Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

September 1985

NTIS order #PB86-182961 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense Tech- nologies, OTA-ISC-254 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sep- tember 1985).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600586

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 Foreword

President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative has kindled a national debate over the roles of strategic offensive nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses, and arms control in U.S. national security policy. It has also underscored the important ramifications of U.S. military space policy. At the requests of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate For- eign Relations Committee, OTA undertook an assessment of the opportunities and risks involved in an accelerated program of research on new ballistic missile defense technologies, including those that might lead to deployment of weapons in space. Debate over the relevant political, military, and technical issues has been hotly contested by participants with widely varying assumptions and points of view. OTA has not attempted to resolve the debate, but rather to try to clarify the issues and enhance the level of discourse. This report examines both the “why” and the “what” of ballistic missile defenses. Why would we want ballistic missile defense weapons if we could have them? Would the advantages of deploying them outweigh the disadvantages? What technologies are under investigation for BMD applications? How might those applications serve our strategic goals? These policy and technology questions interact with one another in complex ways: what seems technologically possible conditions perceptions of policy options, while policy choices shape technological pursuits. Closely related to BMD technology issues are questions about the development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Whether or not the United States decides to deploy BMD systems in space, the other military uses of space will continue to be of national importance. How might the United States deal with the potential threat of current and future Soviet anti-satellite weapons to U.S. military space activities? After consultation with the staffs of the requesting com- mittees, OTA decided to prepare a companion report, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control. The relative role each of those elements (the weapons, the countermeasures, and arms control) plays will be strongly affected by the course followed in the development and deployment of space-based BMD systems. OTA gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the many individuals, firms, laboratories, and government agencies who assisted its research and writing for this report.

#. .

Director

. Advisory Panel on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

Guyford Steve, Chairman President, Universities Research Associates Solomon Buchsbaum Michael M. May Executive Vice President Associate Director-at-Large AT&T Bell Labs Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Ashton Carter H. Alan Pike Kennedy School of Government Program Manager, Space Stations Harvard University Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Robert Clem Frederick Seitz Director of Systems Sciences President Emeritus Sandia National Laboratories The Rockefeller University Sidney D. Drell Robert Selden Deputy Director Associate Director for Theoretical and Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Computational Physics Los Alamos National Laboratory Daniel J. Fink President Marshall D. Shulman D. J. Fink Associates, Inc. Director Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of Richard Garwin the Soviet Union IBM Fellow Columbia University Thomas J. Watson Research Center Ambassador Gerard C. Smith Noel Gayler, Admiral, USN (Ret.) President American Committee on East-West Accord Consultants International Group, Inc. Colin Gray Sayre Stevens President Vice President National Institute for Public Policy System Planning Corp. George Jeffs Maj. General John Toomay, USAF (Ret.) President Consultant North American Space Operations, Rockwell International Seymour Zeiberg Vice President General David Jones, USAF (Ret.) Research and Engineering Operations Former Chairman Martin Marietta Aerospace Joint Chiefs of Staff Robert S. McNamara Former President of the World Bank

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The views expressed in this OTA report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment. Participation on the Advisory Panel does not imply endorsement of the report. iv OTA Project Staff on New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Thomas H. Karas, Project Director

Michael Callaham

Richard DalBello Gerald Epstein Anthony Fainbergl Robert Rochlin2 Alan Shaw

Contractors

Fredrick Drugan William Green Brian McCue

Administrative Staff

Jannie Coles Dorothy Richroath Jackie Robinson

ISince February 1985. ‘On detail from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Workshop on Soviet Military Doctrine and BMD (December 1984)

Raymond Garthoff Stephen Meyer The Brookings Institution Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Daniel Goure Science Applications International Corp. Harriet Fast Scott David Holloway Edward Warner Center for International Security and The RAND Corp. Arms Control Stanford University

Participating Members of Advisory Panel Marshall D. Shulman Sayre Stevens H. Guyford Stever Contents

Chapter Page I. Executive Summary ...... 3

2. Introduction...... 37

3. Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now ...... 45

4. Deterrence, U.S. Nuclear Strategy, and BMD ...... 67

5. BMD Capabilities and the Strategic Balance ...... 93

6. Crisis Stability, Arms Race Stability, and Arms Control Issues . . .119

7. Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies ...... 139

8. Feasibility ...... 197

9. Alternative Future Scenarios ...... 221

IO. Alternative R&D Programs...... 239

Appendix A. Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty. ..., ...... 263 B. Texts of the 1982 ABM Treaty, Its Agreed Interpretations, and Its 1976 Protocol ...... 272 C. Effects of BMD Deployment on Existing Arms Control Treaties . .283 D. Defense Requirements for Assured Survival ...... 285 E. Defense Capability Levels and U.S. Strategy Choices ...... 290 F. BMD and the Military Budget ...... 292 G. Studies of the High Frontier Global Ballistic Missile Defense I...... 294 H. Excerpts From Statements on BMD by Reagan Administration Officials ...... 297 I. List of Reagan Administration Statements on BMD, ...... 308 J. Articles by Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative...... 310 K. Excerpts From Soviet Statements on BMD ., ., ...... 312 L. References on Strategic Nuclear Policy ...... ,316 M. References on Soviet Strategic Policy ...... 320 N. Glossary of Acronyms and Terms...... , ...... 321

vi; Chapter 1 Executive Summary Page The Presidential Challenge ...... 3 The BMD R&D Debate ...... 4 Goals ...... 4 Technical Feasibility ...... 5 Arms Control...... 6 Alternative BMD Research Programs ...... 7 Soviet BMD Research and Comparison With U.S. Research ...... 9 Issues for R&D Programs ...... 12 1. Maintenance of the ABM Treaty ...... 12 2. Requirements for Arms Control ...... 13 3. Anti-Satellite Weapon Arms Control ...... 13 4. R&D/Deployment Coupling ...... 14 5. Technology Experiments ...... 14 6. Research and Development of Offensive Forces . . 15 ‘7. Relations With Allies ...... 15 8. Technology Transfer ...... 15 Deployment Issues ...... 16 &it&ion 1: Potential Role in U.S. Nuclear Strategy 17 Criterion: Crisis Stability ...... 20 Criterion: Arms Race Stability and Arms Control. 22 Criterion: Diplomatic Stability ...... 23 Criterion: Feasibility ...... 24 Criterion: cost ...... 28 Concluding Remarks...... , ...... 31 Debated Issues ...... 31 OTA Findings ...... ,...... 32

Table Table No. Page I-I. Hypothetical Multi-Layered BMD System...... 27 Chapter 1 Executive Summary

THE PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGE

President Reagan’s speech of March 23, missile defense technologies. This research 1983, renewed a national debate that had been program was called the “Strategic Defense intense in the late 1960s but much subdued Initiative” (SDI). since 1972. Wouldn’t the United States be If there were a national consensus on the more secure attempting to defend its national territory against ballistic missiles while the role, if any, ballistic missile defense (BMD) should play in our national strategy, assess- Soviet Union did the same? Or would it be more secure attempting to keep such defenses ing the likelihood of attaining the necessary largely banned by agreement with the Soviet capabilities at an acceptable cost would be difficult enough. There is extensive controversy Union? over the potential of various BMD technol- The President posed the question, ogies and the possibilities for applying them in affordable weapons systems that would be What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest effective against a Soviet offensive threat which upon the threat of instant retaliation to de- includes countermeasures to our defenses. But ter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept there is also extensive controversy over wheth- and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before er various levels of ballistic missile defense ca- they reached our own soil or that of our pability, if attainable, would be desirable. A allies?’ fair assessment of the technological possibil- Calling upon the U.S. scientific community ities must weigh them against a range of stra- " . . . to give us the means of rendering these tegic criteria which are themselves matters of nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, he controversy. announced that he was This report is intended to illuminate, rather . . . directing a comprehensive and inten- than adjudicate, the BMD debate. It provides sive effort to define a long-term research and more questions than answers. But the ques- development program to begin to achieve our tions will remain relevant in the years to come, ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed because their answers will affect national pol- by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave icies with or without ballistic missile defense. the way for arms control measures to elimi- For the short term, the important questions nate the weapons themselves. have to do with what kind of research the After that speech the President ordered United States should conduct on BMD and studies to explore further the promise of bal- with how future BMD technical possibilities listic missile defense, and in 1984 the Depart- affect current offensive force planning and ment of Defense established an organization diplomatic activities. For the longer term, the to expand and accelerate research in ballistic important questions have to do with what kind of BMD we could reasonably expect to ‘Transcript of televised speech, Mar. 23, 1983. For text of deploy, whether we would want to, and what relevant passages, see app. H. the consequences might be. 4

THE BMD R&D DEBATE The near-term debate over BMD research not appear to be a goal of the Strategic Defense and development (as opposed to deployment) Initiative program.2 has focused on the following issues in par- Rather, some of the President’s language ticular: and many subsequent policy statements indi- 1. What are (or should be) the central goals cate that the Administration envisions a more of the U.S. BMD research and develop- complex scenario that might eventually lead ment program; to deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals with 2. The feasibility of reaching those goals; which the United States and the Soviet Un- 3. The relationship between this research ion now threaten one another. The steps in this and arms control negotiations with the scenario are: Soviet Union. 1. A research program to seek ballistic mis- Participants in the debate over ballistic missile defenses that would be cheaper to de- sile defense hold differing views on: ploy than the offensive weapons needed

● to penetrate them. Soviet motivations, intentions, and capa- 2. A decision in the early or mid-1990s to de- bilities; ● velop such defenses for deployment near Whether current U.S. nuclear strategy the end of the century. and nuclear forces are now, and will con- 3. Negotiations with the Soviet Union for tinue to be, adequate to deter Soviet agreed mutual deployment of defenses threats and aggression; ● coupled with reductions in offensive The past role and future prospects of weapons. In this transition stage, the arms control in contributing to U.S. na- threat of nuclear retaliation would play tional security; ● a still important, but presumably declin- How optimistic or pessimistic one should ing, role in deterring Soviet threats and be about the technical feasibility of ren- aggression. dering nuclear ballistic missiles “impo- 4. An ultimate stage in which ballistic mis- tent and obsolete. ” sile defenses, air defenses, and negotiated These differing views have shaped the debates reductions of offensive weapons to ex- both about BMD research and about BMD de- tremely low levels have eliminated the ployment. ability of the United States and the So- viet Union to destroy one another’s soci- Goals eties with nuclear weapons. Strategic Defense Initiative Goals Administration officials have stated, however, that negotiating with the Soviets does Few are comfortable with a situation in not mean giving the Soviets a veto over a U.S. which U.S. security depends heavily on our decision to deploy BMD. In their view, if threatening mass destruction with nuclear defenses become cheaper than the weapons weapons. Fewer still are comfortable with the they must intercept, the Soviets ought to see vulnerability of the U.S. population to Soviet the rationality of the U.S. negotiating sce- nuclear attack. President Reagan’s speech ap- nario. But if the Soviets refuse to negotiate, peared to offer a way of eventually escaping —— ‘According to the Department of Defense “Report to the Con- this condition. Although some people have in- gress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985”: terpreted some of President Reagan’s state- The goal of the SDI is to conduct a program of vigorous research focused on advanced defensive technologies that may ments to mean that he envisions development lead to strategic defense options that could: of a virtually perfect defense of the U.S. popu- • support a better basis for deterring aggression; lation against all types of nuclear attack, pur- ● strengthen strategic stability; ● increase the security of the United States and its allies; and suit of defenses able to protect the U.S. popu- ● eliminate the threat posed by ballistic missiles. The SDI seeks, therefore, to exploit emerging technologies lation and that of its allies in the face of a that may provide options for a broader-based deterrence by turn- determined Soviet effort to overcome them does ing to a greater reliance on defensive systems. . —

U.S. security would increase anyway because marily (or, in some cases, exclusively) to pro- (a) Soviet ballistic missiles would be less ca- tect U.S. ICBM silos and probably using nu- pable of achieving military objectives than clear warheads. A description of how various they had been in the past; and (b) if the Soviets BMD research goals might present congres- and the United States spent equal amounts sional choices for alternate research and de- on strategic forces, the assumed cost advan- velopment programs is presented in a later tage of the defense would lead to a continu- section. ing decline in ability of the Soviet offensive forces to penetrate U.S. defenses.

Although the pursuit of this scenario ap- Technical Feasibility pears to be the central purpose of the Strate- gic Defense Initiative, other goals have also A second major focus of the debate over been ascribed to it. These include: BMD is technical feasibility–the likelihood that the research will lead to the development ● maintaining an ability to deploy U.S. bal- of BMD systems that could achieve Admin- listic missile defenses promptly in case istration goals. There are at least two layers the Soviets should “break out” of the of technical issues involved in this part of the ABM Treaty; debate. One is whether particular technology ● hedging against Soviet unilateral devel- performance levels (for example, those of sen- opment and deployment of advanced bal- sors, pointing and tracking systems, com- listic missile defense technologies by gain- puters, chemical lasers or electromagnetic rail ing an understanding of what is feasible guns) could be scaled up and integrated into (U.S. responses could include comparable effective weapons systems. The second layer defenses, more offensive weapons, offen- of technical issues is whether the weapons sys- sive countermeasures, or all three); tems could operate effectively against deter- ● developing new technologies which may mined Soviet efforts to counter them. Propo- or may not be applied ultimately to BMD, nents of the SD I believe that the technologies but which could have other military and are sufficiently promising to be worth inten- civilian applications. sive research. In addition, they point out that for many years the Soviets have been conducting research in advanced BMD-related technologies (such as lasers) and that the SDI as Other Perspectives on Goals a research program would be justified if on no The differing views of BMD debate partici- other grounds than hedging against possible pants cited above lead to support for differ- Soviet progress in these areas. ing research goals or different placements of research emphasis. Some approve of the SD I Skeptics argue that offensive nuclear weap- long-term goals but believe that there should ons are so likely-unless offenses are tightly be greater emphasis on moving toward near- constrained in number and quality-to con- term deployment of land-based and space- tinue to dominate defensive weapons that pur- based BMD systems. Others question the SDI suing the SDI goals is not justifiable. They goals on strategic or technical grounds. They question whether Soviet research into ad- suggest that the United States should empha- vanced BMD-related technologies is likely to size technology development and hedging lead to actual defensive systems that U.S. mis- against Soviet BMD potentials and that mov- siles could not penetrate. They believe that the ing toward a deployment decision in the fore- best hedge against such Soviet programs is seeable future should not be a goal. Those who continuing or accelerating work on U.S. of- stress maintaining a base for quickly deploy- fensive penetration aids. They may support ing BMD to deter or respond to a Soviet ABM continued U.S. research on BMD, but they are Treaty break-out tend to favor research em- concerned about the potential consequences phasis on “terminal” defenses, designed pri- of certain SD I demonstration experiments. 6

Arms Control The SDI has already caused the Soviets to return to arms control negotiations Most BMD systems based on advanced 4 which they had previously walked out of. technologies could not be developed, tested, 3 The best prospect for future arms control or deployed under the ABM Treaty regime. agreements lies in persuading the Soviets One issue is whether or not our program of that their “first strike” ICBMs will be- BMD research will be compatible with the come obsolete in the face of U.S. defenses, ABM Treaty. A more fundamental issue, how- and that the most promising way of add- ever, is whether or not the ABM Treaty con- ing to Soviet security is negotiating the tinues to be compatible with our national in- reduction of both U.S. and Soviet offen- terest. sive weapons while both sides emphasize Differing views on the nature of the United defenses. Failing such persuasion, a com- States-Soviet strategic relationship come to petition in which defensive weapons had the fore most strongly in debates over the in- an economic advantage over offensive terplay between the Strategic Defense Initia- weapons would be more in the U.S. inter- tive and arms control. est than the current situation because in the long run it should reduce net Soviet Supporters of the SDI tend to argue from offensive capabilities. the following perspective: Given the asymmetries between the so- ● The Soviet Union has been relentless— cieties and the strategic objectives of the and at least partly successful-in its pur- United States and Soviet Union, the arms suit of strategic nuclear superiority over control process as it has been conducted the United States. In particular, the to date may never be to the net benefit Soviets have obtained a “first strike’ ca- of the United States. On the other hand, pability against U.S. land-based ICBMs. BMD may permit pursuit of a common In the future, the Soviets might conceiv- interest in the “assured survival” of each ably find means of detecting and destroy- society. ing U.S. missile-launching submarines as Many critics of the SDI have another per- well. The Soviets can be expected to ex- spective: ploit such advantages by attempting to intimidate the United States and its ● Given the continuing mutual abilities of allies. the United States and the Soviet Union ● Past arms control agreements have not to destroy one another’s societies with successfully limited the Soviet offensive several kinds of nuclear delivery vehicle buildup. In particular, the ABM Treaty (ICBM, SLBM, cruise missile, bomber), and the companion Interim Offensive the Soviets do not have and cannot rea- Agreement, contrary to U.S. hopes, led to sonably hope to obtain an exploitable no significant Soviet offensive restraint. strategic nuclear advantage. Even the Instead, behaving as if nuclear war would narrower possibility of destroying most be like other wars, only bigger, the So- U.S. land-based ICBMs in their silos is so viets have deployed far more weapons fraught with uncertainties that the So- than they need for deterrence. viets would be irrational to try it. More- ‘While laboratory research into any type of BMD system is over, there are other potential means, permitted under the treaty, there are severe limitations on field testing and development of ABM systems. Only fixed, land- ‘The official position of both the United States and the So- based systems can be developed or tested, and only one speci- viet Union is that the ongoing Geneva talks are new negotia- fied fixed, land-based system can be deployed. See app. A. tions and do not represent a resumption of the previous ones. 7

such as mobile basing, to increase the sur- have resumed, we should believe the vivability of the ICBM leg of the nuclear Soviets when they say that U.S. BMD re- triad. search and deployment would lead them ● While certain issues of Soviet compliance to seek and deploy more offensive weap- with past arms control agreements need ons and countermeasures rather than to to be resolved, by and large those agree- agree to offensive reductions. Negotia- ments have kept Soviet offenses below tions offer a better chance of reducing the the levels they might otherwise have net Soviet offensive threat to the United reached. The ABM Treaty successfully States than does ballistic missile defense. limited Soviet deployment of anti-ballistic Whatever value SDI does have in en- missile launchers and spared the United couraging arms control can best be real- States the need to build countering offen- ized if we agree to constraints on BMD sive and defensive weapons. Abandon- technology development, for example by ment of the Treaty could lead to a more clarifying or extending provisions in the costly and more dangerous arms race. ABM Treaty, in exchange for Soviet agree- ● Rather than having driven the Soviets ment to deep cuts in offensive forces. back to the negotiating table, the SDI ● Over the longer term, the best hope for might instead have merely provided them avoiding nuclear war lies not in new kinds a face-saving way to reverse their previ- of military strategy or technology, but ous decision—which they now regret-to rather in maintaining a stable balance of stay out of arms control talks until newly invulnerable retaliatory forces until the deployed nuclear weapons were removed political relationship between the two su- from Europe. Even though negotiations perpowers can be considerably improved.

ALTERNATIVE BMD RESEARCH PROGRAMS The issues facing Congress in the near term changes which have been initiated in the U.S. concern the U.S. research program on technol- BMD research program and in U.S. arms con- ogies for strategic defense. There is general trol policy by President Reagan’s Strategic agreement that these technologies merit inves- Defense Initiative: tigation. Support for BMD research, however, Urgency. does not necessarily imply support for the Stra- —Research under the SDI is intended to proceed at a “technology-limited” tegic Defense Initiative. Possible BMD research pace to permit a decision to be made at the programs can differ greatly from the SDI in em- earliest possible date on whether to enter full- phasis, direction, and level of effort. Moreover, research programs having different perceived scale engineering development; entering such development would clearly be inconsistent and intended purposes—even if they have simi- with ABM Treaty constraints. The pre-SDI lar technical content—can have very different program had no such mandate for an early de- consequences. cision on maintaining or abandoning the ABM Treaty. Decisions to be made by Congress this year and in the years to come will have a major im- Visibility.--The SDI has much higher visibil- pact in either ratifying or re-directing major ity and a much higher level of Presidential at- 8 tention than the previous program of research ogies are to be studied. Most BMD-relevant in BMD-relevant technologies. The decision to technologies would be investigated, at some spotlight BMD has already been made, and level, in all three. its consequences are already being felt. These The first approach is the SDI as proposed consequences certainly include a decision by by the Reagan Administration. The second ap- the Soviets to at least explore their options proach would proceed to BMD deployment to respond to the increased probability of a faster than the SDI would be able to, and the U.S. BMD deployment. third approach would conduct BMD research Direction. -Under the SDI, emphasis has and development at a slower rate than the shifted away from fairly well-understood, or SDI. Each of the last two approaches is fur- “mature,” technologies, which generally in- ther broken down into two suboptions which clude use of nuclear-armed interceptors, to- differ in the emphasis given to existing versus wards non-nuclear defenses which would use near-term technologies (in the second ap- much more speculative but potentially more proach) or near-term versus far-term technol- powerful technologies. ogies (in the third). The five research subop- Budget. —Over the next decade, much more tions are defined as follows: is to be spent on BMD research than would 1. SDI approach.–Vigorously investigate ad- have been allocated in the absence of the SDI. vanced BMD technologies with the intent to In the proposed FY 1986 budget, the BMD decide in the 1990s on whether or not to en- funding level was more than twice its pro- ter full-scale engineering development and jected FY 1986 level under the pre-SDI pro- subsequent deployment. This approach as- gram. Subsequent increases under SDI are to sumes that while technology now within the be even greater, and by FY 1990 are projected state of the art is not good enough to be worth to be over eight times the FY 1984 funding deploying today, the potential of advanced level. BMD technologies is sufficiently promising that a technology-limited effort (i.e. a program Arms Control Policy.–Instead of the pre-SDI limited by what is technologically feasible approach of seeking deep reductions of offen- rather than by funding constraints) is war- sive forces along with maintenance of the ranted to develop that potential. It also as- ABM Treaty ban on defenses against ballis- sumes that if successfully developed, such tic missiles, current arms control policy seeks technologies could make possible a national “greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and security regime (weapons systems and arms an enhanced ability to deter war based on an control) preferable to the current one. increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. “b 2a. Early deployment approach.–Emphasize early and incremental deployment of currently Different approaches that can be taken to- available BMD technology. This approach wards ballistic missile defense research proceed places high strategic value on the modest from different sets of basic assumptions about levels of defensive capability which could prob- the value and feasibility of BMD, and from ably be obtained today. Although the ABM differing assessments of the consequences of Treaty permits the United States to defend pursuing BMD research. Three such approaches some ICBMs with a single, highly constrained can be distinguished and are presented below. defensive deployment, most early deployment These approaches differ primarily in empha- proposals go beyond these constraints and sis and urgency, rather than in which technol- could not be pursued under the existing treaty regime. ‘Quoted from “The U.S. Strategic Concept, ” enunciated by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze in an address before the Interna- 2b. Intermediate deployment approach.–Em- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Mar. 28, 1985. phasize research on BMD technologies advanced (Emphasis added.) beyond those available today but which, un- 9 like many SDI technologies, might be appli- the development of near-term deployment op- cable to deployments in the early to mid- tions which would include “traditional” BMD 1990s. This approach assumes investigations technologies (nuclear-armed, radar-guided in- of longer-run technologies should not delay de- terceptors) of the sort specifically mentioned ployments in the nearer term. in the ABM Treaty. This program, conducted at a funding level well below that requested 3a. Funding-limited approach.–Investigate advanced BMD technologies at a funding level for the SDI, would aim to deter Soviet aban- well below that requested for the SDI and with donment of the ABM treaty; to hedge against a much-reduced sense of urgency. Like the future Soviet BMD developments; to prevent SDI, this approach would focus on advanced technological surprise; and to investigate the long-term potential of advanced BMD technol- technologies that may eventually make a highly capable defense possible. Unlike the SDI, ogies. Like the funding-limited approach, it however, it does not assume that we will know would not include demonstrations or develop- in a few years whether we can achieve that ment work which might raise questions of goal. The program would not aim towards compliance with the ABM Treaty. facilitating a development decision at a par- Important issues that will be relevant to a ticular time, nor would it include tests or dem- decision among these alternative research ap- onstrations which might raise questions of proaches are discussed below. First, however, compliance with the ABM Treaty. note is taken of Soviet BMD research. 3b. Combination approach.–Balance research in advanced BMD technologies with

SOVIET BMD RESEARCH AND COMPARISON WITH U.S. RESEARCH Both the United States and the Soviet Un- partment of Defense publication Soviet Mili- ion have conducted research and development tary Power, 1985, the Soviets are “developing activities in BMD since before the ABM a rapidly deployable ABM system to protect Treaty was signed. Both have acquired con- important target areas in the U. S.S.R.. ” That siderable experience with the “traditional” report concludes that “the aggregate of [their] BMD technologies, such as nuclear-armed, ABM and ABM-related activities suggests radar-guided interceptors, of the sort specifi- that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM cally mentioned in the ABM Treaty. However, defense of its national territory. ”6 Officials of although the level of Soviet “traditional” BMD the CIA, however, have said that they do not technology probably does not exceed our own, judge it likely that the Soviets would in fact the Soviets, with a working BMD production move to such a deployment in the near term.7 base, are almost certainly better equipped in the These officials point out that while the Soviets near-term to deploy a large-scale, “traditional” could expand their presently limited ABM BMD system than we are. system by the early 1990s, The Soviets have deployed and maintained In contemplating such a deployment . . . an ABM system around Moscow utilizing [they] will have to weigh the military advan- “traditional” BMD technologies. They have also extensively upgraded and modernized ‘Both quotations from Department of Defense, Soviet Mili- that system. Ever since the United States tary Power, 1985, p. 48. decided that its own, similar system was not ‘Unclassified testimony of National Intelligence Officer effective enough to justify maintaining it, the Lawrence K. Gershwin before a joint session of the Subcom- mittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear forces of the Senate Moscow ABM has been the world’s only oper- Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of ational ABM system. According to the De- the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985. 10

Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense

ABM-IB Complex ABM Silo Sites Under Construction .: Roads ------.

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense map at right include the Pushkino ABM radar, above, Galosh neW silo-based high-acceleration interceptors, top right.

tages they would see in such defenses against of deployment of a near-term U.S. defense, de- the disadvantages they would see in such a ployment of offensive countermeasures that move, particularly the responses by the would ensure that our strategic forces could United States and its allies. penetrate Soviet defenses, or some combina- One of the functions of a U.S. BMD research tion of the two. Should a defensive response program is to deter or respond to a near-term be desired, a research approach which pre- Soviet ABM Treaty breakout. A U.S. response pared options for near-term deployment would to such a situation would most likely consist be needed. 11

Photo credit: U.S. Army The Missile Site Radar (background) of the Safeguard ABM System was designed to refine the data received from the long-range Perimeter Acquisition Radar, track the attacking ICBM reentry vehicles, and fire Sprint and Spartan interceptor missiles (in cells, foreground), to intercept them. Though this site was permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty and its 1974 protocol, the United States decided that its limited capabilities did not justify the cost and deactivated the system in 1976.

Offensive countermeasures intended to pene- The Soviets are also vigorously developing trate, counter, or evade the Soviet defense are advanced technologies potentially applicable at least as important in deterring or respond- to BMD,8 in addition to modernizing the ing to a Soviet defensive deployment as U.S. “traditional” system they have deployed defensive options are. Offensive countermeas- around Moscow. However, the quality of that ure research would accompany any of the work is difficult to determine, and its signifi- BMD research options above. In addition to cance is therefore highly controversial. It has providing capability against Soviet defenses, been estimated that the total Soviet effort in an offensive countermeasures research pro- directed energy research is larger than that in gram must be an integral portion of any re- the United States. However, in terms of basic search and technology development program technological capabilities, the United States studying BMD so that possible counters to U.S. defenses can be anticipated. 8Soviet Military Power, 1985, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 12 clearly remains ahead of the Soviet Union in key est potential for significantly improving mili- areas required for advanced BMD systems, in- tary capabilities in the next 10 to 20 years” cluding sensors, signal processing, optics, which were surveyed by the Under Secretary microelectronics, computers and software. The of Defense for Research and Engineering.g United States is roughly equivalent to the Soviets in other relevant areas such as directed energy and power sources. The Soviet Union 9The FY 1986 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Statement by the Under Sec- does not surpass the United States in any of retary of Defense, Research, and Engineering, 99th Cong., 1st the 20 “basic technologies that have the great- sess., 1985, p. II-4.

ISSUES FOR R&D PROGRAMS 1. Maintenance of the ABM Treaty The United States can plan for revision of or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, or it can The five research options cited above each attempt to make the Treaty more effective. have different implications for the ABM The middle course–trying to bolster the ef- Treaty. Administration policy is that the SDI fectiveness of the ABM Treaty in the short approach is intended to remain within Treaty run (thereby preventing short-term Soviet bounds until a decision is made to develop BMD testing and deployment) while explicitly BMD systems for deployment. However, pro- and publicly preparing to decide whether to posed technology experiments raise technical abandon it in the future-maybe the most dif- questions concerning compliance with Treaty ficult to implement. If we choose to maintain constraints on BMD development and test- the Treaty in the near term, an important is- 10 ing. Moreover, the sense of urgency and the sue for Congress to consider is how we can carry high visibility imparted to the SDI also raise out our BMD research program so that it does political questions concerning the degree to not either prematurely compromise the ABM which the United States is committed to main- Treaty by encouraging Soviet exploitation of taining the ABM Treaty regime. Early or In- technical ambiguities, or stimulate the Soviets termediate deployment would probably imply to begin deploying BMD and enhanced offensive abandonment of the Treaty, though intermedi- forces at a time more advantageous to them ate deployment might allow time for attempts than to us. If we were to allow the ABM Treaty at reaching agreement with the Soviet Union regime to erode, and then find at the end of on Treaty revisions to permit limited deploy- our BMD research program that the new ments. The funding-limited and combination BMD technologies did not fulfill expectations, approaches would relax the urgency of BMD we could end up with the worst of both worlds: research, easing the political questions; to the no arms control to limit BMD, Soviet BMD extent that technology demonstrations were deployment, no effective U.S. BMD, and, quite de-emphasized, the technical questions of possibly, augmented Soviet offensive forces in- treaty compliance would be relaxed as well. tended to overcome an anticipated U.S. BMD. Advocates of these approaches would strive not to damage the Treaty regime before we At the same time, current issues of Soviet had identified a preferable alternative which non-compliance with the Treaty must be ad- we had confidence could be attained. dressed as well. If they cannot be satisfactorily resolved, the United States in effect would have adopted stricter standards of compliance 10 In app. A of this report, OTA points out that if one accepts than those observed by the Soviets, which the Defense Department’s current interpretation of key terms of the ABM Treaty, one may also reasonably accept the con- might put us at a competitive disadvantage. clusion that the current SDI program will be Treaty compliant; however, applying a different interpretation to key Treaty Congress may wish to review the standards terms could lead to the opposite conclusion, and the procedures by which U.S. activities 13

are judged to comply with existing treaty postures with an increased role for defenses commitments-perhaps by establishing an relative to offenses. On balance, however, if independent and nonpartisan commission to such an agreement could not be reached, they review Soviet BMD activities and to advise would probably see uncoordinated deploy- Congress and the President on compliance ments by the two sides as being more in the questions associated with BMD activities pro U.S. interest than the current ABM Treaty posed by the U.S. Department of Defense. regime. Under the funding-limited and combination 2. Requirements for Arms Control approaches, negotiations with the Soviets In addition to their differing effects on the which attempted to establish the boundaries ABM Treaty, the alternate BMD research ap- between permitted and proscribed BMD re- proaches pose different requirements for arms search would be desirable for the purpose of control. clarifying activities on both sides. If the prospect of the United States’ developing ad- The role of arms control under the SDI ap- vanced technologies under the SDI approach proach would be to facilitate a safe transition sufficiently concerns the Soviets, Soviet de- to a state of highly constrained offenses cou- sires for limitations which would have the ef- pled with highly effective defenses. Such a fect of constraining U.S. research and technol- transition agreement would have to be nego- ogy development might give the United States tiated before actual deployments began. And considerable bargaining leverage. Such an it might need to take effect during the research agreement would almost certainly have to per- and development stages, in order to regulate mit laboratory research, which would be ex- offensive and defensive developments. The tremely difficult to ban verifiably, but it might negotiability of any such agreement is very constrain more observable activities such as much in question. Nobody has yet suggested demonstrations of ABM “sub-components” how the problems of measuring, comparing, and other field experiments which the Depart- and monitoring disparate strategic forces— ment of Defense argues are currently not pro- problems which have plagued past arms con- hibited by the ABM Treaty. Although it trol negotiations—could be satisfactorily re- might be difficult to construct a verifiable and solved in the far more difficult situation where equitable agreement of this sort, the task both offensive and defensive forces must be might be easier than reaching agreement on included. the mutual introduction of strategic defenses. By deploying BMD in excess of ABM Treaty limits without waiting for the estab- 3. Anti-Satellite Weapon Arms Control lishment of a replacement arms control re- At the Spring 1985 U.S.-Soviet arms con- gime, most early deployment approaches im- trol negotiations in Geneva, the Soviets em- ply abandonment not only of the ABM Treaty phasized the importance they attach to limit- but of the entire arms control process. Not ing weapons deployed in or directed at space. content with the condition of strategic parity As the companion OTA report, Anti-Satellite prerequisite to arms control (or, alternatively, Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Con- believing that the Soviets are not willing to trol, indicates, anti-satellite weapon technol- settle for such a state) supporters of these ap- ogies and BMD weapon technologies are proaches would instead attempt to attain and closely related. Therefore, those favoring unin- maintain a lead over the Soviets in strategic hibited research on BMD would find arms con- forces. trol measures limiting antisatellite weapon Supporters of the intermediate deployment testing highly constrictive. Indeed, to attempt approach might see the possibility of negoti- to remain compliant with the ABM Treaty, ating with the Soviets over a transition not some technology demonstrations now planned to “defense dominance, ” but to agreed force under the SD I would be conducted as anti- 14 satellite tests. On the other hand, those interested in strengthening the testing limitations in the ABM Treaty would find anti-satellite weapon test restrictions a useful tool in further constraining BMD development.

4. R&D/Deployment Coupling There is an inherent conflict between seeking the ability to make deployment decisions in the near term and seeking to keep control over whether and when such a deployment might be made. Vigorous U.S. R&D programs could lead the Soviets to infer an intent to deploy, and might stimulate them to preempt such a deployment. Therefore, proposals for a vigorous R&D program should demonstrate the ability to cope with a Soviet defensive breakout and associated Soviet offensive actions in a timely way. Offensive countermeasures would probably contribute more than defensive actions towards our ability to respond to Soviet defensive breakout. If our research program is not to be presumed to be a prelude to deployment, there must be a clearly perceived threshold which requires a positive decision—not merely the lack of a negative one—to cross. The limitations posed by the ABM Treaty provide such a threshold. Also required, however, is a clear set of decision criteria that must be met before BMD development continues past the point requiring ABM Treaty renegotiation or abrogation. As the level of effort devoted to BMD research increases, a momentum or constituency will be created that will favor continuing and enlarging the research effort and then moving from research to demonstrations to deployment. For this reason, it would be easier to establish decision criteria before a few more years of BMD research growth had occurred and before the time comes to make the actual decision.

5. Technology Experiments Technology demonstration experiments are the most expensive and one of the most controversial aspects of a BMD research program. 15

foreseeable future. To ensure their effectiveness in the event that the Soviets deploy defenses, the United States will need to continue its development of penetration aids and other offensive countermeasures. By minimizing the potential effectiveness of Soviet defense, the existence of such countermeasures would help deter the Soviets from abrogating the ABM Treaty or any subsequent agreement limiting defenses. However, prudence dictates we assume that any offensive countermeasure that can be developed by the United States could also be available to the Soviets, and we therefore must consider what such countermeasures would do if deployed against our defenses. Development by either side of powerful offensive counter- Photo credit U S Departrnent of Defense measures conflicts with the long-term goal of Homing Overlay Experiment—Kinetic Kill: Video minimizing the role for offenses—a problem recording of telescopic view of impact of homing which will be exacerbated if defensive technol- vehicle on reentry vehicle target. Debris resulting from ogies have applications in offensive roles (e.g. collision is spreading out from center of rectangle. attacking satellites or aircraft, or, particularly, attacking enemy defenses). Demonstrations of BMD technology are also complicated by ABM Treaty constraints 7. Relations With Allies on developing and testing ABM components or systems. Experiments that raise treaty Beyond its effects on the ABM Treaty, the compliance questions run the risk of provok- U.S. BMD research program can have other ing a Soviet reaction that could eliminate the foreign policy consequences which should be option of deferring BMD deployment until taken into account in evaluating options. Most technology had advanced further. One possi- of our allies support United States BMD re- ble way to assess whether this risk is worth search as a counter to Soviet research, and taking might be to require that before such ex- some have inquired how they can participate periments are approved there should be devel- in this research. However, for the most part oped both (1) a plausible system architecture they generally have deep reservations about which would use the particular technologies the wisdom of deploying a strategic defense. to be demonstrated and (2) a corresponding Whether the U.S. BMD research program now, arms control approach. Congress may wish to and any deployment in the future, can be con- satisfy itself beforehand that, if the technol- ducted so as to avoid endangering the cohesion ogies are proven feasible, such an architecture of our alliances is an important issue. and arms control regime appear likely to meet satisfactorily whatever criteria are established 8. Technology Transfer for proceeding with BMD. The ABM Treaty prohibits the “transfer to 6. Research and Development of other states” of “ABM systems or their com- Offensive Forces ponents, ” or of “technical descriptions or blue prints” worked out for their construction. In the absence of an agreement to forgo or These provisions prohibit the signatory na- drastically reduce them, there will be a role for tions from using their allies to circumvent U.S. strategic offensive nuclear forces for the ABM Treaty constraints. As a result, allied 16

participation in a treaty-compliant research plans or devices are transferred, potential ad- program would have to be limited to research versaries might be able to study them to dis- which had not reached the “system” or “com- cover vulnerabilities, enabling them to circum- ponent” level. More of a problem for research vent or destroy our own such components. If at this stage would be restrictions which the technological capability is transferred, rather United States itself might impose, as it does than specific devices, the American advantage now, on the transfer of military technology to which had enabled us to develop that technol- its allies for fear that such technologies may ogy first would necessarily be compromised. eventually reach the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many BMD-relevant technologies have applications in other military areas that In some discussions of BMD research or de- we may not want to help the Soviets develop. ployment approaches it has been suggested Approaches towards BMD which assume that that the United States might intentionally we can and should maintain technological transfer BMD technologies to the Soviet Un- supremacy over the Soviets would not be con- ion to prove that the United States did not sistent with transfer of U.S. BMD technology seek military superiority. Any such transfer would raise two very significant issues: If BMD to them.

DEPLOYMENT ISSUES Decisions about BMD should be made in the We label the criteria: light of their overall impact on U.S. national 1. Potential Role in U.S. Nuclear Strategy security. National security depends on more than military capability. It is also affected by 2. Crisis Stability Effects such factors as Soviet perceptions and actions, 3. Arms Race Stability Effects arms control, the cohesion of our alliances, national unity and resolve, and economic 4. Diplomatic Stability Effects strength. It is beyond the scope of this report 5. Feasibility to attempt to define or measure national security or to explore the merits of alternative ap- 6. Cost proaches to enhancing it. Instead, we address The national debate over BMD in the years the narrower question of how a decision to de- to come is likely to center on the application ploy BMD might affect our national security. of these criteria. It is possible that the Soviets, One way to approach this question is to estab- who maintain a vigorous BMD research and lish a set of criteria that BMD deployment development program, will choose to “break would have to meet to some degree in order to out” or “creep out” from the ABM Treaty be- produce net benefits for national security. fore the United States has decided whether to Most participants in the current debate deploy BMD itself. Soviet judgments about would probably agree on what criteria to ap- the relation of their BMD deployments to the ply in making a U.S. decision about whether above criteria could be quite different from to deploy BMD. But there is considerable dis- U.S. judgments. But a U.S. decision about agreement over how stringent each of these how to respond to Soviet BMD deployments criteria should be and what relative weights would still need to take these criteria into should be assigned to each. There are also account. strong disagreements about both the strategic and the technical prospects for satisfying them. 17

Criterion 1: Potential Role in Level 2: Either/Or.–Defenses–including U.S. Nuclear Strategy BMD and air defense—able to ensure the survival of most land-based ICBMs or a high de- BMD should enhance the effectiveness of gree of urban survival against a follow-on (or current U.S. national strategy or permit the simultaneous attack), but not both. adoption of a new and better one. And things should not get much worse before they get bet- Level 3: Most ICBMs, Some Cities.—Defenses ter: the transition to an improved strategy that could intercept enough Soviet missile and should not make the world significantly more and air-breathing weapons to deny the Soviets dangerous than it is now. On the other hand, the ability to destroy most U.S. land-based if one believes that current strategy in the ab- ICBMs in their silos but could not deny them sence of BMD is likely to lead to a worse situ- the ability to destroy many U.S. cities if all ation for the United States, then one might their offenses were concentrated on cities. settle for a BMD deployment which simply Level 4: Extremely Capable.–Defenses which kept things from getting as bad as they might would permit the Soviets to destroy, by any otherwise have. In addition, the BMD deploy- means, few if any targets in the United States. ment should be no more costly or risky than They could not be confident that they could alternative means, if they exist, of achieving destroy any U.S. cities. the same strategic goals. The Soviets might, of course, have compara- For analytic purposes, OTA has postulated ble levels of defensive capabilities. The com- five levels of ballistic missile defense capabil- bination of U.S. and Soviet capabilities would ities (including none at all) and, where appro- determine what nuclear strategies were avail- priate, of air defenses. In this part of the disable to the United States. cussion we do not consider the feasibility or cost of obtaining and sustaining those levels The stated goal of the Administration’s of protection against Soviet offensive weap- Strategic Defense Initiative is that the early ons (these are discussed in this summary stages of BMD deployment should make the under Criteria 5 and 6). Rather, we simply at- existing U.S. deterrent strategy more effec- tempt to explore some of the strategic impli- tive, while later stages would allow us to move cations of those levels if we and the Soviets to a different strategy. could both achieve and sustain them. (Analy- The following discussion summarizes the po- sis in chapter 5 of this report also addresses tential implications for U.S. nuclear strategy asymmetrical situations—cases in which one of each of the five BMD capability levels side or the other has a higher level of defense postulated above. capability. For the most part, however, we assume that, in accordance with stated U.S. pol- No Additional Strategic Defense icy, the United States does not seek superi- Some argue that in the absence of ballistic ority over the Soviets and will not permit missile defenses, U.S. nuclear forces will be Soviet superiority over the United States.) less and less able to support current U.S. nu- These postulated levels are: clear strategy, which has been called a “countervailing strategy. ” It attempts to deter the No Additional Strategic Defense.–No defenses Soviet Union from nuclear attack or threat of against ballistic missiles beyond those per- attack on the United States or its allies by permitted by the ABM Treaty; passive and air suading the Soviets that U.S. nuclear counter- defenses comparable to current levels. attacks would, primarily, lead to unacceptable Level 1: Protection of Some ICBMs.–Defenses damage to valued Soviet assets (punishment), able to assure the survival of a useful fraction and, secondarily, would cause such Soviet at- of U.S. land-based ICBMS, but which would tacks to fail in their gee-political objectives offer little or no protection to cities. (denial). Although the United States would 18

first attempt to repel a Soviet non-nuclear at- At the same time, given the kinds of offen- tack with conventional forces, it holds out the sive missile forces the Soviet Union and the possibility to the Soviets that their aggression United States now have, modest levels of Soviet could escalate into a nuclear conflict. Thus the BMD performance would reduce the net num- United States seeks not only to deter a nuclear ber of ballistic missile warheads reaching the So- attack on itself, but to obtain “extended de- viet Union in a U.S. retaliatory attack. (See terrence” by making the Soviets fear that chapter 5 of this report for a detailed expla- other kinds of aggression could lead to nuclear nation.) This reduction in the total effective escalation. size of the U.S. retaliatory force may be thought worthwhile when weighed against the In 1985, the Department of Defense esti- advantages of preserving at least some land- mated that the Soviet SS-18 ICBMs could based ICBMs in addition to the SLBMs and destroy 80 percent of the U.S. Minuteman 11 bomber weapons and of having a partly pro- ICBMs in their protective silos. Some argue tected command and control system. that this vulnerability of the U.S. land-based missile force could, under some conditions, On the other hand, in the view of those who offer the Soviets an incentive to launch a think that the probability of Soviet success in preemptive nuclear strike against the United a disarming first strike is already sufficiently States. Even if the Soviets did not wish to uncertain, the uncertainty that BMD could launch a preemptive attack, however, they add to Soviet military planning would do lit- might believe that their ability to destroy a tle or nothing to enhance deterrence. In addi- high proportion of U.S. land-based intercon- tion, if the survivability of land-based ICBMs tinental missiles gave them a basis for nuclear and command and control facilities were the blackmail against the United States or its only goal of U.S. defenses, then there might allies. be other, less costly, means of achieving that goal, such as making the ICBMs mobile (and Others argue that the Soviets are highly thus difficult for the Soviets to target) and in- likely to remain deterred from such strikes by creasing the redundancy and mobility of com- the threat of retaliation from thousands of munications nodes and command centers. U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on alerted bombers and submarine-launched ballistic Another goal might be to deter Soviet lim- missiles. Moreover, they argue, the probabil- ited nuclear strikes against various kinds of ity of success of a necessarily high-precision military targets in the United States or a the- attack on the U.S. Minuteman force is subject ater of war abroad, particularly in Europe. De- to many uncertainties, including the possibil- pending on how they were configured, low to ity that the U.S. might launch its missiles be- moderate levels of BMD might offer some pro- fore Soviet missiles could reach them. tection to such targets. But, unlike multiple, relatively hard-to-destroy targets like missile Level 1: Defense of Some ICBMs silos, these other military targets would, as a To the extent that the Soviets have confi- whole set, still be highly vulnerable to a de- dence in the success of an attack on U.S. land- termined Soviet attack using many hundreds based missiles, on U.S. command and control of nuclear weapons. The presence of BMD facilities, and on some other military targets, would force the Soviets to use more missiles even relatively modest levels of BMD perform- than otherwise would be necessary, thus rais- ance could reduce that confidence and thereby ing the threshold of violence and perhaps in- enhance U.S. deterrence. creasing the Soviet perception of risk of large scale nuclear retaliation from the United States. At the same time, the presence of So- 11The ,soviet9 have other accurate missiles that rnigM rtise viet BMD would similarly narrow the range that estimate, and as they add still more accurate missiles to of U.S. limited options for using nuclear bal- their arsenal, the estimate could go up further. U.S. Depart- ment of Defense, Soviet Mih”tzuy Power, 1985, p. 30. listic missiles. —.—

Modest levels of nationwide ballistic missile Soviets allocated their offenses, the Soviet defense might protect the United States and the strike might destroy nearly all, some, or vir- Soviet Union against relatively small missile at- tually none of the U.S. land-based ICBM force. tacks from other nuclear missile powers. On the As a result, a U.S. retaliatory attack, on the other hand, small nuclear powers interested other hand, might or might not be large and in nuclear weapons as instruments of ter- well-coordinated enough to penetrate Soviet rorism may not rely on ballistic missiles as de- defenses. Depending on how one measures livery vehicles, but might use, for example, ‘‘success’ in a nuclear strike, the Soviets small aircraft or boats to smuggle their weap- might emerge “better” or “worse” off than ons into superpower territory. For the near fu- they would have been if neither side had had ture, however, it is the Soviets, not we, who defenses. However, at this level, a significant face Chinese, French, and British nuclear mis- and extremely dangerous possibility is that the siles. From the point of view of U.S. allies Brit- Soviets might calculate that a first strike ain and France, Soviet BMD could degrade the against U.S. retaliatory forces combined with credibility of their own nuclear deterrent forces. Soviet defenses could keep damage from a U.S. If, on the other hand, the United States were retaliatory strike to a relatively low level. If the able to provide them with effective missile Soviets similarly calculated that the United defenses of their own, they might or might not States could strike first and defend successfully consider that to be a fair trade. against their retaliation, that would be an additional incentive for the Soviets to attack preemp- Yet another benefit of even limited nation- tively. wide BMD capabilities would be the probable interception of accidental or unauthorized The very wide range of possible outcomes launches of very few ballistic missiles. of a strategic nuclear war under these circumstances, and the difficulty of predicting which Level 2: Either/Or might occur, should reinforce military conser- (Defenses–including BMD and air defense vatism on both sides. But, particularly dur- —able to ensure the survival of most land- ing a crisis, as the uncertainties of striking based ICBMs or a high degree of urban sur- first go up, so do the potential gains, in terms vival against a follow-on or simultaneous at- of reducing the other side’s ability to retali- tack, but not both.) If the United States and ate. And, perhaps more important, the poten- the Soviet Union both had this level of defense tial risks of waiting for the other side to go capability, both Soviet and U.S. strategic plan- first also increase. ners would face still greater uncertainties. For Level 3: Defense of Most ICBMs, Plus Some example, in planning a first strike on the Cities United States, the Soviets would have to consider not only how the U.S. ICBM silos might (Ballistic missile and air defenses that could be defended, but also how U.S. defenses might unconditionally deny the Soviets the ability be allocated between silo (and other military to destroy most U.S. land-based ICBMs in target) defense and city defense. They would their silos but could not deny them the abil- have to be careful to retain sufficient offensive ity to destroy many U.S. cities if all their capability to threaten many U.S. cities after offenses were concentrated on cities). At this they had attacked U.S. silos. level of defense capability on both sides, neither the Soviets nor the United States could A Soviet first strike followed by a U.S. have confidence in almost any plausible plan retaliation could have a wide range of out- for attacking military targets, no matter how comes. The Soviets would have little ability they allocated their warheads.12 Both sides to determine in advance what the actual outcome would be. Depending on how the United “Some might argue, though, that several hundred or a thou- States had allocated its defenses and how the sand nuclear weapons reaching key strategic command and con- 20 would still be able to do considerable damage Level 4: Extremely Capable to many “soft” civilian or military targets (Defenses that would permit the Soviets to (though perhaps markedly less than if neither destroy few or no U.S. targets; they might be had defenses”), but each would have to expect able destroy some U.S. cities, but their mili- comparable retaliatory destruction imposed tary planners could not have confidence in by the other. Soviet decisions to challenge U.S. their ability to do so). The previous hypothe- interests would not be reinforced by any pos- sized levels of defense capability all retain a sibility that the Soviets could improve their key element–many say the key element–of military position by a preemptive strike on today’s situation: the threat of massive nu- U.S. offensive forces. clear destruction should the Soviets attack us. At this high level of defense capability, both At this high level of capability, however, sides would also want very capable air defense denial of Soviet ability to inflict damage on systems, in order to deny any attempts to ac- the United States would supplant retaliation complish significant military ends with nu- as the key element of U.S. security. The sur- clear weapons delivered by bomber or cruise vival of U.S. society as a whole would no missile. Substantial civil defense capabilities longer depend on the rationality of Soviet de- might further reduce the level of casualties cisions, but on the inability of the Soviet Un- predicted. ion to inflict mortal damage upon us. If we believed that the Soviets had virtually no chance At a such high level of BMD capability on of delivering any nuclear weapons at all on both sides, the Soviets might also perceive a re- U.S. cities or those of our allies, we might do duced risk that conventional or tactical nuclear away altogether with threats of retaliation. If, war would escalate to strategic nuclear war. In- on the other hand, we believed that there was sofar as the risk of escalation to nuclear war at least some risk of their being able and will- had discouraged the Soviets from aggressive ing to do so, we might want to retain some re- acts, they might now be more tempted to use sidual (albeit low-confidence) retaliatory capa- or threaten to use military force. On the other bility. hand, U.S. leaders might be more willing to commit conventional or tactical nuclear forces In either case, the threat of nuclear retalia- to block Soviet aggression if they believed that tion would play a much smaller role in U.S. escalation to a war that would damage U.S. security policy than it does today. As the Ad- territory were unlikely. ” ministration’s long-range scenario for the Stra- — tegic Defense Initiative implies, this level of trol nodes would be a plausible military accomplishment. But protection could probably only be reached by a if sufficient survivability measures had been incorporated in combination of defense deployments and nego- the command and control system, weapons penetrating the tiated deep reductions of offenses. The princi- BMD system might not accomplish much. 1%ome might argue, though, that several hundred nuclear ple of “extended deterrence” would have been weapons reaching cities would be comparable in horror to sev- abandoned, but in an international climate in eral thousand. which the superpowers had negotiated vast re- lt should be noted that some policy analysts believe that the United States relies too much on the extended deterrence ductions in their nuclear offensive capabilities thought to be provided by nuclear weapons. In their view, more toward one another, they might also be able emphasis should be placed on conventional forces adequate to to negotiate reductions in the conventional repel aggression as the primary means of deterring threats or aggression. Some holding this view believe that nuclear weap- and nuclear threats to U.S. allies. We return ons should be used only to deter the use of nuclear weapons below to the question of BMD and arms con- by threatening punishment. In this latter view, any nuclear first- trol negotiations, as well as to questions of strike attack by either the Soviet Union or the United State, assuming either current levels of nuclear delivery capability or technical feasibility and cost. much lower levels, would be irrational because the cost would be out of proportion to any conceivable gain. In other words– again, in this view—there is already little or no military utility Criterion 2: Crisis Stability to nuclear weapons, and ideas of “nuclear war-fighting” are unrealistic. Thus BMD deployment at “Level 3“ would have no The deployment of BMD should not increase significant value for U.S. national security. incentives to launch a strategic nuclear first 21 strike in a crisis situation. Preferably, such in- Level 2: Either/Or.–(Defenses–including centives should be decreased. The motive for BMD and air defense—able to ensure the sur- a Soviet decision to escalate a crisis to a cen- vival of most land-based ICBMs or a high de- tral nuclear war might not be to gain a clear gree of urban survival against a follow-on (or political or military objective: instead, it may simultaneous attack), but not both.) be to reduce what they fear could be a severe 15 As indicated above, there would be a far loss. In time of crisis we would not want the more serious potential for crisis instability if Soviet leadership to calculate that its least bad option was to start a nuclear war. We would both sides had a “Level 2“ strategic defense not want our own force posture to lead them capability. That the Soviets would be less cer- to believe either that they could gain in some tain that an attack on U.S. ICBMs would succeed ought to be a stabilizing factor. On the way by striking first or that the United States would be likely to preempt. (The issue is not other hand, at “Level 2“ there would be at least the possibility-not previously avail- whether U.S. policy would actually allow a preemptive U.S. attack, but whether the So- able—that a first strike combined with defenses could keep damage from a retaliatory viets might fear that possibility.) strike to a relatively low level. Worst of all, No Additional Strategic Defense.—Those who it is possible that both sides could arrive at believe that vulnerability of the U.S. land- a highly unstable situation in which each based ICBM force and U.S. command and con- might perceive a chance of assuring its own trol facilities might offer the Soviets an incen- survival by striking first, and only by strik- tive to launch a preemptive nuclear attack see ing first. this vulnerability as crisis-destabilizing. It is Level 3: Most ICBMs, Some Cities.—If both also possible that the growing accuracy of U.S. missile warheads that could attack Soviet miss- sides had ballistic missile and air defenses that could unconditionally deny the other side the iles might induce the Soviets to believe they must “use or lose’ their vulnerable weapons ability to destroy most U.S. land-based ICBMs in their silos, but could not deny them the abil- under some circumstances. ity to destroy many of one’s cities if all the Others argue that current crisis stability is offenses were concentrated on cities, crisis sta- relatively high and likely to remain so as long bility should be quite high. The advantages as both sides continue to maintain thousands of attacking first should be marginal, the of relatively survivable warheads on subma- threat of retaliatory destruction still sub- rines and bombers. stantial. Level 1: Some ICBMs.–Insofar as ICBM vul- Level 4: Extremely Capable.–At a level of de- nerability is a destabilizing factor, the ability fense at which few or no military targets and on both sides to defend some ICBMs should few or no cities could be destroyed, a strate- be crisis-stabilizing. Again, if protection of gic nuclear crisis would seem to be out of the retaliatory capabilities were the only goal for question. An aggressor calculating that he a BMD system, it should be compared in cost- might in some way deliver a few weapons on effectiveness to other means of achieving the enemy territory would have to contend with same end. On the other hand, those who see the risk that the victim could retaliate on a crisis stability as high and likely to remain so similar level. Nor could a first strike do any- are likely to view defense of ICBMs as unnec- thing to reduce such residual retaliatory ca- essary for that purpose. pabilities.

“Many factors would go into a decision to escalate a crisis Importance to Crisis Stability of BMD System to strategic nuclear war. Calculations about the likelihood that Survivability the other side might launch a preemptive attack and about the disadvantages of waiting for it to do so would be only one set One criterion for a BMD system which of such decision factors. In this report we treat only the even more limited question of how BMD (or its absence) might af- many Administration officials have cited is fect such calculations. system survivability-the ability of the sys- 22 tern to perform at desired levels despite direct crease crisis stability by making the aggres- attack on its components. We may take it for sor less willing to gamble on a favorable out- granted that neither side would bother to de- come from a first strike. On the other hand, ploy a BMD system which could obviously be in the face of growing uncertainty about the rendered ineffective by enemy attack. Rather, effectiveness of its military forces, each side the question would be about the degrees of will have an incentive to try to reduce that un- confidence on each side regarding the continu- certainty by deploying additional offensive ing survivability of its own and the other and defensive weapons and countermeasures. side’s defensive systems. BMD deployments at any level would be If one side or the other had a BMD system much less likely to destabilize the strategic nu- that was itself vulnerable, preemption would clear competition if they could be coordinated leave the attacked side defenseless and the at- in advance by explicit agreement between the tacker at least partially defended against United States and the Soviet Union. If the retaliation-even if the victim of attack Soviets could be persuaded that U.S. defenses launched ICBMs before they could be de- hold the potential for rendering offenses ob- stroyed. solescent by making them less and less able to reach their targets, then the Soviets might If both sides had vulnerable BMD systems, have an increased incentive to try to negoti- the net result of simultaneous successful at- ate mutual reduction of U.S. and Soviet of- tacks on both systems could be to leave the fenses. Moreover, if both sides could agree for two sides in an offensive stand-off similar to other reasons on the desirability of reducing the one existing now. However, an extremely offenses and increasing defenses, then the in- unstable situation would arise if each sides’s centive of a favorable “cost-exchange ratio” space-based BMD system were vulnerable to at- of defenses over offenses would not be neces- tack, but only from the other’s BMD system. sary. Or, to put it another way, a favorable ra- Each would have powerful incentives to “use tio could be negotiated: decreasing offenses or lose” his system, to attack before the other would make defenses more effective. A “race” side did. The one that struck first might sub- between offenses and defenses would be cir- stantially disarm the other side. cumvented. Criterion 3: Arms Race Stability and An arms control agreement for phasing in Arms Control BMD would have to establish acceptable levels and types of offensive and defensive ca- Related to, but separate from, the issue of pabilities for each side and means for verify- crisis stability is the issue of arms race sta- ing them adequately. It would have to specify bility. What incentives would BMD deploy- offensive system limitations that prevented ei- ment by one side offer the other to agree to ther side from obtaining a superior capability negotiate arms control measures limiting or to penetrate the other’s defenses. It would reducing those forces? On the other hand, have to specify the BMD system designs for what incentives would BMD deployment by each side that would not exceed the BMD ca- one side offer to the other side to increase its pabilities agreed to. It is important to note, offensive or defensive forces in a way which however, that no one has as yet specified in any would induce the first side to further increase detail just how such an arms control agreement its own forces? could be formulated. There is a degree of paradox associated with Without such an agreement, as the United the uncertainties that BMD deployment could States and the Soviet Union began to deploy introduce in the calculations of the two sides. BMD, each might easily suspect the other of at- On the one hand, increased uncertainty about tempting to gain military advantage by seeking the likelihood of successful attacks could in- the ability to destroy most of the opponent’s 23 land-based missiles and then use defenses to Some argue, for example, that even if incre- keep retaliatory damage to a very low level. If ments of offense were more expensive than either side feared that its retaliatory capabil- corresponding increments of defense, the So- ities were about to be lost or greatly reduced viets would still add offenses. In the long run, relative to those of the other side, there would of course, if the United States stayed in such be an incentive to add offensive capabilities an arms race, the Soviets would find them- and defensive capabilities at the same time. selves with declining offensive capabilities. Those additions, in turn, could look to the But, for the near term before any BMD de- other side like the pursuit of a “first-strike ca- ployment, if the Soviets perceive the likelihood pability” and stimulate further reactive offen- of U.S. BMD deployment later on, then they sive and defensive deployments. The potential are likely to remain unwilling to agree to offen- interactions could be extremely complex, de- sive arms reductions. pending as they would on the actual deployments made by each side, the effectiveness of Criterion 4: Diplomatic Stability those deployments as perceived by the other side, and the future deployments each side Relations with other nations benefit from a anticipated that the other would make. Land- degree of mutual understanding of each other’s based ICBMs, sea-based SCBMs, bombers, intentions and from some predictability of ac- cruise missiles, and air defenses would all af- tion. While it is clear that many kinds of mili- fect strategic stability—positively or nega- tary deployments will affect our international tively. relationships, we would do well to try to introduce changes in ways that minimize ad- We do not yet know at what point the So- verse effects on our overall relations with for- viets might decide that their best chance of avoiding military inferiority was to abandon eign nations. their offense and stress defense. Would they The deployment of BMD would have signif- do so after calculating in advance that offen- icant effects, positive or negative, on our re- sive responses would be economically futile, lations with our allies, with our adversaries, or only after a considerable acceleration of the and possibly with other countries. Moreover, strategic arms competition had proved the the manner in which we carried out a deploy- fact through experience? Thus far, they have ment decision could also affect our diplomatic repeatedly declared that their reaction to the relations. As Presidential arms control advi- SDI will be to augment their offensive forces sor Paul Nitze pointed out in a speech in Lon- and pursue countermeasures. Most observers don in March 1985, seem to believe that these (along with Soviet President Reagan has made clear that any BMD deployments) are the most likely initial future decision to deploy new defenses Soviet reaction to possible U.S. BMD deploy- 16 against ballistic missiles would be a matter ments. for negotiation. But there is much disagreement about when, This does not mean a Soviet veto over our if ever, the Soviets might reverse their deci- defense programs; rather, our commitment sion and agree to deep offensive reductions. to negotiation reflects a recognition that we should seek to move forward in a cooperative manner with the Soviets . . . “Some believe that the Soviets would actually deploy countermeasures to 13MD such as penetration aids before increas- Before negotiating such a cooperative tran- ing already planned levels of offensive weapons. Others believe sition with the Soviet Union, we would con- that in any case the rate of growth of Soviet offensive forces sult fully with our allies. ” is already so high that prospective US. BMI) deployments would have little effect on that rate. Yet another argument is that since the Soviets have heavily emphasized other forms of strategic defense (e.g., air defense and passiive defenses), they may be more willing than they admit to shift to an emphasis 1‘Speech before International Institute for Strate@c Studies, on ballistic missile defenses. op. cit. 24

The Administration has made a frequently between the United States and the Soviet restated commitment to develop defenses that Union much less likely, most of the effects would defend U.S. allies as well as U.S. ter- of U.S. “extended deterrence” would be ritory. lost. Either the likelihood of Soviet conventional aggression might increase, or Proponents of BMD argue that deployment large additions to Western conventional could enhance U.S. diplomatic relations in at forces might be necessary, or both. least two ways. First, if U.S. deterrence of a ● European allies of the United States may Soviet nuclear attack on the United States correctly believe that BMD cannot pro- were enhanced, our allies should feel more se- tect them as well as it could the United cure about our commitment to fight if they are States, particularly in view of their prox- attacked since it might be less dangerous for imity to Warsaw Pact territory and the us to do so. Second, if their territory were also variety of shorter-range nuclear delivery protected against Soviet missiles, our allies means available to the Soviets; thus, they should feel directly more secure from the So- may see U.S. and Soviet BMD as tend- viet threat. This might be especially true if the ing to decouple their defense from that of deployment of BMD led to mutual deep reduc- the United States and, conceivably, make tions of offensive nuclear forces. Some would Europe a “safer” sphere of conflict for the argue, however, that even defense of NATO Soviets. military targets against Soviet missiles would ● Soviet BMD might render the British and strengthen allied feelings of security by en- French nuclear deterrent forces ineffec- hancing deterrence of Soviet attack. Third, a tive, thus leading those allies to oppose new strategic relationship with the Soviets, in the U.S. initiative in upsetting the stra- which we had negotiated a transition to a tegic equation. “defense dominant” world, might lead to a ● Many national leaders see the ABM healthier relationship both between the United Treaty as the keystone of East-West arms States and its allies and between the Western control; if the United States leads the way allies and the Soviet bloc. As Paul Nitze put it, to abandonment of that Treaty regime, Clearly, were we able to move cooperatively U.S. allies may question whether the with the Soviet Union toward a nuclear-free United States is serious about arms con- world, that would presuppose a more coop- trol and may seek to distance themselves erative overall relationship than exists at from the United States. In addition, sig- present–one in which efforts to establish a natories to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Pro- conventional balance at lower levels should 18 liferation Treaty may also see U.S. and be fruitful. Soviet abandonment of the ABM Treaty On the other hand, skeptics about the diplo- as abandonment of the arms control proc- matic promise of BMD make the following ess (a process the nuclear powers commit- sorts of predictions: ted themselves to in the 1970 treaty) and be more inclined to develop their own nu- ● The likely Soviet response to U.S. BMD clear weapons. deployment, prospective and actual, would be to add offense rather than negotiate offensive reductions; thus, the idea of a Criterion 5: Feasibility negotiated transition to a safer world or There are two important levels of technical indeed of any offensive arms reductions feasibility. First, it must be feasible to apply at all in the context of BMD deployments the technologies under consideration in work- is probably unrealistic. ing components of a BMD system. Second, it ● If a “defense dominant” situation had must be feasible to make the components work made escalation of conflict to nuclear war together effectively as an operational system in the face of attempts of the adversary to 181 bid., p. 6. overcome that system. General Issues vehicles (self-propelled or projectile), and particle beams. No known physical law stands in Whether new ballistic missile defense tech- the way of developing such components and as- nologies could lead to the kind of defense we sembling them into a layered system intended would want depends both on the potential of to intercept ballistic missiles and their warheads the technologies and on the kind of defense we in the boost-phase, the post-boost (reentry ve- would want. hicle separation) phase, the midcourse, and the ● Levels of BMD performance intended to en- reentry phase. Physical laws do limit the po- hance deterrence by increasing the uncer- tential performance of some kinds of compo- tainty of the Soviets as they calculate the nents, however. For example, neutral particle risks and benefits of a strike on U.S. ICBM beams cannot penetrate the atmosphere, and silos and command and control facilities thus could not intercept missiles while they might be attained with technologies now were still in the atmosphere. fairly well-understood. For most of the new ballistic missile defense ● Levels of BMD performance intended to as- technologies, much research is still necessary sure complete denial of military objectives to determine whether the physical principles (such as destruction of most U.S. missile involved can be affordably applied in working silos) to Soviet ballistic missiles would re- weapon systems. Many of the technologies be- quire major technological advances. ing considered for BMD still require improve- ● Levels of BMD performance intended to of- ments in performance of orders of magnitude fer substantial protection to U.S. cities and (factors of ten) before they can be used in weap- other “soft” targets against nuclear attack ons. Systems for boost phase, post-boost would require still more extensive ad- phase, and midcourse BMD are likely to re- vances. These higher levels of BMD capa- quire many satellites in orbit, satellites which bility (such as clearly denying military must be highly reliable while relatively inac- utility to ballistic missiles or substantially 19 protecting cities) will almost surely re- cessible to maintenance. quire a multi-layered, multi-weapon BMD Massive improvements in computer speed, system. Therefore, lower levels of BMD reliability, durability in a hostile environment, capability might be attained if a few tech- and software capabilities would be required. nical developments prove fruitful, while Current research gives cause for some opti- higher levels will require that more key mism about meeting the hardware require- technologies become available together. ments, though most analysts agree that gen- ● A strategic defense which could assure the erating the necessary software would be a survival of all or nearly all U.S. cities in the monumental task. face of unconstrained Soviet nuclear offen- Space-based BMD systems would require a sive forces (missiles, bombers, cruise mis- much more capable space transportation sys- siles, other means of attack) does not ap- tem than the United States now has, and pear feasible. As we have seen, current would probably require a substantial lowering Administration policy envisages pursing of space launch costs. This requirement would the goal of assured survival through a be less stringent, however, in the case of sys- combination of defensive weapons and ne- tems employing ground-based lasers. gotiated deep reduction of Soviet and U.S. offensive weapons. Another issue is the susceptibility of sensors to defeat by various countermeasures. Their A wide variety of technologies could, in principle, be developed to produce components for a multi-tiered ballistic missile defense system. 19However, some system designs might require fewer than others. For example, those using ground-based lasers, or those Candidate technologies for kill mechanisms in- using weapons “popped up” from the ground, would require clude various types of lasers, kinetic energy fewer satellites than those using entirely space-based weapons. 26 sensitive nature, necessary for long distance Components and Systems detection, makes them vulnerable to various In the absence of officially proposed BMD ar- kinds of temporary or permanent blinding. chitectures (system designs) and in the absence They would have to be designed to operate of specific weapon designs, it is impossible to against a background of nuclear explosions. estimate BMD feasibility and costs. The Stra- Making decoys look like targets and making tegic Defense Initiative Program is charged targets look like decoys may spoof sensor sys- with doing research to find out whether cur- tems. Space-basing makes the the sensors po- rent technologies can be scaled up to the nec- tentially vulnerable to antisatellite weapon essary performance levels and then whether attack. they can be applied in engineering effective, For all space-based BMD system components, reliable, and affordable weapons. How much survivability against directed energy, nuclear, Congress will choose to invest in this research or kinetic energy weapon attack is a major is- program will depend in part on its judgment sue. For example, space mines might be about the benefits and risks considered in this planted to tail sensor satellites or battle sta- report and on its beliefs in the premises and tions. As the companion OTA report, Anti- predictions of differing policy advocates. Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and It is possible, however, to give a general con- Arms Control, indicates, there are many po- ception of the likely ultimate feasibility and tentially effective means of interfering with or costs by conveying a feeling for the requisite destroying space systems, as well as many po- scale of a highly capable, multi-layered BMD tential countermeasures for dealing with those system. OTA has postulated a BMD system means. Whether the means of protecting sat- architecture purely as an illustration of the ellites will be adequate to ensure the surviva- kinds of tasks involved in deploying a very am- bility of particular space-based BMD systems bitious BMD system. We definitely do not pre- will depend in part on the kind of system 20 dict that the example we have hypothesized will deployed and in part on future Soviet anti- ever be proposed or built, nor do we assert that satellite capabilities. Insufficient information the technologies assumed for it are more or less is now available to resolve the survivability promising than any others. The example is question. given (see table l-l) to illustrate that deploy- The Soviet Union will have about as long to ing a large-scale, multi-tiered BMD system develop offensive countermeasures to defensive would be a formidable, complex, and expen- systems as the United States does to develop sive job. the defensive systems, and vice-versa. No one A highly capable BMD system designed can confidently predict today whether defen- along the lines of our postulated example sive technologies will dominate offensive de- would pose the following challenging re- livery technologies in the future. It is clear quirements: that a U.S. BMD research program should devote considerable effort to exploring BMD ● A boost-phase defensive layer effective in countermeasures, both to determine whether the face of proliferation and countermeas- defense at the desired level of effectiveness is ures. The boost phase interception of bal- feasible and affordable, and to hedge against listic missiles must be highly effective to Soviet BMD advances. keep the tasks of the succeeding defensive layers manageable. Soviet deployment of many additional rocket boosters appears possible in the very near term. Rocket boosters which finish burning very quickly and upper stages which dispense their ‘For example, many sensors, redundantly distributed among numerous satellites in a variety of orbits, could increase over- separate reentry vehicles very rapidly ap- all system survivability. pear feasible to deploy in significantly less Table 1-1 .—Hypothetical Multi-Layered BMD System

Description Comments System level System— elements. . .— Level 1 Terminal Defense Early warning satellites, Warning of launch provided by high-orbit satellites Homing either infrared (IR) or radar, in- (defense of hardened sites using ground-based radar: RVs detected and tracked in region of ground tar- terceptors should be relatively inexpen- endoatmospherlc rockets to Intercept gets by ground radar and airborne sensors, ground sive, since many needed, may be reentry vehicles (RVs) as they ap- airborne optical sensors computers assign Interceptors to RVs, kill assess- nuclear or nonnuclear proach their targets) ground-based battle management computers. ment permits reassignment of defense intercep- fast endoatmospheric Interceptors. tors; atmospheric Interception used, air effects used to discriminate between RVs and decoys — Level 2 Light Midcourse and Terminal Level 1 plus As in level 1 for terminal defenses: longer range Passive IR sensors used for crude dis- Defense exoatmospheric homing Interceptors, range Interceptors added which can Intercept some RVs crimination and possibly kill assess- (addltlonal layer added with some hundreds of km; above atmosphere, providing some area defense, ment: data base of Soviet RV and decoy interceptIon capability in midcourse b this requires some discrimination capability, fur- signatures needed, sensors must be and some ability to discriminate RVs pop-up IR sensors (possibly satellite-based nished by passive IR pop-up sensors, launched able to function in a hostile nuclear en- from decoys in space to reduce burden Instead), towards cloud of decoys and attacking RVs; the vironment. on terminal layer, some area defense) self-defense capability for space assets. new layer reduces the burden on the terminal layer Level 3 Heavier Midcourse Layer Level 2 plus’ Satellite-based ultraviolet laser radar (Iadar) used to Ladar imaging rapid with resolution (effective midcourse layer added, ultraviolet laser radar (Iadar) imaging on image objects; discrimination provided by compar- good to 1 meter or less for adequate giving realistic two-layer system, satellites; ing images with data base of Soviet RV and decoy discrimination and birth-to-death track- with each layer highly effective) characteristics, RVs attacked by in-orbit kinetic- ing of RVs, kinetic weapon homing highly capable space-based battle manage- energy weapons, which also defend all space- capability good to less than a meter ment system; based components of system; this level has fully space-based kinetic energy weapons, developed terminal and midcourse layers, but no effective self-defense in space: boost or post-boost phase defense. significant space-based power. Level 4 Boost-Phase Plus Previous Layers Level 3 plus: This level adds a boost- and post-boost-phase Extremely capable battle management (boost-phase Intercept added to kill ground-based high-tntensity lasers (either layer, consisting of very bright ground-based laser system needed; kill assessment required boosters or post-boost vehicles be- excimer or free electron); beams directed to their targets by orbiting mirrors; for boost phase as well as midcourse fore RVs and decoys dispersed) sensing by infrared sensors, imaging by ultra-violet space-based mirrors for relay and aim; Iadar: battle management to handle all Iayers doinq high resolution tracking and Imaging in discrimination, kill-assessment, and target assign-- boost phase; ments and reassignments. Boost- and post-boost- self-defense for all phases phase layers may be combined, since post-boost phase could be shortened to 10 seconds or so. Level 5 Extremely Effective Layer Level 4 plus: More interceptors are added in terminal and mid- Essentially same as Level 4, but more (Level 4 with better capability; more terminal and exoatmospheric inter- course layers; electromagnetic launchers used for of it and higher reliability; newer tech- meant to permit only minimal ceptors; boost, post-boost and midcourse intercepts; high nologies used as they become available. penetration to targets by enemy capacity space power needed; all systems, includ- RVs) electromagnetic launchers for midcourse ing battle management must be extremely reliable. and boost-phase intercepts: large capacity space-based power; all systems extremely reliable. a Kill assessment refers to the process of determining whether a struck target has been effectively disabled bpop-up components are ground-based assets which are launched into space for action upon warning of an enemy attack SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 28

sign weapons to attack the correct targets, account for targets destroyed, and assign other weapons to missed targets. This task will require extremely large, complex computer programs of very high reliability. ● Communications links among sensors, battle management centers, and weapons that can function reliably in the face of jamming attempts, attack, and interference from nuclear detonations. ● Space-based power supply systems, each of ten or more megawatts, with high reliability, quick response, and affordable main- tainability. ● Means of protecting space-based BMD assets from a wide range of possible means of attack. ● Ground-based exoatmospheric (late midcourse layer) interceptors that are inexpensive because they must be numerous. ● Ground-based interceptors for the final (terminal) layer that are-inexpensive because they must be numerous. Not only do issues of technological feasibility need to be resolved, but so do issues of operational feasibility. That is, the developed time than the defensive systems they components must be combined into an in- would be designed to counter. Boost-phase tegrated, reliable system that could operate ef- defenses need to be effective against both. fectively and maintain that effectiveness over Sensors and computers able to discriminate time as new countermeasures appeared. Such rapidly between decoys and reentry vehi- a system could never be fully tested operation- cles in the midcourse phase (as the objects ally-as indeed strategic offensive nuclear sys- separate from the post-boost vehicles, and tems have never been. But we would want to before they reenter the atmosphere). Tech- have high confidence in the effectiveness of a niques now fairly well understood for defensive system to consider steep reductions making reentry vehicles and decoys “look” in our offensive retaliatory forces. like one another to various sensor systems will make target discrimination one Criterion 6: Cost of the most challenging tasks for midcourse interception systems. Another part of the decision about invest- Sensors that can function nearly continu- ment in BMD research depends on a weigh- ously under attack and against a back- ing of potential benefits and risks against ulti- ground of nuclear detonations. mate costs. If some of the research can lead A system of battle management computers only to the demonstration of the technical fea- and software of very high complexity. A sibility of systems so costly that the nation control system will be required to be able would never want or be able to pay for them, to track thousands-possibly hundreds of then the decision on whether to do the research thousands-of objects simultaneously, as- would be different than if the expected costs were commensurate with the expected bene- play a favorable cost/exchange ratio with of- fits. Everyone can agree that a multi-tiered fenses to provide credible estimates of eventual BMD system with significant space basing system costs. would be very expensive, but how expensive depends on many unknowns. Important issues of cost include the following: Besides illustrating the need for the kinds ● Allocation of Defense Department research of technical developments described under Cri- funds. The first six years of the Strategic terion 5, examination of our hypothetical sys- Defense Initiative are scheduled to con- tem also indicates how the presence of so sume a total of approximately $33 billion many unknown factors makes realistic cost in defense research funds. Succeeding estimates impossible now. It does not demon- years before a development decision may strate that deploying a large-scale BMD sys- bring yet higher annual costs. These tem would be either affordable or too costly. should be weighed against opportunity However, the burden of proof is on those who costs in other areas of defense research. maintain that BMD can be affordable and dis- ● Allocation of national technical research re- 30

