(CPC) Outreach Journal #1097

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USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) Outreach Journal

Issue No. 1097, 10 January 2014 Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal! As part of the CPC’s mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The CPC is seeking submissions for its annual General Charles A. Horner award, which honors the best original writing on issues relating to Air Force counter-WMD and nuclear enterprise operations. The deadline for submissions is March 31, 2014. For more information, please visit our web-site. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

FEATURED ITEM: “Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Modernization over the Next Thirty Years.” By Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, Marc Quint, January 7, 2014. http://cns.miis.edu/trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad/index.htm The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) announces the release of its latest publication, "The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Modernization over the Next Thirty Years." The report concludes that the United States will likely spend over $1 trillion during the next three decades to maintain its current nuclear arsenal and purchase their replacement systems. The necessary level of procurement spending, as a percentage of the defense budget, will peak at levels comparable to the Reagan-era build-up of nuclear forces.

Outreach Journal Feedback or sign-up request: [email protected] U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. U.S. to Start Cutting Submarine Missile-Launchers Next Year 2. US to Spend $1 Trillion on Nukes 3. U.S. Needs Modern Nuclear Deterrent Despite High Price Tag -Hagel 4. Embarrassing Air Force Revelation Caps Hagel's Nuclear Tour

U.S. COUNTER-WMD 1. Military Looks to Shield Its Satellites from Electromagnetic Attacks

HOMELAND SECURITY/THE AMERICAS 1. US Military Satellites Vulnerable in Future Space War – Space Command Chief

ASIA/PACIFIC 1. No Joint Command: MOD 2. U.S., South Korea Vow to Face DPRK Threat 3. N. Korea still Worst in Nuclear Material Security 4. Six-Party Talks still Useful Tool to Denuclearize N. Korea: Seoul

EUROPE/RUSSIA 1. Russian Strategic Rocket Forces to Modernize Security Systems in 2014 2. Russian Military to Strengthen Radar Defenses in 2014

MIDDLE EAST 1. IAEA Cannot Overlook Military Component in Iranian Nuclear Program - Russian Diplomat 2. Rouhani Defends Iran Nuclear Deal against Hardliners 3. 1st Batch of Chemical Weapons Leaves Syria 4. Iran’s Khamenei: Deterring Evil Worth Talking to Satan 5. Araqchi-Schmid-Sherman’s Trilateral Meeting Ends

INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. India Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Prithvi-II Missile

COMMENTARY 1. Opposition to B61 Threatens Nuclear Reductions, Deterrence 2. Why the Air Force Should Be Abolished 3. Whatever Happened to Minimum, Credible Deterrence? 4. B-61 Remains Relevant for U.S. Security 5. Hagel’s Nuclear Site Tour Is a Good Start 6. Nuclear Death, Warmed Over 7. Only Nuclear Weapons Can Guarantee Russia's Security 8. US Nuclear Forces, 2014

Global Security Newswire U.S. to Start Cutting Submarine Missile-Launchers Next Year By Rachel Oswald, Global Security Newswire January 6, 2014 The United States next year is slated to begin reducing launch tubes on each of its Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, a new independent report states. The elimination of four operational launch tubes on each of the 14 submarines that make up the Navy's Ohio submarine fleet will be the first substantial reduction in U.S. strategic weapon delivery capability since the 2011 New START accord went into effect, according to Hans Kristensen, who co-authored an assessment on the current status of U.S. nuclear forces. The report was published in the January/February edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Nearly three years after the New START pact with Russia entered into force, implementation of the treaty has "been going very slowly," Kristensen said in a brief Monday phone interview. The treaty requires Russia and the United States by 2018 to each reduce their fielded stockpiles of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and to cut their arsenals of long-range delivery vehicles down to 700 apiece, with an additional 100 systems allowed in reserve on each side. "The way that the U.S. military has approached implementation of the New START treaty so far has not done anything that has actually affected the actual number of nuclear [delivery vehicles] that are in the war plan," said Kristensen, who directs the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Instead, the Pentagon has focused on reducing the nuclear-delivery capability of selected vehicles, such as heavy bombers, that have already been retired, he said. The Defense Department has the latitude to pursue that approach because the treaty allows so many years -- seven, specifically -- before each side must carry out all mandated reductions, Kristensen said. Once all of the Ohio-class submarines have had their launch tubes capped at 20 each -- a project that is to take place in the 2015-to-2016 time frame -- the United States will be able to deploy no more than 240 submarine-

The Diplomat – Japan US to Spend $1 Trillion on Nukes The U.S. will spend $1 trillion over the next 30 years maintaining and modernizing its nukes, according to a new report. By Zachary Keck for The Diplomat January 08, 2014 The United States will spend $1 trillion maintaining and modernizing its nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, according to a new report from an independent think tank. “Over the next thirty years, the United States plans to spend approximately $1 trillion maintaining the current arsenal, buying replacement systems, and upgrading existing nuclear bombs and warheads,” according to the report, Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Modernization over the Next 30 Years, which was released by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) on Tuesday. These costs will not be spread out evenly over the long time period. Instead, the authors of the report — Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis and Marc Quint — conclude that “Procurement of replacement platforms and associated warheads will peak during a four to six year window, sometime after 2020.” During this peak period, the United States will have to devote as much as three percent of its annual defense budgets to its nuclear arsenal. This is similar to the percentage of the defense budget that was devoted to modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal during Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, according to the report. The CNS figures are roughly consistent with those of the Congressional Budget Office, which projected last month that the U.S. will spend $355 billion over the next decade on its nuclear arsenal. The new report is based on a year-long study CNS undertook to estimate the cost of maintaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As the author’s note in the report, “The United States government does not know with any accuracy how much it spends annually on its nuclear deterrent, or how much it will cost to replace the current [nuclear] triad.” Because of this, the authors contend, U.S. lawmakers and policymakers have been able to avoid a robust debate on the strategic utility of maintaining and modernizing the nuclear triad amid an increasingly tight fiscal climate. According to the newly published figures of the Federation of Atomic Scientists (FAS), the U.S. currently has a stockpile of 4,650 nuclear warheads, 2,130 of which are operational. In addition to the 4,650 warheads, Washington has 2,700 retired nuclear warheads that have yet to be dismantled. The United States also maintains a nuclear triad where it can deliver nuclear warheads via land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, or from bomber aircraft. According to the FAS estimates, currently “1,620 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles—1,150 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) and 470 on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); roughly 300 strategic warheads are located at bomber bases in the United States; and nearly 200 nonstrategic warheads are deployed in Europe.”

