important than the said (Deacon et al., 2007) and in this case not mentioning the white settlers and/or the British and the MDC-T by name makes the statement more powerful.

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It is taken as a given that the voter knows who ‘them’ are. By so doing, ZANU-PF successfully uglified the opponent while beautifying the self (cf. Mazid, 2008) without necessarily resorting to crude fear appeal tactics of previous elections. It also uglified the MDC-T as sell-outs, while beautifying itself (ZANU-PF) as the patriots. The discourse of puppets and patriots had dominated most post-2000 electoral contests between ZANU- PF and MDC-T (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Mazango, 2005; Freeman, 2005) but as noted earlier it was muted in July 2013.

Following on the foregoing, the thesis argues that positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other is standard practice in political advertising/branding and is not symptomatic of a party’s dictatorship or democracy. It argues that political communication is just like history which, as Derrida (2004) argues, is always produced by a process of difference. Difference and/or differentiation are the foundation on which political branding and attempts to win consent are premised. It is from this process of history that identities which are ‘…events in language…that [are] articulated in differences’ (Rice & Waugh, 2001, p. 179) emerge and are fostered in the minds of the voters. These differences determine whether one wins or loses an election. History, it is arguable, has both a legitimatory and de-legitimatory function. The thesis reiterates that discursive practices in an electoral context cannot be used to conclude that the post-colony is a reproduction of the colonial; nor can it be indisputably used to conclude that African politics is personal and/or patriarchal. Also, character assassination or threatening messages should not be used to dismiss an election as undemocratic. It is just mere politicking and besides, the sign is murderous by its very nature.

From a sign theory perspective, ZANU-PF raided the past for the image of the white man crossing the river riding on the back of a black man. The picture is a blown out black and white picture and this gives it the illusion of authenticity – the picture is old and is black and white, like most pictures of that bygone era. The picture speaks of the exploitation and abuse that the Africans in Zimbabwe suffered at the hands of the white settlers. Without saying much, ZANU-PF evokes memories and images of white colonial rule and the brutal armed struggle that was waged by the nationalist parties including ZANU-PF. It evokes images of land expropriation by the whites in colonial Zimbabwe and directly

234 connects with the fast-track land reform programme of post-2000. This picture was lifted from its original colonial context and purified into a sign negatively attached to the opposition. In advertising theory, raiding the past or society for images is standard procedure, whereas in political advertising theory negatively portraying the opponent is also legitimate (cf. Harris, 1996; Meirick, 2002; Waldahl, 2005). In this regard, ZANU-PF deliberately creates a link between the colonialists and the opposition without mentioning either. Voting for the opposition is equated to voting for the white colonialists. Implied also is that voting for the opposition will result in re-colonisation which would undoubtedly lead to loss of land again for those who were resettled by ZANU-PF. It is probable that the advertisement was a call to the voters to defend the land reform programme by voting for ZANU-PF.

In the background of the picture is the image of the Great Zimbabwe monuments, a national symbol from which Zimbabwe got its name. It means ‘dzimba dzamabwe’ (house of stones). It is an image that appears in all advertisements with the words ‘Unity, Peace, and Development’. It is part of ZANU-PF’s brand identity and image. The Great Zimbabwe monuments are a source of national pride and they also feature on ZANU-PF’s logo. The ruins also define Zimbabwean nationhood and national identity; they create a sense of belonging to the nation and they remind Zimbabweans about the past and the present, while also pointing to the future. They are central to how the Zimbabwean nation is imagined and ZANU-PF strategically mined this monument to claim authentic ownership of Zimbabwe and leadership of Zimbabwe. From this ZANU-PF perspective, any political entity that does not use this symbol becomes the other, aliens and sell-outs.

Apart from being central in imagining the Zimbabwe nation, the Great Zimbabwe monuments are used to debunk white colonial perceptions of the African as backward and uncivilised, as it is hailed as an example of African genius. It is used to justify decolonial assertions that the African is equally civilised and intelligent. It is arguable that ZANU-PF’s use of the monuments as part of its logo is intended to debunk Western notions that the West is the home of science, theory, reason and philosophy while the South is an abyss; the home of superstition, the irrational and incomprehensible requiring training by the West to reach full humanity (cf. Houtondji, 1997; Mbembe, 2001). As

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Appiah (1997, p. 48) argues, culturally significant sites such as Great Zimbabwe and the Pyramids of Egypt are used by Afrocentrists to urge black Africans to take pride in being African; to return to African values. They are also used as evidence that civilisation started in Africa (Appiah, 1997). It is therefore arguable that ZANU-PF uses the Great Zimbabwe to urge voters to return to their African values by voting ZANU-PF. Voting for ZANU-PF is equated to voting for indigeneity and authentic liberation.

It has been argued that the Great Zimbabwe conical tower, the most prominent feature in the blown up picture of the ruins in the advert has both religious and sexual significance. It is said that in its original context the tower symbolised ancestral worship. It was at this tower that ancient Africans worshipped their ancestors. But others have also argued that the tower is a symbol of sexual virility given its phallic shape and the historical fact that this is the place where initiation ceremonies were conducted. In this context, perhaps ZANU-PF is presented as a virile party, a party that can deliver for the people of Zimbabwe and the only party that can safeguard the country’s ‘hard won independence and sovereignty’12. Or it could be that the conical tower and the Great Zimbabwe as a whole create the illusion that the party has a direct link to the ancestral spirits of the land. As discussed elsewhere in this section, it is a link that is further implied by the Zimbabwe bird that features on the national flag.

The same image of the Great Zimbabwe ruins was being used in this advertisement to present ZANU-PF as a better alternative; a party that offers ‘unity, peace and development’ rather than re-colonisation by the whites. By using the image of the ruins, ZANU-PF branded itself an authentic Zimbabwean party as compared (implied) to the puppet party, the MDC-T. It skilfully juxtaposes itself with the opposition and since branding is naming (Downer, 2013), it names (implied) the opposition as the whites (‘them’). The intention here was to achieve maximum possible positive differentiation over the competition. The whole aim of political branding or naming is to achieve positive differentiation over the competition; in this case, the opposition political parties and specifically the MDC-T. ZANU-PF was being challenged not only by the MDC Team led

12 There is always constant reference to ‘our hard won independence and sovereignty’ in ZANU-PF discourse post-2000. 236 by Tsvangirai, but it takes it for granted that the electorate knows that the MDC Team was a front for the whites. It is a discourse that they have been pushing since the MDC’s formation (cf. Willems, 2004; Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Mazango, 2005; Freeman, 2005). ZANU-PF ignores all the other smaller parties, such as the MDC faction led by Welshman Ncube. However, it is the predominance of such cultural and religious symbols as the Great Zimbabwe Ruins in post-independence Zimbabwe official narratives that led critics like Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) to argue that the nation Zimbabwe is imagined as predominantly Shona. However, this reading obscures the historical fact that prior to the eighteenth century, the Shona did not exist and the ruins predate the emergence of the word Shona. It is a historical fact that there were Karangas, Rozvis, Korekore and others and none of these groups were known as Shona.

The ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement implies that the MDC-T is a front for the former colonial masters, the whites, while ZANU-PF is implied to be the patriots. The choice of headline ‘Lest we forget’ is a call to the voters not to forget the exploitation that the Africans suffered at the hands of the white colonialists. This is made more vivid by the use of a colonial era image. According to the MacMillan online dictionary, ‘Lest’ means, ‘in case something unpleasant happens’. In this case, ZANU-PF is urging the voter not to vote the opposition since re-colonisation and white exploitation would be the end result; a result that means all the sacrifices made by the fallen heroes during the liberation struggle would have been in vain. The advert is a reminder of the unpleasantness of colonialism and the brutality of the liberation war. It is a subtle reminder by ZANU-PF of its threat of going back to war if the opposition wins the election; war which would bring back the suffering that those that witnessed it all too well remember. Memory was again packaged and resold to the voters by ZANU-PF. The advert creates the illusion that ZANU-PF is the only party that can safeguard the country’s independence, and usher peace, unity and development.

ZANU-PF’s ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement should be understood in the context of an advertisement by the MDC-T with a similar headline. Whereas ZANU-PF sought to remind people of white exploitation and the liberation struggle, the MDC-T sought to remind people of the violence (physical, psychological, political, economic and social) visited upon Zimbabweans by the ZANU-PF regime post-2000. It was urging people not to make

237 the fatal error of voting for ZANU-PF. The MDC advertisement mined the past for images which it purified into signs attached to new products in new contexts (cf. Harris, 1996). Through carefully selected pictures, MDC-T sought to package horror and fear of hunger, fuel shortages, diseases, death, state sponsored violence, politically motivated violence and economic ruin and sell these to Zimbabweans in a bid to dissuade them from voting for ZANU-PF. Where the MDC-T sought to brand ZANU-PF as a violent, intolerant and ruinous party, ZANU-PF sought to brand MDC-T as a puppet party but it did not mention MDC-T or who ‘them’ was. It is taken as common sense in the same manner the MDC-T did not mention ZANU-PF and/or Robert Mugabe, but takes it for granted that it is common knowledge to Zimbabweans that ZANU-PF and Mugabe have been in power for 33 years at 2013. Where ZANU-PF used ‘ride’ literally and metaphorically the MDC-T used the word metaphorically likening the hardships that have befallen Zimbabweans under ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe’s watch to an unpleasant ride that could only be brought to an end by voting for Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC-T.

In the two advertisements under discussion the two parties engaged in combat with each other and signs used in the two opposing advertisements were meant to eliminate the other from the language game (Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994; Sonderling, 2013 & 2014). Since ZANU-PF could not reject some of the MDC-T’s accusations, it relied on liberation memory implying that the MDC-T was a sell-out party. In this duel, MDC-T was selling democracy, improved service delivery and a better economy (MDC-T = Democracy/better economy = MDC-T) while ZANU-PF was selling patriotism and freedom (ZANU-PF = Patriotism and freedom = ZANU-PF). As presented in Chapter Five, the ZANU-PF advertisement was a rebuttal of the MDC advertisement. However, the foregoing discussion shows that it is not only incumbent political parties that raid the archives for signs and this makes the criticism that ZANU-PF revisited its nationalist archives to retain power flimsy (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Ranger, 2004; Chuma, 2008). Opposition political parties also raid history for signs, either to positively brand their parties or to inflict harm; namely brand damage on the competition. Indeed, inflicting brand damage on the competition is one of the key requirements of political advertising (cf. Waldahl, 2005). From this perspective, it is arguable that the use of negative/attack advertising and using history to sell a political product does not in any

238 way show whether a party is democratic or not. Neither does it show whether a party’s discourse is bankrupt nationalism, grotesque nationalism, patriotic history or not (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2011; Ranger, 2004). These are just key tools in image building and image destruction; both in a democracy and/or a dictatorship (cf. Menon, 2008). In this scenario, brand building is the flip side of brand destruction. In building up one’s side in an election contest, the political marketer will at the same time be destroying the opponent (cf. Downer, 2013; Jain, n.d). It is impossible to do one and not the other. In other words, negative advertising is the flip side of positive self-presentation and vice versa. Similarly, raiding the past or history and nostalgia to sell products is a key tactic even in commercial advertising practice (cf. Harris, 1996).

Apart from the foregoing, in ‘The people’s constitution’ advertisement ZANU-PF negatively portrays the MDC-T’s Tsvangirai as a sell-out and Mugabe as a patriot. They argued that they made sure that the people’s desire to safeguard ‘the values of the liberation struggle’ were realised. These values included; democracy: one man one vote, freedom and land resettlement, among others. And because it had made sure these values were guaranteed, ‘a sell-out cannot be President of Zimbabwe’. In this advertisement, ZANU-PF again presents themselves as the custodian of Zimbabwe’s independence and liberation struggle and as a bulwark against imperialism. The advertisement sought to de-legitimise any challenge to ZANU-PF and Mugabe, the President, by implying that anybody who challenged them was a sell-out. They subtly delegitimised all the opposition political parties and presidential candidates, unlike in the previous elections where they used crude fear appeal and threatened voters with death and/or war if they voted the opposition (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005). In July 2013, acutely aware of SADC’s active involvement in the election and the global gaze on the elections, ZANU-PF not only refrained from crude fear appeal, but they also refrained from directly attacking Tsvangirai as a puppet. Instead they implied that he was a puppet.

The apparent toning down of language can be understood in the context where all parties were campaigning for a peaceful election and were rejecting the use of hate speech. In this electoral setting, crude and threatening language was treated as hate speech and

239 was thus actively discouraged. In this context, the advertisement does not mention the opposition and this creates the impression that even a sell-out from within ZANU-PF cannot be President. ZANU-PF’s acute awareness of the global gaze on the country, as reflected in its advertisements, shows that the party adapts its discourse to the context in which the election will be taking place. It is capable of changing its colours, chameleon- like, to match its surrounding environs. As a sign, it is very complex and slippery to the point of being ungraspable.

In the foregoing advertisement, it is arguable that since ZANU-PF was the one that created the ‘People’s Constitution’ advertisement, the puppets could only be found in the opposition parties and not within it. From this perspective, the sell-out being referred to here is Tsvangirai since in all their advertisements ZANU-PF sought to directly engage with the MDC-T, led by Tsvangirai, whilst ignoring all the other smaller parties. Given the post-2000 scenario where the MDC-T and Tsvangirai presented the biggest threat to Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s hold on power (ZESN, 2002; Muzondidya, 2009) and were delegitimised as British stooges (Mazango, 2005; Freeman, 2005; Kriger, 2005), it is indisputable that Tsvangirai was the sell-out referred to in the advertisement. In this context, the advertisement’s intention could be read in two ways:

 It was meant to discourage voters from voting for Tsvangirai since he was a sell-out who would most likely bring back the whites. In the context of the ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement, voting for Tsvangirai was likely to bring back white exploitation.  It could also be that the advertisement was meant as a subtle reminder to the voters that even if they voted for Tsvangirai, like they did in 2008, he would not be allowed to rule Zimbabwe since he was a sell-out. Perhaps the advertisement was meant as a gentle reminder of the futility of voting for the opposition, as ZANU-PF and its backers in the military would not allow ‘puppets’ to rule.

The advertisement could thus be read in the context of the disputed 2008 elections in which Tsvangirai defeated Mugabe but failed to garner the required 50% plus1 votes. It took six weeks for the regime to release the results which the opposition rejected, insisting

240 that Tsvangirai won. The run-off period was characterised by political violence and threats by military generals, war veterans and ZANU-PF leaders that a sell-out (Tsvangirai) would never be allowed to rule, even if he won elections. In this situation, elections become a mere ritual (cf. Willems, 2012) that does not in way reflect democracy. But in the 2013 election campaign ZANU-PF sought to dispel the idea that elections in Zimbabwe were just embedded ritual meant to legitimise a dictatorship, by instead focusing on how peaceful the elections were.

It is arguable that the advertisement was perhaps intended to harvest the fear of a repeat of 2008 and the fear of war. It could have been mere negative branding designed to create currency for ZANU-PF, given that the memories of colonialism and liberation make the populace suspicious of anybody labelled a sell-out. By implying that the MDC-T and/or opposition to ZANU-PF and Mugabe were selling out, ZANU-PF was de-legitimising all opposition to it and its presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe. It was implying that ZANU- PF should rule forever. The implication is that no right thinking Zimbabwean can ever challenge Mugabe and ZANU-PF since they liberated the country, they are an authentic Zimbabwean party and they have the blessings of the ancestral spirits of the land. From this angle, anybody who challenges the status quo would just be a front for the British.

In the same advertisement, ZANU-PF boasts that it had ensured that the new constitution did not recognise homosexuality. The discourse of homosexuals and sell-outs should be understood in the post-2000 Zimbabwean context in which ZANU-PF labelled the MDC as sell-outs and agents of regime change that are a front for the British attempts to re- colonise Zimbabwe (cf. Muzondidya, 2009; Ranger, 2005). The ZANU-PF regime also alleged that there was a ‘gay gangster’ plot to unseat it, due to President Mugabe’s characterisation of gays and lesbians as being worse than dogs and pigs. From this perspective, ZANU-PF casts homosexuality as unchristian and as alien to Africa, with President Mugabe on several occasions declaring that homosexuals are worse than dogs, pigs and cockroaches which do not engage in such abhorrent acts (cf. ‘Gays’, 2013; ‘MDC Fumes’, 2013). In the ZANU-PF discourse the African is ‘pure’ and is only corrupted by contact with the whites. Implied here is that ZANU-PF and Mugabe are the only political products that can safeguard African purity from being sullied by the Western imperialists

241 and homosexuals. This was evident during the GNU era constitution-making process, in which ZANU-PF accused MDC-T of trying to smuggle gay rights into the draft constitution. During the constitutional outreach programme, ZANU-PF urged its supporters to speak out against homosexuality. Here Tsvangirai and MDC-T were also accused of being a front for gays and lesbians; the ‘gay gangsters’.

As Prime Minister during the GNU, Tsvangirai gave an interview to the BBC in which he said he considered homosexuality a human right. In the course of the 2013 election campaign, the pro-ZANU-PF, The Heritage Trust, produced and placed on the state- controlled Zimbabwe Television (ZTV) an advertisement based on the interview in which it attacked Tsvangirai for backing homosexuality; a practice it argued was against biblical teachings. Since Zimbabwe is a conservative heterosexual society, ZANU-PF used the discourses of gays to delegitimise the MDC-T. It created the impression that as soon as Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC-T get into power they will legalise homosexuality. It used moral evaluation to legitimise itself while de-legitimising the MDC-T. It used fear of homosexuality to urge people to vote for it and its presidential candidate. As Van Leeuwen (2007, p. 97) notes, ‘legitimation [may be] based on moral values… [and may be asserted by phrases such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ but can also be done through] adjectives such as ‘healthy’, ‘normal’, ‘natural’, ‘useful’ and so on. These adjectives are then the tips of a submerged iceberg of moral values’. In Zimbabwe, the submerged icebergs may be the biblical and traditional views that regard homosexuality as abhorrent. Associating MDC- T with gays and lesbians was a blow meant to eliminate MDC-T from the language game. It was aimed at de-legitimising MDC-T while simultaneously legitimising ZANU-PF as the guarantor of African tradition and Christianity which both regard homosexuality as abhorrent and sinful.