● Allocation of industrial resources. In the procurement stage, BMD deployment might divert engineering and manufactur- ing resources from other production. On the other hand, it might contribute to an industrial base for other activities, such as commercial development of space. ● Total costs. The total system costs for BMD will remain difficult to predict for some time. Also difficult to determine are the potential effects of BMD on other U.S. military needs. For example, a BMD deployment which led to negotiation of deep reductions in offensive forces would eventually allow shifting expenditures away from strategic offenses. In the short run, however, until the cost-exchange ratios in the offense-defense competition on both sides became clear, increased expenditures might be required to maintain offensive forces on a par with those of the So- viet Union. Defenses intended to protect substantial parts of the United States’ and its allies’ populations would also require a highly capable air defense system, since making ballistic mis- Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense siles obsolete would not in itself suffice to as- Artist’s conception of space-based sensors on a sure population survival. Effective population surveillance and tracking satellite. defense might also be judged to require large civil defense expenditures as a complement to sources. The supply of specialized scien- the active missile and air defenses. tists, engineers, and research facilities is A change in U.S. strategy which placed not highly elastic in the short term. BMD greater emphasis on non-nuclear capabilities research would divert some of these na- for deterring aggression against U.S. allies tional resources from other important might require costly enhancements of our air, tasks. On the other hand, BMD research sea, and land conventional forces and those of might produce substantial “spin-off” re- our allies. An alternative, however, which sults which could lead to advances in tech- could reduce rather than increase the cost of nologies applicable to other civilian or mil- such forces might be substantial conventional itary purposes. Over the long term, the arms control, particularly in the NATO-War- research might also stimulate training of saw Pact arena. additional scientists and engineers. ● Allocation of military procurement funds. We referred earlier to the concept of the BMD procurement could absorb funds “cost-exchange ratio” between defense and of- needed for other military programs, such fense. That is, increments of defense should as ground, naval, or air forces. On the cost less than the corresponding increments other hand, under some scenarios, BMD of offense that they must neutralize. If so, then might reduce the need for expenditures on the offense would have a strong disincentive offensive nuclear forces and even on con- to try to keep up with the defense. We also ventional forces. need to estimate at what point the Soviets 31 would decide to concede such a reality and offenses was such that the combined cost of stop trying to maintain offensive capabilities. overcoming existing Soviet offenses and coun- However, a favorable cost-exchange ratio tering their response to our defenses was afford- would not suffice if the defense system as a able. Just what the cost-exchange ratio needs whole were too expensive to deploy. One goal to be would depend on how willing the Soviets of research should be to identify a BMD system might be to try to outspend us to maintain whose base cost and cost-exchange ratio with their offensive capabilities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Debated Issues sile defense system. The central concern of SD I opponents, apart from skepticism The question of the role of ballistic missile that such a system could be effective and defense in U.S. national security is complex. affordable, is that the technology devel- However, national debate has tended to polar- opment may be much more likely to ize between support of and opposition to the destabilize the superpower strategic bal- SDI. ance and set off an arms race than to Both proponents and opponents agree on justify a decision to deploy. For this rea- two major points: son they favor a less urgent, less expensive, and less prominent research program, The United States should adopt whatever mainly to hedge against unexpected tech- BMD posture will be most likely to mini- nological breakthroughs and as a means mize the risk of nuclear war. of deterring the Soviets from abandoning The United States should be carrying out - the ABM Treaty by providing the United some research on BMD technology. States with an adequate response if they The strongest disagreements regarding SD I do. center on two related issues: Proponents of SDI are not all of one mind. How likely is it that technology will reach However, they stress some or all of the fol- a point where it would be desirable to de- lowing: ploy BMD? This disagreement partly reflects differing guesses about the future 1. The most important national goal we can cost and rate of technological progress. have is assured survival; that is, Presi- More significantly, however, it reflects dent Reagan goal of a world in which differing views about how valuable BMD “free people could live secure in the would be for our national security, and knowledge that their security did not de- how effective a BMD system must be for pend on the threat of instant retaliation the benefits of deployment to outweigh to deter a Soviet attack, that we could in- the risks. tercept and destroy strategic ballistic mis- Should the research program be carried out siles before they reach our soil or that of with the vigorous commitment that char- our allies. ” This goal may be attainable, acterizes the SDI? The central idea of the particularly if the development of SDI seems to be an ardent belief that a defenses induces the Soviets to agree on program of urgent, centrally directed, and reductions of offensive forces, and there- generously funded research and develop- fore it is worth pursuing vigorously. ment would have a good probability of 2. Even if we cannot achieve assured sur- bringing us within a few years to the point vival, a strategic policy that relies to a sig- where we would be justified in deciding nificant extent on strategic defenses to deploy a high-technology ballistic mis- would be better for the United States 32

than our existing policy of deterring ag- tide great incentives to preempt in a crisis gression only by the threat of retaliation by holding out the possibility of “victory" by our offensive nuclear forces. to the side launching a massive first strike 3. The strategic balance has gradually been and defending against the presumably shifting against the United States, and less effective retaliatory second strike. If developing and deploying ballistic missile deployed BMD systems were themselves defenses (with or without accompanying vulnerable to attack, the incentive to arms control measures limiting strategic strike first could be even greater. offensive forces) offers the best opportu- 3. The buildup of Soviet strategic forces in nity to reverse this trend. recent years, while certainly undesirable, 4. Many of the new ideas proposed for bal- has not reduced the U.S. ability to deter listic missile defense are now ripe for in- a Soviet attack. The continuing Soviet tensive research and development. If the buildup does not pose a serious threat to United States develops these technologies the credibility of our deterrent. A U.S. vigorously, we can expect major improve- strategic defense would not improve the ments in potential BMD capabilities. strategic balance. Modernization of our There are grounds for believing that strategic forces and vigorous efforts to defensive technologies may improve so make the arms control process effective much faster than offensive technologies would be far more likely than BMD to im- that it will become cheaper to deploy prove U.S. security. defenses than to deploy offensive counter- 4. While nobody can predict with certainty measures to overcome the defenses. This the results of future research, it is highly would give the Soviets a powerful incen- unlikely that we could develop BMD sys- tive to agree to reduce offensive arms and tems which could not be overcome by af- concentrate on building their own defen- fordable Soviet countermeasures. There- sive systems. If the Soviets exploited fore, the SDI is not the most fruitful area these BMD technologies and we did not, in which to concentrate our limited re- our security might be severely jeopardized. sources for military R & D. While research on BMD is necessary, an overly Opponents of SDI argue some or all of the vigorous U.S. BMD program would be following: likely to stimulate a buildup of Soviet 1. Assured survival is so extremely improb- offensive forces, which would preclude able in the forseeable future as to be ir- meaningful offensive arms control meas- relevant as a national goal. If it could be ures and make it harder to maintain the attained at all, it would require drastic re- survivability of our retaliatory forces. ductions and stringent limitations of all offensive nuclear arms even if very effective defenses could be deployed. But since OTA Findings the vigorous pursuit of defensive capabilities now would make such offensive arms I.–Both the capability of a BMD system to control much less likely to be attained, we defend the United States, and the strategic should pursue offensive arms control first value to the United States of any given BMD and defensive deployments afterwards, if capability, depend on the interaction of all the at all. kinds of the defenses actually deployed with all 2. Ballistic missile defenses that are highly the kinds of offensive threat against which they effective, but not adequate to provide as- must actually defend. In the past, the enormous sured survival, could create dangerous in- destructive power of nuclear weapons has meant stabilities. Developing them would set off that offensive strategic technologies have had an offensive/defensive arms race. Further- a large and fundamental advantage over defen- more, defensive deployments could pro- sive technologies. Unless this imbalance between 33 the offense and defense disappears, strategic risk that the other side’s defenses might be- defenses might be plausible for limited purposes, come highly effective against the reduced such as defense of ICBM silos or complication offenses before one’s own defenses were ready. of enemy attack plans, but not for the more am- Such a transition would be more appealing to bitious goal of assuring the survival of U.S. so- both sides if BMD technologies could be de- ciety. This imbalance might be changed either veloped which cost less to deploy than the by political decisions of both superpowers to offensive countermeasures needed to over- reduce the kinds and levels of offensive deploy- come them than it would be if the historic and ments to capabilities much less than available current advantages of offense over defense technology permits, or by development and de- persist. In essence, the question is whether a ployment of defensive systems able to over- vigorous U.S. program to develop BMD, and the come whatever offenses could be developed prospect that both sides might deploy effective and deployed in the same period. While it is BMD, will make the Soviets more willing than certainly possible that defensive technologi- they have been in the past (or now say they are) cal development could outpace the develop- to agree to deep reductions of strategic offen- ment of offensive weapons and countermeas- sive forces on terms acceptable to the United ures to defenses, this does not appear very States. likely. 4.—There is great uncertain y about the stra- 2.–Assured survival of the U.S. population tegic situation that would arise if BMD deploy- appears impossible to achieve if the Soviets are ment took place without agreement between the determined to deny it to us. This is because the United States and Soviet Union to reduce offen- technical difficulties of protecting cities against sive forces as defensive forces grew. Until the an all-out attack can be overcome only if the actual offensive systems (including ICBMs, attack is limited by restraints on the quantity SLBMs, bombers, and cruise missiles) and and quality of the attacking forces. The Rea- defensive systems (including BMD and air gan Administration currently appears to share defenses) were specified and well understood, this assessment. no one could know with confidence whether a situation of acute crisis instability (i.e. strik- 3.—If the Soviets chose to cooperate in a tran- ing first could appear to lead to “victory”) sition to mutual assured survival, it would prob- could be avoided. A fear on either side that the ably be necessary to negotiate adequately veri- other could obtain such a first strike capabil- fiable arms control agreements on reducing ity could lead both sides to buildup both their present and restricting future offensive forces offenses and their defenses. Such build-ups and on the manner, effectiveness, and timing of would make it even more difficult to negoti- defensive deployments. OTA was unable to ate a cooperative transition from offense dom- find anyone who could propose a plausible inance to defense dominance. agreement for offensive arms reductions and a cooperative transition that could be reached 5.–The technology is reasonably well in hand before both the Soviets and the United States to build a BMD system that could raise signifi- learn more about the likely effectiveness and cantly the price in nuclear warheads of a Soviet costs of advanced BMD technologies. Indeed, attack on hardened targets in the United States; such a transition could hardly be planned un- such a system, if combined with a re-basing of til engineering development was well advanced U.S. ICBMs, could protect a substantial frac- on the actual defensive systems to be deployed. tion of those U.S. land-based missiles against Even then, adequate verification would be dif- a Soviet first strike. However, it is not clear ficult. Without such agreement on the nature whether BMD would be the best way to pro- and timing of a buildup of defensive forces, it vide missile survivability, nor is it clear would be a radical departure from previous whether the combination of a U.S. program policies for either side to make massive reduc- protecting ICBMs and the Soviet response-- tions in its offensive forces in the face of the perhaps expansion of their Moscow defense to 34

other Soviet cities—would on balance strengthen in the face of intense Soviet efforts to counter or weaken our deterrent. it would enhance U.S. security depends on a judgment that decreased Soviet confidence 6.–It is impossible to say at this time how ef- that they could destroy targets in the United fective an affordable BMD system could be. To States or on allied territory would, in Soviet answer this question requires extensive re- minds, outweigh their increased confidence search on sensor, command and control, and that targets in the Soviet Union would survive weapons technologies; and on system architec- because of their own BMD. ture (including survivability and computer software); on counter-counter-measures. Credi- 8.–Whatever type of BMD research program ble cost estimates based on this research will the United States decides to pursue, it would be also be necessary. prudent to carry out that research in such a way as to minimize Soviet incentives to decide to de- 7.–The decision whether to push ahead vig- ploy their own BMD beyond the limits set by orously with the SDI or to scale back the Ad- the ABM Treaty before the United States has ministration proposal involves a balancing of completed the research necessary to make our opportunities against risks, in the face of con- decision. This might be done by unilaterally siderable uncertainty. The SDI offers an oppor- restraining our BMD research. We would have tunity to substantially increase our nation’s greater influence over Soviet actions, however, safety if we obtain great technical success and if we reached agreement with the Soviets re- a substantial degree of Soviet cooperation. The garding disputed interpretations of the ABM argument that sufficiently great U.S. techni- Treaty-including the boundaries of permitted cal success would force the Soviets to cooper- research-and regarding the conditions under ate in their own security interests is logically which future BMD deployments would be compelling, but there can be no assurance that desirable. Such an agreement would also re- the Soviets would actually behave as we think duce Soviet incentives to buildup their offen- they should. The SDI carries a risk that a vig- sive forces in order to overcome anticipated orous BMD research program could bring on U.S. defenses. However, it must be recognized an offensive and defensive arms race, and a that acting to deter a Soviet decision to de- further risk that BMD deployment, if it took ploy BMD may require limiting and slowing place without Soviet cooperation, could create severe instabilities. Whether BMD deployed our own BMD research. Chapter 2 Introduction Contents

Page The Strategic Defense Initiative...... 37 Studies Following the President’s Speech ...... 37 The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization ...... 38 Organization of the OTA Study ...... 38 Chapter 2 Introduction

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE President Reagan’s speech of March 23, size preventing Soviet ballistic missiles from 1983, proposed a major shift in U.S. nuclear reaching their targets at all. strategy. For at least 25 years, since the earli- The President called upon est Soviet deployments of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the United States has relied . . . the scientific community in our country, on the threat of retaliation to deter Soviet nu- those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn clear attack on the United States. During the their great talents now to the cause of man- 1960s both sides worked on developing weap- kind and world peace: to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent ons that were intended to defend against z ICBMs. In the United States, a debate also and obsolete. arose over whether such defenses were feasi- He did add a caution to his proposal: ble and desirable. Would the United States be . . . defense systems have limitations and more secure attempting to defend its national raise certain problems and ambiguities. If territory against ballistic missiles while the paired with offense systems, they can be Soviet Union did the same? Or would it be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and more secure attempting to keep such defenses no one wants that. largely banned by agreement with the Soviet He nevertheless announced that he was Union? In 1972 President Nixon chose the latter by signing the SALT I ABM (Anti-Ballis- . . . directing a comprehensive and intensive tic Missile) Treaty, and the Senate consented effort to develop a long-term research and de- by ratifying it. velopment program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed In his speech President Reagan said that by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave even if current arms reduction negotiations the way for arms control measures to elimi- with the Soviets were to succeed, nate the weapons themselves.3 . . . it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation—on mutual threat . . , Studies Following the Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to President’s Speech avenge them? , . . What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their secu- Presidential National Security Study Direc- rity did not rest upon the threat of instant tive 6-83 (NSSD 6-83) called for the Defense U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that Department to study and report on how such we could intercept and destroy strategic bal- a research and development program might listic missiles before they reached our own best be shaped. The Defense Department es- soil or that of our allies?’ tablished two groups of consultants to study He held out the prospect, then, for a substan- ballistic missile defense (BMD). The most tial change in U.S. nuclear strategic policy. prominent of these, a “Defensive Technologies With this change, the United States would Study Team” prepared a study on “Elimina- move away from its current deterrent posture ting the Threat Posed by Nuclear Ballistic Mis- against the Soviet Union, which stresses offen- siles. ” That committee of 50 defense scientists sive counter-threats to deter potential Soviet and engineers was chaired by Dr. James C. aggression. Instead, deterrence would empha- Fletcher, former NASA administrator, and be-

‘Ibid. ‘Ronald Reagan, televised speech of Mar. 23, 1983. ‘Ibid,

37 38

came known as the “Fletcher Panel. ” The fense and the President, early in 1984 the De- Fletcher Panel produced a technology research fense Department began to establish the BMD and development plan (with “fiscally con- research program under the rubric ‘Strategic strained” and “technology-limited” alterna- Defense Initiative Program. ” In March, Secre- tives), the aim of which was to tary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appointed Air Force Lieutenant General James A. Abra- . . . allow knowledgeable decisions on whether, several years from now, to begin an an engi- hamson to head this program. In April, the neering validation phase that, in turn, could Secretary chartered the Strategic Defense Ini- lead to an effective defensive capability in the tiative Organization and appointed Lt. Gen- 21st century.4 eral Abrahamson as its Director. This Orga- nization was charged with undertaking The Department of Defense also created a second panel to carry out NSSD 6-83: the Fu- . . . a comprehensive program to develop key ture Security Strategy Study Team, headed technologies associated with concepts for de- by Fred S. Hoffman, which produced a report fense against ballistic missiles. The technol- entitled “Ballistic Missile Defense and U.S. ogy plan identified by the Defensive Technol- National Security. ” Saying that “A combina- ogies Study and the policy approach outlined in the Future Security Strategy Study will tion of technical and strategic uncertainties serve as general guides for initiating this pro- makes it impossible to say when or whether gram . . . The SDIP will place principal em- we can reach the ultimate goal” of fully de- phasis on technologies involving non-nuclear fending our people against nuclear ballistic intercept and destruction concepts. The basic missiles, the Hoffman Panel paid particular at- approach will be to consider layered systems tention to how “defenses might also reinforce that can be deployed in such a way as to in- deterrence” by increasing the uncertainties crease the contribution of defenses to deter- faced by nuclear attack planners.5 rence and move the United States toward its ultimate goal of a thoroughly reliable defense . . . The program shall protect U.S. op- The Strategic Defense Initiative tions for near-term deployment of limited bal- Organization listic missile defenses.6 Following these studies and the acceptance of their major findings by the Secretary of De-

*As paraphrased in “The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defen- sive Technologies Study, ” Department of Defense, March 1984, p. 4.

5A third group, an Interagency Working Group headed by Franklin C. Miller of the Defense Department, also produced a BMD-related report on “Future Security Strategies. ” (The Caspar Weinberger, Memorandum on “Strategic Defense Ini- executive branch has denied Congress access to this report. ) tiative Organization (SDIO) Charter, ” Apr. 24, 1984.

ORGANIZATION OF THE OTA STUDY

The national debate about ballistic missile system we need. How good a system we need defense technologies will take place in the con- depends on what our national strategy would text of larger issues of national security strat- require the the system to do. On the other egy. On the one hand, BMD development and hand, the emergence of new BMD-related tech- deployment would be carried out to fulfill the nologies has suggested to many that new requirements of a U.S. national strategy. The strategies, once infeasible, may become avail- answer to the question of whether we can build able. President Reagan’s call for a Strategic a BMD system depends on how good a BMD Defense Initiative stemmed both from a dis- .— —

39 satisfaction with our existing national strat- This study tries to bring light to the debate egy and from the belief that changes in strat- by clarifying both the strategic and the tech- egy might be made technically feasible. Thus nological issues. It begins by reviewing cur- the issue of what is technologically possible rent U.S. nuclear strategy and the reasons for is embedded in a debate about what is strate- the absence of a role for ballistic missile de- gically desirable and practical. fense in that strategy. It outlines some strategic ideas that various advocates have offered The absence of a national consensus about for altering the current strategy, but does not what our strategy ought to be makes difficult attempt to choose among those ideas. That the question of what kind of BMD capabilities, choice is left to the reader. if any, we should pursue. Differing strategic perspectives lead to disagreements over Second, the report assumes, for the sake of whether particular levels of BMD capability, discussion, that various levels of BMD capa- integrated into an appropriate, U.S. nuclear bility might be available to the United States strategy, would: and the Soviet Union, and examines how one would go about analyzing the ways such ca- make nuclear war less likely or more pabilities might serve various strategic goals. likely; Third, it explores some of the possible conse- ameliorate the effects of a nuclear war quences for crisis stability, arms race stabil- should it occur or not; ity, and arms control that BMD might have. lead to more effective international agree- Fourth, it reviews the technologies being re- ments to limit offensive arms or to a searched for their applicability to BMD tasks. greatly accelerated arms race. Fifth, it reviews some of the alternative over- Estimates of which of these results BMD all BMD research program objectives that deployments might produce depend in part on Congress may wish to consider. The approach difficult judgments about what kind of stra- of this study, then, is to try to assist Congress tegic relationship the United States should try in understanding the potential implications, to sustain with the Soviet Union. both long- and short-term, of the new BMD technologies. But those strategic judgments depend at least in part on technical estimates of the po- Chapter 3 of this volume briefly reviews some tential effectiveness of strategic defenses. historical background to the current BMD de- Such technical estimates will be based part- bate, recalling the nature of the earlier tech- ly on projections of levels of technological nologies and the strategic assumptions behind achievement (what kinds of system could we the national decision in 1972 to agree by treaty build?) and partly on projections of potential with the Soviet Union to forgo their deploy- Soviet strategic and technological responses. ment. It also reviews the debates since the ratification of that treaty over whether the de- Thus the questions, “What kind of ballistic cision was, in retrospect, a wise one or not. Fi- missile defense, if any, would we want if we nally, it attempts to delineate the differences could have it?’ and ‘‘What kind of ballistic in politics and technology between the current missile defense can we have?” feed back upon era and the one in which the earlier decisions one another. Since we cannot afford to carry about BMD were taken. The information in this out research on every kind of weapon that may chapter should be useful for understanding how be technically possible, our research on BMD it is that U.S. nuclear strategy today does not should be guided by our strategic objectives. contain a role for BMD and why some propo- But decisions about our strategic objectives nents now argue that it should. should be informed by what is technically possible, so research may lead to new strategic This study first analyzes not the question, objectives. “Could we build a BMD system?, ” but there- 40

lated questions “Why would we want one?” votes the majority of its discussion to the and “How capable would it have to be?” To question of how the additions of BMD to that set the stage for these questions, we start in strategy might be expected to work. Deter- chapter 4 with a review of the principles of cur- rence, whether relying on the threat to deny rent U.S. nuclear strategy and of some proposals military successes or on the threat of punish- for altering that strategy that have appeared in ment, rests on the perceptions and calculations public debate. The chapter also explores some of the one deterred on the outcome of a con- of the implications of such changes in strat- flict that he might consider starting. Calcula- egy, particularly for our commitments to al- tions about the outcome of a nuclear war lies. The United States might want BMD to would be affected by the presence of ballistic enhance its current nuclear strategic posture, missile defense on both sides. The chapter ex- which consists of trying to deter Soviet ag- amines the strategic implications of several gression through a mix of threatening retalia- levels of defense capability, ranging from none tory punishment and being able to deny the at all to extremely high. Soviets the goals of such aggression. For rea- Whether BMD can make a satisfactory con- sons explained in chapter 3, current U.S. strat- tribution to U.S. strategic goals depends on egy relies on nuclear offensive forces, pro- a great deal more than whether certain levels tected only by passive means, and not on of technical performance can be achieved active defenses against ballistic missiles. against postulated offensive threats. If certain Successfully building and sustaining rela- kinds of BMD looked technically feasible, tively low levels of BMD capability might, in there would still be several important ques- various ways, strengthen the current nuclear tions we would want answers to before we strategic policy. Reliance on considerably decided on deployment. In particular, we higher levels of strategic defense, however, would want the addition of BMD to enhance would amount to a substantial alteration in international stability in a crisis, not increase existing policy. We would come to rely much the incentives presented to either side to ini- more on simply denying the Soviets the dam- tiate nuclear conflict. Chapter 6 describes some age they might intend with their nuclear bal- conditions for crisis stability and looks at some listic missiles and rely much less on our threat ways in which BMD might either enhance it or of retaliation to deter them. With extremely weaken it. high levels of defense against all forms of So- For BMD to be effective in serving our na- viet nuclear delivery vehicle, we could even tional strategy, it must not stimulate offen- consider largely abandoning the threat of nu- sive responses on the part of the Soviets that clear retaliation against the Soviets. (If we leave the United States exposed to a more se- could, on the other hand, build a highly effec- vere nuclear threat than it was before. Nor tive defense while retaining a highly effective should BMD deployment lead to an arms race offense against Soviet territory, we might re- of offense against defense on both sides that gain the strategic superiority over the Soviets was so costly that we could not or would not which we possessed for the first 15 years or want to sustain it. Instead, we would want to so of the nuclear age.) see BMD contribute to arms race stability. In Chapter 5 tries to indicate what must go into some hypothesized cases, BMD leads not just a persuasive analysis of how various postulated to arms race stability, but to new possibilities levels of BMD performance might either en- for arms control. Some argue, on the other hance the current nuclear deterrent posture of hand, that moving toward BMD could erode the United States or promote movement to a the current strategic arms control regime different strategy. Because any move to a new while lessening the prospects for future agree- strategy will necessarily start with modifica- ments. Chapter 6, then, also discusses arms race tions of our current strategy, the chapter de- stability and arms control in relation to BMD. 41

Chapter 7 introduces the technologies which be avoided. Beginning with the strategic evo- might form the basis for new ballistic missile lution envisaged by Administration propo- defense systems in the coming two or three dec- nents of the President’s Strategic Defense Ini- ades. Potential countermeasures to weapons tiative, it examines a variety of cases, looking using these technologies are also identified. at different imaginable outcomes both of BMD The interplay of defenses, countermeasures, development and deployment and of non- and counter-countermeasures cannot be dis- deployment. It attempts to present the prem- cussed in detail, because many concepts are ises, values, and conclusions of those advanc- classified. But the chapter does attempt to ing such viewpoints. This exercise should give an idea of the nature of the problem. Be- serve as useful background to the current de- cause most of these technologies are in a rela- bate over BMD research and development. tively undeveloped state, Congress will not Chapter 10 examines the general goals and likely be faced in the near future with full-scale shape of the current BMD research program, its BMD deployment decisions. Rather, it will implications, and possible alternatives to it. The have to judge how public money should be chapter does not attempt to define the details spent on BMD research in the next few years. of such alternate programs, but the differences Chapter 8 describes an imaginary design for in purpose and shape that might underlie a multi-layered BMD system. The purpose of them. It attempts to relate such alternatives this hypothetical construct is not to predict to the strategic context established in the what kind of BMD system the United States earlier chapters. Even though no deployment might actually choose to deploy after the cur- decisions are now before Congress, eventual rent research program is completed. Rather, goals must at least be considered at the time it is used as a means of illustrating the kinds research and development programs are un- of technological problems that must be solved, dertaken. The decision to find out what is fea- the kinds of feasibility issues that will arise, and sible implies some ultimate goals. How the re- the kinds of cost factors that will have to be con- search is carried out and at what levels will sidered if the decision to build a large-scale bal- be affected by those goals. Moreover, even a listic missile defense is to be taken. research program can have important national and international consequences. Once we had defined the future strategic condition we would like to be in, and once we Since many of the BMD-relevant technol- had chosen the technologies we believe should ogies could lead to space-based weapons sys- be applied to BMD, we would have to see a tems and components, issues concerning anti- plausible path from our present condition to satellite (ASAT) weapons are closely related the future one. And we would like to have to ballistic missile defense issues. Because of some assurance that there were feasible ways special Congressional interest in some of the of maintaining that condition once it was nearer term issues around ASAT, and in con- reached. We would want to have some confi- sultation with the staffs of the requesting com- dence that the transition to the new situation, mittees, OTA undertook a subsidiary study as well as the new situation, would make nu- of ASAT issues. In the resulting companion clear war less likely, not more likely. report, Anti-satellite Weapons, Countermeas- ures, and Arms Control, OTA has attempted Chapter 9 presents alternate descriptions of to make clear the implications of ASAT and how the transition from our present strategic BMD for one another. Decisions about one nuclear posture to one incorporating significant cannot be rationally made without consider- strategic defenses might take place—or might ing implications for the other. Chapter 3 Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now Contents

Page Introduction...... 45 The U.S. ABM Program to 1969 ...... 45 Soviet ABM Program to 1970 ...... 49 Salt I: The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms ...... 49 Provisions of the SALT I Agreements ...... 49 Implications and Aftermath of SALT I...... 50 The Current Ballistic Missile Defense Debate...... , ...... 55 Strategic Nuclear Forces: The ICBM Vulnerability Issue ...... 55 Technological Developments ...... 57 Soviet BMD Activities ...... , ...... 59 Political Developments ...... 61 What is New? ...... 62

Figure Figure No. Page 3-1. U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces, 1970-84 ...... 53 Chapter 3 Ballistic Missile Defense Then and Now

INTRODUCTION This chapter briefly reviews events and de- the positions of those who subsequently sup- cisions of the 1960s and early 1970s which ex- ported or questioned the desirability of U.S. plain why the United States does not now adherence to that agreement. have ballistic missile defense. It pays particu- With that debate over values and premises lar attention to the rationale of the Johnson as background, the chapter then recounts some and Nixon Administrations for ultimately de- of the factors that produced the renewal of the clining to deploy large-scale ballistic missile public debate over what is now generally called defense and instead agreeing with the Soviets “BMD,” for “Ballistic Missile Defense. ” to severely limit it. The chapter also describes

THE US. ABM PROGRAM TO 1969 In the late 1950s, the U.S. Army repeatedly foreseeable Soviet ICBM threats. Moreover, sought authorization to begin producing an Secretary of Defense McNamara’s systems anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system called the analysts concluded that it would cost the Nike-Zeus. 1 The Army’s goal was a nation- United States considerably more to offset So- wide defense against Soviet ICBMS. Derived viet missiles than it would cost the Soviets to from the air defense missile, the Nike-Hercules, deploy them. In addition, trying to limit dam- the Nike-Zeus interceptor would have been age to the U.S. population with ABM made directed by ground-based radars toward in- even less sense without an extensive civil de- coming Soviet missile reentry vehicles (RVs). fense program, which seemed an unlikely pros- When within range of the reentry vehicle, the pect.’ The 1963 Defense budget authorized re- nuclear weapon aboard the interceptor would search on a new BMD system, to be called the explode, destroying the RV. The Eisenhower Nike-X. The new system would employ faster Administration resisted Army urgings of burning rockets (later called Sprint), electron- Nike-Zeus deployment, though the Army con- ically steered phased-array radars, and new tinued to win substantial support in Congress computers, and would intercept incoming reen- for BMD deployment. try vehicles just after they entered the atmosphere (making it easier to sort out genuine The Kennedy Administration was uncon- warheads from decoys). vinced that the Nike-Zeus system—with its relatively slow rocket booster, mechanically In 1965 the U.S. Army began to develop steered radar, and limited computational ca- another interceptor, the Spartan, which would pacity—would perform adequately against detonate a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere, where it would generate intense X-rays ‘The following survey of early BMD developments drawnthat might be expected to knock out several from Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (NewYork: incoming reentry vehicles at once. While the Harper Colophon, 1972), pp. 184-196; David N. Schwartz, “Past Sprint rocket had a limited range of about 25 and Present: The Historical Legacy, ” Ballistic Missile Defense, miles, the Spartan had one of several hundred Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (eds. ) (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 330-349; and J. P. miles. Ruina, “The U.S. and Soviet Strategic Arsenals, ” SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond, Mason Willrich and John — B. Rhinelander (eds. ) (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. ‘See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: 34-65. Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 321-324.

45 46 ——— —

By the end of 1966, pressures on the John- son Administration to deploy the Nike-X had grown strong. Evidence that the Soviets were deploying an ABM system had become unambiguous. Over Administration objections, Con- gress had voted money to begin U.S. deployment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the President that the United States deploy, as a first step, the Spartan as an area defense of the whole United States and the Sprint to defend 25 cities with later expansion to cover 52 cities. This system was intended to reduce casualties in the event of full-scale nuclear war with the Soviet Union. After hearing arguments for and against deployment in December 1966, President John- son requested money in the fiscal year 1968 budget to permit deployment in January 1967, but postponed an actual decision pending attempts to interest the Soviets in limiting ABMs. The Secretary of Defense continued to believe that although the Nike-X might be somewhat effective against current Soviet missiles, that effectiveness would be short- lived. McNamara explained to Congress in March 1967: . . . the Soviets have it within their technical , and economic capacity to offset any further damage limiting-measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and

Photo credit U.S. Army ours without any gain in real security to either sides Army Nike-Zeus ABM interceptor in test firing. Derived from the Nike-Hercules air defense missile, the Nike- The Joint Chiefs of Staff were recommend- Zeus with its nuclear warhead was designed to intercept incoming ballistic missile reentry vehicles at altitudes ing deployment of a system that at least prom- of about 100 nautical miles. The Eisenhower and ised to be effective against current Soviet Kennedy Administrations, doubting the systems likely performance against foreseeable Soviet ICBM threats, ‘U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hear- did not support its deployment. ings on Military Posture 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 874. 47

Photo credits: U.S. Army Interceptor missiles deployed as part of the Safeguard ABM System (deactivated in 1976) defending Minuteman ICBM silos near Grand Forks, North Dakota (see photo, p. 51). The Sprint (on left) was designed as part of the Nike-X ABM program. The nuclear-armed Sprint accelerated rapidly to intercept incoming reentry vehicles after they had entered the atmosphere, making it easier to discriminate them from decoys. The Spartan (on right) was to operate above the atmosphere, where intense X-rays from its nuclear warhead were intended to knock out several reentry vehicles at once. 48

ICBMs, but McNamara proposed only to pur- living near the proposed deployment areas. sue the development, test, and evaluation of When the Nixon Administration took office Nike-X. He also proposed that the United in January 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin States initiate negotiations with the Soviet Laird suspended the Sentinel deployment and Union designed to limit the deployment of an ordered a review of the ABM program. In anti-ballistic missile system. During the first March 1969, President Nixon announced plans half of 1967, the State Department and the to deploy a somewhat different system, to be White House attempted without great success called “Safeguard.” The announced purpose to interest the Soviet Union in such nego- of the Safeguard system was to defend not cit- tiations. ies, but ICBM silos. Nixon had accepted the McNamara reasoning, explaining: On September 18, 1967, Secretary McNamara gave a speech in which he first explained his Although every instinct motivates me to reasons for opposing ABM deployment, then provide the American people with complete announced that the United States would de- protection against a major nuclear attack, it ploy a partial ABM system.4 The rationale he is not now within our power to do so. The offered for deployment, however, was intended heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still to lessen congressional pressures for a large- could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. scale system. The proposed U.S. ABM would fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet at- not attempt to protect U.S. cities against a tack. And it might look to an opponent like large Soviet missile attack, but instead would the prelude to an offensive strategy threat- offer a shield against the much smaller threats ening the Soviet deterrents of a potential Chinese ICBM fleet or an acci- Although the Spartan (exoatmospheric) mis- dental Soviet attack. Even so, the Nike-X siles were no longer to be located near large system to be deployed—called “Sentinel”- cities as with Sentinel, the Safeguard system closely resembled the first stages of a system would still offer a thin area defense as well as designed to defend against Soviet missiles. As the United States prepared to deploy its ‘U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1969 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government ABM system, it also continued to attempt to Printing Office, 1970), p. 103. engage the Soviets in negotiations to limit ABMs as well as offensive strategic arms. In the summer of 1968 the two countries agreed in principle to begin such negotiations, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August made them politically impossible. The Strate- gic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) finally began under the Nixon Administration in No- vember 1969. Meanwhile, during 1968, senatorial and pub lic opposition to the ABM deployment began to develop. To the surprise of ABM advocates, who had expected people to welcome deployment of a system to defend them and who had Photo credit: U.S. Army expected opposition from cities not included The 12-story Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) was built in northeastern North Dakota as part of the on the initial deployment list, ABM opponents Safeguard ABM System. It was to detect and track were able to mobilize opposition from groups attacking ballistic missile reentry vehicles at long- range until they were close enough to be handed over to the shorter range Missile Site Radar pictured below, ‘For an explanation of the apparent paradox, see Morton p. 51. When the Grand Forks ABM site was deactivated Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washing- in 1976, this PAR became part of the NORAD missile ton, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 1-7 and 297-310. early warning system. 49 a site defense of ICBMs. The Safeguard pro- guard program narrowly missed being held up posals set off rounds of hearings in Congress by Congress when the Senate defeated a de- and considerable public debate.G The Safe- laying amendment in a 50-50 tie.’

‘For the contrast between the Sentinel and Safeguard proposals, see Herbert F. York, “Military Technology and Na- ‘Stanford Arms Control Group, International Arms Control tional Security, ” Progress in Arms Control? Readings From issues and Agreements, 2d ed., Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Scientific American (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1979), pp. Duffy (eds.) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), 45-56. p. 225.

SOVIET ABM PROGRAM TO 1970 The pressures—political and strategic-on also begun to deploy the necessary radar sys- the Johnson Administration in 1967 to begin tems (the so-called “Hen House” early warn- deployment of an ABM system were strength- ing radar and the “Dog House” battle man- ened by reports of Soviet ABM deployments.8 agement radar) and a ring of Galosh launch Some argued that the Soviet Talinn air defense sites around Moscow. system, with its SA-5 interceptors, might be As late as 1967, it may have appeared that “upgraded” to ABM capability (earlier, it had the Galosh system, with its long-range, nu- been argued that the Talinn system was de- 9 clear-armed interceptors, would be extended signed as an ABM system) In 1964, during to other cities as well. During that year, how- their annual May Day military display, the ever, only six of eight prepared sites around Soviets had paraded a larger interceptor mis- Moscow were under active construction. By sile, the Galosh, through Moscow. They had 1969 the Soviets had halted construction of two more sites. In 1969 and 1970 they in- ‘For more detailed descriptions of Soviet ABM programs, see stalled missiles at four sites with 16 launchers Sidney Graybeal and Daniel Goure, “Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense (B MD) Objectives: Past, Present and Future, ” Ballis- each. The Galosh system deployment stopped tic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center, contract No. at 64 launchers, and even for the defense of DASG-60-79-C-0132, U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Im- Moscow the number was clearly inadequate plications for Ballistic Missile Defense, proceedings of a symposium held at the Center for Science and International Affairs, to deal with the impending deployment of U.S. Harvard University, Nov. 1-2, 1979, pp. 69101; Sayre Stevens, ballistic missiles with multiple, independently “The Soviet BMD Program, ” Ballistic Missile Defense, Carter targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), or even and Schwartz (eds. ), op. cit., pp. 330-349; and John Prados, The Soviet Estimate (New York: The Dial Press, 1982), pp. 151-171. to deal with a determined attack with single- ‘See Prados, op. cit., pp. 160-166. warhead missiles.

SALT I: THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS

The controversies over the deployment of the Soviets had apparently come to the same the U.S. Safeguard ABM system and over the conclusion (after having resisted the idea in degree of progress in Soviet ABM develop- early talks with the Johnson Administration). ments took place as the Nixon Administration prepared its positions for entering strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. Provisions of the SALT I Agreements After its own review of the issues, the Nixon ABM Treaty Administration ended up agreeing with the Johnson Administration that it was highly The texts of the SALT I agreements be- desirable to attempt to limit ballistic missile tween the United States and the Soviet Un- defenses. By the time the negotiations began, ion were completed at Helsinki in May 1972. 50

The centerpiece of those agreements was the for every 5 years. In addition, the treaty cre- treaty on”. . . The Limitation of Anti-Ballistic ated a Standing Consultative Commission Missile Systems."10 Each side agreed “. . . not where the two sides could discuss not only to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the matters of compliance with the treaty, but territory of its country and not to provide a “possible proposals for further increasing the base for such a defense, and not to deploy viability” of the treaty, “including proposals ABM systems for defense of an individual re- for amendments. ” It also stated that each side gion. . .“ with certain very limited exceptions. had the right to withdraw from the treaty, The exceptions were that each side could de- with 6 months’ notice, “. . . if it decides that ploy 100 ABM launchers within a 150-kilom- extraordinary events related to the subject eter radius of its national capital and another matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its su- 100 within a 150-kilometer radius of an area preme interests. ” containing ICBM launchers. These provisions The two parties agreed that “in order to in- allowed the Soviets to keep the system they sure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy were building around Moscow and it allowed ABM systems . . . in the event ABM systems the United States to keep its first Safeguard 11 based on other physical principles . . . are cre- installation in North Dakota. ated in the future, specific limitations on such In 1974 the two sides agreed in a protocol systems and their components would be sub- to the treaty that each would be limited at any ject to discussion in accordance” with the pro- one time to one of the two areas provided for visions for the Standing Consultative Commis- in the treaty. In practical terms, that meant sion and for amendments. that the Soviets would retain the system around Moscow and the United States would Interim Agreement keep its system in North Dakota. The United When they signed the ABM Treaty, Presi- States judged that the minimal effectiveness dent Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev also of its North Dakota installation did not justify signed an “Interim Agreement . . . on Certain the cost, and deactivated it in 1976. The So- Measures With Respect to the Limitation of viets, though allowed 100 ABM launchers Strategic Offensive Arms. ” This agreement around Moscow, at first kept the system at froze the number of kind-based ICBM launch- 64 and later reduced it to 32. More recently, ers on each side and set ceilings on the num- they have begun to upgrade and expand it, bers of SLBM launchers each could deploy (up possibly to the full 100 allowed launchers. to the limits, land-based ICBM launchers The ABM Treaty was to be of unlimited du- could be “traded in” for SLBM launchers). The ration: the parties agreed that the defense of Interim Agreement on offensive forces expired most of their national territories against strain 5 years, although the two sides continued tegic (long-range) ballistic missiles would be to observe it as SALT II negotiations ex- banned until one or both decided to abrogate tended on for 7 years. or seek to amend the treaty. In order to keep the treaty up to date, a review was provided Implications and Aftermath of SALT I Points of view on the original desirability and ‘°For the full text of the treaty and associated agreed and unilateral statements, see app. B. subsequent success of the ABM Treaty vary 1lFor a detailed analysis of the ABM Treaty Provisions, see widely. Supporters of the treaty believe that George Schneiter, “The ABM Treaty Today, ” Ballistic Mis- the treaty enhanced U.S. security, though they sile Defense, Carter and Schwartz (eds, ), op. cit, pp. 221-250; John B. Rhinelander, “The SALT I Agreements, ” SALT: The differ in the degree of dissatisfaction they feel Moscow Agreements and Beyond, Willrich and Rhinelander with the offensive limitations agreed upon in (eds.), op. cit., pp. 125-159; and U.S. Congress, Office of Tech- SALT I and SALT II. Some critics of contin- nology Assessment, Arms Control in Space: Workshop Procee- dings, OTA-BP-ISC-28 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government ued adherence to the ABM Treaty do not quar- Printing Office, May 1984), pp. 33-34. rel with the original idea of the agreement, but 51

Photo credit U.S. Army The Missile Site Radar (background) of the Safeguard ABM System was designed to refine the data received from the long-range Perimeter Acquisition Radar, track the attacking ICBM reentry vehicles, and fire Sprint and Spartan interceptor missiles (in cells, foreground), to intercept them. Though this site was permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty and its 1974 protocol, the United States decided that its limited capabilities did not justify the cost and deactivated the system in 1976. believe that subsequent U.S. policy overly ne- ulating the opponents to build up their offen- glected U.S. BMD research while too gently sive forces in order to try to overcome the tolerating possible Soviet violations of the enemy defenses. Recall Secretary McNamara’s agreement. Other critics tend to believe that belief in the “. . . virtual certainty that the the very premises under which the treaty was Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent. . .“ entered into were erroneous. and President Nixon’s conclusion that BMD " might look to an opponent like the pre- Supporters lude to an offensive strategy threatening the Supporters of the ABM Treaty believe that Soviet deterrent. ” This reasoning led, con- the agreement was basically “stabilizing,” in versely, to the idea stated in the ABM Treaty the senses both of “arms race stability” and that limiting ABMs would be a “substantial “crisis stability. ” Proponents of limiting BMD factor” in curbing the offensive arms race. have argued that anti-missile defenses would Ballistic missile defense, said ABM Treaty “destabilize” the offensive arms race by stim- supporters, might also induce “crisis instabil- 52 ity ” by affecting the structure of incentives weapons inventory and the size of individual before the two sides in a confrontation. No- strategic warheads dropped from the 1960s). body seriously believed in 1972 that a BMD Much of the numerical increase came in the system could limit the damage from a nuclear form of submarine-launched ballistic missile war to “acceptable” levels, and thus make the (SLBM) warheads, which were too inaccurate possessor of a BMD system less afraid of nu- to threaten Soviet ICBM silos, but which were clear war. However, even a less capable BMD also invulnerable to a Soviet preemptive first system might offer an incentive to attack first strike. The Soviets, meanwhile, had built a if its owner believed that nuclear war had be- lead in numbers of SLBM and ICBM launch- come inevitable and that damage could be kept ers and in the carrying capacity of the missiles acceptably low only if the other side’s forces in those launchers. In the mid to late 1970s, had first been substantially weakened by a the addition of multiple reentry vehicles to “counterforce” blow. An even more subtle de- their large ICBMS multiplied their strategic stabilizing effect of owning a BMD system warhead count severalfold. That large force, might be to induce in the other side the expec- coupled with increased accuracy of the reentry tation that one intended to strike first, and vehicles, appeared to threaten a substantial therefore gave him an incentive to preempt portion of the U.S. ICBM silos (see figure 3- that first strike by going first himself. Such 1). By most static measures of strategic nu- reasoning that ABMs might increase the risk clear force, the Soviets were taking a lead.13 of nuclear war, then, led to the premise in the On the other hand, we have no way of know- ABM Treaty preamble that limiting ABMs ing whether the offensive competition might would decrease it. not have been even more vigorous than it was Some supporters of the treaty agree that its if each side had been attempting to guaran- effects on limiting the offensive arms race are tee the penetration of its forces against sub- difficult to discern. As one observed in 1974, stantial ballistic missile defenses on the other side. The only way of testing that proposition To the great disappointment of many of would have been to forgo the treaty. In any the strongest supporters of the ABM Treaty, its conclusion has not resulted in the notice- case, we have at least avoided the costly able slowdown in strategic offensive weapons deployment of BMD systems which, many programs that would have been expected ac- would argue, would have provoked offensive cording to the action-reaction theory. Even countermeasures and would have been tech- U.S. MIRV programs, which had been spe- nically ineffective at the same time. cifically rationalized as being required to penetrate possible Soviet ABM defenses, are Supporters of the ABM Treaty also see it proceeding without change. It has become in- as a significant step in a larger process of arms creasingly clear that strategic weapons pro- control negotiation between the United States grams have the bases for their support in a and the Soviet Union. SALT I led to SALT multiplicity of interests and that, once under- II, SALT II was to lead to SALT III, and so way, expedient and changing rationales will on. The SALT process seemed to be one sign be used to sell them. ’2 of a recognition by both sides that coopera- It is difficult to identify an offensive strate- tive action to reduce the likelihood of nuclear gic weapons program on either side which was war is desirable. Abandonment of the ABM stopped by any provision of either the SALT Treaty, would, conversely, signify to some a I or the SALT II agreements. During the early retreat from that recognition. and mid-1970s the United States more than Supporters of the ABM Treaty agree that doubled the deliverable strategic nuclear war- Soviet violations of the treaty must be dealt heads in its arsenal (though the total nuclear with firmly if the treaty and the arms limita-

‘zGeorge W. Rathjens, “Future Limitations of Strategic 13Cf. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, Arms, ” Willrich and Rhinelander (eds.), op. cit., p. 228. 1985, pp. 25-41. 53 —

Figure 3-1 .— U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces, 1970.1984

Delivery systems

United States Soviet Union 3,000 “ oo”~~

2,500 — 2,500

2,000 2,000

1,500 1,500

1,000 1,000

500 500

0 1970 1975 1980 1984 1

Nuclear weapons

United States Soviet Union 12,000 12,00C

10,000 10,OOC 1

8,000 8,000

6,000 6,000

4,000 4,000

2,000 2,000 Bombs/ASMs/ALCMs 0 I I 0 1970 1975 1980 1984 1970 1975 1980 1984 U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear warheads both increased in the 1970s and 1980s, but the composition of forces on the two sides differed. The United States maintained a substantial fraction of its warheads as bombers and air-to-surface missiles while it added many multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to its SLBM force. The Soviets added SLBM warheads, but concentrated on deploying many, relatively large, warheads on increasingly accurate ICBMS.

SOURCE Congressional Research Service 54

tion process are to survive. Some argue that terim Agreement (H.J.R. 1227, Sept. 30, 1972) such firmness should have been exercised stated that Congress considered that: much sooner. But they argue that the chances . . . the success of the interim agreement and of successfully enforcing Soviet compliance the attainment of more permanent and com- would be much better in the context of a clear prehensive agreements are dependent upon U.S. intent to strengthen arms control rather the preservation of longstanding United than in a context of public threats to abandon States policy that neither the Soviet Union the arms control process.14 nor the United States should seek unilateral advantage by developing a first strike poten- The policy of every Administration since tial15 1972, including the present one, has been that adherence to the ABM Treaty has been, on Critics of the ABM Treaty argue that seek- balance, in the national security interest of the ing first strike potential is exactly what the United States. The Reagan Administration Soviets have been doing. In their view, the has stated that Strategic Defense Initiative Soviets have always rejected the notion that research will be carried on within the limits they should be deterred by the U.S. retaliatory of the treaty. There are, however, critics of the capability. Instead, the Soviets believe they treaty within the Administration. The follow- should actively pursue the capability to fight ing section offers a range of critical views of and win a nuclear war with acceptable losses the ABM Treaty, but does not describe cur- to the Soviet economy, society, political re- rent Administration policy. gime, and military forces. In this view, Soviet war plans call for a preemptive first-strike Critics against U.S. land-based ICBMs, bombers on the ground, and submarines in port. Extensive Various critics of the ABM Treaty disagree Soviet air defenses and civil defense would pro- with the proponents on almost every count. tect key Soviet industrial, political, and mili- Some believe that SALT I slowed the pace of tary targets from a weakened U.S. retaliatory the U.S. strategic force modernization pro- strike. grams since 1972 while the deployments of So- viet ICBMs and SLBMs in the same period Critics of the ABM Treaty believe that, al- could hardly have been higher even in the pres- though Soviet ballistic missile defenses could ence of U.S. BMD and the absence of the mod- limit damage to the Soviet Union even further, est offensive limitations in SALT I and SALT the Soviets nevertheless decided to forgo them II. They point out that many in the United because they feared that U.S. technology States had hoped in vain that SALT I would would produce a greatly superior BMD sys- prevent the Soviets from acquiring the abil- tem. Now that they have used the treaty to ity to threaten destruction of substantial num- slow U.S. BMD developments while pushing bers of U.S. land-based ICBMs in a preemp- ahead with their own, they may soon be ready tive nuclear strike. In a unilateral statement clandestinely or openly to deploy BMD sys- attached to the ABM Treaty; the United tems, which, though not perfect, would com- States declared its belief that: plement their damage-limiting strategy. In- deed, in this view, evidence of Soviet cheating . . . an objective of the follow-on negotiations on the ABM Treaty (as well as other arms con- should be to constrain and reduce on a long- term basis threats to the survivability of our trol agreements) suggests that the Soviets are respective strategic retaliatory forces, already set on that course. ” Many treaty critics believe that, lulled into a false sense of Moreover, the Jackson Amendment to the joint resolution of approval of the SALT I In- “Stanford Arms Control Group, op. cit., 249. “For a discussion of Soviet cheating and recommended U.S. “Cf. Michael Krepon, “Both Sides Are Hedging, ” Foreign responses to it, see Colin Gray, ‘‘MOSCOW Is Cheating, ” For- Policy, No. 56, fall 1984, pp. 153-172. eign Policy, fall 1984, pp. 141-152. 55

security by the SALT agreements, the United In this view, then, arms control has led to States failed to make necessary efforts in air naive inaction on the part of the United States defense, civil defense, ballistic missile defense, and the attainment of strategic superiority by and offensive force modernization. Some go so the Soviet Union. What the United States far as to conclude that the resulting asym- should do is pursue nuclear war-fighting ca- metry in U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities pabilities, including offensive counterforce capabilities, air defense, civil defense, and bal- . . . virtually guarantees that in case of a nu- listic missile defense, that will give it a credible clear war the U.S. will suffer defeat and prob- “theory of victory” with which to deter Soviet ably suffer annihilation as a functioning so- 19 ciety while the Soviet Union and its system aggression. will survive and with sufficient power intact Others argue that while limiting ballistic to establish the world hegemony that its missile defense may have been a reasonable leadership has always considered its ultimate due. ’7 policy when the available technology was more primitive, new technologies call for new pol- In these circumstances, far from enhancing icies. They say that at the very least, the addi- crisis stability, the ABM Treaty has contrib- tion of ballistic missile defenses could enhance uted to increasing Soviet incentives to nuclear the current U.S. deterrent posture. And some risk-taking: suggest that defenses might permit a dramatic the U.S. lack of strategic defense con- change in strategy from offensive to defensive siderably reduces the credibility of U.S. de- emphasis. terrence in Soviet eyes and may facilitate a We return in chapter 4 to the question of Soviet belief in safe expansion. As a result, what it might take to deter the Soviets. in crisis situations the Soviets may consider themselves less restrained than the United States and act accordingly .18

“Michael J. Deane, Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy (Mi- ami, FL: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980), p. 19Cf. Colin Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory 114. of Victory, ” International security, vol. 4, No. 1, summer 1979, ‘g Ibid, pp. 54-87.

THE CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE DEBATE

Strategic Nuclear Forces: would have open to them the possibility that The ICBM Vulnerability Issue they could launch a preemptive strike on U.S. ICBMs and on U.S. bomber bases (as well as As the Soviets added MIRVed missiles to on many missile carrying submarines in port), their ICBM force during the late 1970s, the leaving the U.S. President with only the less Defense Department was predicting that the accurate SLBM weapons to retaliate, perhaps growing numbers of more accurate Soviet mainly against Soviet cities. Since this choice ICBM warheads would place the U.S. land- would then bring about the destruction of U.S. based ICBMs at increasing risk of destruction cities in counter-retaliation, the argument in a preemptive strike. By the early to mid- went, the President would have a strong in- 1980s, some argued, the United States would centive to withhold retaliation and capitulate have entered a “window of vulnerability” in to whatever Soviet demands followed the So- which 90 percent or more of its land-based viet strike. Given this theoretical first-strike ICBMs could be destroyed within minutes. capability, the Soviets would be inclined to There has been considerable debate, though, attempt nuclear intimidation of the United over how significant this problem is and what States and might succeed without ever hav- to do about it. Some argued that the Soviets ing to fire a missile. 56

Critics of this point of view argued that: the deployment of 100 MX missiles in fixed, presumably vulnerable, silos now occupied by 1. the Soviets could, for various reasons, Minuteman missiles. It also recommended de- have little confidence that they could exe velopment of a small, possibly mobile, ICBM cute this partially disarming first strike 20 that might reduce the ICBM vulnerability successfully; 21 problem sometime in the early 1990s. At va- 2. a “surgical” strike against U.S. missile, rious times during the course of debate over bomber, and submarine bases is not pos- ICBM vulnerability, ballistic missile defense sible—millions would be killed and the had been suggested as a measure for protect- Soviets could not count on U.S. restraint 22 ing the missiles. The Scowcroft Commission in retaliation; and 3. U.S. SLBMs and bombers would be ca- 21Report of the President Commission on Strat+p”c Forces pable of damaging a great variety of (April 1983), reprinted in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Soviet military, political, and economic Armed Services, Defense Department Authorization and Over- sight, Hearings on H.R. 2287, Department of Defense Author- targets-the President would not be lim- ization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984 and Oversight ited to retaliating against urban popu- of Previously Authorized Programs, Part 2 of 8 Parts, Strate- gic Programs, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, pp. 33-62. lations. ~tFor a discussion of the technical issues, see U.S. Congress, The Carter and Reagan Administrations Office of Technology Assessment, MX Missile Basing, op. cit., pp. 109-143. took positions which implied that the ICBM vulnerability issue was important but not urgent. The Carter Administration proposed deploying a new ICBM, the MX, which would be based deceptively among multiple protective structures so as to raise the price in warheads of a Soviet attack to unacceptable levels. The fully deployed system was scheduled to restore relative invulnerability to land- based ICBMs in about 1989. Rejecting the Carter Administration’s multiple protective structure basing mode, the Reagan Administration first explored alternate “survivable” basing modes, then referred the ICBM issue to a “President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, ” chaired by Brent Scow- croft. The Scowcroft Commission recommended

20Some argue that imputations of the required degrees of accuracy to Soviet reentry vehicles are, for various technical reasons, not justifiable and that the Soviets would be foolish to have confidence in a theoretical, basically untestable, capability. In addition, Soviet ICBMs could not attack U.S. ICBMs without giving U.S. bombers enoughwarning to become airborne. Furthermore, the Soviets must take into account the possibility that U.S. ICBMs would be launched on warning, escap- Photo credit: U.S. Air Force ing before the Soviet ICBMs arrived. For many years it has been U.S. policy to have a capability to launch on warning. Al- Artist’s concept of a new small intercontinental ballistic though we have no declared policy to do so, the possibility that missile (SICBM) now under research and development we might is a part of our deterrent posture. See U.S. Congress, by the U.S. Air Force. In this design, the missile would Office of Technology Assessment, MX missile Basing, OTA- be about 46 feet long and weigh about 30,000 Ibs. It ISC-140 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, would deliver a 1,000 lb payload at ranges in excess September 1981), for a discussion of the technical requirements of 6,000 miles. The President’s Commission on Strategic for launch-on-warning. (On the other hand, some argue that an Forces, appointed by President Reagan and chaired by attack of shorter range, submarine-launched missiles produc- Brent Scowcroft, recommended deployment of a small, ing nuclear detonations above the U.S. missile fields could pin possibly mobile ICBM that might alleviate the ICBM the missiles down until the Soviet ICBMs arrived.) vulnerability problem in the early 1990s. —- .

57 — — concluded, however, that the vulnerability of the Minuteman and MX silos . . . in the near term, viewed in isolation, is not a sufficiently dominant part of the overall problem of ICBM modernization to war- rant other immediate steps being taken such as closely spacing new silos or ABM defense of those silos.23 Some proponents of ballistic missile defense, however, disagree. They say that the immediate goal of pursuing ballistic missile defense should be to reduce or eliminate the “military utility” of Soviet ICBMs, which, presumably, means their ability to destroy a large number of ICBM silos as well as other hardened military targets. Indeed, the defense of ICBMs became the major focus of U.S. BMD research through the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Technological Developments “Conventional” BMD In the years since the signing of the ABM Treaty, the United States has continued research on ballistic missile defense technology. Although some work was conducted on “exotic” technologies with possible long-term application, the major focus was on systems that might be deployed within a few years in response to a Soviet “breakout” from the ABM Treaty. The systems to which most attention was paid were designed primarily to partially defend hard targets, such as ICBM shelters, against ‘‘counterforce attacks. The goal would not be to protect every single shelter perfectly but to try to assure the survival of adequate retaliatory forces after a Soviet first strike by raising the “price” of successful attack on U.S. ICBMs to levels the Soviets would not want to pay. (’‘Price” here is measured as either a percentage of available Soviet missile forces or the financial and political cost Photo credit: US Army of deploying additional forces. ) In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Army developed the The Army Ballistic Missile Defense Pro- Low Altitude Defense System (LoADS) as a successor to the Sprint ABM interceptor and its associated gram Office developed some subsystems for Missile Site Radar (see photos above, pp. 47 and 51). a successor to the Sprint missile component It would have used small, possibly mobile, short-range phased-array radars and computers to direct small, of the old Safeguard system: the Low Altitude nuclear-armed missiles to intercept incoming reentry Defense System, or LoADS. The LoADS would vehicles after they had entered the atmosphere. Because ———— nuclear explosions would occur so close to the ground, 231 bid., p. 51. For further discussion of the Scowcroft Com- these weapons would have been suitable for protecting mission findings, see ch. 6 of this report. only hardened targets such as ICBM shelters. 58 —

use small, possibly mobile, short-range phased- cal problems that made BMD less attractive array radars and computers to direct small when the ABM Treaty was signed. missiles carrying nuclear warheads to incom- Technological limits of the late 1960s and ing enemy reentry vehicles after they had en- early 1970s made it seem that BMD systems tered the atmosphere. Because nuclear explo- could be of only limited effectiveness and that sions would occur so close to the ground, these it would likely be less costly to improve the weapons would have been suitable for pro- ability of offenses to penetrate defenses than tecting only hardened targets such as ICBM it would be to build the defenses in the first shelters.24 The Army has also worked on an place. The systems under development were endoatmospheric (inside the atmosphere) non- limited to ground-based interceptors that nuclear kill missile for the LoADS, but has not 2K would operate during the last few minutes of established its feasibility. the offensive trajectory, in the terminal phase, The Army has also been developing a non- and in late midcourse. Guidance would have nuclear exoatmospheric (above the atmos- been provided by large radars located at or phere) interceptor. A sensor and kill vehicle near the interceptor launchers. The radars, vul- (which collides with the incoming reentry ve- nerable to attack, would themselves have been hicle) were demonstrated in a test of the Hom- prime targets for the offense. Proliferation of ing Overlay Experiment held in the summer the radars would have been difficult because of 1984. A full-blown system with many such they had to be large and expensive. interceptors would probably use missile-borne The speed and capacity of available comput- or airborne optical (long-wave infrared) sensors ers limited the ability of the radars to oper- to detect and track the numerous incoming ate successfully in a complicated environment reentry vehicles, and would need to be able to and of automated battle management systems discriminate between warheads and decoys. to handle large attacks. It would have been The Army has argued that while either the very difficult to discriminate targets from LoADS or the high-altitude system could work decoys or other penetration aids. This prob- well standing alone, they could be even more lem would have forced either the commitment effective if deployed together in a “layered” of very large numbers of interceptors to kill defense. 2e comparatively few targets, or the delay of any attempt at intercept until the incoming war- Newer Technologies Potentially heads entered the atmosphere, where dis- Applicable to BMD27 crimination becomes easier. Either would have Those who advocate greater efforts now in put a substantial strain on data handling and BMD research and development argue that weapon resources. This situation limited the technical advances since the early 1970s point range at intercept, and therefore the area each the way to solving many or all of the techni- site could protect, forcing up requirements for numbers of interceptors.

24Such systems are apparently not being considered under the Guidance and warhead technology had not Strategic Defense Initiative. yet made it feasible to consider trying to use ‘sSuch low-altitude nonnuclear interception could still not assure protection of soft targets like cities because the incoming nonnuclear warheads to destroy missile re- warheads could be salvage-fused-i. e., designed to detonate at entry vehicles. Nuclear explosions threatened the moment of impact with the interceptor. collateral damage problems which further lim- 26 See William A. Davis, Jr., “Current Technical Status of U.S. ited the region over which the intercept could BMD Programs, ” U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Im- 28 plications for Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., pp. 37-40. take place. They also posed the risk of black- *’Much of the basic material comes from the unclassified ver- out of the radars once the first intercept was sion of the DOD Defensive Technologies Study, submitted to Congress March 1984, and from a recent paper by James Fletcher, the leader of that study (James C. Fletcher, “The Tech- “Again, if the incoming warheads were salvage-fused, the col- nologies for Ballistic Missile Defense, ” Issues in Science and lateral damage might be greater from the the intercepted war- Technology, fall 1984). head than from a nuclear interceptor. 59 made. Analyses showed that the cost of rela- ational this year [1985], and the new defenses tively easy countermeasures—e.g., adding to could be fully operational by 1987.29 the offensive forces or even just adding crude In addition, “the Soviets have developed a decoys–would be less than the cost of build- rapidly deployable ABM system for which ing the BMD systems. sites could be built in months rather than For some, technical advances of recent years years. ” Soviet early warning and tracking ra- suggest solutions to the problems previously dars, including one site under construction limiting the promise of ballistic missile de- which violates the ABM Treaty, could support fense. The advances are, for the most part, an “ABM deployment to protect important more embryonic than mature. They will have target areas in the U. S. S. R.” in the next 10 to be further proven, and in many cases vastly years. Another hypothesized addition to such scaled up from present performance levels, a system would be the SA-10 (under deploy- before they can be designed and engineered ment) and SA-X-12 (under development) sur- into working BMD weapon components. Never- face-to-air missiles which “may have the po- theless, advocates of greater investment in the tential to intercept some types of U.S. strategic development of these technologies believe they ballistic missiles. ”3° offer the promise of building weapons with According to the Department of Defense re- nonnuclear kill mechanisms; weapons that port, then, the Soviets are “developing a rap- could attack missiles in their boost and idly deployable ABM system to protect impor- midcourse phases; sensors, computers, and, tant target areas in the U. S. S. R.” The report especially, software for high-speed, high- concludes that “the aggregate of [their] ABM volume target tracking and discrimination; and ABM-related activities suggests that the and computers and software for high-capacity U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense battle management. The new technologies are of its national territory. “31 Officials of the CIA, discussed in detail in chapters 7 and 8. however, have said that they do not judge it likely that the Soviets would in fact move to Soviet BMD Activities such a deployment in the near term.32 These Meanwhile, in the early 1980s, Soviet BMD officials point out that, while the Soviets could developments were giving U.S. officials some expand their presently limited ABM system cause for concern. According to the Depart- by the early 1990s, ment of Defense document, Soviet Military In contemplating such a deployment . . . Power, 1985, since 1980 the Soviets have been [they] will have to weigh the military advan- upgrading the Moscow ABM system from 64 tages they would see in such defenses against launchers to the 100 allowed by the ABM the disadvantages they would see in such a Treaty: move, particularly the responses by the United States and its allies.33 When completed, the new system will be a two-layer defense composed of silo-based long-range modified GALOSH interceptors ‘gSoviet Military Power 1985 (Washington, DC: U.S. Depart- ment of Defense, 1984), p. 48. designed to engage targets outside the at- ‘“I bid. mosphere; silo-based high acceleration inter- “Ibid. ceptors designed to engage targets within the ‘zUnclassified testimony of National Intelligence Officer atmosphere; associated engagement and guid- Lawrence K. Gershwin before a joint session of the Subcom- ance radars; and a new large radar at Push- mittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of kino designed to control ABM engagements. the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. 33Prepared testimony of Robert M. Gates and Lawrence K. The first new launchers are likely to be oper- Gershwin, ibid. 60

Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense

Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense

The Moscow ballistic missile defenses identified in the map at right include the Pushkino ABM radar, above, Galosh anti-ballistic missile interceptors, top left, and new silo-based high-acceleration interceptors, top right.

The Defense Department also reports that program underway for [ground- and space- the Soviets are working on ground-based based] particle beam development and could lasers for ballistic missile defense, although have a prototype space-based weapon ready “initial operational deployment is not likely for testing in the late 1990s.”35 The CIA, on in this century. “34 They also have a “vigorous “The CIA says: ing the feasibility and practicality of using ground-based lasers We are concerned about a large Soviet program to develop for BMD. ground-based laser weapons for terminal defense against reen- Testimony of Gates and Gershwin, prepared testimony, ibid. try vehicles. There are major uncertainties, however, concern- 361 bid., p. 44. 61

—.

Photo credit: US. Department of Defense Artist’s concept of large phased-array early warning and missile tracking radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union. The U.S. Government has judged this radar to violate the ABM Treaty because of its siting, orientation, and capability. the other hand, estimates that the “technical systems (e.g., theater ballistic missile defenses) requirements are so severe” that there is a nominally permitted by the treaty. “low probability” that the Soviets will test such a prototype before the year 2000.36 The Political Developments Soviets are also reported to be working on particle beam weapons. Decline of Detente Soviet BMD developments, then, lead some In 1972, when the Nixon Administration to project either of two threatening possibil- signed the SALT I agreements, U.S. policy ities, One is that the Soviets might decide for- toward the Soviet Union was one of detente, mally (or at least overtly) to abandon the ABM in which the United States was attempting to Treaty and rapidly deploy ballistic missile ameliorate its adversarial relationship with the defenses that gave them a strategic advantage Soviet Union through various cooperative arr- over the United States before it could respond angements, including but not limited to arms adequately. This possibility is sometimes re- control. According to one of the architects of ferred to as a “break out” from the treaty. The this policy, a “network of agreements” was meant to provide “incentives and penalties” second threatening possibility is that the 7 Soviets might “creep out” of the treaty. That that might “moderate Soviet behavior. “3 Al- is, they might feign adherence to the ABM though arms control negotiations between the Treaty but gain a significant unilateral ballis- two superpowers continued through the 1970s, tic missile defense capability through treaty during the same period U.S.-Soviet coopera- violations and through technical advances in tion declined and conflict increased. The So- “Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, 36 Testimony of Gates and Gershwin, Op. cit. Brown & Co., 1982), p. 246. 62 .— ——

viet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 led certainly open to question, the Reagan Admin- the Carter Administration to withdraw the istration, manned in key positions by people signed SALT II treaty from senatorial consid- hostile to arms control, did not negotiate seri- eration. The Reagan Administration came to ously.38 office with a stated intent of correcting what With the debatable, or at least ambiguous, it saw as the undue softness of previous Ad- success of previous arms control arrangements ministrations toward the Soviets and serious and the lack of apparent progress toward new neglect of U.S. military strength. Harsh So- limitations, there has been a growing public viet reaction to political liberalization in Po- concern about the eventual outcome of the land and Soviet destruction of a Korean air- strategic arms race and a general desire for nu- liner that had strayed over Soviet air space did clear arms reduction agreements.39 not improve Soviet standing in U.S. eyes. By the time of President Reagan’s speech Decline of Arms Control of March 23, 1983, several conditions held: During his 1980 election campaign Presi- ● the competition in strategic offensive nu- dent Reagan emphasized that the SALT II ac- clear weapons continued; cords signed by the Carter Administration ● there was considerable skepticism in the were “fatally flawed. ” In office, he decided not Administration and in Congress that to request Senate confirmation of them (while arms control could do much to contain the promising not to violate them.) He declined to Soviet military threat to the United pursue ratification of two other previously ne- States; gotiated agreements, the Threshold Test Ban ● the near-term potential for mutually ben- Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions eficial negotiations with the Soviets Treaty. A view that seemed to be widely held seemed slim; within the Reagan Administration was that ● there was deep suspicion toward the So- previous arms control agreements had re- viet Union inside the Administration and sulted in substantial net advantages to the So- widely shared by the U.S. public; viet Union, and that only a determined U.S. ● advocates of ballistic missile defense for program of “strategic modernization” would the United States were arguing that new persuade the Soviets to agree to equitable limi- technologies had put effective defenses tations. within sight; ● Although discussions were begun with the the Department of Defense was concerned about Soviet BMD developments; and Soviets on strategic and intermediate-range ● nuclear force limitations, no progress was there was strong public feeling that some- made. Some argued that the Soviets actually thing should be done to curb the nuclear had no wish to reach an equitable agreement, arms race. but wished only to score propaganda points ‘“Cf. Strobe Talbot, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Adminis- against the United States, to divide the NATO tration and the Stalemate in ”Nuclear Arms Control (New York: alliance, and to prevent deployment of Per- Knopf, 1984), shing II and ground-launched cruise missiles ‘See Jamie Kalven, “A Talk With Louis Harris,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August/September 1982, pp. 3-5. See in Western Europe. Others argued that while also, Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble, “The Public Mood,” Soviet bargaining intentions and tactics were Foreign Affairs, fall 1984, pp. 33-46.

WHAT IS NEW? If President Reagan meant to set a bold gram is probably the first major national precedent with his March 23d speech, he suc- weapons research program which was begun ceeded. The Strategic Defense Initiative Pro- with a public Presidential appeal for a national 63 commitment. The Initiative has made BMD could lead to engineering development deci- once again a central issue of national debate sions in the early 1990s and deployment deci- over defense policy. But there are striking sions in the late 1990s. Just where the lines technical and political differences between the are between research on the one hand and de- new debate and the old one. velopment on the other is not entirely clear: if the research is highly successful, there will In the late 1960s, the Nixon Administration be pressures for moving to the early stages of policy was (until the ABM Treaty was nego- development. Then, if early development is tiated) to propose immediate deployment of highly successful, there will be pressures for fully developed, currently available systems. deployment. And whether or not decisions to The costs and capabilities of these systems deploy BMD systems are ever made, a U.S. were understood reasonably well. The likely research program may affect Soviet weapons countermeasures (multiple reentry vehicles decisions and U.S.-Soviet political relations. and other penetration aids) had also been in- vented and, by the time of the signing of the The political environment today differs from ABM Treaty, tested in the United States. what it was when the United States decided There was wide (though certainly not complete) to exclude ballistic missile defense from its agreement that when the Soviets adopted strategic posture. Although the country was these countermeasures the proposed U.S. BMD still in a bitter war with a Soviet ally (the system would be substantially reduced in ef- Democratic Republic of Vietnam) in 1972, the fectiveness. Nixon Administration had embarked on a policy of detente with the Soviet Union, acting Today, while there are those who advocate on the assumption that a judicious mixture of early BMD deployment using near-term tech- competition and conflict was possible. Arms nology, the SD I focus is on BMD systems control was seen as a possible tool both for re- which are still only conceptual, based on tech- ducing the risk of fatal conflict between the nologies that are yet to be developed or ma- two sides and for establishing political bonds tured. Similarly, the likely countermeasures which might ameliorate the causes of conflict. are mostly conceptual, and their effectiveness Detente, seen by many as a failed policy, has and cost remain speculative. been discarded by the United States and arms Some experts consider these technologies to control has come under increasing suspicion be promising, not only for “enhancing deter- and criticism. At the same time, public fears rence, ” but perhaps ultimately for protecting of the consequences of unrestrained arms com- most U.S. cities and population from the petition have grown. Although in 1985 the threat of nuclear destruction. Most experts United States and the Soviet Union embarked agree that at least some research should be on a new series of arms control talks, no one done on them. Although some argue for early expected early progress. deployment of BMD based on currently avail- Another significant difference between the able technology, the debate now centers mainly BMD debate before 1972 and the one now is on what kind of research to pursue, at what that then the ABM Treaty did not exist, and funding level, and for what ends. today it does. In the late 1960s, the United Nevertheless, the SDI cannot be adequately States entered into negotiations with the characterized as “just a research program to Soviets intending to persuade them that for- find out what is possible. ” The President has going BMD would be mutually advantageous; called for a national commitment of scientific in 1985, the announced U.S. intent is to per- and technological resources to find effective suade them that having BMD would be mutu- defenses against ballistic missiles. The pro- ally advantageous. Although the Secretary of posed research program envisages a steadily Defense and other Administration officials rising level of expenditures and a series of “ex- have expressed dissatisfaction with the treaty, periments” to demonstrate capabilities that the Administration has not yet chosen to seek 64 revision of it, let alone abandon it. It has have to be modified or abrogated and what the stated that SDI research will be conducted consequences of such changes would be for within treaty constraints. The ABM Treaty U.S. national, NATO alliance, and U.S.-Soviet is widely seen in the United States, among the politics. On the other hand, those who see NATO allies,40 and perhaps in the Soviet Un- mainly disadvantages to the treaty believe ion, as the most significant arms control agree- that any risks in its abrogation or attempted ment between the superpowers. Its abrogation modification are far outweighed by the risks by either side would symbolize to many aban- (e.g., as militarily significant Soviet violations) donment of the serious pursuit of arms con- of continued U.S. adherence to it. trol and resignation to a largely unconstrained Protagonists in the U.S. debate over BMD nuclear arms race. disagree about how central the ABM Treaty An important consideration in pursuing should be in the debate. But most can prob- BMD, even at the research and development ably agree that the question of the survival level, is when and how the ABM Treaty-would of that particular treaty is subsidiary to the primary issue of whether BMD deployed by 40See David Yost, “Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlan- tic Alliance, ” International Security, vol. 7, No. 2, fall 1982, the United States and the Soviet Union would pp. 143-174. lead to a safer world. Chapter 4 Deterrence, U.S. Nuclear Strategy, and BMD Contents

Page

Overview ...... , ...... + 67 Introduction...... 67 Deterring the Soviets ...... 68 Bolt-From-the-Blue First Strike...... 71 Escalatory Confrontation ...... 73 Threats of Aggression and Aggression Against U.S. Allies and Interests...... 74 Current U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy ...... 76 Countervailing Strategy ...... 77 Strategic Stability...... 78 U.S. Force Requirements and Posture ...... 78 The Strategic Balance...... 79 Current U.S. Attitude Towards Active Defenses ...... 80 Common Criticisms of U.S. Nuclear Strategy...... 81 Maintaining Current Strategy ...... 82 Alternative U.S. Strategies ...... 82 Potential Contributions of Ballistic Missile Defense ...... 87 Current (Countervailing) Strategy ...... 87 Retaliation-Only...... 89 Prevailing ..., ...... 89 Defense Dominance ...... 89 Chapter 4 Deterrence, U.S. Nuclear Strategy, and BMD

OVERVIEW Depending on how the policies and forces of This chapter provides that background. Af- the United States and the Soviet Union changed ter a brief summary of current U.S. nuclear to accommodate it, the introduction of ballis- strategy, it discusses what possible Soviet ac- tic missile defenses into our military posture tions that strategy seeks to deter. The chap- could well represent a major shift in national ter goes on to describe our current strategy strategy. Alternatively, it might only be an in- in greater depth and presents a discussion of cremental adjustment. To understand the role some of the problems with our strategy that that BMD can play in national strategy, we critics have identified. The chapter concludes must first understand what our present strat- by identifying possible evolution of or replace- egy is. We can then ask whether or how bal- ments to our strategy, paying particular at- listic missile defenses might address some of tention to the roles that ballistic missile the problems that have so far been identified defenses might play. with our strategy-or whether it might enable adoption of a strategy significantly better than the present one.

INTRODUCTION The overall strategic objective of our current a nuclear war, and that under no circum- nuclear strategy is, and consistently has been, stances would such a war leave them better to avoid nuclear attack on this nation while off in terms of achieving their geopolitical ob- preserving other national interests. To accom- jectives than they otherwise would have been. plish this, our strategy has attempted to For this strategy to be credible, we must also achieve three major goals: foster the perception among the Soviets that we are not only willing to fight a nuclear war ● deter the Soviets from nuclear attack on if necessary, but that nothing they could do the United States by convincing them could make us incapable of doing so. However, that the outcome would be unacceptable we also do not want our forces to be structured to them; in such a way as to give the Soviets increased ● convince the Soviets that we will attempt incentive to strike first in a crisis. We there- to preserve our national interests by fore strive to balance potential war-fighting means short of nuclear war, but that at- capability against crisis stability. tacks on those interests might well lead to nuclear war; and In the event of attack, U.S. strategy incor- ● terminate nuclear war, if it cannot be porates two broad elements. We would seek avoided, at the lowest possible level of vio- to deny the Soviets success in achieving the lence and on terms most favorable to us. goals motivating such an attack, and we would threaten retaliation. The perception of these We strive to deter nuclear attack by foster- capabilities contributes to deterring attack; ing a perception among the Soviet leadership the possession of these capabilities is intended that they would suffer unacceptable losses in to make possible the termination of hostilities

67 68 on favorable terms if they cannot be avoided. ies, on economic targets, or on “soft” military These elements apply both to deterring a targets. We threaten retaliation by maintain- Soviet first strike and to deterring and re- ing survivable offensive forces that are capa- sponding to subsequent Soviet actions. This ble on balance of riding out attack and then discussion stresses “intending” to terminate reaching and destroying Soviet military and hostilities, rather than successfully doing so, civilian assets. In short: because it is by no means obvious that any ● The survival of the United States depends plan for initiating even limited use of nuclear on rational behavior of the Soviet leader- weapons can avoid the destruction of the so- ship. We seek to deter them from attack- cieties of both parties to the conflict. ing, but if they intend to destroy the We would accomplish these elements, denial United States and suffer the consequences, of success and retaliation, with offensive and we cannot prevent them from doing so. passive defensive means. We deny the Soviets ● Deterrence rests primarily on offensive success in attacking military installations by forces. We rely more heavily on the threat means of a variety of passive measures such of retaliation than we do on denial of as hardening them and making them redun- success. dant (e.g., ICBM silos), dispersing them (e.g., ● We rely on the use of passive defenses, air and naval forces), and hiding them (e.g., not active ones, for the survivability of ballistic missile submarines). We do not at- our offensive forces. tempt to deny success to attacks on our cit-

DETERRING THE SOVIETS The principal target of U.S. nuclear strat- whose conquest the United States would egy-the Soviet Union-is obvious. The mech- see as challenging vital U.S. interests. anism by which that strategy works, however, is not simple. From what actions do we want Exactly what one believes the United States to deter the Soviet Union? How does the de- must do-to deter the Soviet Union from the terrent mechanism operate? These questions kinds of behavior listed above depends on are the subjects of a vast literature;1 the prob- one’s perceptions of Soviet motivations, strat- lem can only be outlined here. In general, there egy, and military capabilities. However, deter- are three broad, and to some extent overlap- mining Soviet intentions is a controversial pro- ping, categories of Soviet behavior the United cedure, and U.S. Sovietologists offer a wide range of interpretations of Soviet views. Be- States would like to deter: fore examining current U.S. strategy in any ● A surprise, “bolt from the blue, ” strate- detail, we will first explore this diversity of gic nuclear attack intended to disarm the opinion. United States and, conceivably, remove It arises, in part, from apparent contradic- it as an international competitor to the tions in Soviet statements and writings on the Soviet Union. ● Initiation or threatened initiation of nu- subject. Examination of actual Soviet nuclear force deployments helps narrow the contro- clear war against the United States as an escalation of an ongoing crisis, conven- versy somewhat, but still does not persua- tional war, or theater nuclear war. sively resolve the debated questions to everyone’s satisfaction. A recent OTA workshop2 ● Threats of or acts of military aggression against U.S. allies or against countries ‘OTA workshop of Soviet military strategy and policy, held Dec. 12, 1984; summary to be made available separately from I See app. M for references to a representative sampling. this report. .—

suggested that the conflicting statements of Examining actual Soviet nuclear force de- Soviet strategic doctrine emanate from two ployments seems to some analysts to support overlapping, but distinguishable spheres: the the notion that the “military-technical” set of “sociopolitical” and the “military-technical.” doctrines has been given considerable operational application.3 The Soviets have built a The former consists of propositions of the large land-based ICBM force which appears following kinds, which are often heard emanat- capable of destroying the bulk of the U.S. land- ing from the highest levels of Soviet political based ICBM force in a first strike. Their anti- leadership, and often from high military submarine warfare programs seek the ability leaders as well: to threaten our sea-based deterrent. They have ● The Soviet Union will not be the first to a massive air defense system and a large civil use nuclear weapons. defense program. Although they have de- ● Nuclear war with the United States would ployed no nationwide ballistic missile defense be mutual suicide. capability (which would be prohibited by the ● It is impossible to keep a nuclear war 1972 ABM Treaty), they appear to continue limited. preparations to be able to do so. ● Soviet nuclear policy is defensive and On the other hand, other characteristics of retaliatory in nature. the Soviet strategic posture, especially when ● A rough parity of nuclear forces now ex- viewed in the light of the relevant U.S. stra- ists between the Soviet Union and the tegic capabilities, suggest that Soviet leaders United States. should and do give some credence to the “so- ● The Soviet Union does not seek nuclear ciopolitical” set of propositions above. Even superiority. in a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack, the So- On the other hand, many contemporaneous viet Union cannot expect to escape a devastat- Soviet military writings on operational levels, ing retaliatory blow against a wide range of the “military-technical” arena, stress such military, economic, and political targets. This strategic principles as: follows for a number of reasons: ● It is important to seize the offensive at ● Only one-quarter of U.S. strategic nuclear all levels of warfare. warheads are deployed on land-based ● Getting in the first blow (preemptive at- ICBMs which are thought to be at risk tack) can decide the outcome of a nuclear to Soviet preemption; the rest are on bombers and submarines. In normal times, ● Nuclear warfare might be contained half the submarines are invulnerable at within a particular theater of operations. sea and many bombers are poised for ● A combination of offensive attack and rapid take-off. If nuclear forces were in a strategic defense (e.g., air defense and “generated” posture, such as in a crisis civil defense) could limit damage to the when a preemptive strike could be antic- Soviet Union from a nuclear war. ipated, even more submarines would be ● The Soviet Union would prevail in a nu- at sea and more bombers would be on clear war. alert, widely dispersed, and ready for quick take-off. Analysts of Soviet military policy agree that ● Although the Soviet air defense system both of these bodies of doctrine co-exist in So- is impressive, the U.S. Defense Depart- viet writings, as indeed they do in U.S. writ- ment believes that structural and elec- ings. However, there is disagreement on which tronic upgrades to current U.S. bombers, would take precedence under what circumstances. When it actually comes to running risks of engaging in nuclear war with the One such analysis is done by Stephen Meyer, “Insight From Mathematical Modeling in Soviet Mission Analysis, Part I I,” United States, which precepts are Soviet deci- a report done under contract MDA-903 -82-K-O1O7 with the De- sionmakers most likely to follow? fense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 70

Figure 4-1.— U.S.S.R. ICBMs

USSR ICBMs SS-78 METERS 30 SS-19 SS-X-24 Ss-11 Ss-13 SS-16 SS-17 SS-X-25 20

0 I 1 [ h ... -.——.MOD —-— MOD MOD MOD MOD In Neafmg II ~ II II Development Deployment 1 3 2 3 4 3 4?0 NLJMf3ER DE PL C)YE~ 100 60 Unde!ermmod 150 308 360 tikUfiiAD-S- 1 1 :1 MRVS 1 1 4 MIRVS 10 MIRVS 6 MIRVS up I() 10 MIRVS 1 MAX RANGE (KM) 11000 13 00(-) 10600 9.400 9000 10,000 11000 10,000 10 (.)00 10500 LAUNCH MODE Hot Hot t-lot Ho! Cold cold Cold Hot cold cold

The Soviet iCBM arsenai. The Soviets have built a large land-based ICBM force which appears capable of destroying the bulk of the U.S. land- based ICBM force in a first strike.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense.