New York Times U.S. Needs Modern Nuclear Deterrent Despite High Price Tag -Hagel By Reuters January 9, 2014 ALBUQUERQUE, New Mexico - Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said on Wednesday the United States had always supported a strong nuclear deterrent and would continue to do so, even as it braces for a nuclear forces overhaul that analysts say could cost $1 trillion over 30 years. "To modernize your nuclear weapons stockpile and assure that they continue to stay secure and safe, it takes money, it takes resources," Hagel said after touring Sandia National Laboratories and Kirtland Air Force Base, two facilities involved in maintaining the weapons. The U.S. defense chief said upgrading U.S. nuclear warheads and the submarines, bombers and missiles that deliver them would require setting priorities and minding the budget, but he added the country "has always been willing to make that investment and I think it will continue to make it." The visit was part of a two-day trip to bases supporting U.S. nuclear forces. Hagel travels on Thursday to F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, where he will see intercontinental ballistic missile silos and talk to troops in a nuclear mission that has been troubled by morale problems. Major General Michael Carey was fired as head of the 450-weapon U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile force in October for getting drunk and carousing with Russian women while leading a government delegation to Moscow for talks on nuclear security. Hagel acknowledged the morale problems in the unit and said he planned to underscore the importance of the ICBM mission and thank the troops for their service. "They do feel unappreciated many times," he said. "They're stuck out in areas where not a lot of attention is paid." Hagel's visit to the nuclear-related facilities comes as the administration is pushing ahead with ambitious plans to upgrade nuclear systems by modernizing weapons and building new submarines, missiles and bombers to deliver them.

Stars and Stripes Embarrassing Air Force Revelation Caps Hagel's Nuclear Tour By Jon Harper, Stars and Stripes January 10, 2014

Foreign Policy.com Military Looks to Shield Its Satellites from Electromagnetic Attacks By Robert Beckhusen, War Is Boring January 3, 2014 Electromagnetic pulse attacks are one of those things that keep some military officials wide awake at night -- and put others soundly asleep. It all depends on who you’re talking about. For the former, including a number of doomsayers, missile-defense boosters, and prominent politicos, the risk is that a rogue state could emit a blast of electromagnetic energy by way of a nuclear explosion in the upper atmosphere, frying electronic systems from California to Cape Cod. For skeptics -- and many scientists -- it’s all an overblown theory containing loads of technical and practical problems. More realistically, it'd be lights out when we’re eventually hit by a rare and exceedingly powerful solar storm. But concerns about weaponized EMP persist. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, a Pentagon body focused on countering threats from nuclear weapons, has put out the call for new studies into the phenomenon, according to a notice from the agency posted in December. Specifically, DTRA wants to research "high-altitude weapons electromagnetic pulse effects modeling" for satellites. The ultimate goal is to come up with a uniform military standard for EMP effects on satellites, which could later be used to harden them against an attack. The term "effects modeling" in the notice refers to laboratory simulations. DTRA has also stressed it's not trying to predict the likelihood of an e-bomb attack, just the expected results of one. We have some experience with this -- albeit with several gaps. For one, we do know that satellites in low-earth orbit would be in grave danger of getting zapped by EMP. Satellites at these orbits include ones used for high-resolution imagery, monitoring the weatherb and handling

RT (Russia Today) – Russia US Military Satellites Vulnerable in Future Space War – Space Command Chief January 9, 2014 US military satellites could be disabled or destroyed in the event of a war in space, an American general has said, citing China’s tests of anti-satellite weapons. To protect US space capability, the satellite park should be reformed, he believes.

Global Times – China No Joint Command: MOD Global Times, January 6, 2014 By Bai Tiantian and Liu Yang China's defense ministry Sunday denied news reports that China will implement a joint command system, adding that such reports are groundless. Previous overseas media reports said China will implement a joint command system in due course, adding that establishing such a system is a fundamental requirement in an era of information, and the military has begun positive programs in this regard. The defense ministry denied both claims in a statement released to the Global Times on Sunday and said the reports are "without basis." The reply from the defense ministry was echoed by an official from the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who told the Global Times on Sunday that he was not informed of the plan. Declining to provide more details, the defense ministry referred questions on reforming China's military organization structure to the ministry's press conference on November 28, 2013. Yang Yujun, a spokesperson for the defense ministry, said at the press conference that after studies, the PLA will deepen reform in good time and blaze a trail in reform on a joint operation command system with Chinese characteristics. "Modern warfare is characterized by information leading, systematic confrontation and joint operations, and therefore, it is a necessary demand of operations under information conditions on building a joint operation command system. The Chinese military has made explorations in that field," Yang said. Japanese media reported on Wednesday that China is considering reorganizing its seven geographic military regions into five and each of the new military regions would create a joint operations command controlling the army, navy, air force and a strategic missile unit. The Japanese media further reported that the reform marks a shift from the defense-oriented military to one "ensuring more mobile and integrated management." Despite the statement from the defense ministry, observers say that implementing a joint operational command could be the right move for China's military reform, though speculation on a detailed plan to set up the command is still premature. Oh Ei Sun, a political analyst and former political secretary to Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, told the Global Times on Sunday that joint operational command is long overdue for China and the implementation of it will not affect the relationship between China and its neighbors. Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 10 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama "We understand China's needs to consolidate and modernize its military command structure, which has the added advantage of prevention of misfire on the part of subordinate military units," said Oh. A military expert, who asked to remain anonymous, told the Global Times on Sunday that from an international perspective, the establishment of a joint command system is in line with the general trend. He suggested that it could also be sensed from the reform package released following the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee last November. The expert noted that building the joint command system could not be accomplished in one step, since the issue of which military branch would occupy the dominant position still needs to be resolved in China. According to him, although the PLA ground forces used to play a dominant role over the PLA navy and PLA air force, nowadays there were more threats from the air and sea toward China than on the ground. Nevertheless, the expert noted that the Chinese military would not copy the US model in the setup of the joint command, and should learn from the lessons seen in the Russian military's winding path of reform. Yang He contributed to this story http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/835937.shtml#.Us2FxK-x5Dx Return to Top

People’s Daily Online – China U.S., South Korea Vow to Face DPRK Threat (Xinhua) January 8, 2014 WASHINGTON, Jan. 7-- Top diplomats from the United States and South Korea vowed Tuesday to face any threat or provocation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as the Pentagon sent more troops to South Korea. "We were deeply focused on the challenge of North Korea, particularly with the events that have taken place in recent weeks in North Korea," Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters after meeting with his South Korean counterpart Yun Byung-Se at the State Department. Kerry reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the defense of its ally, adding "we will continue to modernize our capabilities so that we are prepared to face any threat." Kerry urged Pyongyang to denuclearize, saying Washington and Seoul "stand very firmly united" on the issue. He reiterated that "we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear state, nor as a nuclear armed state." For his part, Yun said that South Korea and the United States will firmly respond based on their robust combined defense posture. "In addition to our actions, we'll ensure that the UN Security Council will take prompt measures which it deems necessary," he added. The Pentagon announced Tuesday that it would send 800 soldiers to Camps Hovey and Stanley near the demarcation line with the DPRK on Feb. 1, in support of the U.S. forces already stationed in South Korea, which number around 28,500. The battalion will return to Fort Hood, Texas, after completing its 9-month rotation, but will leave behind its wheeled and tracked vehicles "for use by follow-on rotations," the Pentagon said in a statement. Yun met with U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on Monday and both sides pledged to maintain a robust combined defense as a deterrent against "provocations" by the DPRK. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8506677.html Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 11 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Return to Top