The advertisement also creates the illusion that homosexuality was a white man’s problem, as it originated from Europe. This is symptomatic of decolonial assumptions that valorise the South and see the West as the singular original source of all evil (Nakata et al., 2012). In this context, since MDC-T was considered a Western puppet by ZANU-PF, the advertisement implies that if it were not for ZANU-PF, then the MDC-T, as part of the constitution making team would have included gay rights in the new constitution. Here the

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MDC-T is produced (implied) as homosexual (MDC-T = Homosexual = MDC-T) while ZANU-PF is produced (implied) as heterosexual (ZANU-PF = Heterosexual = ZANU-PF). The product MDC-T is produced as homosexual and homosexuality is produced as MDC- T, whilst ZANU-PF is produced as heterosexual and heterosexuality is produced as ZANU-PF. Here ZANU-PF uses the fear of homosexuality to eliminate the MDC from the language game. From a Baudrillardian point of view, homosexuality became a weapon or sign to murder Tsvangirai and the MDC-T in the July 2013 electoral context. The sign, as Baudrillard et al. (1976) and Baudrillard (1983) argue, is murderous; it is a discriminator that violently eliminates other signs from the playing field.

In the same ‘The People’s Constitution’ advertisement, ZANU-PF boasted that 80% of the views contained in the new constitution came from ZANU-PF. Boasting about one’s achievements is one of the ways through which dominance is justified (cf. Mazid, 2008). ZANU-PF also used positive self-presentation (implied: we are a revolutionary and patriotic party as we safeguarded the values of our liberation struggle) and negative presentation of the MDC (implied: homosexuals and sell-outs) (cf. Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk, 1993). ZANU-PF also used analogies (ZANU-PF = Patriots; MDC-T = Sell-outs) to legitimise itself while de-legitimising the MDC-T. From a sign theory perspective, ZANU- PF produced itself as patriots and patriots were produced as ZANU-PF, while simultaneously producing MDC as sell-outs and sell-outs were produced as MDC-T. In the end, the distinction between ‘patriots’ (the sign) and ZANU-PF/Mugabe (the political products) or between ‘sell-outs’ (the sign) and MDC/Tsvangirai (political products) was blurred (cf. Baudrillard et al. 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994). It was eradicated. In the end, truth and falsehood, the real and the imaginary were blurred and this gave birth to myths; for example, the myth that ZANU-PF and all its members are revolutionaries while the MDC-T and all its supporters were sell-outs who did not participate in the liberation struggle (Baudrillard, 1983; Baudrillard et al., 1976). The claim obscures the fact that some officials in ZANU-PF fought on the side of the white minority regime during the liberation struggle. It also obscures the fact that some of the opposition politicians fought on the side of the two revolutionary parties, ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU during the liberation struggle.

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In addition, in the same advertisement, ZANU-PF ridicules the MDC-T’s claim to be a democratic party urging voters to, ‘vote for a party that knows that “democracy” is not just a word but a way of life’. The implied meaning especially by the placement of the word ‘democracy’ in quotes is that the MDC-T is not a democratic party but it only uses the word to fool voters. It is an attempt by ZANU-PF to delegitimise the MDC-T’s democracy discourse by presenting itself as a more democratic party. ZANU-PF deliberately does not mention the name of the ‘party’ but it takes it as common sense which party it was referring to. To achieve the implied connection it appropriated the word ‘democracy’ from the MDC-T’s name; Movement for Democratic Change. Implied here was that no change was required at all, since the MDC-T is not democratic but merely uses the word ‘democracy’ as ‘just a word’; for political expediency. The MDC-T is thus negatively presented as pretenders, while ZANU-PF is presented as the democratic ones.

By claiming that they do not treat democracy as ‘just a word’ but as a ‘way of life’, they were implying that to them democracy is a culture, especially considering that culture is defined as a way of life. In this instance, ZANU-PF is proclaiming that it is a democratic party; it has always been democratic and will remain democratic. This democracy motif was also evident in ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ advertisement as discussed earlier. The democracy motif ties in well with the ZANU-PF’s post-2000 argument that they were the ones that brought democracy to Zimbabwe and thus cannot be lectured on democracy by the MDC-T and the West. It is a discourse that flows directly from ZANU-PF’s liberation struggle discourse, in which they argue that the liberation struggle was all about democracy; a democracy that the West and their kith and kin, the white settlers, had denied the Africans. ZANU-PF turns criticism that it veils its dictatorship through legalism and holding regular elections that are neither free nor fair (cf. Booysen, 2003; Willems, 2004) on its head by accusing the MDC-T of treating democracy as ‘just a word’.

However, the party’s democracy motif is at variance with Moyo’s (2004) and Tekere’s (2006) argument that the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe was characterised by continuity rather than change. It is also at variance with Willems’ (2012) assertion that the vote in Zimbabwe has become embedded ritual rather than an indicator of democracy. Democracy in the country is argued to be a prostitute word that anybody can take home

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(Chikumbirike, 2013), a word that the elite across the world use without necessarily subjecting themselves to democratic practices (Ake, 2000). ZANU-PF rebuts post-2000 criticism that it is a dictatorship by posturing as a party that knows that democracy is ‘a way of life’ and not a ‘just a word’. It is compelling to argue that since culture is defined as a way of life, the use of the phrase ‘a way of life’ creates the illusion that contrary to critics’ claim that, it is a violent and dictatorial party, ZANU-PF’s culture, is in effect democracy. ZANU-PF is merely saying democracy is its culture. It is a rebuttal of critics’ claim that ZANU PF is a violent party that failed to do away with the violent side of the liberation struggle and the repressive Rhodesian system (see Makumbe & Compagnon, 1996; Lindgren, 2003; Masunungure, 2004; Reeler, 2004; Kriger, 2005; Tekere, 2006; Masunungure, 2009a). In the Zimbabwean terrain, democracy is a ‘hot’ sign that is fought over by the ruling ZANU-PF party and opposition political parties. As a result of this contestation over this valorised sign, the real meaning of the word is lost somewhere in the struggle for ownership of the term pitting the ruling ZANU-PF party against opposition parties. It is the ability to project one’s party as a democratic party that gains it favour before the global public.

But it is ironical that ZANU-PF embraces democracy; a term that critics generally agree is Western and thus foreign to Africa given its anti-West rhetoric. It is strange that the sign democracy sits side-by-side with signs of indigeneity (for example, Gushungo and the Great Zimbabwe). Furthermore, it is strange that a supposedly anti-Western political outfit valorises Western concepts of democracy when it is supposedly a bulwark against Western encroachment. It is arguable that democracy is one of the tools used by the West to compromise the sovereignty of third world countries (cf. Ake, 1996 & 2000; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1996; Thussu, 2000; Barrow, 2005; Axtmann, 2007). In this context, it is plausible that the reference to democracy by ZANU-PF was meant to create the impression, for the benefit of the global world, that it is a democratic party. It was a tactic that was meant to guarantee the legitimacy of an envisaged ZANU-PF government in a globalising world, especially considering that one of the key characteristics of globalisation is the global circulation of ideas and terms such as democracy, feminism and freedom of sexual orientation (cf. Thussu, 2000). It is thus arguable that the use of the sign democracy was meant to debunk previous accusations of ZANU-PF as a 245 dictatorial party. However, ironically this democracy, which was supposedly ZANU-PF’s way of life, did not tolerate homosexuality. This is a contradiction, but one that could be understood in the context where the West’s endorsement of the election as democratic was needed and votes were also needed from a conservative society that frowns upon homosexuality. This was a balancing act by ZANU-PF, where on one hand they used the word democracy to try and hoodwink the international community, while at the same time using anti-homosexuality discourse to gain votes at the expense of the supposedly gay- loving opposition, the MDC-T.

Apart from the foregoing, in ‘The People’s Constitution’ advertisement, ZANU-PF also boasts that it had ensured that the people’s views on key fundamentals including ‘the irreversibility of indigenised land and guaranteeing the recognition of the values of the liberation struggle’ were guaranteed in the new constitution. The advertisement was meant to reassure black Zimbabweans resettled on land seized from the white farmers during the post-2000 fast-track land reform programme that tenure of land is guaranteed. In previous elections, ZANU-PF had used the fear of land repossession by the whites to dissuade people from voting for the MDC-T. It argued that the MDC-T would bring back the British and the former white farmers and that only a ZANU-PF regime headed by Robert Mugabe could stop that from happening. This advertisement was thus appealing to nationalistic sentiment – to patriotic feeling in the voters. It equated voting for ZANU- PF to being nationalistic or patriotic while voting for the opposition was equated to voting for the former colonialists. This motif is also evident in the ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement discussed above.

The reference to land, homosexuality and the liberation struggle was deliberate and intended to evoke memories of the liberation struggle and patriotic sentiments. After all, it is argued that one of the major grievances of the Africans during the liberation war was land; the Africans waged the war in order to reclaim their land from the colonialists. In this advertisement, ZANU-PF was thus boasting that it had delivered on its promise to prevent the MDC-T and their alleged Western backers from reversing the land reform programme. It implies that that the opposition parties did not respect the values of the liberation struggle including indigenisation of land. It also implies that were it not for ZANU-PF, the

246 opposition wanted to legalise homosexuality. Boasting about their achievement in successfully reclaiming the land was one way of legitimising ZANU-PF’s and Mugabe’s rule (cf. Mazid, 2008). It was meant to encourage the citizens to vote for a party that supposedly fulfils its promises to the electorate. This is one tactic that ZANU-PF consistently used in its advertisements for July 2013.

The patriotism/nationalism motif is also evidenced through the Zimbabwean flag that appears on the cover page of the three copies of the final draft constitution at the top of the advertisement. The national flag has connotations of nation and nationalism; it brings to the fore the imagined community that is Zimbabwe (cf. Anderson, 1991; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2009) while hiding the contestations that characterise the nation. In the case of post-independence Zimbabwe, the flag is a reminder of colonialism and the liberation struggle. It reminds the nation of the First and Second Chimurenga (war of liberation) and indirectly justifies ZANU-PF’s continued rule over Zimbabwe since it is a liberation movement. The use of the flag implies that ZANU-PF is a patriotic party, a party that liberated the country and played a critical role in founding the Zimbabwe nation. The flag is thus very symbolical and in the July 2013 electoral context it also served to legitimise ZANU-PF and Mugabe, while de-legitimising the opposition. The flag is very similar to ZANU-PF’s flag since its days as a liberation movement. The only difference is that the ZANU-PF flag does not have the white triangle, red star and the Zimbabwe bird. The Zimbabwe flag reminds one of ZANU-PF’s days as a guerrilla movement. It is intended to create the illusion that the passage of time has not altered the party’s ideals and values as it remains committed to what it fought for during the liberation struggle.

The Zimbabwe national flag has the following colours and features:

 Red represents the blood that was shed during the liberation struggle.  Black represents black majority rule which was attained on 18 April 1980.  White represents peace.  Green represents vegetation.  Gold represents the minerals found beneath the soils of the country.  Zimbabwe Bird represents national heritage.

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 Red Star represents the nation’s aspirations.

The use of these colours in the ZANU-PF advertisements shall be discussed further under the section, ‘The use of Colour’. However, it is important to note that the Zimbabwe bird has its origins in the carved soapstone birds that were found at the Great Zimbabwe Ruins in Masvingo. The bird has religious symbolism just like the conical tower. The carved stone bird represents the sacred Chapungu/Hungwe bird (bateleur eagle) which was associated with rain-making. According to Victoria Falls Guide (n.d, paragraphs 8-9), ‘The bateleur or chapungu is a good omen, the symbol of a protective spirit and a messenger of the gods. The Zimbabwe bird is believed to be an ancestral link to the heavens and is sometimes called Shiri ya Mwari, the Bird of God’. In my culture, the bird is mystic and is associated with divine Kingship. Legend has it that it doesn’t drop its feathers; when it does it follows it and tears it to smithereens before it hits the ground. Any person who happens to pick its feather(s) is said to be a very lucky person. It is said to be so secretive and stingy with its feathers, that people who are very stingy are often likened to ‘chapungu’. It is also widely believed that it rarely cries and when it does, it is usually to signal the death of the King. The bird is thus as Victoria Falls Guide (n.d) observes ‘a messenger of the gods’. It is also said that it is rarely seen and during the liberation struggle it was used as part of the danger warning system by both liberation fighters and peasants. The bird’s circling above and cries were taken as a sign that danger is on the way and communities would flee their homes and hide. The bird has religious significance amongst some communities in Zimbabwe. The mere presence of the bird has mythical significance. It brings to the fore myths of origin and divine kingship.

The use of such religious symbolism in ZANU-PF advertisements is meant to create and sustain the illusion that ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s rule is by divine intervention. These images are in line with ZANU-PF election discourse that claimed that Mugabe was anointed to rule Zimbabwe at a tender age by God. In this regard, Mugabe’s divine right to rule is confirmed by both traditional African religion and Christianity. The implication is that if Mugabe and ZANU-PF were ordained by God to rule, then the opposition candidates were not; thus they are agents of the devil. Furthermore, these ancient symbols, especially the Great Zimbabwe which by its mere appearance brings to the fore

248 the Zimbabwe bird, are found in all of the ZANU-PF advertisements. They are aimed at presenting the party as an authentic indigenous Zimbabwean party, as opposed to the opposition. These cultural-religious symbols give rise to the ‘…proliferation of myths of origins and signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity’ (Baudrillard, 1983). For example, the Great Zimbabwe is meant to create and sustain the myth that ZANU-PF and its leader Mugabe trace their origins back to the Great Zimbabwe. The national flag also creates and sustains the myth of the liberation struggle as the alpha and omega of Zimbabwean history. From the foregoing, it is arguable that the proliferation of the signs of the real such as the Great Zimbabwe ‘threatens the difference between “true” and “false”, between “real” and “imaginary’ (Baudrillard, 1983, paragraph 6, line 6). For example, the signs obfuscate the fact that Zimbabwe is a colonial artefact that has no link whatsoever to any pre-colonial reality (cf. Shaw, 1986). They further obscure the fact that there is no link whatsoever between ZANU-PF and the Great Zimbabwe; the link is arbitrary. However, in as much as the ZANU-PF discourse tries to create the illusion that ZANU-PF and its leader are pure and unsullied by the colonial encounter, the use of the flag tells us otherwise. The flag is a colonial invention since the pre-colonial African society probably had no such thing. It is thus arguable that in the process of retaining power, ZANU-PF has mastered the art of raiding society for the most politically profitable signs which they arbitrarily attach to their political products for purposes of hoodwinking voters.

In light of the foregoing, it is also compelling to argue that the signs of the real (Great Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe bird, the national flag) result in nostalgia achieving its full meaning (cf. Baudrillard, 1983). The Great Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe bird, for example, are an invitation to Zimbabweans to look at the past with fond memories; a past when the African was supposedly pure, free and had not yet been sullied by the colonial encounter. Similarly, the national flag is an invitation to voters to remember the liberation struggle, its goals and those that died and ZANU-PF’s role in that struggle. Using nostalgia to sell political products is part of post-2000 ZANU-PF discourse but it is presented here in a more subtle way. In advertising theory, nostalgia or selling the sense of roots is a profitable sign that can be packaged and sold (cf. Packard, 1957). In other

249 words, in advertisements where the party merely presents the Great Zimbabwe in the background or as part of the call to action, the Zimbabwe bird is present in its absence and in cases where the Zimbabwe bird only appears, the Great Zimbabwe ruins are present in their absence. It is not only the spoken that matters but the unspoken is equally important, if not more important than the spoken (cf. Deacon et al., 1997 & 2007). These symbols, both the present and the absent but present, speak indigeneity and they legitimise ZANU-PF’s rule.

ZANU-PF authenticates itself an indigenous political party through cultural-religious symbolism, where it simultaneously creates a link between itself and valorised foregone legendary indigenous societies, the land and the ancestors. By so doing, the party is legitimising its rule. In this scenario, where the party utilises cultural and religiously valorised symbols, the answer to Van Leeuwen’s (2007) why question is because ZANU- PF is an authentic indigenous party that draws its origins from Mwari (God), the builders of the Great Zimbabwe and the keepers of the sacred Hungwe bird – the Zimbabwe bird. From a political advertising perspective, ZANU-PF strategically branded itself as an authentic indigenous party while implying that the opposition traces its origins from the colonial and the West. In this ZANU-PF discourse, the West is the singular original source of post-colonial Zimbabwe’s woes. It is however, significant to note that there is nothing tangible that links ZANU-PF to the Great Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Bird; the relationship is arbitrary. It just managed to get the hottest sign in society, a sign that is a discriminator and/or murderous such that the moment the party appropriated it, the sign eliminated the opposition as imperialist stooges (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994; Sonderling, 2013 & 2014). In the post-colony where memories of colonialism and its ills may still be fresh, associating a political opponent with the West is designed to eliminate them from the language game.

The next section discusses ZANU-PF’s discourses of development and economic indigenisation.