● Although the Soviet civil defense program is-large, it remains a matter of controversy in the United States as to how well it could actually protect Soviet political and economic assets against U.S. strategic forces.4 The Soviets have also taken measures to protect their own nuclear forces from a nuclear strike. They have hardened their ICBM silos to withstand high overpressures; they have a large submarine-launched missile force; they appear to be developing a mobile land-based ICBM. Such survivability measures can be interpreted as maintenance of a secure “third- Photo credit: U.S. Navy strike” reserve force which would be protected The U.S.S. Ohio, first of the Trident ballistic missile from a U.S. retaliatory attack and which there- submarines. About half of U.S. strategic nuclear fore could be used to deter the United States warheads are deployed on submarine-launched ballistic 5 missiles aboard Poseidon and Trident submarines. In from retaliating. However, the survivability normal times, about half of these are hidden under measures can also be viewed as providing an water; during a “generated” alert, still more would be sent to sea. ‘Two contrasting views are given by Leon Goure, “War Sur- vival in Soviet Strategy” (Washington, DC: Advanced Inter- national Studies Institute, 1976); and U.S. Central Intelligence current and advanced cruise missiles, the Agency, “Soviet Civil Defense,” Director of Central Intelligence, B-lB bomber, and use of new bomber N178-1OOO3, July 1978. See also note 8, below. technology will continue to assure pene- 'Some argue that if the United States calculated that after it retaliated the Soviets would be left with a larger reserve of tration of those defenses for the foresee- nuclear weapons, a U.S. President would be even more hesitant able future. about retaliating. 71

under which the Soviets might choose to exercise a preemptive option.6 Returning to the three general categories of Soviet actions the United States would like to deter, we can see how differing interpretations of Soviet nuclear strategy lead to differing assessments of what deterrence requires of U.S. nuclear forces.

Bolt-From-the-Blue First Strike The requirement to absorb such an attack and still retain the capability to deliver an un-

6Sovietologist Raymond Garthoff argues from Soviet military and political writings that: 1) Soviet doctrines of strategic preemption cover only certain narrow cases, with a launch on warning or launch under attack being more likely; and 2) a decision to preempt, and therefore to start a nuclear war, would be suicidal because such a war would be disastrous for both sides. (cf. “Mutual Deterrence, Parity, and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy, ” Chapter 5 of Soviet Military Thinking, Derek Leebaert (cd.) (London: George Allen & Un- win, 1981), pp. 92-124. Another analyst concludes: The Soviet leaders have been forced to recognize that their rela- 9 tionship with the United States is in reality one of mutual vulnerability to devastating nuclear strikes, and that there is no immediate prospect of escaping from this relationship. Within the constraints of this mutual vulnerability they have tried to prepare for nuclear war, and they would try to win such a war if it Photo credits U S Air Force came to that. But there is little evidence to suggest that they

( think victory in a global nuclear war would be anything other than ‘ Air-breathing,” means of delivering U.S. strategic catastrophic. nuclear weapons. Top left, air-launched cruise missiIe (David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (Lon- being launched from Air Force B-52 bomb bay. Top don and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 179.) right, B1-B bomber, Advanced Technology Bomber On the other hand, still other analysts argue that: (ATB) design, right, still highly classified. According There is a regrettable tendency in the West to view the So- to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The viet Union almost entirely in “mirror image” terms . . . The sim- B1-B is designed to penetrate Soviet defenses well into ple fact of the matter is that U.S. and Soviet concepts of the the 1990s. The strategic modernization program also benefits of “victory” and its relative costs reflect philosophical calls for the development of an ATB with stealth and societal parameters that are in no way symmetrical . . . The characteristics. Plans call for the ATB to deploy in the data available suggest, in fact, that the Soviet leadership, in the 1990s to neutralize an increasingly sophisticated Soviet pursuit of its hegemonical objectives, may be prepared to incur air defense system. ” [United States Military Posture losses in societal and human values that would be “unthinka- ble, ” at least in cold blood, within Western polities, but which for FY 1986, p. 25.] in Soviet eyes are bearable, viewed, for instance, in relation to the total Soviet military and civilian casualties in World War II. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra’a- invulnerable retaliatory force capable of inflict- nan, “Soviet Strategic-Military Thought and Force Levels: Im- ing unacceptable damage on an attacker, plications for American Security, ” in Jacquelyn K. Davis, et which would support a strategy of deterrence. al., The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense (Cambridge, MA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1980), p. 25. Many U.S. Sovietologists believe that the Yet another analyst argues that emphases in Soviet strategic doctrine have varied over time but always according to the concept of strategic preemption to limit dam- dictates of Soviet political leadership when it takes a stand. age (if not to completely decide the outcome Currently, he argues, “ . . . the primary rationale for all Soviet of the conflict) is an important element in So- nuclear options is now retaliation-the inhibition of American escalation. ” James M. McConnell, “Shifts in Soviet Views on viet military doctrine and force deployments. the Proper Focus of Military Development, ” World Politics, There is less agreement about the conditions April 1985, p. 337. 72 — acceptable retaliatory strike to the Soviet Un- tack on U.S. land-based strategic forces would ion has been a fundamental determinant of the inevitably lead to the deaths of millions of U.S. strategic posture. Although this is the Americans. The Soviets would be imprudent, scenario most analysts agree is the least likely, to say the least, to believe that the United it is also one of the most stressing; the chances States would fail to retaliate. They also need of its occurring could well increase if we were to consider that the United States maintains to ignore this case and, as a result, become the option of launching its land-based ICBMs dangerously vulnerable to it. on warning of attack, leaving only empty silos to await the Soviet first strike. In addition, In this scenario, the Kremlin leaders sit although currently less accurate than land- down one day and decide that a world with- based missiles, U.S. SLBMs are aimed at a out the United States as a major power would wide variety of military, political, and eco- be a more comfortable one for the Soviet Un- nomic targets-targets presumably chosen to ion, and that they have the means of bring- be those the Soviet leadership would least like ing that world about at acceptable cost. Al- ternatively, they decide that they face some intolerable trends (perhaps the disintegration of their position in Eastern Europe, or economic collapse at home) and that only a victory over the United States can rescue them. They would presumably estimate that a surprise attack on the United States could disarm it sufficiently so that it might prefer negotiations to retaliation and that, at worst, whatever retaliatory damage the United States could inflict would be an acceptable price for the defeat of the United States. Some have argued that the Soviets might attempt a more or less surgical strike on U.S. land-based missiles (and perhaps bombers), leaving only the less accurate submarine- launched U.S. missiles available for retaliation. Since the present generation of these missiles is not accurate enough to destroy Soviet reserve ICBM silos or other very hard targets (e.g., command bunkers or shelters for the So- viet political and military leadership), the United States might be deterred from retaliating at all, hoping to spare its cities from a So- viet “third strike”; instead, U.S. leaders would be forced to sue for peace on Soviet terms. Aside from the operational uncertainties So- viet military planners would face, this scenario minimizes several considerations.7 First, an at- Photo credit; U.S. Navy

‘On Soviet planning uncertainties, see Benj amin S. Lambeth, U.S. Navy Trident C-4 SLBM in test launch. The C-4 is “Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner,” International Secu- more accurate than its predecessor, the Poseidon rity, vol.7, winter 1983, pp. 139-166. See also Stanley Sienkk- SLBM, but not as accurate as the D-5 (Trident 11) SLBM, wicz, “Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strate- which, when it becomes operational in the late 1980s, gic Analysis, ” World Politics, vol. XXXII, October 1979, pp. is expected to be nearly as accurate as 90-110. land-based ICBMs. 73 — to lose. Finally, surviving U.S. bombers and In this case, compared to the “bolt-from-the cruise missiles could accurately attack Soviet blue” scenario, the Soviet calculus of risk is hard targets. different. They do not necessarily believe that a nuclear war will be to their strategic advan- Moreover, there is no consensus in the tage. They assume that the United States will United States about just what levels of na- retaliate devastatingly if struck; moreover, tional loss the Soviet leadership might be pre- they have some doubt as to whether the pared to suffer to obtain various objectives.’ United States, expecting a Soviet strike, will The question becomes even more complicated wait for it. If the Soviets were absolutely cer- when one moves from a scenario in which the tain that strategic nuclear war was inevitable, Soviets deliberately choose to begin a nuclear they would presumably see no choice but to war (as would result from bolt-from-the-blue launch a preemptive strike. Although the So- attack) to scenarios in which the Soviets are viet Union might suffer grievous damage from only running a risk of nuclear war. a U.S. retaliation, that damage might be reduced at least marginally by the combination Escalator Confrontation of Soviet counterforce strikes and defensive What might deter the Soviet Union from measures. risking nuclear confrontation remains ex- Suppose, however, that the situation re- tremely controversial. But suppose the risk mained at least somewhat ambiguous. The has been taken. The Soviets may have miscal- Soviets would be confronting a U.S. strategic culated U.S. willingness to escalate a conflict, force in a high state of alert: many submarines thus miscalculating the risk of war involved in port might have been sent to sea; additional in some act of aggression. It is also possible alerted bombers might have been dispersed to to imagine scenarios in which the Soviets ei- many airfields; in the expectation of imminent ther do not believe the United States to have attack, U.S. land-based ICBMs might be pre- made a deterrent commitment, or do not be- pared to be launched under warning of attack lieve that their own actions constitute what so as to escape a Soviet disarming strike. At- others would see as aggression. Varying per- tacked by this augmented retaliatory force, ceptions of Soviet motivations lead to vary- Soviet civil defense and air defense capabilities ing degrees of willingness to postulate such might not go far in preventing damage.9 The scenarios. In any case, the situation postulated here is not that the Soviets have decided in ‘It is possible that greater immediate damage could be done to the Soviet Union as a result of having civil defenses. Evacu- advance that victory at a reasonable price is ation of Soviet cities could be interpreted as a signal that the achievable, nor that they believe the conse- Soviets were considering a preemptive strike, so the United quences of a nuclear war to be acceptable. States might respond by “generating” its strategic forces, or putting them in a high state of alert. In a generated posture, Rather, it is that they believe (and think that U.S. forces would be less vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. the United States probably shares the belief) Therefore, it is conceivable that more Soviets would be killed that past miscalculations and the pressure of by U.S. retaliation which had been bolstered as a result of So- viet evacuation than would die in U.S. retaliation for a ‘‘bolt- events have made central nuclear war immi- from-the-blue” attack that the Soviets mounted without evacu- nent and quite possibly inevitable. The ques- ating their cities and therefore without warning the United tion is whether they would launch a preemp- States of their plan. One study estimated that a retaliatory second-strike attack tive strike on the United States or whether by U.S. forces in their “day-to-day” posture against Soviet nu- they would wait and take the chance either clear forces, other military targets, and industry would kill 60 that the United States would not strike, or to 64 million Soviets, over the short term, if they did not evacuate cities but instead took protection in the “best available” that they could launch their own forces upon shelter. If the Soviets successfully evacuated 80 percent of their detection of U.S. attack. urban population and caused the United States to generate its forces, a U.S. retaliatory strike would kill 23 to 34 million Soviets. However, that total would rise to to 54 to 65 million if the evacuated population were targeted. The study did not “’4A Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Strategic Doctrine, ” consider long-term effects, and no analysis was made to deter- Strategic Review, vol. 10, fall 1982, pp. 36-63. mine the feasibility of implementing such an evacuation suc- 74

Soviets would face the difficult choice of in the late 1950s and early 1960s by deploy- launching an attack which assured great dam- ing hundreds of medium- and intermediate- age to themselves, or taking a chance that a range nuclear missiles that could at least reach strategic exchange could still be avoided but Western Europe.) at the same time risking even greater damage But during the 1960s, the Soviets began to if the gamble on U.S. restraint failed. It is acquire their own ICBMs, stationed in silos widely believed that this is the kind of scenario that would be hard for the United States to which is the most likely to lead to a nuclear knock out in a quick first strike. By that time, war. the United States had added thousands of tactical and “theater” nuclear weapons to NATO Threats of Aggression and Aggression forces. In a strategy of “flexible response, ” the Against U.S. Allies and Interests United States would answer Soviet aggression at whatever level seemed necessary-including The extension of U.S. nuclear forces to de- first use of nuclear weapons—to repel the at- ter against attack on NATO allies as well as tack. Given the Warsaw Pact numerical su- against attack on the United States proper, periority in many categories of conventional provides the called “extended deterrence, ” force, it was widely assumed that NATO greatest challenge to U.S. nuclear strategy. would have to resort to nuclear counterattack This commitment to United States allies is at a fairly early stage. Such nuclear counter- central to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- attacks might lead to termination of the con- nization: flict before it escalated to central nuclear The Parties agree that an armed attack war-but then again they might not. Thus, against one or more of them in Europe or U.S. strategy in NATO held out the ultimate North America shall be considered an attack prospect, if not the immediate threat, that the against them all; and consequently, they agree US. assured destruction capability might still that, if such armed attack occurs, each of be called into play. them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 At the same time, the United States would of the Charter of the United Nations, will as- have to reckon with the risk that escalation sist the Party or Parties so attacked by tak- of a European war might lead to assured ing forthwith, individually and in concert with Soviet-inflicted destruction of the United the other Parties, such action as it deems nec- States. As Henry Kissinger told a European essary, including the use of armed force, to re- audience in 1979: store and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.10 The European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we In the 1950s, when the Soviet Union had cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we very little capability for a nuclear attack on should not want to execute because if we exe- the United States, it was more or less plausi- cute, we risk the destruction of civilization. * ble for the United States to threaten nuclear The Soviets might not believe that the punishment for aggression against its allies. United States would really run such a risk in (The Soviets attempted to compensate some- order to defend Europe. what for this asymmetry in nuclear deterrence Extended deterrence, therefore, poses an inherent dilemma which U.S. nuclear strategy cessfully. “In fact, ” the study noted, “it is highly questiona- has not fully solved: to the extent that U.S. ble whether the United States or the Soviet Union could effectively achieve this [civil defense] posture. ” U.S. Arms Con- strategic nuclear forces are believable as trol and Disarmament Agency, “An Analysis of Civil Defense “NATO’s ultimate deterrent, ” their use in in Nuclear War, ” December 1978, figure 13, pp. 11 and 12. that role risks the United States’ own destruc- ‘The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, signed on Apr. 4, 1949 in Washington, DC, The Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty— *Henry A. Kissenger, Proceedings, Department of State Publication 3497, (Washing- “NATO Defense and the Soviet ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1949). Threat, ” Survival, November/December 1979, p. 266. 75 tion. To the extent that such use is not believ- with their central strategic forces, are suffi- able, those forces cannot effectively deter at- cient to deny NATO high confidence in impos- tack on NATO. The prospect of inviting Soviet ing escalation dominance on the Warsaw Pact. retaliation directly against the United States Therefore, measures have been taken to tighten for use of nuclear weapons in defense of Eur- the perceived “coupling” between Europe and ope looks as repugnant to some Americans as U.S. central strategic forces to bolster the its converse of confining a superpower-initi- United States ‘ “extended deterrent. ”12 ated nuclear war to European soil looks to For example, the recent deployment by the some Europeans. U.S. of intermediate-range Pershing II mis- The reasoning behind “flexible response” is siles and ground-launched cruise missiles that it is credible to threaten the possibility, (GLCMs) in Europe was undertaken in part but not the certainty, of escalation to general .— nuclear war. In a situation where escalation ‘*This and the following paragraph draw on Robert S. McNamara’s arguments in “The Military Role of Nuclear Weap- might or might not occur, with that possibil- ons: Perceptions and Misperceptions, Foreign Affairs, fall ity not necessarily under the direct control of 1983, p. 59. either side, what would otherwise have been an unbelievable threat might acquire credence. Strategist Thomas Schelling describes the role of uncertainty, “the threat that leaves something to chance, “ in this situation: The brink is not, in this view, the sharp edge of a cliff where one can stand firmly, look down, and decide whether or not to plunge. The brink is a curved slope that one can stand on with some risk of slipping, the slope [getting] steeper and the risk of slipping greater as one moves toward the chasm . . . One does not, in brinkmanship, frighten the adversary who is roped to him by getting so close to the edge that if one decides to jump one can do so before anyone can stop him. Brinksman- hip involves getting onto the slope where one may fall in spite of his own best efforts to save himself, dragging his adversary with him.ll The threat of first use of nuclear weapons by NATO depends either on the assumption that any nuclear use may lead to uncontrolled escalation, making the threat of a NATO nuclear response an effective deterrent to both conventional and nuclear aggression, or on the assumption that NATO can maintain “escalation dominance” on the Warsaw Pact, preventing the use of nuclear weapons beyond the level that NATO chooses to use them. Soviet Photo credtt U.S. Air Force deployments of tactical, theater, and intermediate-range nuclear forces, in conjunction Test firing of U.S. Air Force Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), This mobile missile is being deployed in Europe partly to respond to NATO fears that the “Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (London: Ox- United States might be unwilling to use nuclear forces ford University Press, 1960), p. 199. “Children,” says Schell- based at sea or in its own homeland in ing, “understand this perfectly. ” defense of Europe, 76 to respond to NATO fears that the United States rather than to maximize their own ben- States would be unwilling to use nuclear forces efit (should those cases differ). based at sea or in its own homeland in defense The United States, similarly, cannot know of Europe. These European-based systems, in exactly what the Soviets will do. It therefore addition to the submarine launched ballistic can only do its best to make sure that aggres- missiles which the United States had already sion is a very unattractive choice for the assigned for NATO use, were intended to Soviets no matter how the Soviets make their strengthen the connection between conven- decisions. tional and tactical nuclear forces, on one hand, and American central strategic forces, on the Some argue that if the extended deterrent other. In striking Soviet territory, they might is to be truly credible, the United States must precipitate a Soviet retaliatory strike on be able to greatly erode the Soviet assured de- American territory which in turn might gen- struction capability, either by preemptive erate a U.S. central strategic attack. The counterforce attacks on Soviet missiles, by in- Soviets, no longer perceiving a “firebreak” be- corporating significant defenses (civil, air, and tween conventional aggression (which might ballistic missile), or both. As Colin Gray has result in NATO first use of tactical nuclear put it, weapons) and central strategic exchange, . . . if U.S. strategic nuclear forces are to be would be deterred from making the initial con- politically relevant in future crises, the Amer- ventional attack. ican homeland has to be physically defended. In calculating whether to challenge the It is unreasonable to ask an American Presi- United States in areas where the United dent to wage an acute crisis, or the early stages of a central war, while he is fearful of States appears to have a military commit- being responsible for the loss of more than 100 ment, the Soviets must weigh the gains they million Americans. If escalation discipline is hope to achieve (or losses they hope to avoid) to be imposed upon the Soviet Union, even in against a calculated risk of nuclear war. They the direst situations, potential damage to cannot know with certainty what the United North America has to be limited . . .13 States’ responses will be. Therefore, they must On the other hand, if the Soviets wish to estimate the probability of various U.S. re- avoid such “escalation discipline, ” they have actions. It might be that what they predict to a strong incentive to try to assure the penetra- be the most likely outcome is the one they tion of their forces through such U.S. de- seek. Alternatively, there might be a less likely result which was nevertheless so desirable that fenses—to see to it that the United States does not come to believe that damage can be the Soviets would judge their overall risks to limited. be tolerable, considering the possible gains. They might even act to minimize the most Colin Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: the Case for a Theory of Vic- favorable outcome obtainable by the United tory, ” International Security, vol. 4, No. 1, summer 1979, p. 84.

CURRENT U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY Current U.S. nuclear strategy is a balance retary of Defense Caspar Weinberger listed between attempting to minimize the risk of nu- the five highest priority national security ob- clear war, on the one hand, and attempting to jectives of the United States in his Report to prevent the coercion or intimidation of the the Congress for Fiscal Year 1984. The three United States and its allies, on the other.” Sec- that directly concern strategic nuclear weap- — refusal to run any risks would amount to giving the Soviet rulers “Henry Kissinger wrote in 1957 that “ . . . the enormity of a blank check . . . “ (cf. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy modem weapons makes the thought of war repugnant, but the (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 7). 77 — — ons are quite similar to the formulations of While catastrophic failure of this strategy previous administrations: would be clear, its success is hard to quantify. “We can never really measure how much ag- ● To deter military attack by the U.S.S.R. and its allies against the United States, its gression we have deterred, or how much peace allies, and other friendly countries; and to we have preserved, ” wrote Secretary of De- deter, or to counter, use of Soviet military fense Weinberger. “These are intangible– power to coerce or intimidate our friends until they are lost. ”17 and allies, ● In the event of an attack, to deny the Countervailing Strategy enemy his objectives and bring a rapid end to the conflict on terms favorable to our in- In 1980, after having conducted a compre- terests; and to maintain the political and hensive review of U.S. strategic policy, Presi- territorial integrity of the United States dent Carter issued Presidential Directive 59 and its allies. which formally codified a “countervailing” ● To promote meaningful and verifiable mu- strategy. As described by Secretary Brown in tual reductions in nuclear and conventional his Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1982, forces through negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, respectively; the countervailing strategy is based on two and to discourage further proliferation of fundamental principles: 15 nuclear weapons throughout the world. The first is that, because it is a strategy The strategy adopted to achieve these ob- of deterrence, the countervailing strategy is jectives is based on three major principles, designed with the Soviets in mind. Not only stated in the same report, that are also a con- must we have the forces, the doctrine, and the will to retaliate if attacked, we must con- tinuation of longstanding policies: vince the Soviets, in advance, that we do. Be- • First, our strategy is defensive. It excludes cause it is designed to deter the Soviets, our the possibility that the United States strategic doctrine must take account of what would initiate a war or launch a preemptive we know about Soviet perspectives on these strike against the forces or territories of issues, for, by definition, deterrence requires other nations. shaping Soviet assessments about the risks ● Second, our strategy is to deter war. The of war . . . . We may, and we do, think our deterrent nature of our strategy is closely models are more accurate, but theirs are the related to our defensive stance. We main- reality deterrence drives us to consider . . . . tain a nuclear and conventional force pos- The second basic point is that, because the ture designed to convince any potential ad- world is constantly changing, our strategy versary that the cost of aggression would evolves slowly, almost continually, over time be too high to justify an attack. to adapt to changes in U.S. technology and ● Third, should deterrence fail, our strategy military capabilities, as well as Soviet tech- is to restore peace on favorable terms. In nology, military capabilities, and strategic responding to an enemy attack, we must doctrine. 18 defeat the attack and achieve our national In particular, countervailing strategy in- objectives while limiting—to the extent tends to make clear to the Soviets that: possible–the scope of the conflict. We would seek to deny the enemy his political . . . no course of aggression by them that led and military goals and to counterattack to use of nuclear weapons, on any scale of at- with sufficient strength to terminate hostil- tack and at any stage of conflict, could lead ities at the lowest possible level of damage to victory, however they may define victory. to the United States and its allies. ” Besides our power to devastate the full target system of the U. S. S. R., the United States —— — 15Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Annual Re-17 Weinberger, DOD FY85 Annual Report, Feb. 1, 1984, p. 8. port to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 (referred to as DOD ‘8 Harold, Brown, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the FY84 Annual Report), Feb. 1, 1983, p. 16. Congress, Fiscal Year 1982, Jan. 19, 1981, p. 38 (emphasis in 16 Ibid,, p. 32 (emphasis in original). original). 78

would have the option for more selective, tage of aggression and also reduce the risk of lesser retaliatory attacks that would exact a war by accident or miscalculation.21 prohibitively high price from the things the Soviet leadership prizes most–political and Another type of stability is arms race sta- military control, nuclear and conventional bility, in which there are minimal incentives forces, and the economic base needed to sus- for the United States and U.S.S.R. to contin- tain a war.19 ually update or expand their strategic arsenals in order to compensate for developments by Seeking to incorporate flexibility and encom- the opposite side. The assumption underlying passing many options and target sets, the the concept of arms race stability is that de- countervailing strategy continues to be the ba- ployments on one side may lead the other to sis for U.S. strategic nuclear policy .20 counter-deployments which in turn stimulate new deployments by the first. Strategic Stability American nuclear strategy has placed high U.S. Force Requirements and Posture priority on strategic stability. Most often, the According to Secretary of Defense Wein- term “stability” used alone has stood for cri- berger, present U.S. countervailing strategy sis stability, which describes a situation in places five specific requirements on strategic which, in times of crisis or high tension, no nuclear forces:22 country would see the advantages of attacking first with nuclear weapons as outweigh- 1. Flexibility: “ . . . A continuum of options, ing the disadvantages. Crisis stability depends ranging from use of small numbers of on the force structures and doctrines of both strategic and/or theater nuclear weapons sides and on each side’s perception of the aimed at narrowly defined targets, to other. The lower the degree of crisis stability, employment of large portions of our nu- the greater the risk that a power would preempt clear forces against a broad spectrum of if it perceived that it were likely to be at- targets. ” tacked. This is not to argue that it is U.S. pol- 2. Escalation Control: “ . . . We must con- icy to consider a preemptive strike, but Soviet vince the enemy that further escalation perceptions of such a possibility might in- will not result in achievement of his ob- crease a Soviet inclination to preempt under jectives, that it will not mean ‘success, ’ some circumstances. President Reagan’s Com- but rather additional costs. ” mission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft 3. Survivability and Endurance: “ . . . The Commission) stated that: key to escalation control is the survivability and endurance of our nuclear forces ,.. stability should be the primary objective and the supporting communications, com- both of the modernization of our strategic 3 forces and of our arms control proposals. Our mand and control, and intelligence (C 1) arms control proposals and our strategic arms capabilities. programs . . . should work together to permit 4. Targeting Objectives: “We must have the us, and encourage the Soviets, to move in ability to destroy elements of four general directions that reduce or eliminate the advan- categories of Soviet targets. ” These are strategic nuclear forces, other military —.——— forces, leadership and control, and the in- ‘gIbid., p. 39. 20 dustrial and economic base. 1n 1982, Secretary Weinberger told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Reagan Administration policy “does 5. Reserve Forces: “Our planning must pro- not change substantially or materially the policy set out” in vide for the designation and employment P.D. 59, and that “the essential strategic doctrine set out in P.D. 59 remains. ” (“U.S. Strategic Doctrine, ” hearing before —— —— the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 97th “April 1983 Report of the President’s Commission on Stra- Cong., 2d sess., Dec. 14, 1982, p. 99. See also an insert for the tegic Forces (referred to hereafter as the Scowcroft Commis- record outlining nuclear policy differences between the Carter sion Report I), p. 3. and Reagan Administrations on p. 100.) “Ibid., pp. 40-41. 79

of adequate, survivable, and enduring re- Submarines, the Scowcroft Commission serve forces and the supporting C31 sys- noted, can remain hidden for months at a time. tems both during and after a protracted Bombers can be launched upon warning with- conflict. out being irrevocably committed to an attack, and they have very high accuracy against a To attempt to satisfy these requirements, variety of targets. ICBMs “have advantages the United States maintains a triad of strate- in command and control, in the ability to be gic offensive weapons systems consisting of retargeted readily, and in accuracy. This long-range bombers, submarine-launched bal- means ICBMs are especially effective in de- listic missiles (SLBMs), and land-based inter- terring Soviet threats of massive conventional continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These or limited nuclear attacks, because they could systems carry thousands of nuclear warheads most credibly respond promptly and controll- in ballistic missile reentry vehicles, bombs, ably against specific military targets and cruise missiles, and short-range air-to-ground promptly disrupt an attack on us or our al- missiles. There are thousands more nonstra- 24 lies. ” tegic nuclear warheads including those in artillery shells, bombs carried by tactical air The countervailing strategy does not require forces, short- and medium-range rockets, and that the U.S. force structure mirror that of the intermediate-range rockets and cruise missiles. Soviets or vice versa, provided that the over- However, weapons considered nonstrategic by all military capability of the United States is the United States, such as the Pershing II not allowed to become inferior to that of the intermediate-range ballistic missile, can reach Soviet Union, in either reality or appearance. Soviet territory and are considered to be stra- “Indeed,” wrote Secretary Brown, “in some tegic by the Soviets. sense, the political advantages of being seen as the superior strategic power are more real Characteristics such as survivability, bas- and more usable than the military advantages ing, penetration modes, range, yield, accuracy, of in fact being superior in one measure or time of flight, independence from enemy warn- 25 another. ’ ing systems, and ease of command and control distinguish the various strategic weapons systems. U.S. administrations have put high The Strategic Balance value on maintaining this diversity in nuclear Soviet strategic nuclear forces in fact do not forces. The triad, wrote the Scowcroft Com- mirror those of the United States. In particu- mission, serves several important purposes: lar, the Soviet allocation of warheads among First, the existence of several strategic types of delivery vehicles is quite different forces requires the Soviets to solve a number than that of the United States. The final re- of different problems in their efforts to plan port of the Scowcroft Commission discussed how they might try to overcome them. Our ob- the asymmetry between U.S. and U.S.S.R. jective, after all, is to make their planning of strategic forces, along with the problems of any such attack as difficult as we can . . . comparing the two: Second, the different components of our strategic forces would force the Soviets, if In the United States the strategic advan- they were to contemplate an all-out attack, to tages of diversity, our own military tradition make choices which would lead them to reduce as an air and naval power, plus a certain significantly their effectiveness against one amount of interservice competition, produced component in order to attack another . . . strong strategic bomber and submarine The third purpose served by having multi- forces, as well as a land-based ICBM force. . . ple components in our strategic forces is that Soviet strategic forces developed along very each component has unique properties not different lines , . . Geography and history present in the others , ..23 “Ibid., p. 8. 23 Scowcroft Commission Report I, pp. 7-8. “Brown, DOD FY82 Annual Report, p. 43. 80 —

have made Russia a continental land power, ballistic missile defenses was preferable to one with a tradition of heavy emphasis on massive in which either (and therefore most likely, artillery forces. As might have been expected both) attempted to do so. That situation was under such circumstances, the development of codified in 1972 by ratification of the ABM Soviet strategic nuclear forces has been heav- Treaty. The single BMD installation per- ily oriented toward ICBM weapons . . . The result of all these differing traditions mitted the United States by the 1974 Protocol and technical capabilities is strategic forces to the ABM Treaty was decommissioned in which are very dissimilar. In addition, each 1976 after it was determined that the limited strategic force component has its own strengths benefit provided by such a highly constrained and weaknesses, which tend to be different system did not justify the expense of main- from those of the other components. This, in taining it. Extensive air defenses in the ab- turn, makes force structures very difficult to sence of effective BMD were similarly held not compare and each side tends to stress certain to be worthwhile. aspects of the force posture of the other as more menacing.26 Like its predecessors, the Carter Adminis- tration viewed the ABM Treaty as being “to In comparing the strategic nuclear capabil- the benefit of strategic stability and deter- ity of the United States with that of the Soviet rence. “3° The reasoning leading to this assess- Union, both Carter and Reagan Administra- ment found nationwide defenses to be desta- tions agreed that “the era of U.S. superiority 7 bilizing in that they call into question the is long past. “2 However, they differed signif- ability of nuclear weapons to threaten destruc- icantly in their interpretations of what fol- tion of assets that a potential attacker values lowed. The Carter Administration held that highly. Defenses were not judged to be cost- “parity–not U.S. inferiority–has replaced effective in that they would merely force the [U. S.] superiority, and the United States and Soviets to increase their offensive forces to the Soviet Union are roughly equal in strate- maintain whatever level of damage expectancy 28 Two years later, on the gic nuclear power. ” had previously been thought sufficient– other hand, the Reagan Administration main- increases which would cost less than our de- tained that “the Soviets have acquired a mar- fenses. gin of nuclear superiority in most important categories. ’29 Both Administrations under- During the Carter Administration, BMD re- took strategic modernization programs to research permitted by the ABM Treaty was ac- dress what were seen at least as adverse trends tively pursued as a hedge against possible So- in the military balance, if not adverse situ- viet developments. It focused on point defense ations. capabilities for hardened targets, particularly MX missiles deceptively deployed in Multiple Current U.S. Attitude Towards Protective Structures, and on nonnuclear de- Active Defenses struction of ICBMs outside the Earth’s atmosphere. The preferential defense possible with BMD is currently not included in the U.S. MPS basing of MX made BMD a logical strategic posture, while air defenses are mini- choice for responding to Soviet warhead pro- mal (but being upgraded). Previous U.S. Ad- liferation beyond the SALT II limits. ministrations have agreed that a condition in The Reagan Administration differs from which both the United States and the Soviet previous ones in its conception of the role that Union refrained from instituting nationwide defenses might play in future nuclear strategy and in its planning for BMD research and de- *’March 1984 Report of the President’s Commission on Stra- velopment. It has initiated a broad-ranging in- tegic Forces (Scowcroft Commission Report II), Mar. 21, 1984, p. 4. vestigation into the role of and possibilities for “Brown, op. cit., p. 43. “Ibid., p. 43. 29Weinberger, DOD FY84 Annual Report, p. 34. ‘“Brown, op. cit., p. 51. 81

strategic defense. It has not, however, adopted Under President Reagan, the Department a doctrine incorporating such defenses. Its po- of Defense has initiated the “Strategic De- sition is that such a decision should await the fense Initiative” (SDI), a comprehensive pro- completion of a BMD research and technology gram “to develop key technologies associated development program which could take at with concepts for defense against ballistic mis- least 10 years. 3 I At that time, a future Presi- siles” whose ultimate goal is “to eliminate the dent and Congress could decide whether to threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles and proceed to develop, test, and deploy one or increase the contribution of defensive systems more BMD systems. Meanwhile, the United to U.S. and allied security. ”34 Although the States and the Soviet Union in 1982 “each SDI research and technology development reaffirmed its commitment to the aims and program is intended to comply initially with objectives of the Treaty, ”32 and President Rea- the restrictions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, the gan has further made clear that U.S. BMD re- development, testing, or deployment of BMD search will be “consistent with our obliga- systems investigated under the SD I would re- tions” under that Treaty .33 quire modification of or withdrawal from that -— ——— —--—— treaty. The SDI differs substantially from pre- 31Time estimates given by Administration representatives vious BMD efforts in that: 1) it shifts empha- vary. Ambassador Paul Nitze estimated that it will take “at least ten years” to determine whether sufficiently capable bal- sis from near-term, almost proven technologies listic missile defenses can be built [quoted by Walter Pincus to relatively high risk but conceivably higher in ‘‘Decade of Study Seen for ‘Star Wars’, The Washington payoff ones; and 2) it significantly increases Post, Apr. 27, 1985]. ‘zJoint communique issued at the conclusion of the 5-year re- both the funding and attention given to BMD view of the ABM Treaty, reported in ‘‘SCC Completes Review research. Nuclear strategies incorporating of ABM Treaty, ” Daily Bulletin (U.S. Mission, Geneva), Dec. BMD systems of the sort to be investigated 16, 1982 (quoted by George Schneiter in “The ABM Treaty Today, ” chapter 6 of Ballistic Missile Defense, Ashton B. Carter under the SDI could be quite different from and David N. Schwartz (eds. ) (Washington, DC: The Brookings this nation’s current strategy. Institution, 1984), p. 236. 33 President Reagan’s speech on Military Spending and De- “Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Strategic De- fense Technologies, Mar. 23, 1983. fense Initiative Organization (SDIO) Charter, Apr. 24, 1984.

COMMON CRITICISMS OF U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY This nation’s strategic nuclear doctrine has nesses. In many cases, differing recommenda- continually evolved, but it has not been dra- tions stem from differences in fundamental matically changed in the last 20 years.35 De- premises and values. They may also arise from spite this consensus, various analysts have different predictions of future capabilities and suggested either further modifications or ma- intentions. Much of the strategic debate, jor revisions to it to redress perceived weak- therefore, is really a debate about which assumptions more closely reflect (or will reflect) reality. ‘5 Desmond Ball “Targeting for Strategic Deterrence” (Lon- don: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Pa- Few are pleased that the U.S. deterrent pos- per No. 43, 1983), discusses the evolution of U.S. strategic nu- ture relies heavily on threatening the use of clear targeting policy over the last 40 years. He finds that although the numbers of targets and the packages of target- weapons of mass destruction. What is debated ing options available to the President have changed dramati- is not whether deterrence by threat of nuclear cally over that period, the actual character of those targets has retaliation is a good thing, but whether there is remained remarkably consistent. He argues that those changes that have occurred in targeting policies and plans are the re- a viable and preferable alternative. Some ana- sult of many factors, including the changing nature of Soviet lysts believe that existing strategy, although targets. better U.S. intelligence about those targets, and imperfect, is the best available under the cir- changes in U.S. force capabilities, and that changes in avowed U.S. national security policy have been “perhaps one of the least cumstances. They argue that it should in es- important” of those factors. sence be continued, perhaps strengthened in 82

various ways or carried out (with the aid of systems today are able to enhance the effec- arms control agreements) at substantially tiveness of terrestrial forces, and this ability smaller force levels. Others who basically will no doubt be accentuated in the future. agree with the premises underlying current Combined with political factors such as the So- strategy foresee difficulty in maintaining its viet ability to proliferate military forces taken viability in the face of continual technologi- with what is perceived to be U.S. reluctance cal evolution, particularly on the part of the to do the same, these actual and possible tech- Soviet Union. Some of the latter see a poten- nological trends lead some analysts to ques- tial role for ballistic missile defense in enhanc- tion whether the “countervailing strategy” ing the U.S. deterrent posture. can be maintained without significant change into the indefinite future. Still others hold fundamentally different assumptions than those on which current strat- Proposals for change vary. Some include egy is based. Their concern is to modify ex- defenses; others do not. Some would empha- isting strategy in accordance with a different size U.S. technological strengths to maximum set of premises. advantage in the military competition between the United States and the U. S. S. R., including Maintaining Current Strategy uses in areas (e.g., ballistic missile defense) now closed off by mutual agreement. Others Technological evolution influences strategy would incorporate active defenses in our stra- both by changing what is seen as possible tegic posture but would not otherwise intro- (“technology push”) and what is viewed to be duce major changes to U.S. strategy. Still necessary (“requirements pull”). On the “tech- others would eschew active defense, preferring nology push” side, for example, many believe to retain the ABM Treaty as one of a number that we now have the potential to develop bal- of means to manage the overall military com- listic missile defenses which are considerably petition via arms control and other political more capable than could be considered years and diplomatic measures. The specific means ago. Such advances have been one of the ma- by which defense could augment our present jor motivations for the requesting of this re- strategy or support a transition to another are port, and they will be discussed in further de- discussed below and in the following chapter tail in chapters 7 and 8. (chapter 5). Discussions of how such transi- Technology is also advancing in areas other tions might evolve are presented in chapters than ballistic missile defense, and contributes 6 and 9. to the “requirements pull” that some believe will mandate changes to our strategy. In par- Alternative U.S. Strategies ticular, Soviet ability to harden and make mo- In addition to those advocating modifica- bile elements of their land-based strategic tions to current strategy, there are those who forces, and their efforts towards hardening differ with basic assumptions central to that command and control facilities and other tar- strategy and who therefore offer alternatives. gets, all serve to degrade the ability of U.S. Three such alternatives are presented below. forces to place these targets at risk. In addition, although there is as yet no reason to be- One group believes that current strategy lieve that the Soviets will ever be able to relia- does not sufficiently recognize what they see bly detect U.S. ballistic missile submarines as the inherent opposition between minimiz- when on patrol, it cannot be ruled out that ing the risk of nuclear war, on the one hand, some as-yet-unknown technology might some- and preparing to fight one, on the other. There day threaten SLBM invulnerability .30 Space —— — ask, ‘Aren’t the oceans getting more transparent, ’ we say, ‘No “Advances in technology may make it harder, rather than way, they are getting more opaque, ’ because we’re learning more easier, to locate submarines. Admiral James D. Watkins, the about them all the time. ” The Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1985, Chief of Naval Operations, has stated that “ . . . when people p. A10. 83 .

fore, they see that the balance mentioned pre- differ, they are based on a fundamental prem- viously between war-fighting capability and ise similar to that stated by Robert McNamara: crisis instability is swinging dangerously I do not believe we can avoid serious and towards instability, and that weapons systems unacceptable risk of nuclear war until we that could improve the ability to fight a nu- recognize-and until we base all our military clear war could also make such a war more plans, defense budgets, weapon deployments, likely to occur. Alternatively, they may believe and arms negotiations on the recognition— that existing plans for prosecuting a nuclear that nuclear weapons serve no military pur- war overestimate the probability that those pose whatsoever. They are totally useless— things which the war would be defending except only to deter one opponent from would survive the war at all. These analysts using them.38 recommend that the United States pursue a Accordingly, “retaliation-only” strategists strategy which we will label “retaliation only.” adopt the principle of “no first use” of nuclear A second group of strategists believes instead weapons, which in some versions would be stated publicly and in others would be left si- that present strategy does not sufficiently rec- 39 ognize the essential equivalence between deter- lently ambiguous. Starting with that prem- ring war and preparing to fight war. Moreover, ise, retaliation-only strategists can go in two existing strategy does not offer a coherent pic- different directions. In the first, a variety of ture of what it would consider victory, and it nuclear weapons with flexible targeting op- cannot be expected to effectively deter an options would be retained in order to display the ponent who, it is argued, would have a very capability of responding in kind to any level clear conception of his strategic objectives in of nuclear attack. There would be no immedi- war. These strategists advocate adopting ate requirement to reduce the number of war- what might be called a “prevailing” strategy. heads existing today (although should Soviet forces be reduced, U.S. forces could be reduced Finally, there are strategists who think that accordingly.) However, nuclear forces under this country should not and need not accept this strategy would differ qualitatively from having its continued survival contingent on today’s forces in that weapons would not be the decisions of others. They argue that no given prompt hard-target kill capability—a ca- matter how strong our deterrent strategy can pability needed in order to conduct a success- be made, should it fail (whether due to acci- ful preemptive attack on enemy nuclear forces. dent, miscalculation, or just poor design), the Attacks on a wide variety of military forces results would be catastrophic. They moreover would still be possible under such a strategy argue that we have, or will have, the means to using those weapons having slow hard-target develop defenses (possibly augmented by strin- kill capability. This strategy would therefore gent offensive force limitations) which can remove, or substantially reduce, the ability of —— -.— bility for escalation control. On p. 40 of his Annual Report for others to destroy this country. Discussion of Fiscal Year 1982, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown empha- such “defense dominant” strategies concludes sized two points which he had made “repeatedly and publicly”: the alternatives presented below. First, I remain highly skeptical that escalation of a limited nuclear exchange can be controlled, or that it can be stopped short of an all-out, massive exchange. Retaliation-Only Second, even given that belief, I am convinced that we must do everything we can to make such escalation control possible, “Retaliation-only” strategists question that opting out of this effort and consciously resigning ourselves to the inevitability of such escalation is a serious abdication of whether any military utility at all can be de- the awesome responsibilities nuclear weapons, and the unbeliev- rived from nuclear weapons which justify the able damage their uncontrolled use would create, thrust upon us. risks inherent in planning to use them in bat- “Robert S. McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weap- ons: Perceptions and Misperceptions, ” Foreign Affairs, fall tle, short of retaliating against nuclear at- 1983, p. 60 (emphasis in original). tack.37 Although their prescriptions for change “Of course, even a public statement leaves some ambiguity– no matter what our doctrine, it would remain physically possi- 37They therefore differ from the current “countervailing” ble to use nuclear weapons in a first strike, and the Soviets strategy, which requires some measure of war-fighting capa- would have to worry about this possibility. 84 — — — — be able to maintain some degree of war-fight- still be credible. However, uncertainties in ing potential, but would significantly lessen each side’s evaluation of the opposing side’s the degree to which that potential could be defense might make assuring an equivalent used (or would appear capable of use) in a first retaliation difficult. strike. Since a “retaliation-only” strategy explicitly In the second variation, often called mini- denies use of nuclear weapons in response to mum deterrence, only those weapons which conventional attack, some other way of fulfill- would be needed to threaten a number of high- ing U.S. defense commitments to its NATO value targets—cities, for example-would be allies must be found (e.g., augmentation of con- retained. The number and nature of those tar- ventional forces in Europe). Furthermore, a gets would be selected to threaten enough de- “minimum deterrence” strategy, presumably struction to deter a potential attacker from ini- using far fewer weapons than are presently in tiating a nuclear strike. Opinions differ as to the U.S. arsenal and probably embodying a the exact size of “minimum,” but no defini- much more limited repertoire of nuclear re- tion of a minimum deterrent would require sponses, must ensure that all opponents re- thousands of warheads on a multiplicity of de- main firmly convinced that any use of nuclear livery vehicles. weapons will be met with a retaliatory response. If retaliatory threats are not credible, What would be essential in either version then potential attackers may gamble that would be that the nuclear weapons that were retaliation might not be carried out and they retained include (in the first case) or constitute may not be deterred successfully. (in the second) an invulnerable, second-strike force. The size of this force would be deter- One suggested implementation of a “re- mined in the first case by being able to retali- taliation-only” deterrent strategy40 (similar to ate for whatever form of attack had been ex- minimum deterrence as described above in its ecuted initially, and in the second by being force employment policy but not necessarily able to destroy with high confidence that set in the size of its arsenal) would eliminate all of targets judged to provide minimum deter- tactical and theater-level nuclear weapons. It rence. To the extent that the retaliatory weap- would retain only an invulnerable, second- ons were vulnerable, or to the extent that a strike force of central strategic weapons which potential attacker posessed defenses, the would not be given the combination of yield, second-strike force would either need to ex- accuracy, and quantity needed to pose a threat pand in size or increase its invulnerability and to the retaliatory capability of the other side. penetrativeness in order to maintain a mini- Their survivability would be critical, and it mum deterrent threat. could be enhanced by deploying them in a redundant manner similar to that of the pres- Should the Soviets acquire defenses so ef- ent triad. Flexibility in responding to nuclear fective that even this minimum deterrent attack could be maintained, in that the at- retaliation could not be executed with high tacked nation would have options ranging confidence, and were the United States una- from delivering a single retaliatory weapon to ble to penetrate, evade, or neutralize these launching its entire strategic arsenal. defenses effectively, then the fundamental premise of promising nuclear retaliation for Critics of “retaliation-only” strategists be- nuclear attack could not be assured, and strat- lieve that there may not be effective alterna- egies based primarily on the threat of retalia- tives to the threat of first use to deter attack tion would no longer be viable. On the other on NATO, that such strategies (in particular hand, if the United States and the Soviet Un- ion had equal offensive and defensive capabil- ‘“Richard L. Garwin, “Reducing Dependence on Nuclear Weapons: A Second Nuclear Regime, ” Nuclear Weapons and ities (and if the survivability of offensive forces World Politics, 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations (New did not depend on defenses), retaliation might York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1977), pp. 83-147. 85 the “minimum deterrence” approach) would However, to change from the current strat- not credibly deter attack since potential ad- egy towards a prevailing one, the United versaries might not believe the United States States would actually carry out its retaliatory threats, must set its planning sights considerably and that such strategies do not provide suffi- beyond developing a defense posture that will cient opportunity to terminate hostilities on simply deny victory to the enemy. To prevail favorable terms should deterrence fail. in stressful circumstances the United States must be able to defend itself against nuclear Prevailing attack.43 A quite different proposed change to current Credibility that deterrent threats would ac- doctrine would push in the opposite direction tually be carried out would result not so much from the recommendations of “retaliation- from flexibility in strategic planning or re- only” strategists, towards the formulation of sponse options as it would from the “Soviet more credible plans for the use of nuclear belief, or strong suspicion, that the United weapons in wartime. These strategists believe States could fight and win the military con- that, in a world where adversaries possess nu- flict and hold down its societal damage to a clear weapons and may well believe in their tolerable level. ”44 As a result, such credibility military utility, it is not sufficient for the that we would use nuclear weapons to retali- United States merely to seek to deny the ate would be greater than it is in our current, enemy his political and military goals should undefended posture. war break out. Credible deterrence requires that we plan in the event of war to “secure the Clearly, determining “tolerable” levels of achievement of Western political purposes at damage “commensurate with the stakes of the a military, economic, and social cost commen- conflict, ” in addition to predicting potential surate with the stakes of the conflict. ”41 levels of attack, will be needed in order to specify the defensive capability required by Where some see the uncertainties inherent such a strategy. Effective air defense, civil de- in estimating outcomes of nuclear war to be fense, and ballistic missile defenses would all so great, and the potential damage so dev- be required were defending a major portion of astating, that there is little to be gained in try- population and economic and industrial infra- ing now to affect the nature of a post-war structure to be a high priority. Offensive force world, a “prevailing” strategy focuses specif- requirements for such a strategy would de- ically on the conduct of a nuclear war, and is pend on the set of targets in the Soviet Union based on consideration of how such a war (their number, hardness, and location), and might end. It would agree with the counter- would depend critically on the level to which vailing school (and the “no prompt hard-target these targets were defended. kill” option of the “retaliation-only” school) that “Prevailing” strategists directly address the problem of extended deterrence by recom- . . . the deterrent effect of our strategic forces mending sufficient damage-limitation capabil- is not something separate and apart from the ity (passive defense, active defense, or preemp- ability of those forces to be used against the tive attack) to make believable the threat that tools by which the Soviet leaders maintain the United States would use central strategic their power. Deterrence, on the contrary, re- z forces in circumstances other than responding quires military effectiveness.’ to nuclear attack. If the Soviet Union were convinced that a defended United States believed it could use tactical or even strategic 41 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Planning, Phil- adelphia Policy Papers (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Re- —— search Institute, 1984), p. 2. “Gray, op. cit., p. 2. ‘zScowcroft Commission Report I, p. 7. “Ibid., p. 3. 86 nuclear weapons in defense of NATO Europe yet, “4s there is not so widely developed a body without leading to unacceptable devastation of strategic thought on this alternative as of the United States, the Soviets might be there is concerning some of the others. more likely to believe that conventional attack Proponents of “defense-dominant” strat- against NATO would lead to the use of nuclear egists see defenses as lessening both the prob- weapons against the Soviet Union. ability of nuclear war and the damage that One essential factor in establishing defense would be done by such a war, should it occur. requirements for a prevailing strategy is de- They also see such strategies as being moral, termination of how much damage to the United in that defending through active defense is States can be tolerated in pursuit of those ob- preferable to defending through terrorism— jectives that strategic nuclear forces will be the ultimate mechanism by which deterrence employed to attain or preserve. Another is the through threat of retaliation operates. In a degree of U.S. military superiority such a “defense-dominant” world, the probability of strategy would require, and whether such a war would be lessened since the attacker, less strategy would be viable without it. From certain of achieving his objectives, would be 1945 until the early 1960s, U.S. strategic su- less likely to attack in the first place. Two fac- periority was such that this country had the tors would lessen the attacker’s confidence in capability to adopt a “prevailing” strategy; success. For one, it would be much more dif- adopting one today in the light of existing So- ficult to destroy all his intended targets, viet forces poses an entirely different set of directly frustrating his objectives. Probably challenges. more importantly, though, he would not be able to plan an effective attack since he would Critics of “prevailing” strategies argue that not know in advance which warheads will the United States has no guarantee of being penetrate the defense. Defenses will contrib- able to attain or maintain the degree of mili- ute uncertainty to an attack in addition to tary superiority necessarily to implement defeating part of it. In addition, if war never- them, and that these strategies are equivalent theless were to break out in a “defense-domi- to destroying the Soviet “deterrent,” which nant” world, its consequences might be less the Soviets have the will and the technology severe than they would be in any of the other to prevent. cases described here. Defense Dominance In a way, “defense-dominant” and “retalia- The “countervailing,” “retaliation-only,” tion-only” strategists share a common goal: and “prevailing” strategies described so far a world in which the only plausible use for a are characterized by the policies they recom- strategic nuclear weapon is in retaliation for mend for employing offensive forces. Although the use of another. However, adherents of the there are also differences between them in the “reliation-only” strategy believe that we are roles that defenses play, it is primarily the role already in such a world although our offensive of the offense that distinguishes them. In con- strategy does not recognize it, and that BMD trast, defenses supplant, more than they aug- might destabilize the situation; supporters of ment, offensive forces in “defense-dominant the former believe that the Soviet Union, at strategies. President Reagan’s speech of March least, finds “military utility” in ballistic mis- 23, 1983, and his Strategic Defense Initiative, siles and that only BMD can ensure that all have greatly stimulated discussion about the sides will perceive the use of nuclear weapons feasibility of attaining such a long-term goal. as truly and clearly irrational for all sides. However, since a defense-dominated world is Moreover, they argue, at the very highest “too distant a technical prospect to be a very active player in the U.S. strategy debate as 451 bid., p. 3. —

87 — levels of defensive capability, even an irra- operation with the Soviet Union in order to be tional decision by the Soviets would not lead implemented in a coordinated, mutual manner. to the destruction of U.S. society. Indeed, if The degree to which the Soviet Union, and defense dominance became total, we could con- other nuclear powers, would cooperate in a sider strategy of “assured survival” in which transition to a defense-dominated world is retaliation became unnecessary because we therefore crucial. The Soviets will choose to had confidence that no Soviet nuclear attack cooperate in such a transition either if they of any kind could succeed. conclude that such a world is preferable to the However, to the extent that defenses on present situation, or if they decide that defen- both sides lessen the utility and the probabil- sive measures will prove to be so cost-effective ity of preemptive nuclear attack, they will in- that they recognize the futility of offensive/ terfere with any other roles assigned to offen- defensive competition.” In either case, they sive strategic forces. This is, after all, the might be expected to be amenable to regulat- point. In particular, if conventional attack on ing the defensive buildup and controlling Europe is deterred by the ultimate threat of offensive arms. escalation to central strategic exchange, then Critics of “defense-dominant” strategies ar- lessening the effectiveness of strategic forces gue that it is by no means clear that defensive may lessen their deterrent value, possibly in- technologies capable of supporting such strat- creasing the likelihood of conventional war in egies can be developed, that such strategies Europe. A “defense-dominant” strategy, like raise the risk of both preemptive nuclear at- a “retaliation-only” one, must solve the prob- tack and conventional war, and that nobody lem of deterring conventional attack without knows how a coordinated transition to de- nuclear weapons. fense-dominance could ever be carried out. Unless a defense can be deployed which is so effective that the Soviet nuclear arsenal becomes irrelevant, the Soviet response will be “Cost-effectiveness is not the only criterion on which the the key to the success of a “defense-dominant’ Soviets will base their decision to cooperate in a defensive tran- strategy. Such a strategy will either attempt sition. Others include total resource base, total defensive sys- to force the U.S.S.R. to unilaterally avoid tem affordability, ability to redirect civilian resources to the military, and relative utility of offensive forces vs. defensive strategies which the United States believes to forces for geopolitical ambitions. Internal Soviet politics and be particularly dangerous, or it will seek co- interservice rivalries may also play a role.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Current (Countervailing) Strategy nically feasible, there are several roles that defenses might play in a strategy similar to The overall contribution that defenses can the current one: make to current strategy depends on whether the benefits of implementing defenses are seen ● BMD might enhance deterrence by in- to outweigh the advantages to the United creasing the difficulty a potential attacker States of having the Soviet Union refrain from would have in achieving military objec- building defenses or adding to offenses. tives, strengthening “deterrence by de- Should that be the case, and should defenses nial. Defenses would also introduce unable to provide those benefits prove to be tech- certainty into attack plans, lessening the 88 —

attacker’s confidence in achieving his likelihood or outcome of a conventional war goals as well as reducing his ability to do in Europe. If the superpowers are able to de- so. fend themselves better than Europe can be de- ● “Deterrence by retaliation,” the underpin- fended, 48 nuclear war in Europe might become ning of our current posture, might be more likely rather than less. Soviet nuclear strengthened by protecting our own retal- weapons aimed towards Western Europe iatory forces against preemptive attack. would retain a degree of effectiveness lost to Our ability to project military power those fired back in retaliation. On the other abroad, or alternatively our ability to pre- hand, effective homeland defense of the United vent adversaries from doing so, would States might strengthen the credibility of ex- also be enhanced were our conventional tended deterrence. Any net assessment re- military forces defended against preemp- quires consideration of the relative effective- tive nuclear attack. ness of U.S. and Soviet defenses against their ● Certain deployments of BMD might raise respective offensive threats. the threshold of nuclear war by removing Further complicating BMD’s effect on ex- the military utility of small nuclear at- tended deterrence are the independent French tacks, and they might also protect against and British nuclear forces. At present consist- small accidental or nonsuperpower attacks. ing of SLBMs, intermediate-range nuclear ● To the extent that assets including, but missiles (IRBMs), and a few bombers, they are not limited to, military forces could be far less extensive than the U.S. and Soviet nu- defended, our retaliatory threats might be clear arsenals. More because of their small size more credible because we might be per- than because of the reasons discussed in the ceived as having less to lose should our previous footnote, the French and British nu- retaliation provoke further attack. clear forces would be more easily negated than All of these benefits, of course, become lia- the superpower arsenals, further stressing the bilities when the tables are turned and we face extended deterrent demand on the U.S. cen- Soviet defenses: a rational decision requires tral strategic forces. the two to be balanced off against one another. Stability issues, in particular, are discussed in greater detail in chapter 6. 48There are reasons both for why this should and should not be the case. Since the short- and intermediate-range ballistic Since the United States and the U.S.S.R. missiles threatening Europe arrive at their targets traveling have different nuclear doctrines and force more slowly than ICBM warheads, they might be more easily destroyed by terminal defenses. On the other hand, since a structures, it might be that similar defensive shorter-range missile reenters the atmosphere at a steeper an- capabilities would confer asymmetric benefits gle than does an ICBM, the vertical component of its velocity to the two sides. For example, since our strat- (its rate of descent) is comparable to that of an ICBM. There- fore, the time from when atmospheric effects begin to separate egy “excludes the possibility that the United warheads from decoys to time when the weapons arrive on tar- States would initiate a war or launch a preemp- get is about the same for a shorter range system as it is for tive strike, ”47 making a first strike more dif- an ICBM. As a result, screening out the decoys and intercepting the actual warheads in their terminal phase will not neces- ficult might seem to confuse Soviet plans more sarily be easier for shorter range systems. Furthermore, the to- than U.S. ones. tal flight time of a shorter range missile, and consequently the period during which it might be destroyed in midcourse, is much However, in addition to depending on one’s less than that of an ICBM. Those short-range systems never conception of Soviet attack plans, any such exiting the Earth’s atmosphere will not be vulnerable to certain directed-energy weapons at all. Tactical and theater-range analysis must take the problem of extended systems are likely to be less extensively MIRVed, lessening the deterrence fully into account. To the extent advantage of destroying them in boost phase. In addition, de- that strategic nuclear weapons lose their mil- livery systems other than ballistic missiles (e.g., bombers, cruise missiles, artillery, or even covertly placed mines) can more easily itary utility, they lose their power to affect the be used against European targets than against the superpowers, so defense systems other than BMD would need to be compared as well as BMD effectiveness in order to determine whether 47Weinberger, DOD FY 1984 Annual Report, p. 32 Europe were better or worse defended than the superpowers. 89 . .——. .—

Chapter 5 looks at the relationship between sive, be superior to that of the Soviet Union. strategic objectives for BMD and the capabil- The success of a “prevailing” strategy, then, de- ities of BMD systems. pends on the ability of the United States to maintain this superiority. Defenses in a “pre- Retaliation-Only vailing’ strategy would protect strategic offensive forces, deny the Soviets success in In practice, most adherents to the “retalia- their attack plans, and lessen “self-deterrence” tion-only” school of strategy see only a limited by which U.S. leaders would be unwilling to role for ballistic missile defense in “retaliation- use U.S. strategic offensive forces for fear of only” strategies. This point of view probably incurring unacceptable retaliation. However, stems from a concern that the introduction of Soviet defenses would limit the effectiveness defenses into the strategic equation could lead of those offensive forces, and they would com- to dangerous instabilities for crises or for the plicate the extended deterrence problem as dis- arms race in general. If each side were intent cussed in the “Current Strategy” section on maintaining substantial offensive capabil- above. ities, defenses would only be tolerable to the extent that the United States could be assured Defense Dominance that its retaliatory capabilities were not undermined. Defenses consistent with this prin- Defenses are not only necessary but also pre- ciple, for example defending retaliatory forces, eminent in these strategies. Going beyond en- would be acceptable and possibly beneficial. hancing the “denial” aspect of deterrence as However, comprehensive, areawide defenses we now know it, a ‘‘defense-dominant’ strat- would be not be compatible with preserving egy relies on defenses while the role of offenses retaliatory capability unless the net effective- is greatly reduced. Neither side could count ness of the offenses on both sides were ap- on achieving any military objectives by using proximately equivalent. ballistic missiles. Attacks intended only to do general societal damage, although possible Ballistic missile defense could serve a simi- with all but extremely capable defenses, would lar role in a world which went much further be highly irrational. If defenses could be towards nuclear disarmament. Even if posses- brought to a high enough level of performance, sion of nuclear weapons should be renounced, even the capacity to do societal damage might the possibility of building them cannot be be greatly reduced. Then, U.S. survival would eliminated. One vision of a nuclear-free world49 not depend on Soviet rationality, but would would have nations retain their weapons de- be assured by our ability to intercept even an sign and production facilities as a hedge irrational attack. against sudden development of nuclear weapons by other states. To guard against surprise Imposing a “defense-dominant strategy on attack, these facilities would be protected by an uncooperative adversary requires an ex- active defenses. tremely high level of defensive capability. Rea- gan Administration officials have suggested Prevailing that effective U.S. defenses might offer the Soviets incentives to reduce their offensive Defenses are necessary to make a “prevail- forces. Against increasingly constrained offen- ing” strategy viable. However, they are not sive forces, any defense would be more ef- sufficient. In order to impose escalation dom- fective. inance, it would very likely be necessary that overall U.S. capability, offensive and defen- In chapter 5, we look more closely at how various levels of BMD capability, if techni- 49Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, cally feasible, might play roles in U.S. nuclear 1984). strategy, current or prospective. Chapter 5 BMD Capabilities and the Strategic Balance Contents

Page Introduction...... 93 The Components of Strategic Defense Capability ...... 94 The Role of BMD in Strategic Defense ...... 94 Operating Modes for BMD ...... 95 Current Strategic Forces and Possible Future Developments ...... 98 How BMD Might Affect the Strategic Balance ...... 101 The Current Strategic Balance ...... 101 Possible Future Development of the Offensive Balance ...... 102 What Might We Want BMD to Defend? ...... 103 Levels of Strategic Defense Capability...... 107 The Effect of U.S. and Soviet Defense Levels on the Strategic Balance ...... 110 The Effect of U.S. and Soviet Defenses on U.S. Strategy Choices ...... 114 Conclusion ..., ...... , ...... 116

Table Table No. Page 5-l. Levels of Defense Capability ...... 108

Figures Figure No. Page 5-1. Notional Reliance of U.S. Security on protection and Threat of Retaliation ...... 103 5-2. How Ballistic Missile Defense Affects U.S. Ballistic Missile Retaliatory Capability ...... 106 5-3. How Strategic Defense Might Affect the Strategic Balance ...... 110 5-4. How Strategic Defenses Might Affect U.S. Strategy Options...... 115 Chapter 5 BMD Capabilities and the Strategic Balance

INTRODUCTION Since the President’s March 23, 1983, speech Almost all observers agree that reaching or there has been much discussion of the strate- approaching the President’s goal would re- gic implications of the steps along the way to quire a lengthy and complex transition period.2 his goal. In that speech he announced his “. . . They do not all agree that we can be sure that ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed the transition could ever be completed. But by strategic nuclear missiles,” while recalling whether partially effective defenses are viewed the need to “. . . remain constant in preserv- as transitional stages or as the most we can in ing the nuclear deterrent and preserving a practice achieve, it is important to understand solid capability for flexible response. ”l He also the strategic implications of various levels of warned that the pairing of offensive and defen- U.S. strategic defense and Soviet strategic de- sive systems “can be viewed as fostering an fense. This chapter discusses how various levels aggressive policy. ” of U.S. and Soviet defense capability might affect the strategic balance as well as the choice Among those who see potential value in de- of strategy available to the United States. Of veloping BMD there are some who argue that particular interest are the implications for a only a realistic prospect of defending the U.S. transition from a condition of offense-dominance population against an all-out Soviet attack can to one of defense-dominance. justify both a major change in strategic direction and the massive program that develop- To understand how U.S. and Soviet strate- ing and deploying BMD would entail. In their gic defenses can affect the strategic balance, opinion, the United States has little or noth- it is necessary to be able to specify what each ing to gain-and perhaps much to lose—by defense can accomplish against the other’s of- building less effective defenses. As they see fense. Saying that we have a BMD system it, in an attempt to reach the President’s goal that can destroy some number of Soviet reen- the U.S. strategic position may worsen before try vehicles (RVs), or that it has a given leak- it gets better, since the Soviets also can be ex- age rate, tells us little by itself. What it could pected to build defenses. Other supporters of accomplish would depend on how many ballis- BMD maintain that the United States can tic missile weapons the Soviets had, what benefit from any level of strategic defense and other nuclear delivery systems they had, how that U.S. security will improve as the strate- they attacked, and how we defended. gic balance moves from offense-dominance We cannot specify now what offensive and toward defense-dominance. Critics of the Pres- defensive weapons systems the two sides will ident Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Pro- deploy in future decades. What we can do, for gram maintain that his ultimate goal is unat- the sake of analysis, is postulate various levels tainable and that little could be gained by building lesser levels of defense. ‘In the President’s March 23, 1983, speech he predicted that it will take year, probably decades, of effort on all fronts. For a discussion of the Administration’s scenario for the transition, ‘Relevant sections of that speech reproduced in app H. see ch. 9.

93 94 of effectiveness for strategic defenses. These strategic defense capability: the major compo- levels might or might not be achieved in the nents of strategic defense (BMD, air defense, face of the other side’s offensive measures. But civil defense, etc.); basic modes for operating assessment of the BMD issue requires analy - BMD; and the structure and possible evolu- sis of the strategic implications of various de- tion of strategic offensive forces. In the sec- fense capabilities if we could have them. ond part we specify illustrative levels of defense capability and discuss their implications. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines and explains factors that affect

THE COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE CAPABILITY The Role of BMD in Strategic Defense than minutes to take steps such as getting command authorities to safety, activating civil Defense–reducing the damage an opponent defense procedures, and deciding to launch a can do in an attack—can be divided into three retaliatory strike. Today, ballistic missiles are broad categories: passive defense, active de- the largest part of the Soviet strategic nuclear fense, and preemptive destruction. Even if the threat against the United States. Soviet Union struck first and the United States retaliated, the United States could at- An alternative to reducing the number of tempt to defend against follow-on strikes by weapons reaching their targets is to reduce the preemptive destruction of Soviet weapons not effectiveness of each weapon. This might be employed in the first strike. accomplished by passive defense techniques. We currently use some passive defenses to Active defenses such as BMD and air de- protect elements of our strategic forces. ICBM fense seek to prevent launched weapons from silos are hardened to reduce the effectiveness reaching their intended targets, either by de- of nuclear weapons detonating nearby. Subma- stroying them or by disrupting their opera- rines are hidden in the open ocean to preclude tion. If the goal of the defense is to prevent all the Soviets successfully barraging their de- weapons—or the great majority of them—from ployment areas with nuclear weapons. Bombers, reaching their targets, both BMD and air de- their tankers, and airborne command posts fense would be required. If, on the other hand, can be sent aloft so that very large areas would the goal is only to reduce the number of weap- have to be barraged to destroy them. Civil de- ons reaching their targets, or to reduce the num- fense applies similar techniques–dispersal ber of arriving weapons that have properties and sheltering—to protecting civilians. Civil unique to ballistic missiles, then BMD alone may defense cannot protect the buildings and other be sufficient. structures within the cities. Ballistic missiles are unique in their ability to Passive and active defenses can be alterna- kill targets at intercontinental ranges promptly tive means to reach the same ends, or they can —within 30 minutes or less of launch. Because be combined. In general, the more ambitious of their accuracy, ICBMs can kill hard targets the goal the more likely it is that some com- promptly, and it is likely that in the future bination of both would be required. For exam- SLBMs will also have that capability. Bombers ple, consider population defense. The U.S. pop- and cruise missiles can kill hard targets, but ulation is not evenly distributed over the it takes them much longer to reach their tar- United States, but is highly concentrated in gets. Assuming that bombers and cruise mis- cities. These cities are soft targets. A few nu- siles can be detected hours before they reach clear weapons delivered in any way against a their targets, being able to defend against bal- major population center would kill millions of listic missiles would mean having hours rather people. City defense would therefore require 95

both BMD and air defense. That defense would would maximize the ability to save targets. In have to be extremely capable to ensure that reality, a completely preferential defense no weapons got through, especially if the would be very difficult—if not impossible— Soviets launched many at each city they at- to achieve. Nevertheless, the idea is a con- tacked. One reason an attack would kill so venient analytical tool because it represents many people is that the population is concen- the best that any defense could do. trated, unprotected, in a small area. Even with A more likely situation would be “semi-pref- highly effective active defenses, it would prob- erential” defense. A semi-preferential defense ably also be necessary to use civil defense to would also shoot only at selected RVs, but the reduce the number of people killed by the few defense capability allocated to defend any par- weapons that might reach the target. Civil de- ticular target would be determined before the fense alone would probably be of limited value attack. To operate semi-preferentially the de- against a large attack, since destruction could fense would have to be able to determine where be spread over a large area. Active defense individual RVs are aimed, but unlike a com- would have to be extremely good to protect plete preferential defense it would not have to against that attack. However, together the determine where they are all aimed before it two types of defense might be much more ef- begins firing. A semi-preferential defense fective than either alone. would be less efficient than a completely preferential defense: some targets would be Operating Modes for BMD over-defended while others might be under- Depending on its design, a BMD system defended. When the defender has a semi-pref- may operate in one of several different modes. erential defense, the attacker and defender The simplest operating mode might be called play a double-blind game. Each allocates its “random subtractive. ” In this case the defense weapons according to how it thinks the other would shoot at as many enemy reentry vehi- will. This introduces an uncertainty into pre- cles (RVs) as possible, with no attempt to dis- dictions of the outcome beyond the uncer- tinguish among them.3 Random subtractive tainty stemming from ignorance of the precise defenses can be characterized by a kill prob- capabilities of the offensive and defensive ability (i.e., the probability that any given RV weapons. However, if the attacker knows how is stopped by the defense), or, alternatively, well each target is defended, or if he can de- by a “leakage rate” (the probability that any stroy some of the defensive system with his given RV gets through the defense). The kill RVs or other weapons, some of the advantage probability is the same regardless of where the of a semi-preferential defense is lost because RV is aimed. It would depend on the size of the attacker knows exactly how many RVs to the attack and the time over which it occurs. allocate in order to overcome the defense and achieve his attack goal.4 At the other extreme is the “completely preferential” defense. A completely preferential defense shoots only at selected RVs, and can select them for maximum effect. A com- ‘Although semi-preferential and completely preferential pletely preferential defense can determine defenses can increase the number of assets (ICBM silos, for example) surviving a large-scale attack, neither can necessarily where all the RVs in an attack are aimed and provide enduring survival. If the offense can exhaust the de- can allocate its weapons so that all the RVs fense and determine which targets were not destroyed in the aimed at selected targets are destroyed, thereby first strike, it can reattack those targets in a follow-on attack. A determination of targets surviving the first strike might be saving those targets. This kind of defense made by visual (or photo) reconnaissance. It has been suggested that it could be done more rapidly with space-based sensors that 3Reentry vehicles carry the nuclear weapons. They are dis- can accurately locate nuclear detonations, or by fitting warheads pensed from ballistic missiles above the atmosphere, and are with devices that broadcast their location just prior to detona- designed to shield the weapons from the effects of reentry into tion. In planning his follow-on strike, the attacker would want the atmosphere. A random subtractive defense would probably to have some estimate of his opponent remaining defense ca- attempt to distinguish RVs from decoys. pability. Photo credits: U.S. Air Force Test reentry vehicles being loaded on “MX” or “Peacekeeper” nosecone indicate general scale and appearance of “RVs” referred to in this and other chapters.

Artist’s concept of the missile, right, shows in cut-away how multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are positioned on upper stage (post boost vehicle, or “PBV”) of the rocket.

The key to a preferential (or semi-preferen- tacker’s force. It is more likely that he would tial) defense is the ability to destroy any RV build more than enough interceptors to kill all that is shot at with near 100 percent confi- of the attacker’s RVs. If, on the other hand, dence. This ability might come from highly ca- the single shot kill probability were substan- pable interceptors or from using a less capa- tially less than 100 percent, but the defender ble defense to shoot several times against each had enough shots to assure a very high kill of the selected attacking weapons. In this lat- probability against 90 percent of the attack- ter case, a random subtractive defense might ing RVs, he could achieve a kill probability kill more attacking weapons than a preferen- almost as high against all of the attacker’s tial defense, but would save fewer of the tar- RVs. Shooting at all of them would simplify gets from destruction. his battle management problem but not concede any targets to the attackers Distinctions between random subtractive and preferential defenses are most important —-———-—- for light and moderate defenses. Defenses that 6For example, assume that the attacker has 10,000 RVs and the defender can shoot a total of 81,000 times with a.4 kill prob- can destroy in excess of 90 percent of an at- ability per shot. If he elects to shoot nine times at each of 9,000 tacker’s RVs are likely to be random subtrac- RVs he can achieve a .99 kill probability against each RV and tive. If the defense were composed of highly expect to kill 8,9,10 RVs. If he elects to shoot eight times against each of 10,000 RVs, he can achieve a .98 kill probability, which capable interceptors each of which had close is not substantially different, and can expect to kill 9,800 RVs. to a 100 percent probability of killing any RV If, on the other hand, he has only 8,000 shots rather than 81,000, that was shot at, it would be unlikely that the by shooting eight times at each of 1,000 RVs, he can be reasonably sure of saving some targets. If he shoots randomly, defender would only build enough interceptors he will kill more RVs, but he is unlikely to save many targets to destroy 90 percent or 95 percent of the at- if several RVs are used against each. 97

BMD Operating Modes

Random subtractive defense. The defense cannot distinguish among RVs, and therefore attacks them randomly. This shows one possible outcome. All the silos are destroyed. It is possible, although not very likely, that all the RVs aimed at one silo would be shot, thereby saving the silo.

Semi-preferential defense. The defense can determine the targets of the individual RVs, but cannot determine where all the RVs are going before some of them reach their targets. The defender decides in advance of the attack how many shots to defend each silo with. In this case he has not allocated enough, and the silos are destroyed. If the attacker had decided to use fewer RVs against each defended silo, those silos would have survived.