Global Post – Boston, MA N. Korea still Worst in Nuclear Material Security By Lee Chi-dong, Yonhap News Agency January 8, 2014 WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea remains at the bottom of a major ranking of nuclear materials security conditions, a nonprofit group of experts here said Wednesday. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), which is working to curb the threat of nuclear terrorism and accidents, released the results of a survey of 25 countries with one kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear material. It was conducted with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) The NTI ranked North Korea 25th, giving it just 30 points out of the total 100. It took into account the amount of nuclear materials, sites, domestic commitments, societal factors and global norms. "North Korea ranks last in the NTI Index, with its score unchanged compared to 2012," the Washington-based organization said. The NTI, however, pointed to a lack of credible information on the secretive communist nation's nuclear program. In 2008, during talks with the U.S., the secretive North reportedly declared that it possessed 38.5 kg of plutonium. "The lack of available information on North Korea's nuclear security -- it does not publish its nuclear security laws and regulations or other information -- meant that North Korea received the lowest possible score for several sub- indicators," it said. If North Korea were to publish its nuclear security laws and regulations or other information about its nuclear security or its materials stocks, its score in a future edition of the NTI Index might improve, said the NTI. "North Korea could also improve by signing and ratifying key international agreements and participating in international nuclear security initiatives," it added. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140108/n-korea-still-worst-nuclear-material- security-0 Return to Top

The Korea Herald – South Korea Six-Party Talks still Useful Tool to Denuclearize N. Korea: Seoul January 9, 2014 The six-party forum on ending North Korea's nuclear program remains a useful tool for resolving the issue, Seoul's foreign ministry said Thursday, again urging Pyongyang to show sincerity to resume the long-stalled talks. The talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China and Russia have not been held since late 2008 as the North was found to have continued its development of nuclear arms in breach of previous aid-for- disarmament agreements. "I feel very sorry that the dialogue is not resuming," foreign ministry spokesman Cho Tae-young said in a briefing. "It's still a useful format in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue." In order for the talks' resumption, North Korea should first show its sincerity toward denuclearization, the spokesman said, reiterating its previous stance.

The Voice of Russia – Russia 6 January 2014 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces to Modernize Security Systems in 2014 In 2014 the modernization of the automatic security systems at five facilities of the Russian strategic rocket forces will involve for the first time the Russian Defense Ministry's 12th main department responsible for maintaining, developing and servicing the Russian forces' nuclear arsenal and for controlling nuclear tests of other countries. "In 2013 these works were held at eight facilities of the Russian strategic rocket forces. The modernization of the automatic security systems includes changing technical means of detection, alert and protection. The works in this direction will continue," representative of the Russian Defense Ministry's press service and information department for the Russian strategic rocket forces, Col. Igor Yegorov, told Interfax-AVN on Monday. The forces being re-equipped with the Yar rocket complex are supplied with the latest automatic security systems "including a number of modern means increasing the reliability and readiness for target use in any conditions," Yegorov said.

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Russian Military to Strengthen Radar Defenses in 2014 08 January 2014 MOSCOW, January 8 (RIA Novosti) – The Russian Aerospace Defense Force will add dozens of radars this year, a force spokesman said Wednesday. The list includes six Nebo-M active electronically scanned arrays (AESA) and a mix of 23 Podlyot low-altitude and Sopka medium- and high-altitude radars, the spokesman told journalists. An unspecified number of modernized Kasta and Desna radars is also on the list. The Aerospace Defense Force also plans to add a regiment of S-400 Triumph air defense missile systems in 2014, the force’s commander Alexander Golovko said earlier. The force will also prioritize deployment of Voronezh-M early warning radars in Orenburg Region in the Urals and Siberia’s Altai and Krasnoyarsk regions, Golovko said. Last year, the Russian military added about 20 radars of different classes and modifications, including Gamma-S, Nebo-U and Podlyot-K. http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140108/186343225/Russian-Military-to-Strengthen-Radar-Defenses-in- 2014.html Return to Top

The Voice of Russia – Russia 4 January 2014 IAEA Cannot Overlook Military Component in Iranian Nuclear Program - Russian Diplomat Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 14 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors cannot overlook a military component that could possibly appear in the Iranian nuclear program, Russian Ambassador to Tehran Levan Dzhagarian said. "As we see it, the appearance of a military component in Iran's nuclear program cannot remain unnoticed by IAEA inspectors," Dzhagarian said in an interview with Interfax. IAEA specialists have not recorded such changes by now, he said. "In addition, to do this, Tehran would have to create a special research and production infrastructure from scratch, partially transform the already existing facilities, and carry out some operations with the nuclear material that has been accumulated. These measures presume that Iran should take its nuclear program into the shadows and even absolutely suspend any interaction with the IAEA," Dzhagarian said. "As we see, the Iranians' actions at the negotiating track are diametrically opposite to this," he said. In commenting on regular statements by U..S. and Israeli officials that Iran is on the verge of creating nuclear weapons and will be able to obtain them shortly after the relevant political decision is made, Dzhagarian said, "It should not be forgotten that the positions of opponents of the nascent relaxation of tensions surrounding Iran are quite strong in the U.S. and Israel." "They often use openly propagandistic methods to destabilize the situation and torpedo the nascent diplomatic settlement process," he said. Moscow expects Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to visit Russia in the fall of 2014 to take part in the 4th meeting of the heads of the Caspian states in Astrakhan, Russian Ambassador to Iran Levan Dzhagarian said. "I would like to mention the 4th session of the heads of the Caspian states in Astrakhan scheduled for the fall of 2014. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov handed an official invitation to this meeting to Rouhani while visiting Tehran on December 11," Dzhagarian said in an interview with Interfax when asked whether top-level contacts between Russia and Iran are expected in the near future. "Apart from the session itself, a conference of the foreign ministers of the five nations is expected to take place in Moscow in spring as a milestone event in preparing the Astrakhan summit, at which, along with the Caspian problems, the Russian and Iranian foreign policy chiefs will certainly have a good opportunity to exchange views on key international and regional issues," he said. Political contacts between Moscow and Tehran are regular and are maintained not only at the ministerial but also at the inter-governmental, inter-parliamentary, and interregional levels, he said. President Vladimir Putin said at a press conference in December that he had received an invitation from the Iranian leadership to visit Iran and would definitely make use of it. At the same time, he did not say when exactly he could travel to Iran. Voice of Russia, Interfax http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_01_04/IAEA-cannot-overlook-military-component-in-Iranian-nuclear- program-Russian-diplomat-3977/ Return to Top

The Daily Star – Lebanon Rouhani Defends Iran Nuclear Deal against Hardliners Agence France-Presse (AFP) January 07, 2014 TEHRAN: Iran's President Hassan Rouhani defended Tuesday a landmark nuclear deal with world powers that promises modest sanctions relief, saying his government did not fear "the few" domestic critics.

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency 1st Batch of Chemical Weapons Leaves Syria 07 January 2014 MOSCOW, January 7 (RIA Novosti) − The first consignment of chemical weapons has left the Syrian port of Latakia on a Danish cargo vessel, the international chemical weapons watchdog said on Tuesday. “The removal of the first consignment of priority chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic took place today,” the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) said in a statement on its website.

