Prudence Or Peril?

Nuclear First Use Prudence or Peril? By STEPHEN J. CIMBALA pen discussion of the possible in open discussion by Russian and NATO that Russia will use armed force to defend its first use of nuclear weapons, military leaders about policies with respect own and its allies’ sovereignty and territorial against terrorists or other to the first use of nuclear weapons. Although integrity. It may resort to a pre-emptive nuclear Otargets, is becoming more some dismiss this rhetoric as repetition of strike in cases specified by its doctrine.”1 acceptable in American, North Atlantic past points about Russian or NATO doctrine, Experts immediately cautioned that Bal- Treaty Organization (NATO), and Russian the frequency of public declamation on issues uyevsky was restating the “traditional” position policy circles. Presumably intended on all normally treated as internal military matters of Russia since the end of the Cold War and sides as an example of rhetorical deterrence bears scrutiny. that the message was consistent with the 2000 or reassurance, declaratory policies of nuclear In a speech at Russia’s Academy of Mili- military doctrine of the Russian Federation. first use or first strike carry prospective tary Sciences on January 19, 2008, General In contrast to the Cold War declaratory policy costs and risks. These costs and risks might Yuri Baluyevksy, chief of the general staff of of the Soviet Union, Russia’s military doctrine increase if the spread of nuclear weapons, the Russian armed forces, noted that Russia includes the option of nuclear first use or first especially in Asia, is not contained within would use its military power to uphold its strike in a conventional war involving attacks present boundaries. In addition, the unfortu- interests in a variety of situations. He empha- on Russian state territory or otherwise threat- nate possibility of ambiguous lines between sized that, if necessary, Russia would strike ening to Russia’s vital interests. nuclear first use and first strike, and equally preemptively, not excluding the possible use On the other hand, it was possible to indistinct lines between preemption and of nuclear weapons in a first strike. According interpret Baluyevsky’s statement as a more preventive war, has the potential to turn one to Baluyevsky, “We are not going to attack assertive affirmation of the right of nuclear first state’s deterrent into another’s provocation. anyone, but we want all our partners to realize use than hitherto made by Russia’s military Is nuclear first use, especially as a matter of command. The question remained open with declaratory policy, a necessary option or an respect to the particular circumstances of an unacceptable risk—or both? attack and how Russia would define its “interests” and “sovereignty” as having been affected. Overtures Former Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov In the United States and Russia, 2008 is reportedly considers as quite defensible the a Presidential election year. These events were carrying out of presumably preemptive or pre- foreseen. Less anticipated has been the upsurge ventive nuclear strikes against terrorists. Other Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor Nuclear fireball from 23-kiloton test of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State detonation, Nevada Test Site, 1953 University–Brandywine. Department of Energy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 51, 4th quarter 2008 / JFQ 27 FORUM | Nuclear First Use: Prudence or Peril? high ranking Ministry of Defense officials have long-range delivery systems, will take note. For warning, command and control, and missile also discussed this option.2 example, China’s official policy with respect to defense.9 Similar discussions about nuclear pre- the use of nuclear weapons is one of “no first emptive or preventive attacks have been taking use.” On the other hand, new doctrine for the Caveats and Complexities place in Western circles. In a report prepared use of missiles in warfare notes that a strategy Russian and NATO interest in the pos- by five prominent former U.S. and allied of “active defense” can include sudden “first sibility of preemption, and in making more NATO generals calling for “root and branch” strikes” in campaigns or battles as well as “coun- explicit the existence of preemption against ter- reform of the Alliance, the authors contend terattacks in self defense” into enemy territory.6 rorists or other nonstate actors, is quite under- that NATO must be ready to resort to a pre- In addition, a vigorous debate has standable. In the aftermath of 9/11 and other emptive nuclear attack to halt the “imminent” appeared among Chinese military and civil- high profile terrorist attacks in the United States spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass ians about the viability of China’s no first use and Europe, the “war on terror” has carried destruction.3 The authors—including retired policy—partly in the context of U.S. conven- NATO military operations into Afghanistan General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman tional military capabilities for long-range, and realigned U.S. military