-. . , . , .! .L - J- ’--J-. Completely preferential defense. The defense can determine where all the RVS are aimed before it has to snool, In 1nls case ~ne aelenuer elects to use all his defensive capability to ensure that the leftmost silo survives. SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 98

Defenses exact an “attack price. By reduc- structures more than a few years into the fu- ing the effectiveness of the attacker’s weap- ture is highly speculative. ons, they force him to use more weapons to achieve his attack goal. The attack price can Current Forces and Near-Term Trends be raised both by destroying weapons and by U.S. strategic offensive forces consist of forcing the attacker to waste weapons because about 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles he does not know in advance which of his (ICBMs); 600 submarine launched ballistic weapons will be destroyed. When the attack missiles (SLBMs); and 325 long-range bomb- price exceeds the number of weapons the at- ers carrying gravity bombs, short-range attacker has available, survivability increases tack missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles and the attacker’s confidence in achieving his (ALCMs).’ The strategic command, control, attack goals decreases. One advantage of and communications (C3) system manages these semi-preferential defenses (assuming the at- forces. In addition to offensive weapons, we tacker does not know the defense allocation have limited strategic defenses—small air de- and cannot destroy the defense) is that the at- fense and passive defense of strategic forces.7 tacker does not know which targets he will have to attack with additional weapons and Soviet strategic forces include the same ma- how much defense each target will have. Hence, jor elements, but with different emphases. the attack price may be substantially higher Roughly three fourths (about 6,000) of our bal- than the number of RVs the defender can ac- listic missile warheads are deployed on SLBMs, tually destroy. Furthermore, some targets and we try to keep a large fraction of these at may survive at almost any level of attack. sea at all times. The Soviets, by contrast, have Completely preferential defenses, if they could about two-thirds of their ballistic missile weap- be achieved, could ensure the survival of at ons mounted on 1,400 ICBMs, and they tend least some targets. to keep a smaller fraction of their ballistic missile submarines at sea during peacetime.8 Fur- Current Strategic Forces and Possible thermore, most of the Soviet firepower is con- Future Developments centrated on fewer than half of their ICBMs. While no U.S. ICBM currently has more than The value of future strategic defenses to the 3 warheads, more than 80 percent of the So- United States would be highly dependent on viet ICBM warheads are on missiles with 6 to the nature of future offensive forces, but it is 10 warheads each.9 Soviet ICBM silos are gen- difficult to predict with any confidence what erally thought to be harder (i.e., more resistant those offenses would be. Moreover, the nature to nuclear attack) than U.S. silos. ’” The U.S. of future defenses is at least as uncertain as strategic bomber force is a substantial leg of the nature of the offenses they will oppose. the triad of offensive forces, and is now being This section discusses current strategic forces, equipped with air-launched cruise missiles near-term modernization programs, and the (ALCMs). Soviet bomber forces appear to play problems of predicting future forces. a less prominent-although probably increasing—role. The United States and the Soviet Union both have a variety of strategic nuclear deliv- Both nations’ offensive forces are undergo- ery systems. Although both use the same ing modernization. The United States is now types of weapons, there are important differ- building the 10 warhead MX ICBM, the B-1 ences between the ways the two sides structure their forces. In the future, both will be ‘United Stat-es Military Posture FY1986, Organization of the able to make the same types of force improve- Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 19-33. ments. However, if history is any guide, we ‘Ibid., p. 33. ‘Soviet Military Power, Department of Defense, 1985, p. 29. can expect the two sides to exploit their op- ‘Ibid., p. 29. portunities in different ways. Projecting force 10Ibid., p. 29. 99

bomber, the ALCM, the submarine-launched The Soviets expect to be able to communi- cruise missile (SLCM), and the Trident I (C-4) cate with their forces during a strategic nu- SLBM. A small single warhead ICBM–pos- clear exchange and to direct all operations. sibly for mobile deployment—an “advanced Toward this end, the Soviets have constructed technology” bomber, an advanced ALCM, and hardened, deep-underground facilities for the Trident II (D-5) SLBM are in various their primary military authorities. The So- stages of development. The D-5 will have viets have developed air- and ground-mobile systems that can serve as alternate com- longer range and higher accuracy than the C- 11 mand posts if primary sites are destroyed. 4. The Soviets have in development a single Soviet systems emphasize survivability, re- warhead ICBM and a 10 warhead ICBM— dundancy, and flexibility and provide exten- both believed to be for mobile deployment–a sive internetting of communications from the new SLBM, a long-range bomber similar to the high Soviet command to lower echelons. ”

B-1, and several cruise missiles. They are 3 The U.S. and Soviet C systems have many building a new class of ballistic missile sub- features in common. However, recent unclas- marine, as well as a new variant of their ex- 12 sified publications have reported that parts of isting long-range bomber, the BEAR. the U.S. system are soft, few in number, and The Soviets have put much more emphasis easy to locate.16 In a nuclear attack the C3 sys- on strategic defense than the United States tem would be a prime target. has. In the aftermath of the ABM Treaty and its protocol, the Soviets chose to build and Projecting Forces Into the Future maintain the one ABM site permitted, a lim- According to the Administration, decisions ited ballistic missile defense of the Moscow to begin full-scale development of a BMD sys- area. They have emphasized both homeland air tem might be made in the early to mid- 1990s. defense and civil defense. The Organization of These decisions could be expected to produce the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates that Soviet initial deployments during the first decade of strategic air defenses consist of 6,300 radars, the next century. More extensive and more 9,600 missile launchers, and 1,200 interceptor technologically advanced systems could be ex- aircraft, including six new types of aircraft de- pected to follow according to a time scale ployed since 1975. ’s The United States saw no roughly marked in decades. purpose in maintaining an operational BMD as constrained by the treaty, and little purpose The strategic offensive forces that those in building extensive defenses against bomb- defenses face could be very different from to- ers as long as we had no defense against So- day’s. By 2005, almost all currently deployed viet missiles. The U.S. air defense system con- forces would have been replaced, and many of sists of about 100 radars and 300 interceptor those now in early production or in develop- aircraft. Both radars and aircraft are currently ment would be in the process of replacement. being upgraded with modern equipment. ” By 2020, most systems deployed by the turn of the century would have been replaced. A coordinated nuclear strike requires a func- While we can predict with moderate certainty tioning command system that can communi- the rate at which individual units will be cate with the forces and exercise control. replaced, it is much more difficult to predict According to the Organization of the Joint how different those replacements will be. Chiefs of Staff: While we may have some confidence that we can predict many of the technical options for — future forces, we cannot confidently predict ‘ ‘DOD ,4rm~al Report to the Con~ess Fisca) Year 1986, p. 52, 14So\’iet Military Power, Department of Defense 1985, pp. 29-36. I j~nit~ s~a~s ~i~”tm Posture FYI 986, organization of the ‘ ‘United States llifit~’ Posture F1’1 986, organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 28. Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 33. “Detailed information that could allow one to distinguish ma- “Ibid., pp. 31-33. jor differences between U.S. and Soviet C’ systems is classified. 100 which will prove workable and which will not, which will be exploited and which will not. The offenses faced by future strategic defenses could be very much different from today’s forces (although they need not necessarily be), and the serious pursuit of strategic defenses will influence the nature of the offenses. Offensive forces might evolve in response to actual or anticipated BMD developments in three general ways: proliferation of weapons; changes in the mix of weapons in the force; and improvements or changes in existing weapon types. An obvious, “brute force” response to de- Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense fense is to build more offense. The Soviets Artist’s concept of Soviet BEAR bomber launching cruise have said that that is what they would do. Ball- missile, One possible effect of BMD deployments might be to lead the Soviets to emphasize bombers and cruise istic missile warheads can be proliferated by missiles for delivery of strategic nuclear weapons. Higher adding more boosters, or by increasing the levels of strategic defense protection for the United number of warheads carried by each booster. States would require effective air defenses Between 1980 and 1984 the Soviets built 875 in addition to BMD. ICBMs, 950 SLBMs, and 2,175 theater-range ballistic missiles, an average of 800 new bal- ening, or less destabilizing in a crisis than listic missiles per year.17 Much of this produc- ICBMs, then building BMD would have action has apparently gone to replacing existing complished something. However, the nature missiles as they age. However, this production of the strategic relationship would have rate indicates a capacity to increase their force changed. The Soviets might emphasize bomb- levels and to modernize by incorporating coun- ers and cruise missiles. They currently have termeasures. The Soviet SS-18, their largest two types of bombers in production (includ- ICBM (currently restricted to 10 warheads un- ing the BACKFIRE, whose range is a matter der the terms of the SALT II Treaty), is re- of controversy), and one in flight test. They ported to have eight times the throwweight have four cruise missiles in development, in- 18 cluding two large missiles that are probably of the U.S. Minuteman III. Under the terms 21 of SALT II the United States reserves the for long-range operation. Another possibil- right to deploy Minuteman III with seven ity might be the deployment of shorter range warheads, the maximum number with which ballistic missiles on submarines and other plat- it has been tested.19 This indicates consider- forms close to the United States. Finally, less able room for expansion in the number of conventional weapons might be used, such as weapons carried by the SS-18.20 orbital bombing systems (now prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty), and very high-speed Another possible response to BMD devel- aerodynamic vehicles that are launched on bal- opment would be to reemphasize weapons listic missile boosters but stay within the that BMD might be effective against and to atmosphere. increase the role of other weapons. If these other weapons were less effective, less threat- Technology may offer a variety of methods to improve the ability of ballistic missiles and 17Soviet Military Power, 1985, p. 38. their warheads to penetrate defenses. It may ‘a U. S,-Soviet Mifitary Balance, John Collins, Elizabeth Ann also offer counters to those countermeasures. Sevems, Congressional Research Service, 1980, Book II, p. 123. lgFir9t aw~ statement to paragraph 10, Article IV. ‘Whe SS-19, which currently carries up to six RVS, has almost half the throwweight of the SS-18. See Collins, op. cit. ZISoviet Mih”t~y Power, 1985, p. 35. 101

In some cases the countermeasures will win ited by arms control agreements. This range and in others they will be overwhelmed by the of available options, however, implies a broad counter-countermeasures. However, without range of uncertainty about future forces. knowing in advance what the countermeasures The value of BMD to the United States may and counter-countermeasures are likely to be, also be affected by technical advances that evaluating the effectiveness of the defense will offer ways to improve the ability of potential be difficult. targets to survive a ballistic missile attack. While it is important to understand the Mobility and hardening of ICBMs and other range of options the Soviets would have avail- potential targets are obvious examples, but able to them, it would probably be erroneous others may emerge. While these developments to assume that they could and would exploit will not directly affect the ability of a ballis- all of them to the fullest. Soviet efforts would tic missile defense to destroy enemy missiles, be limited by the resources they could allocate they may reduce the payoff for doing so, and to strategic forces and by their rate of success therefore affect the potential value of BMD. in new developments. They might also be lim-

HOW BMD MIGHT AFFECT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE Assessments of the value to the United tain a threat to our cities as a deterrent to the States of acquiring BMD rest on comparing United States retaliating against Soviet cit- what the strategic balance might be like if ies. A major purpose of the first strike would BMD were built to what it would be like with- be to limit our ability to retaliate. Therefore, out BMD. In order to make this assessment, they would attack our ICBMs, bomber bases, we would like to know: and ballistic missile submarine bases. They would also attack the C3 system in an effort 1. how the balance is currently assessed and to “disconnect” the surviving forces, or “de- how it might evolve in the continued ab- capitate” the United States. Attention has pri- sence of BMD; marily focused on an attack on U.S. ICBMs, 2. how we might use various levels of BMD which the Soviets would attack with their own if we had them; and ICBMs. 3. what the balance might be like if the United States and the Soviets had vari- Whatever U.S. forces survived could be used ous levels of BMD. in a second strike against a full range of targets in the U.S.S.R. The Soviets might then These topics are the subject of this section. use some part of their reserve forces in a follow-on strike, to which we might respond, The Current Strategic Balance and so on. Any attempt to construct a detailed U.S. strategic planning is based in part on scenario and predict its outcome would be very a “worst case” massive Soviet strike on the uncertain. No one really knows how well sys- United States. While other scenarios are cer- tems would operate in a nuclear conflict, let tainly conceivable, this one is considered to be alone how military and civilian leaders would the most stressing to our forces. In overview act. There are wide differences of opinion on the scenario is simple. The Soviets launch a basic issues like whether Soviet leaders are large strike against a full range of militarily likely to be bold or conservative, and what it important targets in the United States, with- takes to deter them from attacking. (See chap- holding some of their forces as a strategic re- ter 4.) serve. The strategic reserve could have many Today, deterrence of a Soviet strike rests on purposes, but a primary one would be to re- the Soviets believing that there is a high prob- 102

ability that if they struck, thousands of U.S. As chapter 4 discussed, some Soviet actions nuclear weapons would reach targets in the and statements are consistent with a first U.S.S.R. in a retaliatory strike. Deterrence is strike posture, while others are consistent with aided by many factors that limit Soviet con- a retaliatory posture. Whether or not they ex- fidence in their ability to achieve their first pect to attack first, it would be imprudent for strike goals, including limiting U.S. retaliatory them to ignore the possibility that the United capability. States might strike first. The Soviets are likely to be highly suspicious of developments that Although analysts disagree over the credi- appear to increase their vulnerability to a U.S. bility of this deterrent and its continued credi- first strike. bility into the future, everyone would agree that thousands of U.S. nuclear weapons would As these differences of view illustrate, as- survive—primarily on submarines at sea, but sessing the outcome of a nuclear exchange (or also on bombers that are launched successfully assessing the credibility of our deterrent) is un- and on those ICBMs that survive the attack. certain. Combining many uncertain factors Analysts disagree on such issues as whether leads to a wide range of possible answers. enough of our C3 system would survive to sup- Different predispositions lead different ana- port timely employment of those weapons, lysts to draw very different conclusions from how effective SLBMs can be, how many bomb- the same range of answers. Some point out ers would survive the first strike and the So- that planners, wishing to be safe and plan con- viet air defenses, and whether the United servatively, will make the least favorable as- States would actually retaliate knowing that sumptions. A U.S. or Soviet planner would be the Soviets had a large reserve force. likely to assess the adversary as more capable than he assesses himself. Others point out Some argue that the degree to which the that wars are often won by bold, decisive, Soviets could be confident that they could de- actions. stroy a large part of our ICBM force has been vastly overestimated. They point out that the Soviets do not really know how capable their Possible Future Development weapons are or how hard our silos are, and can- of the Offensive Balance not be sure that we would not launch our It is extremely difficult to project forces dec- weapons when we detect a massive ICBM ades into the future. Whether in the absence launch. As they see it, this uncertainty would of defense the strategic balance would become contribute to deterrence. In this view, the more or less favorable to the United States Soviets would only launch a nuclear strike as than it currently is depends on the results of a desperate act, not as a rational instrument several competing developments. Therefore, of policy. not unexpectedly, some analysts foresee the Others argue that Soviet capabilities may U.S. position improving while others think it be even greater than official estimates state. will worsen. Soviet ICBMs may become more They assess a Soviet capability to accomplish accurate, reliable, responsive, and numerous. militarily useful missions and to limit damage On the other hand, their targets may become to themselves through offensive strikes and more difficult to destroy. Mobility, prolifera- various defensive measures. As they see it, the tion, and hardening can all be applied to mak- Soviets plan for the possibility of a nuclear war ing U.S. ICBMs and C3 components more sur- as they would plan for any war, taking account vivable. Improvements in SLBMs may give of the risks and opportunities. Once in a nu- them capabilities similar to those of ICBMs. clear war, they would attempt to achieve cer- Soviet air defenses may improve, but U.S. tain objectives. In this view, the Soviets would bombers and cruise missiles are becoming attempt to fight and win a nuclear war, if nec- more capable. Submarines may become harder essary, despite the risks and uncertainties. or easier to find and destroy. On the other . .

103 hand, some kinds of targets in the U.S.S.R. defense, our security would still rely heavily may become more difficult to find and destroy, on the threat of retaliation. (If offenses could reducing the value of U.S. retaliatory forces. be reduced by negotiation to extremely low levels, much less capable defenses would be What Might We Want required to produce the same results. See chap- BMD to Defend? ter 6.) The implications of various levels of defense We could build BMD to defend either mili- for the dependence of our security on retalia- tary assets— such as ICBMs and other weap- 3 tion and protection are shown schematically ons and our strategic C system—or our cit- in figure 5-I. We could completely abandon our ies (or both). We might defend our military reliance on threatening retaliation only if our assets in an effort to improve our ability to defense were nearly “perfect.” To do so at absorb a first strike and retaliate, or to reduce lower levels of defense would risk giving the Soviet confidence that their first strike could Soviets an important advantage: they could destroy their chosen target set. We might de- threaten considerable damage to the United fend our cities to shift the basis of our security away from the threat of retaliation. States with no risk of nuclear retaliation. Even a few nuclear weapons penetrating our defense The capability to protect our cities would could devastate several cities. At what point mean a major shift in our strategy away from reliance on retaliation and reliance on protec- retaliation and toward assured survival. How- tion would be equal is, of course, debatable, ever, we could not abandon retaliation until but it would have to be at a very high level defenses gave us confidence that they could of defense. A defense that allowed even a few assure a high degree of protection. Protecting percent of a large Soviet attack to reach our cities requires an extremely capable defense. cities would provide little security directly Opinion differs as to how many nuclear explo- through protection, although it might contrib- sions in populated areas in time of war would ute to deterring the attack. lead to unacceptable or intolerable damage. However, that number would be at most tens Some observers argue that the Soviets would be deterred from attacking U.S. cities if it were of weapons out of an attack measured in thou- to cost them about 100 weapons for each sands. A defense that let through no more than 1 percent of the attack—and perhaps far less than that—would be required before the basis Figure 5-1 .—Notional Reliance of U.S. Security on of our strategy could shift away from retaliation. - Protection and Threat of Retaliation Protecting military assets puts less strin- High gent requirements on defense than protecting cities does, since, for example, losing a few Retaliation ICBMs would mean much less than losing a few cities. If we could protect enough of our aJ retaliatory forces that it would no longer be v worthwhile for the Soviets to attack them, we =s might change the strategic balance in a ma- &l jor way. Our security might depend somewhat less on the threat of retaliation, since there Protection would be less reason for the Soviets to attack in the first place, but we would still need a retaliatory capability. Protecting our military Low forces to this degree would still require very O% 100% capable defenses, but not as capable as those Strategic defense capability required to protect cities. At lesser levels of SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment 104

weapon that reached its target. If the United This can be illustrated as follows. Consider States were to abandon the threat of retalia- a Soviet first strike that includes an attack on tion under these circumstances it would have our ICBMs. For a given U.S. defense capabil- to decide that this high cost would be suffi- ity used to defend ICBMs, the greatest num- cient to deter attack under all circumstances— ber of U.S. ICBM RVs would survive a Soviet that the Soviets would not attack even if we attack if the defense could operate completely could not retaliate against them. To others, it preferentially. With completely preferential seems likely that we would still have to rely defenses the United States would be able to heavily on the threat of retaliation for deter- allocate the defense in response to the actual rence even if defenses were highly capable. attack. Therefore we would be free to arrange Similarly, a defense that could preclude a our defense to achieve the greatest number of 22 meaningful attack on our military forces surviving RVS. Furthermore, if our defense might aid deterrence by removing a major in- were completely preferential, the Soviets’ best centive for the Soviets to strike in time of cri- tactic would be to attack all the silos with the 23 sis, but deterrence of an attack on our cities same number of RVS. In this case, the num- for whatever reasons would have to rely pri- ber of RVs the defense could save from de- marily on a threat of retaliation. Some argue struction would be the number of RVs resid- that if the Soviets could not achieve some mil- ing in the silos the defense has the capacity itary objective-e. g., limiting damage to them- to protect. The fraction of the silos that could selves—they would be much less likely to start be protected would be simply the fraction of a nuclear war. the Soviet RVsaimed at the silos that the defense could destroy. If, for example, the de- Less capable defenses, although they could fense could destroy 25 percent of the attack- not prevent the Soviets from destroying large ing RVs, it would preferentially destroy all the portions of our retaliatory forces, might still RVs aimed at 25 percent of the silos and save have a role by protecting some of those forces. 25 percent of the silos. The number of U.S. Defending the forces could directly increase RVs available to retaliate with would be the the number surviving the attack. Defending number of ICBM RVs the defense saved plus cities might indirectly increase the number of the number of SLBM RVs at sea. The num- forces surviving the attack, since in order to ber of U.S. RVs that survived the attack and maintain some minimum threat to our de- penetrated to targets in the U.S.S.R. would fended cities, the Soviets would have to re- be the number that survived minus the num- serve more weapons for that role leaving fewer ber the Soviet defense had killed. available to attack our forces. The more weapons surviving the attack, the more we have available to retaliate with. However, if the Soviets also have defenses, their defenses will reduce the number of U.S. weapons that survive and penetrate to their targets. Thus, whether or not BMD enhances the U.S. retaliatory force will “If they were to attack some silos more heavily than others, we could defend the more lightly attacked silos and save a depend on the capabilities of both U.S. and So- greater number from destruction. For example, if they attacked viet defenses. Clearly, all other factors being 1,000 silos with 4,000 RVs, 4 per silo, and we could defend equal, for a given level of Soviet defense we preferentially against 1,000 RVs, we could save 250 silos from destruction. We would destroy the 1,000 RVs aimed at those have a greater retaliatory capability if we de- silos, If they attacked 500 silos with 2 RVs each and 500 silos fend our forces than if we do not, but it is not with 6 RVs each, we could destroy the 1,000 RVs aimed at the necessarily true that our retaliatory capabil- first 500 silos, and save all of them. As long as the defense was completely preferential we could always defend the most lightly ity is greater if both have defenses than if nei- attacked silos first. Therefore, their best tactic would be to at- ther does. tack them all uniformly. 105

Illustration of the Effect of Defending ICBM Launchers on Retaliator Capacity Illustration of the Effect of Adding BMD

$3 “ ‘ .$’ . . + w ;:; With BMD -Each side's ;r-.> BMD can kill ., . ~. 4,000 RVs

2,240 ICBM RVs IF survive * 1,, .,

Note: Each symbol represents 500 RVs SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

A specific example can illuminate the mean- Therefore, the number of U.S. RVs that ing of this expression. If the Soviets attacked could survive and penetrate is given by the ex- our 1,000 undefended ICBM silos with 5,000 pression:- (U.S. RVs SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM RVs, they would prob- (U.S. ICBM RVs) x (Soviet countersilo destroyed RVs intercept) + U.S. SLBM by Soviet ably destroy almost all of them. We could Soviet RVs that attack U.S. ICBM silos) RVs at sea) defense) retaliate with our surviving SLBM RVs, per- The expression is independent of how the haps 4,500. In the absence of Soviet BMD, almost all of these would reach their targets. Soviet defense is operated. If the U.S. defense If both sides had BMD capable of destroying were not completely preferential, fewer RVs 1,250 RVs, our preferential defense could pro- would survive and penetrate. 106 tect 250 silos from destruction. Assuming we Figure 5-2.—How Ballistic Missile Defense Affects had a total of 2,800 ICBM RVs, 700 ICBM U.S. Ballistic Missile Retaliatory Capability RVs would survive in addition to the 4,500 SLBM RVs.24 However, of the 5,200 RVs surviving, the Soviet defense would destroy 1,250, and only 3,950 would reach their targets. Thus in this case, equal defenses on both sides would increase the number of U.S. RVs surviving the attack, but reduce the number that survive and penetrate to their targets. This is indicative of a general trend. As long as the number of RVs the Soviets attack our silos with exceeds the number of U.S. ICBM RVs–which is quite possible with today’s forces—adding defense to both sides in equal increments will decrease the number of U.S. RVs that survive and penetrate the So- viet defense.25 As the expression shows, under these circumstances the number of surviving RVs added by the U.S. defense (the top line of the expression) will be less than the number of Soviet RVs the U.S. defense can de- I I stroy, and therefore less than the number of 1,000 2,000 3,0 0 RVs lost to an equal Soviet defense. Thus, U.S. defense capacity in Soviet RVs killed while defending U.S. ICBMs and other assets Assumptions: — 5,000 Soviet RVs shoot at U.S. ICBMs carrying 2,800 RVs may aid deterrence, for example by increasing — U.S. has 4,500 SLBM RVs at sea1 the uncertainties the Soviets face in planning — U.S. defends completely preferentially — Not shown: U.S. bomber forces—survivability will be an attack, it may well decrease our available affected by U.S. BMD and Soviet air defense

1 retaliatory force if the Soviets also have Modernizing U.s. Strategic Offensive Forcesr Congressional Budget Office, defense. May 1983, Figure 5-2 shows the number of surviving and penetrating U.S. RVs for three cases: U.S. ble the U.S. defense. The figure assumes the and Soviet defenses equal; U.S. defense dou- replacement of 100 Minuteman IIIs with MX, ble the Soviet defense; and Soviet defense dou- for a total of 2,800 U.S. ICBM RVS. The

24 Soviets attack with current SS-18 and SS-19 We could have 2,800 RVs by replacing 100 Minuteman III missiles with 100 MX. The force would be: missiles, about 5,000 RVs. If the Soviet defense equals the U.S. defense in number of Missile Type Number RV/missile Total RVS MX 100 10 1,000 RVs it can destroy, larger defenses mean fewer Minuteman III 450 3 1,350 U.S. RVs penetrating to their targets. This Minuteman II 450 1 450 Total 1,000 2,800 problem might be redressed by a defense It is likely that under these circumstances the United States asymmetry favoring the United States. How- would defend MX silos first, defend MM III only after all MX ever, in this case it would require a U.S. advan- had been defended, and defend MMII only after all MX and tage of approximately two to one. Similarly, MMIII had been defended. This would produce considerably more than 700 RVS surviving if the Soviets attacked all silos a major Soviet advantage in defense could re- uniformly. However, it is also likely that the Soviets would an- sult in large reductions in U.S. ballistic mis- ticipate that the United States would allocate its defenses in sile retaliatory capability. Unless the U.S. this manner and would allocate its attack accordingly. *’The OTA staff is indebted to Glenn Kent of RAND for call- defenses could be operated completely prefer- ing this to our attention. entially, the number of surviving and penetrat- .—

107 ——..—— —— . . ——— — ————— . ing U.S. RVs would be less than the number capability can be arrived at in several ways. shown in the figure.26 Since we are dealing with a time in the indefinite future for which we can predict neither Any reduction in U.S. ballistic missile re- offenses nor defenses with any certainty, we taliatory capability would have to be evalu- do not specify the architecture of the defenses ated within the context of the total U.S. or address the feasibility of obtaining them. retaliatory force, including air-breathing weapons, and what it could accomplish. Opinions Ballistic missile defense alone could not pro- vary widely about the significance of various vide a complete strategic defense of either the size reductions in numbers of retaliatory RVs United States or our NATO Allies. Weapons for the U.S. deterrent and the ability to re- other than ballistic missiles are part of the spond to a first strike. threat. Furthermore, passive defense techniques—e.g., civil defense—are potentially Whether one believes that having defenses available either to augment active defenses on both sides—when the result would be a re- (i.e., BMD and air defense) or to provide alter- duction in the number of surviving and pene- native means to the same defensive goals. This trating U.S. RVs—would aid deterrence, de- section is a general discussion of strategic detract from deterrence, or have little or no effect fense. However, this report, like the current on deterrence will depend on certain under- national debate, focuses primarily on BMD lying attitudes and assumptions, as discussed and on defense of the United States against below (see pp. 111-112). For example, some be- ICBMs and SLBMs. lieve that the assets that the U.S. defense might protect—including but not limited to Drawing on the considerations discussed in ICBM RVs–would be much more valuable the preceding section, we can identify five than the RVs lost to Soviet defenses. Others levels of protection against nuclear weapons believe that only a few surviving and penetrat- to aid in understanding the implications of ing RVs are sufficient to deter and that addi- U.S. and Soviet defenses. These are listed in tional retaliatory forces beyond that small table 5-l. These are not absolute levels of de- number add little to our deterrent. Neither of fense, but rather net defense capability. The these groups would be likely to view the re- defensive system that the United States reduction in U.S. retaliatory capability as being quires to achieve level 1, for example, maybe significant for deterrence. larger or more capable than the defensive system the Soviets would need to achieve the Levels of Strategic Defense Capability same level. Given the imbalance in ICBMS, this would certainly be true today. Further- This chapter specifies strategic defense in more, the defense required to achieve a given terms of its “net defense capability. ” Net de- level can change as the offenses change. The fense capability is what the defense can do, defense that the United States requires to taking into account all its characteristics as achieve level 1 in 1995 may be very different well as those of the other side’s offense. It will from the defense required to achieve level 1 depend on a number of factors, including the in 2015. Negotiated reductions of offensive opponent offense, the components of the de- forces could raise the defense level without fense, and the basic mode of operation of the changes in the defense systems. Increases or defense. In many cases, the same net defense qualitative improvements in the offense could — “Under these same conditions–Soviet ICBM RVs outnum- lower the defense level. ber U.S. ICBM RVs–adding equal defenses on both sides would increase the number of Soviet 1 CBM RVS that would survive In the offense-dominated region, the strate- a U.S. first strike and penetrate U.S. defenses. Put another way, gic relationship would remain basically as it it would decrease the ability of the United States to limit dam- is today. Although by adding defense we might age to itself by a first strike. OTA is not suggesting that the United States has a first strike posture, or that we should de- make it more difficult for the Soviets to attack velop one. our military assets, the addition of defense 108

Table 5-1 .—Levels of Defense Capability

Region Level Description Offense-dominated O no defense 1 “some ICBMS”* A defense capable of ensuring the survival of a useful fraction of the ICBMs, but not capable of protecting cities Transition 2 “either/or” A defense (including BMD) that can ensure the survival of most ICBMs or a high degree of urban survival against a follow-on (or simultaneous) attack, but not both Defense-dominated 3 “most ICBMs/some A defense that ensures a high level of survival of cities” military targets. Massive damage can only be obtained by concentrating the entire offense against cities 4 “extremely capable” Ensures a high level of urban survival against a full attack. The attacker cannot have high confidence that any cities can be destroyed

● Terms in quotes are a shorthand used to identify the levels NOTE For simplicity the chapter often divides targets Into ICBMs and cities There are, of course, many other types of targets that might be attacked, but discussing them all in each case would greatly expand the text ICBMs are representative of strategic military targets (although by no means an accurate model of them all) “Cities” IS typically used as a short hand for people, economic assets, and social structure A level 1 defense, for example, might be used to defend the C3 system rather than the ICBMs

could preclude neither a militarily useful strike At level 3, the probability that the attacker nor the destruction of our cities. Similarly, the could cause any useful level of damage to mil- Soviets would still know that we could absorb itary targets would be so small that he would a first strike and be able to devastate them. be limited to attacking cities. He could not Thus in this region, the offenses (including hope to use his offensive forces to reduce the retaliatory capability) dominate the strategic other’s ability to retaliate. For a level 3 de- balance. In an offense-dominated situation, the fense, air defense would certainly be needed value of strategic defenses to the United in addition to BMD. At level 4, the defender States would have to be judged on the basis would approach a condition of assured sur- of how well they supported our ability to ab- vival, but widespread civil defense would sorb a first strike and retaliate (or supported almost certainly have to play a prominent role Soviet perceptions that they could not prevent along with BMD and air defenses. us from doing so), weighing the effects of our If one side had level 3 or level 4 defenses and defenses against the effects of any Soviet the other had no defense or very little defense, defenses. In deciding whether defenses are the side with the heavy defense could have a worthwhile in an offense-dominated posture— very significant advantage. It could attack the other than as a part of the transition to higher other and do a very good job of defending levels of defense–it would be necessary to against any retaliatory attack. The level 3 de- weigh whatever they might contribute to our fense, which could not preclude major urban retaliatory capability against the cost of build- damage from a full-scale strike, might be able ing the defense. It would also be important to to defend almost completely against a retalia- compare the effort to build such a defense with tory strike by a force that had been signifi- alternative ways to achieve survivability of cantly reduced by a preemptive strike. From our deterrent. the perspective of the weaker side this could In the defense-dominated region, defenses be a very dangerous situation: its ability to would severely limit the ability to use offenses. deter an attack by the other could be seriously 109 in doubt. The stronger side might have the A level 2 defense might operate semi-pref- forces to adopt a prevailing strategy. How- erentially. The defender could choose to use ever, some observers believe that the probabil- this defense to defend his military assets or ity of completely defending against the retalia- his cities, and the attacker would not know its tory strike would have to be very high before allocation in advance. Other types of defenses, the stronger side could be said to have an ex- such as short-range fixed terminal defenses, ploitable advantage.27 lack this flexibility and could not be used to produce a level 2 defense. Building these other Because of all the uncertainties in predict- types of defenses might avoid the problems ing the outcome of a nuclear attack, it would of the transition region. However, building a be difficult for the defender to know with great dominant defense would be more difficult with confidence that he had indeed achieved a level a defense that could not react flexibly to an 4 defense. A small number of weapons leak- attack. ing through the defense would spell the difference between assured survival and widespread With a level 2 defense the defender may be destruction. Two different sublevels–4A and able to protect a great number of his assets, 4B—can be identified. At level 4A the attacker but he cannot come close to protecting them has only low confidence that his strike against all from a full strike. In particular, he might the defender’s cities will cause unacceptable save most of his ICBMs from destruction, but destruction. He would arrive at this assess- he could not protect his cities at the same time. ment by making “offense-conservative’ as- Alternatively, he might sacrifice his ICBMs sumptions, giving the defense the benefit of while gaining a high degree of urban survival, the doubt. At this level, the low prospect of providing the attack on his cities was suffi- success would contribute to deterrence, but ciently limited. (The attacker might limit his the defender—making “defense conservative” attack on cities in order to increase his chances assumptions —would probably want to main- of destroying military targets he thought to tain his retaliatory threat. If he did not, the be defended.) The defender might, however, do attacker would have little to lose by attack- a good job of protecting against a strike con- ing despite his low expectation of success. At ducted with much less than the full offensive level 4B, the defender would be confident that force, such as a retaliatory strike with a force his criteria for “assured survival” were met. that had been seriously reduced by a first He could then abandon his retaliatory threat. strike. Perhaps the most important character- That level of confidence could probably only istic of the transition region is that if one side be achieved with a defense system believed ef- has a level 2 defense–and especially if both fective even under the most conservative as- do–there is a wide range of possib]e outcomes sumptions about enemy offenses. of a nuclear exchange. Furthermore, the outcome would be especially difficult to predict The transition region encompasses those sit- in advance because it would depend on how uations in which neither the offenses nor the each side chose to allocate its weapons, and defenses clearly dominate. The attacker would each would allocate its weapons based at least be much less confident of accomplishing most in part on how it thought the other would al- of his attack goals than he would be when locate. 28 offenses dominate, and the defender would be -—.— — . — —— much less confident in his ability to deny the “The outcome would depend on: the mode of operation of the defense; whether the defense were limited in capacity or engage- attacker major attack goals than he would be ment rate; whether the attacker elected to attack all at once, when defenses dominate. or to attack only military targets in a first strike and keep re- —. serve forces to threaten cities with a follow-on strike; how much ‘-Some strongly disagree with the assessment that this situ- defense the defender allocated to cities and how much he allo- ation would provide the attacker with an exploitable advantage, cated to military assets; how the defense was distributed among They argue that unless the defense were perfect, the attacker military targets: how good the attacker’s and defender’s intel- could not be sure that no nuclear weapons would reach his ter- ligence estimates were regarding each other’s capabilities and ritory. The possibility’ that he might suffer some retaliation plans; how the attacker distributed his attack among and within would still be a powerful deterrent, target sets: etc. 110

Achieving a level 2 defense would probably States of seeking a first strike posture. require defenses against air-breathing weap- Whether or not we intended ever to strike ons as well as BMD. We would not be able to first, this situation would be a very uncomfort- defend our cities against a follow-on attack if able one for the Soviets. we could not defend against bomber forces. If we and the Soviets both had level 2 de- If we had a level 2 defense and we knew how fenses, our defenses might reduce the confi- the Soviets planned to attack, we might deny dence of the Soviets that they could in fact them success in destroying some target sets, successfully strike first, but we could not nec- but they would be successful against others. essarily preclude it. Because of the uncertain- Even if we didn’t know their plans, we might ties each side faced in planning its offense and guess correctly enough to accomplish this. If defense, the broad range of possible outcomes they knew our defense plans, they could guar- might well include a successful Soviet first antee success against some target sets, but strike. others would survive. If neither knew what the other intended to do, it would be very difficult to predict the result, except in the situation The Effect of U.S. and Soviet Defense in which the Soviets concentrated their attack Levels on the Strategic Balance very heavily against a limited number of tar- Figure 5-3 illustrates schematically how dif- gets in order to ensure that they killed those ferent levels of U.S. and Soviet defense capa- targets while conceding the survival of the bility might affect the strategic balance. rest. This situation could introduce great uncertainty into Soviet attack planning, and that uncertainty ought to enhance deterrence. If Figure 5-3.—How Strategic Defense Might Affect the Strategic Balance the Soviets kept a large reserve in order to be able to threaten our cities, they would have to reduce their attack on our forces. However, if we used our defenses to protect our forces, 4 their counterforce strike might accomplish nothing. On the other hand, if they attacked our forces very heavily but we reserved our 3 defenses to defend our cities, they might find themselves without a credible threat to our cities. 2 If the Soviets had a level 2 defense, it might appear to us to be part of a first strike posture, because if they could significantly reduce our forces by a first strike, they might be able to 1 achieve high, or even total, success in defending against our “ragged” retaliation. Clearly, 29 we would be alarmed by this prospect. (In- 0 deed, we would be alarmed by indications that the Soviets thought they had such a capability, even if we thought that in reality they did 0 1 2 3 4 not.) Similarly, if the United States had a level Soviet defense level 2 defense, the Soviets might suspect the United .— 29 Some believe that the Soviets could not be highly confident in their ability to do this, and would be effectively deterred. 111

If one side had a level 4 capability and the Offense-Dominated other had a lesser defense, the side with level The differences among the four offense-dom- 4 might have a clear advantage. It could cause inated situations shown in figure 5-3 (the heavy damage to the other, which in turn United States having level O or 1 and the could do very little in retaliation. The greater Soviets having level O or 1) are a matter of the disparity, the more the options the stronger some controversy. The root of that contro- side would have. If one side had a level 3 de- versy is found in differing assessments of the fense and the other had level 1 or less, the current situation and its evolution in the ab- stronger side might have a strong capability sence of BMD deployments. to attack the other and defend successfully against the retaliatory attack. The level 3 de- Some believe that the current situation is fense, which would let enough of a full-scale acceptable, and likely to remain so—or im- counter-city attack through to cause signifi- prove–in the foreseeable future. Others think cant damage, might be much more capable that the current situation is acceptable, but against a retaliatory strike that had been re- that the trends are adverse. In this view, duced by a counterforce strike. Opinions dif- sooner or later the strategic balance could be- fer as to whether this would constitute an ex- come dangerously disadvantageous to the ploitable advantage. If the other had a level United States. Still others believe that the 2 defense, the stronger might be able to do trends are disadvantageous and the balance this, but not necessarily. As discussed in the has already tilted against us. These groups will preceding section, if one side had a level 2 de- differ in their assessments of the four offense- fense, and the other had either level 2 or less, dominated situations.30 it may be able to attack successfully. How- Those who believe that the current strate- ever, it would be much less sure of its ability gic balance is acceptable and likely to remain to do so than it would be if it had a level 3 so believe that the Soviets know it is highly defense. likely that were they to attack, thousands of We would, of course, wish to avoid situa- U.S. nuclear weapons would survive and would tions in which the Soviets had (or thought they be launched back at them. In this view the had) an exploitable advantage. Both situations damage that those thousands of weapons could of approximate parity and those in which the do would be so overwhelming that hundreds or United States would have an advantage could even a few thousand more or less would make be acceptable, except to those who believe that little difference, This damage would far out- the United States should strive to achieve a weigh anything the Soviets might hope to gain clear advantage over the Soviets. However, if by attacking. Those holding this position see the transition to a mutually defended world nothing in the future that would erode this sit- is to be a managed, cooperative one, it is un- uation, and some developments that reinforce likely that the Soviets would agree to let sit- it. uations of clear U.S. advantage emerge. If the Those who see the current situation as erod- evolution were not cooperative, we should ex- ing, point to Soviet developments that in- pect that the Soviets would do everything in crease their ability to destroy our forces and their power to prevent a U.S. advantage. our ability to use them, as well as active and Therefore, the regions of primary interest lie passive defensive measures that decrease the along the diagonal of the square in figure 5-3, effectiveness of our weapons against important where the two sides have equal defense capa- targets. Some state that the Soviet leadership bility. However, as discussed earlier, situations has a different value system than the United of equal levels of defense capability on the two sides are not necessarily situations of equal de- — — fense systems. If equivalent defense systems 30Yet another group finds the entire situation in which our security rests on a threat of retaliation to be unacceptable, and were added to today’s offensive forces, it would therefore may care little about changes that affect our ability result in unequal levels of defense capability. to retaliate. 112

States does and therefore would not be as a combination of limited active defense and strongly deterred by certain threats as would strong passive measures (such as mobile ICBM the United States. Some fear that the Soviets basing) could make it more or less impossible would expect a U.S. President, faced with a for the Soviets to achieve any militarily sig- threat to more than half the U.S. population nificant goal with a first strike. In effect, a from a Soviet follow-on strike, to be deterred level 3 defense might result from strong pas- from responding to a first strike. sive measures and the synergism between active and passive defenses. They see this as From this perspective, a Soviet first strike strongly enhancing deterrence by eliminating might destroy most of our ICBMs, bombers a major incentive for the Soviets to strike. and tanker aircraft, and all submarines in port. Soviet anti-submarine warfare before and af- Those who believe the current balance is ter the strike might destroy some of the sub- acceptable concede that a Soviet first strike marines at sea. The strike might also destroy would reduce the number of weapons the most of our leadership and its strategic com- United States could retaliate with. But they munication system, making a coordinated rethink that the Soviets could only have very sponse impossible. Most important would be low confidence in their ability to decapitate the this decapitation and the loss of the ICBMs United States. In this view, neither United which are uniquely prompt and capable of kill- States nor Soviet defenses would make much ing hardened targets. In this view, Soviet difference as long as the balance remained defensive measures—including civil defense offense-dominated. Some also point out that and similar passive defenses—would effec- unless the structure of U.S. and Soviet offen- tively protect their leadership and its commu- sive forces changes in a major way, deploying nication system, as well as reduce civilian similar defenses on both sides is likely to re- casualties and protect important war-related sult only in a decrease in U.S. retaliatory capa- industrial capacity. These defenses would raise bility, which they see as reducing deterrence. the price of attacking important targets to Whether or not those holding these two such a high level that our remaining forces points of view would agree that building level would be incapable of covering the intended 1 defenses would be worthwhile as a step to target set. Some who hold this position see more capable defense, they disagree funda- current Soviet offensive and defensive devel- mentally over the value of having a level 1 opments as exacerbating the situation to an defense. Those who see the current strategic alarming extent. balance as unsatisfactory or as eroding in If this is the case, a level 1 defense could per- dangerous ways see level 1 defenses as enhanc- form a valuable function for the United States ing deterrence. Those who see the current stra- even if the strategic balance remained strongly tegic balance as satisfactory fear that level 1 offense-dominated. If used to defend our com- defenses on both sides could harm our deter- mand, control, and communication system (C3) rent posture. it might reduce or eliminate the Soviet abil- If one believes that having a level 1 defense ity to decapitate the United States. It could would be useful, two other important ques- contribute to the survival of ICBMs and tions need to be addressed. First, how much bombers. Denying the Soviets high confidence would the level 1 defense be worth? Second, that they could decapitate the United States are there less costly—or otherwise more at- and eliminate the ICBMs would more than tractive—ways to achieve the same benefit? compensate for the decrease in the ability of For example, would passive measures suffice? U.S. weapons to reach their targets due to similar Soviet defenses. (However, if the Soviets had “level 1“ defenses and we did not, it would Defense-Dominated make a bad situation that much worse). Some If both sides had level 3 defenses, each of those holding this point of view argue that would have an assured retaliatory capability. ——

The strategic relationship would be one often In this case, the United States might survive referred to as ‘‘mutual assured destruction. despite the detonation of tens of weapons. (Ap- Each side would have the ability to inflict pendix D illustrates how urban destruction widespread damage on the other, but could not might be related to the effectiveness of stra- prohibit the other from doing so in return. tegic defense.) Nuclear weapons would pose the ultimate If our defenses could keep the probability threat against populations and societies, but very low that even one nuclear weapon would would have little or no use as a military tool. reach the United States, our security would If both had level 4 defenses, the strategic bal- be largely independent of the level of Soviet ance would approach one of “mutual assured defense. If we could expect tens of weapons survival. to reach the United States, the level of dam- Whether a condition of mutual assured de- age we could inflict on the U.S.S.R. would be struction is desirable, and whether that con- relevant. If we could “survive” that level of dition would differ from the present situation destruction, but the U.S.S.R. could go undam- (or the future in the absence of strategic de- aged, they might have a significant political fense) are both issues of contention. A related advantage. issue is whether or not passive measures that Assured survival would probably be impos- increase the survivability of important assets sible to achieve if the Soviets were determined could bring this situation about without in- to deny it to us. By improving or adding to vesting heavily in BMD and air defense. As their offense, they could increase the number discussed above, most observers believe that of weapons penetrating to the United States, the United States now has the ability to as- forcing us to increase our defense, and so on. sure destruction of the U.S.S.R. in retaliation Another basic problem would be the difficulty for a strike on the United States, and many of knowing with high confidence how well our believe it is likely to retain that capability into defense would actually perform against their the future. Others believe the opposite. offense, since it could never be tested and we Few would argue that assured survival is could never know in great detail the working not preferable to assured destruction. The is- of their offensive weapons. Many who advo- sue is whether assured survival is attainable cate assured survival envisage it being by the technological approaches being pursued achieved by agreements that limit offensive under SDI. The basic question the SD I pro- levels far below defensive capabilities. gram is supposed to answer is: how capable a strategic defense can we produce and what The Problem of Transition would it cost to get that defense? Answers to Both the offense-dominated region and the these questions do not as yet exist, and prob- defense-dominated region are regions of crisis ably will not for a number of years. Later chap- stability. Neither side would have the ability ters discuss the types of BMD system capa- to damage the other with a first strike and de- bilities that might be used to support assured fend completely against the retaliatory strike. survival. Therefore, neither has an incentive either to It is difficult to define specifically what as- try it or to take action to prevent the other 31 sured survival is. Some would argue that sur- from doing so. However, in order to reach the vival is assured only if the probability that one defense-dominated region, the strategic bal- or more weapons will reach the United States ance is likely to pass through the transition is very low ( or, alternatively, that there is high —— confidence that no weapons can be expected 31Some maintain that in the absence of U.S. defenses the to penetrate the defense). Others argue that Soviets might be able to strike the United States in such a way that the United States would be either unable or unwilling to survival is assured if society survives and the respond, despite the fact that the Soviets could not prevent a economy recovers in some number of years. large number of weapons from penetrating if we did retaliate. 114

region in which each side may have the capa- could be powerfully destabilizing factors— bility to strike the other and defend completely particularly during an acute crisis.33 (or nearly so) against the retaliatory strike. In Precautions to avoid instability might in- this region there would be great uncertainty clude measures other than active defense that in predicting the outcome of a nuclear ex- could reduce the ability of both sides to launch change, because it would depend strongly on a first strike and defend successfully against how each side allocated its offense and defense. the retaliation. Passive defense to reduce the Each could be very mistaken in its assessment effectiveness of a first strike might be one such of how the other would make its allocations; measure. A shift in both sides’ arsenals to therefore each could have a very different much greater emphasis on air-breathing weap- assessment of the outcome of an exchange. ons might be another. Because of their slow While we would not necessarily fare worse speed, bombers and cruise missiles pose less in a nuclear exchange under these circum- of a massive first strike threat than ballistic stances than if there were no defenses—indeed missiles do, provided they can be detected we might fare considerably better—we might when they are still far from their targets. fare worse. The Soviets might be able to strike Longer warning time provides more time to first and defend completely against our retalia- get bombers safely aloft and to launch a tory strike. In one view, the expanded uncer- retaliatory strike. tainty in the minds of the Soviets regarding Some implications of this transition prob- the outcome of a nuclear exchange would aid lem are explored more fully in chapter 6. deterrence. In another view, the possibility that the Soviets could strike first and suffer The Effect of U.S. and Soviet Defenses no damage, a possibility that does not exist if the offenses dominate, would undermine de- on U.S. Strategy Choices 32 terrence. The knowledge by each side that the In chapter 4 we discussed at some length other might be able to strike and suffer no both our present countervailing strategy, and retaliation has important implications for sta- three suggested alternatives-a “retaliation- bility. only” strategy, a “prevailing” strategy, and The problem of passing through this transi- a strategy based on defense dominance. If the tion region has been described as follows: defense were to dominate, two strategies would be possible. If our defense were ex- A third potential source of instability could tremely capable, we may be able to adopt an arise during that phase of a transition when “assured survival” strategy. Otherwise, de- strategic defenses would be capable of effec- fense dominance could enforce a “retaliation- tive area defense against an offensive threat that had been degraded by a previous first only’ strategy by limiting any strike to urban strike. Assuming that a comprehensive de- targets only. This section discusses which fense cannot spring forth fully formed, like strategies are available to us for the various Athena from the head of Zeus, both super- combinations of U.S. and Soviet defense ca- powers are likely to pass through such a tran- pability that are shown in figure 5-3. sitional phase unless precautions are taken well in advance. The possibility that they A retaliation strategy would require that might pass through such a phase (roughly) some number of U.S. weapons survive a So- simultaneously makes this situation poten- viet first strike and penetrate to their targets. tially even more dangerous. The premium for It is beyond the scope of this report to calcu- striking first, and the penalty for waiting, late the number required, and indeed advocates of this strategy differ on the retaliator —— -.. y 32Some believe that while the United States currently has the . weapons to retaliate for a first strike, the Soviets may believe “Keith B. Payne, “Strategic Defenses and Stability, ” Orbis, that the United States lacks the will to retaliate. summer 1984, p. 217. 115 —— — —- . capability required to make the threat of retali- Each of these strategies would generate re- ation credible. If we can absorb the first strike quirements for the capabilities of U.S. offen- and inflict great damage on the Soviets, we sive forces and (in the case of prevailing and can have a retaliation strategy. assured survival) for limits on the amount of damage the Soviets could inflict on the United Countervailing would require more capabil- States. These, in turn, would be determined ity than retaliation only. In order to counter- at least in part by U.S. and Soviet defense ca- vail, we must be able to execute a strike that pabilities. Thus, which strategies the United will deny the Soviets their goals, or inflict States could adopt are dictated by the defense damage beyond the value of whatever the So- levels on both sides. For example, a Soviet de- viets might hope to gain. Countervailing would fense that prevented attack of military targets require more surviving and penetrating RVs (i.e., level 3 or 4) would generally limit the than retaliating would, and it would probably United States to a retaliation-only strategy. require more specific capabilities to deliver Similarly, with a level 1 defense we could not those RVs against military targets. In the ab- limit the damage to ourselves to a “tolerable” sence of Soviet defenses, neither countervail- level, and therefore could not have a prevailing nor retaliation would require U.S. strate- ing strategy. Figure 5-4 shows which strategy gic defense. However, U.S. defense might choices would be permitted by various com- contribute to the extent that it helped assure binations of U.S. and Soviet defenses. Appen- that a sufficient number of weapons could sur- dix E explains how this figure was generated. vive. On the other hand, neither of these strategies would be viable if Soviet defenses could From this figure, we can make the follow- prevent the required number of RVs from suring observations: viving and penetrating to their targets. In order to prevail, we would have to be able Figure 5-4.—How Strategic Defense Might Affect to defeat the Soviets while keeping our losses U.S. Strategy Options at a “tolerable” level. prevailing would require U.S. strategy options even greater capability in the force that sur- A A A A A vives and penetrates than countervailing 4 p?a would. Perhaps more significantly, it would P P P R also require a substantial defense of the United States in order to keep our losses 3 P b P b c R R?c “tolerable.” The conditions for adopting a prevailing strategy are probably the most strin- c 2 P?b c ? R? gent, since it would require both that we R achieve a high level of protection against So- viet attack and that we have substantial ca- 1 c c R R R?c pability to penetrate Soviet defense. Condi- tions that would support a prevailing strategy o c R R R R?C would also support a countervailing or retaliation-only strategy. Conditions that would o 1 2 3 4 support a countervailing strategy would also Soviet defense level support a retaliation-only strategy. A - Possible assured survival An assured survival strategy would require P -Option for prevailing, countervailing, or retaliation-only C - Option for countervailing or retaliation-only an even higher level of U.S. defense capabil- R - Retaliation-only ity than prevailing would. An assured survival ? - Unclear

strategy would not require a retaliatory capa- a U S has a possibly large advantage but little capability for attack of military targets. bility, so it could tolerate Soviet defenses that b Opt Ion for prevailing only if U S. strikes first kept the number of penetrating U.S. RVs very Ability to retaliate IS in question.

low. SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment 116 —

For the United States to have the option of must be at level 2 or less. Enough Soviet defense a prevailing strategy, we would need a level 3 precludes the existing U.S. strategy regardless or 4 defense while the Soviets had a substan- of U.S. defense. This is one reason that BMD tially less capable defense.34 If we had a level is opposed by some who see the existing strat- 4 defense we could prevail even if they struck egy as the least dangerous option. Further- first. However, if we had a level 4 defense it more, countervailing requires that the U.S. de- seems highly unlikely that they would strike. fense level not be less than the Soviet defense If we had a level 3 defense we could prevail level. We cannot fall substantially behind in only if we struck first; if the Soviets struck an offense/defense arms race and maintain our first our level 3 defense would not limit dam- current strategy. age to a tolerable level, but if we struck first A retaliation-only strategy is always possible it would. Developing the option for a prevail- unless the Soviets have level 4 defense. How- ing strategy requires that our defense deploy- ever, if the Soviets were to reach level 3 and we ments substantially outpace Soviet offense de- did not, we would be threatening retaliation ployments, and that our offense deployments from a position of inferiority. The combination limit the capability of Soviet defenses. of a Soviet first strike and the Soviet defense For the United States to have a countervail- might limit our retaliation to a very low level ing strategy, as we now do, the Soviet defense (or even preclude it), but our defense would not ——-— —— — be sufficient to keep the Soviets from inflicting “Or possibly a level 2 defense if the Soviets have no defense. great damage on the United States.

CONCLUSION Opinions will differ over whether the levels engineering a cooperative negotiated transi- of defense capability discussed in this chap- tion. Since some defense deployments can pro- ter are worth striving for. Other important fac- vide incentives to compete as well as incen- tors will also influence decisions on the value tives to cooperate, arms race stability will also and desirability of attempting to reach these bean issue. Finally, cost and feasibility must defense levels. As the discussion of the tran- be taken into account. These subjects are ad- sition region pointed out, crisis stability will dressed in subsequent chapters. be an important issue, as will the problem of Chapter 6 Crisis Stability, Arms Race Stability, and Arms Control Issues Contents

Page Introduction...... 119 Crisis Stability ...... 119 The Current Situation and Future Prospects...... 121 Effects of BMD Deployment on Crisis Stability...... 123 BMD Deployment and Arms Race Stability...... 128 Responses to BMD Deployment ...... 129 Defense Plus Offense ...... 131 Additional Observations ...... 132 BMD Deployment and Arms Control ...... 133 The Importance of a Negotiated Transition...... 133 Working Out the Details ...... + ...... 134 Potential Effects of the Absence of a Negotiated Transition ...... 135 Conclusions ...... 136

Table Table No. Page 6-1. Missile Production: U.S.S.R. and NATO ...... 130 Chapter 6 Crisis Stability, Arms Race Stability, and Arms Control Issues

INTRODUCTION The preceding chapters discussed how add- the effect of planned deployments on the scope ing ballistic missile defense to U.S. forces and pace of the arms race. Arms control has might affect U.S. strategy. This chapter will been pursued in the past as a way of trying address the relation of BMD deployments to to enhance these two kinds of strategic stabil- three other force posture issues: crisis stability. If the United States and the Soviet Union ity, arms race stability, and arms control. Cri- decide in the future to deploy new BMD sys- sis stability is the degree to which strategic tems, new arms control agreements may be force characteristics might, in a crisis situa- even more important for avoiding serious in- tion, reduce incentives to initiate the use of nu- stabilities, particular during transitional clear weapons. Arms race stability involves stages.

CRISIS STABILITY It is widely believed that a nuclear war kinds of BMD deployments, the general na- would be most likely to occur as the result of ture of crisis stability will be described.1 escalation of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation dur- A decision to initiate a nuclear attack would ing a severe crisis. Such a crisis could result from a deliberate act of aggression by the So- depend on several factors, including the circumstances leading up to the crisis, the per- viet Union against the United States or its allies, but it could also arise from a dispute sonal attributes of the leaders, their perception of each country’s military capabilities and triggered by some third-country actions which involve the perceived vital interests of the su- vulnerabilities, their perception of their adversary’s incentives and intentions, and the doc- perpowers. The likelihood that such a crisis trines of the two countries regarding nuclear would result in nuclear war not only would de- strategy. Most specialists believe these doc- pend on the political and military situation at trines differ between the two countries in im- the time, but might also be influenced by the nature of the strategic forces deployed before- portant ways. For example, the U.S. contingency plans for first use of nuclear weapons hand by each side. In addition, crisis instability can also motivate arms race instability by contemplate a possible ‘‘flexible response’ to Soviet aggression; i.e., a relatively small-scale inducing remedial arms acquisitions by one initial use of nuclear weapons with the hope side or the other. Hence, in deciding whether of avoiding escalation to a large-scale nuclear to develop and deploy a new weapon system, an important question is whether the new system will add incentives or disincentives for using nuclear weapons in a crisis. Before we ‘See app. L for a list of references on crisis stability and other aspects of strategic nuclear policy.. App. M lists references to address this question with respect to various a range of views on Soviet strategic policy.

119 120 exchange.2 As noted in chapter 4, the declared to strike first. Hence crisis stability can be in- policy of the United States precludes a pre- creased by force structures that minimize the emptive strike.3 The issue here, however, is not difference in the results of striking first or sec- whether American leaders would continue this ond (e.g., by deployment of retaliatory forces policy in future crises, but whether the Soviets that are invulnerable to a first strike). Mini- would believe that they would. mizing this difference for both sides would reduce a Soviet leader’s incentive to strike first On the other hand, Soviet doctrines for deal- in two ways. It would not only reduce his per- ing with crisis contingencies are thought by ception of the advantages of striking first, but many analysts to include the option of launch- would also reduce his fear that the United ing a massive preemptive attack against all States had a strong incentive to strike first. targetable U.S. nuclear forces (ICBM silos, bomber bases, command and control sites, The analysis below is not intended to imply etc. ).4 The Soviets also place greater reliance symmetry between the way American and So- than we do on civil defense and air defense to viet leaders would make such decisions, nor help reduce the damage from a nuclear attack. is it intended to examine all of the factors that The Soviets have declared that they will not would be involved. It will focus on only one be the first to use nuclear weapons. But it re- of those factors: how such decisions might be mains possible that, faced with the prospect influenced by the nuclear force structures on of defeat in a nonnuclear conflict they consider each sides Crisis stability is not absolute; it of vital importance, the Soviets would decide is a matter of degree. It is determined by how to initiate a limited nuclear attack. However, great a net disincentive for either side to strike if they believed that the escalation process was first arises from the force structures of both likely to lead to a full-scale U.S. attack, they sides.e might decide to preempt with a massive stra- Weapon systems are considered destabiliz- tegic attack. ing if in a crisis they would add significant in- Whatever the current Soviet doctrine really centives to initiate a nuclear attack, and par- is, future crises could face Soviet leaders with ticularly to attack quickly before there is much decisions on whether to initiate a nuclear at- time to collect reliable information and care- tack. In each case, the Soviet leader would fully weigh all available options and their con- have to balance his perception of the risks of sequences. In the current U.S.-Soviet strate- striking first against his perception of the gic relationship, crisis stability is enhanced to risks that the United States might strike first. the extent that each side possesses substan- The smaller he judged the chances of avoiding nuclear war altogether, and the larger he 5It is quite possible that a leader’s perception of the degree judged the advantages of striking first rather of crisis stability at a particular time could influence his will- than second, the more incentive he would have ingness to risk actions that might cause a crisis to arise. ——— ..— 6Some analysts prefer to define strategic stability more ‘For a detailed discussion of how command and control vul- broadly than as comprising crisis stability and arms race sta- nerabilities could severely limit U.S. options in a crisis, regard- bility only, For example, Colin S. Gray has proposed a concept less of declaratory policies and doctrines, see Daniel Ford, The of stability which requires that Western governments acquire Button: The Pentagon Strategic Command and Control Sys- plausible “prospects of both defeating their enemy (on his own tem, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). {Also published terms) and ensuring Western political-social survival and re- in The New Yorker, Apr. 1 and 8, 1985. ) covery. ” See Colin S, Gray, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered, ” ‘For example, the FY 1984 annual report of the Department Daedalus, fall 1970. Gray suggests that any NATO force struc- of Defense states: ture short of that, such as the current force structure, may be Our strategy excludes the possibility that the United States insufficient to deter Soviet attack. He argues that a stable stra- would initiate war. The United States would use its military tegic balance is one that would permit the United States to: strength only in response to aggression, not to preempt it. Once Initiate central strategic nuclear employment in expectation of an aggressor had initiated an attack, however, the principle of gain . . . Seize and hold a position of ‘escalation dominance,’ [and] non-aggression would not impose a purely defensive strategy Deter Soviet escalation, or counterescalation, by a potent threat in fighting back. posed to the most vital assets of the Soviet state and by the Caspar W. Weinberger (Annual Report of the Secretary of ability of the United States to limit damage to itself. Defense to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984, Feb. 1, 1983, p. 33.) Obviously this concept precludes mutual U.S. and Soviet stra- ‘See discussion of Soviet strategic doctrine in ch. 4. tegic deterrence, which Gray refers to as “strategic stalemate. ” 121 tial retaliatory forces that are invulnerable to on their rival’s allies, or in Third World areas a first strike. Specifically, the retaliatory weap- susceptible to superpower confrontation. Views ons and their associated command and control of strategic analysts differ on the relative im- chain must be survivable, and the weapons portance of these competing policy objectives must be able to reach their targets. On the for each side, depending on their different as- other hand, weapon systems with a substan- sumptions as to, for example, the motivations tial capability to attack the other side’s retalia- and policies of the adversary and the feasibil- tory forces, such as large numbers of highly ity of controlling the course of a nuclear war accurate MIRVed ICBMs, detract from crisis after it starts. stability. Moreover, force deployments are sometimes There are different views regarding the ap- a response not so much to national strategic plicability of the above analysis to future So- needs as to strong domestic political pressures viet behavior in a crisis. It may be that in the to increase military budgets, develop and future Soviet leaders would be sufficiently de- exploit new weapon technologies, or deploy terred from a preemptive strike if most Soviet weapon systems primarily because the adver- 8 cities, industrial facilities, and “soft” military sary is doing s0. targets remained as vulnerable to a retaliatory strike as they now are. Alternatively, it may The Current Situation and be that a successful Soviet strike against U.S. Future Prospects ICBMs only would oblige the United States to choose between surrender and the mutual The U.S. SLBM force is generally consid- suicide of a U.S. second strike against Soviet ered stabilizing to the extent that a Soviet urban-industrial targets followed by a Soviet leader would not think that a Soviet preemp- “third strike” against U.S. cities and indus- tive strike could destroy many of the U.S. try. Moreover, if the Soviet leaders thought SLBMs at sea and thereby prevent massive a preemptive strike could destroy most of the retaliation from them.9 Conversely, to the ex- U.S. ICBMs, and thus reduce the expected tent that fixed-base U.S. ICBMs are perceived damage to such “hard” targets as Soviet mis- as relatively more vulnerable to attack, they sile silos and military and political command tend to reduce crisis stability somewhat be- bunkers, their tools of control and power, they cause of at least some uncertainty on each side might decide to risk the loss of Soviet cities as to the importance the other side attaches 7 — and strike first. ‘For general discussions of such pressures, see: Gordon Adams, The Iron Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contract- It should be recognized that neither coun- ing (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 198 1); Andrew try’s strategic nuclear forces are structured to Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New maximize crisis stability, since both sides plan York: Random House, 1983); Miroslav Nincic, The Arms Race: The Political Economy of flfih”tar~ Growth (New York: Praeger their forces to try to satisfy several other stra- Publishing, Inc., 1982); Marshall D. Shulman, “The Effect of tegic policy objectives as well—objectives ABM on U. S,-Soviet Relations, ” ABM: An E\raluation of the which may compete with the crisis stability Decision to lkplohv an Anti’ballistic Missile System, Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner (eds.) (New York: Harper& Row, objective. For example, both superpowers have 1969); Adam Yarmolinsky, “The Problem of Momentum, ” I bid.; developed ‘‘counterforce’ capabilities, de- Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strat- signed to reduce damage to themselves if de- egy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1977). terrence should fail, and to provide war-fight- For discussions of the effects of such pressures on the Stra- ing ability to try to limit hostilities and tegic Defense Initiative, see: !l’illiam D. Hartung, et al., The “prevail” in a nuclear war. Moreover, their Strategic Defense Im”tiati\,e: Costs, Contractors and Conse- quences (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985); and ability to use nuclear forces serves to deter Fred Kaplan, “The ‘Star Nrars’ Tent Holds Many Players, ” 130s- them from conventional attacks on each other, ton Globe, Mar. 17, 1985. ‘Views differ on the degree to which this Soviet perception would be affected by the possible vulnerability of the commu- 7This option would presumably become less attractive as U.S. nication links between the submarines and the national com- SLBM accuracy improved. mand authority. 122

to such Vulnerability .’” As just noted, the as survivable today as ever, could well be views of U.S. commentators differ as to whether threatened in coming years by the incredibly the Soviets would think the damage from U.S. rapid advances we’re seeing these days in data ICBMs would be a significant addition to the processing technologies. ”12 According to Presi- overwhelming damage they would suffer from dent Reagan’s Commission on Strategic Forces a full-scale SLBM retaliator-y attack. This (the Scowcroft Commission), “. . . ballistic mis- damage will extend to hard targets as well sile submarine forces will have a high degree when the United States deploys its highly ac- of survivability for a long time. “13 (The Com- curate Trident II SLBMs. mission also recommended starting research on smaller submarines, each carrying fewer There are reasons to believe that current missiles than the Trident, as a hedge against U.S. and Soviet strategic force structures are possible Soviet progress in anti-submarine at least for now fairly stabilizing (although warfare.) Admiral James D. Watkins, the they include some elements that detract from Chief of Naval Operations, has been quoted as crisis stability). Despite their considerable follows: “. . . when people ask ‘Aren’t the counterforce capabilities, each side has the oceans getting more transparent?’ we say ‘No ability to inflict ‘devastating retaliatory dam- way, they’re getting more opaque . . .' So the age after a full-scale first strike by the other ability to track submarines-we don’t see that side. Therefore, in a crisis neither leader would as being a threat to our forces until the turn rationally perceive that the advantage in fir- of the century or later, depending on what kind ing first outweighed the imperative to make of breakthroughs we might find at the end of every possible effort to avoid nuclear war al- 14 this decade or into the next decade." Accord- together, and both leaders would have avail- ing to press reports, Congress has asked the able the option of taking time to attempt to Central Intelligence Agency to carry out a de-escalate the crisis. comprehensive study of submarine detectabil- The need to maintain adequately invulner- ity. 15 able retaliatory nuclear forces for decades to The following testimony on this subject was come is often cited by those who advocate BMD given June 26, 1985, to two Senate subcom- deployment to protect U.S. ICBM silos. ” It mittees by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director is therefore relevant to review briefly the de- for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency: gree to which our current retaliatory forces are secure against attack, and the prospects for The Soviets still lack effective means to the future. locate U.S. ballistic missile submarines [SSBNS] at sea. We expect them to continue to pur- Presidential Science Advisor George Key- sue vigorously all antisubmarine warfare worth II has stated, “. . . our submarines, while (ASW) technologies as potential solutions to the problems of countering U.S. SSBNs and 10There is considerable controversy as to how many U.S. ICBMs would actually survive a Soviet preemptive attack, defending their own SSBNs against U.S. at- given the inherent uncertainties in missile accuracy, missile tack submarines. We are concerned about the reliability, and coordination of such an unprecedented, untested, energetic Soviet ASW research and technol- and massive operation. See, for example, Matthew Bunn and ogy efforts. However, we do not believe there Kosta Tsipis, ‘*Ballistic Missile Guidance and Technical Un- certainties of Countersilo Attacks, Report No. 9, Program in is a realistic possibility that the Soviets will Science and Technology for International Security, Massachu- be able to deploy in the 1990s a system that setts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, August 1983; Matthew Bunn and Kosta Tsipis, “The Uncertainties of a Preemptive Nuclear Attack, ” Scientific American, November 1983; Les AuCoin, “Nailing Shut the Window of Vulnerabil- ity” Arms Control Today, September 1984; J. Edward Ander- “Speech June 23, 1984, at the University of Virginia. son, “First Strike: Myth or Reality, ” Bulletin of the Atomic ‘3Report of the President Commission on Strategic Forces, Scientists, November 1981; John D. Steinbruner and Thomas chaired by Brent Scowcroft, Apr. 6, 1983. The recommenda- M. Garwin, “Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance Between Pru- tions in this report were endorsed by President Reagan on Apr. dence and Paranoia, ” International Security, summer 1976. 19, 1983. “Some of these advocates also attach importance to main- lThe Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1985, p. A 10. taining a prompt hard-target kill capability. ) TheWashington Post, June 6, 1985, p A 1. 123

could pose any significant threat to U.S. Effects of BMD Deployment on SSBNs on patrol. ” Crisis Stability The Scowcroft Commission’s report empha- Whether various kinds of BMD deployment sizes that the U.S. secure retaliatory deterrent would tend to increase or decrease crisis sta- does not depend on our SLBMs alone, but on bility depends on: the synergistic capabilities of the triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and long-range bombers.” the types and levels of BMD deployment For example, if the Soviets should decide to on each side (e.g., whether the BMD is de- attack U.S. bomber bases and ICBM silos ployed to defend cities, strategic forces, with simultaneous detonations, many of our or conventional forces); bombers would have been alerted by detection the types and levels of air defense and of the first Soviet missile launch and would civil defense on each side; have escaped before their bases were struck.18 the types and levels of offensive strate- If, on the other hand, the Soviets chose to gic forces on each side (including those de- launch their close-in SLBMs against our bomber ployed in response to the defensive de- bases at the same moment as they launched ployments); their ICBMs, hoping thereby to reach our the survivability of each side’s defensive bomber bases before the bombers had time to and offensive systems; escape, we could launch our ICBMs after the the perceptions (correct or not) of the top bomber bases were hit but before the Soviet leaders of each side as to the capabilities ICBMs could reach our ICBM silos. This of each side’s offensive and defensive would be launch after attack.19 Of course, nei- forces; ther side can be sure that the other would not the perceptions (probably very uncertain) launch its ICBMs on warning that the other of the top leaders of each side as to how side’s ICBMs were in flight.20 the other side would allocate its offenses and defenses as between cities and stra- Soviet strategic forces currently possess tegic forces. considerable survivability, albeit with less redundancy than U.S. forces. The U.S.S.R. has It is necessary to assess not only whether, missile-carrying submarines on sea patrol. It on balance, a particular BMD deployment has such a large number of ICBM warheads would do more to increase or to decrease cri- that a substantial number could be expected sis stability, but also whether the net effect to survive a U.S. attack on them. of the BMD deployment on crisis stability would be significant in comparison to the effects of the offensive force structures. The — analysis of crisis stability with BMD is far “Unclassified prepared testimony before a joint session of more complicated than is the case in the ab- the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Sub- sence of BMD. For reasons discussed below, committee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June we conclude that the net effects that various 26, 1985. ) ~To further reinforce the suryrivability of the I CB M Portion types and levels of BMD deployment would of the triad in future years, the Scowcroft Commission recom- have on crisis stability are far too complex to mended development of a small, mobile, single-warhead ICBM. analyze adequately within the scope of this It also recommended continued modernization of the U.S. bom- study. ber and air-launched cruise missile force. ‘“Under crisis conditions, more bombers than usual would Accordingly, the following discussion will probably be in a state of alert. IWiews differ on the degree to which vulnerability of the U.S. not attempt to reach detailed net judgments. IC13M command and control chain could affect this scenario. Rather, it will use the examples of BMD ca- See Daniel Ford, op. cit. pability presented in chapter 5 to illustrate “ )See Richard I.. Garwin, 4’I.aunch Under Attack to Redress hlinuteman l’ulnerabilit~r’?” International Securit~’, winter some ways in which certain types of BMD de- 19’79 80, pp. 117-139. ployment could tend to increase or decrease 124 crisis stability, and to indicate why a realis- Views differ on how significant the stabiliz- tic analysis would have to be highly extensive ing effect would be. On the one hand, those and complex. As in chapter 5, we assume in who believe that the threat of retaliation by these examples comparable levels of BMD ca- U.S. SLBMs and bombers might not, for va- pability on both sides unless stated otherwise, rious reasons, deter the Soviets from attack- and we assume that the postulated level of ing our ICBMs also believe that the surviv- BMD performance is technically attainable ability of our ICBMs is an important element and sustainable in the face of the adversary’s in assessing crisis stability. If defenses for countermeasures and offensive augmenta- ICBMs also increased the potential surviv- tions. For the time being we disregard questions ability of the U.S. strategic command and con- of technical feasibility and cost. trol system, then the credibility of the U.S. ability to retaliate against a Soviet attack Level 1: Defense of Some ICBMs might also be somewhat increased. On the Insofar as the vulnerability of ICBM silos other hand, those who believe that the threat of retaliation by U.S. SLBMs and bombers or other hardened, redundant military targets is a destabilizing factor, the ability on both would suffice to deter a Soviet attack on our ICBMs also believe that the uncertainty of sides to defend some of these kinds of targets 21 success that BMD could add to deterrence of should be crisis-stabilizing. such an attack would be marginal or nil. ICBMs have unique properties that some believe make them especially valuable. Cur- It must be remembered, however, that sur- rently, they are the only intercontinental-range viving U.S. forces would have to face Soviet weapons with enough accuracy to destroy defenses against a retaliatory attack. As noted hardened targets within 30 minutes (as op- in chapter 5, as long as the Soviets were willing and able to expend more nuclear warheads posed to several hours for bombers). Since they are based on national territory, they are attacking our missiles than we have warheads potentially the easiest strategic weapons to on those missiles, the net effect of symmetrical defenses on both sides would be to reduce maintain in an alert status and to communi- 24 cate with reliably. (As other weapons evolve, the total size of the potential U.S. retaliation. Thus it is not clear that the uncertainties in- these advantages may erode.) In typical anal- troduced by BMD into Soviet offensive plan- yses, it is usually assumed that a Soviet first ning would outweigh the fact that they could strike would be carried out in large part to destroy as many of the U.S. strategic forces as still use offenses and defenses to reduce the possible, especially the ICBMs and their com- U.S. retaliatory potential. mand chain. The U.S. Department of Defense Both the United States and the Soviet Union estimates that currently part of the Soviet SS- are currently taking measures other than 18 ICBM force alone could destroy more than BMD deployment to reduce their ICBM vul- 80 percent of the U.S. ICBM silos.22 Thus, nerability, such as hardening silos and control judged solely by its effect on the ability of the bunkers and developing mobile ICBMs. Inso- Soviets to confidently destroy U.S. ICBMs in far as these measures are effective for the a first strike, U.S. BMD of missile silos could United States, Soviet offenses will have a re- have a stabilizing effect.23 duced “first-strike” capability. Depending on what the ICBM survivability measures are, *’Some argue that the ability to disrupt a Soviet missile attack on the U.S. nuclear command, control, and communica- defenses may also then be a less significant tions (C’) system would greatly strengthen deterrence of a So- potential element in the protection of ICBMs. viet first strike. But unless that Cs system is redundant and attack resistant (in the way that the system of 1000 Minute- man missile silos is), modest levels of BMD protection may not do much to improve its survivability. ‘zSoviet Military Power, U.S. Department of Defense, 1985, “This would be true unless Soviet defenses were strictly dedi- p. 30. cated only to defending targets the United States would not 23A comparable effect might be achieved with a less vulner- be attacking in a retaliatory strike–i.e., empty Soviet missile able ICBM basing mode. silos. —

125

Photo credit: U.S. Air Force Artist’s concept of U.S. “MX” or “Peacekeeper” ICBM to be deployed in silos now housing Minuteman missiles. The Minuteman silo will not be hardened above current levels, but better protection for the new missile will result from the new shock isolation system and the launch canister that holds the missile before launch. This mode of deployment would not appear to substantially reduce the estimated Soviet ability to destroy U.S. land-based ICBMs in a first strike. In the future, new techniques promising to make silos up to 20 to 25 times “harder” than current levels may offer more protection.

Level 2: Either/Or other hand, at “Level 2“ there would be at (Defenses–including BMD–able to ensure least the possibility–not previously avail- the survival of most land-based ICBMs or a able—that a first strike combined with de- high degree of urban survival against a follow- fenses could keep damage from a retaliatory on (or simultaneous attack), but not both.) As strike to a relatively low level. Worst of all, indicated in chapter 5, there would be a far it is possible that both sides could arrive at more serious potential for crisis instability if a highly unstable situation in which each could both sides had a “Level 2“ strategic defense have a chance of assuring its own survival by capability. It ought to be a stabilizing factor striking first, and only by striking first. This that the Soviets would be less certain that an situation could occur even if the Soviets and attack on U.S. ICBMs would succeed. On the the United States had approximately equiva- 126 —— ———-

lent defensive capabilities. Under that circum- enemy territory might have to contend with stance, uncertainties on each side about the a risk that the victim might be able to retali- actual capabilities of the other could be espe- ate on a similar level. Striking first would cially high and could intensify mutual sus- probably not reduce such retaliatory capabil- picions. ities. Hence crisis stability, strictly defined, would be high. But other kinds of strategic in- We would like to be able to discern the net stability could arise from the possibility of nu- effect on crisis stability of deploying BMD on clear weapons smuggled into U.S. cities with both sides, and to identify potential areas of no assurance the the United States could instability to be avoided as defensive and retaliate against such an attack. offensive forces evolve on both sides. This would depend partly on speculation as to how Special Cases future leaders on both sides would weigh various factors when making decisions. It is pos- City Defense or ICBM Defense.—As shown sible, however, to throw some light on this im- in chapter 5, defenses that could be allocated portant issue by assessing a large number of to defending either retaliatory forces or cities possible cases. That assessment would require would lead to a complex range of possible out- a detailed specification of the defensive and comes of a nuclear exchange. Defenses able to offensive capabilities and the options they pro- defend only retaliatory forces should be rela- vide each side, as well as an exploration of the tively stabilizing; they would not raise the tactical choices each has in allocating its de- prospect of a first strike against missiles fol- fense and offense under representative circum- lowed by an effective defense against a “ragged stances. In addition, because crisis stability retaliation. Defenses able to defend only cit- depends so much on perception, it would be ies but leaving retaliatory forces unprotected important to consider how each side might would be destabilizing, because they would think the other would use its defense. place a premium on striking the unprotected forces, thus increasing the incentive to use Level 3: Effective Defense of Most ICBMs, those forces before they were destroyed. Some Cities The latter situation may not be purely spec- If both sides had ballistic missile and air ulative. The U.S. BMD debate has focused defenses that could unconditionally deny the mostly on far-term deployments of BMD sys- other side the ability to destroy most land- tems based on advanced technologies. How- based ICBMs in their silos, but could not deny ever, if the Soviets were to deploy BMD, they them the ability to destroy many of one’s cit- might well elect to begin with extensive de- ies if all the offenses were concentrated on cit- ployments of ground-based rocket interceptors ies, crisis stability should be quite high. The of the types they have already deployed 26 advantages of attacking first should be mar- around M OSCOW. Each interceptor deploy- ginal, the threat of retaliatory destruction still ment would be restricted to defending a defi- substantial. 25 nite area. Using such technology would oblige the Soviets, in peacetime, to choose among Level 4: Extremely Capable Defense defending their cities (as the system now de- At a level of defense at which few or no mil- ployed near Moscow does), defending their itary targets and few or no cities could be de- ICBM silos, or defending both. If the Soviets stroyed, there would be little incentive to chose to defend only cities, whatever inclina- strike first. An aggressor calculating that he tions they had before toward preemptive stra- might in some way deliver a few weapons on tegic attack could be strengthened: they would have the incentive described above to use rather than lose their ICBMs. *sThis situation would be equivalent to one in which neither side had defenses and both sides had deployed most of their offensive nuclear forces in an invulnerable basing mode. “Soviet Military Power, 1985, op. cit., pp. 46-48. —

127 — —— —- .———— -

Asymmetric Defenses.—If the Soviet Union themselves be tempting targets for a first had BMD and air defenses that were substan- strike. This would decrease, rather than entially more effective than those of the United hance, stability. ”27 This point has also been States, crisis stability would be reduced. In stressed by other Administration spokesmen. this case, the Soviets might calculate that by Whether an attack on a defensive system striking first, they could sufficiently penetrate were part of an ICBM attack or not, it could U.S. defenses to weaken the U.S. retaliatory leave the attacked side defenseless. The at- response, and then use their own BMD to deal tacker, on the other hand, would be at least with that response. partially defended28 against retaliation-even Conversely, a substantial U.S. advantage in if the victim of attack launched ICBMs before BMD and air defense capability could cause they could be destroyed. Whether anti-BMD the Soviets to fear that the United States is attacks could be prevented from escalating to more likely to strike first. They might fear attacks on silos or cities is difficult to predict. such an attack particularly if they believed If both sides had vulnerable BMD systems, U.S. defenses to be able to intercept nearly all the net result of simultaneous successful at- the Soviet weapons that could survive a U.S. tacks on both systems could be to leave the first strike, thus largely avoiding Soviet retali- two sides in an offensive stand-off similar to ation. Fearing this, the Soviets might calcu- the one existing now. However, an extremely late that a Soviet preemptive attack could pos- unstable situation would arise if each side’s sibly reduce the ultimate damage that the space-based BMD system were vulnerable to Soviet Union might suffer, or at least draw attack from the other’s BMD system and only down U.S. defenses to the point where remain- to that system. Each would then have power- ing Soviet forces could threaten a subsequent ful incentives to “use or lose” his system, to high damage attack on the United States. The attack before the other side did. The one that latter threat, they might calculate, could also struck first might substantially disarm the induce U.S. leaders to restrain their retaliation other side. for the initial attack. It is also important that the capabilities of Alternatively, if the Soviets could be per- a BMD system not be subject to degradation suaded that U.S. policy would not permit a from an attack by ballistic missiles or airborne U.S. preemptive strike, whatever the appar- nuclear weapons. A nuclear first strike could ent incentives, then a U.S. advantage in de- be better planned, coordinated, and executed fense capabilities should contribute to sta- than a retaliatory strike. Even if both sides bility. began with comparable BMD capabilities, the BMD System Survivability.-One criterion for premium on preemptive attack would be high a BMD system which many Administration if a first strike had a much higher probability officials have cited is system survivability— of penetrating enemy defenses than did the the ability of the system to perform at desired retaliation. levels despite direct attack on its components. Automatic Command and Control.–A space- We may take it for granted that neither side based BMD system, especially one targetted would deploy a BMD system which could ob- against missiles in their boost phase, would viously be rendered ineffective by enemy at- have to have some form of automated com- tack. Rather, the question would be about the mand and control if it is to respond in time degrees of confidence on each side about the to engage its targets. There are arguments continuing survivability of its own and the other side’s defensive systems. -— “Speech to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council on Feb. Ambassador Paul Nitze has said, “The tech- 20, 1985. ‘“Some believe that there would be virtually no strategic nologies must produce defensive systems that advantage in having a defense of cities that is only partially are survivable; if not, the defenses would effective. 128

that this would be a source of instability, and Transition Periods.–At present, when each other arguments that it might be stabilizing. side has thousands of offensive nuclear warheads and essentially no defenses (“offense If the automated system malfunctioned, or dominance”), the mutual threat of retaliation if some unanticipated situation arose for which provides a relatively high degree of crisis sta- the system had not been programmed, the sys- bility. Conversely, if each side were able to ob- tem could respond in a way that set off a fa- tain virtually perfect defenses against all types tal chain of action and reaction in the strate- of nuclear weapon delivery, there would be a gic forces on the two sides. Or, automation very low probability that even a single nuclear might be a stabilizing factor, because having weapon could reach its target, and the situa- an automated system forces planners to think tion (“assured survival”) would also be rela- in advance about what situations the system tively stable. But, as the analysis of “Level might have to respond to, and how they would 2“ of BMD capability in chapter 5 suggests, want it to respond. Even if the system were the transition from the current situation to one not automated, leaders would still have to re- of defense dominance could require passing spond to the same situations in a very short through an interim stage which might be very time, and therefore they should have devel- unstable. Since that interim period might last oped their responses beforehand. However, for many years, there could be a serious risk while many contingencies could be imagined that a crisis would arise during that period. and programmed into the system, there would be some practical limit on the number which would be feasible to include.

