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Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies (September 1985) Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies September 1985 NTIS order #PB86-182961 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense Tech- nologies, OTA-ISC-254 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep- tember 1985). Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600586 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 Foreword President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative has kindled a national de- bate over the roles of strategic offensive nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses, and arms control in U.S. national security policy. It has also underscored the im- portant ramifications of U.S. military space policy. At the requests of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate For- eign Relations Committee, OTA undertook an assessment of the opportunities and risks involved in an accelerated program of research on new ballistic missile defense technologies, including those that might lead to deployment of weapons in space. Debate over the relevant political, military, and technical issues has been hotly contested by participants with widely varying assumptions and points of view. OTA has not attempted to resolve the debate, but rather to try to clarify the issues and enhance the level of discourse. This report examines both the “why” and the “what” of ballistic missile defenses. Why would we want ballistic missile defense weapons if we could have them? Would the advantages of deploying them outweigh the disadvantages? What technologies are under investigation for BMD applications? How might those applications serve our strategic goals? These policy and technology questions in- teract with one another in complex ways: what seems technologically possible con- ditions perceptions of policy options, while policy choices shape technological pursuits. Closely related to BMD technology issues are questions about the develop- ment and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Whether or not the United States decides to deploy BMD systems in space, the other military uses of space will continue to be of national importance. How might the United States deal with the potential threat of current and future Soviet anti-satellite weapons to U.S. military space activities? After consultation with the staffs of the requesting com- mittees, OTA decided to prepare a companion report, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control. The relative role each of those elements (the weapons, the countermeasures, and arms control) plays will be strongly affected by the course followed in the development and deployment of space-based BMD systems. OTA gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the many individuals, firms, laboratories, and government agencies who assisted its research and writing for this report. #. Director . Advisory Panel on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies Guyford Steve, Chairman President, Universities Research Associates Solomon Buchsbaum Michael M. May Executive Vice President Associate Director-at-Large AT&T Bell Labs Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Ashton Carter H. Alan Pike Kennedy School of Government Program Manager, Space Stations Harvard University Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Robert Clem Frederick Seitz Director of Systems Sciences President Emeritus Sandia National Laboratories The Rockefeller University Sidney D. Drell Robert Selden Deputy Director Associate Director for Theoretical and Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Computational Physics Los Alamos National Laboratory Daniel J. Fink President Marshall D. Shulman D. J. Fink Associates, Inc. Director Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of Richard Garwin the Soviet Union IBM Fellow Columbia University Thomas J. Watson Research Center Ambassador Gerard C. Smith Noel Gayler, Admiral, USN (Ret.) President American Committee on East-West Accord Consultants International Group, Inc. Colin Gray Sayre Stevens President Vice President National Institute for Public Policy System Planning Corp. George Jeffs Maj. General John Toomay, USAF (Ret.) President Consultant North American Space Operations, Rockwell International Seymour Zeiberg Vice President General David Jones, USAF (Ret.) Research and Engineering Operations Former Chairman Martin Marietta Aerospace Joint Chiefs of Staff Robert S. McNamara Former President of the World Bank NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The views expressed in this OTA report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment. Participation on the Advisory Panel does not imply endorsement of the report. iv OTA Project Staff on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA Energy, Materials, and International Security Division Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager Thomas H. Karas, Project Director Michael Callaham Richard DalBello Gerald Epstein Anthony Fainbergl Robert Rochlin2 Alan Shaw Contractors Fredrick Drugan William Green Brian McCue Administrative Staff Jannie Coles Dorothy Richroath Jackie Robinson ISince February 1985. ‘On detail from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Workshop on Soviet Military Doctrine and BMD (December 1984) Raymond Garthoff Stephen Meyer The Brookings Institution Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Daniel Goure Science Applications International Corp. Harriet Fast Scott David Holloway Edward Warner Center for International Security and The RAND Corp. Arms Control Stanford University Participating Members of Advisory Panel Marshall D. Shulman Sayre Stevens H. Guyford Stever Contents Chapter Page I. Executive Summary . 3 2. Introduction... 37 3. Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now . 45 4. Deterrence, U.S. Nuclear Strategy, and BMD . 67 5. BMD Capabilities and the Strategic Balance . 93 6. Crisis Stability, Arms Race Stability, and Arms Control Issues . .119 7. Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies . .......139 8. Feasibility . ...197 9. Alternative Future Scenarios . .221 IO. Alternative R&D Programs. .239 Appendix A. Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty. ..., . .......263 B. Texts of the 1982 ABM Treaty, Its Agreed Interpretations, and Its 1976 Protocol . .272 C. Effects of BMD Deployment on Existing Arms Control Treaties . .283 D. Defense Requirements for Assured Survival . ...285 E. Defense Capability Levels and U.S. Strategy Choices . .............290 F. BMD and the Military Budget . .292 G. Studies of the High Frontier Global Ballistic Missile Defense I. .. ....294 H. Excerpts From Statements on BMD by Reagan Administration Officials . ............297 I. List of Reagan Administration Statements on BMD, . .. ...308 J. Articles by Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative. .............310 K. Excerpts From Soviet Statements on BMD ., ., . ..........312 L. References on Strategic Nuclear Policy . ...,316 M. References on Soviet Strategic Policy . ..320 N. Glossary of Acronyms and Terms. , . .321 vi; Chapter 1 Executive Summary Page The Presidential Challenge . 3 The BMD R&D Debate . 4 Goals . 4 Technical Feasibility . 5 Arms Control.. 6 Alternative BMD Research Programs . 7 Soviet BMD Research and Comparison With U.S. Research . 9 Issues for R&D Programs . 12 1. Maintenance of the ABM Treaty . 12 2. Requirements for Arms Control . 13 3. Anti-Satellite Weapon Arms Control . 13 4. R&D/Deployment Coupling . 14 5. Technology Experiments . 14 6. Research and Development of Offensive Forces . 15 ‘7. Relations With Allies . 15 8. Technology Transfer . 15 Deployment Issues . 16 &it&ion 1: Potential Role in U.S. Nuclear Strategy 17 Criterion: Crisis Stability . 20 Criterion: Arms Race Stability and Arms Control. 22 Criterion: Diplomatic Stability . 23 Criterion: Feasibility . ... 24 Criterion: cost . 28 Concluding Remarks. , . 31 Debated Issues . 31 OTA Findings . ..,. 32 Table Table No. Page I-I. Hypothetical Multi-Layered BMD System. 27 Chapter 1 Executive Summary THE PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGE President Reagan’s speech of March 23, missile defense technologies. This research 1983, renewed a national debate that had been program was called the “Strategic Defense intense in the late 1960s but much subdued Initiative” (SDI). since 1972. Wouldn’t the United States be If there were a national consensus on the more secure attempting to defend its national territory against ballistic missiles while the role, if any, ballistic missile defense (BMD) should play in our national strategy, assess- Soviet Union did the same? Or would it be more secure attempting to keep such defenses ing the likelihood of attaining the necessary largely banned by agreement with the Soviet capabilities at an acceptable cost would be dif- ficult enough. There is extensive controversy Union? over the potential of various BMD technol- The President posed the question, ogies and the possibilities for applying them in affordable weapons systems that would be What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest effective against a Soviet offensive threat which upon the threat of instant retaliation to de- includes countermeasures to our defenses. But ter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept there is also extensive controversy over wheth- and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before er various levels of ballistic missile defense ca- they reached our own soil or that of our pability, if attainable, would be desirable. A allies?’ fair assessment
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