thinking and plan- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Supreme precision strike against Chinese nuclear ning along the lines of asymmetrical warfare. Allied Commander, Europe, and counter- forces. According to one American expert on Russia, also victimized by costly terrorist attacks parts from Britain, France, Germany, and the the Chinese military: since 9/11 and fighting against terrorists and Netherlands—contended that a first strike insurgents in Chechnya, is as concerned as the nuclear option remained an “indispensable They [People’s Liberation Army military United States and NATO countries in regard to instrument” since there was “simply no realistic thinkers] fear that a conventional attack possible terrorist WMD use. Both NATO and prospect of a nuclear-free world.”4 In a possibly on China’s strategic missile forces could Russian leaders recognize that nuclear weapons oxymoronic or fatalistic construction with render China vulnerable and leave it in the hands of terrorists create an unacceptable regard to future NATO options, the authors without a deterrent. This has led to a debate risk of a catastrophic attack.10 noted that the “first use of nuclear weapons in China among civilian strategic think- Acknowledgement of the peril created by must remain in the quiver of escalation as ers and military leaders on the viability terrorists with nuclear weapons or other WMD the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of of the announced “no-first-use” policy on does not necessarily lead to the conclusion weapons of mass destruction.”5 nuclear weapons. Some strategists advocate that nuclear preemption against such targets As in the case of Baluyevsky’s statement departing from the “no-first-use” policy and is a valid choice. There are several points to about Russian doctrine, the NATO generals’ responding to conventional attacks on stra- be considered. First, the United States now manifesto about nuclear first use can be inter- tegic forces with nuclear missiles.7 holds the high card with respect to long-range, preted in either of two ways: as a restatement, conventional precision strike capabilities, sup- perhaps with brio, of existing doctrine; or, to A further concern for U.S. military ported by mastery of the information and elec- the contrary, as a slight movement of the pen- observers is the apparent mixing of nuclear, tronics spectra. Given accurate intelligence and dulum of usable military options further away nuclear-capable, and conventionally armed targeting information, the United States and from the “nuclear taboo” and toward an explicit missiles within the same operational and therefore NATO can strike across continents or oceans and against virtually any target with near impunity and unprecedented accuracy. Russia’s military doctrine includes the option of nuclear first use Second, nuclear weapons cause col- or first strike in a conventional war involving attacks on Russian lateral damage that may be unacceptable to state territory or otherwise threatening to Russia’s vital interests the user. The first use of nuclear weapons in anger since Nagasaki would bring interna- preference for nuclear preemption or preven- tactical units. As Larry Wortzel has noted, tional inquiries, and possibly recrimination, tion under certain conditions. The implication the decision “to put nuclear and conven- for the perpetrator. Even tactical or “mini” that either NATO or Russia might authorize tional warheads on the same classes of bal- nuclear weapons would cause civilian casual- the first use of nuclear weapons against non- listic missiles and collocate them near each ties in unknown numbers. And if, in the state actors who were planning attacks with other in firing units of the Second Artillery aftermath of a nuclear preemption for the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and/or Corps also increases the risk of accidental sake of counterterrorism, the target were against states harboring such terrorists, was not nuclear conflict.”8 Related to this concern misidentified or the intelligence were flawed, unknown in military planning studies. But the about accidental or inadvertent nuclear war the damage to the credibility of the attacker, public advertisement for such drastic military or escalation are the doctrinal emphases in in political and in moral terms, would be options has seemed to reach a higher decibel People’s Liberation Army and Second Artil- inestimable. For example, a preemptive of recognition outside of professional military lery thinking on the massing of decisive nuclear attack on the pharmaceutical plant in circles. missile fires with surprise in a theater war; Sudan in 1998, whose operators were alleg- American, NATO, and Russian declara- ambiguity about the kinds of warheads used edly in cahoots with al Qaeda and engaged in tory and operational policies with respect to in ballistic missile attacks on naval battle making or storing biological weapons, would nuclear first use are of interest not only to their groups; and increasing Chinese interest in have been worse than an embarrassment respective internal audiences.

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