BMD DEPLOYMENT AND ARMS RACE STABILITY The strategic nuclear force postures of the on the two sides did not lead to offensive in- United States and the Soviet Union are shaped creases, the race in defensive systems might by both internal and external factors. The in- be self-stabilizing. That is, if each side could ternal factors may be political, bureaucratic, reach a high degree of protection against the economic, and technological. The chief exter- other’s offenses, the competition might wind nal factor for each side is the other side’s force down. Alternatively, we might see it to be in posture, both current and forecast: the adver- our advantage to begin an arms race if we were sary’s forces may present threats to counter, sure we would “win” at acceptable cost. That incentives to reduce disparities, or opportuni- is, if superior technology, for example, could ties to seek strategic advantage. One issue to give us a permanent strategic advantage over consider in deciding to deploy a weapon is the Soviets, we might want to engage them what kind of reaction it is likely to evoke from in a race which would give us long-lasting es- the other side. If a deployment on one side is calation dominance over them and might even likely to lead to a responding deployment on force them into expenditures so heavy as to the other side which is in turn likely to induce draw away from their conventional armed a still higher level of deployment on the first strength. side, the first side’s deployment might be seen as “destabilizing” the arms competition. On the other hand, a destabilized strategic arms competition could prove both costly and A destabilized arms competition might not indecisive. We could spend billions on new necessarily be a bad thing for U.S. national weapons but find that our strategic position security. For example, if we and the Soviets relative to the Soviets was about the same as entered into a competition in defensive strate- or worse than when we started. Moreover, the gic systems (e.g., BMD) but the deployments ongoing competition could lead to deploy- 129 ments on one side or both that reduced crisis conclusion would be that each side’s offensive stability as well. In general, past strategic threat to the other would be reduced and nei- arms control agreements with the Soviets ther felt compelled to try to negate the other have (at least on the U.S. side) been intended side’s defenses. to add at least some stability to a continuing competition. Tacit Stabilization As noted in chapter 3, many are dissatisfied If the United States began to deploy BMD with the results of arms control thus far. In unilaterally and the Soviets followed suit, one view, the strategic arms competition is al- there might still be a stable competition. Each ready unstable, due largely to Soviet initia- might find the reduction in its own offensive tives over the past decade. In this view, the capabilities against the other acceptable be- Soviet deployment of many accurate ICBM cause the other’s was also proportionately re- warheads threatens the survivability of the duced. A situation similar to the negotiated ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad and of the one above might be reached, but as the result command and control system which would di- of mutual unilateral calculations rather than rect a U.S. retaliatory attack. In addition, So- joint decision. viet air defenses, civil defense activities, and sheltering of key leadership facilities would Maintenance of the Offense lessen the effectiveness of a U.S. retaliatory The Soviets might decide that it was worth- attack. A Soviet breakout from the ABM while to try to maintain or restore their offen- Treaty would further weaken the deterrent ef- sive capabilities by countering the U.S. BMD fect of the U.S. threat of retaliation. Respond- system. As Presidential arms control advisor ing to Soviet activities, the United States is Paul Nitze has said: increasing the accuracy of its own ICBMs and SLBMs, improving its bomber force, and ac- New defensive systems must also be cost effective at the margin, that is, it must be celerating BMD research. Thus, in one view, cheap enough to add additional defensive ca- the possible destabilizing effects of future pability so that the other side has no incen- BMD deployment on the arms race will have tive to add additional offensive capability to to be considered in the context of the insta- overcome the defense. If this criterion is not bilities which will exist in any case. met, the defensive system could encourage a proliferation of countermeasures and additional Responses to BMD Deployment offensive weapons to overcome deployed defense, instead of a redirection of effort from offense to One can imagine a variety of Soviet re- defense.29 sponses to U.S. BMD deployments (and vice- There are several ways the Soviets could try versa). Some of these responses might be to maintain offensive capabilities, and some stabilizing, others more destabilizing. In rough of these ways could lead to a destabilizing order of increasing destabilization, the range arms race. In fact, the Soviets have explicitly of imaginable Soviet responses follows. announced that they intend to preserve their offense capabilities in the face of any U.S. de- Negotiation fense.30 Possible means of maintaining the of- If the Soviets could be persuaded to negotiate the transition to a world in which ballis- “Paul H. Nitze, Speech to the Philadelphia J$’orld Affairs tic missile defenses played an important stra- Council on Feb. 20, 1985. F;mphasis added. tegic role, the process might be a stable one. 3~lFor examp]e, SoIlet General Nikolti Chervov told reporters Each side would agree to reduce offensive nu- that to counter U.S. efforts in space, “. we will have both an increase in offensive strategic weapons, and correspondingly clear capabilities, or at least not to increase we will take certain defensif’e measures. (The 11’ashington them, while building up defenses. The stable Post, tJune 9, 1985. p. 14-1.) 130 fense, which are not at all mutually exclusive, ther side had plausible chances of a success- include: ful attack on the other’s BMD system. A part of the cost-exchange ratio calculation for a de- Deployment of Passive Countermeasures.— cision to deploy a BMD system would be an Such countermeasures as decoy weapons, de- assessment of the cost of defending the sys- ception of BMD sensors, or altered ballistic tem as opposed to the cost of attacking it. Un- missile flight characteristics could require the less the Soviets were persuaded early on that U.S. to respond with additional BMD system the survivability of the U.S. BMD system components or with technological changes in could not be seriously threatened within the the BMD system If corresponding increments limits of Soviet resources, a costly race of de- of U.S. defense were less costly for the United ployments of anti-BMD weapons and anti- States to add than the increments of offensive anti-BMD weapons might result. countermeasure were for the Soviets to add, this measure might not be destabilizing—or Increasing the Numbers of Offensive Weap- not for long. The Soviets ought to see that ons.—Again, the cost-exchange ratio between there would be no point in a continued offense- increments of defense and of offensive counter- defense competition, because no gains in ca- measures would have to favor the defense if pability would be possible. On the other hand, the race were not to go on expensively, indeci- if the cost-exchange ratio between defense and sively and indefinitely. It is also possible that offense were somewhat ambiguous, the two the Soviets might decide to try to maintain sides might go through many expensive rounds some level of net offensive capability even at of offensive and defensive countermeasure be- a cost higher than the corresponding U.S. de- fore the futility of further counteractions was fenses. If, on the other hand, the United States obvious. A competition involving defensive were willing to match Soviet expenditures, the systems and offensive countermeasures could Soviets in the long run would see their net be costly, though probably not as costly as one offensive capability decline. In the meanwhile, involving defenses and additional offensive however, additional Soviet offensive weapons weapons. If weapons were cheaper than coun- could be destabilizing in another way: if the termeasures (per warhead penetrating the de- United States perceived the additional Soviet fense), than one would probably just add weapons as upsetting the balance of U. S.- weapons. Soviet offensive forces, the United States would have an incentive to respond with offen- Active Countermeasures: Attacking the De- sive additions of its own. fense.—If the Soviets believed that vital components of a U.S. BMD system were vulner- Circumventing the Defense.—If defenses able to attack, they might deploy weapons clearly had the advantage over ballistic mis- designed to weaken or disable the BMD sys- siles, the Soviets might try to compensate for tem. We have noted in the first section of this their declining strategic nuclear offensive ca- chapter the potential for crisis instability if ei- pabilities by deploying other means of deliv-

Table 6-l.— Missile Production: U.S.S.R. and NATOa Soviet missile production rates in the 1980s indicate a substantial capability to respond to U.S. BMD deployments with additional offensive missile deployments, should the Soviets choose that option. — —— U.S.S.R. NATO Missile type —— 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1984 ICBMs ...... 250 200 175 150 100 0 LRINF b ...... 100 100 100 125 150 70 C SRBM S ., ...... , ...... 300 300 300 350 350 0 SLCMS ...... 750 750 800 800 850 665 SLBMs ...... , ... , .. 200 175 175 200 200 80 a — revised to reflect current total production Information Includes United Slates, excludes France and Spain bLRINF--Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces CSRBM—Short Range Ballistic Missile.

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

132 —. .—— — other side’s current and future BMD capabil- could defend ICBMs or cities but not both ities or of the cost-exchange ratios. As was il- would be potentially destabilizing. If the lustrated in chapter 5, the side with inferior United States did not decide to pursue high defenses could see its situation as so disadvan- levels of BMD capability, but had the limited tageous as to call for substantial efforts to objective of a defense of its land-based ICBMs, catch up, regardless of cost. But if the defen- there would still be potential arms race insta- sive and offensive capabilities of the two sides bilities. The United States would have to be are not well understood by both, one side or very careful to configure the BMD system so both might see the other as having–or seek- that its purpose was unambiguously the local- ing—an advantage. ized defense of hardened targets. Otherwise, the Soviets might see the system as the core Additional Observations of a much broader defense, and take anticipatory countermeasures to maintain their own A Problem of Timing offensive threat. The United States would have to react accordingly, increasing its defen- If the current BMD research and develop- 31 ment program demonstrated in a few years sive forces, its offensive forces, or both. Nor that BMD deployments could lead to a safer might the United States feel secure if the world, the United States would certainly want Soviets were to respond to a U.S. missile-site to alter the current treaty regime banning all defense by expanding and spreading the sys- but very limited BMD deployments. But we tem now deployed around Moscow. Designed would want to avoid a breakdown of that re- to protect selected regions rather than just So- gime before the research and development pro- viet missile silos, such an expanded system gram is concluded. This might be true for at would degrade the retaliatory threat residing least two reasons. in the ICBMs that the United States was defending. An expansion of U.S. offenses, First, the Soviets appear to have maintained defenses, or both might be taken in response. a technology base for a large-scale deployment of current-generation BMD systems, and in Instabilities With Either/Or Defenses the short run of a few years they might attain We noted in chapter 5 and in the first sec- a noticeable advantage in BMD deployments tion of this chapter that special instabilities over the United States. This could lead to the may arise if both sides have what we call kind of crisis instability discussed in the first “Level 2“ defense capabilities—the ability to section of this chapter. protect most ICBM silos, or many cities, but Second, it is possible that the U.S. BMD re- not both. The danger is that one side may per- search program may show that effective BMD ceive the other to have the possibility of is not feasible and should not be deployed. launching a very effective first strike against But, if in the meantime the ABM Treaty re- the other’s retaliatory force and then defend- gime limiting BMD had been abandoned, the ing very effectively against a “ragged” retali- United States might consider it necessary ation. Such perceptions would lead to very nevertheless to deploy additions to its offense great pressures to remove the possibility of to counter Soviet BMD, and perhaps to deploy such a strike by increasing offenses to restore defenses as well, just to maintain the current the credibility of the retaliatory deterrent. strategic balance.

Limited BMD Systems 3] Since it takes several years to develop and deploy major weapon systems, each side tends to plan and build its systems As was noted in chapter 5 and again in the on the basis of what it thinks is the largest deployment the other first part of this chapter, BMD systems which side might be able to field several years in the future. 133

BMD DEPLOYMENT AND ARMS CONTROL The Importance of a There is a degree of paradox associated with Negotiated Transition the uncertainties that BMD deployment could introduce in the calculations of the two sides. Administration officials have stressed the On the one hand, increased uncertainty about importance of a substantially favorable cost- the likelihood of successful attacks could in- exchange ratio between defense and offense as crease crisis stability by making the aggres- an incentive for the Soviets to agree to nego- sor less willing to gamble on a favorable out- 32 tiate the reduction of offenses. Some believe come from a first strike. On the other hand, that without such an incentive—i.e., without in the face of growing uncertainty about the clear evidence that ballistic missiles are being effectiveness of its military forces, each side made economically obsolete by defenses—the will have an incentive to try to reduce that un- Soviets may never agree to deep offensive re- certainty by deploying additional offensive ductions. On the other hand, it should be noted and defensive weapons and countermeasures. that if the United States and the Soviet Union could agree that it was desirable to reduce In the absence of coordinated structuring of offenses and increase defenses, then a favor- defenses and offenses on the two sides, the able cost-exchange ratio would not be a prereq- United States would have to anticipate and uisite to moving in that direction. Mutual adapt in advance to a wide range of potential offensive reductions could be the main instru- Soviet responses. Even if the cost-exchange ment for increasing the effectiveness of de- ratio between defense and offense favored the fenses: the less formidable the offensive threat, defense, the transition period could bring a the less capable the defenses would need to be. costly arms competition until the effects of the cost-exchange ratio asserted themselves. Recently, Administration spokesmen have emphasized the importance of negotiating Arms control has been one measure pursued with the Soviet Union about the transition to by the United States to try to enhance crisis a strategic relationship in which BMD plays stability and arms race stability .34 Crisis sta- a significant role. As Presidential national bility may be enhanced if the United States security advisor Robert McFarlane said, and the Soviet Union can negotiate force structures or mutual procedures (e.g., the hot There is a relationship between reductions line) which might reduce incentives in a crisis of offensive systems and the integration of to strike. Slowing the arms race may be pos- defensive systems because of the potentially sible if the two can agree to limit weapon de- destabilizing effect of either side achieving ployments which might accelerate the compe- a first-strike capability through possession of both. So our policy must be to first estab- tition. Arms limitations can also add a certain lish agreement between ourselves and the amount of predictability to the force structure Russians on the value of defensive systems. planning on each side, reducing the steps each Once we have reached agreement on that, then we must establish a path for the integra- defenses, and so on, and so on. That snowball effect would un- tion of these defensive systems into the force dercut stability and weaken deterrence. 33 That risk can be reduced and managed through the kind of structure that will be stable. overall strategic discussions Secretary Shultz launched in Geneva last month and that Ambassador Kampelman will take 3ZAS noted earlier, there are likely to be large uncertainties up further when the arms talks begin again next month. This in calculating such ratios, and the two sides may well assess type of exchange with the Soviet Union–an in-depth dialog them differently. about critical strategic relationships, strategic concepts, stra- ?3A~ interviewed in IJ. SJ. News and World Report, Mar. 18, tegic stability-is indispensable to an effective SDI approach. 1985, p. 26. In a similar statement, Kenneth Adelman, Direc- (Speech before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Feb. 13, 1985.) tor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said 34 in February 1985: For a discussion of the objectives of arms control, see Na- \$’e must scrupulously guard against a vicious cycle of defen- tional Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Control: Background sive efforts—even research for defense-spurring the other side and Issues (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985), on to more offensive weapons in order to saturate prospective pp. 4-6. 134 might feel compelled to take in anticipation sonable intermediate stage would be one in of what the other might do in the future. which defenses could prevent offenses from effectively attacking military targets, even A negotiated transition to a U.S.-Soviet though cities might still be vulnerable. A stage strategic relationship in which BMD plays an to be avoided, however, is one in which the So- important role would be an arms control ar- viet Union, for example, might be able to use rangement intended, like earlier ones, to en- offensive missiles to weaken the U.S. retalia- hance strategic stability. The two sides would tory force, then defend very well against a first need to agree in principle that there ‘‘ragged’ U.S. retaliation. (See discussion should be such a negotiated transition. Accord- above, p. 125 and in chapter 5). In that stage ing to Secretary of State George P. Shultz: it would be very difficult for the United States As our [BMD] research proceeds and both to agree to further offensive reductions when nations thus gain a better sense of the future it already feared the possibility of the Soviets prospects, the Soviets should see the advan- defending successfully against a U.S. retali- tages of agreed ground rules to ensure that ation. any phasing in of defensive systems will be orderly, predictable, and stabilizing. The To avoid that and the other kinds of insta- alternative-an unconstrained environment– bilities discussed in this chapter, the two sides would be neither in their interest nor in would need to agree on the orderly accumula- 35 ours. tion of comparable ballistic missile defense Soviet acceptance of such ground rules may (and, possibly, air defense) capabilities. They not come easily. The public position of the would need to agree on comparable, mutually Soviet Union thus far is that BMD deploy- acceptable, offensive capabilities. Without ments (beyond what is now allowed by the such agreed levels of capability, each side ABM Treaty) would evoke an offensive re- might see the other as having or seeking mili- sponse and make arms control impossible. (See tary advantages. appendix K for various Soviet statements on this subject.) Working Out the Details We do not know whether the Soviet public As with past agreements on offensive and position is purely propaganda posturing in- defensive arms, agreements on acceptable tended solely to undercut the Strategic De- levels of offensive and defensive capability fense Initiative. There is general agreement would probably have to be translated into that at least the initial Soviet response to U.S. agreements on some specifications of the BMD deployments would be to try to restore weapons systems each side could deploy. The their own offensive capabilities. The United current ABM Treaty, for example, specifies States might decide to deploy BMD because what kinds and numbers of components of a it believed that it would make further offen- BMD system, are acceptable. This agreement sive deployments by the Soviets futile. What was possible in part because the BMD sys- is difficult to predict is when or whether the tems of the two sides were roughly similar in Soviets might arrive at the same conclusion. principle and because the permitted BMD de- Until they did, they might engage in a sub- ployments kept actual capabilities almost stantial offensive build-up. negligibly small. Once agreement in principle to a negotiated Agreements to phase in increasingly higher transition had been arrived at, the stages of levels of BMD capability together would be the transition would have to be defined. The far more challenging. One problem seen in pre- ultimate goal may be to reach a state in which vious arms control negotiations could be par- greatly reduced offenses are believed to be ticularly severe: that of asymmetries in the highly unlikely to penetrate very effective forces on the two sides. The United States and defenses. Before that stage is reached, area- the Soviet Union have in the past found it difficult to agree on what mixes of ICBMs, ‘5 Speech in Austin, Texas, Mar. 28, 1985. SLBMs, and aircraft on the two sides con- 135 stituted equivalent nuclear offensive forces. At aircraft and highly effective defenses, yet least in the early transition stages, force asym- another potential problem would still have to metries could remain a serious problem. As be considered. That is, some residual uncer- long as the number of ballistic missile war- tainties would likely remain about Soviet ca- heads that the Soviets could use to attack U.S. pabilities and intentions. They might be sus- missile silos exceeds the number of U.S. war- pected of working on or actually achieving heads in those silos, equal defense capabilities some effective countermeasure to a key part would not have equal strategic significance. of our defensive shield. There would always Equal defenses would reduce the net number be the possibility of smuggled nuclear weap- of U.S. retaliatory weapons surviving a Soviet ons, secretly implanted in U.S. cities. The first strike and penetrating Soviet defenses United States, for its part, might have no com- (see chapter 5). parable retaliatory threat. This situation would leave the United States open at some Different technical approaches to BMD and point to Soviet nuclear blackmail. different levels of technological accomplishment would also complicate calculations of equivalence. Moreover, those differences Potential Effects of the Absence would exacerbate the problem of assuring ade- of a Negotiated Transition quate verification that one side or the other The deployment of BMD in the absence of did not have significantly more capable defen- a negotiated transition would mean, in effect, sive systems. Although President Reagan has that the United States and the Soviet Union suggested the possibility of the United States 36 would have abandoned the ABM Treaty but sharing BMD technologies with the Soviets, not replaced it with a new arms control regime many are skeptical that this would or should for BMD. The potential diplomatic and broader ever happen. They point out, for example, that arms control consequences of such a course de- the more the Soviets knew about the details serve consideration. of a U.S. BMD system, the easier it would be for them to devise effective countermeasures Offensive Arms Limitations to overcome it. Negotiations on offensive arms limitations The two sides might also have difficulty without regulation of defensive deployments agreeing on which approaches to BMD are could be extremely difficult. Unless each side acceptable. The Strategic Defense Initiative was absolutely convinced that it could not af- is currently emphasizing nonnuclear defenses. ford to deploy offenses that would counter the The kind of system the Soviets have deployed other’s defenses, it would have a strong incen- and are currently best prepared to expand uses tive to increase, rather than decrease, offen- nuclear warheads. In the longer term, how- sive arms levels. ever, perhaps the two sides’ technological approaches to BMD problems might converge. U.S.-Soviet Relations If the two sides were to reach the ultimate To the degree that arms competition adds stage of deeply reduced offensive missiles and to tension in the U.S.-Soviet relationship (some would argue that the arms competition is “1 n replying to a statement that the proposed U.S. SD I program is seen in hloscow as an attempt b}’ the United States solely a result, not a cause, of the tension be- to regain strategic superiorit~ b~ making the Soliet Union vul- tween the two political systems), a BMD- nerable to a first strike, Secretar~. of Defense Caspar fl’einberger said: offense competition could make U.S.-Soviet hl~ response is that i> not only totall~ wrong, I)ut it conclu- agreements in other areas more difficult. sliel}r pro\ cd to he wrong I)i t hl~ f ‘resident”~ offer to share th i+ w)th t h[~ world If w (, ran got it, [ f w t> w antt,(i a war-v.’] nning capability t hr(]ugh tlu> nl(’an<, W(I It ouldn ”t h{, L tilking alx)ut +har- U.S.-Allied Relations i ng I [ wIt h t hr M orld To the extent that U.S. allies see the ABM (A 13(’ h’e~work tele~’i~ion program ‘ ‘The [’ire Unleashed. June 6, 1 W;. ) Treaty (or would see its successor) as central 136

to an arms control process that they wish to port recent Administration emphasis on the sustain, and to the extent that they saw the importance of a negotiated transition to U. S.- United States as responsible for its abandon- Soviet BMD deployments, should a deployment ment, U.S.-allied relations could be strained. decision be made. For either side to proceed to deployment of BMD outside the context of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty an arms control arrangement effectively gov- Some nonnuclear-weapon states that signed erning offensive and defensive arms on both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty take seri- sides could lead to serious strategic instabili- ously the obligations assumed in that accord ties. Whether such a negotiated transition is by the nuclear-weapon states to try to make possible remains to be seen. But because both further progress in nuclear arms control. If sides plan strategic forces several years in ad- they saw abandonment of the ABM Treaty vance, the negotiations would probably have (without replacement by a new arms control to begin during the research and development regime) as a major step away from that prom- stage, not in the stage of first BMD deploy- ise, then their adherence to the Non-Prolifera- ments. Indeed, any decision about BMD de- tion Treaty could be called into question. (This ployment should take into consideration the risk is discussed further in appendix C.) realistic prospects for such negotiations. The relationship between research and develop- In sum, there appears to be a broad and, cu- ment and arms control is discussed in chap- mulatively, compelling set of reasons to sup- ter 10 of this report.

CONCLUSIONS A complete analysis of the potential impact “runs” of the model. Carrying out this analy- of BMD deployments on crisis stability would sis would not prove that the net consequences have to include, inter alia, a large and complex of deploying various levels of BMD would be exploration of the potential outcomes of nu- positive or negative. But it would be one con- clear exchanges between the Soviet Union and tribution toward such assessments and might the United States given various levels and help to avoid particularly unstable relation- kinds of offense and defense on the two sides. ships between the force structures on the two Such an exploration would require highly so- sides. Potential crisis instabilities may not phisticated “exchange model” calculations to only be risky in themselves, but may induce simulate the possible impact on outcomes of arms race instabilities, as one side or the other such factors as: adds new forces in an attempt to remedy what they would consider to be a dangerous stra- ● asymmetries in the offensive and defen- tegic disadvantage. Moreover, exploration of sive force structures of the two sides; the strategic implications of various levels of ● uncertainties on each side about the offen- offense and defense would be an important sive and defensive capabilities of the other preparation for attempting to negotiate with side; the Soviets on a transition to a world of in- ● varying degrees of ability on each side to creased defenses and reduced offenses. defend certain types of targets “preferentially” (see chapter 5); and Congress may wish to see that credible and ● the differences made by the size of attack thorough strategic analyses have been per- and rate of attack defended against on the formed well before it must decide whether to au- numbers of warheads each side could in- thorize BMD programs beyond the research tercept. stage. Such an analysis would require extensive computing resources and many hundreds of Chapter 7 Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies Contents

Page Introduction...... 139 Feasibility ...... 139 Technological Prediction...... 140 Organization of This Chapter...... 140 BMD Technologies ...... 141 Overview...... 141 Weapon Kill Mechanisms ...... 146 Sensors and Data Processing...... 159 Power and Logistics ...... 168 Countermeasures ...... 170 Countermeasures to Sensors and Discrimination ...... 170 Countermeasures to Weapons ...... ~ÿ• ...... 172 Countermeasures to Overall System Performance...... 174 Relationships Between Countermeasures ..., ...... 177

Tables Table No. Page 7-l. Constellation Size Given Assumptions in Text ...... 185 7-2. Constellation Size Given Assumptions in Text ...... 185

Figures Figure No. Page 7-1. Multilayered Space Defense ...... ,.,,...... 142 7-2. Compensating for Atmospheric Distortion With Adaptive Optics ....151 7-3. Long- and Short-Wave Infrared Detection ...... 161 7-4. Onboard Signal Processing...... ,...... 167 Chapter 7 Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies

INTRODUCTION This chapter and chapter 8 describe the tech- measures—forces the successful development nologies applicable to ballistic missile defense and implementation of BMD technologies to and point out some of the uncertainties that be far more than a purely technological accom- further research may hope to resolve. Ballis- plishment, such as reaching the moon or split- tic missile defense technologies and ballistic ting the atomic nucleus. The moon and the nu- missile defense policies, of course, are interde- cleus did not hide, run away, or shoot back. pendent. BMD policy choices, the subject of Evaluating the robustness of a prospective the preceding chapters of this report, are con- defensive system requires making assump- strained by the state of our technology. At the tions about the motivations and relative tech- same time, however, policy decisions influence nical skills of the two sides. It also requires technological advances by providing (or with- a clear conception of the system’s intent. Is holding) resources and incentives to extend 1 a successful defense one which can defeat a our knowledge and capabilities. given threat and deters threat growth? Or is it one which can defeat the threat and provokes Feasibility growth, forcing the Soviets to spend a lot of The overall feasibility of ballistic missile de- money? fense technologies involves a set of related is- Failure to take full account of the offense- sues which become increasingly harder to an- defense competition can lead to what has been swer definitively. Scientific feasibility-whether called the ‘‘fallacy of the last move, in which or not something is physically possible—is ob- some action is evaluated as if the strategic viously necessary for any BMD concept, but competition were frozen immediately after- it is by no means sufficient. Technical and eco- wards. However, although the concept of a nomic feasibility questions go on to ask “last move” in the competition between of- whether a device permitted by the laws of na- fense and defense does not make sense, the ture can actually be built at a reasonable cost starting point of such a competition is well de- within a reasonable amount of time. Assum- fined. Massive, diverse, and highly effective ing that a system can be designed and built offensive forces dominate the strategic rela- according to specifications, operational feasi- tionship today. From that starting point, ad- bility issues address the questions of whether vanced defensive technology and advanced of- it can actually be deployed, tested, main- fensive technology will evolve together, in the tained, and operated with a high degree of con- absence of political agreements to regulate fidence. that competition. If both offenses and defenses Overriding all of these considerations is the evolve at comparable rates, the present domi- issue which forms the crux of the BMD tech- nance of the offense will clearly be maintained. nical debate: any effective BMD system must Economic questions are as important as tech- be “robust,” in that it must operate and endure nical ones, since the outcome of a technologi- against a reactive adversary intent on defeat- cal competition depends in part on who is bet- ing it. The dynamic competition between offen- ter able to pay for it. These economic questions sive and defensive technologies-among meas- are discussed further in chapter 8. ures, countermeasures, and counter-counter- If it turns out that offensive technologies have developed so far along their learning ‘For example, technology in the area of pollution control has curve that their rate of continued technical primarily been driven by policy decisions. progress slows, evolving defensive technolo-

139 140 gies might make progress in eroding the great When the “experts” do make mistakes, they distance currently existing between the two. err in both directions. Just as breakthroughs The relevant question is whether it is likely have been made which were previously pre- that an arms development competition will dicted to be impossible, other foretold inevita- close that gap. To say that the time is ripe for bilities have never come to pass. For example, offense dominance to give way to defense dom- General David Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board inance either prejudges the outcome of this tech- of the RCA Corp., claimed in 1955 that “[I]t nological competition, or assumes that a politi- can be taken for granted that before 1980 cal agreement will be reached which will ensure ships, aircraft, locomotives and even automo- that defenses catch up and overtake offenses. biles will be atomically fuelled.” John von Neu- mann, the father of the modern computer and Technological Prediction a member of the Atomic Energy Commission stated the following year that “[a] few decades Even aside from the all-important question hence, energy may be free-just like the unme- of effectiveness against a reactive opponent, tered air.”* predicting future technical feasibility is a difficult business. Experts can have hunches and One way to attack the question of predict- gut feelings, and they can make elaborate tech- ing the feasibility of a given technical accom- nical calculations. However, firm answers can- plishment (setting aside the question of reac- not be obtained without experimentation. No tive opponent) is to specify a time limit. Is a Boeing 747 airliner feasible today? Of course— one, regardless of technical credentials or crea- 4 tive ability, is an expert when it comes to pre- it has been in service for more than 15 years. dicting the future. Secretary of Defense Cas- Would it have been feasible in 1940? No– par Weinberger has called attention to Albert unless 30 years were allotted at that time for Einstein’s 1932 observation that “there is not its development, including some unanticipated the slightest indication that [nuclear] energy and rather fundamental inventions that made will ever be obtainable.”2 Arms Control and it possible, and provided that large expendi- Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth Adel- tures were allocated for producing and oper- man has similarly recalled the warning that ating its predecessors. Admiral Leahy, President Truman’s Chief of A more relevant measure is to ask whether Staff, gave the President in 1945: “The [atom- progress can be accelerated significantly by ic] bomb will never go off, and I speak as an a crash (“technology-limited’ program. Per- expert in explosives. “3 Adelman warned that haps a 747 could have been developed by 1955 technical critics of the Strategic Defense Ini- or 1965 if doing so had been a compelling na- tiative “may well turn out to be just as short- tional priority. However, attempting to build sighted in retrospect as many of their prede- one before all of the required technologies had cessors have been in hindsight today. ” matured to their 1970 levels would probably In the context of the time, however, Einstein have produced a very different airplane at was correct. The “indications” that nuclear en- much greater expense. ergy might be obtainable had yet to be discov- ered. If a major effort to develop nuclear power Organization of This Chapter had been undertaken before basic research had This chapter introduces the technological revealed the phenomenon of heavy element fis- components which might contribute to future sion, it might have focused on the wrong end of the periodic table and floundered for years. *AI1 quotes in the preceding three paragraphs can be found in The Experts Speak: The Definitive Compendium of Author- itative Disinformation, by Christopher Cerf and Victor Navas- ‘Speech before the Foreign Press Center, Dec. 19, 1984. ky, a joint project of The IVation magazine and the Institute Quoted by Ambassador Adelman in “SDI: Setting the Rec- of Expertology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). ord Straight, ” speech before the Baltimore Council on Foreign ‘Pan Am introduced the Boeing 747 airliner to commercial Affairs, Aug. 7, 1985. service with a flight from New York to London on Jan. 22, 1970. 141 ballistic missile defense systems. It reviews and it introduces some of the systems issues the characteristics of many of the relevant relevant to integrating the pieces into a coher- technologies and outlines the key uncertain- ent whole. It does not attempt to predict ex- ties concerning those technologies’ potentials. actly how each of the technologies will evolve, Readers who do not wish to immerse them- and it compares different contenders for some selves in technological details are invited to given task to each other only in a general way. concentrate on the sections labeled “Issues,” The chapter was prepared with access to with the descriptions preceding those sections classified materials. For the most part, those used as reference material. In addition, the fol- classified data concerned schedules, budgets, lowing chapter (chapter 8) summarizes some and technical matters too detailed for this dis- of the major issues of technological feasibility. cussion. A few relevant classified details and This chapter also examines how the techno- concepts are discussed in a classified annex. logical building blocks need to be put together,

BMD TECHNOLOGIES Overview The first opportunity to engage the missile would be in its boost phase, when the ICBM’s BMD Concepts booster motor is burning. A second layer might Ballistic missile defense systems as described operate in the post-boost phase after the by the ABM Treaty and as primarily pursued booster has dropped away, leaving a post- prior to 1980 consisted of ground-based inter- boost vehicle (PBV or bus) which aims the in- ceptors of various ranges supported by ground- dividual warheads at their targets and lets based radars. These systems would attempt them go. Decoys and other defense penetra- to intercept ballistic reentry vehicles (RVs) as tion aids can also be dispensed by the PBV they descended toward the United States, ei- during this phase. The post-boost is followed ther prior to or just after they reentered the by a midcourse phase of up to 20 minutes in Earth’s atmosphere. Current BMD concepts length during which the RVs and decoys coast posit systems that can intercept ballistic mis- towards their targets; the last phase is the ter- siles and their RVs at all stages of their flight, minal or reentry phase, lasting less than a min- from shortly after launch to just prior to det- ute, which starts when the RVs reenter the onation. Earth’s atmosphere and the lighter decoys burn up.

Layered Defenses Operation of each layer is controlled by a battle management system, which also coordi- The basic concept is to use layered defenses, nates between the layers and provides over- which provide the defense with several oppor- all supervision and control. tunities to attack the incoming warheads. Ear- ly layers would reduce the number of warheads Properties of the Phases that later layers would have to handle; later layers would “mop up” those that get through Boost Phase.– During boost phase, the hot the early layers. gases in the booster’s exhaust produce a large, easily detected infrared signal, or signature, It has become convenient to discuss defen- especially as the rocket rises above the clouds sive layers which are associated with each and the denser layers of the atmosphere. For phase of a ballistic missile’s flight. Since the current missiles, the boost phase lasts 3 to 5 missile has different properties in each phase, minutes.5 However, not all this period is avail-

different defensive components are associated 5 See J. C. Fletcher, “The Technologies for Ballistic Missile with the different phases. Defense, ” Issues in Science and Technologu, fall 1984, p. 15. 142

Figure 7-1 .—Multilayered Space Defense

Each of the phases presents specific opportunities to the corresponding defensive layer. The phases are boost, post-boost, midcourse and terminal.

SOURCE U S Department of Defense able for the defense to attack the boosters. The which, under day-today conditions, would re- defensive system must first detect the launch, quire human intervention before boost-phase determine that there is actually an attack in defenses could engage an attack (leaving sur- progress, decide to engage the boosters, and prise attacks to be handled by later layers), allocate defensive weapons platforms to the but which in times of crisis would permit the boosters. How much time this would take de- defense to engage boosters autonomously if pends on how automated the system would be an attack were detected. Such a procedure, of and how quickly decisions could be made. In course, would increase the incentive for sur- particular, requiring that human intervention be prise attack. necessary before the defense can commence fir- Successful engagement in the boost phase ing imposes extreme time constraints on com- 6 can provide a high degree of leverage-i. e., the mand and control procedures. Possibly, a suc- destruction of one booster results in the de- cession of alert conditions could be established struction of all its RVs and decoys. There is also another sort of leverage involved–the ‘Requiring human decisionmaking could pose even more se- boosters are much more vulnerable than the vere problems in terms of platform self-defense, when only a very short time may be available to characterize and engage RVs, providing another advantage to attack- attacking weapons before they come within lethal range. ing the boost phase. 143

One consequence of the high leverage of By their nature, boost-phase defenses have boost-phase defenses is that small errors in little ability to defend selectively. While a boost-phase BMD performance are magnified booster is burning, it may be possible to de- to become larger errors in the later phases. termine where it came from, wherein general Each missile that survives the boost phase it is headed, and what kind of missile it is. may ultimately produce hundreds of objects However, until the individual RVs are released (RVs and decoys) that must be tracked, dis- by the PBV, their specific targets cannot be criminated, and attacked by later layers. Be- determined. Therefore, boost-phase defenses cause effective discrimination is vital to the cannot effectively conduct preferential de- success of the midcourse layer, successful mid- fense, in which limited defensive resources are course defense maybe tightly linked to the concentrated on defending only some sites at success of the boost phase. the expense of permitting attacks on others 144 to continue unimpeded. In this manner, a lim- may have more total time to engage each in- ited defensive capability can be used to save dividual target. However, targets must be en- a greater number of sites than would be pos- gaged early in the post-boost phase to achieve sible with a random allocation of defenses (see best results. As in the case of boost-phase discussion of preferential defense in chapter defenses, small errors in post-boost perform- 5).7 ance can have larger consequences in the later phases. Unlike boost phase, however, the per- Even without the ability to conduct prefer- formance of the post-boost phase depends on ential defense, a boost-phase defense which when targets are killed as well as on how many eliminates some fraction of an attack can deny are killed. Since targets become less valuable the offense the ability to conduct a highly as time goes on, uncertainties in timing will structured attack which requires warheads to affect overall post-boost-phase performance. arrive at specified targets in a precise order. Selectivity in the post-boost-phase defense– Such an attack would be much more difficult the ability to conduct preferential defense—is to carry out if some fraction of the offensive similar to that of the boost phase. boosters were intercepted by the boost-phase layer. A structured attack, intended to blind Midcourse Phase.— Most of an RV’S flight or destroy components of the defensive sys- time is spent in the midcourse, the period be- tem, might make it easier to penetrate later tween release from the bus and reentry into defensive layers. Therefore, the inability to the Earth’s atmosphere. This period lasts conduct such an attack might make those later about 20 minutes for ICBM RVs; it may be layers more effective. much shorter for SLBM RVs. Although there is much more time to find and engage targets Post-Boost Phase.—The post-boost phase in the midcourse than in the earlier phases, may last as long as 6 minutes, but it could be there is also much more to do. Before a tar- much shorter. As this phase progresses, the get can be engaged, it must be discriminated PBV dispenses RVs and decoys and therefore from decoys and possibly from debris; imper- loses value as a target. Therefore, leverage is fect discrimination capability will result in high at the beginning of the post-boost phase shooting at objects that are not really targets and low at the end. Although the individual and in withholding fire on objects that should RVs on each PBV are relatively “hard” (dif- actually be attacked. To kill the 10 RVs car- ficult to destroy with certain types of defen- ried on one SS-18 in boost-phase, the defense sive weapons), the PBVs themselves might be must find and destroy one target in the few ‘‘softer, adding to the leverage of the post- minutes that the boost phase lasts. To kill the boost phase. However, if a PBV is disabled same number of RVs in midcourse, the defense without disabling the RVs still attached to it, must sort through possibly hundreds of ob- those RVs may still have to be handled by 8 jects in order to find and destroy the 10 RVs later defensive layers. in 20 minutes. The rate of activity required in The post-boost defense has more time to get midcourse could, therefore, be the same or ready than the boost-phase defense (since it higher than in the boost phase. Of course, in a can get ready during the boost phase), and it massive launch, the number of targets and de- ——-.— coys would be thousands of times larger. ‘Only redundant targets, where the loss of many or most can be tolerated, are logical candidates for preferential defense. Leverage is low in the midcourse, but mid- ICBM silos are perhaps the best example, since only a small course defense does have the potential for be- fraction of them still carry enormous destructive potential. 8RVS which have not been properly dispensed by the PBV ing selective. Destinations of individual RVs will not be accurately aimed, although they may nevertheless can be determined once the RVs have sepa- be armed and left on a trajectory which will take them some- rated from the bus. where within the borders of the country being attacked. If their mission requires high accuracy, such RVS will have been ren- Terminal Phase.–The terminal (or reentry) dered ineffective; if their mission merely requires that they reach some region of the country and detonate, they may still be able phase is very short. If hardened targets are to accomplish their task. defended, defensive intercepts can occur at 145 fairly low altitudes, since hardened targets by tivity of the midcourse. A single layer defense definition are designed to survive nearby nu- could have only one or the other. clear explosions. However, if soft targets are However, there are drawbacks as well as ad- to be protected, intercepts must take place at g vantages to layered defenses. The most obvi- a higher altitude. As few as tens of seconds ous problem is that four layers are likely to would be available between the time reentry cost more than one layer—especially if the lay- began (or more accurately, the time that at- ers are completely independent—although per- mospheric effects begin to sort out decoys haps less than a smaller number of layers from RVs) and the time that terminal inter- which were as effective as the total of the four. ceptors would have to be launched in order to Second, the degree to which the layers can destroy the RV at a sufficiently high altitude. combine to produce high effectiveness will de- However, the terminal defense would have al- pend on how independent the layers are. To most 30 minutes to get ready to engage the take an extreme example, if all layers depend RVs. Time pressures would be minimized if on the same sensor system and that sensor earlier phases had identified and tracked those system fails, all the layers will fail. The same RVs which they failed to destroy, and were holds true for battle management algorithms able to “hand off” this trajectory information or other shared resources. The leakage rates of to the terminal defense. This tactic assumes the individual layers of a layered defense can be good discrimination and kill effectiveness in multiplied together to give the total leakage rate the earlier layers. only if the individual layers are totally independ- Advantages and Disadvantages of ent and share no common elements. Otherwise, Layered Defenses leakage through early layers may not be fully compensated for by later layers. Multi-1ayered defenses have the potential for performing much better than single layer de- The robustness of the system against the fenses. First, several layers of moderate effec- loss (or severe degradation) of one layer will tiveness which combine to produce a total de- depend on how much capacity is built into the fense of high effectiveness will, in general, be system to compensate for that loss. The layers easier to design and build than a single layer must be able to take advantage of the other having the same resultant effectiveness. Sec- layers without being overly dependent on ond, multi-layered systems, in theory, are them. For example, if boost and post-boost de- more robust than single-layered systems, espe- fenses permit twice the expected number of cially if each layer employs different technol- objects to reach midcourse, and if that in turn ogies and different designs. In that case, offen- substantially degrades the midcourse de- sive developments which degrade one layer fense’s ability to sort objects, the midcourse might not severely affect later layers. Third, may let through not only the additional RVs the presence of early layers—the boost and but also many of the ones it would otherwise post-boost layers–reduces the burden on the have intercepted. later layers. The number of objects the mid- In practice, it will be impossible to know in course defense has to handle is cut in half if advance exactly how effective any layer will the early layers kill half of the missiles. Final- be; there will probably be large uncertainties ly, building several layers allows the designer in predicting how well it will work against an to take advantage of whatever unique advan- actual attack. Those uncertainties, however, tages each layer provides. For example, a mul- will be viewed differently by the two sides. ti-layered defense could have both the lever- From the defensive point of view, extra capac- age of the boost-phase defense and the selec- ity will be required in each layer in order to hedge against the possibility that it (or the ‘Even if the defensive interceptor is nonnuclear, the attack- other layers) will not perform as well as antic- ing warhead may be salvage-fused to detonate if intercepted. Therefore, intercepts must take place higher above soft targets ipated. From the offensive view, however, un- than they need to above hardened ones. certainties will make it more difficult to de- 146 —.

stroy (or penetrate) the defense with high gets. These are processed to yield information confidence. about the individual targets. Sensor and data processing technologies are therefore crucial The significance of a degradation in capa- to an advanced ballistic missile defense. When bility will depend on the goal of the defense. targets have been identified and assigned to It makes little difference whether an ICBM weapons systems, energy stored in the weap- silo defense is 40 or 50 percent effective. If one ons must be converted to a form which can be were only interested in providing a surviva- delivered to the target in sufficient quantity ble deterrent, rather than defending popula- rapidly enough to destroy it. Various types of tions, these concerns regarding the vulnera- directed-energy (beam) weapons and kinetic- bility of one of several layers would be energy (projectile) weapons have been proposed relatively unimportant. However, the differ- for this role. ence between a 90 percent effective city defense and a 99.9 percent effective city defense Technological candidates for sensors, proc- is a hundredfold increase in the number of essors, and weapons are described in this chap- weapons reaching U.S. cities; this could make ter. The battle management issues involved the difference between the survival and the de- in coordinating and integrating these “build- struction of our civilization. ing blocks’ into a complete, functioning system are also discussed, along with possible of- Individual Tasks of Each Layer fensive responses or countermeasures. Some Each layer must perform the following of the logistical issues involved in construct- tasks: ing and operating such a system are noted as well. Further discussion of the feasibility and ● Surveillance and Acquisition: Attacks operational issues is presented in chapter 8. must be detected, and the number, location, and probable destination of all threatening objects must be determined. Weapon Kill Mechanisms ● Discrimination: Actual missiles, busses, and warheads must be distinguished from Introduction and Types of Kill nonthreatening decoys and other debris. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organiza- ● Pointing and Tracking: Targets must be tion is investigating the feasibility of many tracked with whatever precision is re- types of weapons. The type that has been pub- quired by the weapon designated to de- licized the most, possibly because it appears stroy that target, and that tracking infor- to be the most exotic, is the directed-energy mation must be communicated to the weapon. Although this class of weapon is only defensive weapon. one potential facet of the SDI, it could possi- ● Target Destruction: A defensive weapon bly become the centerpiece of some of the de- must deliver sufficient energy to a target fensive layers. The advantage of such weap- rapidly enough to destroy it. ons is clear: killing energy is delivered at or ● Kill Assessment: Those targets that have near the speed of light, and, for typical BMD been successfully destroyed-must be iden- distances, arrives at the target in less than a tified and distinguished from survivors. tenth of a second. In addition, if it can be determined why a targeted warhead was not destroyed (in- Concepts under investigation in this area include several types of laser and particle beam correct pointing, for example), this infor- weapons. For weapons purposes, the relevant mation can be used for a subsequent criteria used to determine the usefulness of the attack. different technologies mostly concern their The above tasks all involve processing either ability to neutralize targets in a small amount information or energy. Sensors collect signals of time (seconds, at the most). Another con- or radiation emitted by or reflected from tar- sideration is the capability for kill assessment after the target has been engaged. This latter Impulse kill does not achieve its goal by question depends in part on the target; it may heating the target, but by depositing energy be a booster rocket stage, a post-boost vehi- in a powerful pulse on its surface. A mechani- cle, or an RV. Enemy satellites could also be cal shock wave is driven through the target, targets. collapsing it.

There are three types of kill mechanisms by Lasers which directed-energy systems can act: 1) functional kill, 2) thermal kill, and 3) impulse A laser is a device which produces a coher- kill. ent beam of electromagnetic radiation at a well-defined wavelength. Coherence means The functional kill mechanism, pertinent to that all the waves of radiation are in step, particle beam or microwave weapons, prevents crest-to-crest and trough-to-trough, and main- an offensive weapon from operating correctly tain this alignment over time. When they without necessarily destroying it. Subatomic strike a surface, the effects are greater than particles with kinetic energies of a few hun- would be the case for incoherent radiation. The dred million electron-volts’” (MeV) can pene- intensity of incoherent radiation is limited by trate at least several centimeters of dense the temperature of the object producing that materials, or tens of centimeters of typical aer- radiation; there is no such limit to laser radi- ospace materials. Therefore, sensitive electron- ation. The radiation may be in the infrared, ic components deep inside the target can be visible, ultraviolet, or X-ray regions of the elec- altered or destroyed. However, it may not be tromagnetic spectrum. immediately apparent to an outside observer that a kill has occurred. A kill of this sort may Lasing occurs when more of the lasing ma- be referred to as a “soft, “ i.e., initially unob- terial’s molecules (or atoms) are in an “ex- servable, kill. cited” higher energy state, and fewer in a lower energy state, than is normally the case. To disable boosters by thermal means, a When an excited molecule drops back to a low- nominal range of 1 to 100 kilojoules of energy 2 er energy state, it emits radiation at a precise- deposited per square centimeter (kJ/cm ) of ly defined wavelength. This radiation stimu- target has been taken as an estimate in the lates other molecules to do exactly the same literature. This energy must be delivered thing. They drop back to the same lower state, quickly–if the time needed to deliver a lethal emitting radiation in step with the original ra- amount of energy is very long (hundreds of diation and having the same wavelength. This seconds or more), the heated area of the boost- effect quickly spreads throughout the lasing er may have time to conduct away much of the materiaI (the lasant), and a laser beam is energy being directed at it and may then not produced. Mirrors are usually placed at each fail. The actual value of a lethal energy dose end of a resonant cavity which contains the for a given target depends on many factors, lasant. They reflect the radiation back and including material, surface properties, and me- forth in order to stimulate further emission chanical stress. This energy will raise the sur- along a very narrow range of angles. face temperature of the target sufficiently to weaken or deform it, allowing internal forces A major task is to arrange the molecules of to cause a catastrophic failure. The ability of the lasant so that there is a “population a given technology to effect a thermal kill de- inversion’ ‘—i.e., so that there are more mole- pends on the power levels attainable, the fo- cules in an excited state than in a state of cusing ability of the weapon, and the distance lower energy. A suitable lasant must be found, from the target. and the energy needed to “pump” it—i.e., to raise its molecules to the upper laser state— IOAn ~]ectron.~.olt is the mount of energy an electron ~~ Pick must be provided. There are several ways to up from a l-volt battery. provide the energy for this purpose. Some 148 lasers use chemical energy (in the form of a mirror size should be maximized.13 Of course, chemical reaction which produces molecules in choosing these parameters, one is limited in an excited state); others use electrical by physical and engineering constraints. energy. The characteristic wavelength pro- Smaller wavelengths, while allowing smaller duced depends on the material used as a la- mirrors for the same amount of spreading, also sant, and it is determined by the difference in impose more stringent tolerances on the qual- energies between the upper and lower states. ity of the optics used. The size of the irregular- The effectiveness of a laser as a beam weap- ities in the optics must be much less than one on depends on the rate and amount of energy wavelength of the radiation used. which can be delivered per unit area on a tar- Aiming radiation at a moving target thou- get. This quantity is determined by the laser sands of kilometers away requires highly ac- power, the distance to the target, and the de- curate tracking and pointing. Typically, a gree to which the beam can be focused on the beam spot of roughly a meter in diameter is target. Effectiveness also depends on the re- envisioned for attacking today’s missiles in target time. the boost phase. To hit a target with an error All electromagnetic radiation, even focused of tenths of a meter at a distance of thousands radiation, eventually spreads out with dis- of kilometers (km) requires aiming accuracy tance. This spreading, known as diffraction, re- of about a tenth of a microradian. This is sults in a beam which becomes less intense as equivalent to hitting a television set in Los An- it travels out from its source; the maximum geles with a beam fired from directly over New possible intensity of a laser beam (assuming York City. the greatest possible degree of focusing) falls In order to complete a thermal kill, the beam off as the square of the distance from the la- has to dwell on the target long enough to de- ser. The amount of diffraction depends on both posit a lethal amount of energy. Tracking ac- the wavelength of the radiation and the diam- curacy must therefore be maintained over that eter of the mirror, with the minimum possi- interval. During one second, an ICBM may ble spreading angle in radians” being equal to travel from 1 to 7 km (depending on when it about 1.2 times the ratio of the wavelength of is engaged) and can sweep through an angle the radiation to the diameter of the laser aper- 12 (as observed by the laser weapon) of up to ture. This angle of spreading is an ideal limit, about 3,000 microradians. assuming perfect optics and perfect focusing. An important consequence is that the smaller Chemical Lasers: the wavelength, or the larger the laser mirror Description. –Chemical lasers use the diameter, the less spreading occurs. To reduce energy from a chemical reaction between two diffraction, and therefore to reduce the beam fuels to produce laser radiation. The most ma- size on target and deliver more energy per unit ture chemical laser technology for high- area, wavelength should be minimized and powered lasers is the hydrogen fluoride (HF) ‘] One radl~n is an angle of 360/2 ~ (about 57.3) degrees. It or the deuterium fluoride (DF) laser, in which is defined as the angle subtended by that portion of the circum- hydrogen (deuterium) and fluorine combine to ference of a circle having a length equal to the circle’s radius. 12 form hydrogen (deuterium) fluoride. Relatively Ashton Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, background paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assess- high levels of power have already been ment (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April produced in this type of laser, although a ma- 1984), p. 17, takes the spreading angle to be 1.2 times the wave length divided by the mirror diameter. It is noted that the full jor scale-up from these levels is still needed angle subtended by the null ring of the Airy disk diffraction ——— - pattern requires a multiplier of 2.4. However, most of the energy 13 For exmple, the minimum diffraction UIgh? for a wave is contained within a diameter only half as big; therefore, 1.2 length (in the infrared) of 3 microns (millionths of a meter), using is taken as the multiplier. This assumption is favorable to the a perfect mirror 10 meters in diameter, would be 3.6 x 10-7 laser technology, since not all of the beam’s energy is contained radians, or 0.36 microradians. Even this small angle, however, within this angle; the lethality of the actual beam will thus be would result in a beam spot of about 1 meter diameter at a dis- slightly less than the estimates in this section. tance of 3,OOO km. 149 before power levels necessary for BMD can be We could also increase the diameter of the obtained. The HF (DF) wavelength is 2.7 (3.8) mirror to extend lethal range. By doubling the microns (millionths of a meter). Other chemi- mirror diameter to 20 meters, the spreading cal lasers at different wavelengths are under angle is reduced by a factor of 2, and the de- consideration, such as oxygen-iodine (1.3 livered intensity increases by a factor of 4. microns wavelength), iodine fluoride (0.65 and Therefore + the lethal range of a laser weapon 0.72 microns), and nitrogen oxide (0.24 grows as the laser power and as the square of microns). the mirror diameter. For illustrative purposes, we can look at po- Issues.—Several technical questions must tential requirements for an HF laser. As men- be resolved in order to demonstrate the feasi- tioned above, the diffraction phenomenon sets bility of the chemical laser approach. The re- a lower limit on angular spreading. Approach- quired laser power levels must be approached ing this limit requires a significant technical closely enough to assure that no significant effort; for illustrative purposes, the following engineering problems will prevent scaling up example assumes that this theoretical limit to the full required power. Mirrors of the re- can be attained in practice. quired dimensions and quality must be constructed and tested at high power levels. The The beam from an HF laser with a 10-meter total system of the required power, optical diameter mirror would have a minimum angu- quality, and physical size must be robust lar spread of 1.2 x 2,7 x 10 ‘/10 = 0.32 micro- enough for transport to on-orbit position. The radians. At a distance of 1,000 km, therefore, atmospheric absorption of HF infrared radia- a spot size of about 0.3 meters diameter would tion does not permit ground-basing (although be produced. A laser of 20 megawatts (MW) this is not necessarily true for other wave- output power would have an intensity of 25 2 lengths under consideration). Finally, the kW/cm at this distance. A watt is a joule per physical characteristics of the system should second. Therefore, exposures of 0.04 to 4 sec- permit the installation of many units in orbit, onds would be required to reach the level of 2 given the transport shuttle capabilities likely 1 to 100 kJ/cm . At a distance of 2,000 kilom- to be available within two decades or so. To eters, exposures four times as long would be deal with Soviet countermeasures making required. At 100 kilometers, the required times their boosters more resistant to attack, it would be 100 times shorter.14 would be necessary to increase greatly bright- The length of time required to deliver a le- ness levels over those needed to counter ex- thal amount of energy is inversely proportion- isting Soviet ICBMs. Such devices would be alto the power of the laser, if the other param- several orders of magnitude beyond present eters are held constant. Thus, if a 20 MW laser capabilities, and would require reducing the were to be replaced by a 40 MW laser of the laser wavelength, increasing laser power, in- same wavelength and mirror diameter, the re- creasing the size of the optics, or some com- quired dwell time would be cut in half. bination of the three. Excimer Lasers: Description. –Another promising area of la- “The device parameters used here are only intended as examples. Although relatively powerful H F lasers have been conser research is the excimer laser. An “excimer” structed and operated, none has yet come close to a 20 MW is an excited dimer, or two-atom molecule, typ- rating. The largest telescope mirror in the United States, at ically consisting of a noble gas (e.g., argon, the Mt. Palomar observatory, is 200 inches (5.08 m) in diameter; a telescope using a 10-meter diameter mirror is currently be- krypton, xenon) atom and a halogen (e.g., chlo- ing designed by astronomers at the University of California. rine, fluorine) atom. In an excited state, these The diameter of the Space Telescope mirror is 2.5 meters. No mirrors of this size have yet handled megawatts of electromag- two atoms can form a bound molecular sys- netic radiation. There are, however, no obvious technical bars tem. When the molecule drops to a ground to prevent either the laser or the mirrors from being developed. state, it rapidly disassociates into two separate 150 atoms: noble gases do not form stable mole- be aimed at one or more mirrors in geosynchro- cules in the ground state. The excited popu- nous orbit. This scheme would have the obvi- lation of excimer molecules is produced by a ous advantage of utilizing a ground-based pulsed electrical discharge process, rather than power source, allowing continuous operation by a continuous chemical reaction. The light for long periods of time and reducing the produced, therefore, occurs in pulses. After the weight placed into geosynchronous orbit. pulse of laser radiation is produced, the proc- There would have to be several lasers, since ess repeats with a new electrical discharge, cloud cover could render some of them useless leading to another “pumping” of excited dimer at a given moment. The geostationary relay molecules. Relative to HF lasers, excimer la- mirrors would reflect the beams from the sers have the advantage of a shorter wave- ground lasers onto smaller battle mirrors in length (typically 0.3 to 0.5 microns in the near low-earth orbit, which, in turn, would track in- ultraviolet to visible region of the spectrum), dividual targets and redirect the laser beam which greatly reduces the size requirements to them.15 The geostationary relay mirror on mirrors. As a result, however, the optical would have to be much larger in diameter and requirements for mirror uniformity are that much more complicated if it were to attack much more stringent. boosters directly without the help of lower orbit battle mirrors. Using the battle mirrors, The reduced requirement on mirror size, if the relay mirror need not track individual tar- such mirrors can be made, is a significant ad- gets at all. A constellation of battle mirrors vantage over longer wavelength options. The would be needed so that enough of them could fact that the wavelength is only about one- always be on station to deal with missiles tenth that of infrared lasers means that, for launched from all possible launch sites. Note a given range, the mirror’s diameter need only that this scheme is impractical for long wave- be one tenth that required for chemical lasers. length lasers since the required mirror sizes The area, then, would only be one-hundredth are so large. as large. Since the thickness of a mirror, including its support structure, can be kept Even at short wavelengths, a very power- fairly constant over a substantial range of di- ful laser would be needed in order to travel ameters, its weight will be approximately pro through the atmosphere and bounce off sev- portional to its area. Excimer laser mirrors, eral mirrors while retaining its lethality. (The then, with one-tenth the diameter, may weigh additional spreading introduced by making only on the order of one-hundredth as much the beam travel out to geosynchronous orbit as HF laser mirrors with the same capability. and back can be compensated for by making To see the advantage of the shorter wave- the relay mirrors sufficiently large in diame- length laser, consider the hypothetical exam- ter.) A very large quantity of power (hundreds ple of placing a laser in geosynchronous orbit of megawatts) would have to be available on where it could always see all of the Soviet mis- short notice to each of the ground-based lasers. sile fields. The distance of effectiveness would In order to compensate for atmospheric dis- have to be about 40,000 kilometers. At that tortions, a technique known as “adaptive op- range, an HF laser would require a perfect mir- tics” is being developed. A pilot laser beam ror of about 130 meters in diameter to keep the beam size down to 1 meter in diameter at 15 the target. This is infeasible for the foresee- Relay mirrors could be in lower orbit than geosynchronous, and could therefore be somewhat smaller than they would have able future. However, an excimer laser would to be if they were in geosynchronous orbit. However, since mir- require a mirror of the order of “only” 15 me- rors in lower orbit would not remain over the same spot on the ters in diameter for the same size beam spot. ground, enough would be required so that one or, preferably, more would always be in a position to relay the laser beam to Placing any sort of a BMD-capable laser in an appropriate battle mirror. In addition, if the relay mirror orbits were too low, more than one bounce would be required geosynchronous orbit may, however, be im- to direct the beam from a ground laser to a battle mirror on practical. Instead, a ground-based laser might the other side of the Earth. .-. 151

Figure 7-2.—Compensating for Atmospheric presence of such an intense beam has not yet Distortion With Adaptive Optics been demonstrated. Mirrors of the required Probe beam Output beam size and robustness, and satisfying the exact- ing tolerances, must be constructed. They must withstand intense laser beams without distorting significantly or failing. Unlike the HF case, only a few very large ones need be made. However, many more smaller battle mirrors, each with a diameter of about 5 meters, would be needed. With countermeasures by the offense, this number could increase further. A possibly significant problem for this system, as well as any other directed-energy system, is the need to retarget from one object to another in 1 second or less. This requirement may be quite difficult to meet; greater retargeting times would not rule out given Detector Main Laser weapons systems, but could imply the need for Phase information from an incoming probe beam reveals far larger constellation sizes (see section on atmospheric distortion. Large ground-based laser beam is distorted in the opposite sense to cancel out the atmospheric System Architecture, p. 179 ff.). If only small effects. retargeting angles are needed for a single sat- SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment ellite, fast retargeting may be easier to attain; this possibility is under investigation. sent from the space mirror would be detected Another issue to be resolved is the ability at the ground-based laser. Information from to produce excimer lasers of the power levels the beam would reveal the pattern of phase required. Current excimers are several orders shifts caused by atmospheric distortions. As of magnitude smaller than requirements for a result, corrections could be applied to the SDI applications. Large amounts of power will beam generated by the ground laser, possibly have to be delivered in short pulses. The re- by distorting a mirror at many points over its quired power levels will depend on the results surface, in such a way as to compensate for of research in the various fields. Excimer the atmospheric effects. Atmospheric distur- lasers tend to have a high weight-to-output bances typically occur over times which are power ratio, which would make them more on the order of tenths of a second, during problematic for space-basing. This would not which time the pilot beam can travel through affect a ground-based mode, where weight is the relevant part of the atmosphere (the 20 km less of a consideration. nearest the surface), the main laser beam can be corrected for the distortion, and the beam Free-Electron Lasers: can propagate back out through the atmos- Description. –When the paths of charged phere, all before the disturbance changes sig- particles are bent by a magnetic field, they nificantly. As atmospheric distortions change, emit radiation. The recently developed free- the optics would automatically compensate. electron laser uses this principle in an innova- Issues. –To determine the feasibility of this tive way to produce laser radiation. A beam ground-laser/space-mirror approach, the adap- of electrons is passed through a periodically- tive optics method of compensating for atmos- varying magnetic field. The radiation pro- pheric distortion must be examined for high duced can provide an intense coherent beam. power levels over long distances. The ability In the free-electron laser, the interaction of the to compensate for atmospheric effects in the electrons and the magnetic field replaces the 152

laser beam while maintaining the required optical quality. X-Ray Lasers: Description. —Like the free-electron laser, X- ray lasers are relatively new. The “pumping” of the lasant material to an excited state would be accomplished by intense sources of radiation, such as a nearby nuclear explosion, an optical laser, or some other source. Should a nuclear explosion be used to pump an X-ray laser, that laser could be lethal to a target even if the energy conversion process were very inefficient since the energy produced in just a small nuclear explosion is still very large. The U.S. Department of Energy is investigating the feasibility of developing nuclear-pumped X-ray laser weapons; however, it has classified virtually all details of this research other than its existence. excited energy levels of a lasant as the source of coherent radiation. The wavelength, which An advantage of a nuclear-pumped X-ray la- depends on the periodicity of the magnetic ser weapon would be that it would have the field and on the electron energy, can be changed potential for killing many targets using mul- as desired by varying either one. Such a laser tiple beams, providing high leverage and coun- operating in the visible could be ground-based, tering attempts to saturate the defense. A dis- using space-based reflectors to reach targets advantage of such a weapon would be that it beyond the horizon (see previous section). could be fired only once—the explosion that High energy efficiencies could also permit the powered such a weapon would very shortly af- possibility of space-based lasers. terwards destroy it. Such a weapon would not be able to assess damage and fire again, al- In addition to the advantages of good beam though a second weapon could certainly do so. quality and high energy efficiencies which are obtainable, the free-electron laser also has the There are natural limits on the distance to advantage of being able to use a relatively ma- which X-rays can propagate within the atmos- ture technology: that of the particle accel- phere, where they are rapidly absorbed. Since erator. an X-ray laser used for a boost-phase defense must therefore wait for a booster to climb issues.—The process is potentially more higher than the minimum altitude to which the energy efficient than other schemes, and it has X-rays can reach (which depends on parame- the significant advantage of frequency tuna- ters such as X-ray intensity, wavelength, and bility. The technology is in its infancy, al- incident angle), the time available for the de- though progressing rapidly, and much research fense to act is reduced. effort is needed to determine its potential for application as a directed-energy weapon. The A conceivable mode for use of X-ray lasers, SD I program is investigating whether power assuming that they would be developed as levels can be scaled up by many orders of mag- weapons, is the pop-up technique. The relative nitude at useful wavelengths. It is also study- ly low weight of such a weapon system could ing, as in the case of excimer lasers, whether contribute to the desirability of such an archi- window and mirror materials can be developed tecture. The lasers could be deployed on spe- which are capable of withstanding the intense cially developed submarine-launched missiles. 153

When the defense receives notice of an attack, particles exist in various sizes all over the it could launch its pop-up weapons to an alti- world. They are used for fundamental research tude sufficient to attack one or several ICBM in the areas of solid state, nuclear, and, above boosters or post-boost vehicles after they have all, high energy physics. It is known and risen above the minimum engagement alti- understood how to produce and accelerate all tude. In such a system, the weapons would not manner of atomic and subatomic particles. The have to be deployed in space, avoiding a seri- challenge for weapons purposes is to produce ous vulnerability problem faced by space-laser beams of very high intensity which are also or ground-laser/space-mirror schemes. Also, extremely collimated-i. e., which are narrow deploying nuclear-pumped weapons on subma- and have a small spreading angle, so that the rines, rather than in space, would avoid violat- particles move in very nearly parallel paths. ing the Outer Space Treaty (see appendix C). Accelerators producing such beams must be Other military applications of this technology light enough to be placed in space economical- may be possible, but are beyond the scope of ly, and they must be very reliable. this report. In order to accelerate particles with electric Issues.–The first question to be resolved is fields, one must use charged particles. How- whether the X-ray laser can be developed to ever, over long distances, a charged beam will the point of use as a weapon. The efficiency bend in the Earth’s magnetic field, present- of the conversion process and the possibility ing formidable difficulties in targeting. Inhom- of achieving adequate levels of brightness are ogeneities in the Earth’s field can render it major issues. If a pop-up mode were to be in- virtually impossible to direct a beam at a tar- vestigated, secondary systems-related ques- get spot of a meter size, or so, at the distance tions would also arise. Since the X-ray lasers of thousands of kilometers. would have to be popped up after a Soviet Preliminary experiments in laboratories launch, their boosters would have to be sub- have led to some hope that for low-Earth orbit stantially faster and more rapidly accelerat- altitudes, it maybe possible to use a charged ing than the Soviets’, which would have a head beam by means of the following mechanism. start. This means that the pop-up would have A laser first ionizes a straight path through to burn much more fuel per unit payload the rarefied near-space environment. Then, an weight than its target. A system would have electron beam is fired along this channel, with to be developed with an almost instantaneous the positively charged gas ions providing an response time, including high-quality commu- electrostatic restoring force which compen- nications links between the orbiting satellite sates for the bending forces of the Earth’s sensors and the submarines. Further, a sub- magnetic field. Demonstrating the ultimate marine, which might only be able to fire one practicality of such a scheme requires further rocket at a time with a delay between succes- resolution of a number of issues. sive launches, could become a “sitting duck” once it had revealed its location by firing. The A less exotic solution is to produce a neu- practicality of a global scheme involving pop- tral beam, unaffected by magnetic fields, which up X-ray lasers of this type is doubtful. will travel in a straight line and be more easily Particle Beams: directable to a target. To make a neutral hydrogen beam, for example, a large number of Description. —Unlike electromagnetic radi- hydrogen ions is created by attaching an extra ation, which consists of pure energy, beams electron to neutral hydrogen atoms. The of subatomic particles consist of bits of mat- charged ions (H - ) are then accelerated by ter. They can be protons, electrons, neutral electric fields, and, after exiting the accelera- atoms, heavy ions, or more exotic types. They tor, are neutralized by one of a variety of tech- are accelerated to velocities approaching the niques. The extra electron can be knocked off speed of light by electric fields in particle by passing the ion beam through a small amount accelerators. Accelerators for diverse types of of matter, for example, or it can be stripped 154 — off by means of appropriately tuned laser ra- Individual particle energy, however, is only diation. In either case, a set of neutral hydro- one of the parameters that determines a par- gen atoms is again produced. Now, however, ticle beam’s effectiveness as a weapon. Anoth- they are traveling together in very large num- er is the beam current, which is proportional bers at nearly the speed of light. to the number of particles per second in the beam. The beam current (in amperes”) multi- This beam of neutral particles contains a sig- plied by the energy of each particle (in electron- nificant amount of energy, can penetrate sev- volts) gives the total beam power (in watts). eral centimeters into virtually any material, The brightness of a particle beam, which de- and can penetrate typical aerospace materials termines the power that can be delivered per to a depth of tens of centimeters. Because of unit area at a given distance, depends on the this penetrating power, neutral particle beams beam power and additionally on how tightly may be difficult to countermeasure. The hy- the beam can be focused. At present, particle drogen atom’s electron is quickly stripped off beams are closest to the required level of as the atom enters the target. The bare proton brightness of all the directed energy options which remains deposits its energy more or less generally discussed for SDI. uniformly along its path through the material, with a slight enhancement in the small region One problem with a particle beam weapon where it finally comes to rest. If the beam will be kill assessment. A beam intensity suffi- strikes electronic circuits, such as those in cient to disable its target electronics may not guidance systems, they can be fatally altered be sufficient to produce external effects which or destroyed, rendering the target “stupid” are immediately observable. This drawback and unable to function in its progr ammed way. might impose severe problems regarding tar- An energy deposition of some tens of joules geting decisions if neutral beams are to be per square centimeter could be sufficient to de- used in such a “soft,” functional kill mode. To stroy unprotected electronics in a target. The provide externally observable effects, bright- deliverable energy requirements for this type ness levels perhaps a thousand times greater of weapon, therefore, are considerably less might be required, unless the guidance system stringent than in the case of lasers, where 1 of a booster or post-boost vehicle were struck to 100 kJ/cm2 (10 to 1,000 MJ/m2) may be re- in such a way as to cause obvious trajectory quired. At higher levels of neutral particle modifications. beam energy deposition, objects can be melted A related problem is tracking the beam. If and explosives detonated. the beam misses the target, it will be very dif- Such a weapon, however, can work only out- ficult to know where it went; even if it strikes side the atmosphere: even a small amount of the target, it may not be visible at “soft” kill air will strip off the electrons, resulting in a intensities. “Open-loop” pointing, in which one beam of charged protons. These will be bent measures the direction of the beam as it exits by the Earth’s magnetic field and will also be the accelerator with great precision, is a pos- scattered by collisions with atmospheric mol- sible solution, but it remains to be demon- ecules. As a result, the beam will not be effec- strated. tive against targets below about 100 km. A further problem would be presented if the Issues.-The energy of each particle in a par- electronic components of beam weapon targets ticle beam is not a serious problem. Energies were hardened against radiation. Circuits of several hundred million electron-volts are using gallium-arsenide (GaAs) technology usually discussed in this context, which are could be as much as 1,000 times more resis- well within the limits of current capabilities tant to radiation than commonly existing cir- for the particles in question. In fact, the larg- — est accelerators today are able to reach ener- “Neutral beams, which are not charged, technically carry no electrical current. The intensity of a neutral particle beam in gies a thousand times higher, although at low- amperes is the electrical current that the beam would carry if er intensities. each particle in it had the charge of one electron. 155 — — cuits based on silicon technology .17 Such hardening could increase resistance to ionizing radiation by a factor of up to 1,000, stressing further the energy delivery requirement of a particle beam weapon. The system hardness, however, may not be increased by the same large factor as the component hardness. Another serious issue is whether an accelerator can be constructed which will be light enough to permit many to be placed in orbit, and which will retain the ability to function reliably after long periods of dormancy. While current Earth-bound accelerators approach the necessary beam intensities, they are large and heavy and also require maintenance and repair at irregular intervals. Space-qualified equivalents would need to be much lighter, much more reliable (since they would be harder to fix), and like other space-based assets, protected against attack.