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7.7 ZANU-PF, AN ECONOMIC INDIGENISATION AND DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED PARTY

The discourse of development reverberates throughout all the ZANU-PF advertisements. This discourse as mentioned in Chapter Two traces its origins to independence when the new regime adopted developmental journalism (Rusike, 1990). It features prominently in ZANU-PF’s post-independence rhetoric such that the word ‘development’ features on the ZANU-PF logo as part of its motto ‘Unity, Peace, Development’. Although the word may appear innocent, scholars are not agreed as to what development really is. This fact notwithstanding, ZANU-PF creates the impression that the voters know what the term development means. It is taken as a given. ZANU-PF presents itself as a development- oriented party; a party that is committed to the empowerment of the black Zimbabwean. However, in the July 2013 elections the discourse should be understood in the context of the post-2000 fast-track land reform programme and the economic indigenisation programme. ZANU-PF’s campaign theme was ‘Indigenise, empower, develop and create employment’. This theme features in the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ advertisement among others.

The use of the word ‘indigenise’ was intended to appeal to the black masses; to appeal to race. In post-2000 Zimbabwe, the word is associated with the appropriation of land and companies from whites – both local and foreign – and giving it to the landless peasants. Thus, the discourse of indigenisation speaks only to black Zimbabweans while excluding Zimbabweans of other races. It is a discourse that is also associated with the transfer of 51% of shares from foreign hands into local ownership in the mining and other sectors of the economy. Given that the phrase reverberates throughout the advertisements, the phrase has nationalistic connotations. It implies the liberation struggle whose objectives included repossessing land from the whites. It is a phrase that is intricately linked to the discourse of empowerment and empowerment is, just like development, equally linked to race. In the post-colony (cf. Mamdani, 1996), transfer of the economy and land into native hands is part of the discourse and/or sign system and it is indeed part of post-colonial nation building. For example, part of post-colonial Zimbabwe’s goal was to develop the country and its previously marginalised black majority as evidenced by, for example, the

251 emphasis on, for example, developmental journalism (cf. Rusike, 1990) and the massive investments in education and health in the early years of independence. This was also evident in the socialism discourse of the early years of independence.

The foregoing focus on the indigene – the appeal to race in the ZANU-PF advertisements – is what critics such as Mbembe (2001) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) call nativism. However, the thesis argues that probably this discourse was influenced by the realisation that the blacks constitute the majority of the voters, whilst people of other races constituted an insignificant number of voters. In an electoral context, numbers matter the most and political parties’ communications are geared towards gaining the biggest chunk of the votes. From this standpoint, it makes political marketing sense to tailor-make one’s messages to appeal to the largest number of voters; in this case the largest number of voters was the majority black people. The Zimbabwe population census National Report (2012, p. 12) states that, ‘persons of African ethnic origin made up almost the entire population, while those of non-African ethnic origin accounted for a negligible proportion’. In the context of an election campaign, the discourse of race and indigeneity is mere politicking designed to positively brand ZANU-PF at the expense of the opposition. The crux of political advertising strategy is to gain maximum possible positive differentiation over the competition. The specified goal of political advertising in an electoral context is to win votes at the expense of the competition. The messages crafted in this context are designed to achieve just that; they are not an end in themselves but are a means to an end. The focus will be on the three Cs of strategy; that is, customer (voter), competition (opposition) and corporation (the self/political party) (Jain, n.d; Porter, 1996). The party should perform activities differently than the competition with the intention to win more votes. From this perspective, the discourse of indigeneity and race would be intended to positively brand the party as indigenous with the opposition implied to be a non- indigenous or an alien party.

The discourse of indigeneity was meant to create the illusion that blacks would be given preferential treatment in the development project as a way of redressing colonial imbalances. But post-2000, one of the strategies for achieving development was presented as indigenisation of the economy. Indigenisation, in post-2000 Zimbabwe,

252 became part and parcel of the post-colony’s developmental goal. It is a discourse that implies more than just political independence and it treats blacks as victims of white colonialism. In this discourse, the opposition is cast as agents of imperialists opposed to black empowerment. Implied also is the illusion that ZANU-PF is an anti-imperialist party dedicated to the fulfilment of the goals of the liberation struggle. These goals included resettlement of the landless black majority on white-owned farms.

The illusion of ZANU-PF as a development-oriented party is evident in the phrase, ‘Taking back the economy’ found in the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ advertisement. The statement is silent on from whom the economy will be taken back. The silence implies that it is common knowledge that it is the whites; the ‘them’ referred to in the ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement. The word ‘back’ implies that the economy had been forcefully taken and now was the time to take it back and ZANU-PF was the party that was going to do it. The phrase ‘back’ implies re-possession. The advertisement deliberately does not mention the whites but the phrase ‘taking back the economy’ brings the whites to the fore. It also brings to the fore ZANU-PF’s post-2000 anti-imperialism discourse and discourse of economic empowerment and indigenisation. It ties in with its discourses of ‘indigenised land’ in ‘The People’s Constitution’ advertisement and ‘them’ in the ‘Lest we forget’ advertisement. The intention here is to present ZANU-PF as the vanguard party: a party dedicated to defending the gains and values of the liberation struggle and to empowering the populace. The indigeneity motif is also evident in the phrases ‘indigenise’, ‘taking back the economy’ and ‘them’. To legitimise its dominance, ZANU-PF deliberately creates the illusion of ‘us’ and ‘them’ with ‘us’ (cf. Van Leeuwen, 2007; Mazid, 2008) being the indigenous people with links to the land and the Great Zimbabwe whilst the whites and their alleged puppets – the opposition MDC-T – are ‘them’.

Rather than castigating ZANU-PF discourse as grotesque nationalism, nativism, reverse racism or exclusionary (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009 & 2011), the use of the word ‘indigenise’ in an electoral context makes sense from a political marketing perspective. In politics, where people make their voting/buying decision in one day, what matters is the number of votes that a political party or a political candidate gets. It therefore makes political marketing sense in the Zimbabwean context to specifically target the blacks,

253 since they constitute the biggest chunk of the voting public. It also makes sense especially considering blacks and not whites were the hardest hit by the post-2000 economic crisis, including unemployment. In effect, the number of voting whites is insignificant, thus targeting only blacks by making reference to the indigenous could be read as mere politicking intended to gain ZANU-PF votes – especially considering that the party has previously been observed to use populist rhetoric during elections which they usually would not follow up on (cf. Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Muzondidya, 2009).

In the context of the July 2013 elections, the discourse of indigeneity was merely politicking meant to win ZANU-PF candidates’ votes at the expense of the opposition, as events after the election indeed show. For example, after the elections they toned down on the indigenisation discourse, arguing that they would not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach. This was a contradiction of what they had said during the campaign period at rallies and through posters and advertisements placed in the media. It is a contradiction of the ‘How economic indigenisation would create employment’ advertisement. In this light, it is arguable that ZANU-PF electoral discourse is a means to an end – electoral hegemony – as the party has over the years shown that it does not always stick to what it had promised during electoral contexts. As Sithole and Makumbe (1997) show, the party is well-known for using populist rhetoric to win votes. As the Shona saying goes; “rume risinganyepi hariroori” (he who does not lie to a woman when proposing should not expect to marry). From this perspective, it is arguable that ZANU-PF discourse is merely politicking meant to positively brand the party and its candidates at the expense of the opposition.

The discourse of ‘taking back the economy’ was a rebuttal of MDC-T’s ‘it’s time to move forward instead of taking the economy backward’. In its advertisement that poured scorn on the ZANU-PF’s manifesto, the MDC-T launched a thinly veiled attack on ZANU-PF’s economic indigenisation policies. The MDC-T advertisement implied that ZANU-PF’s land reform, indigenisation and economic empowerment policies were retrogressive. The choice of words, ‘it’s time to move the economy forward instead of taking the economy backward’ creates the illusion that ZANU-PF’s economic policies are ruinous. The advertisement was laying the blame for the post-2000 economic crisis on ZANU-PF. In

254 this context, the ZANU-PF’s ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ advertisement was a counter-attack and it brings to the fore the MDC-T and implies that if the opposition party wins the elections, then the economy may never be taken back from the whites. It is arguable that by ‘economy’ ZANU-PF meant both the land and the manufacturing sector. This is plausible given that in the early 2000s elections ZANU-PF’s election slogan was ‘land is the economy the economy is the land’ (Mazango, 2005). But considering that by 2013 it had already repossessed most of the land from the white commercial farmers, it is possible that in July 2013 ‘economy’ referred to the manufacturing and mining sectors. These were earmarked for indigenisation.

However, the idea of ‘taking back the economy’ again creates the myth of a direct link between post-independence Zimbabwe and the pre-colonial societies. It obscures the fact that Zimbabwe has no direct link whatsoever to any pre-colonial realty (cf. Shaw, 1986). If that is the case, then the post-colonial economy did not exist prior to colonisation; it was a creation of the colonial establishment in the same manner as post-colonial media. In this context, the idea of ‘taking back the economy’ creates the illusion that these industries had belonged to the indigenous blacks before they were forcibly seized by whites. It is false and mythical to assume that the industry at some point in pre-colonial Zimbabwe belonged to the blacks. These are, as Baudrillard (1983) would argue, signs of the real that blur the difference between ‘true’ and ‘false’, between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’. But then a man who does not lie should not expect to marry. The mouth is a tool to deceive with. What is true, it is arguable, is that some of these countries unduly benefitted from the exploitation of blacks.

The myth of ZANU-PF as the only political party that can redress Zimbabwe’s colonial economic imbalances is perpetuated through the party’s July 2013 campaign theme, ‘indigenise, employ, develop and create employment’. The advertisements, without mentioning it, de-legitimise the opposition as incapable of delivering the black man from white dominance. Without explicitly stating it, the advertisements imply a link between the MDC and the whites; a link that is implied in the ‘Lest we forget’; and ‘The people’s constitution’ advertisements among others. Similarly, the MDC-T implicitly blames ZANU- PF for the economic ruin that Zimbabwe finds itself in without necessarily mentioning the

255 party’s name. This subtle blaming of ZANU-PF for Zimbabwe’s post-2000 misfortunes is evident in the MDC-T’s ‘Lest we forget’ and ‘33 years of desperate leadership’ advertisements. The advertisements were a not-so-subtle attack on ZANU-PF’s land reform and economic indigenisation programmes; programmes that the advertisements imply have taken the economy backwards. In this context, the ZANU-PF advertisement implies that voting for MDC-T will see the whites retain control of the economy since they are the MDC-T’s masters. Given the foregoing, it can be concluded that during the July 2013 elections courtesy of the international gaze on Zimbabwe and agreements made under the GNU, the major political parties refrained from crude attack advertising. They did use attack advertising but it was veiled as they largely restricted themselves to making innuendos. This not-so-explicit attack on each other by the two major contestants in the elections is a confirmation of Waldahl’s (2005) observation that in an electoral contest building up one’s reputation is as important as destroying an opponent’s.

Apart from the above, the reference to employment creation should be understood in the post-2000 context in which there were massive industry closures and job losses. In the context of the July 2013 election, critics argued that unemployment in the country stood at over 90%. In this context, where it was being accused of ruining the economy – for example, ‘MDC’s 33 Years of desperate leadership’ and ‘Lest we forget’ advertisements – ZANU-PF sought to make employment creation one of its key electoral goods. This was an attempt to appeal to the retrenched workers and to those able-bodied people who have never been employed in all their lives. ZANU-PF sought to absolve itself of blame regarding the economic ruin and its attendant massive unemployment in the country by instead offering to create employment. To lend credence to its offer to create employment and to empower the masses, ZANU-PF in another advertisement provided a flow chart of how the indigenisation process would result in development, empowerment and employment creation. It gave specific figures of the money and jobs to be generated by the process. In this advertisement ZANU-PF sought to appeal to a wide range of society; in fact, it sought to appeal to every Zimbabwean, as it mentioned all sectors of the economy. It is an advertisement motivated by the realisation that the economy was in a shambles and it was a strategic attempt by ZANU-PF to hoodwink the voters into believing that it could fix the problems bedevilling the country through indigenisation. The

256 advertisement can be read in a context where ZANU-PF has always argued that it does not need the Western donor aid to develop the country. The advertisement sought to conceal ZANU-PF’s culpability in the economic ruin of the country. Concealment is one of the techniques through which dominance is reproduced (cf. Mazid, 2008; Van Dijk et al., 2007). These were lies by ZANU-PF, as they lacked the capacity and willpower to solve the myriad of problems bedevilling the country. The post-election period especially the massive dismissals of workers around July-August 2015, following a Supreme Court ruling that gave employers the right to terminate an employee’s contract on notice, shows that the promise to create massive employment was mere politicking.

The pledge to set aside $300 million dollars for SMEs for women and youths was an attempt by ZANU-PF to create the illusion that it would fulfil its promise to make Zimbabweans employers rather than employees through indigenisation and economic empowerment. In the context of the economic indigenisation drive, the regime often chided the policy’s critics for having an inferiority complex and always wanting to be the white man’s employees. However, recognising that it could not claim to want to make everyone an employer, it also promised to create 2.265 million jobs from the economic indigenisation drive. In light of the reality on the ground, it can be argued that this was mere politicking by ZANU-PF as companies continued to close and to fire workers on a daily basis. It could be that for ZANU-PF, in the process of trying to win electoral hegemony, lies and exaggerations are a justifiable means to an end and not necessarily a symptom of dictatorship.

The discourse of indigenisation, empowerment and development was extended to include the marginalised groups in the July 2013 election. In ‘The People’s constitution’ and the ‘How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment’ advertisements, ZANU-PF promises to take steps to empower women, youths and other marginalised groups. This shall be discussed further under ‘Segmentation and novel issues in the ZANU-PF Campaign advertisements’. The post-colony, as Mamdani (1996) has argued, is characterised by calls for the transfer into native hands of those benefits of colonialism that are controlled by the former colonial masters. The post-colony is characterised by discourses of indigenisation; a discourse that forms part of what

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Mbembe (2001) calls the post-colonial sign system or simulacra created and circulated by the political elite to sustain their dominance. In Zimbabwe, it is arguable that this discourse did not remain mere rhetoric as the ZANU-PF regime – some say out of political expediency – resettled thousands of landless peasants. Whether the programme was orderly or chaotic, legal or illegal is beside the point; the fact remains that indeed some people were resettled. The evidence is also there that the MDC-T is Western funded and that shows that parts of the ZANU-PF nationalistic discourse are based on facts even though the party then goes on to present these facts in a way that gives it an advantage over the opposition. From a decolonial perspective, ZANU-PF discourse is not mere propaganda even though it suffers from the assumption that the disappearance of the colonial marks the end of the post-colony’s woes. As argued by critics, the colonial is still present in the colony in its absence since its defeat does not mean its total disappearance for both the colonial and the colony were dirtied by the colonial encounter (Nakata et al.; Zeleza, 2006). The constant reference to the colonial in the ZANU-PF discourse and the use of liberation war symbols, such as the picture of a white man ‘riding’ on the back of a black man and the pictures of the national flag, are evidence of the colonial sign system’s endurance in the post-colony. However, these symbols sit side by side with indigenous symbols (for example, the Great Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe bird) and the Western symbols (such as democracy and football) in the post-colonial sign system. It is also arguable that in ZANU-PF simulacrum primordial signs sit side by side with modern and post-modern signs. These signs are contradictory. Put together, all these signs form part of a constellation of signs from which the post-colonial sign system borrows for purposes of reproduction of dominance.

The next section analyses the use of colour in ZANU-PF advertisements for July 2013. It discusses both the denotative and connotative meanings of these signs in the context of the July 2013 elections. The analysis below relies on semiotic analysis and the theory proposed in Chapter Three for purposes of making sense of these colours and how they were deployed by ZANU-PF during the elections.

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7.8 USE OF NATIONAL FLAG COLOURS: REBIRTH AND REVERBERATIONS OF PATRIOTISM AND INDIGENEITY (AGAIN!)

This section discusses the use of colours and their meanings in ZANU-PF advertisements. ZANU-PF utilised national flag colours in its advertisements, and the colour green was the dominant colour in their advertisements. In the context of the national flag, this colour denotes the country’s green vegetation. In the post-2000 context, the use of the green colour in ZANU-PF advertisements could be linked to the agrarian reform. It is a colour that evokes images of the land resettlement programme which in turn conjures up ZANU-PF’s post-2000 anti-imperialism, indigenisation and empowerment discourses. Green also symbolises life and regeneration and it could be that in the context of the July 2013 election, ZANU-PF’s use of green was a deliberate ploy to project the rebirth of the party and its presidential candidate. Following the humiliating events of March 2008 in which by its open admission ZANU-PF almost lost the Presidency to MDC-T’s Morgan Tsvangirai and found itself marginally outnumbered by the opposition parties in Parliament, green symbolised rebirth for ZANU-PF. It maybe also have symbolised that ZANU-PF would breathe life into the ailing economy. Perhaps it was meant to create the illusion that ZANU-PF would breathe life into Zimbabwe once again. Green is also associated with abundance and in the context of the July 2013 elections the colour was in tandem with ZANU-PF’s campaign theme ‘indigenise, empower, develop and create employment’. The theme was a promise to Zimbabweans to deliver: for example, plenty of jobs (2.265 million), ownership of the economy, infrastructural development, cancellation of electricity bills, and compensation for loss of savings.

In the context of the GNU era opposition ‘Mugabe is too old’ discourse, the use of the colour green could also be read as intending to create the illusion that both the party and its presidential candidate have been rejuvenated. Perhaps it was a picture trigger (cf. Packard, 1957) that was meant to rebut the opposition discourse that ZANU-PF was clueless with regard to the challenges facing the country. The colour green had the effect of creating an illusion of vitality; an illusion that both the party and its presidential candidate – the then 89-year-old Robert Mugabe – were energetic. It is an illusion that

259 starkly contrasted with the picture that the opposition painted in its advertisement pouring scorn on ZANU-PF’s manifesto, and the ‘Lest we forget’ and the ‘33 years of desperate leadership’ advertisements. It also starkly contrasted with opposition claims that Mugabe was too old and tired to rule. The colour green was in tandem with the images of a younger-looking Mugabe that ZANU-PF used and the focus on his mental alertness, wisdom and deftness in dealing with matters of the state. The re-birth implied by the colour green is also in tandem with ZANU-PF’s promise to create 2.265 million jobs, to resuscitate health delivery service, to improve the education sector and to embark on massive infrastructural development, courtesy of the economic indigenisation drive.

