The Ups and Dow ns of Counterforce Strategic Air Command B-52s launch seconds apart, dem- ostrating the MITO—minimum interval takeoff—formation capability needed to respond to a combat alert. DOD photo by SSgt. Phil Schmitten 58 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 A big issue in the Cold War was whether nuclear weapons should be targeted mainly on the enemy force or on the enemy’s cities. The Ups and Dow ns of Counterforce By John T. Correll he early atomic bombs were crude could be done with simpler capabilities. Army Chief of Staff in 1955, he called for city-busters. They weighed more It was the forerunner of “Assured De- “flexible response,” with less emphasis Tthan 5,000 pounds each, and, in the struction,” the balance-of-terror doctrine on strategic airpower and more emphasis years immediately following World which held that each side should have on conventional ground forces. War II, the United States had only a just enough nuclear force to destroy the Taylor was unable to sell his pro- few of them. At that point, not much other as a viable society. gram. Disgruntled, he retired and wrote deep thinking had gone into the devel- The Air Force advocated counter- a book, The Uncertain Trumpet. It was opment of a nuclear strategy. force. “It makes a great difference laden with complaints about the Air In the 1950s, the United States adopted whether victory is sought by the de- Force and about the Army’s reduced a policy of “Massive Retaliation,” rely- population of a nation or by the disarm- share of the defense budget. ing on airpower and the threat of a full ing of a nation,” said Gen. Nathan F. In one astounding passage, Taylor nuclear counterattack to deter nuclear Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, in said with disdain, “The Air Force sees aggression by the Soviet Union. a February 1954 speech. “We can now our principal danger in the growing Real options on how to employ nuclear aim directly to disarm an enemy rather strategic air and missile forces of the weapons did not emerge until the middle than to destroy him as was so often Soviet Union.” 1950s, when the bombs became smaller necessary in wars of the past.” Taylor said the requirement for and more powerful. By the end of the Nuclear targeting had moved well strategic retaliatory force could be decade, nuclear warheads were compact beyond city-busting. Strategic Air met by “a few hundred reliable and enough for delivery not only by bombers Command’s first priority was the accurate missiles, supplemented by a but also by fighter aircraft and long-range enemy’s atomic capability. Second decreasing number of bombers.” ballistic missiles. priority was counterair strikes to retard The Navy, whose strategic role and There were two basic targeting con- the advance of Soviet ground forces. budget share had been diminished by cepts: counterforce and countervalue. Third priority was destruction of the the rise of the Air Force, also advo- Counterforce emphasized strikes on the enemy’s “war sustaining resources.” cated a strategy of a minimum force enemy’s military forces, installations, for deterrence. In 1959, the Navy tried and assets. Countervalue, also called Minimum Deterrence to seize the strategic nuclear mission, countercity early on, centered on the The Army and the Navy were more arguing that the retaliatory power to enemy’s economy and population. inclined toward countercity targeting. destroy 100 to 200 Soviet population Countervalue was easier, cheaper, and When Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor became centers was enough and that 45 Polaris AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 59 to the SIOP in April 1962 allowed for more flexibility and emphasized AP photo counterforce targets. McNamara announced the change to NATO leaders in May 1962. The Euro- peans, especially the French, did not like These photos show the departure from Massive Retaliation. the city of Nagasaki, Japan, before (top) They wanted a full response by the US and after (bottom) nuclear deterrent linked automatically the atomic bomb to an attack on Europe. attack that helped A month later, McNamara was the end World War II. This bomb and the few de- commencement speaker at the Universi- veloped immediately ty of Michigan. He gave the same speech after the war were he had given to the NATO ministers, crude city-busters. minus the classified targeting data. “The US has come to the conclu- sion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past,” McNamara said. “That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy’s forces, not of his civilian population.” SIOP-63, adopted in the fall of 1962, incorporated that view. Most of the submarines would “come close” to the in February 