Al Arabiya – U.A.E. Iran’s Khamenei: Deterring Evil Worth Talking to Satan By Staff Writer, Al Arabiya News Thursday, January 9, 2014 Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei admitted on Thursday pursuing the religious deception tactic known as a “taqiyya” in talks with the United States over his country’s nuclear program. Taqiyya is known as a form of dispensation with religious principles when people are under threat or persecution. “We had announced previously that on certain issues, if we feel it is expedient, we would negotiate with the Satan to deter its evil,” Khamenei told a gathering in Iran’s theological center of Qom. “The nuclear talks showed the enmity of America against Iran, Iranians, Islam and Muslims,” he added. The leader of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution Ruhollah Khomeini used the expression “the great Satan” to describe the United States. Ever since the word “Satan” has been frequently by Iranian leaders to described the United States, which they accuse of sponsoring “evil” throughout the world. Despite blasting the United States in weekly speeches, Khamenei’s regime engaged with Washington last year in direct negotiations that led to a landmark nuclear deal that partially eased economic sanctions crippling the Iranian economy. Iran and Western powers are expected to resume nuclear talks this year for a comprehensive final agreement amid lingering disputes. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif expressed optimism about the talks schedule to resume in Geneva on Thursday. “The nuclear talks are continuing with seriousness and a strong political will,” wrote Wednesday on his Facebook page, adding that hours of technical talks with experts from the so-called P5+1 group of world powers in December had produced “positive results.” Zarif’s deputy, Abbas Araqchi, will meet Helga Schmid, deputy to EU foreign policy Chief Catherine Ashton whose office represents the P5+1 group of world powers in the decade-long negotiations with Tehran. Their talks are due to last for two days. The U.S. State Department confirmed Wednesday that U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman was also travelling to Geneva to attend the talks. Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 17 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama She would meet with both Araqchi and Schmid, the State Department said in a statement, without confirming reports from Iranian news agencies that there would be a three-way meeting. Iranian foreign ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham said the talks will focus on remaining issues “pending a political decision” before the deal can go into effect on Jan. 20, a date mooted by both sides. Centrifuges According to diplomats, negotiations between Iran and the six powers on implementing the November deal have run into problems over advanced centrifuge research. Research and development of a new model of advanced nuclear centrifuge that Iran says it has installed is one of the major issues, diplomats told Reuters on condition of anonymity. “This issue (centrifuges) was among the main factors in stopping the previous technical discussions on Dec. 19-21,” a Western diplomat said. Centrifuges are machines that purify uranium for use as fuel in atomic power plants or, if purified to a high level, weapons. Other Western diplomats confirmed that centrifuges remained a “sticking point” in the talks with Iran but noted that last month’s discussions were understandably adjourned ahead of the December holidays - not because of the centrifuge issue. Meanwhile, the Obama administration entered 2014 locked in a battle with Congress over whether to plow ahead with new economic sanctions against Iran or cautiously wait to see if last year’s breakthrough nuclear agreement holds. The Nov. 24 agreement “makes a nuclear Iran more likely,” Senator Marco Rubio told the Associated Press. Fellow Republican Senator John Cornyn called it an attempt to distract attention from President Barack Obama’s health care rollout. “We really haven’t gained anything,” Republican Senator Lindsey Graham said. The deal “falls short of what is necessary for security and stability in the region,” added Democratic Senator Mary Landrieu. With Agence France-Presse (AFP), Reuters and Associated Press (AP) http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/09/Iran-optimistic-as-nuclear-talks-to-resume-.html Return to Top

Trend News Agency – Azerbaijan Araqchi-Schmid-Sherman’s Trilateral Meeting Ends 10 January 2014 A trilateral meeting among political representatives of Islamic Republic of Iran, the European Union and the United States over the few remaining issues on implementing the Geneva nuclear deal ended in Geneva, Switzerland Thursday night, IRNA reported. The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Seyyed Abbas Araqchi, the EU Deputy Foreign Policy Chief Helga Schmid and the US veteran diplomat in G5+1 talks Wendy Sherman began and ended their talks on Thursday evening. Ms. Sherman who attended the meeting on her way to Moscow on Thursday will not be present in Friday bilateral talks between Araqchi and Schmid.

Times of India – India India Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Prithvi-II Missile Press Trust of India (PTI) January 7, 2014 BALASORE (Odisha): India on Tuesday test-fired its indigenously developed Prithvi-II missile, which is capable of carrying 500 kg to 1,000 kg of warheads and has a strike range of 350 km, from a test range at Chandipur near here. The test was carried out as part of a user trial by the Army. The surface-to-surface missile was test fired from a mobile launcher in salvo mode from launch complex-3 of the Integrated Test Range at about 0948 hrs. "The missile was randomly chosen from the production stock and the entire launch activities were carried out by the specially formed Strategic Force Command (SFC) and monitored by the scientists of DRDO as part of training exercise," the sources said. "The missile trajectory was tracked by DRDO radars, electro-optical tracking systems and telemetry stations located along the coast of Odisha," they said. "The downrange teams onboard the ship deployed near the designated impact point in the Bay of Bengal monitored the terminal events and splashdown," they said. Inducted into India's SFC in 2003, Prithvi II, the first missile to be developed by DRDO under India's prestigious IGMDP (Integrated Guided Missile Development Program) is now a proven technology, said a defence source. "The launch was part of a regular training exercise of SFC and was monitored by DRDO scientists," the source said. Such training launches clearly indicate India's operational readiness to meet any eventuality and also establishes the reliability of this deterrent component of India's Strategic arsenal, the source said. Prithvi-II is capable of carrying 500 kg to 1,000 kg of warheads and is thrusted by liquid propulsion twine engines. It uses advanced inertial guidance system with manoeuvring trajectory. The last user trial of Prithvi-II was successfully carried out from the same base on December 3 last. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2014-01-07/india/45954586_1_user-trial-missile-trajectory-prithvi-ii Return to Top