Apart from the colour green, ZANU-PF also used the colours red, white, black and gold. As pointed out in Chapter Five, these are the colours of the national flag. In the context of the July 2013 election, ZANU-PF used the colours red and white in a dual and contradictory manner. In the first instance, the colour red and white were used as part of a football that was supposed to be scored or kicked into the MDC-T goal. Red and white are the MDC-T’s brand colours; what are known as corporate colours in mainstream marketing. In this case, the colours were meant to represent the MDC-T – the team that was supposed to be defeated by ZANU-PF in the political game. The use of football discourse and imagery shall be explored further in the next section.

In the second instance, the use of the colour red as part of the national flag, appearing in some ZANU-PF advertisements and as part of the margins of some advertisements as pointed out in Chapter Five, was meant to draw a direct link between the party and the nation. These colours, minus the star and the triangle, constitute the ZANU-PF flag. In this context, red denotes the blood that was shed during the liberation struggle. The use of the colour red in ZANU-PF advertisements during the July 2013 elections was meant to also remind people of the party’s role in liberating the country from colonial rule. It was also meant to reinforce the party’s anti-imperialism discourse and its claims to being a revolutionary party; a party that ensured the guaranteeing of the values of the liberation struggle in the new constitution. By using red in this context, ZANU-PF wanted to contrast itself from the MDC-T, a party it implied was a front for the whites.

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It is significant that these colours appear in the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone’ and ‘The People’s constitution’ advertisements. Firstly, a manifesto represents a political party’s policy document if it wins governmental power. It contains all the party’s promises to the electorate; namely, what the party offers by way of governance in exchange for votes. The political goods that it is offering to the electorate are contained in this document and the use of flag colours in the ‘Our manifesto has excited everyone!’ advertisement was perhaps meant to create the illusion that the governance that ZANU-PF was offering was patriotic and one that flows from the ideals of the liberation struggle. Secondly, a constitution is a country’s supreme law, the law to which all other laws in the state should conform to. Given its centrality in the political life of a country, ZANU-PF’s claim of ownership of over 80% of the views in the constitution was intended to create the illusion that the constitution was their baby. In a context where the opposition parties were celebrating their ability to force ZANU-PF to agree to a new ‘democratic’ constitution, ‘The People’s Constitution’ advertisement was meant to weaken their celebrations of victory over ZANU-PF. It was intended to project a picture of ZANU-PF as invincible. This is in tandem with the connotations of virility, discussed earlier, that are suggested by the Great Zimbabwe’s conical tower. These symbols create the impression that ZANU-PF is a virile and/or invincible party; a party that will deliver economic empowerment to Zimbabweans and that can never be defeated either by the opposition or ‘Western imperialists’.

The use of these symbolical colours was meant to reinforce the party’s post-2000 anti- imperialism, indigenisation and economic empowerment discourse. Furthermore, the use of this revolutionary and nationalistic imagery was meant to create the illusion that ZANU- PF has remained dedicated to the ideals it fought for during the liberation struggle. The colours declared that ZANU-PF was a patriotic party and this is in tandem with the indigeneity-authenticity motif discussed earlier. It also reinforces the myth of the party as revolutionary and as dedicated to improving the lives of indigenous Zimbabweans, even though the rampant poverty and alleged official corruption tell us otherwise. The flag and other cultural-religious symbols were signs of the real ‘meant to re-win consent’ for ZANU- PF (cf. Baudrillard, 1983). Consent is not constant and has to be constantly won and re- won, as people’s material conditions remind them of their disadvantaged position (Fiske, 1992). For example, the dire state of the economy, the high levels of unemployment and

261 the dilapidated infrastructure (such as education, health and roads) reminded people of the economic ruin that ZANU-PF has presided over in post-independence Zimbabwe.

Fully aware of this and without accepting blame, ZANU-PF acknowledged all these challenges in the ‘Council bills cancelled’, ‘We will compensate you’ and ‘How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment’ advertisements. In some advertisements, as discussed earlier, it apportioned blame on the MDC-T, while in others it promised to rectify the problems through indigenisation and economic empowerment. In other advertisements, it promised to use its monopoly over state power to rectify the problems, if elected. As an example, it promised to cancel electricity bills and compensate those who lost their savings. These are things that the party implies it could provide but could not during the GNU allegedly because the ministries responsible were headed by the members of MDC. The flag, the Great Zimbabwe, discourses of indigenisation, employment creation and empowerment were meant to obfuscate the suffering that people had endured under successive ZANU-PF and Mugabe regimes post- independence.

The colour white on the Zimbabwe flag represents peace, the peace that followed the years of conflict. In the context of the July 2013 election, the colour white could be argued to have taken a new meaning – peace amongst Zimbabwean political parties. Given the violent 2008 presidential run-off election, the use of white in ZANU-PF discourse could be understood in the context of the campaign for a peaceful election by the parties contesting the 2013 election. It was meant to create and sustain the illusion of a peaceful election, which in turn implied that the election was free and fair. It can be argued that ZANU-PF’s manipulation of signs in the July 2013 election was influenced by the context in which the election was being contested. It is arguable that it tailor-makes its election advertisements to specifically reflect the context in which the election will be conducted. It does draw on the past, the present and the future for signs, but in such ways that make them meaningful in the here and now whilst justifying ZANU-PF’s continued hold on power. This observation both confirms and contradicts the claim that post-2000, ZANU- PF concentrates on the past/history in order to retain power (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Chuma, 2008). In as much as it raids the past for signs, ZANU-PF also looks at the

262 present and the future in order to retain power, as shown by its July 2013 election advertisements. In any case, selling nostalgia, the past and/or history is standard practice in both political and commercial advertising (cf. Harris, 1996; Packard, 1957).

The liberation war motif discussed above, is evident again in ZANU-PF’s use of black on the Zimbabwe flag, which symbolises ‘black majority rule’. This black majority rule was attained on independence-day on 18 April 1980 following a protracted liberation war. ZANU-PF ascended to power courtesy of its electoral victory in which it won 57 of the 80 contested parliamentary seats in Zimbabwe’s first democratic elections in 1980. Given this background, the use of the colour black again evokes memories of white colonialism, the liberation struggle, ZANU-PF’s role in that struggle and the first ‘one-man, one-vote’ 1980 election that ushered ZANU-PF into power in Zimbabwe. In effect ZANU PF likened the significance of the July 2013 election to the 1980 independence election. In this context black is a colour that talks directly to the black Zimbabwean majority and to the ZANU-PF discourse of indigenisation; the blacks being the indigenous peoples of Zimbabwe. Thus the colour black has connotations of political and economic independence, while also reminding the populace of the ills of colonialism and the role played by ZANU-PF in ending white minority rule. In the absence of the colonial history and the history of how ZANU-PF came to power in Zimbabwe, the colour black is meaningless. In other words, the phrase ‘black majority rule’ is meaningless in the absence of the phrase ‘white minority rule’ (cf. Deacon et al., 2007). The colour black on the flag which represents black majority rule implies ‘white minority rule’ as the opposite. It is a colour that legitimises Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s continued dominance.

Apart from the foregoing, the colour black also has religious connotations. In Shona ancestral worship, the black cloth (known in Shona as ‘jira reretso’) is the attire for spirit mediums. They wear the black cloth during the process of ‘kupira vadzimu’ (worshipping the ancestors) and some spirit mediums are always clad in the black cloths. I witnessed this first-hand on 3 October 2015 at Chief Chisunga’s Court at Angwa in the Mbire District, Mashonaland Central, Zimbabwe, where I had gone with colleagues and students. The ‘Svikiro’ (Spirit Medium) we interacted with on this trip was clad in a black cloth. It is therefore arguable that, since the Zimbabwean flag is similar to the war time ZANU-PF

263 flag, the colour black not only symbolises black majority rule but it also symbolises African Traditional Religion (ATR), a religion in which Africans worship ‘Mwari’ (God) through ancestral spirits. This is plausible considering that during and after the liberation war ZANU-PF closely worked (and still does) with spirit mediums. It is said that during the liberation war the late Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)13 combatants entered Zimbabwe and took to Mozambique the spirit medium of Mbuya Nehanda. The second chimurenga (war of liberation) has always been, in ZANU-PF discourse, the fulfilment of a prophecy that ‘my bones shall rise’ that Nehanda allegedly made as she was about to be hanged by the white colonists. The colour black is thus associated with the mystical and ZANU-PF has always been mystical. This tendency by the party to be mystical has its origins in the liberation war as the role played by the late spirit medium and traditional healer, Chief Rekayi Tangwena shows. He assisted Robert Mugabe and the Late Edgar Tekere to cross into Mozambique in 1975 (see Tekere, 2006) and he himself is famous for resisting Rhodesian attempts to evict him and his people from their ancestral Nyafaru in Nyanga. The spirit mediums were thus part and parcel of the execution of ZANU-PF’s liberation war strategies. This mysticism strangely sat side by side with the party’s scientific socialism implied by the five pointed red star on the national flag and even now it still strangely sits side by side with discourses of democracy.

The red star features on the flags of Russia and China and it is said the five points of the star represent the intelligentsia, the youth, the military, the peasantry and industrial workers. These groups were supposed to work for and defend socialism (Jackstone, 2005). The ZANU-PF discourse for the July 2013 election largely spoke to the youth, the peasants and the industrial workers as shall be further discussed under Section 7.9 of this chapter. In Zimbabwe post-1990, ZANU-PF’s mysticism also strangely sat side by side with the IMF/World Bank prescribed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). It sits side by side with capitalism and post-2000 the most glaring examples of this mysticism was when the regime believed Rotina Mavhunga’s lies that the ancestors had brought pure diesel out of a rock at Chinhoyi and the President and senior officials’ frequenting of Apostolic sects. Indeed, the mysticism is capped by the claim that Mugabe

13 ZANLA was ZANU-PF’s military wing during the war. 264 rules by divine right. The colour black thus has all the foregoing religious connotations. Zimbabwe is implied to be the land of its ancestral spirits; spirits that Mugabe has a direct link to, courtesy of his Gushungo lineage which has its roots at Great Zimbabwe; it is this mysticism that the MDC-T attacks in the ‘33 years of desperate leadership’ advertisement, described in Chapter Five.

It is therefore arguable that the colour black is the differential sign that invests ZANU-PF and Mugabe with their meanings and value. It is the colour black and other differential signs such as Mugabe that set them apart from the opposition (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 &1994; Downer, 2013; Goldman, n.d; Jain, n.d). From a political advertising perspective, it is these differential signs that positively brand ZANU-PF a revolutionary party while negatively branding the MDC-T a puppet party. The colour black’s intention is to murder or to discriminate against the opposition. But from a semiological perspective, signs gain their meanings in opposition to others. For example, the word righteousness would be meaningless in the absence of its opposite sinfulness (cf. Deacon et al., 2007). The mere presence of black in the ZANU-PF advertisements as part of a combination of colours including green, red, white, and gold implies black majority rule which is in itself an allusion to ancestral worship, the liberation struggle, white minority rule/colonialism’s folly and ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s role in ending colonialism. The colours black, white, gold, red and green cease to be just mere colours but they become symbols of ZANU-PF’s revolutionary credentials and thus a justification for ZANU-PF’s continued stay in power. It is these liberation symbols/colours and statements accompanying ZANU-PF and Mugabe that justify the political products Mugabe and ZANU-PF (cf. Irvine, 1989). It is these signs that give them value as authentic Zimbabweans, while also delegitimising any challengers as puppets of the former colonialists.

The signs of the real – in this case the flag and/or the flag colours – successfully sustain ZANU-PF’s myth of revolution. By using these liberation symbols (red, white, green, black, gold, the flag and the Great Zimbabwe Ruins), ZANU-PF successfully brands itself and its presidential candidate as revolutionaries and authentic Zimbabweans; true ‘sons and daughters of the soil’. These symbols are designed to create an unbreakable and

265 unambiguous link between ZANU-PF and the country. They are designed to show that ZANU-PF is an indigenous party committed to the indigenisation of every aspect of the country. Closely related to indigeneity are the nationalistic and patriotic feelings that the flag and flag colours evoke. The flag and flag colours also imply that ZANU-PF is a patriotic party. The flag colours, as Baudrillard et al. (1976) and Baudrillard (1983) argue, discriminate against the opposition political parties. They imply that since the parties did not fight for the liberation of the country (at least in ZANU-PF discourse), they do not have the legitimate right to rule the country. The colours simultaneously play both a legitimation and de-legitimation role. In advertising creative process, whether political or commercial, using salient societal symbols is standard procedure (Harris, 1996). The colours, pictures and words used by ZANU PF confirms the observation that advertising operates through the ‘salience framework’ in which it “…works by standing out by being radically different from all other advertisements in the product class…” (Strydom, Jooste & Cant, 2000, p. 357; see Sandicki n.d).

The indigeneity motif discussed earlier is further reinforced in the use of the colour gold in the ZANU-PF advertisements. In the context of the Zimbabwe flag, gold represents the country’s mineral and/or natural resources. However, in the post-2000 Zimbabwean context the colour gold brings to the fore images of the GNU- era economic indigenisation drive in which the mining sector was primarily targeted for indigenisation. The colour gold evokes in the mind of the voter the 51% local shareholding policy and the various Community Share Ownership schemes that were established by various mining companies as part of their indigenisation compliance drive. The policy was crafted and implemented by the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment. Under the policy, foreign-owned companies were supposed to relinquish 51% shareholding into indigenous hands. The use of this colour is thus in line with the ZANU- PF discourse of indigenisation and economic empowerment that reverberates throughout most of its advertisements for July 2013. It was intended to create the illusion that a ZANU-PF government would transfer ownership of the country’s resources from the foreign-owned companies into the hands of the indigenous black majority. It was perhaps intended to create the illusion of economic emancipation; a discourse that ZANU-PF has

266 been pushing vigorously post-2000 in the face of stiff opposition from the Tsvangirai and the MDC.

The section below explores the use of football discourse during the July 2013 election campaign in Zimbabwe by both the MDC-T and ZANU-PF.

7.9 ‘BHORA MUGEDHI-IBHOLA EGEDINI’ (SCORE THE BALL)

The football discourse that dominated Zimbabwean election campaigning during the 2013 elections (Ncube, 2014) was radically different from all the other parties’ campaigns. As in commercial advertising where football is used to generate profit, during the 2013 campaign period football discourse was appropriated in the hunt for votes by the major contestants in the election: MDC-T and ZANU-PF. The football discourse ZANU-PF appropriated in the July 2013 elections, it is arguable, was used to perpetuate the discourse of Mugabe as energetic and youthful. The party’s sponsor identification notice was #Team ZANU-PF and Mugabe was viewed as team captain who was supposed to score the ball: ‘bhora mugedhi-ibhola egedini’ (Ncube, 2014). The ZANU-PF’s ‘Bhora Mugedhi’ discourse emphasised Mugabe as the team captain and chief striker and this implies that he was still as fit as a fiddle14. Football is a game for the youth and it requires a lot of energy. The fact that Mugabe was the ‘star’ of Team ZANU-PF (cf. Ncube, 2014) served to undercut the discourse that Mugabe was too old, frail and ill. In soccer, the team captain is usually a key player in the team and he/she has the responsibility of commanding the dressing room and has the respect of the team. Furthermore, a team’s chief striker is expected to drag the team to victory by scoring crucial goals even against the odds. Thus portraying Mugabe as the Team ZANU-PF’s captain and chief striker was supposed to challenge the discourse that he was tired and too old. This football discourse is consistent with the characterisation of Mugabe as ‘deft’, ‘special’ and ‘of a golden mind’ as all these attributes are also required in a football (soccer) teams’ chief striker. In other words, for a striker to gain prominence and for one to be appointed the team captain he

14 Post-2000 in the face of persistent media and opposition claims that his health was failing due to old age, President Mugabe on several occasions proclaimed that he was as ‘fit as a fiddle’. In extreme cases some Western media reported that he had died which again led him to quip that if these media reports were to be taken seriously then he had died and risen up more times than Jesus Christ. 267 should be ‘deft’ (skilful, clever), ‘special’ (exceptional, distinctive) and ‘of a golden mind’ (extremely intelligent and wise). Above all, the team captain should be charismatic and should demonstrate natural leadership qualities. This confirms the observation by Mazid (2008) that charismatic leadership is one of the strategies of reproducing and legitimising elite dominance. The football discourse thus served to reinforce the image of Mugabe as still very fit and more than capable of running the country.

