The Ups and Dow ns of Counterforce

Strategic Air Command B-52s launch seconds apart, dem- ostrating the MITO—minimum interval takeoff—formation capability needed to respond to a combat alert. DOD photo by SSgt. Phil Schmitten

58 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 A big issue in the was whether nuclear weapons should be targeted mainly on the enemy force or on the enemy’s cities. The Ups and Dow ns of Counterforce By John T. Correll

he early atomic bombs were crude could be done with simpler capabilities. Army Chief of Staff in 1955, he called for city-busters. They weighed more It was the forerunner of “Assured De- “flexible response,” with less emphasis Tthan 5,000 pounds each, and, in the struction,” the balance-of-terror doctrine on strategic airpower and more emphasis years immediately following World which held that each side should have on conventional ground forces. War II, the had only a just enough nuclear force to destroy the Taylor was unable to sell his pro- few of them. At that point, not much other as a viable society. gram. Disgruntled, he retired and wrote deep thinking had gone into the devel- The Air Force advocated counter- a book, The Uncertain Trumpet. It was opment of a . force. “It makes a great difference laden with complaints about the Air In the 1950s, the United States adopted whether victory is sought by the de- Force and about the Army’s reduced a policy of “,” rely- population of a nation or by the disarm- share of the defense budget. ing on airpower and the threat of a full ing of a nation,” said Gen. Nathan F. In one astounding passage, Taylor nuclear counterattack to deter nuclear Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, in said with disdain, “The Air Force sees aggression by the . a February 1954 speech. “We can now our principal danger in the growing Real options on how to employ nuclear aim directly to disarm an enemy rather strategic air and missile forces of the weapons did not emerge until the middle than to destroy him as was so often Soviet Union.” 1950s, when the bombs became smaller necessary in wars of the past.” Taylor said the requirement for and more powerful. By the end of the Nuclear targeting had moved well strategic retaliatory force could be decade, nuclear warheads were compact beyond city-busting. Strategic Air met by “a few hundred reliable and enough for delivery not only by bombers Command’s first priority was the accurate missiles, supplemented by a but also by fighter aircraft and long-range enemy’s atomic capability. Second decreasing number of bombers.” ballistic missiles. priority was counterair strikes to retard The Navy, whose strategic role and There were two basic targeting con- the advance of Soviet ground forces. budget share had been diminished by cepts: counterforce and . Third priority was destruction of the the rise of the Air Force, also advo- Counterforce emphasized strikes on the enemy’s “war sustaining resources.” cated a strategy of a minimum force enemy’s military forces, installations, for deterrence. In 1959, the Navy tried and assets. Countervalue, also called Minimum Deterrence to seize the strategic nuclear mission, countercity early on, centered on the The Army and the Navy were more arguing that the retaliatory power to enemy’s economy and population. inclined toward countercity targeting. destroy 100 to 200 Soviet population Countervalue was easier, cheaper, and When Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor became centers was enough and that 45 Polaris

AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 59 to the SIOP in April 1962 allowed for more flexibility and emphasized AP photo counterforce targets. McNamara announced the change to NATO leaders in May 1962. The Euro- peans, especially the French, did not like These photos show the departure from Massive Retaliation. the city of Nagasaki, Japan, before (top) They wanted a full response by the US and after (bottom) nuclear deterrent linked automatically the atomic bomb to an attack on Europe. attack that helped A month later, McNamara was the end World War II. This bomb and the few de- commencement speaker at the Universi- veloped immediately ty of Michigan. He gave the same speech after the war were he had given to the NATO ministers, crude city-busters. minus the classified targeting data. “The US has come to the conclu- sion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past,” McNamara said. “That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy’s forces, not of his civilian population.” SIOP-63, adopted in the fall of 1962, incorporated that view. Most of the submarines would “come close” to the in February 1961. (McNamara did not US nuclear weapons were targeted on total deterrent force required. like the term “counterforce,” and he Soviet forces. Only 18 percent were The Navy proposal appealed to the eventually banned it from use in the targeted on cities and industry. economizers, but was judged too risky. Pentagon.) In 1960, the Joint Strategic Target He did not say much in public about McNamara’s Switch Planning Staff was created to control Counterforce/No Cities but a revision For reasons that are not altogether the targeting of both Air Force and Navy strategic weapons. The JSTPS director was the commander in chief of Strategic Air Command.

