THE LURE & PITFALLS OF MIRVs From the First to the Second Nuclear Age Edited by Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler and Shane Mason THE LURE & PITFALLS OF MIRVs From the First to the Second Nuclear Age Edited by Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler and Shane Mason May 2016 © Copyright 2016 Stimson Center. All rights reserved. Visit www.stimson.org for more information. Cover photo: David James Paquin via Wikimedia Commons The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs CONTENTS Preface................................................................ 7 Executive Summary .................................................... 8 Key Terms and Acronyms . 10 Introduction.......................................................... 13 Michael Krepon and Travis Wheeler The Geopolitical Origins of US Hard-Target-Kill Counterforce Capabilities and MIRVs.................................... 19 Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long The Impact of MIRVs and Counterforce Targeting on the US-Soviet Strategic Relationship .................................. 55 Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs ...................................... 95 Jeffrey G. Lewis India’s Slow and Unstoppable Move to MIRV ............................ 119 Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath Sankaran Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting ........................... 149 Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor Ahmed Summing Up and Looking Ahead ...................................... 177 Michael Krepon 5 PREFACE I am pleased to present the latest publication of the Stimson Center’s South Asia program, The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age. This monograph begins with expert analyses of the internal and external factors that led the United States and the Soviet Union to affix multiple warheads atop their longest-range missiles. Then three essays assess whether and how China, India, and Pakistan might embrace multiple independently targetable re-entry ve- hicles (MIRVs). As with previous Stimson publications, we expect that The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs will be read carefully by government officials, serving and retired military officers, senior and rising strategic analysts, and students interest- ed in how the second nuclear age will play out in India, Pakistan, and China. For more than 25 years, the Stimson Center has generated policy-relevant scholar- ship on nuclear deterrence and crisis management in South Asia. In recent years, Stimson’s South Asia program has gone from strength to strength, including a web- site, South Asian Voices [http://www.southasianvoices.org], dedicated to providing a forum for rising strategic analysts in India and Pakistan. In 2016, we will launch a new Stimson initiative — an open online course on “Nuclear South Asia.” This free course benefits from the input of more than 70 notable strategic analysts, scholars, and diplomats from India, Pakistan, and the United States. It will become the go-to course on South Asia’s nuclear history, Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines, de- terrence and crisis stability, as well as the subcontinent’s alternative nuclear futures. The Stimson Center is deeply indebted for programming on nuclear issues in South Asia from the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The ed- itors also wish to thank: Stimson’s communications team, led by Jim Baird and Miles Abadilla; Stimson’s administrative team, especially Oksana Bellas, Lacie Rawlings, Nakia Bell, and Will Brown; Julia Thompson, a former research associ- ate in the South Asia Program; Akriti Vasudeva, a visiting fellow in the South Asia Program; Stimson interns Joseph Kendall, Mariah Hays, and Poorvie Patel; copy editor Jenny Moore; and graphic designer Lita Ledesma. Sincerely, Brian Finlay President and CEO, Stimson Center 7 Executive Summary EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In the second nuclear age, no less than the first, there are no realistic prospects for banning multiple-warhead missiles. China has started to deploy such missiles, and India and Pakistan are likely to cross this threshold as well. The motivations behind these steps will determine how extensively nuclear arsenals will grow and how pernicious the effects of stockpile growth will become. Success in dampening the negative repercussions of multiple-warhead missiles will rest on two foundations. The first is improved bilateral relations among the contestants. One of the responsibilities of states that possess nuclear weapons is to pursue nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs) with other nuclear-armed states, especially those with which they have previously fought wars. By this yard- stick, China, India, and Pakistan can be found wanting. A willingness to improve bilateral relations is measurable in many ways. It is af- firmed by: the absence of firing across and aggressive patrolling nearby unset- tled borders; the avoidance of violent acts emanating from one country’s soil that can lead to intense crises; failing that, the successful judicial prosecution of high- er-ups; engagement in meaningful strategic dialogue that produces NRRMs; and preventing increased trade or improved relations from being held hostage to issues that are not ripe for settlement. Here again, all three states can be found wanting. The second foundation for dampening the negative consequences of multiple-war- head missiles in Asia is to resist a progression from countervalue to counterforce targeting strategies of nuclear deterrence. This metric, as with the willingness to improve bilateral relations, is measurable in several ways, including: the reten- tion of no first use (NFU) doctrines by China and India; proceeding slowly with limited numbers of multiple-warhead missiles; and being more transparent about strategic modernization plans and programs. China will set the tone for this competition. India will likely indulge in tech- nological advances as well. And Pakistan, the country least equipped to engage in an accelerated competition, is most susceptible to this dynamic as it seeks to keep pace with India. Unlike the first nuclear age, it is possible to dampen the extent of warhead increases due to multiple-warhead missiles. But even modest increments in multiple-warhead missiles — resulting in perhaps 200 warheads among the competitors over the next 10-15 years — will ratchet up the triangu- lar, interactive nuclear competition in Asia. If the growth of warhead totals and missile accuracy presages moves by Beijing and New Delhi toward warfighting strategies of deterrence, then the second nuclear age 8 The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs EXECUTIVE SUMMARY will become far more dangerous, and prospects for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons on international affairs will be undermined. If decisionmakers in China, India, and Pakistan wish to avoid repeating the missteps of the United States and the Soviet Union during the first nuclear age, they will limit the extent to which mul- tiple warheads are placed atop missiles, they will proceed at a slow pace, and, most important, they will reject the lure and pitfalls of counterforce targeting strategies. 9 Key Terms & Acronyms KEY TERMS & ACRONYMS ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile ASAT Anti-Satellite BMD Ballistic Missile Defense CEP Circular Error Probable CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty C3 Command, Control, and Communications DAE Department of Atomic Energy (India) DRDO Defence Research and Development Organisation (India) HTK Hard-Target Kill ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces IRBM Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile ISPR Inter-Services Public Relations (Pakistan) ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance LACM Land-Attack Cruise Missile LNO Limited Nuclear Options MAD Mutual Assured Destruction MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle MaRV Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle NCA National Command Authority (Pakistan) NESCOM National Engineering and Scientific Commission (Pakistan) NFU No First Use NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSA National Security Advisor NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense (United States) PBV Post-Boost Vehicle PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) 10 The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs KEY TERMS & ACRONYMS PMO Prime Minister’s Office (India) PSA Principal Scientific Advisor (India) RV Re-entry Vehicle SAC Strategic Air Command (United States) SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SFC Strategic Forces Command (India) SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan (United States) SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SNF Strategic Nuclear Forces SP Special Projects (United States) SPD Strategic Plans Division (Pakistan) SPS Strategic Program Staff (India) SRF Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet Union) SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (Pakistan) USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 11 The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs INTRODUCTION Michael Krepon and Travis Wheeler The dawn of the first nuclear age came as a great shock. The assumption of waging wars by “ironmongery,” with the outcome determined over time by remorseless acts of cumulative punishment, was immediately upended. With stunning effect, the “absolute” weapon was unveiled. The Bomb could be used as a war-winning weapon or, paradoxically, it could be too powerful to be used in war.1 Other shocking technological advances followed the “atomic” bomb in quick