The Hill – Washington, D.C. OPINION/Congress Blog

The News Tribune – Tacoma, WA OPINION/Commentary Why the Air Force Should Be Abolished By James Carroll, The Boston Globe January 4, 2014 The Pentagon was built to wage wars abroad, but much of its war-making has been inside the building. Inter- service rivalry is a hackneyed phrase that fails to convey either the brutality of the bureaucratic in-fighting over budgets and resources that has always defined the place, or the actual cost in blood, treasure, and a succession of shaming military defeats that have resulted from the Pentagon’s endemic in-house competitiveness. For more than 70 years, the very structure of America’s military establishment has been tragically misaligned, and you don’t have to be a peacenik to think it’s time for a major reform. In 2014, under pressures both of shrinking funds and of dramatically shifting strategic needs, this can begin to change. And, as a heretical article in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs dares suggest, the place to start might well be the abolition of the Air Force. When the Pentagon opened in the thick of war, in 1943, the U.S. Navy was reluctant to move its command offices there for fear of being dominated by the Army. Even in wartime, the two services were already treating each other like enemies: The Army Air Forces refused to commit tactical bombers in support of Navy operations against German U-boats in the North Atlantic; the Army and the Navy fought separate wars in the Pacific. Ultimately, Gen. Douglas MacArthur resented having to accept the Japanese surrender on a battleship, which so happened to be President Harry Truman’s beloved USS Missouri - a "Navy trick," as the Army brass called it. The National Security Act of 1947 was supposed to end such squabbling. But, by creating the United States Air Force as a stand-alone branch of the military, the overhaul made it worse. Before joining an arms race with the Kremlin, the Pentagon ran one with itself. In assessing dangers posed by Moscow, each of the services sounded alarms about Russia more with an eye on its own budget needs and desired weapons than any actual Soviet threat. The Air Force, seeking sole custody of the atomic arsenal, led the way in this, roundly pre-empting the Navy’s atom-bomb-capable supercarrier with its long-range strategic bomber. Undeterred, the Navy developed its own air force anyway, and so did the Army, with helicopters. The Air Force created myths of "gaps" - first bomber, then missile - that existed only in the minds of wing-wearing planners, and Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 21 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama only long enough to ignite an explosion in Air Force warhead acquisition - again, overwhelming the Army and Navy as much as the Soviets. But with the dawning of the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Navy decisively struck back with the Polaris submarine and a nuclear attack force that would prove to be far more invulnerable than either lumbering bombers or sitting-duck ICBMs. To this day, the most stable leg of the nuclear deterrence triad remains the submarine missiles, even as Air Force strategic bombing has long since proved to be irrelevant in asymmetrical wars, whether against the Vietnamese, Iraqi insurgents or al-Qaida. Defense scholar Robert Farley’s Foreign Affairs article, "Ground the Air Force," proposes folding it "back into its two sibling services." After transitional costs, this would not only reduce the massively expensive redundancy of separate air power entities, but would remove one of the main engines of self-defeating inter-service rivalry. Moreover, abolishing the Air Force would merely ratify changes that are already happening: The redefinition of air power around pilotless drones is eviscerating the bomber-jacket culture of fly-boys; as the Air Force’s Minuteman nuclear missiles age into irrelevance, the officers in charge of them are failing tests and acting out. In other words, the Air Force’s responsibilities have eroded. Whether the creation of the Air Force in 1947 was itself a mistake, rooted in fallacies about strategic bombing during World War II, is debatable, but few institutions have undergone less structural or ideological change across these decades than the Pentagon. Universities, churches, journalism, retail marketing, public schools, transportation, broadcast companies - all such enterprises have had to reimagine themselves again and again, while the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been walled off from pressures to change by coalitions of contractors, Congress and surprisingly durable myths of invincibility. But the wind-sock has shifted. Instead of tinkering around the edges of a bloated, unaffordable, and often ineffective national security establishment, the time has come for a major reinvention - starting with the Air Force. Off it should go into the wild blue yonder. Boston Globe columnist James Carroll is Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence at Suffolk University and holder of the 2011 Alonzo L. McDonald Family Chair at Emory University. He is author of 10 novels and six works of non-fiction, including “Jerusalem, Jerusalem: How the Ancient City Ignited Our Modern World.” http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/01/04/2976894/why-the-air-force-should-be-abolished.html Return to Top

Arms Control Wonk.com OPINION/Commentary Whatever Happened to Minimum, Credible Deterrence? By Michael Krepon 6 January 2014 This graphic of the nuclear competition on the subcontinent was compiled by my colleagues, Julia Thompson and Lita Ledesma, to illustrate the contents of Stimson’s new book, Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia. It’s a sobering depiction of high-octane missile development programs and lethargic diplomacy. It still doesn’t begin to reflect the difficulties national leaders in India and Pakistan face in trying to stabilize their nuclear competition.

This graphic excludes strategic modernization programs in China. It makes no reference to ambitious changes in conventional military doctrines in China and India. It excludes developments in air and sea power that can bear on the nuclear competition. It doesn’t reflect the inherent instabilities of opposing nuclear doctrines that rely on threats of first use — including the use of tactical nuclear weapons — and threats of massive retaliation. Nor does this graphic reflect dysfunctional civil-military relations in Pakistan, India and perhaps China as well, that make it difficult to stabilize an extremely active triangular nuclear competition.

The Heritage Foundation OPINION/The Foundry B-61 Remains Relevant for U.S. Security By Michaela Dodge January 7, 2014 Efforts to eliminate funding for the B-61 gravity bomb threaten to undermine U.S. deterrence, writes Thomas Karako, director of the Center for the Study of American Democracy at Kenyon College. Components of the B-61 weapon, the U.S.’s most visible commitment to European security, are reaching the end of their service lives. The U.S. must extend the life of this weapon. The U.S. retains a few hundred of these weapons in Europe. Under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives in the early 1990s, the U.S. eliminated a large portion of its short-range nuclear weapons arsenal. Russia promised to take reciprocal steps but has not followed through. This has left the U.S. with a major disadvantage in this class of weapons. Russia is engaged in a major military build-up, both conventional and nuclear, and it is in violation of its arms control obligations. Reducing the number of B-61 weapons by attrition would seem like a reward to Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior and would make U.S. allies in Europe nervous. The strategic utility of the B-61 weapon, however, goes beyond U.S. interests in Europe. Allies in South Korea and Japan seek Washington’s assurances vis-à-vis North Korea. North Korea already has nuclear weapons and is working on the means to deliver them effectively. It attacked South Korea and has threatened to attack the U.S. The U.S. might need the B-61’s capability to reassure allies and dissuade them from developing their own nuclear weapons. The B-61 Life Extension Program is the beginning of the Obama Administration’s efforts to sustain the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. It will contribute to maintaining the health and knowledge base of the U.S. industrial complex. While the U.S. is not developing any new nuclear weapons, nor is it planning on testing the weapons it currently has, it must maintain nuclear know-how. The world is not getting any safer, and the nation has been surprised by unexpected developments. Future surprises might concern other nations’ nuclear weapon capabilities. The National Nuclear Security Administration estimated that the program will cost over $8 billion total and will extend the B-61’s life expectancy by 20 to 30 years. European allies will contribute their territories, personnel, and

Defense One.com OPINION/Op-Ed Hagel’s Nuclear Site Tour Is a Good Start By Rep. Mike Rogers January 8, 2014 Positive policy comes from positive interactions. This is especially true of the military and its leaders. It's heartening to see that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is taking this truth to heart with the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Today, he begins a trip that will swing him through the brain and muscle of America's nuclear deterrent. His visits to the Sandia National Laboratories, in Albuquerque, where we are rebuilding our nuclear warheads, and F.E. Warren Air Force Base, in Cheyenne, Wyo., where we deploy some of them, begin a welcome display of leadership to the men and women in the nuclear trenches. But visiting the troops isn't enough. Our nuclear forces are a shadowy group. Their mission successes are taken for granted. And, regrettably, when they occasionally fall short of their perfectionist standards, those shortcomings can be very much visible. Whether they sit in underground missile silos, turn wrenches on bombers or work in the reactor of a deployed submarine, America's nuclear warriors are quiet guardians. They do not expect, nor receive, praise for their unique duty, even though that duty is the very centerpiece of U.S. national security. For sixty years, Americans, and their allies, have unknowingly reaped the fruits of the peace and security those warriors provide. Sadly, some Americans enjoy watching them stumble. Our nuclear forces cannot speak for themselves. They depend on their civilian leadership to do that. Former Defense Secretary Bob Gates was a bright light and strong advocate for their mission. At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a heady venue to defend nuclear deterrence, Gates did not shy away from the moral and consequential imperatives of our strategic arsenal. In 2008, he said, "We must deal with the messy realities of the world in which we live. One of those realities is the existence of nuclear weapons." Perhaps Hagel, a one-time disarmament advocate, has come around. In his confirmation hearing last year, he spoke wisely when he said, "What has kept the peace since World War II has been America's nuclear weapons." No one would welcome it more than the individuals who man the trenches of nuclear deterrence. Let's go back to talking policy. Interactions, hands-on experience, an appropriate security clearance, plus specialized knowledge of the minutiae of targets, trajectories and threats are irreplaceable. Nuclear deterrence is fragile. The peace that rests on that deterrence is fragile. And there are too many people in Washington who want to monkey around with that brittle, precious equation without understanding the full scope of factors that support it. Hagel has his staffs, but I'd take the opinion of one bomber pilot, or one targeteer at U.S. Strategic Command, over all the king's staffers and all the king's wonks. The secretary, to his credit, has with this trip sought out the opinions of the men and women in the trenches. And it's a safe bet he won’t like what he hears.