“Counterforce/No Cities” President Kennedy rejected the Sin- gle Integrated Operational Plan—the Defense Secretary nuclear war plan for strategic forces—in Robert McNamara effect when he took office. It called for (left) meets with Presi- firing nuclear weapons in a single flush dent John Kennedy in the event of a Soviet attack. and Gen. Maxwell

Taylor, who had been AP photo/John Kennedy Library F. and Museum “Our strength may be tested at many recalled by Ken- levels,” Kennedy said in his 1962 State nedy to active duty as of the Union address. “We intend to Chairman of the Joint have at all times the capacity to resist Chiefs of Staff. McNa- non-nuclear or limited attacks—as a mara shifted strategy toward “counterforce,” complement to our nuclear capacity, wanting more options not as a substitute. We have rejected short of “spasm war.” any all-or-nothing posture which would European allies were leave no choice but inglorious retreat not happy with the de- parture from massive or unlimited retaliation.” retaliation. McNamara Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, himself soon repented Robert S. McNamara, was likewise and switched his repelled by the SIOP, which he re- support back to city garded as “spasm war.” He had re- busting. cently gotten a detailed presentation on “Counterforce/No Cities,” and he made that the official targeting doctrine

60 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 clear, McNamara began to repent of his conversion to counterforce. For one thing, the services—especially the Air AP photo Force—could use it to justify budget increases. He was also persuaded by the argument that nuclear war was best prevented by the sheer horror of an all-out exchange. In December 1963, McNamara switched his support to Assured De- struction, although the change was not announced until February 1965. Assured Destruction was a reflexive revenge doctrine. After absorbing a nuclear strike, the United States would retain enough retaliatory power to de- stroy the aggressor. The target was the enemy population. The logic of Assured Destruction was that it must be suicidal for both sides, leaving no motive for the aggressor to attack in the first place. It would have been a return to “spasm war” except for one thing: McNamara neglected to change SIOP-63. Assured Destruction never went into actual The 1965 Moscow parade commemorating the 20th anniversary of VE Day featured effect. Nevertheless, McNamara’s es- this display of a Soviet ICBM. While America debated counterforce, the Soviets pousal of Assured Destruction estab- pressed their efforts to achieve strategic superiority. lished a rallying point for those who wanted to limit US strategic forces. McNamara and his aides set about MAD was supposed to be a pejorative missiles in 1969, but their objective was the grisly task of setting a standard term, but McNamara came to accept it not parity. When they pulled even in for Assured Destruction. How much and sometimes used it himself. “It’s not ICBMs, they kept on building, both in devastation would a US counterattack mad!” he said in an interview with CNN numbers and quality. have to inflict in order to deter the in 1997. “Mutual Assured Destruction The huge SS-9 ICBM showed up in initial Russian attack? is the foundation of deterrence.” a parade in Moscow in 1964. It was “After careful study and debate,” said subsequently flown with three multiple McNamara aides Alain C. Enthoven and Retreat From Superiority independently targetable re-entry ve- K. Wayne Smith, “it was McNamara’s The United States prevailed in the hicles (MIRVs). While politicians in judgment, accepted by Presidents Ken- Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 because the United States argued in the 1970s nedy and Johnson, and not disputed by it had clear-cut strategic nuclear supe- about whether to make Minuteman the Congress, that the ability to destroy riority over the Soviet Union. The two more accurate, the Soviets introduced in retaliation 20 to 25 percent of the nations learned different lessons from four new ICBMs. Soviet population and 50 percent of its the experience and moved in opposite There was strong opposition to im- industrial capacity was sufficient.” directions. proving the US strategic force. A sense With the passage of time, McNama- The Soviet Union worked to close the of Congress resolution, sponsored by ra’s commitment to Assured Destruc- strategic nuclear gap, gain superiority, Sen. Edward W. Brooke III (R-Mass.), tion intensified. “It is important to and never again be caught behind. said that “neither the Soviet Union or understand that Assured Destruction The United States turned its back the United States should seek unilateral is the very essence of the whole de- on strategic superiority. It canceled advantage by developing counterforce terrence concept,” he said in a speech weapons programs, imposed a ceiling weapons which might be construed as in September 1967. “Our alert forces on its missile and bomber forces, and having a first strike potential.” alone carry more than 2,200 weapons, aimed for strategic parity with the The Soviet Union, which was the each averaging more than the explosive Soviet Union. only side then building a counter- equivalent of one megaton of TNT. Four Minuteman ICBM production was force capability, paid no attention to hundred of these delivered on the Soviet cut from 2,000 missiles to 1,600, then Brooke’s resolution. Union would be sufficient to destroy to 1,000. The United States capped its Paul C. Warnke, a longtime Wash- over one-third of her population and ICBM force at 1,054. The B-70 bomber ington liberal, said, “The fine tuning one-half of her industry.” was downgraded to R&D status, then of our nuclear weapons and delivery McNamara critic Donald G. Brennan killed. The Skybolt missile for the B-52 systems could create fears of coun- of the Hudson Institute stuck the prefix was canceled. The Advanced Manned terforce attack on the other side and “Mutual” onto Assured Destruction, Strategic Aircraft (later revived as the hence be destabilizing.” making it Mutual Assured Destruc- B-1 bomber) was sidelined. tion and creating the famous acronym, In Moscow, the outlook was different. Assessing Soviet Intentions MAD. The Soviets achieved parity in strategic McNamara had opined in 1965 that

AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 61 The issue flared up again in 1975, when the National Intelligence Estimate said SS-18s and SS-19s, the most ac- curate of the Soviet ICBMs, were not accurate enough to threaten the US By 1970, the USSR caught up with and Minuteman. passed the US in number of ICBMs. Team B After launcher In 1976, CIA Director George H.W. totals were capped by SALT I, the Bush appointed “Team B,” a panel of Soviets turned outsiders, to give an independent as- to increasing the sessment on whether Soviet strategic number of re-entry objectives were more ambitious and vehicles to expand more threatening than depicted in the their advantage. National Intelligence Estimate. Team B reported that the CIA es- timates tended “to play down the So- viet commitment to a war-winning capability” and “minimize the Soviet strategic buildup because of its implica- tions for detente, SALT negotiations, SOURCE: SOVIET MILITARY POWER 1983 and Congressional sentiments as well as for certain US forces.” Especially “there is no indication that the Soviets to “a major one-sided counterforce noteworthy, Team B said, was “the are seeking to develop a nuclear force as capability against the United States continued absence of recognition of large as ours.” The Central Intelligence ICBM force.” Soviet strategic counterforce emphasis Agency said, “We do not believe that The Air Force was not alone in and aspirations” in the National Intel- the USSR aims at matching the US in distrusting the CIA estimates. Both ligence Estimates. numbers of intercontinental delivery Schlesinger and President Richard The Team B report set off a great vehicles. Recognition that the US Nixon “felt that the CIA’s analysts uproar from liberal commentators, who would detect and match or overmatch reflected the bias of the liberal intel- said that Team B was wrong and that it such an effort, together with economic lectual and academic communities at was all a right-wing trick to undercut constraints, appears to have ruled out large,” Pulitzer Prize-winning author detente. this option.” Thomas Powers said in his biography The minimizers hoped that their views The CIA forecast that the Soviet of CIA Director Richard Helms. about Soviet military power would pre- Union would have no more than 400 to 700 operational ICBMs by 1970. (In fact, the Soviets had 1,440 ICBMs by 1970.) The CIA noted that Air Force Intelligence disagreed with both the evaluation of Soviet objectives and the projected number of Soviet ICBMs. AP photo by Jim Palmer The Air Force’s belief that the CIA understated the Soviet threat was a sticky point. In 1964, CIA Director John A. McCone sent McNamara a classified CIA report on Air Force dissent. “The Air Force has consistently taken the position of crediting the Soviets with a greater current and prospective capability than the other members of the Intelligence Community,” McCone said, asking McNamara “to handle this communication on a very personal basis.” Disagreement between the Air Force and the CIA persisted. By the early 1970s, the Russian ICBMs were of growing concern to the United States. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger said in 1974 that the combination of increased throw Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and President Richard Nixon share a light moment weight, increased accuracy, and MIRVs during the detente years. The Soviets had surpassed the American nuclear arsenal. on the new Soviet missiles was leading Nixon’s response was “strategic sufficiency.”

62 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 vail after the election of , but that did not happen. An article in The New York Review of Books bemoaned “the Carter Administration’s surrender to the notion of the vulnerability of its land-based missiles.” AP photo by Dennis Cook Indeed. The best defense thinker the Democrats had was Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, and some of his positions sounded a lot like Team B. “The Soviet Union’s approach to war is different from that of the US,” Brown said in 1979. “They desire and are seeking capabilities which would enable them to fight, win, and survive a nuclear exchange.”