1961. (McNamara did not US nuclear weapons were targeted on total deterrent force required. like the term “counterforce,” and he Soviet forces. Only 18 percent were The Navy proposal appealed to the eventually banned it from use in the targeted on cities and industry. economizers, but was judged too risky. Pentagon.) In 1960, the Joint Strategic Target He did not say much in public about McNamara’s Switch Planning Staff was created to control Counterforce/No Cities but a revision For reasons that are not altogether the targeting of both Air Force and Navy strategic weapons. The JSTPS director was the commander in chief of Strategic Air Command. “Counterforce/No Cities” President Kennedy rejected the Sin- gle Integrated Operational Plan—the Defense Secretary nuclear war plan for strategic forces—in Robert McNamara effect when he took office. It called for (left) meets with Presi- firing nuclear weapons in a single flush dent John Kennedy in the event of a Soviet attack. and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who had been AP photo/John Kennedy Library F. and Museum “Our strength may be tested at many recalled by Ken- levels,” Kennedy said in his 1962 State nedy to active duty as of the Union address. “We intend to Chairman of the Joint have at all times the capacity to resist Chiefs of Staff. McNa- non-nuclear or limited attacks—as a mara shifted strategy toward “counterforce,” complement to our nuclear capacity, wanting more options not as a substitute. We have rejected short of “spasm war.” any all-or-nothing posture which would European allies were leave no choice but inglorious retreat not happy with the de- parture from massive or unlimited retaliation.” retaliation. McNamara Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, himself soon repented Robert S. McNamara, was likewise and switched his repelled by the SIOP, which he re- support back to city garded as “spasm war.” He had re- busting. cently gotten a detailed presentation on “Counterforce/No Cities,” and he made that the official targeting doctrine 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 2005 clear, McNamara began to repent of his conversion to counterforce. For one thing, the services—especially the Air AP photo Force—could use it to justify budget increases. He was also persuaded by the argument that nuclear war was best prevented by the sheer horror of an all-out exchange. In December 1963, McNamara switched his support to Assured De- struction, although the change was not announced until February 1965. Assured Destruction was a reflexive revenge doctrine. After absorbing a nuclear strike, the United States would retain enough retaliatory power to de- stroy the aggressor. The target was the enemy population. The logic of Assured Destruction was that it must be suicidal for both sides, leaving no motive for the aggressor to attack in the first place. It would have been a return to “spasm war” except for one thing: McNamara neglected to change SIOP-63. Assured Destruction never went into actual The 1965 Moscow parade commemorating the 20th anniversary of VE Day featured effect. Nevertheless, McNamara’s es- this display of a Soviet ICBM. While America debated counterforce, the Soviets pousal of Assured Destruction estab- pressed their efforts to achieve strategic superiority. lished a rallying point for those who wanted to limit US strategic forces. McNamara and his aides set about MAD was supposed to be a pejorative missiles in 1969, but their objective was the grisly task of setting a standard term, but McNamara came to accept it not parity. When they pulled even in for Assured Destruction. How much and sometimes used it himself. “It’s not ICBMs, they kept on building, both in devastation would a US counterattack mad!” he said in an interview with CNN numbers and quality. have to inflict in order to deter the in 1997. “Mutual Assured Destruction The huge SS-9 ICBM showed up in initial Russian attack? is the foundation of deterrence.” a parade in Moscow in 1964. It was “After careful study and debate,” said subsequently flown with three multiple McNamara aides Alain C. Enthoven and Retreat From Superiority independently targetable re-entry ve- K. Wayne Smith, “it was McNamara’s The United States prevailed in the hicles (MIRVs). While politicians in judgment, accepted by Presidents Ken- Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 because the United States argued in the 1970s nedy and Johnson, and not disputed by it had clear-cut strategic nuclear supe- about whether to make Minuteman the Congress, that the ability to destroy riority over the Soviet Union. The two more accurate, the Soviets introduced in retaliation 20 to 25 percent of the nations learned different lessons from four new ICBMs.