Kinetic Nonnuclear Kill Boost, Post-Boost, and Midcourse Phase: Description. –A classic method of destroying a target is simply to hit it with another object having a large velocity relative to the target. This method utilizes kinetic energy, or energy of motion, and has been used for a good many millenia in forms such as rocks, cata- pults, arrows, and bullets. Missiles and RVs travel at high speed, typically several kilometers per second; they can be killed quite ef- ets or electromagnetically launched projec- fectively by colliding with something else mov- tiles. Satellite sensors would detect a launch ing at a significantly different velocity. The and would hand tracking information over to problem lies in arranging the collision-in the battle station. The rockets would be as- reaching the missile or warhead and hitting it. signed to, aimed at, and launched towards This technique could be implemented by a their targets. When close enough, homing de- constellation of space-based battle stations, tectors on the projectiles would be used to di- each containing a large number of small rock- rect them to their targets. The kill could be by means of striking the target directly or by ——— detonating an explosive near it, sending frag- 17G~u~ ~wfide (GAs) ij42chno10gy shows promise for m~- ments into it. (Outside the atmosphere, of ing circuits which are faster, as well as much more radiation- resistant, than circuits based on silicon technology. It is there- course, an explosion does not produce a shock fore a topic of intense research interest by the Department of wave, so the fragments would be necessary for Defense as well as by private industry. GaAs technology will a kill.) likely be considerably more expensive than equivalent silicon circuits, primarily because silicon technology has had the ben- For attacking boosters, the bright infrared efit of decades of intensive research. However, it will probably become the technology of choice for many applications requir- signal from the rocket plume serves as a targ- ing speed or radiation-resistance. et for a short-wave infrared homing device; 156 however, the projectile will probably need to If the length of the boost phase were re- correct for the distance between the booster duced, interceptor ranges would be corre- body and that portion of the exhaust plume spondingly reduced. The MX missile burns out flame or engine nozzle which emits most in about 180 seconds. The Soviets are current- brightly in the infrared. For post-boost vehi- ly testing an MX-like ICBM (the SS-X-24) which cles or RVs, short-wave infrared sensors could would therefore effectively shorten the maxi- not be used since the PBVs (except during mum interceptor range from that attainable short bursts of their rocket motors) and RVs against an SS-18. A fast-burn booster would would be at much lower temperatures than the reduce the effective range still further. boosters and would radiate much weaker sig- Another issue for infrared homing devices nals at longer wavelengths. Cooled, long-wave involves the ability of such detectors to func- infrared detectors could be used during the tion in the upper atmosphere. Since friction post-boost and midcourse phases, but other with the atmosphere will heat the skin of the sensing devices might be required because the interceptor rocket, any infrared detector will relatively cool targets may not be readily de- have to look out through a very hot window. tectable by infrared means against the back- Windows which do not emit much infrared ra- ground of the Earth. Short- and long-wave in- diation even when heated to high tempera- frared detectors, along with other sensors, are tures will be required. If homing interceptors discussed further in the following section on cannot be made to operate in the atmosphere, sensors (p. 159 ff.). it will become necessary to wait until boosters Issues.–A major question is whether the have left the atmosphere before intercepting space-based rocket could reach the booster be- them. Alternatively, interceptors might dis- fore burnout. Basing at altitudes of about 400 pense with homing sensors, being guided by kilometers has been discussed. Soviet SS-18 commands sent from other satellites better able rockets burn out in about 300 seconds at an to track the boosters (“command guidance”). altitude of about 400 km. If the satellite plat- Homing outside the atmosphere has already forms carrying the interceptor rockets were been demonstrated in a test configuration. The based at an orbital altitude of about 400 km, Homing Overlay Experiment conducted by the an interceptor could travel horizontally for up U.S. Army in June 1984 demonstrated the abil- to 300 seconds to reach a booster if it could ity to find a cool target outside the atmosphere be launched at the same time that the booster against the cold background of space, and to was. If the platform is based at a higher alti- home in on it accurately enough to collide with tude, the interceptor will have to shoot down it. Similar technology is utilized by the U.S. Air to reach the booster and will not have as far Force’s air-launched ASAT weapon. a horizontal range. Interceptors could attain higher velocities If the interceptors had a burnout velocity using a developing technology: the electro- of 10 km/sec,18 each could travel about 3,000 magnetic railgun. An intense magnetic field km in 300 seconds, giving them a useful range. is used to impart large velocities to electrically A terminal velocity this high for a chemical conducting projectiles; the conductor can be rocket would imply a very small ratio of pay- formed by ionizing a substance which might load weight to fuel weight; this would be com- be an insulator in its normal state. Speeds of pensated for, in part, by multi-staging, but the greater than 20 km/sec or more are envisioned. need for a low-cost lift capability to place the Such techniques would appear promising be- interceptors and their fuel in orbit would nev- cause they could greatly extend the range of ertheless be manifested. interceptors based in space. However, attaining such a high velocity by the time the projec- 18 For comparison, a satellite in low-Earth orbit travels at tile has left the gun requires accelerations hun- about 8 km/sec. dreds of thousands of times that of gravity. 157 ———

Problems to solve, besides the actual proof of Cost-exchange issues will be very important. principle at these high velocities, are the de- For a given hypothetical defense system, the velopment of large power sources, power de- cost of large numbers of interceptor vehicles livery in short pulses, good recoil momentum will have to be compared to the cost of addi- compensation so as not to degrade pointing tional incoming RVs1. Crucial to the cost cal- capabilities, and the development of materi- culations is the defensive system’s footprint, als and guidance systems of very low mass i.e., the size of its defended area. The larger which can survive the rapid accelerations the footprint, the fewer systems are needed. needed. The ability to refire rapidly and accu- Overall, the state of the art of terminal in- rately would also have to be developed. terceptors, with the associated sensors and Terminal Phase: battle management systems, is closer to practicality than many other BMD technologies. Description.–In the terminal intercept However, these technologies at present are phase, kinetic-energy interceptors could be best applied to hardened targets. Discrimina- very high acceleration rockets located near the tion is easier because intercepts can be de- sites to be defended. If nonnuclear, they would layed, and a far smaller volume of space would kill by striking their targets or by detonation have to be covered. Near-term technology may and fragmentation near the target. Phased-ar- be capable of defending hardened targets ray radars (electronically steered and able to against a significant fraction of incoming RVs. shift rapidly from one target to another) would However, the detonation resulting from the track RVs and decoys and give pointing infor- first intercept (in case the target were salvage- mation to the interceptors, which would then fused, giving a nuclear explosion upon impact) home in on their targets with radar or infrared could make subsequent intercepts difficult. sensors. These problems could be mitigated by harden- Another possible technique is the “swarm- ing sensors and by providing high levels of jet” proposal. A large number of small rockets redundancy. is fired in the direction of an incoming RV Interceptors would themselves have to be towards a region 50 m in diameter at a range placed in hardened sites in order to remain of 1 km from the defended site. If properly operational in the case of a nearby nuclear ex- timed, the swarm would have a high probabil- plosion. The survival of some fraction of the ity of destroying the RV. Since intercepts take targets could thus probably be assured, unless place close to the ground, decoys will have al- a very large number of RVs per target were ready burned up during reentry and will not attacking. be a problem. However, the attacking warhead may be salvage-fused to detonate when inter- Soft targets, however, would be more diffi- cepted, and since intercepts will take place cult to defend. As has been stated, the higher relatively close to the defended object, a intercept altitudes needed to protect soft targ- “swarmjet” defense would only be suitable for ets make discrimination harder and also re- defending hardened targets able to survive a quire defending a much larger volume. nearby nuclear explosion. Nuclear Kill: Issues. –The ability of a nonnuclear homing device to kill an RV outside the atmosphere Description. –The discontinued U.S. Safe- has been shown. However, in addition, either guard ABM system used a nuclear warhead the interceptor or (more likely) the overall bat- to kill incoming RVs. Such a system was de- tle management system must be able to dis- sirable when homing systems could not ap- criminate between decoys and RVs (see dis- proach closely enough to kill by impact or by cussion on discrimination, p. 162 ff. ). For in- explosion and fragmentation. The Low Alti- tercepts deep within the atmosphere, the at- tude Defense System (LoADS), which used nu- mosphere itself will screen out decoys. clear-armed interceptors for protecting hard 158

targets, had been under development until it was recently reemphasized under SDI. In principle, nuclear-armed missiles, representing a mature technology, could soon be operation- alas elements of a terminal defense. Although major uncertainties still remain concerning the operation of such a system in the presence of many nuclear detonations, improved sensors, radar tracking, and communications would re- suit in a more effective system now than could have been built in the early 1970s. These improvements would make nuclear interceptors a possible fall-back position for terminal defenses, in case serious impediments develop in adapting nonnuclear kill technologies for that purpose. For example, maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) might be able to evade interceptors to the extent that a nonnuclear kill vehicle could not approach within lethal range. The greater kill radius of a nuclear warhead might compensate for inability to achieve a close approach. There could also be uses for nuclear kill against space-based defenses. Space mines, or weapons placed in orbit with the purpose of detonating on command to destroy enemy battle stations or to neutralize satellite sensors, could be nuclear-armed. They could also be salvage-fused so that, once within lethal range of a potential target, they could destroy that target even if attacked themselves. In terms of killing attacking missiles or RVs, nuclear kills maybe less desirable, since they might not destroy more than one target at a time but could complicate other defensive actions by damaging or blinding elements of the defensive system. Issues.—When using nuclear interceptors in the terminal phase, difficulties could arise from collateral damage or blinding of the defense’s own radar tracking system and communications. Such use implies the need for hardened electronics, robust radar tracking, Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense and effective battle management to minimize Launched in November, 1984 from White Sands Missile collateral damage. Homing systems that Range, New Mexico, as part of the Small Radar Homing Technology (SRHIT, pronounced “S-R-hit”) Program. would permit use of very small nuclear weap- A novel steering steering system is being used. ons could mitigate some of these effects, par- 159 ticularly for exoatmospheric interception. If appropriately be used. (Sensors used for dis- incoming missiles are salvage-fused, however, crimination, as opposed to surveillance, are the environment would be stressful to defen- discussed in the next section. Seep. 162 ff.). sive battle management whether or not the defenses use nuclear-armed missiles. It should Boost Phase. –The hot gases exhausting from an ICBM booster motor emit hundreds be remembered that an advantage of nuclear kill is that the technology is essentially cur- of kilowatts at short- and medium-wave infrared (SWIR and MWIR) wavelengths of a few rently available. microns. This radiation can be detected by sensors at great distances. Both the United Sensors and Data Processing States and the Soviet Union now obtain early Advances in sensors and in data processing warning of ballistic missile launch by sensing technology-in the ability to acquire and ma- the infrared radiation from these exhaust nipulate information–have had at least as plumes; U.S. early warning satellites are at much to do with the resurgent interest in bal- geosynchronous orbit 36,000 km above the listic missile defense as have advances in Equator, while their Soviet counterparts travel weaponry. In addition to their key roles in in highly elliptical orbits which are at even BMD technologies, sensors and data proces- higher altitudes when over the United States. sors probably have greater general application The launch detection sensors characterize than advanced weapons concepts in other mil- the approximate size and trajectories of the itary (and of course in civilian) applications. ICBM attack in order to “hand off” the sus- All of the functions of a BMD system, save pected targets to systems having higher reso- target destruction, involve primarily sensors lution, which can examine the objects and aim and processors. As sensors acquire more and at the threatening ones. In addition, some dis- more data and incorporate greater amounts of crimination can be done at the earliest stages processing directly within the sensing compo- of detection, depending on the spatial and nents, it becomes increasingly difficult to sep- spectral resolution of these early warning sen- arate these two functions. Perhaps a better sors and the image processing software used breakdown would be sensors (including proc- with them. If the infrared sources are not mov- essing), and other data processing activity, ing, or are not moving towards defended areas, such as battle management or command and then they do not pose a threat. control. Battle management will be discussed If a boost-phase layer is present in the de- in a later section on “System Architecture”; fense system, it will only have a few minutes the following discussion will concentrate on after launch detection in which to destroy the the data acquisition and manipulation per- climbing boosters. Once infrared sources are formed by the sensors of a ballistic missile de- detected and are identified to be ICBMs, the fense system. detection sensors will “hand off” their tracks Sensors can further be broken down into sur- to the pointing and tracking sensors associ- veillance and acquisition sensors, whose pri- ated with each weapon system. mary function is to notice threatening objects Post-Boost and Midcourse Phases.—Surveil- and determine their approximate location, and lance requirements become considerably more higher resolution sensors, which investigate difficult in the post-boost and midcourse these objects in much greater detail. phases because the objects to be detected are no longer necessarily associated with conspic- Surveillance and Acquisition uous infrared sources. By the end of the boost There are a number of technological candi- phase, all the ICBM booster stages have burnt dates for performing surveillance and acqui- out and dropped off, leaving the post-boost ve- sition functions. They are distinguished in this hicle. The PBV then dispenses reentry vehi- section by the phase in which they would most cles and decoys, changing course slightly to 160

aim each weapon individually before letting it nents and detonate on command, destroying go.” both themselves and the BMD component. The PBVs, decoys, and deployed RVs can LWIR sensors are useful for such space sur- be detected by their own radiation, rather than veillance systems. Any object in space for a that emitted by their hot exhaust gases. Ob- long enough period of time will reach a steady jects more or less at room temperature emit temperature when the rate at which it absorbs long-wavelength infrared (LWIR) radiation hav- energy (either from the Sun or radiated up ing wavelengths mostly near 10 microns. (By from the Earth) equals the rate at which it comparison, the Sun is hot enough to shine in emits LWIR radiation. The amount of absorbed the visible portion of the spectrum, with wave- power, which tends to heat the object up, de- lengths primarily near 0.5 microns. Rocket ex- pends on the surface properties and the sur- haust, which is cooler than the surface of the face area of the object; the amount of radiated Sun but is still much hotter than the PBVs, power, which tends to cool the object down, RVs, and decoys, emits radiation primarily in depends on its surface properties, its size, and the short- and medium-wave infrared wave- its temperature. For example, the average lengths of a few microns.) temperature of the Earth itself is set by the balance between absorbed sunlight and emitted LWIR radiation can be detected by sensors LWIR; a similar process goes on for all satellites. which are cooled to near absolute zero in order to prevent their own radiation from swamp- In addition, any equipment on a satellite ing the signal.20 Such sensors can search for that uses electrical power will dissipate heat, objects already in space (deployed warheads, further raising the satellite’s temperature. Al- satellites, decoys, or debris) without having to though modifying the satellite’s surface prop- observe a launch, and they can provide inde- erties can lessen the amount of LWIR power pendent backup for the launch surveillance radiated at a given wavelength, doing so would systems. also increase the object’s reflectivity at those wavelengths.21 Emission and reflection cannot In addition to detecting deployed warheads be minimized simultaneously, and lessening which may have escaped launch detection, a one will increase the other. BMD system must do space surveillance in order to keep track of threats to itself. Before As stated above, the Earth itself is a power- launching nuclear weapons against terrestrial ful LWIR emitter. It will be hard for LWIR targets, the offense may choose to attack the surveillance sensors to pick out satellites when defensive system directly in order to damage seen against this background. Therefore, or disable it. Therefore, the BMD system must space-based LWIR surveillance systems will keep track of satellites which could attack look away from the Earth, spotting objects from a long range (those suspected of holding against the cold background of space. Low- nuclear warheads or directed-energy weapons), orbiting satellites can only be detected from objects which need to approach closely in or- space by looking just over the Earth’s horizon. der to attack (ground-based interceptors, or space-based nonnuclear ones), and satellites ————.—.— called space mines which, if allowed by the de- 21 A highly reflective surface only absorbs a small fraction of fense, could constantly trail system compo- the power striking it. However, since the ability of an object to emit power at a given wavelength is directly proportional to how well it can absorb that wavelength, a reflective object ‘The PBV itself intermittently fires small rocket motors to does not emit well, either. maneuver. These rockets emit detectable short- and medium- A piece of metal left out in the sun will heat up, even though wavelength infrared radiation, but only when firing. Their ra- it is highly reflective, because it radiates even less power in the diation is not nearly as bright as that produced by boosters. infrared than it absorbs in sunlight. The infrared power emit- 20Putting such sensors in space systems requires long-lived ted by an object increases rapidly as the object gets hotter (dou- (at least several years), lightweight, and low-power cryogenic bling the temperature above absolute zero increases emitted refrigerators capable of keeping them at their operating tem- power by a factor of 16), so the metal heats up until it can radi- perature. ate away as much power as it absorbs. SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Another problem may arise from the infra- to interference from the atmosphere, LWIR red backgrounds generated by nuclear explo- sensors cannot be used efficiently on the sions in the upper atmosphere. Such effects ground. Airborne observations are, however, are only partially understood and may remain feasible. mysterious in the absence of experimental nu- Terminal Phase.–Reentry vehicles and de- clear tests in the atmosphere. These would, of coys which survive the defenses long enough course, violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty. to reenter the atmosphere enter the terminal However, tests involving other sources of ioniz- phase of a BMD system. Since reentry vehi- ation are being carried out, in conjunction cles can be salvage-fused to detonate if they with computer simulations, to provide more are attacked, interception must take place at extensive knowledge on what might happen a high enough altitude if “soft” targets below in the upper atmosphere under such con- 22 are not to be destroyed. Surveillance systems ditions. Other techniques are available to do space ‘This “keep-out distance” depends on the yield of the weapon surveillance. The U.S. Air Force at present and the hardness of the target. At sea level, a 1 megaton weapon will produce overpressure of 2 pounds per square inch, which uses both radar and optical observations to structures might survive with repairable damage, at a distance monitor objects in space from the ground. Due of 13 km (8 miles) from the blast. 162

that could operate in the terminal phase in- length bands for which the two technologies clude ground-based radars and airborne optical can be utilized are starting to overlap, at and infrared detectors. LWIR detectors, lo- wavelengths on the order of a millimeter. cated on airplanes to provide mobility and to Surveillance and acquisition sensors also minimize atmospheric interference, can detect have wide application beyond BMD. Space reentry vehicles which have not yet started to surveillance systems would be useful either to reenter the atmosphere, helping exoatmospher- verify an anti-satellite arms control agree- ic interceptors to destroy them. Once the RVs ment, should one be concluded, or to support have begun reentry, they heat up and start to an ASAT weapon system, should such an agree- glow, permitting shorter wavelength infrared ment not be entered into.23 Such systems also and visible detection for endoatmospheric in- may have potential for permitting surveillance terception. of terrestrial targets such as airplanes, but Issues.–The technology of SWIR and MWIR they would need to contend with the highly sensors is fairly mature. Additional software significant additional problem of distinguish- and on-board processing capability will have ing the target from its surroundings. to be developed to do image processing. The requirements for surveillance and acquisition High-Resolution Sensors sensors and processing are not anticipated to Surveillance sensors are clearly necessary. stress the state of the art as much as other However, in most cases they will not be suffi- required BMD technologies will. cient. In addition to finding suspicious objects, LWIR technology is not as far advanced as a defensive system must also determine whether shorter wavelength sensor technology. As they are threatening or benign, aim weapons wavelength requirements increase, the task at the dangerous ones, and determine whether becomes more difficult since new detector ma- they have been destroyed. These functions of terials must be developed and since the sys- discrimination, pointing and tracking, and kill tems must operate at temperatures near abso- assessment, respectively, will require additiona- lute zero, However, LWIR space surveillance 1, higher-resolution sensors. The computa- systems have been designed, and the technol- tional capability which can be built into these ogies involved have been under investigation high-resolution systems could make it possi- for a number of years. The data processing re- ble to extract useful information from the quirements of post-boost and midcourse phase weak and/or noisy signals which they will be surveillance sensors are also stressing but may detecting. not present major technical problems if com- Discrimination. —Each layer of a defensive puter science continues to progress over the system must be able to differentiate between next two decades at the same rapid rate which objects which are missiles or warheads and ob- has been evident so far. jects which are decoys designed to fool the de- Radar technology of the sort applicable for fense into treating them as if they were mis- terminal defense is well advanced; radars have siles or warheads. If the defense is unable to been investigated for decades. Of particular distinguish between the two, its job is orders interest is making such radars small and of magnitude more difficult. cheap, so that they can be proliferated (de- If the defense is to be able to discriminate ployed in large number) to deny the offense effectively, it must utilize multiple phenomen- the ability to blind the terminal defense by de- ology—repeated observations of the same ob- stroying a single, high-value radar. The wavelength at which radars can operate has decreased steadily as technology has progressed. 23 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti- More recently, advances in infrared technol- satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, OTA- ISC-281 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, ogy have steadily increased the accessible in- September 1985), the companion report to the present volume, frared wavelengths. At present, the wave- for a detailed discussion. 163 — jects using different sensor systems and dif- jects. On the one hand, the independence of ferent physical principles–and it very likely the different layers will be compromised if will need high resolution sensors. Although de- later layers rely completely on the earlier ones coys which duplicate one particular observa- to detect and discriminate warheads. How- ble (radar cross section, temperature, size, etc.) ever, if earlier observations are used to en- of an actual warhead can be made relatively hance later ones, instead of to replace them, easily, it becomes progressively harder and independent observations of the same object harder to mimic more and more characteris- can be compared. tics simultaneously. If enough parameters are One technique which might make discrimi- to be duplicated, in principle it will cost as nation easier would be direct observation of much to build a highly accurate decoy as it 24 objects as they are deployed off of the PBVs. would just to add another RV. Note, how- In principle, it might be possible to see bal- ever, that the process of making decoys look loon decoys being inflated or to notice some more and more like warheads, or simulation, characteristic PBV behavior which indicates may not be as effective as making warheads that a weapon, rather than a decoy, has just look more and more like decoys, or anti-simu- been deployed. Objects correctly determined lation. These techniques will be discussed fur- at deployment to be decoys could therefore ther in “Countermeasures,” below (p. 170 ff.). safely be neglected by later layers. It is possible, in principle, to decoy ICBM Imaging the RVs and decoys requires high boosters. Discriminating true ICBMs from de- resolution. However, the same diffraction phe- coys could be done if accurate data on the ori- nomenon that limits how tightly a laser beam gin, trajectory, and characteristics of each can be focused also limits the the angular reso- launch could be obtained by the boost-phase lution with which images can be resolved. Ex- surveillance sensors. These operations require amining an object with 30 cm resolution (about primarily data processing capability and would 1 foot) from 3,000 km away requires an angu- not necessarily require high resolution. The ef- lar resolution of 0.1 microradian. To attain fort needed by the offense to defeat such a dis- such resolution in the long-wave infrared crimination scheme would depend on how much wavelengths (about 10 microns) which are data the defense were able to collect on each emitted by such objects, a telescope 120 me- launch (and on how well the offense knew what ters in diameter would be required! the defense was looking at). Note that if a booster decoy were launched from a pad which One way to mitigate the diffraction problem did not have some of the characteristics of an is to utilize prior information about the tar- ICBM launchpad, real missiles might then be get. If the target’s true appearance is already placed on similar pads to guarantee them a known, and only its precise location is re- free ride through at least the first defensive quired, the additional knowledge about its ap- layer. This is an example of anti-simulation. pearance makes it possible to calculate diffraction effects and remove them from the sensor If ICBMs are able to penetrate the boost- image. This process could yield a more precise phase system, each can begin to deploy tens location than would be otherwise obtainable. of warheads and/or hundreds of decoys. The remaining layers, then, may have to contend On the other hand, if it is not known what the target looks like, as would be the case before with thousands of warheads and hundreds of it had been identified, this technique would not thousands of decoys and other pieces of debris. be applicable. The defensive task is lessened if it is able to maintain “birth-to-death” tracking of all ob- The only other way to minimize diffraction is go to shorter wavelengths. Reducing the 24It is assumed in this example that adding RVs to defeat wavelength in the above example by a factor the defensive system is prohibitively expensive. If not, the offense presumably would have done just that and would not have of 50, changing the 10 micron wavelength worried about decoys in the first place. long-wavelength infrared radiation to 0.2 mi- 164 cron ultraviolet radiation, permits the same passive and might be able to operate without resolution to be obtainable from a mirror 50 revealing their location. The transmitter, of times smaller in diameter. However, since the course, would be highly visible, and the tar- objects to be observed do not emit brightly at gets might still be able to know when they are these shorter wavelengths, an active system— under observation. However, their ability to one which illuminates the target-must be interfere with the observations might be com- used. A laser radar, or ladar, lights up the tar- plicated if they did not know where the indi- get with a low power visible or ultraviolet laser vidual receivers were. beam while a telescope observes the reflected Pointing and Tracking.–Once the targets light. If the laser beam scans sequentially over have been detected and identified, weapons the telescope’s field of view, the laser need not must be trained upon them and fired. Point- illuminate that entire field at once, minimizing and tracking requirements, of course, will ing the required power. The wider the ladar’s differ for each type of weapon. Kinetic-kill ve- field of view, the less precisely it needs to know hicles having the ability to home in on their where to start looking for a target. targets need only be pointed closely enough Under certain conditions, antennas which for their on-board sensors to acquire the tar- are physically small can have the effect of very get. On the other hand, laser beams (except large ones, providing high resolution at long those which kill in one pulse) must be held on wavelengths. Microwave wavelengths on the a single spot on the target until damage is order of a centimeter, a thousand times longer achieved. Depending on the laser, this can re- than LWIR, would require an antenna equiva- quire localizing a beam to the order of tens of lent to one 120 km long to achieve the 0.1 centimeters at distances of up to thousands microradian resolution discussed above! How- of kilometers, or angular resolutions of less ever, very long antennas can be synthesized, than tenths of microradians. To obtain this in effect, if the antenna is moving. Processing resolution in the presence of diffraction, either together the echoes of signals emitted at dif- shorter wavelength active sensors or detailed ferent positions along the antenna’s path can knowledge of the target itself (or both) would yield a resolution equivalent to that of a sta- be required. tionary antenna which is as long as the path Part of the pointing problem is determining of the moving one. Such synthetic aperture ra- how far off the beam is if it misses the target. dars (SARs), when based on satellites typically Although by far the majority of a high-quality moving at velocities of about 8 km/see, might laser beam’s energy will fall within a well-de- be applicable in high resolution imaging sys- fined central area, there will be radiation out- tems. A similar technique for achieving high side that main part. Even if the main beam resolution takes advantage of motion of the does not strike the target, there will still very target, rather than of the antenna. Such in- likely be enough radiation reflecting off the verse synthetic aperture radars (ISARs) can ex- target for the pointing and tracking sensor to amine objects which are rotating or tumbling, see and use to direct the main beam to the although they cannot obtain optimal resolu- target .26 tion on objects which are vibrating or otherwise arranged to shake. The price paid for the higher resolution of active sensors is that they cannot operate “Even though a laser beam travels at the speed of light (it without revealing themselves, thus warning is light), that speed is not infinite and the laser must be aimed the offense and giving it an opportunity to ahead of where the object actually is at the time the laser fires. For a target 3000 km away, the target will have moved between spoof, blind, or otherwise interfere with the 50 and 100 meters (depending on its velocity) in the 0.01 sec- sensors. To help prevent this, again at the cost ond that it will take the beam to reach it. Since the laser sees of increasing complexity, the defense can sep- the target by observing light which took another 0.01 second to arrive at the laser, the target’s actual position at the time arate the transmitter from the receiver(s). In the laser is fired is another 50 to 100 meters ahead of where a multistatic system, the receivers would be it appears to be at that time. 165 ——

It is harder to determine the position of a detectable in either case. Kinetic kills in mid- neutral particle beam in the vicinity of a tar- course, whereby a projectile hits a target with get. The angle at which the beam leaves the a closing speed of several kilometers per sec- weapon can be measured by probing the beam ond, will also be easily seen. However, since with a weak laser tuned near a frequency many pieces of what had been the target will which will be easily absorbed by some of the continue along in more or less the original tar- hydrogen atoms in the neutral particle beam. get trajectory, the battle management system How well the laser will be absorbed depends must keep track of all fragments large enough on its exact wavelength as seen by the beam to confuse subsequent sensors and weapons. atoms, which in turn depends on the particle beam’s velocity and its angle with respect to The visibility of laser kills in midcourse de- the laser beam. pends greatly on how badly the target has been damaged. If the target flies apart, its de- However, since the effects of a neutral par- struction will be easily discernible. However, ticle beam on a target are for the most part damage which might not be easily visible may less visible than the effects of a laser beam (the nevertheless disrupt the RVs heat shield so target will not reflect beam atoms back to a badly that it will not survive reentry. Such an sensor which can see them directly, for exam- RV, not recorded as killed, may draw addition- ple), putting the beam precisely on target may al fire from later layers even though it no long- be more difficult than it would be for a laser. er poses a threat. Further, RVs which appear (Kill assessment for a neutral particle beam to fly apart could be merely programmed to in the functional kill mode is correspondingly jettison parts under attack, even though they more difficult; see below. ) The problem is les- may not be killed. This is analogous to sub- sened, however, since a neutral particle beam marines releasing oil to make attackers think will likely be wider than a laser beam and they have succeeded. therefore will not need to be so accurately pointed. A possible method of detecting Neutral particle beams used in the function- whether the beam has struck the target would al (“soft”) kill mode may present the most dif- be to look for secondary radiation emitted ficult problems for kill assessment. Since neu- from the target object. This possibility is be- tral particle beams (NPBs) penetrate into their ing investigated. targets rather than depositing all their energy on the surface, damage can be done to the in- Homing kinetic-kill vehicles are the most terior which may not be visible from the out- straightforward; they keep the target continu- ously in sight, correcting their course until im- side at all. Successful NPB attacks in the pact. The sensors aboard these vehicles can boost and post-boost phases might cause boost- be passive, detecting radiation from the tar- ers or PBVs to act erratically and possibly to destroy themselves. However, the case of RVs get; active, illuminating their targets and de- is different. There is now no guidance on RVs, tecting the reflected light; or semi-active, in so the accuracy of an RV would be unaffected which the vehicles would home in on reflected by a “soft”- kill. Although the detonation radiation which was originally beamed at the mechanism could be damaged, RVs which have target by another source. These sensors would been successfully disabled in midcourse might have difficulty in distinguishing between close- not be distinguishable from live ones. An RV spaced objects, as for example in the case of incorrectly assessed as live might waste re- several balloons tethered to an RV at a dis- sources as later layers kill it over again, and tance of a few meters. an RV incorrectly assessed as dead will do a Kill Assessment.– Determining whether or great deal of damage if it is allowed to pass not a target has been destroyed depends on through later stages to detonate on target. the type of weapon and on the defensive phase. Therefore, to attack RVs with NPBs, the hard An ICBM killed in boost phase will either ex- kill mode, which would provide visible evi- plode or veer visibly off course, being easily dence of destruction, would be required. The 166

use of NPBs in a high current, hard kill mode for synthetic-aperture radars, will be ones we is being investigated. already know how to do, except they will need to be done faster. Others, such as those re- Issues.—The discrimination problem is one quired for interpreting images and making de- of the most challenging technical tasks re- cisions based on those interpretations (e.g., quired of a ballistic missile defense. Even if “the first twelve objects in this field of view some successful techniques are developed, are decoys”) will require development of new they will remain successful only so long as the mathematical techniques and new processing offense does not counter them by developing concepts, in addition to high-speed processors. decoys which are not susceptible to them. Advances in both hardware and software will The techniques for high-resolution sensing be required; they are discussed both immedi- described in this section are not so far devel- ately below and in that portion of the “Sys- oped as the surveillance and acquisition sen- tem Architecture” section concerning Battle sors described earlier. They are extremely Management (p. 188 ff.). computation-intensive and will depend on sub- Hardware: stantial advances in real-time processing capability. Description. –Data processing technology has steadily evolved at a rapid rate (figure 7- Pointing and tracking systems capable of 4). Although we have not reached the end of operating in a BMD system, particularly in this technological evolution, we are now ap- the presence of a hostile enemy, have never proaching some physical (rather than techno- been built. Systems having some of the re- logical) limits. Processing speed is limited both quired characteristics, however, do exist by the rate at which individual computations today. NASA’s Space Telescope, utilizing a can be done, and by the time it takes the inter- technology level which represented the state- mediate results to move throughout the proc- of-the-art characteristic of the time its design essor. The former can be improved somewhat was finalized, will be able to lock onto a point by utilizing higher speed materials and circuit target with an accuracy of less than 0.05 elements, but the latter is limited by the speed microradians-on the order of hitting the “S” of light. Shrinking the overall size of circuits in a San Francisco stop sign from Washington. by moving their elements closer together mit- Developing the required kill assessment igates that problem to some extent, but we are techniques may be even more challenging. Not also approaching physical limits on miniatur- much effort has been devoted to this area un- ization of components. Both these approaches til recently. Before much progress can be made are under investigation in DOD’s Very High in assessing whether an object has been de- Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) program. stroyed by a given weapon, a better under- When individual processors approach funda- standing of that particular kill mechanism mental limits to their speed, further improve- may be required. ments in processing capability can be made The pointing ability of candidate weapons by tying many processors together and doing systems, and the ability of sensors to assess many calculations at once. Such parallel proc- their effects, will likely influence a decision on essing is most effective for problems which the ultimate feasibility of those weapons as lend themselves readily to being broken down much as the technical progress made on the into many independent pieces. There is con- weapons themselves. siderable interest in developing parallel processors, and perhaps even more in inventing High-Speed Processing techniques to utilize these processors efficient- Many of the systems described above rely for a wide range of applications. quire extensive computational capability. Some Another technique for very high-speed sig- of these computations, such as those required nal processing is the use of analog devices. In 167

Figure 7-4.—Onboard Signal Processing 10G

1G .

100M

10M

100K

10K

IK IK 10K 100K IM 10M 100M IG 10G 100G

Memory (bits) The past and projected future development of speed and memory size capabilities in signal processing, including on board satellite processors.

SOURCE: TRW such a device, the data to be processed are not beam. Certain manipulations of that physical represented as a stream of numbers, as they system (e.g., shining that laser beam through would be in a digital processor, but rather are a pinhole) are equivalent to performing calcu- represented directly by some physical quan- lations on the data which that physical sys- tity such as the intensity of part of a laser tern represents. 168

To give an example, a digital processor Software: would determine the time required for a ball Description. –The task of programming a to fall a certain distance by solving the equa- BMD system will be extremely challenging. tions of motion for an object in a gravitational Part of this task is developing and implement- field and calculating the answer. A very sim- ing specific algorithms which will be needed ple analog approach to that problem would be by individual components of a BMD system. to drop a ball and time it. Some of these tasks, such as those involving In this example, the computer would calcu- image processing, will require significant de- late the ball’s trajectory much more rapidly velopment. In several cases, full utilization of than the ball could fall. However, for some spe- hardware advances (such as parallel proces- cific applications, an analog calculation can be sors) will be contingent upon equivalent ad- much faster than the corresponding digital vances in software techniques. one, with the greater speed usually coming at Other software development tasks involve the expense of accuracy. When the calculation not so much the implementation of specific is amenable to analog techniques, and when tasks but rather the coordination and integra- great precision is not required, analog process- tion of the different tasks done by various ing (called optical processing when the physi- components. These battle management issues cal system is a light beam) offers tremendous are complicated by the sheer size of the job, speed advantages. the number of different contingencies which Issues.–Although hardware requirements must be anticipated, and the inability to de- for BMD processing will require technical ad- bug the programs under realistic conditions vances beyond the present state of the art, no so that they can be relied upon to function ade- technological barrier yet identified appears quately the first time. likely to preclude development of sufficiently issues.–The issues involved in developing capable processors to do those tasks that a and testing BMD software are discussed pri- BMD system would need to do. In addition marily in the section on “Battle Manage- to operating rapidly enough, BMD processors merit, ” p. 188 ff. will have to be able to operate in an environment where many nuclear weapons could be detonating in space. These bursts produce Power and Logistics high levels of charged particles and other ra- The details of the problems associated with diation which will severely disrupt the opera- the placement, supply, and upkeep of a space- tion of circuits which are not radiation-hard- based missile defense system depend largely ened. Use of gallium arsenide (GaAs) instead on the details of the system to be employed. of silicon holds out promise for making circuits Here, we shall only outline the problems and which are both fast and radiation-hard, al- the requirements for various of the possible though these circuits would not be as small technological options mentioned above. In no as more radiation-sensitive ones. way should this outline be considered a com- Reliability is also a key criterion for space plete treatment of the problems which must system hardware. There is considerable inter- be dealt with, although the requirements listed est in developing fault-tolerant processors should be considered a bare minimum for the which are able to detect and compensate for successful deployment of a usable system. failures without significantly degrading system performance. The Department of Defense Space Power is actively investigating both radiation-hard- Description. –Large amounts of power will ened and fault-tolerant devices. be required for each battle station, particularly .

169 —— if particle beams, electromagnetic railguns, or free-electron lasers are used. The demand for power may be on the order of tens of megawatts or more. For comparison, this power demand is roughly equivalent to that of a town with a population of at least a few thousands. For some projected applications, large quantities of power must be delivered in short surges. Past space-based power supplies have ranged from a few watts to several kilowatts. The SP-1OO project, representing an intermediate stage of development for high power space- based systems, is intended to develop a nuclear reactor of 100 kilowatts or more. In general, solar power may not be practical for demands in excess of tens of kilowatts, or for large surge requirements. Possibly, one power technology, most likely nuclear, would be used for the continuous source, and another method, perhaps stored chemical energy, could be used for the surges. Issues.–The requirements for multimega- watt power systems in space pose engineering problems which are difficult, but within the limits of foreseeable technology. Requir- ing large surges would provide additional problems for power conditioning. Minimizing the frequency of maintenance Photo credit General Electric Co. problems is also a serious issue, and one which SP-1OO Space Power Nuclear Reactor: Artist’s concept could become dominant in developing the ap- of a deployed nuclear-powered electric generator in space. Power levels are designed to be in the propriate power supplies and conditioning. Ex- neighborhood of 100 kW. The reactor is at the lower tremely high reliability would have to be at- left of the drawing. Fingers pointing backwards from tained, considering the need for many battle the reactor are heat radiators. stations. The Fletcher Panel wrote of requirements for a 10-year maintenance-free reliability standard for space-based computer and Space Logistics software systems. Placing similar demands on Description. –Whichever weapons options power sources would be a difficult problem. may eventually be chosen, an enormous amount Since such high reliability is not cost-effective of mass will have to be placed in Earth orbit. for Earth-based applications, where mainte- Placing objects in geosynchronous orbit, of nance can readily be performed, it has not yet course, is more expensive than putting them been developed and there is little experience in lower orbits. The Fletcher Panel declared to draw on. There are no obvious reasons why the necessity for a new heavy-lift launch ve- such reliability would be impossible, although hicle for space-based platforms of up to 100 new testing procedures may have to be de- metric tons. The space shuttle has a capacity veloped. of up to 30 metric tons for orbits of 200 km 170 altitude or so, and less than this at higher al- cally designed protective satellites already in titudes. Additionally, there will be a need for space. A significant fraction of the total pay- a space transport which can travel between or- load to be launched from Earth in the early bits. This would provide means of moving per- stages could be shielding. Further into the fu- sonnel and objects from a space station base ture, it is possible that near-Earth asteroids to individual system components for the pur- could be mined for shielding, reducing the re- poses of maintenance and testing. Some de- quirements for lifting payloads from the sur- ployments might also require such a vehicle. face of the Earth. The mirrors in a laser-based system, as an Issues.—The feasibility of developing some example, would have to be checked periodically high-reliability multi-megawatt power system for operability. This would involve removing in time for the deployment of space-based protective covers and testing the mirrors’ per- BMD assets needs to be demonstrated. Power formance with lasers. After testing, some conditioning for burst mode operation must maintenance might be required. Other weapon also be shown to be feasible if such surges are components would also have to be periodically required by the chosen weapons option. The tested and maintained, as would the computer total cost of placing various possible systems hardware and software. in orbit will have to be estimated. For this, it will be necessary to estimate the cost per space Altogether, the cost and effort of a space- platform and the needed constellation size. In based system does not end with deployment. addition, the feasibility and estimated cost for Even in the absence of hostile action, there will component testing, maintenance, and repair have to be constant activity in space, occasion- must be determined for each candidate sys- ally with human presence, to maintain a work- tem. Finally, estimates will have to be made ing system. The threat of attacks on the system of the level, cost, and feasibility of self-defense would require the erection and maintenance needed for a space-based system. For further of defenses. It is also possible that vehicles discussion of testing and reliability issues, see used for deployment may have to have the ca- the section on “Testing, Reliability, and Secu- pability of defending themselves. Alternative- rity,” p. 190 ff. ly, they would have to be defended by specifi-

COUNTERMEASURES

Countermeasures to Sensors cate targets in the boost, post-boost, and mid- and Discrimination course phases. In the terminal phase, infrared, visible, and microwave wavelengths would be Blinding used to locate targets and to discriminate be- Sensors used in ballistic missile defense rely tween decoys and real RVs. In addition, com- primarily on electromagnetic radiation of di- munication links could function at various ra- verse frequencies. Short-wave infrared radia- dio, microwave, and possibly optical frequencies. tion emanating from the booster exhaust plumes A generic problem with sensors is the fact is used in the boost phase. Post-boost-phase that they must be very sensitive in order to interception will rely on more sensitive infra- perform their tasks of locating and tracking red detection at longer wavelengths, since the objects, often small ones, at distances of thou- target will not be as hot and its emissions will sands of kilometers. At the same time, they be less intense. There is also the possibility of must be able to resist attempts by the offense using radar or ladar (a technique which uses to disable or confuse them—an easier offensive laser light in a way analogous to radar) to lo- task than destroying them outright. .

171 — ——..

Defensive capabilities can be compromised tance around the explosion. There is also the by neutralizing the abilities of the sensors to possibility that some of the offense’s own as- perform their tasks. If a sensor can be over- sets could be damaged. loaded with energy, particularly at frequencies Large nuclear explosives would be useful to to which it is sensitive, it may be disabled. The the offensive forces during the terminal phase. condition may be permanent-here referred to When exploded high in the atmosphere, they as “blinding”- or temporary. If temporary, would disturb the ionospheric layer, thus caus- say for a period of seconds or minutes, the ing communication difficulties and making phenomenon may be referred to as “dazzling. tracking and intercept more difficult for min- Blinding or dazzling will be effective if the sen- utes. Exploded above the atmosphere, they sor is thereby unable to give correct position would create large electromagnetic pulses, and/or velocity information for its targets to which could destroy electronics which are not the needed accuracy. adequately hardened and would threaten large There are a number of ways in which blind- power grids and power interconnections with ing or dazzling may be induced. However, sen- destruction or disablement. Defense battle sors could be hardened against some of these management and C3I might be threatened. effects by a variety of means. Nuclear weapons, judiciously used, could be One possible blinding technique could be the a simple, brute force way of fooling or dis- occasional nuclear detonation of an RV by the abling some sensors. The offense decides when offense by salvage-fusing when attacked, by to use them and how many to use. Its only lim- active battle management, or by prepro- itation is to avoid collateral damage to its own grammed plan. One characteristic of a nuclear hardware. explosion is the very intense electromagnetic radiation it produces at all frequencies, from Spoofing and Hiding gamma rays down to long wavelength radio Another method of defeating sensors is the waves. Additionally, a nuclear explosion in the use of misleading signals, or the use of decoys, upper atmosphere causes ionization glows by the offense. This is commonly called “spoof- over a range of infrared wavelengths. These ing. ” For example, the characteristics of the glows may extend for substantial distances and persist for many seconds, possibly mask- rocket plume could be changed so that a homing sensor which compensates for the distance ing signals from potential targets. from the plume to the vulnerable parts of the The intense radiation from a fireball could booster would do so incorrectly, sending the cause problems for sensors. The first problem weapon into space, rather than into the tar- is one of overloading or even blinding the de- get. The defense’s response to this strategy tector. This possibility could apply to all types could be to use the infrared emission from the of sensors, from visible and near-visible light plume only for the initial target acquisition, detectors to radio and radar devices. Secondly, and to use ladar to illuminate directly that when the nuclear explosion is not as close, the part of the booster to be attacked. Shielding background signal from the explosion might of the plume has also been discussed, although divert the “attention” of the sensor (depend- this would present engineering difficulties if ing on how “smart” it was). all directions were to be covered. However, there can be costs to the offense In the midcourse phase, the key problem de- of employing these tactics. In addition to the fined by the Defensive Technologies Study chance that defensive sensors may be hard- Team is the difficulty of discriminating be- ened to resist them, the offense must contend tween RVs and decoys. It is by no means clear with the risk that detonating nuclear explo- that the possible future methods of discrimi- sions during the midcourse phase could “un- nation that have been proposed and analyzed mask” its own decoys for a substantial dis- by the Fletcher Panel will be successful. Fur- 172

ther work, both theoretical and experimental, countermeasures which would make the dis- is necessary before an informed judgment on crimination task more difficult. Some discus- this point can be made. sion of these items is presented in the classi- An often discussed problem for discrimina- fied annex to this chapter. tion would be the possible tactic of using alum- inized mylar balloons to surround both RVs Countermeasures to Weapons and decoys. Balloon-type decoys could be very Hardening light, and could be included in payloads in quantities far in excess of 10 per RV. When Some simple passive countermeasures to la- a balloon is placed around the RV, the war- ser weapons have been suggested. One in- head is made to resemble a decoy—an exam- volves rotating the booster, so that the laser ple of the concealment technique called anti- spot must illuminate a larger area. This would simulation. Also, shrouds such as balloons or work if the period of rotation of the booster other configurations may be placed around, were not much longer than the necessary la- but not centered on, the RVs. This would make ser dwell time for a kill, and it would force the a kill more difficult for some kinetic-energy offensive laser to be increased in power in or- weapons, since the position of the RV target der to compensate. Such a countermeasure inside may not be known with sufficient pre- would not work in defending against a pulsed cision. laser, which would deposit its energy in a time much less than the period of rotation of the A decoy could be given signatures which booster. would closely match real RVs for several sensing methods, a technique known as simulation. Resistance to continuous-wave (non-pulsed) There may be from 10 to 100 decoys per RV, lasers could be increased by coating boosters causing an immense bookkeeping problem. Up with ablative shields which evaporate when to hundreds of thousands of objects could be heated, protecting the booster underneath. involved. The booster would suffer some loss in throwweight, but could gain some laser protection. A variety of measures has been suggested to overcome this problem.” One possibility Post-boost vehicles could be hardened against would be to observe the deployment of the attack, although the weight penalty could RVs and decoys with ladar during the post- prove serious. The possible degree of attain- boost phase, if the offense permitted such ob- able hardening is an issue to be investigated. servations. The changes in post-boost vehicle RVs are hardened by design, since they must velocity upon each deployment could be ob- survive the high temperatures and decelera- served, providing a clue to the mass of the ob- tions of reentry. This does not mean that they ject deployed: RVs will be much more massive are immune to attack, even by lasers, but that than decoys. Another tactic might be to at- the energy required for a kill would be substan- tempt to discriminate between RVs and de- tially greater than in the case of a booster. coys by observing emission from an object at Kinetic-energy weapons are the weapons of several electromagnetic wavelengths, and by choice for midcourse and terminal phases. Har- inferring temperature from the radiated elec- dening against such weapons does not seem tromagnetic energy spectra. Prolonged observa- a feasible option. Particle beams would also tions may be needed to perform discrimination be difficult to protect against without a great using this technique, since the rate of temper- cost in weight. However, in this case, kill ature change would be the discriminant. assessment could be a serious problem unless a hard kill mode were used. Many other possibilities for discriminating between RVs and decoys also exist, as well as Evading—Fast Burn Another much-discussed countermeasure is e ‘ See discussion on “Discrimination,” p. 162 ff. the use of fast-burn ICBMs by the Soviet 173 —-— — ———.— —

Union. The current SS-18s burn out in about dled in the full 300 seconds. The first effect 300 seconds at an altitude of about 400 km. would be to multiply the requirements for the The boost-phase defense then has nearly 300 size of the defense constellation by a factor of seconds to reach each target. If the length of between 2 and 6.27 Additionally, the problems the boost phase were to be reduced by one half of battle management would be severely ex- (to approximately that of the U.S. MXs), the acerbated, with more permutations of track- defense’s job would be severely complicated. ing, target assignment, and kill assessment to The Soviets are currently testing their equiva- accomplish in a shorter time. Again, cost-ex- lent to the MX, the SS-X-24. If boosters are change arguments will have to resolve the is- developed which burn out in the atmosphere sue of whether the offense finds it cheaper to (say, at 60 to 80 km) in 50 seconds or so, as double its fleet, or the defense finds it cheaper the Fletcher Panel asserted is possible, some to compensate by increasing its constellation boost-phase defensive techniques would be size. seriously compromised, if not rendered un- The fast-burn booster would also severely workable. These are the particle beam, and, strain the capabilities of pop-up weapons. probably, the X-ray laser, both of which might Since the weapons would be placed on missile not penetrate to the required altitude without losing the ability to kill. submarines several thousand kilometers from the ICBM fields, they would have to travel far- The effectiveness of homing vehicles could ther in less time than their quarries. This is also be impaired by fast-burn boosters, which because the weapons would have to rise high would require the vehicles to enter the atmos- enough to clear the Earth’s curvature before phere. Their infrared homing sensors might be they would have straight line paths to their blinded by atmospheric heating of the win- targets. Even if both hunter and hunted were dows through which the sensors must look. launched simultaneously (which is clearly not Since fast-burn boosters burn out both at a possible), the defensive weapon would have to lower altitude and in a shorter time, homing travel farther in the same period of time. More- vehicles would also have the problem of tra- over, weapons unable to penetrate below a cer- versing a greater distance in less time. These tain point in the atmosphere must rise high problems could be circumvented to a degree enough so that not only the target, but also if sufficiently accurate targeting were possi- the entire line of sight between the weapon and ble after the burn-out of the booster, and be- the target, is above the minimum altitude. fore deployment of the RVs during the post- These difficulties are mitigated if the pop-up boost phase. One would have to rely on far weapons are able to detect and destroy the tar- more sensitive infrared sensors which were ca- gets after boost phase is over, without the pable of finding their targets against the back- clear infrared plume signals. ground of the Earth. The homing technology The defense could therefore counter a fast- could be strained by this requirement. Alter- burn booster by improving post-boost-phase natively, command guidance of the homing ve- detection and kill. The offense could counter hicle could be used, whereby the homing vehi- again by deploying the post-boost vehicle in cles are steered by commands transmitted much shorter times than is now the case. from other satellites. In the terminal phase, there is less than 1 All possible systems would face the enor- minute available for intercept. Countermeas- mous problem of dealing with a boost phase lasting only one-sixth to one-half as long as ures in this phase, besides the use of nuclear the current base case time of 300 seconds. If ——.———. a 1 second dwell time were necessary on aver- “For some possible types of constellations. constellation size age for a kill, each satellite involved in the bat- would grow by a smaller factor than that by which the boost phase were decreased. In those cases, constellation size would tle would be able to handle 50 to 150 boosters, grow by less than the factor of 2 to 6. See section on “Constel- instead of the 300 that each could have han- lation Size, ” pp. 179-186. 174 weapons mentioned earlier, would include the boost phase, in which case more boosters introduction of maneuverable reentry vehicles might have to be added by the offense to over- (MaRVs). Such warheads would engage in a come the defense. If hardened targets were preset series of zig-zag motions to avoid inter- defended preferentially, some of them could ceptors which would be unable to match the be protected against attacks of many RVs;29 evasive maneuvers in the time required. Small if the defenses operated randomly, some seven movable fins or other aerodynamic techniques or eight RVs per target would still provide might be used. Counters to this tactic could high kill assurance for nearly all of the targets. involve the use of kill mechanisms (probably One possible offensive counter strategy would nuclear) with larger radii of lethality. therefore be to aim RVs at soft targets instead of hardened ones. Should the offense counter Countermeasures to Overall the defense by adding warheads, the cost of System Performance adding a significant number (although perhaps not enough to regain high confidence of kill- Saturation ing preferentially defended targets) is likely There are a number of ways to saturate de- to be far less than the cost of deploying a 50 fense systems. For example, in the terminal percent effective defense. Moreover, the offen- phase, a preferential offense could overcome sive response would require much less time to implement than the defensive system would. defenses if the defender’s object is to protect cities. The aggressor could concentrate many If a defensive system were 80 percent effec- RVs on a few cities. If the defense wishes to tive, the needed response by the offense to ac- protect all its cities, not knowing which of complish the same expected damage on soft them will be attacked, it is forced to deploy targets (again, not defended preferentially) defenses at all of them, resulting in the require- would be to multiply the number of warheads ment for significantly more defensive forces. by 5. For preferentially defended hardened tar- If it were considered acceptable to permit the gets, it would be more difficult for the offense destruction of some cities, the defensive re- to assure the same expected level of damage.30 quirements could be relaxed. There will clearly be some point of defensive efficiency where the offense will not find it eco- For defensive systems which are substantially less than 100 percent successful, one pos- nomical to respond merely by increasing warhead and missile production. An estimate of sible countermeasure is simply to increase the the cross-over point requires knowledge of the number of warheads. It should be remembered that the Soviet SS-18s probably have a capac- cost of other countermeasures which would be ity of at least 18 and perhaps 30 warheads possible, as well as of the defensive system. 28 each, well beyond the currently tested 10. Saturation could occur particularly during the Therefore, a doubling of Soviet RVs could be midcourse phase, where penalties to the offense relatively inexpensive. are small for producing a large number of de- For a 50 percent effective defensive system, coys. These can be cheap and light. It cannot a simple response of expanding the SS-18 ca- be emphasized too strongly that the ability to pacity could restore the previous strategic bal- discriminate in this phase is essential to the ance, as far as soft target defenses (which were feasibility of the whole space-based BMD con- not “preferential defenses”) are concerned. cept. The quality of midcourse discrimination This would be the case unless a significant por- determines the difficulty of constructing credi- tion of the defensive capability were in the ble decoys. — ‘8See, e.g. B. W. Bennett, How to Assess the Survivability ‘gEven so, preferential defenses can be defeated if the offense of U.S. ICBMS (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1980), p. 70; is able to determine which warheads did not detonate on tar- W. J. Perry, Nuclear Arms-Ethics, Strate~, Politics, J. Wool- get, and is then able to retarget additional warheads on those sey (cd.) (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984), p. 90; Strobe Tal- targets. bott, Endgame (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 265. 30See, however, the preceding footnote. 175

Evading—Circumvention weapons for ground attack would be quite dif- Circumvention of space-based BMD could ferent from the mission and technologies of a take several forms. A heavy reliance on cruise space-based BMD system, some of the surviv- missiles or other air-breathing delivery sys- ability techniques necessary for the latter tems, for example, would force the construc- might be applicable as well to the former. tion of a parallel air defense system in addi- The introduction of bombs into the United tion to a space-based missile defense. It is States by suitcases, commercial routes, or dip- conceivable that some elements of a space- lomatic pouches could be accomplished and, based system would be useful in such a de- for all we know, may already have been done. fense, but they would be unlikely to be suffi- Techniques for screening such devices by neu- cient. An air defense could possibly be tech- tron interrogation and radiation detectors are nically feasible, but would not be perfect in mature technologies and would be easy to use defending soft targets, and would be expen- at designated ports of entry. To cover all pos- sive. Full analysis of air defense is beyond the sible entry routes, however, including deserted scope of this study. coastlines, forests, and deserts along our bor- Depressed trajectory missiles launched from ders, would be expensive and impractical. submarines could pose difficulties for BMD Suppression systems. If the missiles were launched near U.S. territory, the shortened flight times could With the exception of pop-up weapon con- significantly strain defensive timelines. cepts, directed- and kinetic-energy weapon scenarios all postulate a large number of space- Vehicles could be developed which never based stations, which must function continu- leave the atmosphere, but glide immediately ously in order to be effective. The assets con- after booster cut-off. They would bypass the tained in these satellites maybe high-powered post-boost and midcourse phases (unless those lasers, delicate optical mirrors, a fleet of hom- phases employed atmosphere-penetrating ing rockets, electromagnetic launchers, or par- weapons). They might, however, be vulnerable ticle accelerators. These assets have varying to certain types of boost-phase defense and degrees of sensitivity to disruption when sub- could be vulnerable to terminal defenses. jected to external attack. They would probably The boost phase might be avoided entirely have to be shielded as a defensive measure. Re- by pre-positioning nuclear weapons in orbit.31 quired shielding weights could reach up to Such weapons, if permitted to be launched and many tons for each defensive satellite station. to remain in space, would bypass all but the Further in the future, as noted earlier, it may terminal layer and perhaps the later part of be possible to use material mined from near- the midcourse layer of a BMD system. The Earth asteroids for shielding purposes. This warning time for nuclear attack would be re- would eliminate the need for putting enormous duced from the 25 minutes or so of an ICBM weights into orbit from the Earth’s surface. flight (or 7 to 10 minutes of an SLBM) down to only a few minutes for reentry. In order to Even the best shield, however, would probably be useless against a nearby nuclear det- be viable, such weapons would have to be survivable against attack, especially since their onation (within a few kilometers or so). A seri- emplacement in orbit could be considered an ous threat to any set of satellites is therefore extremely provocative act. Although the mis- the concept of space mines. A salvage-fused sions and technologies of orbiting nuclear space mine could be emplaced, if unopposed, within kill range of any ballistic missile de- “Any basing of nuclear weapons in space would explicitly vio- fense satellite. Presumably, this would occur late the outer Space Treaty of 1967, However, there is no reason to suppose that the OST would necessaril}r be an~’ sturdier during the deployment period. The mines could than the 1972 ~1 BM Treat~, which would already ha~re been already be in orbit when the defensive battle a casualt~’ of an~ space-based 13 LI I) regime, stations were deployed, and could then be 176 —

moved into position trailing those stations. for offenses than for defenses. This is because The cost of a small nuclear (or conventional) satellites travel in known and predictable device would likely be much less than that of paths, and because beam weapons act nearly a defensive satellite station for any system be- instantaneously. An attacker can choose the ing discussed, so the cost-exchange would ap- moment to strike, and can take a very long pear to favor the offense. time to plan the logistics and battle management. Battle management problems for an of- A defense against this tactic might need to fensive attack on sensing satellites would be rely on previously stationed defender satel- minor compared to those of a defender against lites, which would be able to destroy the space a ballistic missile attack, when decisions must mines before they approached within lethal be made in only a few seconds. Since the place range of their targets. The difficulty is, that and time of the attack on satellites would be these defender satellites could also be space up to the offense, to a large degree, the offen- mined: the technology for the mines could be sive forces could possibly even use land-based developed in the near term, and there is little lasers to kill some satellites. To accomplish reason to suppose that, once the United States this, the offense would have to act when the began positioning a layer of defender satel- sensors were exposed, and might only be able lites, the Soviet Union would be unable to to deaden a few satellites in a constellation. launch (or redeploy from higher orbit) its However, for an attack to succeed, it maybe mines. The defenders would then have to be sufficient to punch a “hole” in the constella- able to defend themselves against the mines. tion and to attack through the breach. A ro- The issue revolves then around the ability bust defensive system architecture would have of mines (an easier and more accessible tech- to be resilient against such an attack. nology) to disable the defender satellites (anew technology) as they are being deployed for the The defense would have to develop means first time, at a favorable cost-exchange ratio. to hide and disguise its satellites, if possible, They must be able to do this at a stage when and decoys would have to be deployed. The there may be far fewer defenders than mines. sensing satellites and decoy satellites would Another important issue is the willingness of have to be proliferated to complicate attacks either side to initiate hostilities by attacking on them. The extra satellites could be deployed a suspected mine in peacetime. in a dormant mode in different orbits from the active sensing satellites, ready to change or- Defense satellites or battle stations could bit and come on-line when needed. Careful also defend themselves by means of kinetic- study would be needed to determine whether kill vehicles (KKVS), attacking whatever ob- the cost-exchange arguments would favor the jects approached. A reply could then be to exhaust the kill vehicles by means of cheap de- offensive or defensive forces in such a scenario. coys, and then to send in a real mine for the As OTA’s companion report on Anti-Sate]- kill. A counter-reply could be to use cheap lite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms KKV decoys. Control indicates, a number of advanced tech- The number of sensing and battle station nologies have the potential to be used in fu- satellites would be far less than the number ture anti-satellite weapons which could be of warheads and decoys. Therefore, a directed- highly effective against current generations of energy technology, even if not very effective satellites. Several countermeasures which against an offensive assault, could be deadly could make satellites more difficult to attack when used by the offense against inadequately are also under investigation; presumably, hardened defensive space assets, provided they space-based components of a BMD system could be found. There is always the possibil- would employ such countermeasures (cf. p. 186 ity that these weapons could be more effective ff.). 177

Once an entire defensive constellation has evaluating the interaction of the defense and been deployed, attacking parts of it could be the offense. Possible countermeasures to one rather difficult. A system intended to handle part of a defense system may increase vulner- tens of thousands of targets, or more, might ability to other parts. A few examples might be more easily able to handle a few in self- be of some interest: defense. In principle, in the mid- to far-term, • it might be possible that ground-based di- The fast-burn rocket avoids several types rected energy stations could damage the sen- of defensive weapons, and it puts a severe strain on the defense by reducing the time sors of space assets. However, if a complete available to attack and kill boosters and constellation were in place, defensive counter- post-boost vehicles before the deployment measures could be taken. These include redun- of RVs and decoys. The throwweight pen- dancy, the use of battle assessments by by- alty may be relatively small. However, stander members of the constellation, and the post-boost vehicle and decoys cannot counterstrikes by the defense to avoid further usefully deploy within the atmosphere, so damage, as well as maneuvers, decoys, and anti-simulation techniques. some period of vulnerability in the post- boost phase cannot be eliminated. While the system is being deployed, compo- ● Offensive responses which modify the nents may be vulnerable. It is quite conceiva- timing of launches (for example, which ble that the adversary would try to destroy launch all at once to put maximum stress the first few satellites as they were being on the defense) can interfere with struc- placed in orbit. A complete system could re- tured attack plans, which then make the quire many scores of stations, and deploying terminal layer more effective. it would take a substantial amount of time. ● Nuclear weapons as suppression or blind- Therefore, the opportunity will probably ex- ing agents could disable one’s own space ist to attack when few stations are deployed. assets during a nuclear engagement, and This could be accomplished with space mines thus prove harmful to the offense. which could already be in orbit, or by ground- ● Decoys can imitate RVs better if they launched missiles, possibly nuclear-tipped. contain small thrusters, for example. These A defense against this countermeasure would behave more like real RVs upon re- would be to have a smaller deployed system entry. However, the thrusters are heavy, and thus a throwweight penalty would be already in orbit, which could defend the bat- incurred. Simple decoys, such as balloons tle stations, as noted above. Another counter which mimic the optical properties of an might be to threaten retaliation for any hos- RV, might not also mimic other signa- tile act against the newly deployed stations. A full analysis of such deployment battle sce- tures such as radar cross section. More narios would have to be based on more detailed sophisticated decoys would have to be used which duplicated as many signa- deployment plans and weapons choices which have not yet been made. tures as the defense measured. ● Likewise, hardening of the boosters or any other component by heat-countering Relationships Between ablative coatings may increase surviva- Countermeasures bility against some weapons, but would Offensive countermeasures usually provide reduce available throwweight for real some penalty which must be considered in warheads. 178 —.

COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES The discussion immediately above, pointing ber of possible approaches it might take, it out the costs to the offense of implementing might be able to force the other side to pre- countermeasures, is closely connected with the pare a number of possible countermeasures problem of counter-countermeasures. Possible while preventing it from implementing any of offensive responses to a defensive system may them. themselves be countered by modifications to The eventual outcome of this competition the defense. will depend on whose intelligence cycle time is Counters to all possible countermeasures do shorter. The defense will win if the interval be- not now exist. Ideas have been suggested for tween the time it discovers that the offense some, but it is far too early to determine is preparing a particular countermeasure and whether many have any validity at all. They the time when it can neutralize that counter- cannot, however, be ruled out. The “fallacy of measure is less than the time the offense re- the last move, ” described in the introduction quires to discover that its counter has been to this chapter, is just as invalid when used defeated, discard it, and prepare another. On to show that countermeasures will always be the other hand, if the offense can constantly found as it is when used to neglect the exis- keep the defense one step behind, the offense tence of countermeasures at all. will win. Note that if the defense is required to be 99 percent effective, the offense need It is misleading to treat the countermeas- only manage to penetrate the defense with a ure/counter-countermeasure competition as a few per cent of its warheads in order to “de- game in which each side moves in turn. In feat” the defense (e.g., to cause the defense to actuality, a proposed defensive deployment fail in achieving its defensive goals). In gen- must try to anticipate possible countermeas- eral, no clear outcome of the offense-defense ures before they are made. Defensive counters competition can be predicted. to obvious offensive responses, such as increasing the number of warheads per booster, prolifer- Examples of counter-countermeasures have ating decoys, and attacking space-based assets been given already in this chapter. If the de- of the defense, must clearly be available before fense can develop a method to measure the a decision to deploy the defense is justified in mass of objects in space, the offense will not the first place. Similarly, the most effective be able to use light decoys. If the defense is offensive countermeasures will be the ones able to develop extremely effective post-boost which anticipate and frustrate possible defen- and midcourse phase defenses (which would sive reactions. require effective discrimination or else extremely rapid weapons), it would not need to Some counter-countermeasures can be im- use a boost-phase layer and fast-burn boosters plemented after deployment has been made. would be less useful. (However, the post-boost Since neither side can anticipate nor prepare phase can also be speeded up, and the dura- for all possible counters by the other, each side tion of midcourse phase can be adjusted some- can hope to at least confuse the other by at- what by changing trajectory. ) If the offense tempting to keep its own moves secret while hopes to overwhelm a defense by executing a at the same time trying to discover what its massive, simultaneous launch, defensive weap- opponent is doing. If one side can successfully ons which operate best when many boosters keep the other from knowing which of a num- are available at once will be more effective. 179 —

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

The building blocks of a strategic defense Constellation Size have to be integrated into a coherent, organized system if they are to constitute a use- One factor influencing the total cost of sys- ful defense. The system architecture specifies tems utilizing space-based weapons is the the design of such a system. It denotes what number of weapons platforms, or constellation sorts of components are to be included, how size. This number by itself is no more impor- they are to be based, and how they will inter- tant than other features of the defense, includ- act. The system architecture is driven by the ing the as-yet unknown unit cost of the satel- objectives of the system and by the effective- lites, their vulnerability to attack, and their ness of each of its parts. Cost and schedule fac- resistance to potential countermeasures. Fur- tors also influence the system architecture, as thermore, weapons platforms are only one of do operational constraints imposed by those the types of space- and ground-based compo- who will eventually be asked to manage and nents that a BMD system would require, and maintain any deployed BMD system. the number of weapons platforms needed might or might not accurately reflect the total sys- Many of the elements required to specify a tem complexity. BMD system architecture are not available at present, such as a clear specification of sys- Nevertheless, calculations of the number of tem objectives (which must include an esti- space-based weapons platforms needed to per- mate of the threat such a system will face) and form boost-phase intercepts have attracted estimates of the effectiveness of various com- considerable attention because they provide ponents. Further off still are estimates of the one way to investigate how variations in the costs and times at which various levels of ca- quality of system components, or in the de- pability might be deployed. Extensive re- mands put upon them, affect the required search not yet conducted must be undertaken quantity of those components. to provide this information. In its absence, this study will review some aspects of a BMD sys- There is no “correct” constellation size. These tem which any candidate architecture must calculations can only be done assuming hypo- specify. These are: thetical defensive capabilities and offensive threats, and different sets of assumptions will ● Size: the defensive system must be big lead to different numbers of satellites. However, enough, taking the expected threat into the way in which constellation size depends account, to satisfy its objectives. on various parameters can be determined. If ● Survivability: the defensive system must values for these other parameters are as- be able to survive attacks upon itself. sumed, the corresponding number required of ● Battle Management: various components defensive satellites can then be found. of the system must accomplish their individual missions and must also interact Constellation size depends most directly on with the rest of the system. Due to the the number of missile boosters the defense overall complexity of such a system, the must handle in a given amount of time. Either way in which its pieces are to act and in- increasing the number of missiles or decreas- teract must be considered at the time the ing the available time will serve to increase the system is designed. Moreover, the defen- rate at which missiles must be destroyed, forc- sive system must be able to operate with ing the defense to grow. Other important fac- a minimum of human intervention. tors influencing the size of a defensive constel- 180 lation are weapon brightness (for directed- Directed-energy weapons are characterized energy weapons), retarget or “slew” time, con- by brightness, or how much power they can stellation altitude, threat size, and threat dis- concentrate into a specified angular range. tribution. No simple formula relating number Since the maximum possible intensity of such of defensive satellites to the offensive launch a weapon on a target falls off as the square rate will be valid over the entire ranges of of the distance between the two, the time re- these other factors. quired to kill a target goes up as the square of that distance. The kill time also depends on Weapon and Target Characteristics the target hardness-how much energy per unit area is necessary to destroy it. Although The effectiveness of a defensive weapon, to- targets may be very sensitive to attack in cer- gether with the vulnerability of its target, de- tain critical spots, target hardness represents termines how long (and with what likelihood) the intensity necessary, on average, to destroy it will take the weapon to destroy the target the target without taking advantage of these at a given distance. These individual kill times, “Achilles heels. ” divided by the total length of time available, determine the number of targets that each de- Kill time, then, is proportional to the target fensive weapon can destroy. hardness J and the square of its distance R, 181 -—

Depending on the target distribution and orientation, an optimum altitude can be calculated to maximize the constellation’s kill rate. However, other considerations (e.g., orbital lifetime or satellite survivability) are often more important, so nonoptimal altitudes will in all likelihood have to be used.32 To increase the number of targets that can be killed in the available time, a directed-en- Orbit ergy weapon must either increase its bright- In addition to altitude, the angle of a satel- ness or decrease its slew time; the more tar- lite’s orbit with respect to the Equator (its in- gets each weapon can kill, the fewer weapons clination angle) affects how efficiently a sat- are needed. Note that reducing the brightness ellite can cover a launch site. The satellite orbit of a directed-energy weapon by a factor of 2 has most effectively covering a site at a given lati- exactly the same effect on kill time as doubling tude has an orbital inclination equal to that the hardness. Both are equivalent to doubling latitude. For example, a satellite in polar or- the number of targets (to the extent that slew bit (inclination 90 O) will pass over the poles time is negligible—i.e., if a second target were (latitude 90°) on every orbit and can cover put next to each existing one and the weapon high-latitude sites efficiently. However, it will could switch instantaneously from one to the pass over a different portion of the Equator other). on each orbit as the Earth rotates underneath, Kinetic-energy weapons have a different set and will therefore not often be in a position of characteristics from directed-energy weapons. to cover a particular site at low latitudes. Con- They can kill only those targets close enough to versely, a satellite in equatorial orbit passes be reached by projectiles in the available time. over every point on the Equator on each or- Increasing either the projectile velocity or the bit, but has no coverage of higher latitudes at available time of engagement increases the range all. of each weapon and lessens the total number re- Orbital inclination is not very important for quired. Hardness is less relevant for kinetic kill; long-range weapons at high altitudes, which a 1 kg projectile colliding with a booster at a rela- are able to attack boosters far from the point tive speed of 10 km/sec carries the energy equiv- on the Earth’s surface which is directly be- alent of a heavy tractor-trailer rig traveling at neath the defensive satellite. 140 miles per hour. Mission Altitude Obviously, a boost-phase system expected Raising their orbits takes the defensive sat- to destroy all enemy missiles at launch must ellites farther away from the boosters. For be more capable than less ambitious systems directed-energy weapons where the total kill which accept some leakage. However, there time is not dominated by the retarget time, are more subtle effects of system mission upon increasing the altitude will significantly de- system capability. A mission requirement crease each satellite’s total kill rate. At the specifying certain orbital inclinations can im- same time, however, satellites in higher orbits pose a penalty if those inclinations are not op- can see farther, putting more boosters in their timal for other mission requirements. field of view at any given instant. Depending on which effect is more important, increasing “The chosen altitude must be high enough so that residual the altitude can either increase or decrease the atmospheric drag will not cause the orbit to decay too quickly total number of defensive satellites required. (above about 300 km); survivability considerations might man- (One of the two example constellations pre- date an altitude significantly higher than that (1,000 km or more). The greater altitude would provide increased warning sented at the end of this section gets bigger time in event of direct-ascent attack and might lessen the threat at higher altitudes; the other gets smaller. ) posed by other types of ground-based weapons. 182

Figure 7-5 .—Orbital Inclination One example would be requiring a boost- phase defense to counter submarine-launched missiles as well as land-based ICBMs. The number of extra satellites to counter SLBMs need not be much more than the number needed only for ICBMs because most of the additional capability (in terms of weapons platforms) needed to counter SLBMs comes “for free. ” In a system sized to handle the existing So- viet land-based ICBMs, only a small percentage of the defensive satellites will be within range of those missile fields at any one time. The rest will be somewhere else. Those others which are over the oceans can counter SLBMs if they are in a position to see them. In order to cover possible Arctic Ocean deployment of Soviet SLBMs (which would have to be able to break through the polar ice cap), at least some of the defensive satellites must be in polar orbit. These satellites will be less effective against land-based ICBMs than they would be if they were in less inclined orbits which did not waste time going over the poles.33 Target Distribution In the example immediately above, the capability to handle SLBMs came at almost no cost because SLBM launch areas are far from ICBM silos. Those satellites which would handle the SLBMs in an attack would probably be different from the ones handling the ICBMs, so both jobs could be done simultaneously. Similarly, should the Soviets add additional ICBMs in areas so far away from their exist- Since not all the missiles on a sub can be fired at once, and since the subs are more widely dispersed than missile silos, the rate of submarine-based missile launches per unit area of the ocean will be smaller than the corresponding rate of ICBM launches per unit area in a missile field. Therefore, SLBM launches should be easier for a boost-phase defense to handle. This becomes less true for higher altitude constellations, where each satellite defends against launches from a wider area and more satellites are in a position to shoot simultaneously at ICBMs and SLBMs. Moreover, these statements apply for simultaneous SLBM and ICBM launch. Should the Soviets be able to time SLBM launches so that they occur under defensive satellites which have already been depleted in countering ICBMs, the SLBMs would not be intercepted. However, the (c) orbital arrangement of defensive satellites can mitigate this problem to some extent by ensuring that satellite coverage areas Equatorial orbits (a) give no coverage of northern latitudes. Polar overlap. orbits (b) concentrate coverage at the north pole. Inclined orbits Midcourse systems will have a harder job defending against (c) are more economical, SLBMs than against ICBMs, since normal SLBM flight times SOURCE: Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, are shorter than those of ICBMs. SLBMs flying depressed background paper prepared for the Office of Technology trajectories can arrive on target even faster than those on more Assessment, OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984, usual flight paths. 183 — —. ing missiles (and from SLBM launch areas) parameters, or very similar ones, have recently that the defensive satellites needed to counter been discussed fairly extensively in the liter- the increase were not already being used to at- ature.36 tack existing boosters, no additional defensive The second case utilizes extremely bright capability would be needed to handle the in- lasers generating 25 MW of power at a wave- crease. length of 0.25 microns. These lasers have 25-me- However, targets which are close together ter diameter mirrors. The greatly reduced are more difficult for the defense to handle wavelength, in particular, yields a very large than targets which are dispersed. Should ad- increase in brightness, since it permits the ra- ditional missiles be added near existing ones diation to be focused to a much smaller spot.37 (or near each other, if there are enough of An increase in brightness by a factor of 911 them), new defensive satellites would have to over the first case is thus obtained (B = 2.1 23 be added to counter the increase. Boosters lo- x 10 w/sr). cated in the same general direction from a defen- A booster 4,000 km away could be irradiated sive weapon can be considered “near each other” 2 with an intensity of 1.5 kw/cm in the first case if that weapon requires about the same amount 2 and 1,300 kw/cm in the second one. If that of time to target and kill each of them. For 2 booster had a hardness of 10 kJ/cm , the value directed-energy weapons that operate by “ther- taken for these examples, it would be de- mal kill, ” this will be the case if the kill time stroyed in 7 seconds (ignoring retarget time) for each booster in a group is dominated by in the first case and in 8 milliseconds (similarly retarget time (e.g., the time required for the ignoring retarget time) in the second. beam to switch between targets is large compared to the amount of time the beam must These hypothetical cases have been selected dwell on each target) or if the dimensions of only for the purpose of demonstrating how con- the missile field are smaller than the orbital stellation sizes vary as system parameters are altitude of the weapon. Note especially that changed. The actual parameters chosen do not missiles within existing ICBM missile fields represent an optimized system design, nor are already ‘‘close together’ by these criteria. does their use imply that either system could Deployment in a closely-spaced basing mode or would be constructed. By way of reference, such as that proposed for the MX missile the first case uses space-based lasers which are (“dense pack”) would be much closer together much more capable than any existing ground- than required to be considered near each based ones; the second case requires great ad- other. 34 vances in optical capability beyond those needed for the first case. Examples Perfect optics is assumed, so that the beam spreads at the minimum diffraction-limited angle. Absorption by the atmosphere, in particular absorption by the ozone layer which would severely affect the second case, is neglected.

be at the center of a sphere and aimed at some small portion of that sphere’s inside surface, the weapon’s brightness is given by the amount of power {in watts) the weapon can beam into a given angular range (in steradians). Brightness increases either if power increases or if the width of the beam (the beam’s solid angle) decreases. ‘For a summary of references, see Richard L. Garwin, “How Many Orbiting Lasers for Boost-Phase Intercept?’ Nature, vol. 315, May 23, 1985, p. 286. 37 Brightness is proportional to the square of the ratio of mirror diameter to wavelength. 184

For the purposes of this example (unless other- sile firing broadside at it than firing straight wise noted), Soviet boosters are assumed to down on its nose cone. have been replaced with hypothetical MX-like Some examples, run for both laser bright- boosters having a burn time of 180 seconds and 2 nesses, assumed that the Soviets would use the 10 kJ/cm hardness figure given above. “fast-bum” boosters which burned out in 80 Such boosters would probably be more diffi- seconds, rather than 180. A 30 second delay cult for the defense to destroy than most ex- for identification and assessment was taken isting Soviet boosters, but they also would be for these cases, as for the others. much easier to destroy than boosters that the Soviets could develop in the time it took the The computer model used was provided by United States to deploy such a defensive sys- Christopher Cunningham at the Lawrence tem. In addition, it was assumed that a spot Livermore National Laboratory. A constella- at least 15 cm in diameter would be required tion of defensive satellites is specified by la- to destroy a booster. If the laser was capable ser brightness, beam divergence (which de- of focusing to a smaller spot than that, its pends on the ratio of mirror diameter to laser beam, in effect, was blurred to be 15 cm wide wavelength), altitude, retarget time, number on target. Only boost-phase engagements are of satellites, and orbital placement. For each presented here. The effective engagement time set of conditions, the offense was assumed to is 150 seconds since we assume that the defense launch at the moment when the defensive sat- requires 30 seconds to identify and assess the ellites were in the worst position to handle the attack and to prepare to fire. No limitation was attack, and the minimum defensive constella- imposed on the resources available (e.g., power tion size capable of destroying all the missiles and fuel) on each station; the number of kills under those circumstances was found. Constel- each satellite could make was limited only by lations were not augmented to provide spares the number of targets in view and the avail- to account for satellites which would be out able time. of service due to attack or maintenance. The following two tables present the results of the For most cases, Soviet missiles were assumed computer simulations for the two cases. to be located at 12 sites having the approximate locations of Soviet ICBM fields. Each hypothetical launch site was given 117 boosters for a to- Observations tal of 1,404, approximating the size of the The most useful information derivable from present Soviet ICBM force. Many cases were the above tables is the relationship showing also run for a doubled threat where each site how minimum constellation size varies with had 234 missiles. Defensive satellites were orbital altitude and with retarget time. This placed in 600 inclined orbits, maximizing their variation is less sensitive to individual as- coverage of Soviet missile fields. The lasers sumptions than is the actual size of the con- were credited with being equally effective stellations, which could be increased or de- against surfaces at any orientation. creased by taking different values for other parameters. We draw the following conclusions Examples were also run for satellites in po- for the first example: lar orbits and for a Soviet force concentrated at a single site— the most stressing case for 1. The number of satellites needed in the a boost-phase defense. As was mentioned above, constellation varies linearly with the a “single site” does not necessarily indicate threat size. The only exception is for very a high density of boosters. In these examples, low altitude constellations (300 km) hav- distributing all Soviet boosters over an area the ing retarget times substantially less than size of the State of Ohio effectively puts them 1 second and attacking widely distrib- in a single site. One run took a more realistic uted boosters. In this case, the number angular dependence for laser lethality which, of satellites increases less rapidly than in effect, made it easier for a laser to kill a mis- the number of boosters. Even in this 185

Table 7-1.—Constellation Size Given Assumptions in Text case, the constellation size varies nearly 20 Megawatt Laser/10 Meter Mirror/2.7 micron 2 linearly with the threat size for a “sin- Booster Hardness 10 kj/cm gle site” launch. Altitude ...... 300 km 2. For the particular parameters chosen for Retarget time ...... 0 sec 0.1 sec 1 sec 3 sec hardness, boost time, etc., the constella- Threat size: 1,404 ...... 80 88 192 396 tion size must be at least 100 satellites 2,808 ...... 120 143 368 777 for altitudes of 1,000 km and above. Altitude ., ...... 1,000 km 3. Grouping boosters at a “single site” in- Retarget time ., . . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 1 sec 3 sec creases constellation size by about 60 Threat size: 1,404 ...... 108 * 117 192 336 percent. If the threat is doubled by plac- 2,808 ...... 204 224 384 667 ing the additional boosters at a “single ● —Base case site, ” the defensive constellation should Altitude ...... 3,000 km more than double (except, possibly, for Retarget time ...... 0 sec 1 sec 3 sec the low altitude, low retarget time case). Threat Size: 1,404 ...... 312 357 440 By grouping the added boosters togeth- 2,808 ...... 620 er, they become even harder to kill than Excursions about base case (noted with asterisk above): if boosters were doubled at their exist- Base case (Distributed launch, 1,000 km altitude) 108 Fast burn (80 sec), 1,000 km altitude, O sec slew 306 ing locations. Fast burn (80 sec), 1,000 km altitude, 1 sec slew 588 Fast burn (80 sec), 300 km altitude O sec slew 176 For the second (superbright) example, we “Single site” launch, 1,000 km altitude 180 find the following: “Single site” launch, 1,000 km altitude, double threat 352 “Single site” launch, 300 km altitude 132 4. The altitude is much less important than “Single site” launch, 300 km altitude, doubled threat 234 “Single site launch plus fast burn, 300 km altitude, O sec slew 352 the slew time in determining constellation size. The limit on the kill rate ap- Table 7-2.—Constellation Size Given Assumptions in Text pears to be determined by the slew time, 25 Megawatt Laser/25 Meter Mirror/O.25 micron which, when longer than 0.25 second, is Booster Hardness 10 kj/cm2; Atmospheric Absorption Ignored much longer than the time needed to kill an individual target. The number of tar- Altitude ...... 1,000 km gets each satellite can kill is then limited, Retarget time . . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 0.25 sec 1 sec Threat size: not by laser brightness, but by the time 1,404 ...... 10 15 25 6!3 needed to retarget. In this regime, defen- 2,808 ...... 14 27 42 128 sive constellation size scales linearly with Altitude ...... 3,000 km threat size. Retarget time . . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 0.25 sec 1 sec Threat size: 5. For some of the particular parameters 1,404 ...... 6 9 16 40 chosen here, constellation sizes can be 2,808 ...... 9 16 27 75 very small. Altitude . . . . 10,000 km Retarget time . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 0.25 sec 1 sec 6. For retarget times at or below about 0.25 Threat size: second with distributed launch, the de- 1,404 ...... 5 8 10 26 fensive constellation size scales less than 2,808 ., ...... 9 13 20 49 linearly with the threat size. In this re- Altitude ...... 15,000 km Retarget time. . . . 0 sec 0.1 sec 0.25 sec 1 sec gime, however, the difference in absolute Threat size: number between the actual scaling and 1,404 ...... 6 8 11 26 linear scaling is not very big. 2,808 ., ...... 10 14 22 49 “Single site” launch, 3,000 km altitude, O sec slew .7 7. For very high altitude constellations, the “Single site” launch, 3,000 km altitude, O sec slew, double threat 12 entire Soviet Union is effectively a “sin- “Single site” launch, 15,000 km altitude, O sec slew 7 Fast burn, 3,000 km altitude O sec slew gle site, and constellation size varies es- Fast burn, 3,000 km altitude, O sec slew double threat 24 “Single site, ” fast burn 3,000 km alt , 0 sec slew 16 sentially linearly with the threat even for “Single site, ” fast burn, 3,000 km alt , 0 sec slew, double threat 25 zero retarget time. 186

Further Notes.–For cases where constella- Therefore, such defenses themselves have to tion size increases linearly as threat size be effectively invulnerable to attack. Paul increases—most of the ones examined here— Nitze, chief arms control adviser to President the use of fast burn increases the constellation Reagan, stated criteria for BMD which in- size in inverse proportion to the time of en- cluded the requirement that gagement. For the dimmer laser system, put- The technologies must produce defensive ting all the Soviet boosters in one place in- systems that are survivable; if not, the decreases the required constellation size by fenses would themselves be tempting targets two-thirds, since fewer defensive satellites are for a first strike, This would decrease rather in a position to attack boosters and more are than enhance stability. ” therefore needed. However, depending on their attack plans, the Soviets may not want to General Abrahamson, director of the SDIO, “group” their boosters. Although such a similarly has recognized that grouping would still be large enough that it . . . the key functional components of a defen- would not necessarily be any more vulnerable sive system must be made survivable against to attack than their existing booster distribu- attack. This problem is particularly keen for tion is, the Soviets would lose the ability to defensive space assets.” conduct certain types of structured (preci- Some scientists have stated that a defense sion-timed) attacks. Because of flight time var- should not rely on space-based weapons plat- iations in reaching targets when the launch oc- forms since they would be very difficult to de- curs simultaneously from one limited region, fend. Discussing ballistic missile defense sys- one could not simultaneously strike widely tems with a House subcommittee, Dr. Edward separated targets with a simultaneous launch. Teller emphasized that For the brighter system, there is less advantage to grouping boosters. The satellites have I am not talking about orbiting space la- longer range, and exact booster placement ser battle stations. I am talking about third does not matter as much. generation weapons and other instruments that pop up into space when the time to use Although not shown in the table, placing the them has come.40 defensive satellites in polar orbit increases the “We need eyes in space, ” continued Dr. Tell- constellation size by less than 20 percent over er, but once they are there, “our eyes are sen- the inclined orbit case for the lesser brightness sitive and our eyes are in danger. ” system. Modeling the laser effectiveness by including the effects of the angle between the la- However, other opinions have been quite the ser beam and the booster surface also makes less opposite. In an interview, Presidential Science than 20 percent difference. Adviser George Keyworth remarked without elaborating that as a result of recent advances, The results given in these tables do not ap- “We possess the technology today to deal very ply to kinetic-energy weapons, where the impor- effectively with survivability of space as- tant parameters are the velocity of the driven sets.” 41 General Abrahamson, with a slightly projectiles, and the rapidity of fire. A separate different emphasis, stressed functional surviv- analysis would be needed to determine the behavior of constellation size in those cases. ‘%peech before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, Phil- adelphia, PA, Feb. 20, 1985. Survivability “J. A. Abrahamson, “The Strategic Defense Initiative, ” De- fense/84, August 1984, p. 8. If the defensive system is itself vulnerable ‘“Defense Department Authorization and Oversight Hearings to attack by the offensive force, the offense on H.R. 2287, Research and Development Subcommittee, House can penetrate it by diverting part of its re- Committee on Armed Services, Apr. 28, 1983, H. A.S.C 98-6, Part 5 of 8, p. 1357. sources to attacking the defense directly, per- 4! Inter}, iewed in Sejpnce and Government Report June 1, mitting the remainder to continue unimpeded. 1984, p. 5. —.. -.