Huffington Post OPINION/The Blog Nuclear Death, Warmed Over By Jon Wolfsthal January 8, 2014 During the cold war, the United States built a large nuclear arsenal deployed on long-range land based missiles, submarines and strategic bombers. This "Triad" of nuclear systems was thought critical to our security and survival. Maintaining three different systems made it all but impossible for the Soviet Union to target and destroy all three legs of the arsenal, ensuring their own destruction as a result. Investment in this central concept of deterrence -- that you cannot attack without suffering a worse fate -- resulted in America buying and maintaining an expensive nuclear arsenal that eventually reached over 30,000 nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Song Remains the Same The cold war is over is long gone, but the nuclear triad remains. And now, as the nuclear weapons built and deployed in the 1980s reach the end of their operational lives, the government is planning to not only maintain these weapons, but to build their replacements. Yes, despite the fact that the Soviet Union does not exist and the United States needs almost no nuclear weapons for its security or that of its allies, the pressure is on for the U.S. to rebuild a cold war nuclear arsenal over the next 30 years. Unless current plans change, the Departments of Defense and Energy will spend over $1 trillion over the next 30 years to maintain current systems and purchase their replacements. You got that right -- trillion with a T. This is over $33 billion a year, or three times what we are spending on nuclear systems today. As the threat goes down,

Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH) – Russia Opinion/Commentary Only Nuclear Weapons Can Guarantee Russia's Security The significance of nuclear weapons for defense and security is written in Russian military doctrine, but today many believe their role is steadily declining. However, strategic nuclear forces have been and remain Russia's only guarantee of security. By Sergei Brezkun January 9, 2014, VPK-news Should conventional weapons be deployed and enhanced? What is a greater priority, the Mistral amphibious assault ship or returning to medium-range missiles such as the Pioneer? Judging from the statements of Russian officials and publications of military experts, the nuclear factor is being fundamentally underestimated. For some reason, many people forget that nuclear deterrence is not a hypothetical countermeasure to some threat, but a real method of avoiding war. No one in their right mind would want to provoke or discriminate against a country capable of responding in a way guaranteed to obliterate the aggressor. It is no coincidence the U.S. is minimizing Russia's nuclear potential step-by-step (and at the same time its semblance of a fair partnership), making a first disarming strike easier. Russia has been emulating the military organization of the United States lately by attempting to develop cyber command, unmanned aircraft, acquiring imported ships, and so on. However, attempting to play by American rules on their field is doomed to fail. First, Russia has different economic, scientific, and technological resources, and secondly, the systemic role of the U.S. army is completely different. The American army is constantly engaged in actual military operations around the world, which requires modern conventional weapons, including attack aircraft, strike drones, and cyber systems. The Russian armed forces have no vital need for these types of weapons. Of course, it would be nice if Russian soldiers had nanomaterial suits, but 500 nuclear Pioneer missiles would prevent them from being sent to war in the first place. In the meantime, we see plans adopted under President Medvedev for re-equipping by 2020. For example, 4.5 trillion rubles (over $137 billion) is earmarked for modernizing the navy. For that amount the Pioneer missile could be brought back into production with a range of five to six thousand kilometers and could be produced in such quantities that it would provide effective regional deterrence against a whole range of possible external threats to continental Russia - from NATO to Japan. Purchasing Mistrals would let Japan know that its claim to the Kuril Islands cannot go beyond the level of diplomatic rhetoric. Ultramodern amphibious assault ships can scare a potential aggressor, of course, but not as much as medium-range missiles. It would be enough to announce that the hostilities will immediately provoke a strike from deep inside the national territory on a minimally populated area of the aggressor that has been specified in advance. Would the aggressor be willing to test the efficiency of its missile defense by not evacuating residents of the target area?

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist OPINION/Article US Nuclear Forces, 2014 By Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris January/February 2014 vol. 70 no. 1 85-93 Abstract The United States has an estimated 4,650 nuclear warheads available for delivery by more than 800 ballistic missiles and aircraft. Approximately 2,700 retired but still intact warheads await dismantlement, for a total inventory of roughly 7,400 warheads. The stockpile includes an estimated 2,130 operational warheads, about 1,150 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 470 on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Roughly 300 strategic warheads are located at bomber bases in the United States, and nearly 200 nonstrategic warheads are deployed in Europe. Another 2,530 warheads are in storage. To comply with New START, the United States is expected to eliminate land-based missile silos, reduce the number of launch tubes on its missile submarines, and limit its inventory of nuclear-capable bombers in coming years. Coinciding with a revised nuclear weapons strategy, the Obama administration is also planning an upgrade of all nuclear weapons systems. The three-decade-long plan would cost more than $200 billion in the first decade alone.

Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 31 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama In addition to the warheads in the US stockpile, approximately 2,700 retired, but still-intact warheads are in storage and await dismantlement, for a total inventory of roughly 7,400 warheads. Implementing New START As of September 1, 2013, the United States nuclear arsenal was counted under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with 1,688 strategic warheads attributed to 809 deployed missiles and bombers—an increase of 34 warheads and 17 launchers compared with the previous count in March 2013. The increase is an anomaly, however, reflecting fluctuations in launchers in overhaul rather than an actual increase of strategic forces. Since the treaty entered into force in February 2011, the United States has reduced a total of 146 strategic warheads and 90 launchers counted under the treaty (Kristensen, 2013a). To meet the treaty limit on non-deployed launchers, the Air Force plans to eliminate 104 empty ICBM silos. This includes 50 silos at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, which until 2008 housed the 50 Minuteman III missiles of the 564th Missile Squadron; 50 silos at F. E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, which was until 2005 used by MX/Peacekeeper ICBMs of the 400th Missile Squadron; and one MX/Peacekeeper and three Minuteman III test- launch silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The 50 silos at Malmstrom will be destroyed in 2013–2014, the 50 silos at Warren in 2015–2016, and the four test-launch silos at Vandenberg in 2017. The next step will be the reduction of missile tubes from 24 to 20 on each US nuclear missile submarine in 2015– 2016. The third and final step will be the denuclearization of excess bombers to reduce the accountable inventory to 60. Nuclear weapons employment guidance The Obama administration’s long-awaited nuclear weapons employment guidance was announced in June 2013 after more than two years of internal deliberations. The administration published a nine-page report and a fact sheet that described the employment guidance—known as Presidential Policy Directive 24—setting four overall principles for the role of US nuclear forces. Under the directive, the fundamental role of US nuclear weapons remains to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies and partners. The United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. The United States will maintain a credible nuclear deterrent capable of convincing any potential adversary of the adverse consequences of attacking the United States or its allies and partners. And US policy seeks to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with its current and future security requirements (Defense Department, 2013). These planning principles are based on the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and the guidance report describes an employment strategy that contains a mix of constraints on and reaffirmations of nuclear planning. In terms of constraining nuclear plans, the guidance document declares that the United States can safely pursue up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in New START in negotiated cuts with Russia; directs the Defense Department to focus planning only on those objectives and missions that are necessary for deterrence; and tells the department to examine further options to reduce the role Launch Under Attack plays in US planning. The guidance also directs the Defense Department to take concrete steps toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security by increasing planning for non-nuclear strike options and assessing what objectives and effects could be achieved through them; declares that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their non-nuclear obligations;1 declares that the United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects; reiterates the intention to work toward the goal of making deterrence of nuclear weapons the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons; and outlines a more efficient strategy for hedging against unanticipated risks with fewer non-deployed nuclear weapons (Defense Department, 2013; White House, 2013). The reaffirmations contained in the guidance document in some cases simply confirm that long-held principles for nuclear war planning still are in force. In other cases, however, the reaffirmations appear to contradict the Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 32 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama constraints asserted in the same document. Among other things, the document declares that the new guidance is consistent with the fundamentals of deterrence that have long undergirded US nuclear weapons policy, and that the United States will retain a nuclear triad so it can credibly threaten “a wide range” of nuclear responses if deterrence should fail; these responses could include nuclear attacks against adversaries armed with chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. The guidance also states that the United States will maintain significant counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries and rejects countervalue or minimum deterrence as the basis for US nuclear strategy. It also directs the Defense Department to retain the ability to Launch Under Attack; declares that the new employment strategy does not direct any changes to currently deployed nuclear forces; decides to continue to keep a reserve of non-deployed warheads to increase the deployed force if needed; calls for retaining the ability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with heavy bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft in support of extended deterrence; says that the United States should continue a forward-based nuclear posture in Europe; and declares that non-nuclear strike options are not a substitute for nuclear weapons (Defense Department, 2013; White House, 2013). Based on the new employment guidance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense will update the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, and the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will update the nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. These documents will in turn guide Strategic Command’s revision of the strategic nuclear war plan (Kristensen, 2013b). Some changes will be implemented quickly, while others (such as increasing the role of non-nuclear forces) could take years to achieve. Nuclear modernization plan Coinciding with the revised nuclear weapons employment strategy, the Obama administration is planning an extensive upgrade of all nuclear weapons systems: missiles, bombers, submarines, fighters, warheads, and the supporting complex and factories. The plan extends three decades into the future and costs more than $200 billion in the first decade and hundreds of billions of dollars more in the next two decades. The plan envisions the production of significantly modified nuclear weapons, including the addition of a guided tail kit to the B61 bomb to increase its accuracy, broaden strike options against underground targets, and reduce radioactive fallout. The new B61 bomb (B61-12) is already being designed and is expected to cost around $10 billion for 400 to 500 bombs—the most expensive nuclear bomb project ever. The plan also envisions building a family of so-called interoperable warheads that could be used on both land- and sea-based missiles. Little is known about the precise configuration of these warheads, but even though they would incorporate components from previously tested warhead designs, each could differ significantly from warheads currently in the stockpile and potentially increase uncertainty about warhead performance. Each interoperable warhead will be extremely expensive, with IW1 projected at $14.7 billion. The plan is known as the 3 + 2 plan because it envisions the entire future stockpile containing three warhead types for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and two warheads for bombers, compared with seven warhead types today (see Figure 1). The high cost will likely result in significant modification, even cancelation, of the 3+2 plan.