The discourse of ‘bhora mugedhi-ibhola egedini’ and Mugabe as team captain should not just be understood in the context of ZANU-PF’s responses to opposition attacks on Mugabe as too old. It should also be understood in the context of internal ZANU-PF opposition to Mugabe’s continued leadership of not only ZANU-PF but also of the country Zimbabwe. In 2008, some ZANU-PF members had advocated ‘bhora musango’ (kick the ball out) allegedly due to their disillusionment with Mugabe’s reluctance to retire and allow someone to contest that year’s elections. This ‘kick the ball out’ operation saw some ZANU-PF senatorial and parliamentary candidates urging their members to vote for them for parliamentary or senatorial seats, but to vote either Morgan Tsvangirai or Simba Makoni (the other two presidential candidates in 2008) for president and not Mugabe since he was too old and had overstayed his welcome. He lost the first round of the disputed March 2008 election and he controversially ‘won’ the run-off election; an election from which Tsvangirai withdrew, citing violence against his supporters (Masunungure, 2009). Thus in 2013 ‘bhora mugedhi’ (score the ball) was a way of rebutting the ‘Mugabe is too old discourse’ and managing internal ZANU-PF opposition to Mugabe. It came to figuratively refer to campaigning for and voting for Mugabe, while ‘bhora musango’ meant campaigning against Mugabe and voting for someone other than Mugabe. In this discourse, only Mugabe was expected to be able to defeat MDC-T’s Morgan Tsvangirai. It is arguable that in the process of managing internal ZANU-PF divisions, the discourse implies that the other players in Team ZANU-PF were incapable of scoring crucial goals that would drag ZANU-PF to victory. It was only Mugabe, due to his expertise and deftness, who was capable of winning the match for Team ZANU-PF. If that was the case, then this confirms my earlier reading that perhaps when Nelson Chamisa authored his ‘Secret Mugabe Praise Note’, the other aspirants to the Presidency he was referring to were the factional leaders in ZANU-PF jostling to succeed Mugabe.

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The appropriation of football discourse in the July 2013 election in Zimbabwe could be understood from various angles which include the following: ZANU-PF factionalism and operation ‘bhora musango’ of 2008 by some ZANU-PF members; the sportsmanship that is associated with football (in the context of the campaign for a peaceful election and the belief that football unifies); the popularity of the game of football amongst the ordinary people, the voters and advertising practice of raiding society for valorised symbols. These shall be discussed in the paragraphs below.

As noted in Chapter Five, football discourse dominated the 2013 election campaign, with the two major political parties ZANU-PF and the Tsvangirai-led MDC-T constituting themselves into football teams: #Team ZANU-PF and the MDC Team. In this imaginary football game which in reality was a political game #Team ZANU-PF’s payoff line was ‘bhora mugedhi ibhola egedhini’ (score the ball). It also used the image of a red and white football in most of its advertisements. This discourse could be understood in the context of ZANU-PF factionalism and the 2008 operation ‘bhora musango’ (kick the ball out). It is said that following the failure by Mugabe to step aside or name a successor at ZANU- PF’s 2006 Goromonzi Congress, some disgruntled members of the party masterminded operation ‘bhora musango’ during the 2008 election. As part of ‘bhora musango’, some ZANU-PF parliamentary and senatorial candidates openly told supporters to vote for them but kick the ball out for the presidential candidates; that is, vote for anybody else other than Mugabe. Mugabe himself acknowledged as much during the GNU when he openly conceded that ‘bhora musango’ nearly cost him the Presidency. It was also argued that ‘bhora musango’ was the reason why the number of votes that ZANU-PF accrued in the parliamentary elections were more than those amassed by Tsvangirai for the presidential election, whilst Mugabe’s were inexplicably fewer than those that had been cast for the party’s parliamentary candidates combined. This was explained away by ‘bhora musango’.

The ‘Bhora musango’ discourse was borrowed from the everyday football matches in Zimbabwe. In cases where a team is winning by a small margin and the game is drawing towards the end (non-league games), the team’s supporters usually urge their players to kick the ball out as a time wasting/delaying tactic. Kicking the ball out is a way of slowing

269 down the tempo of the game and re-strategising. In the political field of Zimbabwe in the March 2008 elections, ‘bhora musango’ was a counter-hegemonic project by disgruntled ruling ZANU-PF members. Given this background, in 2013 ‘bhora mugedhi’ was a way of managing internal ZANU-PF factionalism. It was a way of ensuring that everybody in the party campaigned for Mugabe where Team ZANU-PF was like a football team whose captain was Mugabe. In this instance ZANU-PF merely appropriated internal divisive discourse and turned it on its head to rally everybody to Mugabe’s side and to ensure that none of its members repeat the ‘bhora musango’ of 2008.

‘Bhora mugedhi’ was thus a way of managing internal ZANU-PF factionalism while simultaneously rebutting the MDC-T’s latter-day ‘bhora musango’ discourse. It was a way of coercing ZANU-PF members and ordinary voters alike to vote Mugabe. It is arguable that the ‘bhora mugedhi’ discourse exposes the lack of internal democracy in ZANU-PF where the members have no freedom to freely choose their leader. It is a discourse that contradicts ZANU-PF’s claims in ‘The People’s Constitution’ advertisement that it understands that democracy is not just a word but a way of life. The discourse, it is arguable, was also meant as a subtle reminder to voters of the folly of ‘kicking the ball out’, that is, voting for the opposition Presidential candidates and not Mugabe. It was a reminder that ‘bhora musango’ of 2008 would not be tolerated as it was in 2008. For those who had survived 2008, the ‘bhora mugedhi’ discourse was a reminder of the horrors – the torture, murder and violence – that was visited on those who had kicked the ball out by voting for Morgan Tsvangirai and Simba Makoni in 2008. In this discourse, violence was implied rather than explicitly threatened as in previous elections (cf. Kriger, 2005; CCJP 2009). In the July 2013, elections the threats of violence were subtle and this was a result of the regional and global gaze on the country alluded to earlier. However, this is not peculiar only to Africa and Zimbabwe in particular as it is argued that even in Western neo-liberal democracy, fear is the ultimate mobilising tool (cf. Zizek, 2007). From this perspective, without arguing that ZANU-PF is democratic or dictatorial, the thesis argues that fear appeal does not in any way expose the anti-democratic tendencies of a political party as it may just be a means to an end. This fear appeal, even in commercial advertising, is a key tool in inducing the consumption of products by people (cf. Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001). The sign is by its very nature violent/murderous and/or discriminatory

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(Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994). The sign is also contextual (Deacon et al., 1999 & 2007).

In the 2013 election campaign, MDC Team appropriated the ZANU-PF factionalism- inspired ‘bhora musngo’ discourse of 2008 and used it to try and score a political victory over ZANU-PF. It urged Zimbabweans to ‘kick the ball out’ or to deflate the ball (bhora ngariponjeswe) (Ncube, 2014). In one advertisement, the MDC-T used football imagery of a referee giving Mugabe and ZANU-PF a red card for foul play. This advertisement was a veiled attack on Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s alleged undemocratic power retention strategies and the economic ruin visited upon Zimbabweans post-2000 by their policies. Voting for the MDC was equated to giving the ruinous and dictatorial regime a red card for foul play. Alleged rigging, violence and/or human rights abuses were equated to a foul during a football match. In yet another advertisement, the MDC-T made reference to a football match ending after 90 minutes of regulation time. This was a veiled attack on the then 89-year-old Mugabe’s age. The advertisement urges Zimbabweans to vote out Mugabe, so that by 90 years of age, just like the late Malawian dictator Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda who was voted out at 90, he would no-longer be in office. Normal regulation time for a football match is 90 minutes. In yet another advertisement, the MDC- T had the image of a football written game over and a goalkeeper celebrating victory over Team ZANU-PF. It had the caption ‘Our team wins, Zimbabwe wins’. In this advertisement, the MDC Team was likening itself to the Zimbabwe national team whose wins should be celebrated by all patriotic Zimbabweans. It could be that given the events of 2008 where a presidential run-off election was called after the first round was indecisive, the MDC-T in these advertisements was calling on the voters to overwhelmingly vote for Tsvangirai and MDC-T to avoid ‘extra-time’, that is, a run-off presidential election.

In the July 2013 electoral context ‘bhora mugedhi’ for ZANU-PF also meant defeating the MDC-T, but this was supposed to be done by presenting a united front against the MDC- T and by rallying behind team captain and chief striker, Robert Mugabe. Furthermore, given the GNU-era ‘Mugabe is too old’ and ‘Mugabe is unwell due to old age’ discourse, the use of football imagery was meant to create the illusion that Team ZANU-PF’s captain

271 and chief striker, Robert Mugabe, was still ‘as fit as a fiddle’ (Chibuwe, unpublished). Football is a game for the young and physically fit and not for the old and frail. From this perspective, the imagery of Mugabe as Team ZANU-PF’s chief striker and captain was in tandem with the use of pictures of a younger-looking Mugabe. It was also in tandem with discourses of Mugabe as mentally alert and deft for a man of his advanced age. In this regard, ZANU-PF was simultaneously concealing Mugabe’s advanced age and justifying his continued dominance by creating the illusion that he is still very much energetic since he is still Team ZANU-PF’s chief striker and captain. But given that Roger Milla of Cameroon was in his 40s when he scored at the 1990 world cup and that Ryan Giggs of Manchester United played until he was 40 years old, it could be that ZANU-PF was implying that Mugabe’s age is not an issue as long as he is still physically fit to play the game. In other words, from this perspective the advertisements could have been implying that Mugabe’s old age that the MDC-T sought to take advantage of was immaterial as long as he is still mentally sharp and physically fit. Politics is thus like a game of football where a person can play as long as they are still delivering the goods.

Besides the foregoing, the use of football discourse and imagery in the 2013 election could also be understood in the context of political parties’ campaigns for a peaceful election. Football is characterised by sportsmanship where teams are expected to compete fiercely against each other in a peaceful, fair and competitive manner. And in the spirit of true sportsmanship before a game, football players shake hands and after a game some exchange shirts. As Ncube (2014) argues, football is considered a beautiful game even though it can be used to score political goals. In the context of the 2013 election where the international gaze was on Zimbabwe and where SADC as the guarantor of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that gave birth to the Government of National Unity (GNU) had a special interest in the election, football discourse was perhaps meant to create an illusion of peaceful competition for state power. In the football pitch that became Zimbabwe in July 2013 where Team ZANU-PF and MDC Team were the major teams, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) could be viewed as the referee with both the local and international observers becoming perhaps the linesmen while SADC was the fourth official (the match commissioner). All of these officials would, after the game, produce match reports. In this context the international community and those

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Western countries that had been denied the right to come and observe the election became the spectators to the football match.

Given the local, regional and global gaze on Zimbabwe, it became politically profitable to push the peace discourse in order to avoid a situation whereby the various officials would produce an adverse match (election) report. In other words, the referee and fourth official’s post-match reports legitimise or de-legitimise a football match result. Similarly, on the basis of the referee’s report and/or television replays, the football governing body whether national, regional, continental and world, may take retrospective action on offenders. For ZANU-PF and MDC-T the adoption of football discourse perhaps implies that both teams were committed to the spirit of fair play, sportsmanship, peace and unity in the July 2013 election. It is a discourse that implies oneness and ‘brotherness’ (sic) as explicitly captured in the ZANU-PF’s ‘What a peaceful campaign!’ advertisement. This illusion of sportsmanship and peaceful competition for state power would serve to legitimise the election result as it created the impression that the elections were free and fair.

Following on the argument above, it is plausible that confusingly in the discourse of football the idea of dictatorship or coercion discussed above sits side by side with the idea of democracy. The idea of free, equal and fair competition for state power conjured up by the images of a Team ZANU-PF versus MDC Team football match implies that the country is a democracy. This is because in a democracy there is free and equal competition for state power (cf. Ake, 2000; Hague & Harrop, 2004; Chipkin, 2007). The implication of this football discourse debunks criticisms that voting in Zimbabwe has become embedded ritual without any true democratic value (cf. Willems, 2012). It proclaims that Zimbabwe holds free and fair elections characterised by free competition and sportsmanship akin to that found in football with ZEC as an impartial referee.

The third context in which the use of football discourse could be understood is the popularity of the game. This popularity has resulted in post-independence African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (Ncube, 2014) using the game in their nation building projects. It has also been appropriated by the corporate sector with many top football teams, footballers and football competitions such as the FIFA World Cup having

273 sponsorship deals with global giants such as Coca Cola, Samsung and Chevrolet. Football thus plays a key role in corporate branding and nation building. This pattern is also evident in Zimbabwe where football is popular with the masses (Ncube, 2014). It could be that both ZANU-PF and MDC-T tapped into football discourse to try and create currency. Whereas Ncube (2014) explains this predominance of football discourse during the July 2013 election from a Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian approach; in this study, the appropriation of football imagery is understood from a sign theory perspective, political advertising perspective and a post-colonial perspective. The appropriation of football discourse is another example of advertising raiding society for images that are valorised, lift them out of their contexts, purify them and turn them into signs attached to new products in new contexts (cf. Harris, 1996). In this case, political marketers for both Team ZANU-PF and the MDC Team raided society for football discourse. They realised that it is very popular with the masses and thus they produced themselves as football teams in a bid to hoodwink the masses into voting for them. It was a strategy designed to tap into the popularity of the game in order to score political victories. For example, when the MDC-T in its ‘Victory’ advertisement claims that ‘Zimbabwe wins’, it creates the illusion that the MDC-T is like the various national football teams that represent Zimbabwe whose victories elicit celebrations and a sense of patriotism from Zimbabweans. This is because national football teams are one of the mediums through which nations are (re)imagined.

The sports motif could also have been influenced by the observation that football supporters are very loyal to their teams and they stick with their team even when it is relegated. Perhaps the political parties also wanted to elicit similar loyalty from Zimbabweans. But in the case of ZANU-PF, it could be argued that following the events of 2008 in which the party was criticised for being dictatorial and for using torture and murder among other tactics (cf. Masunungure, 2009; CCJP, 2009) to force people to vote for Mugabe, the use of football discourse was perhaps an attempt to humanise the party. It was meant to rebrand the party, its supporters, members, officials and Mugabe as humane. By presenting the party as a typical football team, they were merely creating the illusion that the party is harmless and will play the political game peacefully and accept the result peacefully. It was an attempt to create the illusion that ZANU-PF was as harmless as the football teams that the voters supported; teams that always try to play by

274 the rules of the game and respect the referee’s decisions. ZANU-PF was perhaps implying that – win or lose – it was just like a football team, willing to accept the result and the referee’s (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission-ZEC) decision. Indeed, in the press conference alluded to above that President Mugabe addressed on the eve of the election, he emphasised that one enters into an electoral contest expecting two results; either win or lose. He further stated that he would accept the result and hand over power if he lost the election and also urged losers to accept defeat. The President also unequivocally stated that the military generals who had issued numerous statements to the effect that they would not support anyone without liberation war credentials were merely expressing their personal opinions and not the military position. The generals, he claimed were subject to military discipline and would accept the election result even if Mugabe lost. The President’s statement tallies with the football discourse, as in a football match the referee’s decision however diabolical is final.

Given the foregoing, it could be that by constituting themselves into football teams, both parties were implying that unlike in previous post-2000 elections where results were always contested and ZEC always accused of bias, in this election, they were going to gracefully accept the result. On the part of ZANU-PF it was an attempt to create the illusion, perhaps for the benefit of the international community, that there wouldn’t be a repeat of the 2008 fiasco when they refused to accept defeat and instead unleashed a wave of violence on the masses. This could have been mere grandstanding on the part of ZANU-PF, since it is inconceivable that they would have dragged the MDC-T kicking and screaming to an electoral contest if victory was not certain.

The next section, through an analysis of ZANU-PF’s advertisements, discusses voter segmentation during the July 2013 election. It infers the people who were targeted by ZANU-PF from the advertisements. It also analyses the novel issues that were found in the ZANU-PF advertisements with the intention of trying to make sense of them.

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7.10 VOTER SEGMENTATION, NEW TACTICS AND DISCOURSES EMPLOYED BY ZANU-PF

A look at the ZANU-PF advertisements reveals that the party specifically produced its advertisements to target the following voter segments: the general population; resettled black Zimbabweans; youths; workers and the unemployed; women; urban dwellers; minority groups and Christians. The discourse reflected the heterogeneity of the predominantly black voters the party was interested in. In political marketing theory, voter segmentation enables the political marketer/advertiser to tailor-make his/her messages to meet the needs of that specific market segment. The reproduction of dominance partially thrives on identifying the needs of the target audience/market (Mazid, 2008). For example, ZANU-PF specifically produced the following advertisements; ‘Councils bills cancelled’, ‘29 January 2009’ and ‘We will compensate you’ to target the workers and urban dwellers. These were the people who were massively negatively affected by the introduction of the multiple currencies policy. As pointed out earlier, the adoption of the multiple currencies resulted in citizens losing their savings while being left with huge water and electricity bills.

Given that post-2000 ZANU-PF has consistently lost elections in urban areas to the MDC- T, the advertisements were meant to negatively brand the MDC-T as a dishonest and uncaring party, whilst presenting ZANU-PF as a caring party. It was an attempt to win over the urban voters by creating the impression that if they vote for ZANU-PF; a ZANU- PF government would now have the power to also cancel their electricity bills and to make sure they receive compensation for the loss of their bank savings. In the political market place, in exchange for votes, political parties promise the public a better government and better policies (Maarek, 1995; Lock & Harris 1996; Harris & McGrath, 2012; Downer, 2013; Kolovos & Harris, n.d). The advertisements create the illusion that due to the GNU arrangement in which the MDC-T was in charge of the Energy Ministry and the Ministry of Finance, ZANU-PF could not replicate what it did with the council bills, that is, cancel the electricity bills and compensate bank account holders, since the ministries were controlled by MDC-T ministers. It is an attempt by ZANU-PF to portray itself as a humane party. In this case, in exchange for their votes, ZANU-PF promised the voters, especially

276 the urban voters and those rural voters with electricity, cancellation of their bills. It also promised, in exchange for votes, bank account holder compensation for the savings lost when the switch to multiple currencies was made. Considering that most employees receive their salaries through banks, there is no doubt this advert was targeted at mostly workers (both current and retrenched) who are again largely clustered in urban areas. ZANU-PF’s promise was just that; a promise that was a lie since after the election creditors were not compensated for their loss. I was not compensated for my loss. On the basis of the above, it is arguable that African political communication also utilises Western tactics of segmenting the political market but the process is influenced by the conditions of the target market and the context of the electoral contest.