187 ability of space systems rather than individ- its effectiveness seriously. The offense can ual survivability: choose both the time and the place of the attack, and might have the advantage of surprise. An analogy can be drawn by comparing [satellites] to the evolutionary use of military Passive and active measures can both be aircraft during World War 1 . . . The fact that used to improve space system survivability. extremely delicate and vulnerable airplanes Some relevant technologies are given below; became legitimate military targets did not none are applicable in all cases, and all impose end their utility in World War I, nor in any costs and/or are themselves vulnerable to conflict since. Both sides quickly learned how to make their airplanes survivable . . . Al- countermeasures. Much more information on though these [survivability measures] did not these techniques and technologies can be eliminate an enemy’s ability to concentrate found in chapter 4 of OTA’s companion study forces to destroy a given airplane, squadrons of Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, were so constructed that missions could be and Arms Control. See also the section earlier accomplished in the face of losses of large (p. 175) on “Suppression” as a countermeas- numbers of individual airplanes. All these ure to BMD. tactics and technologies are applicable to spacecraft survivability . . .42 Passive Measures Nevertheless, ensuring the survivability of Hiding: Satellites can be made more dif- space systems or space functions—in the pre- ficult to detect. For example, they could sumed presence of a highly capable enemy be miniaturized or stored in a tightly BMD system, and in the highly stressing envi- folded configuration and deployed only ronment of nuclear war-is as challenging a just before use, or they could be hidden task as it is crucial. After all, many of the tech- either in very distant orbits or very close nological advances required to destroy ballistic ones, where they might be hard to detect missiles could also be effective against satellites, against the Earth’s background. and in many cases satellites prove much easier Deception: Satellites can be simulated to destroy. Satellites in orbit today are more with decoys or hidden in clouds of aero- fragile than ballistic missile boosters, which sols or chaff. in turn are easier to destroy than reentry ve- Maneuvering: Satellites can evade at- hicles. Satellites of the future need not be so tackers. fragile, but hardening them will impose costs Hardening: Satellites can be made resis- and may interfere with their function. Sensor tant to attack. satellites in high orbits may be concealable, Proliferation: Satellites can be replicated, at least for a while; concealing battle station and damaged satellites can either be re- satellites in lower orbits would be quite diffi- plenished with on-orbit spares or recon- cult and such satellites would be even more stituted from the ground. difficult to conceal if they carried extensive shielding. Active Measures Furthermore, the presence of orbiting BMD ● Jamming: Satellites can interfere with the components greatly increases the incentive for sensors of attackers by overwhelming or the other side to develop highly capable ASATs saturating them. to negate those components. The defense must ● Spoofing: They can fool attackers by emit- constantly maintain full capability to defeat ting or broadcasting deceptive signals. an attack; depending on defensive system de- ● Counterattack: Highly capable BMD sign, the offense may need only to “punch a weapons can be trained on attackers; al- hole” through the defense in order to challenge ternatively, armed defensive satellites (DSATs) can be provided to escort and de- 4’Abrahamson, op. cit., p. 9 (emphasis added). fend other satellites. 188 ——— .—

Secrecy sified that OTA has not been granted access No matter what combination of active and to it, or else it has not materially affected this passive measures is utilized, protecting sat- conclusion. It is likely that Congress would re- ellites from a hostile and responsive opponent quire assurance that those survivability issues will be an interactive process. (See section on have indeed been satisfactorily addressed be- “Counter-Countermeasures,” p. 178.) In a fore agreeing to fund a full-scale development competition where different techniques and system. measures may suddenly be introduced, it becomes very important for each side to keep its Battle Management opponent from learning in advance what it is Definition doing. It is equally important to learn as much as possible about what the opponent is doing. Battle management is concerned with the allocation of resources. A ballistic missile de- Security therefore becomes especially impor- fense system consists of a number of sensors tant in ensuring survivability. However, it will and weapons, each having a finite amount of be more important to protect those items which available power or fuel. Engagements against the opponent cannot easily find out for him- attacking ICBMs take place in a region of self, such as battle tactics or the locations of space and an interval of time determined by “hidden” satellites, than it will be to protect geometry, weapon capability, and the attack- those things that will become obvious when er’s strategy. The defensive components (sen- a system is deployed. That one or another of sors and weapons) which provide coverage of the techniques under “active measures” or that region have to do their jobs within the “passive measures” above is intended to be available time. The battle management sys- used in a defensive constellation should not tem—the set of rules specifying the operation be particularly sensitive; exactly how that of and the relationships between system com- technique is to be implemented and under ponents, and the computers which process what circumstances it is to be used would be. those rules—must ensure that the overall de- However, any system that relies solely on fensive mission is accomplished successfully. keeping some particular piece of information This job is a demanding one. The first ma- secret has a catastrophic failure mode should jor conclusion of the Defensive Technologies that information be revealed. Study Team subpanel on Battle Management, Survivability-Summary Communications, and Data Processing was that: Overall, the Fletcher Committee concluded that Specifying, generating, testing, and maintaining the software for a battle management Survivability of the system components is system will be a task that far exceeds in com- a critical issue whose resolution requires a plexity and difficulty any that has yet been combination of technologies and tactics that accomplished in the production of civil or mil- remain to be worked out.43 itary software systems.44 From what OTA has been able to determine, examining data on both an unclassified and 44B8ttJe ~aagement, communications, and Data proc- a classified basis, the “technologies and tac- ing, B. McMillan, Panel Chairm an, vol. V of Report of the Study tics” required to resolve system survivability on Elixm”nating the Threat Posed by Nuclear Ba.lh”stic Missiles, J, C. Fletcher, Study Chairman (Washington, DC: Department issues still “remain to be worked out. ” Either of Defense, Defensive Technologies Study Team, February, the work done so far has been so highly clas- 1984), p. 4. This volume will be referred to as the DTST Re- — port, vol. V. Unlike the other six volumes of the DTST report, 43 The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies vol. V is entirely unclassified. Distribution is limited to U.S. Study (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of the Government agencies or as directed by the Assistant for Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, March 1984), Directed Energy Weapons, OUSDRE/ADE W, The Pentagon, p. 5. Washington, DC, 20301. 189

Hardware to estimate that over 10 million lines of code Although the hardware required for BMD might be required for the BMD systems which battle management also exceeds the present they investigated. More recent estimates have state of-the-art, the panel recognized that “the gone considerably higher. basic technology is evolving rapidly and is 45 Such a software system “will be larger, more likely to be available when needed. ” In addi- complex, and have to meet more stringent con- tion, the panel found that technology exists trols than any software system previously today to transmit data between system com- built, ”46 reported the subpanel. No one person ponents at the rates which a BMD system will be able to comprehend or oversee the en- would require. tire system and developing such a system will Battle management functions are done both itself likely require the development of auto- within a given defensive layer and across dif- mated programming techniques. Computers ferent layers. Each layer must perform acqui- will not only be needed to create the final sition and tracking, target discrimination and BMD program but will also have to subject classification, and resource allocation. Across it to exhaustive reliability testing. One anal- layers, the defensive system must provide yst47 has expressed the view that, in the ab- overall surveillance, specify rules of engage- sence of “extensive operational testing in real- ment, delegate control, coordinate between istic environments, ” it would be essentially layers, trade off defending Earth targets impossible to produce error-free software of against defending itself, and furnish current the size and complexity required. This argu- assessments of the state of the defense sys- ment claims that it would be impossible other- tem and the battle. This last function includes wise to be sure that all catastrophic design selecting relevant portions of a much larger flaws had been eliminated, even if automated set of data and presenting it to the command programming techniques were applied. authority. Decentralization and Survivability Software The data processing requirements for a sys- The subpanel of the DTST estimated that tem of this complexity must be distributed for the system to monitor 30,000 objects (not among the system elements. This decentral- a highly conservative number; values of 100,000 ization serves both to minimize the amount of and 300,000 were also considered), it would data which must be passed from component need to maintain a track file of about 6 mil- to component as well as to enhance surviv- lion bits of information, or about 200 bits per ability by eliminating indispensable elements. track. This amount of data is about the same Having a surveillance sensor, for example, as would be contained on 350 double-spaced process each raw image locally and transmit typed pages, and could be transmitted within only the position of a target to a weapon, a second at the data rates considered by the rather than transmitting the entire sensor field panel. of view, cuts down greatly on the transmitted data rate and lessens the risk that the system The software required, however, was esti- could be paralyzed by failure of a central proc- mated to be three to five times more complex essor. With such a decentralized architecture, than what was the largest similar existing mil- the Fletcher subpanel concluded that: itary software system-that controlling the Safeguard ABM system developed in the late . . . it appears possible to design a battle man- 1960s and early 1970s. That project, constitut- agement system having a structure that can ing just the terminal and late midcourse layers survive battle damage as well as other parts 48 of a BMD system, required over 2 million lines of the BMD system do. of computer programming, leading the DTST “Ibid., p. 45. “Herbert Lin, “Software for Ballistic Missile Defense, ” (Cam- ——.— — bridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, July 1985). “Ibid., conclusion 4, p. 6. 48DTST Report, vol. V, op cit., conclusion 9, p. 9. 190

Command and Control dented complexity” of the BMD mission and because these issues bear directly on the de- Given the short times and the large number sign of the battle management system itself. of individual tasks which need to be done in Another problem existing today, but aggra- a ballistic missile defense engagement, the sys- vated in a BMD system, is the inability to test tem must be designed to run as much as posit under realistic circumstances. ‘‘There will sible without human intervention. Command be no way, short of conducting a war, to test and control of such a system must also be fully a deployed BMD system, ” wrote the sub- highly reliable. The Fletcher subpanel declared panel. They concluded that: that: The problem of realistically testing an en- No BMD system will be acceptable to the tire system, end-to-end, has no complete tech- leaders and the voters of the United States nical solution. The credibility of a deployed unless it is widely believed that the system system must be established by credible test- will be safe in peacetime and will operate ef- 49 ing of subsystems and partial functions and fectively when needed. by continuous monitoring of its operations Even if the weapons utilized are incapable of and health during peacetime.50 causing mass destruction should they be fired In addition to reliability, a battle manage- in error, the activation of a defense system ment system must obviously resist attempts (like the placing on alert of strategic nuclear at penetration or subversion. This requirement forces today) would almost certainly be no- mandates that extreme attention be given to ticed by the other side, and could instigate or overall system security. However, the subpan- escalate a dangerous crisis situation. This dan- el realized that: ger might be mitigated by the adoption of mutual confidence-building measures by the There is no technical way to design abso- United States and the Soviet Union. lute safety, security, or survivability into the functions of weapons release and ordnance Testing, Reliability, and Security safety. Standards of adequacy must, in the end, be established by fiat, based upon an in- These last issues of reliable control exist formed consensus and judgment of risks.51 today with respect to strategic offensive nu- OTA concurs with these conclusions of the clear forces. However, the Fletcher subpanel Fletcher subpanel. highlighted them because of the “unprece- —— SoIbid., conclusion 6, P. 7. 4gIbid., p. 6-7. 5] Ibid., conclusion 7, p. 8.

NON-BMD APPLICATIONS The same characteristics of BMD technol- To understand fully the possible implica- ogies which enable them to intercept and de- tions of deploying a BMD system, it is impor- stroy ballistic missile attacks will also provide tant to recognize the additional, non-BMD, the capability to accomplish other military contributions that BMD technologies could missions, including offensive ones. If not de- make to our strategy. Perhaps more impor- signed into the defensive system from the be- tantly, we must understand what capabilities ginning, these other military missions may not we might, de jure or de facto, have to concede be effectively performed; however, the tech- to the Soviet Union, were we to decide that nologies used to construct BMD systems a mutually defended world was preferable to might nevertheless also find use in different a mutually vulnerable one. systems better suited to these other missions. 191

What Is “Offense?” ASAT, and since ASAT attack is a potent BMD countermeasure, the BMD mission and No military system easily lends itself to be- the ASAT mission are closely coupled. The ing characterized as strictly “offensive” or connection is discussed elsewhere in this re- “defensive.” A system’s capabilities, such as port (e.g., “Suppression,” p. 175 ff.) and in the overwhelming destructive power in the case companion volume to this report, Anti-Satellite of a nuclear weapon, can provide some clues. Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control. But in the final analysis, it is a weapon’s use which becomes offensive or defensive, and even that is not unambiguous. A nuclear Anti-Aircraft weapon used in an unprovoked attack on Those BMD weapons able to penetrate the another country is an offensive instrument; atmosphere would be able to attack targets in one used to deter such an attack plays a defen- the atmosphere if those targets could be lo- sive role. When a retaliatory weapon is actu- cated. Neutral particle beams and X-ray ally used, the distinction becomes very difficult to make. lasers, which cannot penetrate the atmosphere to low altitudes, could not be used in this role. Ballistic missile defense technologies, which Neither could kinetic-kill vehicles unless they would not only be incapable of causing mass could be made to function through reentry. destruction but which would be able to pre- Visible lasers, however, could attack aircraft vent it, could be characterized as being primar- targets in the absence of clouds. ily defensive. But there are also offensive roles in which they could be used—some inherent Perhaps the more difficult part of the anti- in any defensive system and others for which aircraft mission will be finding the targets. De- tecting an aircraft against a warm and clut- technologies developed for BMD might be well tered Earth background is harder than spot- suited for, even if a BMD system itself did not ting a satellite against the cold and relatively seek to fulfill them. Some offensive roles, such empty background of space. Cruise missiles, as use to support a first-strike attack by blunt- ing what would be a ragged retaliation, have being smaller, will be even harder to find; application of “stealth” technology complicates been mentioned earlier in this report (cf. chapter 6) and will not be discussed further. Other the task still further. aspects, however, will be presented in the fol- Nevertheless, technology that is potentially lowing discussion. capable of detecting aircraft from space is now under investigation. One of the objectives of Inherent Capabilities the Teal Ruby sensor, a focal-plane mosaic array containing on the order of 100,000 infrared Ballistic missile defense systems involve the detectors which is scheduled to be deployed precise application of power at long range. De- by the Space Shuttle, is to “provide proof of pending on the characteristics of the sensors concept of stepstare mosaic for aircraft detec- and weapons systems, the targets of that power tion and tracking”52 from space. Devices based might be many things other than ballistic on that technology could be powerful surveil- missiles. lance tools, and in conjunction with atmosphere-penetrating weapons could be ef- ASAT fective against airplanes. Any BMD system will need to protect its Attacking airplanes which are over the ter- space-based components against potential ritory of another country is at present very dif- A SAT attack and will almost certainly require ficult. If that task were made easier, it could ASAT capability to defend itself. Since the same technologies applicable to boost-phase and midcourse defense can be adapted for “Rockwell International Satellite Systems Division diagram. have profound strategic implications. Crucial Precision Ground Attack U.S. command and control functions are now Weapons which penetrate into the atmos- conducted aboard airborne command posts, phere can also attack targets on the ground. which are mobile and difficult to find. These There are at present lots of other ways to de- planes supplement ground facilities, which at stroy terrestrial targets, so ground attack mis- present are vulnerable to nuclear attack. sions might not be an attractive option for a Should these aircraft also become vulnerable ballistic missile defense. Furthermore, ground to Soviet attack, the command and control targets would probably be easier to protect structure of our nuclear forces would be seri- than ICBM or satellites from the types of ously weakened and would have to be re- damage that a ballistic missile defense-capable designed. system could inflict. It may therefore be the A BMD system does not have to be able to case that space-based weapons systems would attack aircraft. However, should one be devel- be grossly inefficient for attacking targets on oped, the advantages of also providing it with Earth. However, such a system might provide anti-aircraft capability may be compelling. the ability to do so with essentially no warn- 793 ———— ing, which no existing weapon can do; more- may not be the best for ballistic missile de- over, even if the system is deployed for other fense, they would probably be difficult to ban reasons, some amount of ground-attack poten- under an arms control regime which allowed tial might nevertheless be present. Although space-based BMD weapons. the optimal weapons for space-to-earth attack

CONCLUSION There is a wide variety of technologies which A new space shuttle with about three times could, in principle be assembled to form a space- the capacity of the present one may have to based BMD system. Candidate technologies for be developed for most options. An alternative kill mechanisms include various types of lasers, would be to reduce greatly the cost of placing kinetic-energy weapons, and particle beams. No material in orbit using the shuttle or some- physical law would prevent the construction thing with roughly the same payload capabil- of a workable system, consisting of boost ity. If Soviet attack during the deployment phase, post-boost phase, midcourse, and reen- phase is considered likely, this shuttle should try phase layers. Each technology, however, be able to defend itself during and after inser- is limited by physical laws. These limitations tion into orbit, or it must be defended by sat- complicate, but do not eliminate, the possibil- ellites already deployed. ity of a working system based on that tech- The defensive systems discussed are yet to be nology. Such problems relate, for example, to: proven, and are very far from being developed the limitation on the distance traveled in the and deployed. In a number of essential particu- time available, due to finite velocities (kinetic- lars, improvements in performance of several energy weapons); inability of the energy-deliv- orders of magnitude (factors of 10) will be ery device to penetrate the atmosphere effec- needed. tively (particle beams, X-rays, possibly kinetic energy); the curvature of the Earth (pop-up Operational issues, rather than technical ones, systems). may come to determine questions of technical feasibility. These operational issues are of two For all of the methods envisioned, much re- sorts—the ability of a defensive system to an- search is necessary to determine scientific, engi- ticipate and cope with offensive countermeas- neering, and economic feasibility. All methods ures, and the confidence which defensive plan- except the X-ray laser and very bright optical ners can have in a strategic defense which or ultraviolet lasers with very low slew times cannot be tested under fully realistic con- require a large number of space-based satellites with high performance reliability and with ac- ditions. cess for maintenance. To the extent that sensor An issue to be resolved is the susceptibility satellite requirements exceed those for space- of sensors to defeat by various countermeasures. based weapons platforms, all systems will re- Their sensitive nature, required for long-dis- quire large numbers of satellites. In general, the tance detection, also renders them vulnerable higher the attainable power, and the faster the to various levels of blinding. Another general retargeting time (for directed-energy weapons), counter-tactic is the emplacement of space the fewer battle stations are needed. Great im- mines, which can be used against sensor sat- provements in computer speed, reliability, and ellites or battle stations. For each technology durability are needed to achieve a workable there are many possible countermeasures, both system. Current research in computer hard- active and passive, which can be taken by the ware development gives cause for some opti- offensive forces. Some are simple and straight- mism in that area. However, even greater ad- forward, even with today’s technology. Others vances are required in software capabilities. are more complicated and would require great 194 effort, perhaps comparable in magnitude with countermeasures, there may well be counter- the technology they would counter. countermeasures which are feasible. The eventual outcome of the contest between measures, Defensive systems, if deployed 10 to 20 years countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures from now, will have to deal not only with to- cannot be predicted now. day’s countermeasures, but also with those which will exist 10 to 20 years hence. For these Chapter 8 Feasibility Contents

Page Hypothetical BMD System ...... ,...... 197 Introduction ...... 197 Terminal Defense ...... 198 Light Midcourse and Terminal Defense ...... 202 Heavier Midcourse Layer ...... ,...... , ...... 203 Boost-Phase Plus Previous Layers . ,...... ,., ...... 205 Extremely Effective Defense ...... , ...... 208 Survivability ...... ,...... 210 Earth-Based Assets...... 210 Space-Based Assets...... 211

Feasibility Questions ...... !. .., . ...,.,.. 213

Technological Feasibility ...... 213

Operational Feasibility ...... ,...... ,, ...... 214

costs ...... ,...... ,.... 215

Table Table No. Page 8-1. Hypothetical Multi-Layered BMD System...... 199

Figure Figure No. Page 8-1. Boost-Phase With Ground-Based Lader...... 207 Chapter 8 Feasibility

HYPOTHETICAL BMD SYSTEM

Introduction be added in succession, if and when the required technology is developed. There is a As a way of illustrating the scope and the rough correspondence between the elements nature of the technical and operational feasi- of this set of systems and the four levels of bility issues, this chapter hypothesizes an im- defense capability described in chapter 5. The aginary system architecture. Since an official first system might have the capability of chap- proposed architecture does not yet exist, the ter 5’s Level 1. The second or, more likely, the following system is presented as a structure third system might have roughly the capabil- which is at least plausible enough for illustra- ity of Level 2; the fourth system is meant to tive purposes. We do not suggest or predict have the capability of Level 3, and the fifth that all or even any of its parts can or will ac- system is meant to have the capability of tually be proposed or built. Level 4. The example described is not intended to be definitive or exhaustive. We suggest it to con- The first layer of defense hypothesized is a vey a feeling for the nature of the problems terminal defense for hardened sites. The de- to be resolved in planning a workable BMD.l fense is not structured to defend large areas Several levels of effectiveness are hypothe- or soft targets, but rather has as its purpose sized. Consonant with conservative strategic the defense of a significant fraction of U.S. planning, we assume, in outlining the system, missile silos and hardened command and control sites. The purpose would be to provide the that it must deal with Soviet force modernization and Soviet countermeasures (a “respon- United States with the assured survival of a sive threat’ ‘). It is conceivable that future significant fraction of its land-based retalia- levels of the Soviet offensive threat, rather tory force in the face of a Soviet ICBM attack, than increasing, could decrease as a result of and thus bolster the other legs of our “triad” negotiation, in which case the hypothesized in deterring a Soviet first strike. This layer architecture would be more effective than might not be very effective against a respon- otherwise. sive threat without the presence of other layers, and, by itself, would not follow the path The hypothetical BMD architecture is treated of current Administration policy, which is to as a nested set. That is, the first system, con- develop methods of defending populations, not sisting of one layer of terminal defense, is the weapons. simplest and most readily achievable; the second incorporates and extends the first by add- The second level adds a layer with some mid- ing another layer; the third incorporates and course capability to the terminal defense. This extends the second, and so on, through the begins to provide some area defense and is also fifth system. The reader is also referred to the intended to assure the survival of a larger frac- discussion of a layered defense in chapter 7. tion of the U.S. retaliatory force. Any reentry It is imaginable that an entire architecture vehicles (RVs) destroyed or decoys discrimi- could be deployed in this order. The first sys- nated during the midcourse phase will cor- tem could be realized soonest; the others might respondingly reduce the stress on the terminal defenses. A structured attack may be disrupted by this capability, and the overall ‘cf. J.C. Fletcher, “Technologies for Strategic Defense, ” issues in S’cience and Techno~ogy, vol. 1, h’o. 1, fall 1984, for a number of targets presented to the terminal similar exercise. layer might be significantly reduced.

197 198

The third level adds a significant midcourse Another class of requirements includes capability. The fourth level incorporates boost- those technologies which still need substan- phase and post-boost-phase layers, intended tial research effort in order to demonstrate fea- to give an effective layered defense with low sibility. Among these would be space-based overall leakage. particle beams of sufficient brightness, pointing capability and kill assessment capability; The fifth level illustrates the magnitude of lasers powerful enough for boost-phase kill; the requirements of a near-perfect ballistic and space-based mirrors of many meters in di- missile defense. It improves capabilities for all ameter, which could aim laser beams with layers, and augments terminal defenses to try great accuracy in less than a second. In gen- to make the total leakage extremely small, eral, as the layers in the hypothetical system having as its goal the neutralization of all in- become more numerous and more complex, the coming warheads. This level of defense would corresponding requirements tend to need logically require that all other practical means longer term development. For some require- of nuclear weapons delivery could be similarly ments, there is general agreement on whether neutralized. Otherwise, the aggressor would they could be available in the near term, in the use those alternate delivery strategies and the midterm, or are still to be demonstrated, but advantage of this level over the fourth one for others, experts may disagree on the pros- would vanish. pects for success and on the time needed for Each section of this chapter lists a series of development. technical requirements to be met in order for There is another type of requirement which the given system to be effective. Some of these is more difficult to assess, namely, the capa- requirements could be met today or in the near bility of a subsystem to respond effectively to future. For example, endoatmospheric nuclear an adversary’s countermeasures. The surviv- interceptors have been developed for years and ability of a system in a nuclear environment would likely be able to reach significant per- or under direct attack is especially difficult to formance levels (defending hardened targets) gauge at this stage, particularly in the absence within a short period of time. Appropriate of a well-defined architecture and of a well- communication systems with survivable links defined threat. are likewise highly developed and should be available very soon. In addition to the development of the appropriate technology, other requirements to be The technologies for satisfying most require- met include questions of reliability and main- ments, however, are not nearly as mature as tenance of the system’s components. Discus- in the above examples. One class of require- sion of these matters can be found in chapter ments consists of those which appear feasible, 7, pp. 169-170 and p. 190. but need to be scaled up in magnitude, capability, or both. These are generally considered to be midterm prospects. A hardened system of passive sensors, adequate for some target Terminal Defense discrimination and able to survive in a nuclear This layer of defense would have to inter- environment, could probably be developed cept incoming RVs in the last 30 to 60 seconds with known technology. However, such a sys- of flight as they reenter the atmosphere. De- tem would probably require many years of detection and tracking of targets in the earlier velopment and testing. Similarly, homing phases of their trajectories is required, but lit- kinetic-energy weapons, which are relatively tle discrimination would be possible before inexpensive and fast (5 to 8 km/sec), can atmospheric reentry. almost certainly be developed, but would also require a number of years of development be- The elements of the hypothetical terminal fore effective deployment became possible. defense system would consist of: — --— Table 8.1 .—Hypothetical Multi-Layered BMD System — System level System elements Description Comments Level 1 Terminal Defense Early warning satellites Warning of launch provided by high-orbit satellites. Homing either infrared (IR) or radar, in- (defense of hardened sites using ground-based radar RVs detected and tracked in region of ground tar- terceptors should be relatively inexpen- endoatmospherlc rockets to Intercept gets by ground radar and airborne sensors ground sive, since many needed, may be reentry vehicles (RVs) as they ap- airborne optical sensors, computers assign Interceptors to RVs kill assess- nuclear or nonnuclear proach their targets) ground-based battle management computers menta permits reassignment of defense intercep- fast endoatmospheric Interceptors tors atmospheric interception used, air effects — — used to discriminate between RVs and decoys — Level 2 Light Midcourse and Terminal Level 1 plus As in level 1 for terminal defenses longer range Passive IR sensors used for crude dis - Defense exoatmospheric homing Interceptors range Interceptors added which can intercept some RVs crimination and possibly kill assess- (additional layer added with some hundreds of km, above atmosphere, providing some area defense. ment data base of Soviet RV and decoy Interceptlon capability in midcourse this requires some discrimination capability, fur- signatures needed, sensors must be b and some ability 10 discriminate RVs pop-up IR sensors (possibly satellite-based nished by passive IR pop-up sensors, launched able to function in a hostile nuclear en- from decoys in space to reduce burden Instead), towards cloud of decoys and attacking RVs, the vironment on terminal layer, some area defense) self-defense capability for space assets new layer reduces the burden on the terminal layer — Level 3 Heavier Midcourse Layer Level 2 plus Satellite-based ultraviolet laser radar (Iadar) used to Ladar Imaging rapid with resolution (effective midcourse layer added ultraviolet laser radar (Iadar) Imaging on image objects, discrimination provided by compar- good to 1 meter or less for adequate giving realistic two-layer system, satellites, ing images with data base of Soviet RV and decoy discrimination and birth-to-death track- with each layer highly effective) characteristics, RVs attacked by In-orbit kinetic- ing of RVs, kinetic weapon homing highly capable space-based battle manage- energy weapons, which also defend all space- capability good to less than a meter ment system based components of system, this level has fully space-based kinetic energy weapons developed terminal and midcourse layers, but no boost or post-boost phase defense effective self-defense in space, significant space-based power Level 4 Boost-Phase Plus Previous Layers Level 3 plus This level adds a boost- and post-boost-phase Extremely capable battle management (boost-phase Intercept added to kill ground-based high Intensity lasers (either layer, consisting of very bright ground-based laser system needed, kill assessment required boosters or post-boost vehicles be- excimer or free electron beams directed to their targets by orbiting mirrors, for boost phase as well as midcourse fore RVs and decoys dispersed) sensing by Infrared sensors, Imaging by ultra-violet space-based mirrors for relay and aim: Iadar, battle management to handle all layers doing high resolution tracking and imaging in discrimination, kill assessment, and target assign- boost phase, ments and reassignments Boost- and post-boost- self-defense for all phases phase layers may be combined, since post-boost ——-—— -— phase could be shortened to 10 seconds or so Level 5 Extremely Effective Layer Level 4 plus More Interceptors are added in terminal and mid- Essentially same as Level 4, but more (Level 4 with better capability. more terminal and exoatmospheric inter - course layers. electromagnetic launchers used for of it and higher reliability newer tech- meant to permit only minimal ceptors, boost post-boost and midcourse Intercepts, high nologies used as they become available penetration to targets by enemy capacity space power needed all systems includ- RVs) electromagnetic launchers for midcourse ing battle management must be extremely reliable and boost-phase intercepts large capacity space-based power, all systems extremely reliable 200

● Ground-based radars, for sensing RVs Another possibility, one within current capa- and decoys as they approach. bilities, involves the use of hardened, dispos- ● Several thousand fast acceleration inter- able radars. Normally buried for protection, ceptor rockets with infrared (IR) or radar a few would expose themselves to attack in or- homing capability; nonnuclear kill capa- der to perform their tracking tasks. Those de- bility would be preferable; in case non- stroyed by early nuclear explosions would be nuclear kill could be defeated by offensive replaced by others, which would rise from countermeasures, or were too expensive, bunkers following the destruction of their sib- small nuclear warheads would be sub- lings. These radars would have to be rather stituted. inexpensive, since many of them would be ● Early warning satellites to give notice of needed. Survivability would be provided by attack launch. their numbers and distribution as well as their ● Use of air-based infrared sensors to track protective shelters. incoming RVs and decoys at large distances. Fast interceptors with nuclear warheads ● A battle management system,. consisting have already been developed. In order to min- of computers, sensors, and communica- imize control and command problems when tion links, which would take data from nuclear weapons are used, to reduce collateral tens or hundreds of sensors aboard sat- damage to one’s own hardware and to reduce ellites and on the ground, and register the the chances of blinding or dazzling one’s own reentry of the attacking objects in the up- sensors, it would be preferable to use homing per atmosphere; it would calculate track interceptors with nonnuclear kill devices. files for thousands of such objects, and use atmospheric effects (e.g., deceleration) To defend an area 100 km in radius, rockets to discriminate between RVs and decoys would have to attain the speed of several in the upper atmosphere. The system km/ec in a matter of 10 seconds or so. This would assign particular interceptors to should be achievable with current technology. targets identified as RVs, would deter- One could imagine, for the sake of argument, mine whether or not the RVs were killed, a defense of 10 such areas, in order to assure and would revise target assignments ac- some level of retaliation by U.S. ICBMs in re- cordingly. It would also present real-time sponse to a Soviet first strike. To defend information to command authorities on against an attack of 5,000 RVs (about half of the progress of the battle. today’s Soviet strategic inventory), with the aim of assuring the temporary survival of a Several of these elements are now available significant fraction of U.S. silos, a preferen- or could be shortly. Geosynchronous early tial defense could be used. If one were to sup- warning satellites have been in dependable use for many years. Ground-based radar technol- pose that Soviet RVs were aimed, in a random ogy, capable of multi-object discrimination distribution, at 1,000 U.S. silos, one would anticipate 5 RVs per silo. The defense then could using atmospheric effects, now exists, for in- pick a fraction of silos to defend and assign, tercepts taking place at sufficiently low alti- say, three interceptors to each RV aimed at tudes. In the face of an attack using nuclear those silos, while allowing other RVs to pene- precursor explosions, however, such radar trate. The number of interceptors to be used could be blacked out or otherwise put out of would then depend on how many silos would operation in the early stages of the assault. be preferentially defended. The interceptors The development of aircraft-based infrared could be mobile, making it more difficult for sensors could provide a more survivable and the offense to target them. Radar units could flexible backup for the ground-based radar. also be mobile. -—

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A terminal defense could be used in conjunc- sors able to operate successfully in a hos- tion with multiple protective shelter basing tile nuclear environment; important in (MPS), as was once proposed for MX missile this context is the problem of “redout”: siting.2 Since an extensive national debate at “scintillation,’ or bright electromagnetic that time resulted in the rejection of such a radiation, caused by a nuclear explosion plan, MPS is not considered as an option in in the upper atmosphere, which masks in- this hypothetical architecture. However, its frared signals from targets and could daz- application, together with a terminal defense, zle or neutralize sensors. would provide great leverage if one were to The development of a relatively inexpen- defend missiles preferentially. As described sive homing interceptor with fast acceler- above, in the case of preferential defense, some ation; a nuclear-tipped warhead could be sites are defended and others are not, while the necessary as a backup if a reasonably in- information on which sites are defended is con- expensive nonnuclear kill device could not cealed from the adversary. In this manner, a be developed. small number of interceptors could protect a smaller number of missiles from a much larger in reacting to a defensive system which uses attack. only terminal defenses, the Soviets could apply countermeasures which are well within the The following technical requirements need realm of today’s technology, They could sim- to be met for such a terminal defense system ply proliferate RVs with relative ease. The to operate successfully: marginal cost-exchange ratio between offen- ● Effective homing devices; if infrared (IR), sive RV and defensive interceptor might or they must avoid being swamped by the might not favor the interceptor. It is not ob- strong infrared signal emanating from the vious which side would win the economic bat- nose of the interceptor, which is heated tle on this level, or whether a cost exchange by its rapid passage through the atmos- analysis alone would be the determining fac- phere; if IR or if radar they must be able tor in this competition. to function in an environment where many Another countermeasure would be the de- nuclear explosions may be occurring. ● velopment and deployment of more sophisti- A communication system with survivable cated penetration aids, which could fool the links between its component units, able defensive battle management system into to operate in an extremely hostile nuclear thinking that many more RVs are attacking environment. ● than actually is the case. A variant approach A battle management system able to sur- would be to try to make the RV appear to be vive and function while under nuclear a decoy. The objective would be to saturate attack. the defenses, and to reduce the time available ● Battle management sensors and com- for the defense to commit and intercept. The puter which can discriminate accurately lower the intercept altitude, the harder it between decoys and RVs at an altitude would be to simulate an RV’s behavior with- high enough so that interceptors can be out making a decoy as heavy as an actual RV. launched in time to reach the RVs. ● Battle management systems able to as- Yet another Soviet option would be a struc- sign interceptors to targets within frac- tured attack, where the incoming RVs, possi- tions of a second per target. bly fused to detonate when attacked (salvage- Ž If ground-based radars are not suffi- fused), would come in waves. The first wave ciently effective, air-based infrared sen- would detonate at high altitudes, blinding the defenses long enough to permit subsequent 2For an extensive review of MPS in the MX context. cf. U.S. waves to penetrate closer to the target. Fol- Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “MX Missile Bas- ing, ” OTA-ISC-140 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print- lowing waves would repeat this process and, ing Office, September 198 1). eventually, in this ‘‘laddering down, the tar- 202

gets would be reached and destroyed. The penalty of this technique to the offense is that sev- EXO-ATMOSPHERIC A HOMING KILL VEHICLE eral RVs would need to be expended per target. WITH FLYOUT SHROUD Its resources are correspondingly drained. The defense can extract a high price for each de- \ fended target, thus perhaps saving nondefended targets through attrition of the offense’s RVs. If the Soviets were to pursue this option, they could be expected, therefore, to make a seri- PROPULSION ous effort to increase greatly the number of warheads. A further countermeasure would be for the ● LIGHT WEIGHT offense to use maneuverable reentry vehicles. ● LOW COST This would greatly stress homing capabilities Photo credit: US. Army Strategic Defense Command for nonnuclear kill vehicles. However, the de- Exoatmospheric Reentry Intercept Subsystem (ERIS): fense could then counter with nuclear war- Sketch of proposed concept for exoatmospheric interceptor. heads, which would reduce the need for high precision homing. addition to the defense of a few hard sites. This In general, the technology needed for the layer of the system would be intended to break terminal defense system is either available or up structured attacks and could relieve some could be available within the short term. How- of the stress from the large number of RVs and ever, the overall operation of such a system decoys which could otherwise confront the ter- in an environment of multiple nuclear detona- minal defense system. The hard-target defense tions is not well understood. The system de- would therefore be more solid, and, by use of scribed above would be far more robust in the preferential defensive tactics, some soft tar- face of possible short-term threat responses gets could also be afforded some protection. if supplemented by other layers. One possibility for a sensor system would be the deployment of perhaps 100 satellites, Light Midcourse and Terminal Defense each equipped with sensors, which would have While the requirements of the previous sys- some ability to observe the deployment of de- tem could probably be met in the near term, coys and RVs from the post-boost vehicle, pos- this system and the following ones require sibly aiding in discruminating between the two. technology which is somewhat further off. Perhaps a more survivable and cheaper alter- This additional layer could probably be added native could be a set of pop-up sensors, to be relatively quickly after the deployment of the launched on notice of a massive attack, which previous one. Most of the technological re- would serve the same purpose. quirements in this section should be achieva- The sensors might be based on a passive in- ble in the near to midterm. frared system which could be used to meas- In addition to the terminal phase described ure the infrared emissions of targets. Meas- above, this level of the hypothetical system urements at several different wavelengths would add a set of hundreds of ground-based might make decoying or deceptive simulations infrared homing interceptors, based near the more difficult. This level of capability might borders of the United States, which are capa- be effective against certain types of simple de- ble of exoatmospheric interception. These in- coys. Information on track files for targets terceptors would have a range of many hun- identified as real would have to be transmitted dreds of kilometers. Their long range would to ground stations by links robust enough to make possible some level of area defense in be secure in a stressful nuclear environment. 203 ——.

The ground stations would relay the informa- salvage-fused, or may be programmed to det- tion to battle management computers, which onate at appropriate times in order to confuse would then assign targets to interceptors. defenses. The homing devices on the interceptors may not need to be as robust as the bat- In order to build such a defense, the follow- tle management sensors, in this respect, since ing requirements must be met: only those explosions within the narrow field long-range interceptors with very rapid of view of a given interceptor’s homing sys- acceleration and exoatmospheric capabil- tem would be of concern. ity at relatively low cost per unit; passive infrared sensors which can observe characteristics of objects in mid- Heavier Midcourse Layer course with some ability to distinguish To the terminal layer and light midcourse simple decoys from RVs; layer, one might add a space-based midcourse a data base of Soviet RV and decoy sig- defense layer. The weapons of such a layer natures at various wavelengths which can could supplement the ground-based exoat- permit one to distinguish between the mospheric interceptors described in the pre- two; vious section. More sophisticated space-based algorithms (rules incorporated in battle sensors might substitute for the infrared sen- management decisionmaking) capable of sors of the previous system. accurate and rapid discrimination between RVs and decoys, using the data Such a layer would greatly relieve the stress available from the sensors used in the on the terminal layer for three reasons: first, system; the total number of objects to be tracked and communication links between sensors in attacked in the terminal phase would be re- space and stations on the ground which duced; second, structured attacks intended to can function in a hostile nuclear envir- defeat the defense could be disrupted; and onment, through redundancy or other third, the more capable midcourse system means; would be better able to help discriminate be- the development and deployment of a con- tween decoys and real RVs than the system stellation of satellites or pop-up rockets described in the previous section. This infor- carrying the passive IR sensors; mation would be used by the midcourse layer a sensor system capable of rapid return and would also be passed on to the terminal to effective operation, following nuclear layer. For this level of midcourse defense, the detonations within the fields of view of in- weapons could be space-based kinetic-energy dividual elements; nonnuclear kill vehicles, which are more ma- means of defending the satellite-based ture than directed-energy weapons. sensors (if used) from attack; and To function effectively, a midcourse system some kill assessment capability, with the would have to be able to discriminate decoys ability to relay the information to ground. from RVs. An ultraviolet (UV) imaging laser The effectiveness of this system could be se- system might be used, with units based on a verely impaired by countermeasures employed constellation of about 100 satellites. The ex- to reduce the ability of the sensors to discrim- act number of satellites would depend on the inate between decoys and RVs. Such counter- angular resolution achievable and the altitudes measures could include the use of chaff, aer- of deployment. These would then replace the osols, or other concealment strategies. It is less capable sensors in the previous midcourse also important to emphasize that the sensor system. The laser imaging could be substi- system would have to be robust enough to re- tuted for or augmented by a radar imaging turn to operation rapidly if dazzled by nuclear system, located on the same satellites. The ac- detonations. This is because targets may be quisition and tracking of the enemy targets, 204

from post-boost vehicle (PBV) stage until tial guidance information from the more ca- atmospheric reentry, might be accomplished pable infrared tracking system located on the by a long wave infrared detection system. The sensor satellites; their own homing devices sensor system would aim for birth-to-death would take over when they approach their tracking of RVs and decoys. The decoys would targets. be identified by shape or other cues which might be detected during deployment from the Technical requirements for this kind of sys- PBV. Battle management computers must be tem include the following: able to calculate and store a track file for each object, frequently updating this file, and to ● Kinetic-energy weapons with a homing ca- hand off data on RVs and decoys, that are not pability of within 10 to 20 cm, and which intercepted in this phase, to the terminal de- are relatively inexpensive, since tens of fenses for interception there. thousands may be needed (depending on the threat size and the acceleration and During the midcourse phase, the defenses velocity capability of the rocket inter- would try to kill as many identified RVs as ceptor). possible, and to unmask or negate decoys as ● The launching satellites must be able to well. We might postulate a kinetic-energy kill defend themselves against attack. system as a moderately near-term option. ● High-speed imaging resolution (less than Reentry vehicles would be quite difficult to kill 0.1 sec per image) of less than a meter at with optical lasers since they are already hard- ranges of 3,000 km, in order to discrimi- ened to survive the stresses of reentry. Neu- nate RVs from decoys as they are de- tral particle beams might be possible candi- ployed from the PBV. dates for kill systems, but kill assessment ● A data base of decoy signatures and RV would be a serious problem (see chapter 7). The signatures which would aid in discrimi- technology for practical space-based acceler- nation. ators will likely not be available in the near- ● Tested algorithms for accurate discrimi- term, particularly in view of the fact that beam nation based on target signatures at va- intensities would have to be greatly increased rious infrared (and possibly other) wave- from the present state of the art to assure hard lengths and based on other cues (balloon (i.e., visible) kills. However, long-term devel- inflation, PBV accelerations during de- opment of such a capability is possible. ployment, etc.). More plausible for the near term are kinetic- ● Computing capability to calculate track energy carrier satellites, with large numbers files for tens of thousands of objects or of chemically powered two-stage rockets more. mounted on each one. These would orbit the ● Accurate kill assessment based on UV or Earth in a constellation whose size would de- other imaging information after apparent pend on the acceleration and terminal veloc- hits are achieved. ity of the interceptors. The rockets would ● Battle management capability to reassign accelerate rapidly to 5 to 8 km/sec. They would vehicles to new targets within seconds or have long wave infrared homing devices capa- less, based on constantly updated kill ble of detecting emissions from reentry vehi- assessments and PBV observations. For cles. The homing devices would need to have this and the following systems it may be cryogenically cooled detectors so that the in- desirable to deploy redundant battle man- frared radiation given off by the sensor itself agement computers both in low-Earth or- would not overwhelm the signal from the RV. bit and in orbits beyond geosynchronous, The interceptors would destroy the target by in order to aid in survivability. colliding with it or by approaching closely ● The ability to defend the weapons and enough so that a fragmentation charge could satellite-based sensors from a precursor disable it. The kill vehicles would receive ini- attack. Ž Sufficient and reliable space-based power enormous leverage: for every kill, at least one sources to supply energy for the sensing and perhaps tens of RVs in addition to hun- satellites. dreds of decoys would be eliminated from the attacking force, thereby greatly reducing the An important issue is whether it is possible stress on the succeeding layers of the BMD to image effectively the deployment of RVs system. and decoys from the post-boost vehicles, in the face of countermeasures achievable with cur- For a boost-phase system, we hypothesize rent or near-term technology. More discussion a set of ground-based excimer or free-electron of these questions may be found in the classi- lasers, with a constellation consisting of a fied annex to chapters 7 and 8. small number of large geosynchronous orbit relay mirrors and a large number of low-orbit Boost-Phase Plus Previous Layers “battle” mirrors. Excimer or free-electron lasers were chosen over particle beams, X-ray A boost-phase defense might be added to the devices, and chemical infrared lasers because system described in the previous section. Ef- of their ability to penetrate the atmosphere all fective boost-phase interception would have the way to the ground. A ground-based sys- 206 —

Photo credit: Department of Defense Designed for use with high-powered lasers, this device aims, stabilizes, and focuses a laser beam to selected aimpoints. It will be used to gain experience in integrating a high-power laser with a precise beam director. tern is easier to supply with power: it obviates cal energy would be required to power the the need for space-based power for the weap- ground-based lasers. ons of this layer. In addition, adaptive optics would be needed The laser beams would be generated on the to compensate for beam distortions introduced ground at a number of stations and be sent during passage of the radiation through the to the geosynchronous mirrors. From there, atmosphere. In one such technique, a pilot la- they would be directed to those low-orbit bat- ser beam near the geosynchronous satellite tle mirrors which are nearest the targeted would give information on atmospheric distor- boosters. These mirrors, in turn, would direct tions along the path to the ground laser. The the beams onto the targets. If optically per- ground laser mirror would then be mechani- fect, the geosynchronous mirrors would prob- cally distorted in such a way as to compensate ably need an effective diameter of about 30 for the atmospheric effects on the laser beam. meters, given a laser wavelength of 0.5 microns (the requirement of a large diameter Initial acquisition of the attacking boosters could be lowered by reducing the wavelength would be provided by a geosynchronous short- somewhat). The low-orbit mirrors, if optically wave infrared satellite system, using technol- perfect, would need to be about 5 meters in ogy similar to current U.S. capabilities. More diameter. Hundreds of megawatts of electri- precise tracking needed for attack by the large 207 —— ground-based laser could be provided by ladar Figure 8-1.— Boost-Phase Intercept With (laser-based radar, referred to in chapter 7) sys- Ground-Based Laser tems mounted on the low-altitude sensor satellites. In order to keep the number of mirrors from reaching well into the hundreds, slew times (time required to change pointing from one target to another) will probably have to be on the order of 1 second or less. Technical requirements for this system include: the development of laser beams of sufficient brightness to destroy rocket boosters after traveling from the ground to geosynchronous orbit, back to a low-orbit mirror, and then to the booster; the development of many high optical quality, 5-meter diameter mirrors capable of being deployed in orbit while maintaining their geometry to a small fraction of a wavelength (visible or near UV), robust enough to maintain high optical quality in a hostile nuclear environment, and able to switch from target to target in a second or less; the development of a few 30-meter mirrors, with the same optical and physical capabilities as the smaller mirrors (except for the retarget rate, which could be slower); battle mirrors inexpensive enough so that the offense cannot overwhelm the boost- Beam from ground-based laser in the United States reflects off phase system by merely adding more relay mirror in geosynchronous orbit to battle mirrors in low-Earth boosters: if doubling the number of boosters orbit, Battle mirrors redirect beam to ICBMs. (Geosynchronous (or decoy boosters) requires a near dou- orbit is shown to scale relative to the size of the Earth. ) bling of the number of mirrors and asso- SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment ciated subsystems, the cost of the mirrors and their subsystems cannot be much more than the cost of the boosters; bulence–some atmospheric distortions defensive capability to protect mirrors will be caused by the passage through the and space sensors against attack, includ- atmosphere of the powerful laser radia- ing more subtle attacks designed to de- tion itself, and thus proof of ability to teriorate the quality of the mirrors; compensate must be accomplished at the ability to track a booster by means power levels approaching those used in of ladar to an accuracy of 10 to 20 cm at the actual weapon; a range of thousands of kilometers; ● power supplies able to provide extremely adaptive optics for high-intensity laser large amounts of power on short notice beams to compensate for atmospheric tur- to the ground-based lasers; 208

● communication systems to link the mir- Extremely Effective Defense rors and lasers involved with the battle management system; the links must be This system is intended to provide a nearly able to function in a hostile nuclear envi- perfect defense against ballistic missiles. It ronment; would be designed with the object of prevent- ● overall battle management software to co- ing all incoming warheads of a massive attack ordinate functions of each defensive layer; from reaching their targets. In practice, since and no system is likely to function perfectly on its ● some kill assessment is necessary for both first use, some leakers might be expected, al- booster and post-boost vehicle. In the lat- though it would be hoped that they would be ter case, damage may be more difficult to very few in number. Rationale for including ascertain, yet it is important to do so. If this ambitious case is given in chapter 5. a PBV is unable to deploy its RVs to their targets, it may still be able to reach the For an attack of 20,000 warheads, which as- defender’s territory with one or more live sumes more than a doubling of the Soviet stra- RVs. This cluster would have to be han- tegic force in response to deployment of a U.S. dled by subsequent layers of the defense. BMD, the leakage rate would have to be no more than one- or two-tenths of a percent, A future offensive countermeasure could be equivalent to an overall system efficiency of a fast-bum booster with a fast post-boost de- above 99.8 percent. To accomplish this, all of ployment phase. In the system described the above systems would have to work at a above, one could, in principle, not only attack high level of effectiveness. If one assumed that the booster, but also attack the post-boost ve- all four layers (including the ground- and hicle as it dispenses RVs. Therefore, against space-based midcourse layers) were totally in- current systems having long boost and post- dependent of each other (including independ- boost phases, hundreds of seconds could be ence of the sensors and battle management com- available to the defense after booster burn out puters on which each of the layers rely), this to destroy at least some of the RVs before they could be accomplished via an 80 percent effec- separate from the PBV. The offense could tiveness for each layer. If one layer failed sig- deny most of this advantage by using fast nificantly, however, the others would have to burn boosters and a rapid dispensing tech- be considerably more efficient, in order to nique. The period for neutralization of the maintain the extremely low leakage rate. booster and the PBV could be reduced from today’s 700 seconds or so to only some 50 sec- In addition to the elements contained in the onds (assuming that the defense needs some previous system, this one would add a larger 20 seconds to prepare to act and to begin en- fleet of terminal and midcourse interceptors. gaging the offensive missiles). The offense These would have long-range capability and would be penalized in terms of throwweight be relatively inexpensive. In principle, the (on the order of 10 to 20 percent) and possi- same interceptors which were briefly described bly in terms of accuracy as well. above would be appropriate, if highly prolifer- Attacking during the PBV phase might be ated. Other options for improving the effec- more difficult than attacking during the boost tiveness of the various layers could include im- phase, since the PBV is much more difficult proved sensors for midcourse discrimination to find than the booster. Fifty seconds total and electromagnetic launchers for midcourse engagement time would greatly stress the phase and possibly boost-phase intercept. boost-phase/post-boost-phase intercepts, and These may be longer term options, depending would, at the least, greatly increase the quan- on when the needed technologies are devel- tity of defensive space assets needed. oped. The “conventional” kinetic-energy weapons driven by chemical rockets are effective through to the terminal defense. Although if they can reach their targets, but they gen- most sites would be confronted with only O or erally do not travel more quickly than 5 to 8 1 RVs, some would have to deal with 2, 3, or km/see. Further, time constraints on the period even 4, just because of statistical fluctuations of acceleration (at most, a few hundred sec- in actual defense effectiveness. Conserva- onds) could make chemical rockets less desira- tively, one would want to assign at least 2 in- ble than electromagnetically launched projec- terceptors per RV, so 10 interceptors per tiles. These could accelerate far more rapidly defended area is a safe minimum, assuming to faster speeds, thus possessing a greater that any structure in the offensive assault is range. Systems based on them may be more completely broken up by the earlier defensive survivable than laser systems because of the layers. vulnerability of space-based optical compo- In relying on 4,000 interceptors, the assump- nents; hence their possible advantage for tion is made that the previous defensive layers boost-phase intercept. are each independently effective to a level of Since the offense could preferentially attack at least 80 percent. certain targets, and since the defense would In sum, for a nearly leak-proof defense, sev- not necessarily know ahead of time which tar- eral vital needs must be satisfied: gets would be more heavily targeted, the requirement for very low offensive penetration 1. A high level of boost-phase intercept ef- is quite onerous. If one assumes that the first fectiveness must be attained, in the face two layers (boost-phase and early midcourse, of all countermeasures, including the rela- including PBV) are 80 percent effective, the tively straight-forward ones of fast-burn last two layers must deal with some 800 boosters, rapid PBV deployment, and leakers. It would be desirable for each inter- warhead proliferation. ceptor to cover large areas of the United 2. An excellent discrimination capability be- States so that one can defend against the even- tween light and precision decoys on the tuality that one area might be more heavily one hand, and RVs on the other, during attacked than its neighbors. Long range would the midcourse phase; this must be accom- mean that interceptors assigned to neighbor- plished in the face of various concealment ing areas could come to the help of those areas techniques, some of which are relatively whose own defenses were in danger of deple- well understood at the present. tion. As an alternative to long range, many 3. The sensors must function nearly continu- more interceptors could be deployed. The exo- ously in the face of a massive attack and atmospheric interceptors could be designed to in a nuclear environment. have ranges of many hundreds of kilometers. 4. The space-based assets must defend If each rocket could defend the whole continen- themselves or must be defended by other tal United States (CONUS), perhaps only 1,000 assets against concerted attack. to 2,000 would be necessary. 5. The communication links must function effectively in the face of attempts to in- The terminal defense interceptors would terfere, concerted attack, and in a nuclear have a range of only 100 kilometers. Some 400 environment. basing sites might be needed to protect the entire CONUS. Perhaps about 10 interceptors In addition to the above conditions, since a (amounting to a total of 4,000) might be placed near-perfect system is envisioned, other means at each site. Each site of comparable value of nuclear delivery must be countered to a high should be defended to roughly equal levels, to degree of assurance. This means that an air avoid inviting attack by providing an “Achilles defense system would have to be added to han- heel” of less well-defended sites. If one as- dle air-breathing threats (bombers, cruise mis- sumes that the long-range interceptor layer is siles), and measures would have to be taken 80 percent effective, only 160 leakers penetrate to protect against the introduction and em- 210 —

placement of nuclear weapons within U.S. would mean that the system would fail. For borders by surreptitious means. It may also defenses less ambitious than this one, for ex- be necessary to consider the application of sig- ample, for the previously delineated systems nificant civil defense measures. above, some small failures among the above five conditions could be tolerated. However, Since a nearly flawless system is postulated even for such nonperfect systems, a significant for this level of defense, any deviation from failure in any one category could seriously de- perfection among the above conditions above grade the entire system effectiveness.

SURVIVABILITY For any BMD system, both space- and operating frequencies can be chosen in order Earth-based assets should be able to survive to provide greater resistance to blackout ef- attacks on them. Survivability is a function fects that are caused by nuclear explosions. of the mission of each asset and of the mis- Narrow beams can be used to make radars sion of the system as a whole, the threat faced more jam-resistant. by the system, and the effective redundancy Communication links can be made highly re- of each asset in the system architecture. The dundant, and can often be direct laser links, system survivability depends on the details or other narrowly focused line-of-sight links. of the architecture and of the threat. Some dis- These are nearly impossible to jam and would cussion of the problems involved is given in be resistant to stress in a nuclear environment. chapter 7, p. 170ff and p. 186ff in sections on Electronics can be hardened to survive elec- survivability and countermeasures. It should tromagnetic pulses, which may be induced by be noted that the definition of the needed level nuclear explosions above the atmosphere. of survivability depends on the policy decision Command and control posts might also be regarding the system’s mission; i.e., is it to be made highly redundant, and different basing 90, 95, or 99 + percent effective? modes (mobile and stationary) could be utilized.

Earth-Based Assets Airborne sensors might achieve survivability by maintaining uncertainty as to their Ground-based assets consist of communica- exact locations, and by taking appropriate tion links, command and control posts, ground- hardening measures. Ground-based sensors based interceptors, terminal radars, ground- must be made highly redundant and must be based sensors, ground-based laser sites, and defended against intense radiation from nu- power supplies. For the purposes of this dis- clear explosions. cussion, airborne sensors are considered Earth- Ground-based laser sites pose a particular based. problem, since they would be large, expensive, These assets must survive long enough to and therefore difficult to proliferate. They do their job: to provide defense at their as- would, in principle, have to be provided with signed levels. Ground-based interceptors might heavy terminal defenses, since they would be be made survivable by proliferation (many can the object of strikes early in the engagement. be deployed) and mobility. Smaller terminal Some would certainly survive the beginning radars can be proliferated, made mobile (de- of the engagement. If, as would be likely, they ployed on trucks which are assigned to rove would be attacked simultaneously with many defined areas, possibly at random, to avoid be- other military assets, they could participate ing targeted) and shielded. A disposable sys- in early battles: they could shoot at the first tem has already been mentioned. Larger ra- wave of attacking RVs for up to about 15 min- dars can be hardened to a degree, and higher utes before the first ones reach them. How- .

211 ever, they would certainly be high priority tar- During engagements, space-based sensors gets and would very likely be attacked in the are vulnerable to blinding or temporary blind- first wave. To guard against easy attack by ing (dazzling) by nuclear detonations. Sensor cruise missiles, they should be located far in- hardening and proliferation of sensors are land, so that the cruise missiles could be de- again possible hedges against degradation of tected and destroyed before they were able to the system as a whole. reach the laser. Note that a cruise missile attack might, if detected, give the defense sys- Sensors and weapons could also be vulner- tem warning even before the launch of the of- able to direct attacks by the adversary. These fense’s ICBMs takes place. This might tend attacks could include nuclear attack, kinetic to discourage such an attack. energy or laser attack, or attacks on the integrity of mirrors by radiation, physical or Sufficient survivability could probably be chemical means. These attacks could be deliv- provided to most Earth-based assets by means ered by direct-ascent rockets or by space-based of redundancy, hardening, and mobility. This assets. Direct-ascent interceptors, armed with does not mean that these system elements nuclear weapons, could be hardened against would be indefinitely survivable; it does mean the BMD system to levels that would not be that they could survive long enough so that economical for ICBMs and might survive a they could perform their tasks when called counter-attack by the defense for long enough upon. to get within lethal range. Attacks against space-based BMD assets could be made after Space-Based Assets the whole space-based BMD system is deployed, or at the very beginning of BMD de- There are two broad categories of space- ployment. In the latter case, the BMD system based assets which must be protected in or- is at its most vulnerable stage, since it might der to assure the survivability of the space- not yet be able to defend itself adequately. It based components of the BMD system: sen- should be noted that such an attack could be sors and weapons. considered an act of war and would be risky Defense of space-based assets, particularly to the attacker for that reason. However, the of sensors, is more problematic than in the attacker night view the prospect of his adver- Earth-based case. Since satellites follow pre- sary having a ballistic missile defense of even dictable trajectories (unless they are cons- moderate capability to be a serious enough tantly maneuvering), the offense may target threat to its national security that the risk them relatively easily. Knowing in advance would be justified. In any case, the possibil- where they will be at a given time, the offense ity of an attack at this stage must be reckoned has a long time to prepare an attack against with. them and might even be able to do some dam- In the case of BMD weapons stations, some age before a large-scale outbreak of hostilities. defense could be provided by massive shield- Ground-based directed-energy weapons could ing. These stations would probably be too damage sensors which are looking at or near large, and orbits too low to be effectively con- them (the sensors might be observing such cealed. Regarding sensor stations, although weapons for intelligence purposes, or might be shielding is a possibility, concealment is a observing nearby missile fields). The sensors more likely option. One vulnerability of sen- would be particularly susceptible to damage sors is that during an engagement they have if the lasers operated at a frequency in the to function, and in order to function they must band used by the sensors. Possible counter- be exposed. Moreover, sensor satellites carry- measures are being investigated, including ing large optical components will have to be redundancy of sensing satellites to mitigate large and will therefore be difficult to hide or against potential losses. decoy. 212

The case of space-based mirrors, which are now existing, including that now in effect on used to relay radiation from space- or ground- the high seas. Under that regime, maritime based lasers to their targets, is somewhat powers are free to station naval forces within different from other weapons from the point lethal range of each other during peacetime. of view of survivability. During peacetime, the The use of kinetic weapons for shoot back mirrors can be covered by protective shields is one likely defense strategy. To be effective, against both enemy attack and small meteor- they would have to have a lethal range greater ites. It is reasonable to suppose that these than that of the attacking force. Other BMD shields will have to be removed from time to kill technologies which have been discussed time for testing and maintenance. The mirrors could also have a lethal capability against bat- would probably be extremely delicate, if only tle stations. In determining whether it is fea- because of the very high reflective quality and sible to provide sufficient defenses of one’s the high optical precision needed to function own space assets, particularly during early properly and remain effective when high- phases of deployment, a complex analysis of power laser beams are reflected from them. several factors is required. These factors in- Protection strategies against enemy activities clude system cost of defense versus offense; could include hiding by various means. Also, attack and defense tactics; decoy, hiding, and shields could be in place most of the time. deception tactics; hardness of defense sys- Since the surface coatings could be vulnerable tems; and offensive capabilities. to attack by certain chemicals (possibly including rocket fuel), the covers should be well In the absence of a BMD system architec- sealed. ture, it is difficult to assess accurately the ability of a BMD system to defend its space as- In almost all cases of attack by approach- sets. It would appear, however, that when only ing rockets or mines, a “shoot back” tactic a few space assets have been deployed, a cer- would be preferable to purely passive defenses. tain advantage would lie with the offense. Either the battle station or satellite which is Then, the offense can concentrate its efforts being attacked, or previously positioned de- on a small number of defense targets. Assaults fender satellites (emplaced during the early can be made repeatedly until one attacker stages of deployment of a BMD system) could leaks through the defenses to kill its target. act in this self-defense role. Note that such a shoot-back policy would require at least the The offense might be deterred from attack- implicit declaration of a “keep-out zone” suring the BMD space assets for the same rea- rounding each asset to be defended.3 son that neither side will launch a first-strike nuclear attack on the other in the absence of Such an assertion of sovereignty would re- defenses: the threat of retaliation and all-out quire the institution of a regime unlike any nuclear war. However, the attacker might calculate that his adversary would not risk 9Asserting sovereignty over a region of space would appear mutual annihilation in response to the destruc- to violate Article II of the Outer Space Treaty which declares tion of a few (possibly only one) satellites, and that “Outer Space . . . is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty . . .“ See “Arms Control and Disarma- may conclude that the risk of not attacking ment Agreements” (Washington, DC: Arms Control and Dis- a BMD system in its early stages of deploy- armament Agency, 1982), p. 52. ment are greater. —. .. .

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FEASIBILITY QUESTIONS

Technological Feasibility weapons in times of the order of 1 second or less; Virtually all observers have acknowledged ● the ability to deliver the required amount that the technical questions bearing on the of energy for a kill within the time allot- eventual feasibility of a successful BMD are ted by the parameters set by a responsive complex and cannot be answered until further offense. These parameters include num- research has been accomplished. The Strate- ber of boosters and RVs, the length of gic Defense Initiative Organization argues time they are vulnerable to attack during that the purpose of its research is precisely to their flight, and their hardness, which ena- answer questions of technical feasibility: be- bles them to resist attack; fore the research is done, there will not be ● the ability of the system to defend itself enough information to make a determination. against a concerted attack when fully de- However, there are various technical issues ployed; which appear to present the greatest chal- ● the ability of the system to be deployed lenges. These have been listed in the preceding without being destroyed during the early discussion of a hypothetical defense system. stages of deployment, when the full system is not available for defense; The principal outstanding technical prob- ● the development of computer hardware lems in the development of a multi-layer bal- with 10-year maintenance-free reliability; listic missile defense system, with a large frac- ● the development of robust power systems tion of its assets based in space, areas follows: which can deliver many megawatts, which the feasibility of developing a boost-phase are equally maintenance-free and which intercept system robust enough to be ef- can deliver large power pulses; and fective when confronted with plausible ● the ability of the BMD system to oper- countermeasures; ate in a hostile environment which may the ability of the system to discriminate include many nuclear explosions—an en- between decoys and RVs in midcourse, vironment which is currently poorly un- when confronted with plausible counter- derstood and which would be difficult to measures; duplicate experimentally. the development of inexpensive ground- Within each of these categories lies a myriad based interceptors, meeting required spec- of precise technical issues to resolve: for ex- ifications for midcourse exoatmospheric ample, the degree to which an ablative shield intercept; can protect a booster from attack; the resolu- the development of affordable terminal in- tion achievable using UV laser imaging; the terceptors for high endoatmospheric in- amount of infrared radiation produced by a nu- tercept; clear explosion in the upper atmosphere; the the resistance of sensors to blinding, daz- difficulty of building a 5 (or more) meter di- zling, or spoofing in a hostile nuclear envi- ameter space-deployable mirror which is op- ronment; tically good to a small fraction of a wavelength. the development of very large and complex software packages which can be In addition to the above technical condi- trusted as sufficiently reliable to enable tions, the system should be able to be devel- the United States to make major changes oped and deployed at an affordable cost. in defense strategy without having been tested under battle conditions; Several of the above technical issues involve the ability to retarget both sensors and the battle of countermeasures versus counter- (in the appropriate case) directed-energy countermeasures and so on. No meaningful 214 analysis can stop at a predetermined level; in their interest and preferable to engaging in otherwise the predicted outcome would be an arms race with the United States. prejudged. To determine which side, offense or defense, is likely to prevail in any particu- Operational Feasibility lar facet of this contest requires a careful and detailed analysis. In addition to the matter of the technical feasibility of each of the components of a pro- At this stage, it is too early to predict the likelihood of success in the above areas. How- posed BMD system, there is the problem of the operational feasibility of the system as a ever, failure to satisfy even one of the above list whole. of requirements could render many versions of the space-based BMD concept impractical. It is Assume that a BMD system that meets de- clear that although substantial progress has sired technical specifications can be constructed been made to date, most BMD technologies re- and deployed. The system would be have to quire major advances in the state of the art be- be in a state of readiness for many years; that fore their feasibility can be assessed. is, it would have to spring into action from a state of dormancy on very short notice. Per- After another year of research, at the end of haps a few days would be available, but any fiscal 1986,2 years of the SDI research program system requiring days of warmup would be will have elapsed. At this point, which is a good useless against surprise attack—indeed, it fraction of the time along to the much discussed could increase the incentive to conduct one. decision point on further development in the When called upon to act, some components early 1990s, it may be possible to have some idea may not be operating, since a 100 percent relia- of the rate at which important technical mile- bility is probably unattainable. This difficulty stones are being met. An interim progress report is countered by providing sufficient compo- might then contain significant indications of the nent and system redundancy. The degree of viability of many important facets of the SDI redundancy is set to counter the measured un- project. Such a report would provide a vital in- reliability of the system. put to decisions and directions regarding research funding beyond this point. Suppose, for example, it is calculated that 10 boost-phase intercept battle stations (one A major question is the degree to which defen- does not know in advance which 10) out of a sive measures can outstrip offensive counter- constellation of 100 would be called on to par- measures in general. If one argues that the ticipate in a battle, and suppose further that United States can maintain a 5-to 10-year tech- the reliability of each of these stations is 90 nological advantage over the Soviet Union, the percent over a 10-year period. On the average, question reduces to: will current defensive tech- about one station would have to be serviced nologies suffice to defeat countermeasures each year. If servicing is planned on a once-a- which are 5 to 10 years behind the state of the art? If the answer is not in the affirmative, or year basis, there will be times when one or perhaps two satellites are out of operation. This if the United States cannot achieve and main- would imply a need for a 10 percent (or possi- tain this level of technical advantage, the pros- bly 20 to 30 percent) increase in the number pect of reaching a regime wherein U.S. defenses of satellites, to provide spares. These would can reach and keep superiority over Soviet need to be available to guard against the case offenses will be dim. In such a case, U.S.-Soviet where the nonoperating satellite may be one cooperation towards a mutual deployment of of the 10 that are needed to participate. BMD defenses would be essential to their successful deployment, their effectiveness, or both. It is important to note that the number of re- The Soviets would have to be persuaded that a quired spares depends on the subsystem size, the stepwise transition to a BMD regime would be number of elements of the subsystem which 215 would have to participate in the battle, and, and sensitive optical surfaces to nuclear ex- above all, on the reliability of the subsystem. plosions in space and in the upper atmosphere is uncertain. Since these effects may be diffi- Similar arguments can be adduced for each cult to study in the laboratory or in under- subsystem and each layer of the BMD: the sat- ground nuclear tests, this uncertainty may not ellite sensors, ground-based sensors, and all be resolvable in the absence of extended up- weapons systems, power supplies, computing per atmospheric testing. elements, etc., must have high levels of reliability in order to avoid large increases in sys- The electromagnetic pulse induction in tems sizes. For many parts of the whole, the ground- and space-based systems, which is 90 percent maintenance-free reliability for 10 caused by nuclear explosions in space, is sim- years would be desirable. ilarly not fully understood. The resistance of space-based power supplies and power condi- To maintain reliability, the system would tioning systems to the various types of radi- have to be monitored and tested constantly, ation from nearby nuclear explosions may be a job which would require much ground- and difficult to determine. Nuclear effects may pro- space-based effort. Some human intervention tide significant problems to the defense in this might be needed in both cases. Testing and context. The ability of a system to withstand subsequent repairs would be a permanent and a concerted attack may not be known in ad- constant feature of a large space-based BMD vance and the outcome of such an attack could system. be highly dependent on the tactics used by A totally different question, and a more seri- each side. ous one, arises from the fact that the whole BMD system would never have been tested costs in a realistic battle environment before it would have to operate at a high level of effec- General tiveness. Without launching a massive rocket Questions of cost are even more elusive at attack to test the system, replete with nuclear this point than questions of technical feasibil- explosions in space and in the atmosphere, the ity. Before the architecture of a system is de- synergistic effects of the hostile environment fined, it is impossible to give a reasonable and will not be well understood. Failures of more credible estimate of total system costs. Esti- than one layer in this “common mode” could mates have ranged from tens of billions of dol- drastically reduce the effectiveness of the sys- lars to $1 trillion and more,’ not including tem as a whole. operational and maintenance costs. Not sur- As one example, the immense battle man- prisingly, BMD advocates tend to estimate agement system, including 10 million or more lower numbers than opponents. Nearly all lines of software code, would have to function credible observers concede, however, that the reliably the first time it is tested under full bat- system would require a very large investment. tlefield conditions. Large computer programs The SDI Organization, recognizing the large generally require much time and testing to uncertainties in current cost estimating, has debug. The question is whether simulated test- formed a cost estimating working group. The ing would be adequate and trustworthy enough for the reliance which would be placed in it. ‘E.g., see D. O. Graham, High F’rontier: .4 New National As another example, it is not certain how Strategy (Washington, DC: High Frontier, 1982), p. 9; Z. Brzezinski, R. Jastrow, and M. M. Kampelman, “Defense in much scintillation will occur in the upper Space is not ‘Star f$’ars’, ” I’Vew York Times Magazine, Jan. 27, atmosphere as a result of nuclear explosions 1985; J. Schlesinger, National Security Issues Symposium, there. The uncertainty includes the wave- 1984, “Space, National Security and C’I, ” Mitre Document M85-3, October 1984, p. 56; Department of Defense document lengths, the intensities, and the duration of the presented to Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Senator scintillation. The resistance of radars, sensors, Pressler, Apr. 24, 1984. 216 group is investigating possible new and bet- Indeed, the United States already considers ter cost estimating techniques since the mag- Soviet expenditures on their offensive forces nitude and novelty of the SDI may demand to be inordinately large. Secretary of Defense new estimating tools.5 In addition to cost esti- Weinberger has stated, “Whatever the reasons, mates, cost-exchange analyses will also be per- the Soviets believe that their colossal military formed. effort is worthwhile, notwithstanding the price it imposes on the Soviet society and its trou- Cost-exchange analyses will be essential to demonstrating the attractiveness of the sys- bled economy.’” tem. If it costs the offense less to counter a It is difficult to do cost-effectiveness anal- defense than it costs the defense to deploy one, yses on systems which are on the cutting edge it is generally not advantageous to proceed of future technologies for another reason: tech- with the defense. On the other hand, suppose nological obsolescence. The unpredictable na- the offensive countermeasures cost less than ture of technological progress leads to unpre- the defenses, but suppose, additionally, that dictable shifts, probably major ones, in both the United States has far greater economic re- costs and effectiveness. It is possible that no sources which it can devote to the effort than analysis which assesses systems more than a the U.S.S.R. In that case, it could pay the very few years in advance will have much va- United States to continue with the defense, lidity. even though it would be more costly than the One additional point worthy of mention is, cost to the Soviets of offsetting our move. that in working out cost exchanges between On the other hand, even a defense which the offense and defense, one must account for the United States considered to be cost-effective fact that both the United States and the might not be sufficient in itself to bring about U.S.S.R. are starting from a situation where a transition to defense dominance. First, So- they have little or no effective defense, but viet calculations of cost-exchange ratios may very effective offenses. The funds for this level not coincide with our own. Second, they might of offense have already been spent. The funds redirect their offensive forces along different to deal with this level of offense by defensive delivery modes, concentrating on ones which means have not. Therefore, a massive defense could most cheaply penetrate defenses. This expenditure would be needed initially just to could change the assumptions inherent in counter existing offenses. Cost-exchange ra- some of the U.S. cost-exchange calculations. tios at the margin are meaningful in themselves only beyond this point, when offensive More importantly, cost may not be a major additions and countermeasures are met by de- determining factor for the Soviets in policy fensive additions and countermeasures. planning. They may be capable of spending more on offense than the United States spends Total System Cost on defense because of inflexibilities in their economic structure, because they are more Rather than present an independent esti- easily able to direct their economy towards mate for system cost, this report will point out military expenditures, or because they may the requirements which must be met in order consider the benefits of maintaining their to devise a credible estimate. offensive capability to be of paramount na- It is possible to make some simple cost- tional importance, thus justifying to them- exchange arguments regarding limits on what selves levels of expenditure that the United a system or a part of a system should cost. The States would consider to be inordinate. following brief discussion is only illustrative, ——— and subject to the reservations noted above ‘Information contained in a speech by Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, April 1985, reported in Mili- C.. Weinberger, DOD FY85 Annual Report (Washington, DC: tary Space, Apr. 15, 1985. Department of Defense, 1984), p. 26. 217 concerning cost-exchange concepts in the con- ployment are all elements of the breakdown. text of BMD. As time goes on, broader categories of items are further broken down into more specific Suppose one plans a boost-phase intercept elements. system consisting of 100 battle stations. In chapter 7, it was found that, for satellite alti- Second, cost estimating relationships are tudes of 1,000 km or more and slew times of used. These are equations which use past his- 0.25 seconds or more, the number of battle sta- tory for estimating costs of elements in the tions required increases nearly linearly with project being investigated. One difficulty in the number of boosters. If one were to aim for making such estimates for highly innovative a 30:1 kill ratio of booster to deployed battle projects, such as BMD, resides in the fact that station, this implies that a battle station many of the estimates may depend on totally should not cost much more than 30 times the unknown or unanticipated future results of cost of a booster. If it did, the offense could, basic research. Another problem arises from in principle, force the defense to spend much the uncertainties in extrapolating costs from more on staying ahead of the offense than the items in a historical data base to similar fu- offense would have to spend in keeping up ture items. For qualitatively different technol- with the defense by the simple expedient of ogies, the accuracy of estimates derived from building more boosters. A cost of $50 million historical analogs may be poor. per booster would mean that the defense could A third tool is the use of learning curves. spend $1.5 billion per battle station, and still These are used in predicting cost reductions keep up with the offense in the cost-exchange per unit resulting from gains in experience and race. A $200 million cost per booster would im- volume of production. ply that the defense would have to keep its battle station cost below $6 billion per station Also, planning factors are used to predict to stay in the running. This would mean that costs. They are arithmetic factors used in mak- a total system cost of $600 billion would still ing cost estimates based on general past ex- be cost-effective. periences. One example would be to use the ratio of development costs to investment costs This crude argument includes many sim- for similar programs in predicting the devel- plifying assumptions, but it maybe useful as opment cost of a new project, when the invest- an aid to understanding the nature of cost- ment cost is known. This is similar to the use exchange studies. of cost estimating relationships noted above, There are ways of making rough direct cost but even more general and subject to error. estimates, rather than defining allowed upper It is apparent that in order to use any of limits, as above. One could estimate the fuel these tools for estimating the cost of a BMD costs needed to place a given payload in or- system, the architecture and the technologies bit, or one could use other crude “order of mag- to be used will have to be defined. nitude” assumptions to make simple calculations. However, none of these techniques The burden for providing cost estimates satisfactorily accounts for technological im- should be on those who maintain that an ef- provements, or, a fortiori, possible technical fective BMD will be affordable, including breakthroughs. The conclusion stands that it those who define potential system architec- is too early to make useful estimates. tures. If one argues for the commitment of large sums of money to research in one par- A cost analysis for a BMD system would ticular area at the expense of others, with the use several tools and techniques. intent of making deployment options avail- First, a work breakdown structure would be able, one should provide a cost estimate for made. This is a list of items needed to design the eventual deployments envisioned. Clearly, and construct the system. Research, test and if the end product appears to be prohibitively evaluation, maintenance, procurement, and de- expensive, this indication would discourage de- 218

cisions to fund the expensive large-scale re- or more alternative system architectures. At search which might lead to this undesirable present, it is safe to say that, if, indeed, a result. space-based BMD system is defined which ap- In conclusion, attempts to provide a realis- pears to be feasible; it will likely be consider- tic and defensible cost estimate for an effec- ably more expensive than any other weapons program yet developed. tive BMD system must await the presentation of a realistic and defensible suggestion for one Chapter 9 Alternative Future Scenarios Contents

Page Introduction...... 221 Alternative Future Scenarios ...... 221 The SDI Policy Approach ...... 221 Early BMD Deployment Policy Approach...... 227 Intermediate BMD Deployment Policy Approach ...... 229 Silo Defense Policy Approach ...... 230 A Non-BMD Policy Approach ...... 232 —

Chapter 9 Alternative Future Scenarios

INTRODUCTION Thus far we have examined the possible ap- 2. An approach advocating the earliest pos- plications of ballistic missile defense to vari- sible deployment of space-based and ous strategic purposes and the potential ef- ground-based BMD, as described in the fects of BMD deployments on crisis stability, writings of representatives of the “High arms race stability, and arms control. We then Frontier” organization and others; examined the technologies that might be ap- 3 An “intermediate deployment” approach plied to ballistic missile defense. In this chap- advocating deployment of BMD by the ter we attempt to give the flavor of the cur- mid-1990s, using technology not yet rent debate over BMD by presenting the available; positions of some major policy advocates. We 4 A “missile-silo-mainly” approach, advoca- pay particular attention to the idea of transi- ting defenses with the limited objective tion—of how and with what consequences we of defending the U.S. land-based retalia- might move toward a world where BMD plays tory force, with other targets defended an important strategic role. We also look at only collaterally; ways that the world might evolve if the United 5 An approach aimed at strengthening the States does not take the initiative in deploy- current regime banning most ballistic ing BMD. For each picture of the future, we missile defense through current, and pos- identify what appear to be the major assump- sibly additional, arms control measures. tions upon which that picture rests. What are After describing in this chapter the differ- the key outcomes of U.S. action (or inaction) ing views of various policy advocates on that each picture posits? What events are as- longer-term objectives for BMD deployment, sumed to occur along the way to the predicted we will turn in chapter 10 to the immediate outcomes? We leave it to the reader to choose problem facing Congress: how to orient the which assumptions seem most plausible. U.S. BMD research program this year and in The policy approaches reviewed here are the the years to come. These current decisions w-ill following: be influenced by views on longer-term objectives. 1. The Strategic Defense Initiative approach, as defined by various Administration spokesmen;

ALTERNATIVE FUTURE SCENARIOS The SDI Policy Approach Science Adviser to the President, Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President, Lt. The goals of the Strategic Defense Initiative General James A. Abrahamson, Director of have been explained extensively in a pamphlet, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, The President Strategic Defense Initiative, and other Administration officials.1 issued January 3, 1985, by the White House; in an April 1985 Report to the Congress on ‘Relevant excerpts from these sources are presented in app. the Strategic Defense Initiative; and in arti- H. A list of statements and articles on BMD by Administra- cles and speeches by George A. Keyworth, II, tion spokesmen appears in app. I,

221 222 —

According to these Administration spokes- gress could assess the results of the BMD re- men, progressive BMD deployment would be search program, and then decide whether to accompanied by mutual U.S.-Soviet reduc- begin full-scale engineering development of a tions in offensive weapons. This would lead complete BMD system. The criteria for such first to enhanced deterrence, and ultimately a decision would, of course, be determined by to basing national security primarily on de- the President and Congress at the time the defense. The effectiveness of the defenses would cision is made. As presently envisaged by be enhanced by the reductions in offenses. Ad- Administration spokesmen,3 however, this de- ministration statements postulate the United cision would not be made unless there were States moving to a future defensive strategy high confidence that the proposed system in four phases, along the following lines: would be:

● 1. Research Phase effective in substantially reducing the counterforce capability of current and As described by Reagan Administration projected Soviet intercontinental, sea- officials, the SDI approach begins by launch- launched, and theater nuclear forces; ing “a broad-based, centrally managed re- ● sufficiently survivable itself against pre- search effort to identify and develop the key emptive attack; technologies necessary for an effective stra- ● cost-effective on the margin; i.e. able to tegic defense. This phase, which has already counter an increment in offensive coun- begun, is expected to include a progressive ser- termeasures at a cost substantially less ies of BMD subsystem demonstrations of than the cost of the offensive increment; evolving technical capabilities. Each of these and demonstrations would display a technological ● able to contribute to improving the sta- advance which would be militarily meaning- bility of the overall strategic balance at ful but which would not violate any arms con- each stage of deployment. trol treaty provisions. Meanwhile, the mutual understanding that In view of the undiminished U.S. commit- both sides were seriously pursuing strategic ment to the security of its allies, the SDI re- defense systems would force Soviet planners search program will not confine itself to ex- to rule out an effective first strike as a realis- ploring BMD technologies with potential tic future option, and would provide U.S. and against ICBMs and SLBMs; it will also care- Soviet arms control negotiators with a com- fully examine technologies with potential mon limited strategic objective, retaliation, by against shorter-range ballistic missiles, such which to discuss possible build-down of offen- as those currently targeted against Western sive nuclear arsenals. Europe. U.S. allies have been invited to participate in the SDI research program. 2. Systems Development Phase Principal emphasis will be placed on tech- If a decision were made to go ahead, proto- nologies involving nonnuclear kill concepts. types of all the required BMD components Research on nuclear directed-energy weapons would be designed, built, and tested during the will also be undertaken in order to develop an systems development phase. Meanwhile, the understanding of the potential of this technol- United States would seek Soviet agreement ogy and as a hedge against Soviet work in this to phased deployment of defensive capabilities area. 2 by both sides. Arms control proposals might include mutually agreed schedules for intro- This research phase might last until some ——. time in the 1990s, when the President and Con- ‘See The President Strategic Defense Initiative published in January 1985 by the White House, Ambassador Paul H. Nitze’s speech of Feb. 20, 1985, and Ambassador Edward L. ‘Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Rowny, “America’s Objective in Geneva, ” New York Times, Department of Defense, April 1985, p. 3. Apr. 29, 1985. —