Detente Ironically, it was Nixon, the arch foe of communism, who established de- President Reagan discarded detente and launched an aggressive program to match Soviet strength. Coupled with his Strategic Defense Initiative, the program con- tente—the relaxation of tension—with vinced Moscow that the US was moving toward a first-strike capability. the Soviet Union. When Nixon began his term in 1969, US strategic superiority was already The ABM Treaty was a big trophy “We face a wide range of possible gone. Always a realist, Nixon tailored for the factions in Congress and the actions involving nuclear weapons, his foreign and defense policies to the news media that opposed counterforce. and no single response is appropriate situation. During his first months in of- They had waged an intensive campaign to them all,” Schlesinger said. “To fice, he adopted the planning principle of on behalf of the treaty. Ballistic mis- threaten to blow up all of an opponent’s “Strategic Sufficiency” instead of trying sile defense went against the precepts cities, short of an attack on our cities, to restore strategic superiority. of Mutual Assured Destruction. The is hardly an acceptable strategy, and In 1974, Strategic Sufficiency was devastation had to be mutual and as- in most circumstances the credibility refined by Schlesinger into a more pre- sured. Anything else was destabilizing of the threat would be close to zero, cise concept called “Essential Equiva- and stimulated the arms race. especially against a nation which could lence.” Schlesinger said, “There must retaliate against our cities in kind.” be essential equivalence between the Nuclear Options and Strategies The Carter Administration estab- strategic forces of the United States and In 1970, Nixon described the in- lished the “Countervailing Strategy” the USSR—an equivalence perceived flexibility of options for response to in July 1980. Brown chose his words not only by ourselves, but by the Soviet a nuclear attack. He sounded much carefully, acknowledging Assured De- Union and Third World audiences as like Kennedy had in 1962. struction without being hemmed in well.” “Should a President, in the event by it. Schlesinger’s successors, Donald H. of nuclear attack, be left with the “What has come to be known as Rumsfeld and Harold Brown, followed single option of ordering the mass Assured Destruction is the bedrock of the same basic approach. destruction of enemy civilians, in nuclear deterrence, and we will retain In the Ford Administration, Rums- the face of the certainty that it would such a capacity in the future,” Brown feld—in his first tour as Secretary of be followed by the mass slaughter of said. However, it was also necessary Defense—recast the concept slightly, Americans?” Nixon asked. “Should to “have plans for attacks which pose calling it “Rough Equivalence.” the concept of assured destruction be a more credible threat than an all-out Brown returned to the formulation narrowly defined and should it be the attack on Soviet industry and cities. of Essential Equivalence. It required, only measure of the variety of threats These plans should include options Brown said, that “our overall forces be we may face?” to attack the targets that comprise the at least on a par with those of the Soviet Assured Destruction had taken its Soviet military force structure and Union and also that they be recognized toll on the planning process. Failure to political power structure and to hold to be essentially equivalent.” improve the accuracy of US missiles back a significant reserve.” The biggest innovation affecting had reduced their effectiveness against Brown later said, “The counter- the strategic balance came from a new Soviet military targets, which were vailing strategy is less of a departure direction: arms control. In 1972, Nixon now hardened and more numerous. from previous doctrine than is often and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev The “Limited Nuclear Options” claimed.” signed two agreements. The SALT I strategy adopted in 1974 included treaty froze the number of strategic an explicit return to counterforce. It The Strategic Triad nuclear missiles at existing levels provided for “selected nuclear opera- President appointed for five years, and the ABM treaty tions to seek early war termination ... a bipartisan commission, headed by limited each side to two antiballistic at the lowest level of conflict possible” Brent Scowcroft, national security missile sites. if deterrence failed. advisor in the Ford Administration,

AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 63 to examine strategic force require- armament Agency and deputy director the US Peacekeeper and the Russian ments. at the CIA. SS-18 and SS-24, though the treaty The Soviets “probably possess the The counterforce capability for never entered into force. necessary combination of ICBM num- MX was supposedly dangerous and At a summit meeting in 2002, bers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead objectionable, whereas the Russian the United States and Russia agreed yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047 missile counterforce was nothing to that each side would cut its nuclear US ICBM silos, using only a portion of get excited about. stockpile to 2,200 or fewer deployed their own ICBM force,” the Scowcroft warheads by 2012. Commission reported in 1983. Ash Heap of History So far, the Russians have eliminated “The US ICBM force now deployed Reagan revoked the policy of detente more than half of the ICBMs they in- cannot inflict similar damage, even and threw out strategic parity as an herited from the Soviet Union. Their using the entire force. Only the 550 objective. He did not believe the Cold long-range plan is to field an ICBM MIRVed Minuteman III missiles in War should be—or had to be—strung force consisting completely of SS-27 the US ICBM force have relatively out in a permanent . Topol Ms. The last of the Peacekeep- good accuracy, but the combination Reagan requested and got a large ers was withdrawn last month and the of accuracy and yield of their three increase to the defense budget. He US ICBM fleet now consists of 500 warheads is inadequate to put at described the Soviet Union as an “evil Minuteman IIIs. serious risk more than a small share empire” and said that Marxism-Lenin- The United States has been careful of the many hardened targets in the ism was headed for the “ash heap of to preserve a capability to attack and Soviet Union. Most Soviet hardened history.” destroy hardened military targets. targets—of which ICBM silos are only Reagan also launched the Strategic Writing for the Arms Control Associa- a portion—could withstand attacks by Defense Initiative, an R&D program tion, Janne Nolan said that “prompt our other strategic missiles.” for defense against counterforce remains the sacrosanct The Soviets did not have a clear shot attack. There was widespread doubt, in principle of American nuclear strat- at the US strategic force. Each leg of the defense community and elsewhere, egy.” the strategic triad—bombers, ICBMs, that SDI would work. In Foreign Policy earlier this year, and submarine-launched ballistic mis- The Soviets took SDI seriously. McNamara denounced US nuclear siles—had particular strengths and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, former weapons policy as “immoral, illegal, weaknesses. This diversity made it chief of the General Staff, said in 1990 militarily unnecessary, and dreadfully difficult for an enemy to simultane- the Russians did not expect SDI to dangerous.” ously attack or defend against all create a perfect shield against ICBM “For decades, US nuclear forces three legs. attack, but they did believe it was a have been sufficiently strong to absorb Still, land-based missiles were broad technology offensive meant to a first strike and then inflict ‘unac- vulnerable. To strengthen its ICBM overcome the Soviet Union militarily ceptable’ damage on an opponent,” force, the United States planned to and ruin it financially. McNamara said. “This has been and deploy the MX missile—subsequently The Soviet Union was tottering in (so long as we face a nuclear-armed, called Peacekeeper—supplemented by the 1980s, but the Soviet strategic potential adversary) must continue a small, road-mobile missile dubbed buildup continued. The heavy SS-18 to be the foundation of our nuclear “Midgetman.” was the key weapon in the fleet, but deterrent.” Plans for the MX basing mode in 1985, the Russians introduced two McNamara’s recollections and opin- moved from Multiple Protective Shel- mobile missiles, the SS-24 and the SS- ions aside, the US has not depended on ters (“the shell game”) to Closely 25. The expectation was that within a that kind of strategy for a long time. Spaced Basing (“dense pack”), to few years, half the Soviet ICBM force No one knows where or when the deployment in existing Minuteman would consist of mobile missiles. next strategic nuclear challenge might silos—as an interim step on the way For the United States, Peacekeeper arise, but the current nuclear triad of toward Rail Garrison basing (on warn- achieved initial operational capability in bombers (including stealthy B-2s), ing, the missiles would move out of 1986, and the effectiveness of Minute- improved Minuteman IIIs, and modern their garrisons onto the railroads). man and the bomber force against hard- SLBMs is an effective deterrent against The Cold War ended before Rail ened military targets was increased. nuclear threats—and it offers flexibil- Garrison was established. The end of Neither side completed its strategic ity and options in time of crisis. the Cold War also overtook Midget- modernization program. The Soviet That, not assured destruction of the man, the small road-mobile ICBM Union collapsed in 1991 and the Cold enemy’s cities, has been and still is the with a single warhead. War was over. objective of US nuclear strategy. ■ The counterforce features of the MX Peacekeeper drew fierce attacks from After the Cold War See the Air Force Association study the strategic minimizers. Arms control negotiations contin- “The Air Force and the Cold War,” “President Reagan’s decision on the ued. The START II treaty in 1993 from which this article is adapted, at MX missile signals that the United directed the phased elimination of www.afa.org. States is now firmly and publicly embarked on a first-strike nuclear policy,” complained Herbert Scoville Jr., president of the Arms Control John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now Association and formerly assistant a contributing editor. His most recent article, “The Air Force and the Cold War: A director of the Arms Control and Dis- Chronology, 1945-91,” appeared in the September issue.

64 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005