Figure 1. The first phase of the US nuclear warhead modernization plan, known as 3 + 2 Source: Department of Defense. Annotations: Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2013 Land-based ballistic missiles The US Air Force operates a force of 450 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs split evenly across three wings: the 90th Missile Wing at F. E. Warren Air Force Base; the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota; and the 341st Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base. Each wing has three squadrons, each with 50 missiles controlled by five launch-control centers. Under New START, the Air Force plans to reduce the ICBM force to 400 missiles, probably by retiring one of three missile squadrons at one of the three bases, leaving two bases with 150 missiles each and one with 100 missiles. Each missile carries either the 335-kiloton W78 warhead or the 300-kiloton W87 warhead. A few missiles still carry multiple warheads but are being downloaded in order for the United States to meet the limits of New START. Despite the download, the ICBM force will retain a re-MIRVing capability that could increase warhead loading if directed. The Air Force is in the final phase of a multibillion-dollar, decade-long modernization program to extend the service life of the Minuteman III to 2030. Although the United States has not officially announced deployment of a new ICBM, the upgraded Minuteman IIIs “are basically new missiles except for the shell” (Pampe, 2012). The total modernization program will be completed in 2015. In mid-2014, the Air Force is scheduled to complete an analysis of alternatives for replacing the Minuteman III missiles. Options being studied range from extending the existing missile to beyond 2030 to more exotic options, such as a mobile ICBM to increase survivability. Three Minuteman IIIs were test-launched in 2013. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines The US Navy operates 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (eight based in the Pacific and six in the Atlantic), all equipped with Trident II D5 SLBMs. Normally 12 of the subs are considered operational, with a 13th and 14th boat in overhaul at any given time. The aggregate New START data show that normally fewer than 12 of these submarines are fully equipped with missiles. Of the 14 boats, 10 or 11 are normally capable of deploying with their missiles. Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 34 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The deployed submarines carry approximately 1,150 warheads—or an average of 4.8 warheads per missile. In practice, each missile probably has three, four, or five warheads, depending upon the requirement of the war plan. Loading with fewer warheads increases a missile’s range. Three versions of two basic warhead types are deployed on the SLBMs: the 100-kiloton W76-0, the 100-kiloton W76-1, and the 455-kiloton W88. The W76-1 is a refurbished version of the W76-0, with the same yield but with an added safety device, a dual strong link detonation control. Moreover, a new arming, fuzing, and firing unit provides improved targeting capabilities. Full-scale production of an estimated 1,200 W76-1 s is under way at the Pantex plant in Texas. So far, roughly 500 W76-1 s have replaced W76-0 s on Trident II SLBMs, and production is scheduled to continue through 2019. W76-1 s are also being supplied to Britain’s missile submarines (Kristensen, 2011a). US submarine nuclear deterrent patrols have decreased significantly over the past decade from 64 patrols in 1999 to 28 in 2011. As a result, each sub now conducts an average of 2.5 patrols per year compared with 3.5 patrols a decade ago. The average duration of a patrol is 70 days, with a few lasting more than 100 days. More than 60 percent of the patrols take place in the Pacific Ocean, reflecting nuclear war planning against China, North Korea, and eastern Russia. At any given time, eight or nine of the 12 operational nuclear missile submarines are at sea. Four or five of the at- sea boats are on “hard alert,” which means they are in designated patrol areas within range of the targets specified in their assigned target package in accordance with the strategic war plan. The other three or four subs at sea are in transit to or from their patrol areas, and the remaining boats are in port, some with their missiles removed. Starting in 2015, the number of missile tubes on each Ohio-class boat will be reduced by four, from 24 to 20. The reduction is intended to reduce the number of deployed SLBMs to no more than 240 at any given time, to meet the 2018 limit on deployed strategic delivery vehicles set by New START. The Navy has ambitious modernization plans to replace the Ohio-class subs with a new design, a submarine that is 2,000 tons larger than the Ohio-class submarine, but with 16 missile tubes instead of the current 24—four fewer than the 20 planned under New START. Twelve replacement boats (tentatively known as SSBNX) are planned, a reduction of two compared with the current fleet of 14, at an estimated cost of approximately $100 billion. Construction of the first new submarine is scheduled for 2021, with deployment on deterrent patrol starting in 2031. The plan is that during the first decade of its service life, this new class of submarine will be armed with a life- extended version of the current Trident II D5 SLBM. This upgraded missile, the D5LE, has a guidance system designed to “provide flexibility to support new missions” (Draper Laboratory, 2006: 8) and make the missile “more accurate” (Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division, 2008: 14); it will also be backfitted onto existing Ohio- class subs for the remainder of their service life, starting in the Pacific in October 2017. The D5LE will also be deployed on Britain’s missile submarines. The US submarine force conducted eight SLBM test-launches in 2013. In April, following completion of its reactor- refueling overhaul, the Pennsylvania launched four missiles including the second flight test of the D5LE guidance package. And in September, another submarine launched two salvos of two missiles in the Atlantic Ocean. Strategic bombers The Air Force operates a fleet of 20 B-2 and 93 B-52H bombers at three bases. Of those, 18 B-2 s and 76 B-52Hs are nuclear-capable. An estimated 60 bombers (16 B-2 s and 44 B-52Hs) are assigned nuclear weapons under the strategic nuclear war plan. Each dedicated B-2 can carry up to 16 nuclear bombs (B61-7, B61-11, and B83-1). The dedicated B-52Hs are assigned air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) but are no longer assigned gravity bombs. From the 2020s, the B-2 is scheduled to receive the planned B61-12 precision-guided nuclear bomb, a program currently estimated to cost in excess of $10 billion. It is estimated that approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons, including 528 ALCMs, are assigned Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 35 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama to the bombers. Most of these weapons are in central storage at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico and Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, but a small number (we estimate 200 to 300) are stored at Minot Air Force Base and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri; nuclear weapons are no longer stored at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana (Air Force Magazine, 2011; Ferrell, 2012). The weapons are not deployed on the bombers under normal circumstances but could be loaded on short notice. From the mid-2020s, the Air Force plans to begin replacing B-52 and B-1 (and later also B-2) bombers with a new long-range bomber. Procurement of 80 to 100 aircraft is envisioned; some of the new bombers are planned to be nuclear-capable, at a total cost of well over $55 billion. The new bomber will be equipped to deliver the planned B61-12 precision-guided bomb, as well as a new nuclear ALCM that is currently known as the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile. The current ALCM is scheduled to remain operational through the 2020s. The administration has promised that it will not produce “new” nuclear warheads, so the LRSO could either use a life-extended version of the ALCM’s W80-1 warhead or a life-extended version of the retired W84 warhead that once armed the Ground- Launched Cruise Missile. The LRSO warhead could cost as much as $12 billion, with billions more needed to produce the missile itself. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons The US inventory of nonstrategic nuclear weapons includes approximately 500 warheads, all B61 gravity bombs. Nearly 200 of the bombs are deployed in Europe at six bases in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The Belgian, Dutch, and Turkish air forces (with F-16 s) and German and Italian air forces (with PA-200 Tornado aircraft) are assigned nuclear strike missions with the US nuclear weapons (Kristensen and Norris, 2011). The weapons in Europe no longer serve a military purpose and are not tasked with providing the ultimate security guarantee to NATO, a mission that is assigned to strategic weapons. Although the May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago approved the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review conclusion that the existing “nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012: paragraph 8), NATO has approved modernization in Europe through the addition of a guided tail kit to the B61 bomb to increase its accuracy, and the deployment of the stealthy F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter in Europe. Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey have decided to buy the F-35A, and it is under consideration in Belgium. The modified bomb, known as the B61-12, will also be carried on other fighter aircraft (F-15E, F-16, and PA-200 Tornado) as well as strategic bombers (B-2 and the new long- range bomber), potentially complicating future arms control agreements (Kristensen, 2011b, 2012). Funding This research was carried out with grants from the New-Land Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund. References 1. Air Force Magazine (2011) No weapons storage area for Barksdale. February 23. Available at: www.airforce- magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2011/February%202011/February%2023%202011/NoWeaponsStorageAreaf orBarksdale.aspx . 2. Defense Department (2013) Report on nuclear employment strategy of the United States. June 12. Available at: www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf . 3. Draper Laboratory (2006) Keeping Trident ever ready. Explorations (Spring): 8–10. 4. Ferrell J (2012) No nukes at BAFB creates readiness worries. KSLA-TV, February 16. Available at: http://www.ksla.com/story/16955777/no-nukes-at-bafb-global-strikes-home . 5. Kristensen HM (2011a) British submarines to receive upgraded US nuclear warhead. FAS Strategic Security Blog, April 1. Available at: www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/04/britishw76-1.php . 6. Kristensen HM (2011b) B61 LEP: Increasing NATO nuclear capability and precision low-yield strikes. FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 15. Available at: www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/06/b61-12.php . 7. Kristensen HM (2012) Modernizing NATO’s nuclear forces: Implications for the alliance’s defense posture and arms control. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, November. Available at: http://tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de/pdf/Nuclear_Policy_Paper_No11.pdf . Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 36 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 8. Kristensen HM (2013a) New START data shows Russia reducing, US increasing nuclear forces. FAS Strategic Security Blog, October 2. Available at: http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/10/newstartsep2013/ . 9. Kristensen HM (2013b) US nuclear war plan updated amidst nuclear policy review. FAS Strategic Security Blog, April 4. Available at: http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/04/oplan8010-12/ . 10. Kristensen HM, Norris RS (2011) US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(1): 64–73. 11. Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division (2008) Underwater wonder, Submarines: A powerful deterrent. Warfighter Solutions (Fall): 12–14. 12. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2012) Deterrence and defense posture review. Press release, May 20. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm . 13. Pampe C (2012) Life extension programs send missiles into the future. Inside AFGSC, October 24. Available at: www.afgsc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123323606 . 14. White House (2013) Fact sheet: Nuclear weapons employment strategy of the United States. June 19. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment- strategy-united-states . Author biographies Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington, DC. His work focuses on researching and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the policies that direct them. Kristensen is a co-author of the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations. Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington, DC. His principal areas of expertise include writing and research on all aspects of the nuclear weapons programs of the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, Britain, France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and Israel. He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (Steerforth, 2002). He has co-authored the Nuclear Notebook column since May 1987. http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/1/85.full#abstract-1 Return to Top

ABOUT THE USAF CPC The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended that "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons School, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence.

Issue No.1097, 10 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 37