The above discussion also reveals the tactic of ZANU-PF presenting itself – when it suited it – as more powerful or less powerful than MDC-T in the GNU used by ZANU-PF in the July 2013 election. For example, in ‘The People’s Constitution’ advertisement, ZANU-PF presents itself as more powerful than the MDC-T because it wanted to be seen as invincible and resolute in its defence of the ‘values of the liberation struggle’. But in the ‘Council bills cancelled’ and ‘We will compensate you’ advertisements, ZANU-PF – with the intention to lay the blame on MDC-T for the suffering brought about by the multiple currencies policy – presents itself as powerless to control the MDC-T’s Ministers of Finance and Energy respectively. ZANU-PF relied on diversion, a mixture of lies and truth presented in strategic ways to reproduce dominance.

Considering that Minister Chombo, who had directed all local authorities to cancel residents’ water bills, was ZANU-PF, the party creates the illusion that if the Finance Minister and Energy Ministers were ZANU-PF, it would have prevailed on them to compensate depositors and cancel electricity bills, respectively. In the first instance, casting themselves as powerful was meant to boast about their achievements-legitimation by boasting (cf. Mazid, 2008). However, in the second instance, they portrayed themselves as powerless to control the MDC-T ministers; again to legitimise their rule – legitimation by concealment (cf. Mazid, 2008); that is, concealing ZANU-PF’s blameworthiness in the suffering visited upon people by the multiple currencies policy that they had put in place. It was also legitimising itself by uglifying the opponent through

277 creating the illusion that MDC-T was to blame for the woes faced by Zimbabweans as a result of the multiple currencies policy. The advertisements further created the impression that ZANU-PF wanted to assist depositors and electricity debtors, but the MDC-T Ministers had refused. This was intended to uglify the MDC-T as inhuman and/or heartless. This legitimation/de-legitimation process was intended to positively brand ZANU-PF while negatively branding the MDC-T. The people who were targeted here were largely the urban dwellers.

Apart from the urban voters, ZANU-PF also showed a keen interest in women, youths and the marginalised groups. In the ‘How indigenisation and economic empowerment will create employment’ advertisement, ZANU-PF specifically mentions women and youths as earmarked for empowerment by being allocated $300 million to finance the Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Similarly, in the ‘Gushungo 8’ advertisement ZANU-PF implies that it was empowering the youths by allowing them to contest for Parliamentary seats in Harare during the 2013 election. However, this advertisement could have been an attempt by ZANU-PF to rebut opposition and private press jibes that it is a party of geriatrics. The opposition and private press often point out that ZANU-PF’s party leadership is very old and unwilling to retire, as opposed to MDC-T’s youthful leaders. The advertisement was probably an attempt by ZANU-PF to appeal to the urban youth, specifically Harare youth, given the fact that the city is a known opposition stronghold.

The focus on women could be because ZANU-PF realised that women constitute the biggest chunk of voters in Zimbabwe, given that the 2012 population census report showed that in Zimbabwe women outnumbered men. The report indicated that there were 6 780 700 women, compared to 6 280 539 men. It thus makes political marketing sense to address issues directly affecting women with the intention to tap into this group for votes. Furthermore, ZANU-PF’s targeting of youths and promising them funding for their SMEs could be understood in the context of post-2000 rising unemployment. It was an attempt to entice the youth to vote for ZANU-PF. The party was, in other words, offering the youths money for projects in exchange for their votes. Perhaps this was because of the realisation that its liberation and ‘indigenised land’ discourse has less currency amongst the youths, many of whom were born after independence and have no

278 recollection whatsoever of the liberation struggle or white minority rule. It is argued that one of the ways in which dominance is reproduced is through identifying the needs of the people and present oneself as having the solution to their needs (Mazid, 2008). In this case, ZANU-PF identified employment as a need while concealing its role in creating the massive unemployment.

ZANU-PF also specifically targeted marginalised groups. It boasted that it had ensured that the new constitution would cater for the empowerment of marginalised groups. Minority communities, women and youths could also be included under these marginalised groups. The discourse was intended to appeal to various groups in Zimbabwe which include minority ethnic groups, especially considering that there have been accusations that successive post-independence ZANU-PF regimes have neglected Matabeleland. It is a discourse that creates the illusion of oneness; that is, Zimbabwe is diverse but one and that every Zimbabwean belongs to the nation. It is a discourse that is at variance with criticisms by scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) that the Zimbabwean nation is imagined from a narrow ZANU-PF perspective that privileges the Shona over minority groups. This reading, considered from a political marketing perspective where numbers matter in an electoral contest, looks faulty. The Shona constitute the majority amongst the indigenous groups and it is largely courtesy of their vote that ZANU-PF won the 1980 elections at the expense of PF ZAPU (cf. Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). Even as ZANU-PF lost all the seats in Matebeleland in the 1985 elections to ZAPU, it retained power courtesy of the vote it got from the largely Shona regions (cf. Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). Given this reality, it arguable that largely utilising symbols mined from amongst the majority Shona voting public makes political marketing sense. However, the football discourse used in the 2013 elections is considered universal, since football is also considered to be universal and a unifier. It is arguable that ZANU- PF utilises discourse that speaks to the time and context of the election; a discourse that ensures it amasses more votes than the opposition. Tribalism or imagining the nation from a tribal perspective is thus not an end in itself but it is a means to an end – power retention. ZANU-PF discourse is influenced by one ultimate goal, which is to win the electoral contest and retain hegemony.

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However, the marginalised groups certainly did not include the homosexuals; the same ‘The People’s Constitution’ advertisement goes on to boast that ZANU-PF had also ensured that homosexuality is outlawed. It was intended to appeal to the Christian Community, the Muslim Community and the conservatives or adherents to African traditional religion. This discourse of homosexuality was influenced by the realisation that Zimbabwe is a conservative society where being accused of being a homosexual or of tolerating homosexuality could have disastrous consequences for a political party or candidate. Homosexuality was a tool that ZANU-PF used to negatively brand and thus de-legitimise the opposition MDC-T. From the foregoing discussion, it is arguable that during the 2013 electoral contest, ZANU-PF’s discursive practices confirm Waldahl’s (2005) observation that building up one’s credibility is as important as destroying an opponent’s credibility. The intention is to gain maximum possible positive differentiation and voter appeal at the expense of the competition (Jain, n.d). The foregoing also confirms Harris’ (1996) claim that advertisers raid the past for images which they lift out their original contexts, purify and convert into signs attached to new products in new contexts. However, the study also questions post-colonial scholars’ assertions that post- colonial Zimbabwe’s discourse is nativism. It also rejects criticisms of ZANU-PF’s attack advertising as evidence of its dictatorship, instead arguing that the discourse is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Finally, it also rejects some scholars’ tendencies to praise anything and everything ZANU-PF says and does by exposing how ZANU-PF sought to hoodwink the voters through selective omission and sometimes outright lies.

The following chapter presents a summary of the study and a discussion of the conclusions drawn from the interpretation, analysis and discussion of themes, categories and findings above (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). It also discusses the study’s confirmability, limitations, strengths and contributions to literature and concludes by presenting areas for further study.

7.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY

It can be concluded from the foregoing that ZANU-PF discourse for the July 2013 election was partially influenced by post-2000 anti-imperialism discourse and the socio-economic

280 and political realities in which the election took place. The immediate context of the election – the GNU, the multiple currencies system, the constitution making process and debates around freedom of sexual orientation, the concerns about a repeat of the 2008 election violence and the indigenisation and economic empowerment drive amongst other factors – were the reservoirs from which ZANU-PF tapped most of the images and/or signs it used in the advertisements. It sparingly borrowed exact images and words from the liberation struggle history and its post-2000 anti-imperialism discourse. It was perhaps an attempt to dilute the rhetoric of post-2000 which had on many occasions been condemned by critics as bankrupt and grotesque nationalism, nativism, intimidation, hate speech, character assassination and dictatorial (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Chitando, 20005; Kriger, 2005).

In the July 2013 electoral context, ZANU-PF largely implied its post-2000 discourse; it created the illusion that it was common sense. This deliberate toning down on the discourse of sell-outs and liberation war was a strategy by ZANU-PF to present itself as a democratic party or, in the context of the GPA’s call for reform, as a reformed party. It was an attempt to present an image of ZANU-PF different from the ZANU-PF of the 2008 presidential run-off election which openly threatened war if it lost the election. ZANU-PF had rebranded itself and its presidential candidate as a peaceful football team (Team ZANU-PF). It had also rebranded itself as a peaceful and peace loving party by taking out the ‘“What a peaceful campaign advertisement!’ It was a strategy that was targeted at both the voters and the international community, although it is arguable that it was maybe also a veil to fool the international community that the election was free and fair. Perhaps they knew that the voters would vote for the party out of fear of what might befall them in the post-election period. The memories of the post-March 2008 election period and the period leading up to the June 27 presidential run-off elections were perhaps still fresh in the voters’ minds. This is plausible especially when one considers that ZANU-PF, apart from the present and the future, also always raids the past for signs, both valorised and abhorred, to sustain its dominance. Finally, the segmentation of voters that is evident in the manipulation of signs in the advertisements revealed that ZANU-PF’s political communications are meticulously planned and are far from being irrational.

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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION ZANU-PF and its leader, Robert Mugabe, are perhaps the most widely studied phenomena post-2000 in and about Zimbabwe. This is because, despite stiff competition for state power from the MDC-T – the first party to pose a serious threat to ZANU-PF’s hold on power (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; ZESN, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Moyo, 2005; Waldahl, 2005) – widespread elite corruption, record breaking hyperinflation and damaging Western-imposed economic sanctions, Mugabe and ZANU-PF have, against all the odds, managed to hang on to power. The economic meltdown and stiff political contestation characteristic of Zimbabwe post-2000 attracted intense media and academic scrutiny and spawned countless scholarly publications from a variety of disciplines that include history (cf. Alexander et al., 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, 2009 & 2011; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2003; Ranger, 2004 & 2005), political science (Masunungure, 2004 & 2009; Bratton & Masunungure, 2007 & 2008), religious studies (Chitando, 2005); journalism and media studies (Moyo, 2004; Mano, 2005; Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Mazango, 2005; Moyo, 2005; Chari, 2008; Nyamanhindi, 2008; Moyse, 2008), amongst others. However, this body of literature paid little attention to ZANU-PF election advertisements placed in paid-for space and the literature that did mention the party’s political advertisements mentioned them in passing (cf. Willems, 2004; Chitando, 2005; Chuma, 2005). This is not to say ZANU-PF discourse has never been studied; it has been studied as part of ZANU-PF election strategies (cf. Makumbe & Compagnon, 1996; Makumbe & Sithole, 1997; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, 2009 & 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009 & 2010; Kriger, 2005; Mazango, 2005; ZESN, 2008), but none of these studies located political advertising at the centre of their inquiry. Resultantly, cognisant of the fact that electoral politics has always provided a need for promotional communications (cf. Lilleker, 2006; Kaid, 2012; Bernays, 1947), this study investigates the nationalist discourses that ZANU-PF employed in its election advertisements for the July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe.

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This study suggests that it is worth studying ZANU-PF’s advertisements in post-2000 Zimbabwe in order to understand how ZANU-PF uses them as tools in a complex political play of signs (see Booysen, 2003; Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2003; Chitando, 2005; Kriger, 2005; Mano, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009; Mugabe, 2013). The study argues that seeking to understand the uses and meanings of signs, it is worthwhile paying attention to the context in which the signs (political advertisements) were produced and circulated. This is because the sign and its meaning(s) are in a constant state of flux and grounding them in context is one way of grappling with the complexity of the sign. The study further argued that in the study of ZANU-PF discourse, it is worth noting, for example, that Zimbabwe, like all nations, is an imagined community whose identity is contested (Anderson, 1991; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The dismissal of ZANU-PF’s nationalist discourse as nativism or as bankrupt or as ‘the last refuge of a scoundrel’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009; Ranger, 2005) is testimony of this contestation. The discourse is further criticised for being blind to the process of globalisation, narrow and exclusionary (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009). In contrast, the regime claims to be patriotic and democratic as it defends ‘our’ sovereignty and holds ‘free and fair elections’ regularly (see Booysen, 2003; Mazaranye, 2012). It further argues that democracy is a tool for Western re-colonisation and the West cannot lecture ‘us’ on democracy since they were ‘our’ oppressors (see Mazaranye, 2012). In light of the complexity of ZANU-PF’s discourses and the alterity of the signs that the study investigates, the study deploys a synthesis of theory or explosion and implosion of theory (see Kellner, 1995; Baudrillard, 1991) to the study of ZANU-PF election advertisements. The approach the study utilises is premised on the assumption that, if political communication in Zimbabwe is to be theorised in ways that better reflect everyday experiences and realities of Zimbabweans, it is vital that theorists reject the post-colonial essentialism of existing literature that focuses on ZANU-PF’s power retention strategies (see Lindgren, 2003; Dorman, 2003; Booysen, 2003; Masunungure, 2004; Scholz, 2004; Kaulemu, 2004; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005). It is an approach that is conscious of the complexity of ZANU-PF as a sign, and appreciates that in the study of African political communication, the context, peculiarities and complexity of African states which cannot be theorised in the same way as Western states needs to be grappled with if one is to reach a full and measured

283 understanding of ZANU-PF’s nationalist discourse. Adopting such an approach in the study of signs used in political advertisements is central to unravelling the hegemonic struggle in Zimbabwe post-2000.

The approach that the study utilises insights gleaned from political advertising theory, post-colonial theory, decolonial theory and sign theory. Deploying such a framework was an attempt to overcome the abyssal nature of Western theory (cf. Houtondji, 1997; Mbembe, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 2007; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012), the simplistic celebratory scholarship that treats Africa as Europe upside down (cf. Appiah, 2010; Moore, 2012; Nakata et al., 2012) and post-colonial theory’s reinscription of that which it seeks to challenge (i.e. the abyssal Western theory) (cf. Ahluwalia, 2001; Chipkin, 2007). It is a framework that significantly undercut some of the widely held beliefs regarding ZANU-PF discourse, such as its characterisation as grotesque nationalism, nativism, as evidence of the personalisation of politics, etc. (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, 2009 & 2011; Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Kebonang, 2012). The approach yields, as the study demonstrates, newer and richer data on the practice of political advertising and/or political communication and ZANU-PF discourses in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

Through an analysis of ZANU-PF advertisements placed in paid-for space in Newsday, Daily News, The Patriot and The Standard during the July 2013 elections, the study answers the following questions:

In pursuit of answers to the above questions, methodologically the study employs qualitative research specifically the interpretivist paradigm. It is a paradigm that is interested in the meanings of phenomenon and believes that meaning is contextual. The study findings show that in ZANU-PF advertisements for the July 2013 elections, the anti- imperialism discourse that ZANU-PF has come to be associated with post-2000, was

284 muted. The party largely focused on issues affecting the electorate during the period of the election, thus showing that ZANU-PF’s discourse is neither static nor fixed and is not always about looking back into the past. It is not always about history and the liberation struggle.

The findings confirm that ZANU-PF considers the MDC-T as the main threat to its hold on power (cf. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; ZESN, 2005; Mazango, 2005; Moyo, 2005; Waldahl, 2005). In its advertisements, ZANU-PF solely engaged the MDC-T and ignored all the other smaller opposition parties. This focus on the MDC-T was central to the selection of discourse or signs that ZANU-PF utilised in its messages for the July 2013 elections. Together with ZANU-PF’s intention to appeal to those sympathetic to MDC-T, it also influenced the placement of advertisements in the oppositional private media while placing none in the state-controlled media. These considerations, coupled with the local, regional, and global political-social-economic context in which the elections were conducted, influenced the choice of signs that were utilised in the advertisements. Political advertising theory and political economy of the media theory were useful in making sense of ZANU-PF’s placement of advertisements in selected privately-owned media. It is a placement that both contradicts and confirms the two theories’ assertion that (political) advertisers do not place advertisements in media with hostile content (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1998; Menon, 2008).

The move by ZANU-PF not to place advertisements in state-controlled media was motivated by the desire to keep the MDC-T from having access to the ruling party’s assumed supporters and sympathisers. Their placement of advertisements in the private media was meant to gain access to the assumed MDC-T supporters and sympathisers. This is plausible when one considers the polarisation of the Zimbabwean media and society in general post-2000 into bitterly opposed pro-ZANU-PF and pro-MDC-T camps (cf. Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Chari, 2008; Nyamanhindi, 2008). The fact that there was nothing illegal about this move – a move that automatically meant that the state-media were now free to reject opposition advertisements without being accused of giving ZANU- PF unfair advantage over the opposition – shows that in 2013 ZANU-PF strategy was meticulously and lawfully designed. This contradicts the tendency to view African politics

285 as irrational (cf. Ahluwalia, 2001) and Booysen’s (2003) assertion that ZANU-PF uses the veil of constitutionality to mask anti-democratic practices. The Electoral Act, as noted in Chapters Two and Seven, was the result of political negotiations between ZANU-PF and the MDCs with then South African President, Thabo Mbeki, as mediator. In this context, it is arguable that African politics is rational when one considers that ZANU-PF discourse for the 2013 elections reflected the local, regional and global context of the election. It was not all about history (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Alexander et al., 2000; Ranger 2004) and there were no threats of war or death (cf. Scholz, 2004; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005; CCJP, 2009; Masunungure, 2009). For example, it was observed that most ZANU-PF’s advertisements for July 2013 seemed to be targeting more on urban dwellers and less on voters in rural areas. It is a strategy that shows ZANU-PF’s acute awareness of its poor performance in urban areas and strong performance in rural areas in previous post-2000 elections. It could be that ZANU-PF paid less attention to the rural voters, since it assumed that its support in the party’s traditional rural stronghold was guaranteed. It is arguable that ZANU-PF was determined to wrest control of the urban areas from the MDC-T which has maintained an iron grip on the urban areas since 2000.

