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Siloed-Thinking.Pdf 1 siloed thinking: A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent ABOUT FAS The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is an independent, nonpartisan think tank that brings together members of the science and policy communities to collaborate on mitigating global catastrophic threats. Founded in November 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists by scientists who built the first atomic bombs during the Manhattan Project, FAS is devoted to the belief that scientists, engineers, and other technically trained people have the ethical obligation to ensure that the technological fruits of their intellect and labor are applied to the benefit of humankind. In 1946, FAS rebranded as the Federation of American Scientists to broaden its focus to prevent global catastrophes. Since its founding, FAS has served as an influential source of information and rigorous, evidence- based analysis of issues related to national security. Specifically, FAS works to reduce the spread and number of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism, promote high standards for the safety and security of nuclear energy, illuminate government secrecy practices, and prevent the use of biological and chemical weapons. The Nuclear Information Project provides the public with reliable information about the status and trends of the nuclear weapons arsenals of the world’s nuclear-armed countries. The project, which according to the Washington Post is “one of the most widely sourced agencies for nuclear warhead counts,” uses open sources such as official documents, testimonies, previously undisclosed information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, as well as independent analysis of commercial satellite imagery as the basis for developing the best available unclassified estimates of the status and trends of nuclear weapons worldwide. The project also conducts analysis of the role of nuclear weapons and provides recommendations for responsibly reducing the numbers and role of nuclear weapons. The research is mainly published on the FAS Strategic Security Blog, in the Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the World Nuclear Forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook, as well as in magazines. As a primary source for reliable information on nuclear weapons, the project is a frequent advisor to governments, parliamentarians, the news media, institutes, and non-governmental organizations. FAS can be reached at 1112 16th St. NW. Suite 400, Washington, DC, 20036, [email protected], or through fas.org. Copyright © Federation of American Scientists, 2021. All rights reserved. Cover image: ICBM Prime Team, “Minuteman Weapon System History and Description,” 2001. 2 siloed thinking: A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent AUTHOR att Korda is a Research Associate for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation M of American Scientists, where he co-authors the Nuclear Notebook with Hans Kristensen. Previously, he worked for the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non- Proliferation Centre at NATO HQ in Brussels. Matt is also the co-director of Foreign Policy Generation––a group of young people working to develop a progressive foreign policy for the next generation. He received his MA in International Peace & Security from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Matt’s research interests and recent publications focus on nuclear deterrence and disarmament, progressive foreign policy, and the nexus between nuclear weapons, climate change, and injustice. Matt’s work has been widely published and quoted in The Washington Post, Forbes, CBC, Politico, The Nation, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Defense One, Inkstick, 38 North, Arms Control Wonk, and others. Matt is Ploughshares Fund’s 2020 Olum Fellow, a 2019 alumnus of the Wilson Center’s Nuclear History Boot Camp, and a 2019 CSIS Nuclear Scholar. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author is deeply grateful for the generous support from Ploughshares Fund and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, without which this work would not have been possible. The author is especially grateful to Tricia White for her invaluable contributions throughout this project, and particularly with research, coordination, and polling. The author is also very grateful to Hans Kristensen for providing critical support for this project, as well as to the many individuals who took time to offer comments on earlier drafts or individual chapters of this report, including Hans Kristensen, Steve Fetter, William Hartung, Kingston Reif, Doug Shaw, Jessica Sleight, Frank Von Hippel, Tricia White, and Amy Woolf, as well as several other experts who took the time to provide feedback. The author also owes a special thanks to John Carl Baker, Piers Mitchem, Alex Wellerstein, Jon Wolfsthal, Mercedes Trent, and Erin Connolly for their critical contributions and support for this project, as well as to Kate Kohn for her incredible design work. The author also wishes to thank the current and former members of the Federation of American Scientists, and a very special thanks to Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, John Pope, Beau Salant, and others at Rethink Media who coordinated our polling and associated media efforts. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author. Please direct all inquiries to Matt Korda, Research Associate for the Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists ([email protected]). Visit https://fas.org/issues/icbm-information-project/ for more information about the ICBM Information Project. 3 siloed thinking: A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent TABLE OF CONTENTS introduction 6 executive summary 8 I. The uncertain history of the nuclear “triad” 12 The organizational politics of ICBMs 12 Competing missiles, competing doctrines 15 The “Triad” as strategic nomenclature 17 II. Challenging the Strategic Requirement for ICBMs 20 The role of ICBMs in US nuclear strategy 21 ICBMs invite a devastating attack on the United States 22 ICBMs have significant limitations in addressing 21st century deterrence challenges 27 ICBMs are uniquely destabilizing weapon systems 29 ICBMs would not be necessary under a revised nuclear posture 33 ICBMs are not needed to hedge against submarine vulnerability 38 iII. the enhanced capabilities of the post-cold war icbm force 46 Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) 47 Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) 49 Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) System 50 ICBM Fuze Modernization Program 51 The Pentagon’s flawed assessment metrics 53 iV. “Pork and Butter:” The Influence of the Senate ICBM Coalition 55 The success of the Senate ICBM Coalition 58 GBSD is not a useful avenue for job creation 64 The militarization of American society 66 v. Ground-based strategic deterrent: Program detAILS 68 4 siloed thinking: A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent vi. The flawed assumptions behind the gbsd program 72 What capability gaps would the GBSD need to fill? 73 Does GBSD actually maintain the large solid rocket motor industrial base? 75 Is subcomponent commonality feasible––or wise? 82 Is GBSD cheaper than life-extending the Minuteman III? 85 vii. Exploring possibilities for a minuteman iii life-extension 91 The role of presidential guidance 98 Pursuing GBSD is riskier than life-extending Minuteman III 101 viiI. Public perceptions of the us intercontinental ballistic missile force 107 Americans believe that the United States has too many nuclear weapons 107 Nuclear weapons investments do not create a sense of safety 108 Investments in social priorities are more popular than new nuclear weapons. 110 Support for phasing out ICBMs with a guaranteed economic offset 112 Support for delaying and reviewing GBSD, while life-extending Minuteman III 114 Low levels of support for GBSD 115 Conclusion 118 ABBREVIATIONS 119 5 siloed thinking: A Closer Look at the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent introduction The Pentagon is planning to replace its current arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a brand-new missile force, known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, or GBSD. The GBSD program consists of a like-for-like replacement of all 400 Minuteman III missiles that are currently deployed across Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming, and will also include a full set of test-launch missiles, as well as upgrades to the launch facilities, launch control centers, and other supporting infrastructure. The GBSD program will keep ICBMs in the United States’ nuclear arsenal until 2075, and is estimated to cost approximately $100 billion (in Then-Year dollars) in acquisition fees and $264 billion (in Then-Year dollars) throughout its life-cycle. However, critics of the GBSD program––which include a chorus of former military commanders and Secretaries of Defense, top civilian officials, current congressional committee chairs, subject matter experts, and grassroots groups––are noting a growing number of concerns over the program’s increasing costs, tight schedule, and lack of 21st century national security relevance. Many argue that the GBSD’s price tag is too high amid a plethora of other budgetary pressures. Many also say that alternative deterrence options are available at a much lower cost, such as life- extending the current Minuteman III ICBM force. Despite these concerns, the GBSD program has been accelerated in recent years, apparently in an effort to lock in the system before a new administration could consider reversing it. However, the Pentagon has not offered a convincing
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