ZANU-PF thus sold as its political products, the cancellation of electricity bills, the compensation of depositors for loss of savings when the multiple currencies policy was adopted, employment creation, infrastructural development and empowerment of minorities, expert Mugabe leadership, democracy, peace, freedom and sovereignty, and economic indigenisation. As noted earlier, the products they sold were influenced by the political-economic-socio-cultural, local, regional and global context in which the electoral contest was taking place. For example, the global gaze on Zimbabwe and the rejection of previous elections – especially Mugabe’s 2008 presidential run-off ‘victory’ on account of violence and threats of violence – influenced ZANU-PF’s use of the peace discourse to sell itself and its candidates. The use of the peace sign was necessitated by the context of the elections, mainly the desire to secure the legitimacy of an envisaged ZANU-PF victory. Similarly, ZANU-PF’s targeting of only Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC-T for elimination from the political game was influenced by the reality that in the 2013 electoral contest, MDC-T was the biggest threat to its hold on power. But again, cognisant of the global gaze on the country, ZANU-PF desisted from using crude threatening advertisements it

286 had come to be associated with when dealing with MDC-T in elections (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003; Willems, 2004; Kriger, 2005; Masungure, 2009; CCJP, 2009).

ZANU-PF also desisted from attacking the person of opposition politicians, especially Tsvangirai, as was the norm in previous elections (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni) but instead resorted to innuendos. This was done while strategically rebutting opposition claims that Mugabe was too old and frail to lead Zimbabwe. But the rebuttal simply utilised comparative political advertising where Mugabe’s mental alertness, indigeneity, divine right to rule, expertise in state matters and achievements were used to legitimise his continued rule while delegitimising the opposition. The same tactic was used to legitimise ZANU-PF while delegitimising MDC-T. ZANU-PF was presented as a democratic, caring and policy oriented party, whilst the MDC-T was comparatively presented as uncaring, undemocratic, dishonest and clueless when it came to policy implementation. This ability by ZANU-PF to adapt its discourse to the context of an election shows the fluidity of the signs it deploys in political contestation in post-independence Zimbabwe. It also shows the fluid nature of its identity as an organisation; an identity that is, just like all identities, in a constant state of flux.

The study found out that, contrary to criticisms that ZANU-PF always uses liberation struggle history to retain its dominance while delegitimising the opposition (Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2013; Ranger, 2004; Chuma, 2005 & 2008; Mazango, 2005; Freeman, 2005) the party also uses the present and the future to legitimise its rule while simultaneously de-legitimising the opposition. It is thus arguable that whereas such criticism sought to create the illusion that ZANU-PF discourse is static, this thesis argues that ZANU-PF discourse is constantly shifting and is influenced by the context in which an election is being held. It also argues that in advertising theory, raiding society (the past, the present and the future) for valorised signs is standard procedure (cf. Harris, 1996; Packard, 1957). From this standpoint, political discourse should never be treated as static and as an end in itself but as a means to an end. It is a means to retain power. This fluid nature of the party’s discourse and/or signs it deploys in electoral contexts is confirmed by the deployment of football discourse in ZANU-PF election discourse for 2013. The use of football discourse again confirms the observation that advertisers raid society for

287 valorised symbols. This is because football is a widely followed sport in Zimbabwe and the world over. In this election, the anti-imperialism discourse was, perhaps for the first time post-2000, subdued. It is thus arguable that the use of football discourse and peace discourse confirms the thesis’ observation that ZANU-PF discourse is not static and is not all about liberation struggle history and anti-imperialism. In previous elections, ZANU-PF as argued by critics, threatened war if the opposition won and/or equated voting for the opposition with death (cf. Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005), but in July 2013, in a context where the global gaze was fixed on Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF strategically sold peace. This peace discourse, just like the democracy discourse, was a means to an end rather than an end in itself; it was means to retaining power. For ZANU-PF, signs are a means to power retention. As the Shona saying goes, ‘rume risinganyepi hariroori’ (he who does not lie when proposing to a girl, should not expect to marry). Post-colonial ZANU-PF discourse is constantly shifting but liberation discourses have been a constant feature, although with varying levels of intensity. The 2013 elections were perhaps the first post- 2000 to witness the utilisation of a muted anti-imperialism discourse by ZANU-PF.

The section below presents conclusions to the study drawn from interpretation of themes and categories presented in the previous chapter.

8.2 ZANU-PF DISCOURSE IMAGINES A HYBRID IDENTITY

The thesis concludes that ZANU-PF’s nationalistic discourse imagines a hybrid identity that is partly influenced by history, the present and the future. In looking at the present ZANU-PF was looking into the future; trying to ensure a future free of the crisis of legitimacy that characterised Mugabe’s rule post-2000. ZANU-PF discourse is fluid and it is influenced by the context of its creation (the local and the global) – a scenario that makes the characterisation of its discourse as blind to the process of globalisation, as nativism, grotesque nationalism, as patriotic history, etc. (cf. Ranger, 2004; Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009 & 2011) problematic. ZANU-PF’s discourse is in a constant state of flux as shown by the acknowledgement of the MDC’s supporters as Zimbabweans, a move that renders invalid the claim that ZANU-PF’s discourse is exclusionary (cf. Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009). The use of football discourse during the 2013 election campaign

288 is also evidence that ZANU-PF’s discourse is fluid and is not always about history and the party’s role in the liberation struggle (cf. Ranger, 2004 & 2005; Chuma, 2008). The characterisation above of ZANU-PF discourse as blind to globalisation, nativism, grotesque nationalism, exclusionary, patriotic history, character assassination, etc. (Ndlovu Gatscheni 2003, 2009 & 2011; Ranger, 2004) creates the illusion of a static discourse where there is a centre or a transcendental signified whose roots lie in ZANU- PF’s liberation history. It fails to recognise the sophisticated nature of ZANU-PF’s discourse; a discourse that does not only mine the past for images but also mines the present and the future.

The ZANU-PF discourse, it is arguable, also mines popular culture for valorised symbols as shown by its use of football discourse. The use of football discourse was an attempt to identify with the subalterns since football is popular with this sub-group, a group that happens to constitute a significant number of voters. It is a game that is not only dubbed the ‘beautiful game’ but is arguably the most supported game in Zimbabwe and the world at large (Ncube, 2014). As Ncube (2014) notes, football can be used to score political goals and in 2013 ZANU-PF used it to score political goals as shown by its slogan ‘bhora mugedhi-ibhola egedini’ (score the ball). The use of this discourse and the discourse of peace clearly show that ZANU-PF is a slippery sign whose discourse and by extension identity is characterised by slippage also. As Rice and Waugh (2001) note, identities are events in language articulated through differences. But identities are multiple, are in a constant state of flux and are performances. They, like history, are events in difference (Descombes, 1994).

The party utilises images from the past, the present and the future and from the local and the global to retain hegemony. In the political production process in Zimbabwe, signs that appear to be contradictory sit side by side comfortably in ZANU-PF election discourse. Signs of democracy sit side by side with signs of indigeneity, divine rule and anti- homosexuality discourse. That these primordial signs sit side by side with images of democracy, liberation struggle and market economy appears contradictory as these have been viewed as incompatible (cf. Williams, 1993). It is precisely because of the use of these contradictory signs that appeal both to the indigenous and the global that a theory

289 or an approach that appreciates the two seemingly bitterly opposed and incompatible positions is suggested and utilised in this study. It is a theory that borrows from both Western theory and indigenous knowledge systems or theory from the South to make sense of these primordial and modern/post-modern signs utilised in ZANU-PF discourse. Chapter Seven of this thesis demonstrates how the suggested new multi-theoretical approach may work.

For example, understanding the party’s use of primordial images, such as the totem ‘Gushungo’ and Great Zimbabwe ruins as identity markers, requires one to use theory from the South. The use of the sign ‘Gushungo’ was meant to legitimise Mugabe as an authentic indigenous Zimbabwean who traces his origin to the hallowed Guruuswa; that is, the area around the mystical Great Zimbabwe. The use of the image of the Great Zimbabwe, that the totem Gushungo implies, in all ZANU-PF advertisements shows its centrality to discourses of nation, nationality and authenticity. This image has strong religious, political, cultural and economic connotations. It legitimises anybody associated with it, not only as an authentic Zimbabwean but also as having the legitimate right to rule Zimbabwe; a right that is divine. The Great Zimbabwe as a sign sustains the myth of origin and authenticity (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983). It is thus arguable that the post-colonial sign system is a constellation of a myriad of signs that borrow from the pre- colonial, the colonial, the post-colonial and the Western discourses of democracy.

However, it is compelling to argue that understanding signs of democracy and peace and the complex play of signs that is political advertising also entails utilising sign theory and democratic and/or political advertising theory. These signs, especially, democracy and the practice of political advertising, are largely Western constructs and thus understanding them entails utilising Western theory. But since these signs and practices are being executed in a post-colonial setting, the study also utilises theory from the south and post-colonial theory to grapple with these Western constructs and/or practices adapted to a post-colonial Zimbabwean setting. The approach suggested here raises questions about some of the widely held views about the practice of politics in Zimbabwe and Africa in general.

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For example, democracy is a contested terrain in Zimbabwe in particular and Africa in general. As Comaroff and Comaroff (1997) argue, democracy in Africa is a decontextualised term that leaves Africans with a dangerous dilemma with regard to which political system to adopt. However, there seems to be widespread agreement amongst post-colonial scholars that Zimbabwe and Africa in general chose the despotic path. It is argued that continuity rather than change characterised the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe; the country failed to fully democratise after independence (cf. Masunungure, 2004; Moyo, 2004; Scholz, 2004; Tekere, 2006). From this perspective, pointing at the presence of ‘father figures’ in Africa, post-colonialists argue that African politics is highly personal and patriarchal (White, 2008; Kebonang, 2012; Mkandawire, 2013). In this personalised politics, power is viewed as a private preserve of the party leader (Mbembe, 2001; White, 2008; Mkandawire, 2013). The predominance of symbols valorising the party leader has been used as evidence of dictatorship and personalisation of African politics but in Western liberal political branding practices the party leader is the core of the political product (cf. Downer, 2013). From this political branding perspective, the post-colonial reading of the predominance of images and discourses about Mugabe in ZANU-PF discourse as symptomatic of the personalised and patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean politics is problematic (cf. White, 2008; Kebonang, 2012; Mkandawire, 2013).

Following on the foregoing, it is arguable that the post-colonial reading of the predominance of signs of Mugabe in ZANU-PF election advertisements can, from a Western neo-liberal political advertising/branding perspective, be viewed as evidence of his centrality as party leader to the party’s electoral products. However, Mugabe’s predominance has been used as evidence of personalisation of politics and deification of the leader (see Kebonang, 2012). It is arguable that Mugabe’s mass appeal – he still commands a huge support base despite his advanced age– makes him key to ZANU- PF’s electoral hegemony. In other words, his charismatic leadership made him the party’s best bet in an election, as it is argued in some sections of Zimbabwean society that without Mugabe all the other ZANU-PF leaders would be no match for MDC-T’s Morgan Tsvangirai. This confirms the claim that charismatic leadership is one of the legitimation

291 tools used in political discourse (Mazid, 2008). The Mugabe brand is a key asset of the organisation that is ZANU-PF (cf. Smith, 2009; Downer, 2013).

From the foregoing perspective, the predominance of images of Mugabe in the advertisements, from a Western neo-liberal political branding perspective, is not evidence of his personalisation of power in Zimbabwe, but rather evidence of his centrality to ZANU- PF’s electoral hegemony. In an electoral contest it is the number of votes that matters and if Mugabe has a mass appeal it makes sense to make him central in ZANU-PF electoral discourse. Besides, in an electoral context, even in liberal democracies it is standard procedure to make the party leader a key component of the political product since his or her fortunes are closely linked to the party’s fortunes (cf. Downer, 2013). From this standpoint, using the predominance of Mugabe in Zimbabwean political discourse to claim that politics in Zimbabwe is personal is a tacit confirmation of the faulty Western theory assumption that African politics is irrational. It also reduces post-colonial theory to being merely a re-inscription of that which it seeks to challenge, which is, Western theory assumptions that the South is an abyss and incomprehensible (cf. Houtondji, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Mbembe, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 2007).

Apart from the foregoing, ZANU-PF political communication practices in many ways resemble commercial advertising practices where advertisers can mine both the past and the present in order to induce consumption of their products. In doing this, ZANU-PF uses the images in ways that are designed not only to positively brand the party and its products, but it is done in a manner designed to negatively brand the opposition. Its political communication practices are a confirmation of Waldahl’s (2005) observation that in an electoral contest, negatively questioning or attacking the opponent’s credibility is as important as building up one’s credibility. The signs the party utilised and how they were utilised is also confirmation of the claims that the sign is by nature discriminatory and communication is war (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994; Sonderling, 2013 & 2014). The study also concludes that ZANU-PF’s selection of the signs from the past or the present is done with specific voter segments in mind. For example, the advertisements for July 2013 show that ZANU-PF was mainly targeting the urban voters, the women, the unemployed, minority groups and the youth. In its advertisements, it

292 focused on issues affecting these specific groups, such as unemployment, exorbitant water and electricity rates. Identifying the needs of one’s target market is one key strategy of legitimising one’s dominance (Mazid, 2008). As argued by Kriger (2005) and others, this clearly shows that ZANU-PF does not always rely on intimidation to retain its dominance. In a context where such tactics are untenable, the party relies more on innuendos. ZANU-PF’s discourse is not static, but is fluid and constantly shifting and a multi-theoretical schema such as the one suggested and utilised in this study is required to fully grapple with the signs it deploys in its political communications.

As noted in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, ZANU-PF did not use crude fear appeal and/or crude attack advertising during the election, largely due to the global gaze on Zimbabwe. It left the business of attacking Tsvangirai and the MDC-T to proxies such as the state- controlled media and The Heritage Trust. For example, The Heritage Trust savagely attacked Tsvangirai through advertisements it sponsored and placed on ZBC Television and radio stations and through editorial content in its The Patriot newspaper. The state media editorial content also savagely attacked Morgan Tsvangirai and his MDC-T party. Unlike in previous elections, ZANU-PF largely relied on comparative advertisements that were not crude attack advertisements in nature. It largely resorted to targeting emotions of the voters. The study concludes that ZANU-PF largely used soft-sell tactics and deception to hoodwink people to vote for their candidates. For example, when it suited it, ZANU-PF presented itself as either less powerful or more powerful than the MDC-T. It also claimed ownership of the multiple currency policy and its benefits while blaming the MDC-T for the suffering induced by the policy. The party, it is arguable, relies on diversion and sometimes outright exaggerations and/or lies to retain hegemony.

Apart from the above, in a move that confirms the commercial advertising practice of raiding society for the hottest signs to justify consumption of their products (cf. Deacon et al., 1997; Harris, 1996; Packard, 1957), ZANU-PF utilised football discourse in attempts to win over voters. It constituted itself into a football team with the slogan ‘bhora mugedhi- score the ball’. Football is very popular with the masses in Zimbabwe (cf. Ncube, 2014) and ZANU-PF sought to use it to manage internal opposition to Mugabe and to defeat the opposition in the electoral contest. It was meant to counter the ‘bhora musango-kick the

293 ball out’ discourse of 2008 which was blamed for Mugabe’s loss to Tsvangirai in the 29 March 2008 election. ZANU-PF, it is arguable, mines popular culture for valorised symbols as shown by its use of football discourse. It was an attempt to identify with the subalterns since football is popular with this sub-group, a group that happens to constitute a significant number of voters. It is a game that is not only dubbed the ‘beautiful game’ but is arguably the most supported game in Zimbabwe and in the world at large (Ncube, 2014). As Ncube (2014) notes, football can be used to score political goals and in 2013 ZANU-PF used it to score political goals as shown by its slogan ‘bhora mugedhi-ibhola egedini’ (score the ball). The use of this discourse and the discourse of peace clearly show that ZANU-PF is a slippery sign whose discourse and, by extension, identity is characterised by slippage. As Rice and Waugh (2001) note, identities are events in language articulated through differences. But identities are multiple, are in a constant state of flux and are performances. They, like history, are events in difference (Descombes, 1994). Thus, ZANU-PF’s identity is not static as shown by the slippery nature of its discourse which undergoes constant renewal and is in a constant state of flux.

Further, ZANU-PF also used the signs of the real (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994) such as the Great Zimbabwe, colours of the national flag and a colonial era image of a white man crossing a stream ‘riding’ on the back of a black man to legitimise Mugabe and ZANU-PF, while de-legitimising Tsvangirai and MDC-T. These signs talk of white colonial oppression, ZANU-PF’s role in the liberation struggle, indigeneity, Traditional African Religion (ATR) and Mugabe’s divine right to rule. From the foregoing, it is arguable that the study’s use of an approach that combines insights gleaned from sign theory, post-colonial theory, political advertising theory and decolonial theory, but specifically utilising indigenous knowledges or philosophies to try to fully grasp the meanings of the advertisements is justifiable. It enabled the researcher to grapple with the myriad of signs that ZANU-PF deployed in its 2013 election advertisements; signs that borrow from the primordial, the colonial, the post-colonial and the global. It is an approach that does not privilege one reading over another as it integrates both theory from the South and Western theory. It enabled the researcher to make sense of the contradictory signs used by ZANU-PF in its advertisements.

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8.3 ZANU-PF ADVERTISEMENTS AS SIMULATION

The thesis concludes that use of pictures of a younger-looking Mugabe is a confirmation of Baudrillard’s (1983 paragraph 15, lines 1-2) argument that, ‘when the real is no-longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of second hand truths, objectivity and authenticity’. From this viewpoint, the thesis argues that creating the impression that Mugabe was still younger and fitter than he actually had been in 2013 is second-hand truth. It was an illusion intended to hoodwink the voters to think that Mugabe, the ZANU-PF presidential candidate, was still the same energetic Mugabe of old. This manipulation of signs confirms Baudrillard’s (1983 paragraph 15, lines 1-2) further argument that, ‘when the real is no-longer what it used to be…there is a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential…’. In this case, the image, as argued earlier, murders the reality that Mugabe is very old, while also discriminating against the opposition candidates by focusing on his state of mind and expertise in handling matters of state.

The ZANU-PF advertisements threaten the difference between truth that Mugabe is very old and the falsehood that he is still very fit. It also threatens the difference between the real – a Mugabe the person – and the imaginary – the image of Mugabe that appears in the advertisements. The image of Mugabe looks like Mugabe but is not Mugabe and in the context of July 2013, it had the effect of creating a distorted image of how old Mugabe was in the minds of the voters. It was simulation since it broke the link between the image (picture of younger-looking Mugabe) and the referent (a very old Mugabe). This confirms Falkowski and Cwalina’s (2012, p. 10) observation that ‘…modern day democracy has found itself in the age of manufactured images’. From this observation, it is arguable that simulation is a key tactic in political branding and/or advertising. This is because through simulation, ’political parties seek to influence brands, namely, ‘memory about a particular object [candidate, policies, and the party itself] that is held in the memory of consumers [voters]’ (Keller 1993, cited by Smith, 2009, p. 211). In the political production process in Zimbabwe in 2013, ZANU-PF engaged in simulation. For example, it sought to divert voters’ attention from Mugabe’s advanced age by using images of a younger-looking

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Mugabe and by focusing on his expertise and mental agility. It is plausible to argue that ZANU-PF’s simulation neither shows that it is a dictatorship nor a democracy; it is a just a means to an end. It is a means to eliminate the opposition from the language game. It is a means to retaining power; to winning the consent of the electorate, especially considering that language is central to this process of retaining power (Deacon et al., 1999 & 2007). Simulation is part and parcel of the process Bernays (1947) calls the engineering of consent.

The process of simulation involves discrimination through differentiation. The sign is discriminatory and all forms of communication are violent in the same manner the sign Mugabe is discriminatory and violent (cf. Baudrillard et al., 1976; Baudrillard, 1983 & 1994; Sonderling, 2013 & 2014). This process of discrimination can be executed through negative/attack advertising, advocacy advertising and comparative advertising, among other tactics. It is the sign’s violence or discriminatory nature that simultaneously justifies one’s political products while delegitimising the opponent. From this perspective, the thesis argues that apart from negative advertising being a legitimate political advertising tactic, the criticism of ZANU-PF’s political communications as character assassination (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003) fails to acknowledge the murderous or discriminatory nature of the sign. The sign is by nature violent and because of this communications can never be used to claim that a party is dictatorial or democratic or nativist since it is war by its very nature (cf. Sonderling, 2013 & 2014; Jain, n.d).

The foregoing shows that negative evaluation of the other and positive evaluation of the self – a process that might involve what others criticise as character assassination (cf. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003) – is the essence of political advertising in an electoral context (cf. Waldahl, 2005; Jain, n.d). It is indeed the main endeavour of political branding whose goal is to gain voter appeal at the expense of the competition (cf. Downer, 2013; Jain, n.d). Given this background, it is not without merit to argue that criticism of ZANU-PF’s discourse as character assassination is simplistic and it fails to grapple with how the game is played in an electoral context where the intention is to gain maximum possible positive differentiation over the competition (cf. Downer, 2013; Jain, n.d).

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8.4 DIFFERENCE AND CONTEXT IN ZANU-PF’S STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE

The foregoing chapters show that, just like in any electoral contest, ZANU-PF uses its advertisements to justify its dominance through positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the opposition MDC-T. It largely utilised legitimation and de-legitimation to justify dominance, although this was achieved through several tactics that included boasting about its achievements and Mugabe’s expertise and negatively portraying the opposition, especially the MDC-T. Legitimation involves two complimentary strategies – the positive self-presentation or evaluation (beautifying the self) and negative presentation or evaluation of the other (uglifying the other) (Van Dijk, 1993; Chilton, 2004;: Van Leeuwen, 2007; Mazid, 2008; Cap, 2008 & Van Leeuwen, 2007, cited by Mazid, 2010). As Van Dijk (1993, p. 263) notes, ‘the justification of inequality involves two complimentary strategies, namely the positive representation of the own group, and the negative representation of the others’. The reproduction of dominance and/or justification of dominance are often achieved through attack or negative advertising and comparative advertising. However, in July 2013, as noted earlier, ZANU-PF largely refrained from crude attack advertising and relied heavily on comparative advertising, which some critics regard as a sub-type of negative advertising (cf. Pinkleton et al., 2002; Jasperson & Fan, 2002; Meirick, 2002; Lilleker, 2006; Kaid, 2012). The MDC-T, as noted earlier, also negatively branded ZANU-PF even though they also, like ZANU-PF, refrained from crude attack advertising. This duel between the two contending parties confirms Waldahl’s (2005) observation that in an electoral context, destroying an opponent’s credibility is as important, if not more important, as building up one’s own credibility. The political parties’ intention in utilising the strategy is gaining voter appeal over the opponent.

In its endeavour to gain voter appeal at the expense of the MDC-T, ZANU-PF positively branded the self whilst negatively branding the MDC-T. This was done with specific voter segments in mind, for example, portraying the MDC-T as an uncaring party that refused to cancel electricity bills and compensate depositors for their loss, was done with the urban voters in mind. The MDC-T advertisements in which ZANU-PF engaged in communicative battle, also sought to positively portray Tsvangirai and MDC-T while negatively portraying Mugabe and ZANU-PF. It is arguable that positive self-presentation

297 and negative presentation of the other is a standard procedure in political advertising/branding and is not symptomatic of a party’s dictatorial tendencies. The thesis therefore rejects critics’ attempts to create the impression that negative or attack advertising is a symptom of democratic deficiency in post-colonial Zimbabwe (cf. Ndlovu- Gatsheni, 2003; Kriger, 2005; Chitando, 2005). Instead, it argues that political communication is just like history, which as Derrida (2004) argues, is always produced by a process of difference. This negative advertising and/or comparative advertising is also practised in the neo-liberal Western democracies (cf. Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Pinkleton et al., 2002; Mierick, 2002); thus it is a legitimate political communication strategy in political contestation (cf. Waldahl, 2005).

Difference and/or differentiation are the foundations on which attempts to win consent are premised and dominance is justified or challenged. This process does not unequivocally show whether a party is democratic or dictatorial; thus, the thesis reiterates that discursive practices in an electoral context cannot be used to conclude that the post-colony is a reproduction of the colonial. Similarly, the same tactics of attack advertising (character assassination), comparative advertising and threatening messages cannot be used to conclude that African politics is undemocratic, irrational or the politics of chaos. It is even more plausible when considering that even in Western neo-liberal democracies negative advertising is utilised (cf. Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon & Valentino, 1994; Pinkleton et al., 2002; Jasperson & Fan, 2002; Meirick, 2002; Lilleker, 2006; Kaid, 2012) and fear is the ultimate mobilisation tool (cf. Zizek, 2007). Finally, the predominance of images of Mugabe in ZANU-PF political advertisements and in ZANU-PF political discourse cannot be indisputably used to justify the post-colonial theory claim that African politics is personal and patriarchal. These tactics that ZANU-PF utilises are just mere politicking and besides, the sign is murderous by its very nature.

The findings of the study also show that ZANU-PF crafts its election messages according to the context in which the election is being contested. It is thus a misnomer to use ZANU- PF discourse to argue that Zimbabwean politics is personal and patriarchal or to argue that the party’s utterances are nativism or grotesque nationalism. ZANU-PF’s acute awareness of the global gaze on the country, as reflected in its advertisements, shows

298 that the party adapts its discourse to the context in which the election will be taking place. It is capable of changing its colours, chameleon-like, to match its surrounding environs. As a sign it is very complex and slippery to the point of being ungraspable. It is thus arguable that in the process of retaining power, ZANU-PF has mastered the art of raiding society for the most politically profitable signs which they arbitrarily attach to their political products for purposes of hoodwinking voters.

Furthermore, in attempts to retain its hegemony, ZANU-PF goes against conventional political economy of the media theory and political advertising theory assumptions that advertisers do not associate with ideological enemies by placing the bulk of its advertisements for July 2013 in pro-opposition media (cf. Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Menon, 2008). The implication of this is that in political communication practice in Zimbabwe, hostile content does not stop political advertisers from placing their advertisements in a media organisation as long as it delivers the right prospects. The political economy theory and political advertising theory assumption that advertisers do not associate with ideological enemies does not hold water in Zimbabwean political communication practice. It is a fallacy. Political communication practice in Zimbabwe is a case of keeping the proverbial friend close and the enemy even closer.

8.5 DEMOCRACY, CULTURE AND RELIGION: STRANGE BED FELLOWS?

The study findings show that contradictory signs, both primordial and modern, sit side by side in ZANU-PF advertisements. For example, the implied meaning that Mugabe rules by divine right and is ‘father’ (baba) strangely sits side by side with reference to democracy and signs of democracy. These terms’ philosophical assumptions are located at opposite ends. On one hand, democracy is government of the people, by the people, for the people (Ake, 2000). It is rule by consent and is characterised by periodical free and fair elections where citizens willingly and freely elect their leaders. On the other hand, divine right assumes that the right to rule comes from the Almighty God. The idea of Mugabe as ‘father’ is also at variance with democracy since culturally one is not supposed to challenge one’s father as doing so is considered unAfrican and a sign of deviance (Moyo, 1992). The sign ‘baba’ is anachronistic to democracy (Moyo, 1992). From this

299 perspective, opposing Mugabe let alone not voting for him in an election, becomes unAfrican and sinful. This is at variance with the free will that is envisaged by democracy. Strangely, the free will of the people should confirm the divine plan to make Mugabe rule ‘narini’ (forever). This implies that, for ZANU-PF, elections are supposed to rubber stamp this divine decision. From this perspective, failure to vote Mugabe is not only unAfrican, unpatriotic and an act of selling out, but it is also sinful since it directly contradicts the dictates of God Almighty. Here, ZANU-PF tried to use religion, specifically Christianity and African Traditional Religion (ATR), to reproduce its dominance. These signs of democracy, African culture and Christianity were profitable for ZANU-PF during the July 2013 elections in a context where the MDC-T was promising people democracy, ridiculing Mugabe’s old age and his mismanagement of the country. The signs were meant to eliminate the MDC-T from the language game and they were influenced by the realities of the electoral context.

The use of religious signs by ZANU-PF was influenced by knowledge that Christianity and ATR are the two dominant religions in Zimbabwe. However, it is significant to note that sometimes the signs used by ZANU-PF may appear contradictory, but this is just part of its strategy to hoodwink citizens into voting for the party and its candidates. The use of religious signs by ZANU-PF is a confirmation of Chitando’s (2005) observation that Mugabe uses religion to persuade citizens to vote for him. He argues that in rural areas Mugabe uses ATR, whilst in urban areas he uses Christianity. This confirms the earlier observation that ZANU-PF uses primordial, modern and the post-modern symbols in its discourse.

8.6 IS A MULTIMODAL THEORY THE WAY TO GO IN STUDY OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ADVERTISING?

The thesis concludes that a multi-theoretical approach proposed in Chapter Three is relevant to the study of ZANU-PF advertisements as demonstrated by this study’s findings. The findings show that ZANU-PF utilises primordial and post-modern signs in its advertisements; signs that borrow from the West and the local present, past and future. Given this reality, the study concludes that any analysis of political communication

300 practice in Zimbabwe that utilises only Western theory and does not incorporate indigenous knowledge systems will inevitably result in an abyssal reading; a reading that considers the South as incomprehensible, irrational and characterised by the politics of chaos (cf. Houtondji, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Mbembe, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 2007). Such an approach will be unable to grapple with the meanings of signs specifically gleaned from the pre-colonial, colonial and contemporary indigenous signs. For example, Western theory alone will be unable to grapple with the significance and meanings of signs such as the Great Zimbabwe, Gushungo and the Zimbabwe bird. It is only a decolonial reading of such signs that would enable one to unravel their meanings in the practice of a seemingly Western-influenced post-colonial contestation for state power.

However, a decolonial reading that pretends that the Western disappears with the emergence of the indigenous will also result in simplistic celebratory scholarship that treats the West as the source of all evil (cf. Nakata et al., 2012; Moore, 2012). It may end up simplistically valorising anything and everything that appears indigenous. In order to avoid such pitfalls in attempts to fully grasp the meanings of signs utilised by ZANU-PF, the multi-theoretical approach proposed in this thesis is useful. It is an approach that, as the analysis chapter shows, debunks the tendency to view the South as incomprehensible and its politics as irrational (cf. (cf. Houtondji, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Mbembe, 2001; De Sousa Santos, 2007) while simultaneously avoiding the simplistic celebratory or admonishing tone of some pro-regime and anti-regime scholarship respectively (cf. Moore, 2012; Rwafa; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009). It enabled me to avoid the simplicity of both regime critics and regime praise singers (cf. Moore, 2012, p. 1) who treat the indigenous and the Western as mutually exclusive; yet both the indigenous and the Western were equally tainted by the colonial encounter (cf. Zeleza, 2006; Ahluwalia, 2001). The multi-theoretical approach suggested and utilised in this study has demonstrated that it offers something closer to a negotiable middle way or a balanced reading of the ‘other’ proposed by scholars (cf. Mbembe, 2001; Thomson, 2004; Appiah 1997; Nakata et al., 2012).

But since it is ‘…preposterous to suppose that there is a single African culture…’ (Appiah, 1997, p. 50) or a single African political system (cf. Mafeje, 1971; Allen, 1995; Comaroff

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& Comaroff, 1997; Appiah, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Hyden, 2006; Zeleza, 2006), the study makes no effort to argue that the theory proposed in this thesis is applicable to all African contexts. The study recognises that there is no typical African polity (Allen, 1995; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Ahluwalia, 2001; Thomson, 2004; Hyden 2006) and thus makes no effort to make ‘…conclusions [that] automatically apply to all or most African states…’ (Allen, 1995, p. 301). The theory also rejects the tendency to label the ZANU- PF discourse as character assassination, grotesque nationalism, patriotic history, nativism and Mugabeism (cf. Ranger, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003 & 2009) and argues that the discourse is not as static as implied by the foregoing characterisation, but fluid. The impossibility of transferring the theory and/or findings of the study to the whole of Africa is a limitation of the study. The other limitation is that the proposed approach is still hazy even though the study has demonstrated beyond doubt the need for it and has attempted to show how such an approach may work. But the approach or theory’s strength lies in its recognition of the fluidity of ZANU-PF discourses and the contexts within which ZANU-PF discourse were produced and circulated. The study’s thick description of context is the theory’s key strength since it enables other researchers to compare contexts and see whether the theory maybe applicable in their own contexts. The thick description of context and process that I provide enable the theory and methodology utilised in the study to be transferable to; and confirmable in, similar African contexts. Instead of my subjectivity as a Zimbabwean compromising the credibility of the study, it instead gave the study credibility since I grappled with my own biases during the analysis and interpretation of the themes and categories. I do not pretend that my being as a Zimbabwean who has lived under Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s rule does not affect my interpretation, but I actively explore how my subjectivity has a bearing on my personal interpretation of ZANU-PF discourse. This is important because in order to fully grasp the ZANU-PF discourse, and indeed any political party’s discourse, one needs to ground it in its local, regional and global context and to subject them to a theoretical analysis that borrows from post-colonial theory, decolonial theory and Western theory.

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8.7 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Other studies could focus on ZANU-PF discourses circulated through campaign rallies, especially the star rallies that are usually addressed by the party’s presidential candidate. One could examine the patterns of discourses utilised in rural rallies and those utilised in urban rallies to determine their meanings. Furthermore, opposition discourses as enunciated in their advertisements or campaign rallies could also be studied. The same framework utilised in this study could be useful if deployed in the study of ZANU-PF rallies or opposition rallies and advertisements. Whereas this study focused on the texts, other scholars could focus on the actual execution of ZANU-PF campaigns or the production processes of the campaign advertisements. In other words, an ethnographic study of ZANU-PF election campaigns could yield further insights into how the party executes its campaigns. In this regard, observations of the workings of ZANU-PF’s commissariat department – the department responsible for drawing up the party’s strategy – could very useful in understanding ZANU-PF discourse. The role of ZANU-PF and/or opposition proxies and the discourses they produce and circulate in an electoral context could also be studied. This is especially significant when one considers the role played by the pro- ZANU-PF The Heritage Trust in the July 2013 elections, where they produced and circulated pro-ZANU-PF advertisements. The advertisements they produced were a brazen attack on Tsvangirai’s alleged sexual shenanigans and all tended to mirror the ZANU-PF stance on homosexuality, indigenisation, the liberation struggle and patriotism. Similarly, post-election congratulatory advertisements placed in the mainstream media by parastatals and other ZANU-PF sympathisers could also yield useful insights, if studied, into the Zimbabwean political-economic-socio-cultural system and the role of Mugabe and the party in that system.

Other researchers could utilise ethnographic methods such as participant observation, non-participant observation and interviews to study ZANU-PF election discourse production processes. Such a methodology may yield rich data and/or thick descriptions.

Finally, as noted above, even though the thesis demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt the need for a new theory or approach of African political advertising, the approach is still

303 hazy. In this light, other researchers could clarify this still hazy new theory or approach suggested in this thesis.

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