223 — ducing the defensive systems on both sides, the numbers of ballistic missiles on each side associated schedules for reductions in offen- could be negotiated and implemented.5 sive ballistic missiles and other nuclear forces, While hardened military assets could be suc- confidence-building measures, and agreed con- cessfully defended by these transitional BMD straints on devices designed specifically to systems, cities would still be hostage to mu- attack or degrade the other side’s defensive tual deterrence. This fact would be crucial to systems. The Soviet leaders should respond stability during the transition years. But if cooperatively to these proposals. If they did ICBM silos were defended, the retaliatory ar- not, the United States would have to decide senals needed for attacking cities would not whether to proceed to the next phase anyway. have to be nearly as large as those needed to On this issue, Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary launch or survive a preemptive strike. More- of Defense for Policy, has written: over, during this period BMD deployments might save lives and limit damage in the un- The more the offensive armaments can be reduced by agreement, the easier and cheaper likely event –planned or accidental–that a the job of providing effective defenses. Yet, small number of nuclear missiles were launched to be realistic about Soviet motivations, we despite effective defenses. must seek to develop and deploy systems During the transition period, conventional that can provide effective defenses even with- military forces might have to be improved and out such reductions. The United States is now pursuing new technologies that hold expanded, especially in Europe. Our defense promise for success on the “hard road” as posture would move toward much heavier reli- well. Thus, we make it all the more probable ance upon conventional, nonnuclear forces, that the Soviet leaders will join us some day and correspondingly less reliance on using our on the easy road of cooperation.4 nuclear forces to deter conventional attacks on ourselves and our allies. This strengthened 3. Transition Phase role for conventional forces would need to be During this period, operational BMD sys- supported by restoration of technological tems would be deployed by the United States leverage. At the same time, second- and third- and the Soviet Union on an incremental, se- generation BMD technologies would begin to quential basis, going up the scale of increas- become available, which could in time reduce ing capability levels suggested in chapter 5. the effectiveness of strategic nuclear weapons Each added BMD system increment, in con- to the point that cities could become viable junction with effective and survivable offen- candidates for defense if offensive nuclear sive systems, would enhance deterrence by forces were limited to low enough levels. making each side’s land-based nuclear forces Most explanations of the SDI policy ap- more survivable, thus reducing the incentives proach by Administration officials tend to em- for a preemptive first strike. The United phasize a scenario in which the Soviet Union States could also deploy BMD and air de- agrees to deep reductions in all kinds of offen- fenses to defend preferentially a limited set of sive nuclear forces. In this view, a fully effec- either conventional military systems or pop- tive nationwide defense of the United States ulations, in the United States or overseas. At and its Allies could not be achieved without the same time, as the United States and the deep reductions in Soviet offensive forces.’ So- Soviet Union deployed BMD systems that ‘According to Ambassador Paul Nitze, “We would see the progressively reduced the value of ballistic transition period as a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets. missiles, it is hoped that deep reductions in Arms control would play a critical role. We would, for example, envisage continued reductions in offensive nuclear- arms. (Speech in Philadelphia, Feb. 20, 1985.) “’Nuclear Strategy: Can There Be a Happy Ending?” For- ‘See statement by SD I Director, It. General James A. Abra- eign Affairs, spring 1985, p. 825. hamson, Science, Aug. 10, 1984, p. 601, 224 ..— — -—— —

viet unwillingness to accept such reductions deep mutual reductions in offensive nuclear would therefore preclude a successful transi- forces. tion to the final phase described below. Critical Assumptions for the SD1 Administration officials argue, however, Policy Approach that in that case the United States should still deploy cost-effective BMD systems (if they The SDI policy approach appears to be can be developed) to enhance the deterrent based on the following assumptions: value of U.S. ICBMs and bombers. If the Assumption 1. –There is a reasonable prospect Soviets keep striving to overcome these U.S. of BMD technological developments meeting the BMD systems with offensive countermeasures Administration criteria of effectiveness, cost- and deployment of larger offensive forces, the effectiveness at the margin, and survivability. United States should try to develop and deploy more capable BMD systems. If the So- Effectiveness.-It is assumed that the BMD viets also build up full-scale BMD systems of systems will be effective and that possible So- their own to intercept U.S. missiles, the United viet responses to prospective U.S. BMD sys- States should build offensive forces capable tems will not negate the effectiveness of those of overcoming the Soviet BMD systems. In systems. The technical requirements for such both cases, the United States would hope that effectiveness are discussed in detail in chap- its superior technological talents and indus- ters 7 and 8. trial resources would permit it to stay ahead. Cost-effectiveness at the margin.--lncre- ments of Soviet offense are assumed to be 4. Final Phase clearly more costly than corresponding incre- During this period, both countries would ments of U.S. defense. Increments of U.S. of- complete deployments of highly effective, fense will presumably also be more costly than layered BMD systems to protect their own corresponding increments of Soviet defense. and their allies’ populations, as well as their (But if the latter were not the case, then military assets. Ballistic missile force levels Administration policy would be all the more would “reach their negotiated nadir. ” If sim- likely to succeed, because continuing an offen- ilarly effective defenses had been developed by sive competition would be even more disad- this time against cruise missiles, bombers, and vantageous to the Soviets.) other means of nuclear attack, such defenses If this assumption held, the Soviets would could also be incorporated. have a strong incentive to negotiate the mu- Ballistic missile and air defenses that might tual reduction of offensive forces. (As noted look less than 100 percent effective in the con- in chapter 6, though, the incentive may still text of an offensive exchange involving tens not be sufficient. ) Otherwise, in the transition of thousands of warheads could be expected phase the Soviets might well continue to at- to perform better against an attack by only tempt to counter U.S. defenses with offenses tens or hundreds of warheads. Strategic de- instead of seeing futility in further offensive fense could therefore make possible a world ef- additions. 7 However, this criterion may be fectively disarmed of nuclear weapons, yet still very difficult to apply in practice. First, costs retaining national sovereignty and security. may not be understood that well at the time Thus, by the end of the final phase the United that a decision is to be made. Secondly, the States would achieve President Reagan’s ulti- answer may vary greatly depending on the re- mate goal of “eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. ” Our present reli- 7Indeed, the full Administration scenario would seem to im- ance on offensive retaliatory forces to deter a ply that the Soviets, too, must find a defensive system with a favorable cost-exchange ratio vis-a-vis U.S. offenses; other- nuclear attack would be replaced by reliance wise, the United States would find itself tempted to pursue stra- on a combination of defensive weapons and of tegic superiority by adding offenses as well as defenses. 225 quirements placed upon the system, and the Assumption 3.–The current ABM Treaty re- level of confidence with which those require- gime can be sustained until the United States is ments must be satisfied. prepared to make a BMD deployment decision. on the other hand, if both sides decided that The SDI approach appears to assume that a transition to defense dominance was desira- the necessary research and testing for a U.S. ble, they could agree to reduce offenses despite deployment decision can be conducted within unfavorable cost-exchange ratios between of- what both sides agree are the confines of the fense and defense. ABM Treaty (or that the Soviets will agree to necessary amendments). Otherwise, if the Survivability.– See chapter 6 for a discus- Soviets came to believe that the United States sion of the importance of BMD system sur- was violating the Treaty, they might not post- vivability to maintaining crisis stability. pone their own BMD deployment decision un- Administration officials have emphasized that til the United States was ready to make one. meeting this criterion would be particularly The SDI approach also appears to assume that critical to a decision to deploy BMD. even if no treaty violations (or amendments) Assumption 2.–The strategic program as a are necessary to the U.S. decision, the Soviets whole will be affordable for the United States. will be willing to wait for a U.S. decision and then negotiate the transition to defenses on It should be noted that there is also an as- both sides, rather than move ahead unilater- sumption that defenses will be affordable up ally with their own deployment because they to the margin of trade-off between the offense believe the United States will do so soon. and the defense: i.e. that the initial investment in defense necessary to achieve the desired ef- Judging from published U.S. Department of fectiveness against the predicted responsive Defense descriptions of the current Soviet Soviet offensive threat will be acceptable to BMD program, the Soviets are now in a posi- the United States. Since the Soviets already tion to field a large-scale, ground-based sys- have an offensive force, their initial invest- tem of BMD interceptors sooner than the ment in offense has been made. The total U.S. United States could (although such a system investment in defenses to counter that threat could almost certainly be overcome by exist- has to be considered, as well as subsequent in- ing U.S. offensive forces). Should the Soviets crements of defensive improvement to counter begin such a deployment, however, the United increases in the threat. States might nevertheless feel compelled to respond with hasty offensive “fixes” and invest- Moreover, the costs of the transition stage– ment in U.S. BMD systems with only short- in which defensive systems are being pur- term value. chased, offensive systems are being maintained and improved, and conventional forces Such a Soviet move could be particularly un- may be needing augmentation—must also be desirable if U.S. research should show that considered. It should be noted that particu- technology will not in fact permit defenses as larly in the early stages, even before any U.S. effective as those now hoped for. We could find BMD deployments have taken place, Soviet ourselves in a costly offensive-defensive arms anticipatory offensive responses are highly race with little hope for decisive dominance of likely. These could, in turn, appear to require the defense—the situation the ABM Treaty counter-balancing U.S. offensive deployments. was intended to preclude. Another issue is whether we and our allies This assumption about the short-term via- could afford the additional conventional forces bility of the ABM Treaty is not necessarily es- that would probably be needed to preserve the sential for the long-term SDI scenario, but if military balance in Europe when Soviet BMD it were to prove incorrect, the transition to deployment diminished the credibility of nu- defenses could be more difficult and pose clear deterrence of conventional aggression. greater risks of instability. 226

Assumption 4.—Arms control agreements can negotiations has demonstrated that asym- be formulated and negotiated that will permit metries in offensive force structures and in graduated, mutual, deep offensive reductions and strategic doctrines, Soviet secrecy, and other defensive deployments that are crisis-stabilizing factors have made the process of reaching and arms-race-stabilizing. agreement highly arduous. Agreement on a transition involving a fundamental change in This assumption has three components: a strategic goals and drastic changes in force U.S. desire for such agreements, a correspond- structures, and adequate verification thereof, ing Soviet desire, and the ability of both sides would be much more complex.9 For these rea- to overcome the technical difficulties in reach- sons it might prove to be far more difficult to ing such agreements. reach U.S.-Soviet agreement on increasing Many analysts believe that if the Soviets defensive and decreasing offensive deploy- should conclude that the United States is ment levels than it would be to agree to reduce likely to abandon the ABM Treaty and deploy offensive levels with BMD essentially banned. a nationwide BMD system, they would be Assumption 5. –The loss of the “extended de- highly unlikely to agree to offensive force re- a terrent” threat of U.S. offensive forces could be ductions. Offensive arms control may there- compensated for by either conventional force im- fore be difficult during this stage, because the provements or diplomatic measures to reduce the Soviets would almost surely start to increase Soviet threat to U.S. allies. their offensive nuclear forces in order to counter the U.S. BMD system and maintain For those early stages of BMD deployment their offensive force capability. This appears intended to enhance deterrence by increasing to be a major problem confronting the U.S. the survivability of U.S. nuclear retaliatory ca- negotiators in Geneva. pabilities, this assumption would not come into play. But as long-range offensive nuclear The SD I scenario assumes that technologi- weapons became less effective on both sides, cal developments will eventually persuade the the possibility of escalation of theater conflicts Soviets of the futility of trying to maintain the to nuclear war would serve as less of a deter- military effectiveness of ICBMs. If this as- rent to Soviet aggression. The United States sumption proves incorrect, the demands placed would presumably seek alternate means of re- on the BMD technology for effectiveness, cost- ducing the Soviet conventional and theater- effectiveness, and survivability could be much nuclear threats to U.S. allies and interests. higher. The ultimate goal of negotiated offensive reductions might come later rather than Assumption 6. –Political fallout from any U. S.- sooner, if at all. Soviet disputes over the SDI will be manageable. Even with a mutual desire to negotiate a Already, the Soviets have stepped up their stabilizing transition to defensive deploy- allegations of America’s aggressive intentions ments, the difficulties in working out such an to develop a first-strike capability, to under- agreement should not be underestimated. Ex- mine strategic stability, and to increase the perience with past U.S.-Soviet arms control danger of nuclear war. They have accused the United States of planning to abrogate the 6For example, the Hoffman Panel of experts, appointed by ABM Treaty and thus destroy any hopes for the Department of Defense to assist in planning the SDI program, concluded that the Soviets would be likely to respond progress in strategic arms control. to U.S. BMD deployment “with a continuing build-up in their long-range offensive forces. ” (Fred S. Hoffman, et al., Ballis- Whether Soviet efforts to lay the blame on tic Missile Defenses and U.S. National Security, unclassified the United States for derailing arms control summary report, October 1983, p. 11. ) Participants in the OTA efforts will gain widespread credence, particu- Workshop on Soviet military doctrine and policy also judged that the first Soviet responses to U.S. BMD deployments would larly in Western Europe, remains to be seen. be to try to maintain the effectiveness of their offenses. For ..——— Soviet statements on this point, see app. K. References to The requisite elements of such a negotiated transition are studies of Soviet strategic policy are listed in app. M. discussed in ch. 6. 227 —

If they succeed, neutralism might become a against the U. S., especially of strikes designed stronger political movement in many NATO to achieve decisive military advantage. Their countries, and might well become government program highlights space-based BMD as a policy in several. “technological end-run” around Soviet military capabilities, largely by utilizing superior The SDI scenario assumes that there will U.S. computer miniaturization technology. not be unacceptable damage to the North At- lantic Alliance from neutralist tendencies or In order to create such a space-based BMD from European beliefs that a defensive system system quickly, the “High Frontier” organiza- capable of really protecting Western European tion recommends use of “essentially off-the- cities from nuclear attack is less attainable shelf” technology, and describes an illustra- technically, financially, and politically than tive system which would be designed to inter- one for the United States. It also assumes that cept Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs, MRBMs, and the British and the French would not be ex- IRBMs in their boost and post-boost stages. cessively alarmed by the prospect that loss of Its 1982 report estimated such a BMD sys- the ABM Treaty and subsequent Soviet BMD tem to be deployable within 5 or 6 years at a deployment would undermine their own nu- cost of about $13 billion.11 clear deterrents. That first-generation BMD system would be Opposition from U.S. allies would not nec- followed about five years later by a second- essarily preclude deployment, but the Admin- generation system, perhaps using laser or par- istration has stated that consultation with our ticle beams to attack missile warheads in their allies would play an important part in a de- midcourse stage as well as earlier. ployment decision. The advocates of the High Frontier approach emphasize, however, that these space- Early BMD Deployment based BMD systems should be reinforced with Policy Approach a series of “collateral actions” as follows: Proponents of this approach propose that ● point defense of U.S. ICBM silos, using the United States begin immediately to deploy a ground-based system such as the Low ballistic missile defenses as rapidly as possi- Altitude Defense System (LoADS) inter- ble, using presently available U.S. technol- ceptors with nuclear warheads or the ogy.’” Their goals are to enhance the current SWARMJET nonnuclear, high-velocity basis of deterrence by using defense to com- interceptor rockets, either of which they plicate Soviet targeting and to provide some believe could be deployed within 2 years. measure of protection to U.S. society should ● a greatly enhanced civil defense program, deterrence fail. Complicating Soviet targeting which they believe could save a great would enhance deterrence by increasing the number of lives and “protect enough es- uncertainties in the minds of Soviet planners sentials of our agricultural and industrial regarding the outcome of planned strikes assets to give reasonable hope for the re- covery of national power and our modern ‘“Examples of this approach are described in Daniel O. Gra- standard of living. ” ham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy (Washington, ● mobile, high-performance, manned mili- DC: High Frontier, Inc., 1982); Daniel O. Graham, High Fron- tier: A Strategy for National Sum”val (New York: Tom Doherty tary “spaceplanes” to inspect and main- Associates, 1983); Daniel O. Graham and Gregory A. Fosse- tain U.S. satellites and, eventually, conduct dal, A Defense That Defends (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, “an active defense of U.S. installations in 1983); and Angelo Codevilla, “Understanding Ballistic Missile Defense, ” Journal of Contemporary Studies, winter 1984, pp. space. 19-35. This last article differs from the others in recommend- ing early deployment of spacebased chemical lasers, as opposed to the space-based kinetic kill vehicle constellation of *’High ✍ Frontier. ” Most of the following discussion refers to the “High “Department of Defense officials disagree with these esti- Frontier” proposals. mates; see app. G. 228 .—

● a manned space station for testing BMD viet economy, already severely strained, may system elements, first in low orbit and well be unable to meet these requirements for later in geosynchronous orbit. high technology without disintegrating.’’” He ● comprehensive anti-bomber defenses, cites reports that indicate that Soviet “mili- ● increased anti-submarine warfare de- tary expenditures are already approaching, if ployments, not exceeding, ‘the objective limits’ beyond ● substantial strengthening of U.S. offen- which the U.S.S.R. cannot go without serious sive strategic forces, including bombers, damage to the economy as a whole, including ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, be- the reproductive [sic] base crucial to the very cause the need for offensive retaliatory existence of Soviet military might. “15 forces would remain. Critical Assumptions for the While this policy approach has some simi- Early Deployment Policy Approach larities to the Reagan Administration’s SDI approach, it differs in several important This policy approach appears to be based on respects. First, it is based on the belief that the following assumptions: a BMD system using current technology Assumption 1.–U.S. technology is now ade- would be sufficiently effective to justify its de- quate to support prompt deployment of a func- ployment at this time. Second, it does not hold tional, survivable, space-based BMD system. out an ultimate goal of near-perfect defense of cities, but explicitly advocates deployment of In the view of some Defense Department only partially effective defenses on the ground officials, the High Frontier estimates for costs 12 and construction times for such a system are that these are better than none. Third, the 16 writings of its proponents do not suggest that unrealistic. Lt. General James A. Abraham- it could lead to arms control agreements for son, Director of the SDI Organization, has tes- deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces. On tified before the House Armed Services Com- the contrary, they envisage a hostile Soviet mittee that while many of the components response to U.S. adoption of this policy, result- that the High Frontier proposal might utilize ing in an intensified arms race between the two were available, their integration into an effec- superpowers, a race they believe the United tive and survivable weapons system would re- States would win by making full use of its in- quire much more study .17 Administration offi- dustrial and technological superiority: cials say, in short, that several years of research are needed to assess the validity of If. . . we move strategic systems onto a the assumptions critical to the early deploy- fast-track, high-priority model the Soviets ment approach. will have two or three years, not decades, to respond to our latest defense. And, as they begin to devise countermeasures and build “High Frontier (1982), op. cit., p. 86. “Ibid., p. 162, the hardware to perform them, we will al- “The 1982 High Frontier report (op. cit., p. 71) estimates a ready be deploying the next round of strate- total cost of about $20 billion over 5 years and about $35 bil- gic defenses—high energy lasers, particle lion through 1990. Department of Defense studies estimated beam weapons, and so on.13 that a comparable deployment would cost from $50 to $75 billion or more, according to testimony on the DOD authoriza- In commenting on this prospect, Daniel O. tion before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Mar. 23, 1983 (p. 2668). The DOD witness, John L. Gardner, indicated Graham argues, “The tasks the U.S.S.R. will reservations about the survivability of such a system, and face if High Frontier becomes a reality require stated: high technology on a prodigious scale. The So- Before we would recommend a significant undertaking on a system like the High Frontier we believe that significantly more work 121n A Defense ‘lYMt Defends, op. cit., Graham and Fossedal would have to be done in the examination of that system from the viewpoint of its survivability and considering the kinds of state: “In fact there will never be a perfect defense, not against responsive threats that might come at that system from the So- the bullet, against the tank, against nuclear weapons. What can viet Union, were they to conclude that it represented a military be done is to complicate an attacker’s calculations, blunt his threat. forces, and save millions of lives” (p. 121), See also app. G. ‘gGraham and Fossedal, op. cit., p. 115. “Testimony of Feb. 21, 1985. See app. G. 229

A Background Paper done for OTA contains increased credibility of U.S. willingness to use con- an analysis of the “High Frontier” proposal ventional force. for 432 satellites carrying l-km/see intercep- According to the High Frontier literature, tors. It demonstrates that the concept would have meager coverage of Soviet ICBM fields.18 There would be a realization that the U.S. was beginning to break out of the paralytic Assumption 2. –The cost of such a deployment bonds imposed by the concept of Mutual As- could be relatively low. sured Destruction . . . there would be a res- This assumption is based partly on the idea toration of the badly shaken European confidence in U.S. ability and resolve to actually that Congress and the Administration would 19 use its power to preserve the Free World. be willing to allow the program to proceed on a‘ *fast track’ without existing procedures for Assumption 6. —Political fallout from any U. S.- competitive bidding and administrative re- Soviet disputes over the BMD plans and deploy- view, and that these procedures waste large ments will be manageable. sums of money. While such an approach might See the discussion of SDI assumptions speed progress in some areas, views differ as above. to whether the costs would be reduced significantly. Assumption 3. –Crisis instability will be avoided Intermediate BMD Deployment because technically superior U.S. defenses will re- Policy Approach duce Soviet incentives to execute a preemptive attack under any plausible circumstances. The near-term strategic objectives of the Early BMD Deployment approach—enhanc- See chapter 6 for a discussion of crisis sta- ing the deterrence of a Soviet attack upon the bility issues. Full success of the early deploy- United States by increasing Soviet uncer- ment scenario seems to require U.S. strategic tainty in their ability to accomplish military superiority from the beginning; otherwise, the objectives in such an attack, along with pro- United States could beat a dangerous strate- viding some measure of protection to U.S. so- gic disadvantage for a considerable period. ciety should deterrence fail-are also sought Partial success, however, might depend only by some who, unlike Early Deployment advo- on the increase in uncertainty posed by BMD cates, do not believe that existing BMD tech- to Soviet military planners. nology is adequate. Supporters of an “Inter- Assumption 4.–Arms race instability will be mediate BMD Deployment’ approach believe that U. S. BMD deployment should not wait manageable because the Soviets will not be able for the feasibility of long-term, highly effec- to afford to match U.S. technical superiority. tive BMD concepts to be demonstrated. How- The long-run affordability of this policy ap- ever, they would not advocate that deploy- proach seems to depend on its unaffordabil- ments start immediately. Instead, they would ity for the Soviets. But if the Soviet economy support U.S. deployment of BMD in the cannot be forced into collapse, this approach “intermediate-term’ ‘—say by the mid- 1990s— requires that the United States be able to of the best system that could be deployed at maintain an indefinite lead in the defense- that time. offense competition. Advocates of “early deployment” approaches Assumption 5.–The loss of the “extended de- hope to deploy BMD so rapidly that the terrent” threat of US. offensive forces in the face Soviets will be unable to counter it before it of Soviet BMD could be compensated for by the becomes effective. “Intermediate deploy- . ment” supporters do not expect to avoid So- ‘“Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, —— OTA Background Paper, OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984, pp. “Graham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy, op. cit., 34-35, p. 88. 230 — — viet countermeasures, but believe that the ad- have been saved by U.S. defenses. In other ded uncertainty that Soviet planners and words, fewer U.S. retaliatory warheads would weapons designers will face against even a par- reach the Soviet Union if both had such de- tially effective U.S. defense will enhance defenses than if neither did. Advocates of “inter- terrence. Except for their difference in timing, mediate-term” BMD deployment acknowledge the rationales and underlying assumptions of this possibility, but believe that the uncertain- the “early deployment” and “intermediate de- ties introduced into Soviet attack plans by ployment” approaches are similar. U.S. defenses would more than compensate for whatever success Soviet defenses might have Critical Assumptions for the Intermediate in intercepting our retaliatory strike. BMD Deployment Policy Approach The critical assumptions of the Intermedi- Silo Defense Policy Approach ate Deployment Approach closely resemble A third variant of a policy approach favor- those already discussed under the Early De- ing U.S. BMD deployment differs from those ployment Approach. However, the first as- described above in that it calls for defense pri- sumption in that approach must be modified marily of ICBM silos. The major purpose of slightly, and one more added. such a BMD system would be to enhance the Assumption 1. –In the “intermediate-term” (mid survivability of the land-based leg of the U.S. 1990s), US. technology will be adequate to support deterrent triad, While in some configurations deployment of a functional, survivable BMD it might offer a low level of partial protection system. to some soft targets like cities, it would not be intended as just the first stage of a more Such a system might eventually include ambitious defense. A defense primarily of mis- space-based components, but would probably sile silos would enhance the current basis of start out with ground-based terminal and per- deterrence by increasing the U.S. forces ex- haps midcourse interceptors. Nonnuclear in- pected to survive a Soviet first strike, raising terceptors would probably be desirable, but if the cost to the Soviets of attempting to de- adequate performance and confidence could stroy those forces, and possibly complicate So not be attained with nonnuclear technologies, viet targeting. nuclear interceptors would be required. Proponents of this approach believe it would Assumption 2.–Deterrence of Soviet nuclear at- serve several strategic objectives: tack does not depend critically on the number of ● It would constitute a hedge against pos- U.S. warheads that would penetrate Soviet de- sible future vulnerabilities that might fenses in retaliation. arise for the SLBM and strategic bomber Although an intermediate deployment of forces. ballistic missile defenses by the United States ● It would reduce the incentive to rely on would confuse Soviet attack plans and in- a launch-on-warning strategy for U.S. crease the uncertainties they would face in ICBMs, thereby improving crisis sta- conducting a nuclear attack upon the United bility. States, deployment of a Soviet defense in the ● By adding to the uncertainties the Soviets same time frame, using systems evolved from would face when contemplating a possi- the current upgrade of the Moscow system, ble preemptive strike, it might discourage would lessen the ability of the United States such a strike. to conduct a retaliatory strike. In chapter 5, ● It would introduce a “firebreak” against it was shown that even if the United States limited nuclear attacks by the Soviets, re- and Soviets deploy equivalent defenses, it is quiring any effective Soviet attack to use quite possible that in the event of a Soviet first thousands of weapons, thereby running strike, more U.S. retaliatory warheads would a higher risk of heavy U.S. retaliation be intercepted by Soviet defenses than would than would an attack of only a few. 231 —.—

These objectives are shared by SDI propo- On the other hand, another advocate of nents for the early stages of BMD deploy- limited BMD deployments has argued that the ment. But proponents of limited BMD primar- benefits of limited defense are sufficient in ily for missile-site defense argue that their themselves and that BMD would not make approach would lessen pressure on the Soviet deep reductions in offensive arms more likely: Union to increase its offensive forces to main- Since there are no foreseeable circum- tain its assured retaliatory deterrent capa- stances in which either side will feel secure bility. without maintaining an assured destruction Proponents of the Silo Defense policy ap- capability, the ABM [deployment] would proach believe that advances in BMD technol- make it unlikely that either side would be interested in negotiating reductions to low ogy have made the technical feasibility of ef- 21 levels. fective hard-point silo defense more promising than it was in the early 1970s. They believe This analyst does believe, however, that the that significant progress has been made to- Soviets might agree to modify the ABM ward coping with problems which were par- treaty to permit limited defenses. ticularly troublesome then, such as decoy discrimination and defense of acquisition and Critical Assumptions for the Silo Defense guidance radars. Policy Approach This policy approach does not envision a This policy approach appears to be based on transition to a fundamentally different U.S. the following assumptions: nuclear strategy. Rather, it proposes to deal with a problem in current strategy-the vul- Assumption 1.–BMD for missile silo defense nerability of part of the retaliatory force to can be effective in the face of increased offensive preemptive attack by Soviet ICBMs. Never- forces and countermeasures. theless, it would probably require a carefully Effective BMD for silo defense would have managed arrangement with the Soviets to the effect of raising the cost (in terms of at- achieve its goals without introducing un- tacking reentry vehicles) of destroying each desired instabilities into the strategic rela- missile silo, but would not make the task im- tionship. possible if there were no constraints on offen- Some advocates of silo defense see it as lead- sive forces.22 ing to a defense-oriented world, and argue for Assumption 2.–BMD is the most cost-effective a “defense protected build-down’ ’( DPB), say- means available for protecting U.S. retaliatory ca- ing that: pabilities. An orderly transition to a defense-oriented If a system intended primarily to defend world . . . can be achieved by combining de- missile silos is not considered to form the core ployment of defensive weapons with a con- comitant and compensating reduction of of a more ambitious defense, then the cost- offensive weapons. 20 effectiveness of the alternatives becomes a larger consideration. For example, mobile or They argue that a world free of the threat other deceptive basing modes for ICBMs of nuclear destruction is an illusion, but that should be considered. Depending on the pre- the level of destruction of which retaliatory dicted size of the Soviet threat, such basing weapons are capable might be reduced. modes might be the first step to take, rather “’Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus, “Stabilizing “Jan Lodal. “Deterrence and Nuclear Strategy, ” Daedalus, Star Wars, ” Foreign Policy (No. 54), spring 1984, p. 165. For fall 1980, p. 170. an earlier argument that limited defenses could permit reduced “Testimony of Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of De- offensive forces, see G. E., Barasch et al., *’Ballistic Missile De- fense for Research and Engineering, Hearing before the Re- fense: A Potential Arms-Control Initiative, ” Los Alamos Na- search and Development Subcommittee of the House Commit- tional I.aboratory Paper LA-8632, UC-2, issued January 1981. tee on Armed Services, Nov. 10, 1983, H. A.S.C. 98-21, p. 20. 232 than BMD.23 Since defended U.S. ICBMs Assumption 4.–Neither side will perceive the would probably have to attack defended So- limited BMD system deployed by the other as the viet targets, the trade-offs in U.S. retaliatory core of a more extensive damage-limiting defense. effectiveness need to be considered carefully. A tacit or a negotiated agreement to build Arms control negotiations to reduce the So- larger, but still limited, BMD systems maybe viet counterforce threat should also receive full difficult to formulate. A highly-localized (site) consideration. defense by ground-based interceptors would Assumption 3. –The Soviets would not respond appear to be the least ambiguous type of de- to limited U.S. BMD deployments with a large- ployment, but might not be nearly as effective scale BMD system intended to defend urban- as a system with more than one layer of de- industrial targets as well as ICBM silos. fense. One side or the other might not be willing to settle for a BMD with only a single ter- Such a Soviet response would place pressure minal layer. But systems with more than one on the United States to expand our defenses, layer may appear to give one a “breakout” po- offenses, or both, just to stay in the same rela- tential for a much more ambitious defense. tive strategic position. Some advocates of limited BMD argue that the Soviets would see Assumption 5.–Neither side will respond to the that, given the likelihood of effective U.S. other’s limited BMD system with greatly augmen- countermeasures, trying to build very effec- ted offenses. tive defenses would be futile. But the defen- Lt. General James A. Abrahamson, Direc- sive system the Soviets are best prepared to tor of the Strategic Defense Initiative Orga- deploy might not be best suited to ICBM silo nization, has argued that a defect in setting defense. Should the Soviets deploy a system only limited goals for a BMD system is that which looks to the United States like the base the Soviets are likely to devote considerable for a larger defense of Soviet territory,” the effort to countering it, whereas the promise United States may decide to respond by build- of increasingly effective defenses would cause ing a larger offensive force. This in turn could them to see the futility of trying to maintain stimulate larger Soviet offenses and defenses. offensive capabilities.25 Others argue that the Soviets could be en- Augmented Soviet offenses could cause the gaged in negotiations to define the kinds of United States to deploy additional defenses defenses both sides could live with. The best and offenses, which in turn could stimulate way for the two sides to assure one another further Soviet deployments. of the limited nature of their BMD deployments may be for them to agree to a modifi- A Non-BMD Policy Approach cation of the ABM Treaty specifically to permit carefully defined silo defenses. This Most opponents of BMD believe that, at assumes that the Soviets, who have deployed least for the foreseeable future, U.S. policy a defense of Moscow but never utilized the should be to strive to continue the current sit- ABM Treaty provision allowing them to de- uation in which neither the United States nor fend silos, could be persuaded to seek a silo the U.S.S.R. deploys BMD, and offensive defense. arms development and deployment are limited by agreement.26

——-—..-—— 2gOn various possible basing modes and the potential of “See, for example, his testimony before the Subcommittee preferential BMD for missile bases, see ch. 3 in U.S. Congress, on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Committee on Armed Office of Technology Assessment, MX Missile Basing, OTA- Services, U.S. Senate, Feb. 21, 1985. ISC-140 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, “comprehensive descriptions of this viewpoint appear in Sid- September 1981). ney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, The Rea- ZiIn a tmic~ “prudent worst-case” analysis, *ost ~Y largs- gan Strate@”c Defense Im”tiative: A Technical, Political, and scale Soviet BMD deployment would probably look like that. Arms ControJ Assessment (Stanford, CA: Center for Interna- 233 —.

In view of the factors which threaten the ● Preserving and strengthening the ABM continued viability of the ABM Treaty,27 most Treaty: people who advocate preservation of the treaty —by strong endorsements of its long-term believe that steps should be taken to strengthen importance by the senior officials of it.z’ Their views are described in the following both countries; sections. Since there are many ideas on how –by resolving compliance issues in the this can best be done, the descriptions below bilateral Standing Consultative Com- include a range of proposals drawn from many mission; sources. While this approach is generally con- –by exploring ways to clarify, modify or sistent with the main strategic policy objec- supplement the Treaty to eliminate tives of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter adminis- troublesome ambiguities or loopholes trations, it also includes new measures to indicated by events since the Treaty further those objectives in coming years. was signed and by new technological 29 Advocates of this policy approach agree developments; –by keeping the U.S. and Soviet BMD with SDI advocates that we should not count on the threat of assured destruction to prevent research programs at a level and scope no greater than needed to hedge against a nuclear catastrophe forever. However, they one another’s BMD technology devel- do not believe that the solution to this problem can be found primarily in new military opments. This could include maintain- technology. Instead they believe that in the ing realistic deployment options and exploring new technologies within the near term the best hope lies in early steps to bounds of the ABM Treaty .’” improve strategic stability through arms con- ● trol agreements, as described below. (Their Negotiating a verifiable agreement to ban views on ways to reduce the long-term risks testing and deployment of anti-satellite inherent in threats of nuclear retaliation are weapons and all space-based weapons. Such an agreement would also reinforce discussed subsequently.) the ABM Treaty by eliminating a poten- Under this approach, the United States tial loophole: the testing of devices for po- would make a set of related proposals to the tential BMD use under the guise of ASAT Soviet Union which could include some or all testing. of the following elements: ● Negotiating mutual, verifiable limitations —— .— on offensive nuclear forces, designed not tional Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1984); only to reduce their numbers substan- and Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, and Henry W. Ken- tially, but also to decrease counterforce dall, The Fallacy of Star 14’ars (New York: Random House, 1984). A list of articles by critics of the Strategic Defense Ini- capabilities and strengthen survivability tiative, including former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown, Clark Clifford, Robert McNamara, and James Schlesinger, appears in app, J. “For a detailed discussion of these factors, see Thomas K. “For a development of this approach, see Drell, Farley, and Longstreth, ,John E. Pike, and John B. Rhinelander, The Im- Holloway, op. cit. These authors conclude: pact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Pro@ams on Cooperative action could counter the corrosive effects of uni- the ABM Treat~’ (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Save lateral ABM activities which will ine~’itabl~ cause disputes aris- the ABM Treaty, March 19851. ing out of deliberate or unintentional divergences in interpretation of the Treaty. More important, it could reinforce confidence “For example, in a speech on Nov. 29, 1984, Senator Edward that the two nations see the purposes and value of the ABM Kennedy said: Treaty in consistent ways, and that each is determined to act . .. developments in both [the United States and U. S. S. R.] already separately and jointly toward the fundamental aim of avoiding place the [ABM] Treaty in serious jeopardy. Of particular con- nuclear war. cern is the development of advanced air defenses that may have 3The nature of such a research program is discussed in Sid- a ballistic missile capability. We are now hearing charges and ney D. Drell and Thomas H. Johnson (eds. ), Strategic Missile countercharges of Treaty violations. The trends suggest that the Defense: Necessities, Prospects, and Dangers in the Near Term, superpowers are approaching a point where they must either take concrete measures to renew the Treaty, or risk its abrogation. report of a workshop at the Center for International Security Congress must act on its own to prevent the Administration from and Arms Control (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Apr. misusing Star Wars to provoke the Soviet Union into abrogat- 1985). Also printed in U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Serv- ing the ABM agreement. We should prohibit the funding of any ices, Hearings of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater weapons research or development which could violate that treaty. Nuclear Forces, Mar. 19, 1985, 234 — —— —

of retaliatory forces on both sides.31 This Critical Assumptions for the Non-BMD Policy proposal could include bans on all nuclear Approach missile flight tests and on all nuclear 32 This policy approach appears to be based on weapon tests. It would also be logical to the following assumptions: supplement it with limitations on air defense and on anti-submarine warfare. Assumption 1.–The risks of continuing a strategy of deterrence by assured retaliation, stabilized Among the proponents of this general pol- by arms control measures, are less than the risks icy approach, there is a wide spectrum of views of introducing BMD into the strategic arms com- regarding the long-term prospects for avoid- petition. ing nuclear war, either between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between other Advocates of this approach maybe unhappy countries. Some believe that after (but only af- about the U.S. need to rely on assured retali- ter) offensive forces have been reduced to a ation to deter Soviet attack, but they do not sufficiently low level, deployment of effective see a plausible alternative. This assumption nationwide defenses against nuclear attack is based in part on an assessment that over would help to enable all the countries involved the next two or three decades we can have to agree to do away with nuclear weapons al- higher confidence in our ability to maintain together.33 Others believe that for the foresee- adequately survivable and effective retaliatory able future the most promising way to prevent forces than in our ability to build BMD sys- nuclear war is to maintain a small but invul- tems effective enough to provide “defense nerable nuclear retaliatory force in the hands dominance. It is also based on the view that of at least the United States and U. S. S. R., and the Soviets are more likely to agree to main- perhaps Britain, France and China as well.34 taining and stabilizing the current strategic Still others believe that only by improving po- relationship than they are to agree to shifting litical relationships between nations or by to a defense-oriented strategic relationship. evolving strong translational institutions can Most BMD advocates disagree with one or we hope to banish the long-term threat of nu- both of these views. 35 clear holocaust. Assumption 2. –It is possible to arrive at, and maintain in force, mutually acceptable, adequately “This would be consistent with the conclusion of the Scow- croft Commission that “The central purpose of our arms con- verifiable arms control agreements which will trol efforts should therefore be to enhance U.S. security by in- satisfy both sides that neither is deploying signif- creasing strategic stability. (Second report of the President icant BMD systems or has a significant lead in Commission on Strategic Forces, Mar. 21, 1984, p. 3.) 32Proponents of this approach believe that a missile flight test BMD break-out capability. ban would be particularly valuable in preventing the Soviet Un- ion from increasing its destabilizing counterforce capabilities; Given the questioned record of Soviet com- e.g., by developing more accurate land-based ICBMs, highly pliance with existing arms control agreements, accurate SLBMs that could destroy U.S. ICBM silos, or and given misgivings on each side about new depressed-trajectory SLBMs that could reach U.S. bomber bases before the bombers could escape. See Les AuCoin, technological developments on the other side, “Freeze,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1984; this may be a challenging condition to fulfill. and “Nailing Shut the ‘Window of Vulnerability’, Arms Con- trol Today, September 1984. Other arms control advocates pro- Some of the critics of arms control believe pose allowing certain kinds of missile modernization in order that it is dangerous to try to cooperate with to reduce vulnerabilities of both sides’ offensive forces. See, for example, Harold Brown and Lynn E. Davis, “Nuclear Arms the Soviet Union. They believe that the So- Control: Where Do We Stand?” Foreign Affairs, summer 1984. viets use arms control negotiations solely to 33 For an elaboration of this concept, see Freeman Dyson, attempt to weaken the West. They think any Weapons and Hope (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 73 ff. and 280 ff. effort to seek mutually advantageous agree- “see, for example, Richard L. Garwin, “Reducing Dependence on Nuclear Weapons, in David C. Gompert, et al., Nuclear (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Randall Forsberg, “Con- Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the Future (New fining the Military to Defense as a Route to Disarmament, ” York: McGraw-Hill, 1977). Wor]d Po~jCv Journ~, winter 1984; and Robert S. woito TO 35 See, for example, Burns H. Weston (cd.) Toward Nuclear End War; A New Approach to International Conflict (New Disarmament and Global Security.\’: A Search for Alternatives York: Pilgrim Press, 1982). 235 ments between the superpowers is doomed to systems with penetration aids, enhanced failure, because Soviet hostility to the United offenses, and other countermeasures. States will forever dominate any relationship On the other hand, BMD proponents argue between them. In this view, the Soviets might that U.S. BMD research languished under the enter into additional arms control agreements ABM Treaty regime until the Strategic De- with the United States mainly to limit U.S. fense Initiative began. They contend that a progress on BMD while the Soviets prepare lack of intent to deploy a system might re- to abrogate the treaty, openly or clandestinely, move incentives for adequate funding for in their own time. BMD research. A Soviet break-out from an Other observers have a more complex view arms control regime limiting BMD could then of Soviet motivations, but nevertheless see leave the United States at some disadvantage, significant problems in seeking new arms con- at least temporarily. trol agreements. Even given the political will Assumption 4. –The Soviets can be persuaded on both sides, there are technical obstacles to to enter into and comply with offensive arms con- effective agreement, especially in the case of trol limitations which would reduce the threat of space-based or space-attacking weapons. For preemptive nuclear attack, thereby reducing cur- example, the distinctions between anti-satel- rent U.S. incentives to deploy a defense of ICBM lite weapons and sensors and potential BMD silos. weapons and sensors is becoming more difficult to draw. This assumption may not be critical to preserving the non-BMD regime, but offensive Assumption 3,–A U.S. research program which arms reductions would be useful, particularly hedges against Soviet break-out from such arms in making continued BMD limitations accept- control agreements will either deter such break- able in the United States. During the SALT out or provide the United States with an appro- I period and on into the SALT 11 period, the priate offensive or defensive response to it. Soviets continued to add to and improve their Many advocates of the non-BMD policy ap- ballistic-missile borne hard-target-kill capabil- proach assume that the Soviet Union has not ities. The have shown little interest in negoti- already made a firm decision to break out or ating away those weapons which the United “creep out” of the ABM Treaty, and that such States finds most destabilizing. Some argue a U.S. research program could help to deter that the current U.S. interest in developing them from doing so. Some believe the United BMD may induce the Soviets to take a seri- States could reduce this risk further by devel- ous interest in offensive missile reductions if oping prototype BMD systems within the they believe BMD can be headed off in that bounds of the ABM Treaty, as the Soviets way, but seeking such a trade-off does not ap- have done, as well as by maintaining a strong pear to be current U.S. policy. capability to overcome potential Soviet BMD

Contents

Page Introduction ...... 239 BMI) R&D Options...... 240 Hedges Against Near-Term Soviet ABM Treaty Breakout ...... 241 Soviet BMD Research and Comparison With U.S...... 243 Alternative It&D Program Descriptions ...... 244 Approach 1: The Strategic Defense Initiative ...... 244 Approach 2a: Early Deployment ...... , ...... ,245 Approach 2b: Intermediate Deployment ...... 247 Approach 3a: Funding-Limited ...... 248 Approach 3b: Combination...... , . .248 Alternative R/&D Program Characteristics ...... 249 Technical Attributes...... 249 Economic Attributes...... 250 Political Attributes ...... ,..251 Issues...... 256 Issues Concerning Choice of Research Approach ...... 256 Issues Concerning Preparation of Deployment Options ...... ,...258 issues Pertaining to any BMD Research Program ...... 259

Table Table No. Page 10-1. Correlation Between the Near-Term Research Approaches Discussed in This Chapter and the Longer-Term Policy Approaches Discussed in Chapter 9 ...... 240 Chapter 10 Alternatives R&D Programs

INTRODUCTION In previous chapters, this report has ad- would clearly be inconsistent with ABM dressed the potential contributions and liabili- Treaty constraints. The pre-SDI program ties of ballistic missile defenses, and it has had no such mandate for an early decision primarily discussed the long-term issues as- on maintaining the ABM Treaty. sociated with developing and deploying BMD. Visibility: The SDI has much higher visi- However, technologies now within the state bility, and a much higher level of Presi- of the art are capable of providing only limited dential attention, than the previous BMD capability. More effective BMD sys- program of research in BMD-relevant tems cannot be developed without further re- technologies. The decision to spotlight search and technology development. BMD has already been made, and its consequences are already being felt. These This chapter discusses research programs consequences certainly include a decision to investigate the possibilities for acquiring by the Soviets to at least explore their op- more advanced BMD systems. It presents a tions to respond to the increased probabil- number of different potential strategies for ity of a U.S. BMD deployment. pursuing BMD research, describes some char- Direction: Under the SDI, emphasis has acteristics by which alternative R&D pro- shifted away from fairly mature technol- grams can be compared, and outlines some of ogies, which generally include use of nu- the issues Congress must face in the near- clear interceptors, towards nonnuclear term. defenses which would use much more There is general agreement that BMD tech- speculative but potentially more effective nologies merit investigation. Support for BMD technologies. research, however, does not necessarily imply Budget: Over the next decade, much more support for the Strategic Defense Initiative is proposed to be spent on ballistic mis- (SDI). Possible BMD research programs can dif- sile defense research than would have fer greatly from the SDI in emphasis, direction, been allocated in the absence of the SDI. and level of effort. Moreover, research programs Large budget increases start with the having different perceived and intended pur- $3,722 million fiscal year 1986 request, poses—even if they have similar technical con- which is almost four times the fiscal year tent—can have very different consequences. 1984 total and is more than twice what would have been spent within the Depart- Decisions to be made by Congress in the ment of Defense in fiscal year 1986 under very near future and in the years to come will the pre-SDI budget. Subsequent increases have a major impact in ratifying, or in re- proposed for the SDI are even greater, directing, major changes which the Reagan and by fiscal year 1990 are projected to Administration has initiated in the U.S. BMD reach a level over eight times the fiscal research program. These changes include: year 1984 total. ● Urgency: Research under the SD I is in- Arms Control Policy: Instead of the pre- tended to proceed at a “technology-lim- SDI approach of seeking deep reductions ited’ pace to permit an informed decision of offensive forces along with mainte- to be made at the earliest possible date nance of the ABM Treaty ban on defenses on whether to enter full-scale engineering against ballistic missiles, current arms development. Proceeding past that point control policy seeks “greatly reduced

239 240

levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced from different sets of basic assumptions about ability to deter war based upon an increas- the value and feasibility of BMD and from ing contribution of non-nuclear defenses differing assessments of the consequences of against offensive nuclear arms.”1 pursuing BMD research. Three such approaches can be distinguished and are presented below. BMD R&D Options These approaches differ primarily in emphasis and urgency, rather than in which technol- Near-term decisions by Congress will deter- ogies are to be studied. Most BMD-relevant mine our approach to BMD research. These technologies would be investigated, at some near-term decisions will not completely deter- level, in all three. mine our longer term policy approach, in part The first approach is the SDI as proposed because many factors influencing long-term policy are not under our direct control (e.g., by the Reagan Administration. The second Soviet activities and U.S. progress in technol- approach would proceed to BMD deployment ogy development). However, decisions made faster than the SD I would be able to, and the in the short term can significantly affect, or third approach would conduct BMD research and development at a slower rate than the rule out, options for long-term policy. The research options discussed below correspond SDI. Each of the last two approaches is roughly to the long-run policy approaches dis- further broken down into two suboptions cussed in chapter 9, as is shown in table 10-1. which differ in the emphasis given to existing versus near-term technologies (in the second Different approaches that can be taken to- approach) or near-term versus far-term tech- wards ballistic missile defense research proceed nologies (in the third). The five research suboptions are defined as follows: IQuoted from “The U.S. Strategic Concept, ” enunciated by Paul Nitze in “The Objectives of Arms Control, ” address before the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1. SDI approach: Vigorously investigate Mar. 28, 1985. (Emphasis added.) advanced BMD technologies with the

Table 10.1 .—Correlation Between the Near-Term Research Approaches Discussed in This Chapter and the Longer- Term Policy Approaches Discussed in Chapter 9

Long-term policy approach (ch. 9) . . —. .- Near-term R&D Intermediate Non-BMD, approach (ch. 10) SDI Early deployment deployment Silo defense arms control 1. SDI ...... Compatible Must add near- - Must commit to Eventually EventualIy term deployment deployment becomes becomes incompatible incompatible 2a. Early deployment, . . Not very Compatible Compatible but (see note a below) Incompatible compatible not optimal 2b. Intermediate deployment ...... Conditionally Need to add near- Compatible (see note a below) Incompatible compatible (see term deployment note b below) 3a. Funding-limited . . . . Would delay but Incompatible Incompatible Eventually Compatible not rule out becomes incompatible 3b. Combination ...... Would delay but Incompatible Incompatible Compatible Compatible not rule out a Both early development and intermediate deployment R& D approaches might be compatible with a “silo defense” long-term policy approach, since defending hardened targets such as missile silos, a technically easier task than defending other types of target, could probably be Implemented earlier than other types of BMD. However, to the extent that the early and intermediate deployment R&D approaches are Intended to support widespread area defenses, probably including boost-phase weapons, those R&D approaches may be incompatible with the “silo defense” policy approach in which defenses would be limited to specific sites, and where the appearance b that nationwide area defenses were being implemented would be avoided. If the technologies slated for initial deployments in the "intermediate term” research approach cannot be successfully developed, or If their development triggers offensive countermeasures which render the defense largely Ineffective, pursuit of the long-term “SDI” policy approach would be greatly complicated or prevented Successful deployment of intermediate term technologies, on the other hand, could then be followed by pursuit of more capable BMD technologies and would be compatible with the goals of the Iong term SDI policy approach This path would take longer and would cost more than pursuit of the “SDI" research approach from the beginning, which would not necessarily Include deployments in the intermediate term 241

intent to decide in the early 1990s on know in a few years whether we can whether or not to enter full-scale engi- achieve that goal. The program would neering development and subsequent de- not aim towards facilitating a develop- ployment. This approach assumes that ment decision at a particular time, nor while technology now within the state would it include tests or demonstrations of the art is not good enough to be worth which would raise questions of com- deploying, the long-term potential of pliance with the ABM Treaty. advanced BMD technologies is suffi- 3b. Combination approach: Balance research ciently promising that a “technology- in advanced B-MD technologies with the limited” (i.e., not constrained by lack of development of near-term deployment funds) effort is warranted to develop options which would include “tradi- that potential. It also assumes that if tional” BMD technologies (nuclear- successfully developed, such technol- armed, radar-guided interceptors) of the ogies could make possible a national sort specifically mentioned in the ABM security regime (weapon systems and Treaty. This program, conducted at a arms control) preferable to the current funding level well below that requested one and to other alternatives. for the SDI, would aim to deter Soviet 2a. Early deployment approach: Emphasize abandonment of the ABM Treaty, to early and incremental deployment of hedge against future Soviet BMD devel- currently available BMD technology. opments, to prevent technological sur- This approach places high strategic prise, and to investigate the long-term value on the modest levels of defensive potential of advanced BMD technol- capability which can probably be ob- ogies. Like the funding-limited approach, tained with existing technology. Al- it would not include demonstrations or though the ABM Treaty permits the development work which would raise United States to defend some ICBMs questions of compliance with the ABM with a single, highly constrained defen- Treaty. sive deployment, most early deployment These research options will be described and proposals go well beyond these con- discussed in detail later in this chapter. straints and could not be pursued under the existing treaty regime. Hedges Against Near-Term Soviet 2b. Intermediate deployment approach: Em- ABM Treaty Breakout phasize research on BMD technologies which are beyond the present state of One of the functions of a U.S. BMD research the art, but which, unlike many SDI program is to deter or respond to a near-term technologies, might be applicable to de- Soviet ABM Treaty “breakout” (sudden ini- ployments in the early to mid-1990s. tiation of nationwide BMD deployments) or This approach assumes that investiga- “creepout” (gradual implementation of nation- tion of longer run technologies should wide BMD capability without overt Treaty not delay deployments in the nearer abrogation). A U.S. response to either of these term. actions would most likely consist of deploy- 3a. Funding-limited approach: Investigate ment of a near-term U.S. defense, deployment advanced BMD technologies at a fund- of offensive countermeasures which would ening level well below that requested for sure that our strategic forces could penetrate the SDI and with a much reduced sense Soviet defenses, or some combination of the of urgency. Like the SDI, this approach two. would focus mainly on advanced technologies that may make a highly capa- Near-Term U.S. Defensive Deployment ble defense possible. Unlike the SDI, The SDi approach has largely discontinued however, it does not assume that we will investigation of “traditional” BMD technologies in favor of nonnuclear technologies to-be demonstrated near-term defensive tech- which would make intercepts at altitudes high nologies. enough to protect soft targets as well as hardened ones.2 Although protecting soft targets Offensive Countermeasures with nonnuclear interceptors is technically The U.S. response to Soviet breakout need much more demanding than defending only not be limited to defense. Offensive counter- hardened targets with nuclear interceptors, ad- measures intended to penetrate, counter, or vocates of the SD I approach are confident that evade Soviet defenses are at least as important the technical requirements can be attained in deterring or responding to a Soviet defensive within a few years if required. In principle, deployment as U.S. defensive options are. Offen- “traditional” BMD technologies could be re- sive countermeasure research would accom- stored to the SDI as a hedge against inability pany any of the BMD research options above. to develop other near-term defensive options. However, doing so would require reevaluating The U.S. program responsible at present for SDI's emphasis on nonnuclear technologies, developing offensive BMD countermeasures and it would also require additional funds if is the Air Force’s Advanced Strategic Missiles work on other BMD technologies were not to Systems (ASMS) Program.’ These counter- be impeded. measures include maneuvering reentry vehicles, which evade terminal BMD interceptors The early deployment and intermediate de- by flying unpredictable trajectories, and other ployment approaches would not wait for a penetration aids which would help U.S. war- Soviet breakout before deploying defenses. heads defeat Soviet defenses. According to the Different versions of these approaches would fiscal year 1982 Arms Control Impact State- stress differently the deployment of “tradi- ment on the ASMS Program, tional” BMD technologies as opposed to nonnuclear ones which have yet to be demon- Maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) and strated but are nevertheless thought by some penetration aid R&D is expected to provide to be capable of providing high-confidence de- a high-confidence, low-risk option for timely ployment options. deployment on current or future ballistic missile systems if needed to offset improved rap- The funding-limited approach would deem- idly deployable nationwide Soviet ABM phasize near-term defensive deployments, con- defenses (which would violate the ABM centrating on longer term research which Treaty). could lead to a highly capable defense. It *** stresses offensive countermeasures (see be- The present MaRV and penetration aids low), rather than near-term defensive counter- programs are a hedge against the possibility deployments, to respond to near-term Soviet of such a situation . . .4 breakout. The combination approach would be 3The U.S. capability to penetrate existing Soviet defenses was intended to deter a near-term Soviet breakout not mentioned in the White House January 1985 pamphlet on by putting more emphasis on improving our The President Strategic Defense Initiatitve. That pamphlet asserts that the Soviets will be able to deploy a nationwide ability to deploy a near-term U.S. defense, in ABM defense system within the next 10 years. Should they addition to developing offensive countermeas- decide to do so, it continues, “deterrence would collapse, and ures. This approach would pursue research and we would have no choices between surrender and suicide’” (p. 4). Although any defense deployable by the Soviets in the next development of “traditional” BMD technol- 10 years would certainly complicate U.S. targeting, the avail- ogies (within ABM Treaty constraints) to elim- able offensive countermeasures technologies make it extremely inate the technical risks of depending on yet- unlikely that we could be forced to choose between 4 ‘surrender and suicide. ” ‘Fiscal Year 1982 Arms Control Itnpact Statements, State- ments Submitted to the Congress b~’ the President Pursuant ‘Even if a defensive interceptor does not use a nuclear war- to Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, head, a nuclear explosion can result if the attacking warhead printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and is salvage-fused to detonate when intercepted. Therefore, non- Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives and Senate nuclear interceptors (as well as nuclear ones) must intercept at respectively, Joint Committee Print, 72-434 (), LJ .S. Govern- high altitude if soft targets are to be defended. ment Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 1981, p. 28. 243 ——

Such offensive countermeasures, of course, ABM Treaty was signed. Each has acquired would no longer be required were the United considerable experience with “traditional” States to agree to eliminate its offensive ar- BMD technologies, such as the nuclear-armed, senal. However, defenses good enough to per- radar-guided interceptors of the sort specifi- mit eliminating offensive nuclear forces are cally mentioned in the ABM Treaty. However, not envisioned for the foreseeable future, even although the state of Soviet “traditional” BMD by proponents of strategic defense.5 technology probably does not exceed our own, the Soviets are almost certainly better posi- In addition to providing the United States tioned in the near-term to deploy a limited- with options to respond to Soviet defenses, in- capability ballistic missile defense system than vestigation of potential offensive counter- we are. measures to BMD systems must also be an integral portion of our own defensive research. The Soviets have deployed and maintained Defensive technologies which can be shown to an ABM system around Moscow utilizing be easily countered will not be as promising “traditional” BMD technologies. They have as those for which countermeasures cannot be also extensively upgraded and modernized found so readily. that system. Ever since the United States decided that its own similar system was not Offensive countermeasure research options effective enough to justify maintaining it, the differ in their choice of which defense technol- Moscow ABM has been the world’s only oper- ogies are to be countered and in how far coun- ational ABM system. termeasure and penetration aid research should be taken into advanced development, In addition to the Moscow system permitted production, and deployment. Unlike defensive under the ABM Treaty, the Soviets have built research, there are no treaty constraints ban- a large radar in Siberia which violates the ning testing and development of offensive siting restrictions on such radars in the ABM countermeasures. 6 Treaty. Furthermore, according to the DOD publication Soviet Military Power, 1985, the Soviet BMD Research and Soviets are “developing a rapidly deployable Comparison With U.S. ABM system to protect important target areas in the U.S.S.R. That report concludes “Traditional” BMD Technologies that “the aggregate of [their] ABM and ABM- The United States and the Soviet Union related activities suggests that the U.S.S.R. have conducted research and development may be preparing an ABM defense of its activities in BMD both before and after the national territory. ’ CIA officials, however, — — have testified before Congress that they have ‘When asked by Senator Sam Nunn whether they could (‘en- not judged it likely that the Soviets would in vision our having a [defensive] system that would avoid the ne- fact move to such a deployment in the near cessity of deploying our offensive forces, ” Reagan Administra- 8 tion officials Dr. Robert Cooper (Director of the Defense term. They point out that while the Soviets Advanced Research Projects Agency), Dr. Richard DeLauer could expand their presently limited ABM (Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering), and system by the early 1990s, Dr. Fred Ikle (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) responded negatively. They held out the hope that such a condition might In contemplating such a deployment . . . someday be achieved, but said that at present there can only be an “optimistic view that that will be possible at some time [they] will have to weigh the military ad- in the future. ” vantages they would see in such defenses — “Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, against the disadvantages of such a move, United States Senate, on Department of Defense Authoriza- tion for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, ” S. Hrg. 98-724, Part 6, Strategic Defense Initiative, Mar, 8, 1984, pp. 2924-2925 “130th quotes from Sot’iet Militm~’ Pow-er, 198,5, p. 48. and 2939. ‘Testimony of National Intelligence officer I.awrcncc K, ‘However, testing offensive countermeasures which involved Gershwin before a joint session of the Subcommittee on Stra- nuclear detonations in the atmosphere or in space would vio- tegic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Ser\’- late the Limited Test Ban Treaty and possibly the Outer Space ices Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Treaty. Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985. 244 —

particularly the responses by the United vestigation, indicating that the activity has States and its Allies.9 been classified). Advanced Technologies In terms of basic technological capabilities, however, the United States remains ahead of the The Soviets are also undertaking a vigorous Soviet Union in key areas required for advanced research program in advanced BMD (laser and BMD systems, including sensors, signal proc- particle beam) technologies. ’” It has been esti- essing, optics, microelectronics, computers, mated that the total Soviet effort in directed- and software. The United States is roughly energy research is larger than that in the equivalent to the Soviets in other relevant United States. However, the quality of that areas such as directed energy and power work is difficult to determine, and its signifi- sources. According to the Under Secretary of cance is therefore highly controversial. In large Defense for Research and Engineering, the So- part, we are limited to observing what goes viet Union does not surpass the United States into their efforts (e.g., the amount of floor in any of the 20 “basic technologies that have space at various Soviet research laboratories, the greatest potential for significantly im- the observable activity at test sites) and what proving military capabilities in the next 10 to does not come out (e.g., absence or cessation 20 years.’’” of publication on topics known to be under in- ..— ‘Written testimony of Robert M. Gates and Lawrence K. “The FY 1986 Department of Defense Program for Research, Gershwin, op. cit. Development, and Acquisition, Statement by the Under Sec- ‘nSoviet Mifitary Power, 1985, U.S. Department of Defense, retary of Defense, Research and Engineering, 99th Cong., 1st pp. 43-44. S%SS,, 1985, pp. 11-3 and 11-4.

ALTERNATIVE R&D PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS The alternative R&D program options pre- The SDI is based on the “technology-lim- sented in this chapter are described in terms ited” research plan formulated by the Defen- of basic rationales and objectives, rather than sive Technologies Study Team (DTST), or in terms of which technologies would be inves- Fletcher Panel. It is therefore intended to tigated at what level. The overall effects of proceed as rapidly as possible, with further conducting BMD research depend on much progress waiting not for more money but for more than the technical content of the research previous results. Funding requests reached the program-a point which will be returned to be- DTST technology-limited profile with the fis- low in the section which describes “Political cal year 1986 request.12 Attributes” (p. 251). The SDI research program is intended to comply with all U.S. treaty obligations. How- Approach 1: The Strategic ever, tests that have been viewed as being am- Defense Initiative biguous with respect to treaty compliance are proposed.13 At any rate, if the research is suc- The goal of the SDI is to advance the state cessful, it would lead to systems for which de- of the art of BMD-relevant technologies to the velopment and testing would clearly be incon- point where an informed decision could be sistent with ABM Treaty constraints. made on whether to enter full-scale engineering development and subsequent deployment In addition to developing key BMD technol- of ballistic missile defenses. The program fo- ogies, SDI is directed by its charter to “pro- cuses on resolving those critical technological tect U.S. options for near-term deployment of issues on which a highly effective defense sys- 12 tem might rest but which at present are not Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985; p. 4. adequately understood. ‘gSee app. A. 245 limited ballistic missile defenses. "14 These op- mental deployments are required to address tions are either to be implemented or held in serious problems with existing U.S. strategic reserve as a hedge against Soviet defensive capability, and that delaying such deploy- breakout. SDI is also specifically instructed ments until more research has been done may to “place principal emphasis on technologies be dangerous. They believe that the ABM involving nonnuclear intercept and destruc- Treaty prohibiting such defenses is not in the tion concepts. ” As a result, development of best interests of the United States, and in em- “traditional” nuclear-armed, radar-guided in- barking on this approach would withdraw terceptor technologies has been almost com- from or abrogate it. Although BMD systems pletely discontinued. Research on nuclear di- effective enough to counter a responsive So- rected-energy weapons continues in order to viet threat are not available at present, early understand their potential and to hedge against deployment advocates are confident that U.S. Soviet developments in that area. technological superiority will enable it to prevail should an offensive v. defensive military SDI activities have been grouped into five technology competition ensue. program elements: Surveillance, Acquisition, Tracking, and Kill Assessment; Directed- The research and development program sup- Energy Weapons; Kinetic-Energy Weapons; porting an early deployment approach would Survivability, Lethality, and Key Technol- have two largely distinct aspects. In the first, ogies; and Systems Concepts/Battle Manage- those technologies now within the state of the ment Technology (see box). Each program is art would have to be engineered into opera- designed to advance the technology base, to tional status and deployed; in the second, more conduct demonstrations that experimentally advanced and presumably more capable con- validate the technology, and to provide direc- cepts would have to be investigated in order tion to focus the technology development on to increase defensive capability and to counter those critical issues which must be resolved responses by the Soviets. before feasibility can be determined.15 There are many forms that early deploy- SD I also attempts to encourage innovation ment of BMD technology could take, and their in the U.S. scientific community to aid in iden- cost and effectiveness depend on what tech- tifying new approaches. The Directed-Energy nologies are utilized, what targets are de- Weapons program element, for example, has fended, and the nature of the Soviet response. set aside 1.5 percent in fiscal year 1985 (1.7 Some have advocated that hardened targets percent is requested for fiscal year 1986) to be defended with “traditional” technologies support high risk, highly innovative approaches of the type developed prior to the ABM Treaty which would not otherwise be undertaken. in 1972, or with more recently proposed non- SDI is soliciting advanced technology pro- nuclear, low-altitude interceptors. Others have posals for these funds from small businesses proposed deployment of space-based chemical and the academic community. infrared lasers or kinetic-kill vehicles. Of these technologies, we have significant experience Approach 2a: Early Deployment only with the “traditional” ones, and even their performance in an environment of many Advocates of the early deployment of stra- nuclear detonations is poorly understood. tegic defense systems attach a high strategic value to the modest levels of effectiveness that The most publicized proposal for early BMD deployment is the one presented by High can be provided with presently available BMD 16 technology. They believe that early and incre- Frontier. That study recommended near- term deployment of both a terminal defense 14Caspar Weinberger, “Strategic Defense Initiative Organiza- of hardened targets and a space-based boost- tion (SDIO) Charter, ” Apr. 24, 1984. 1’Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985; “Daniel Graham, High Frontier: A IVew National Strategy p. 23. (Washington, DC: High Frontier, Inc., 1982). 246

SDI Program hacdptioma (reproduced from Report to the Congress on the strategic Defense Initiativ@ 198!$, pp. 2$20 The Shuveihnce, Acquib.itim, !Ikacking, and These concepts are candidates for boost and KiZIAssemmmt (..ATTL4) Rrogram Element in- postiboost phase intercept and for discrimina- cludes a mixture of some of the most and ieast tion functions in the other phases. In addition, mature technologies being developed by the seiected subcomponents for these concepts will SDIO. It inciudes tdlldOgy base efforts to be integrated in on-the-ground experiments de support surveillance, acquisition tracking, and signed to teat interface approaches and resolve kill assessment that provide: 1) data on the ob- technical issues arising from the integration. servable from ballistic missiles and their war- The work on nuclear-driven directed energy is heads; 2) new radar and optical sensors capa- largeiy pursued by the Department of Energy ble of obtaining detailed imagery of warheads and is designed to establish its technical feasi- and warhead deployment; and 3) on”board sig- bility. Equally important, the work ensures that nal and data processing capable of performing the U.S. understands the potential impact of necessary computations right at the sensor. The these emerghg concepts if they were to be used experiments include three general classes: boost- against it by an adversary. It should be reiter- phase surveiiiance, midcourse tracking, and ated that emphasis in the SDI program is be- terminal-phase trding and discrimination. * @v~ ~ nomuckw weapons for defense. Spacebased surveillance exptdmenta are pianned The Kinetic lih.wgy W-pas (KEW) l?ro- for the early 1990s to demonstrate survivable gram Mem4nt is a collection of reiated research means of detecting and tracking boo@ers from that wouid make use of the very high velocity VSry high aititudes m space. Other space-based of a small mass to render a baliistic missile or sensor expedme nts are to be conducted in the its warhead ineffective. The KEW program con- same time frame to explore our abiiity to track tains some of the more mature technology be- tens of thowmnds of objects during midcouree *investigated in the SDI. Efforts include int- flight. Such platforms m~y ~thnately include erceptors and hypervelocity gun systems for active sensors to aid in dwruninatiom A cen- boos@haseintercept, midcoureeintercept, ter- sor experhnent wiil determine the feasibmty Of minal intarcept, and defense of space piatforms. USi!l~ O@iCd s8MQI’s to aid in tfU@3t diSWhll- Both spsbased and ground-based kinetic kill inatiom A terminal imagfng radar ~“t vehieks (KKv) am being investigated The tech- is planned to *nstra* rapidiy avolving thrusts for the spacebased ~ iWhld8 ground-based radar capabil%iea. 2%43 into a high performance multiple kill 7!!40”Lhr@t@dl?hzeqy w (17!!ly) RF@ & (MKV), ti controilguidance, and -x gz’am E.knant is advaneingtT 0 $lt&&@-the-art pro@#on. Ground-launched interceptor studies h the technologies fw+ 1) hig&powerQd lwwr involve both am- and end~atmospheric kill. and particie beam generation; 2) optics and sen- Both ~pace- and ground-based electromagnetic sors fa correcting and Contmdting the high (EM) gtm investigations are included. Space power beam; 3) lar~ lightweight mfrrors and bawd EM gun investigations include critical lightweight magnets for focudng the beam on technologies such as high~g propulsion, high-g the target; 4) Precision acquisition, tracking, COmpact structures, longmmge high resolution and pointing to put and hold the beam on taP tracking, and multiple MKV tracking. AU ex- get; and 5) fire cmitrol to capitaiiaQ on thaw _ts * bS designed and conducted to unique fmturea of dirw%ed mar w conform to ABM Treaty constraints. such as the ability to measure ZTContm tha * ti’V41bti*@ Leth&*ty, and Key T&- energy deihnmd @ the target. The IH!BW tech- 1? akqphs @!L~ I?rOgram Element provides mbgy program includes major ~~ at crithd supporting R&T [research and technol- the Subcomponent level h tha * mU!8pt$ elm qgy~ Understanding the vulnerability of balb rently being ~ --- u tie m&Mes to the various kill mechanisms is ground-based lasers, spmdmsed partials ~al to assessing their effectiveness beams, and nucleardriven directed energy. tit -ent and remxmsivelv hardened tar- 247 — ——. -———

gets. Survivability to mission completion, par- gent choices among competing approaches to ticularly of any defense space assets, is fun- defense architectures and to develop the tech- damental if defensive options are to be viable. nologies necessary to allow eventual implemen- Economical space transportation, on-orbit logis- tation of a highly responsive, ultra reliable, sur- tics and maintenance, kilowatt/megawatt sources vivable, endurable, and cost-effective battle of power, and multi-megajoule energy storage management/command, control, and communi- and conversion are potentially key needs in an cations (C3) system. Threat analyses, mission affordable defense deployment. analyses, conceptual design of defensive ar- Lethality and target hardening efforts will chitectures and performance requirements def- provide the basic theory underlying kill mech- inition, and system evaluation for all levels of a layered defense against ballistic missiles will anism/target interactions, the resulting damage 3 and response of the target to damage, and fun- be performed. The battle management/C efforts damental limitations in hardening countermeas- will provide the tools, methods, and components ures. The survivability problem includes sub- 1) for development and eventual implementa- stantial technology development, particularly tion of the system and 2) to quantify risk and in the case of space-based components. It also cost of achieving such a system. includes identification and assessment of inno- Innovative Science and Technology (IS&T)l vative survivability hardware and tactics and encourages the innovation of the U.S. scien- evaluations of the survivability of conceptual tific community to aid SDI research in identify- designs. Space transportation, logistics, and ing new approaches. To this end, the Strategic space power efforts are designed to take advan- Defense Initiative Organization is soliciting tage of existing DoD and NASA definition ef- innovative, advanced technology proposals forts and to expand them into the definition from small businesses and the academic com- phase and satisfaction of the more demanding munity. requirements of a defense-in-depth. The Systems Concepts/Battle Management ‘Deleted material was a cross-reference to another section of the Program Element is designed to allow intelli- SDI Report to Congress not cited above. phase area defense (Global Ballistic Missile nearer term BMD should be contingent on the Defense System I) which would use rocket- successful development of longer term, ad- powered kinetic-kill vehicles. More effective vanced BMD technologies. They believe that space-based defenses (GBMD II) would be de- strategic benefits of BMD can be realized in ployed when developed. the intermediate-term even without confidence Since High Frontier provided a candidate that long-term, highly effective systems can system architecture, including cost estimates subsequently be deployed. Unlike early de- and timelines, more detailed analyses can be ployment supporters, however, backers of in- done on that system than can be performed termediate deployment do not believe that de- for other concepts. However, studies by several ployments should be started now, but rather groups have shown that High Frontier severely that those BMD technologies which could lead underestimated the cost and overestimated the to deployments in the early to mid-1990s be capability of the GBMD I system. These studies pursued. They believe that existing technol- are discussed in appendix G. ogy is inadequate, and they may also seek to leave open the possibility of discussing and negotiating defensive deployments with the Approach 2b: Intermediate Soviets before deployment starts. Deployment The technologies investigated by an inter- Intermediate deployment supporters, like mediate deployment R&D program would be those favoring early deployment, disagree similar to those studied in an early deployment with the SD I premise that a decision to deploy program. In both programs, technologies 248 slated for initial deployments would have to ports the ABM Treaty and wants to deter the be brought into operational status at the same Soviet Union from rejecting its own ABM time that more advanced technologies were in- Treaty commitment. The prominence of U.S. vestigated. BMD research would be reduced from what it would have (and has already had) under the SDI approach, and that research would take Approach 3a: Funding-Limited on a character more similar to other military A BMD research program might share the R&D programs. Field testing and major tech- SDI program’s focus on advanced defensive nology demonstrations which appeared to be technologies that in the long run may make aimed more towards developing a BMD sys- a thoroughly reliable defense possible, with- tem than towards researching technology out also sharing the SDI program’s premise would be deferred. that we can know in a very few years whether A Soviet near-term ABM Treaty breakout we have any assurance of reaching that goal. would be deterred primarily by the develop- A funding-limited approach would conduct a ment of U.S. offensive countermeasures. Uni- systematic program of laboratory research on lateral Soviet BMD deployment in the long technologies which might have potential for run would be discouraged by the prospect that leading to highly capable defenses, and it the U.S. funding-limited program could be ac- would investigate most of the topics which the celerated if the Soviets were to abandon the SDI proposes to study. This research, how- ABM Treaty regime. ever, would not proceed as rapidly as it would under the SDI; it would investigate the poten- Approach 3b: Combination tial of these technologies without preparing to decide in the near term whether to exploit that The combination approach would balance potential. serious study of advanced BMD technologies Adherents of such an approach would want with the development of high-confidence, near- to maintain the ABM Treaty in the near term. term options to deploy BMD systems based on “traditional” technologies. The advanced Should a new approach to effective national defense be successfully developed–whether technologies would be investigated to under- by breakthroughs in defensive technology stand their potential, especially if used against which made defense-dominant strategies clearly us, and to prevent technological surprise, so viable, or by implementing constraints in that no unanticipated Soviet technological developments would permit them to threaten an offensive forces so stringent that existing defensive technology could bring about de- ABM Treaty breakout in a way we could not fense dominance-the ABM Treaty would counter. In addition, study of advanced BMD have to be reexamined, and the United States technologies could advance their applications in other military (and possibly civilian) uses. would have to consider an arms control/weapons acquisition approach that integrated offen- Near-term deployment options, developed sive and defensive forces. However, advocates within ABM Treaty constraints, would help of the funding-limited approach would expect to deter a near-term Soviet defensive break- such an eventuality to occur well into the fu- out, and they could provide a response if that ture, if at all. Although they might disagree contingency occurred. Perhaps more impor- on exactly which criteria should be met before tantly, a prototype “traditional” BMD system moving defensive research into full-scale engi- would also provide a test-bed for offensive neering development, they would agree that countermeasures which we might have to de- such a decision either should not or cannot be ploy against nationwide Soviet defenses of the made as early as the SD I approach implies. sort already deployed around Moscow. In the meantime, the intent of this approach Like the funding-limited approach, the com- would be to signal that the United States sup- bination approach would be intended to 249 — strengthen rather than to threaten the exist- that it might or might not be desirable to mod- ing ABM Treaty regime in the near term; it ify the ABM Treaty and our overall strategic would therefore defer tests or technology dem- arms control approach in the future to incor- onstrations which appeared to pose questions porate defensive systems, depending on how of compliance with the ABM Treaty. In the BMD technology develops and how the U. S.- long run, advocates of both the combination Soviet strategic relationship evolves. and the funding-limited approaches believe

ALTERNATIVE R&D PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS The alternative R&D programs differ in a high confidence; much more speculative but number of individual characteristics which can potentially more powerful technologies might be grouped into three categories: also be developed, but at present there is much less confidence that those technologies will Ž Technical attributes characterize which lead to BMD options. If they do, those options technologies are to be investigated and would be longer term ones. which deployment options are to be made available. Each of the alternative R&D None of the alternative R&D approaches de- programs would produce deployment op- scribed here would abandon research on tech- tions, but those options differ widely in nologies relevant to long-range BMD con- what they would consist of, how effective cepts. However, the approaches do differ in the they would be, and how long they would relative emphasis put on near-term options as take to implement. opposed to the longer term ones. The SDI ap- ● Economic attributes include most directly proach stresses longer range options. Even the cost of a given R&D approach, but though the SDI maintains an active effort in also include an R&D program’s impact on technologies it considers near-term, SD I offi- other activities which compete with it for cials have stated that it could be counter- the same resources (financial, material productive to deploy near-term technologies and facilities, and technical talent). without also demonstrating that even more ef- ● Political attributes include the effects that fective longer term technologies are feasible a U.S. program to investigate BMD tech- and can later be deployed. 17 The experimental nologies might have on other countries’ technology demonstrations included within actions or relationships with us, and the the SD I program are not intended to be engi- constraints such a program might place neering prototypes of operational BMD com- on arms control possibilities, They also in- ponents, but they must nevertheless be rele- clude the effects that such a program vant to the mission and advanced enough to might have on ourselves. In both cases, provide a meaningful basis for determining perceptions may have a greater political their utility in BMD applications. impact than either announced intentions Although the early deployment approach or demonstrated capabilities. calls for investigation of longer term possibilities, unlike the SD I it stresses primarily the Technical Attributes development of available technologies for near- The technical outputs of a BMD research term deployment. The intermediate deploy- program will be advances in BMD-relevant ment approach similarly stresses technologies technologies which might provide options for for intermediate-term deployment. The fund- deploying ballistic missile defenses. Nearer .—. 17For exanlp]e, ~lenera] .4 braham sons testimon~r beiore the term options using technologies which are now Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces subcommittee of the Sen- fairly mature can be developed with relatively ate Committee on Armed Ser\rices, Feb. 21, 1985. 250 —

ing-limited approach would emphasize longer The SDI approach, intended to proceed at term options; the combination approach would a technology-limited pace, will be the most ex- develop near-term deployment options in addi- pensive of the research-only approaches—the tion to conducting longer range research. definition of “technology-limited’ means that additional money will. not speed up the re- Related to the choice between near- and far- search, and that therefore budgets larger than term options is the balance that should be those requested for the SDI will not neces- struck between basic research, on the one sarily yield greater results. Furthermore, the hand, and development geared towards more SDI approach calls for substantial year-to- immediate application, on the other. The year increases, since each year’s progress is appropriate balance for a given technology de- intended to make possible increasing amounts pends on the status of the research, the per- 18 of follow-up research in subsequent years. ceived promise of its applications, and the urgency of the task. The first of these depends Adding deployment to research would, of on the results of the research to date; the lat- course, cost more than research alone. How- ter two also depend in part on the overall ap- ever, limited deployments of existing technol- proach taken towards BMD research and de- ogies may be less expensive than ambitious velopment. research of more advanced technologies, so approaches which include deployment—the early Prematurely advancing a research program deployment and the intermediate deployment into the development and testing phase can approaches—would not necessarily cost more have two major disadvantages: the technol- 19 than the SDI approach. ogies under investigation can get frozen at an immature level, and the greater expenses of The funding-limited approach would prob- advanced development and testing can absorb ably cost considerably less than the SDI, al- resources which would otherwise be devoted though in principle it could be carried out at to improving the basic technologies or find- almost any level of funding short of the SDI's ing better ones. On the other hand, failing to technology-limited level. Such a program advance a program into development and test- would also be amenable to a growth rate much ing at an appropriate stage delays possible slower than that of SDI, in that much follow- application of newly developed technologies on research made possible by technical progress should it become necessary or advantageous to date would be deferred.20 The combination to do SO. approach would likewise be compatible with a wide range of funding levels; annual in- Economic Attributes creases would probably also be modest.

cost Impact on Other R&D One obvious characteristic for comparing Just as important as the total amount of R&D programs is their respective costs. BMD money which is spent on a research program research will generally yield more results with ‘8 Budget requests for the SD I in fiscal year 1986 and future higher funding until either: 1) the nation’s years are presented in app. F, along with the projected requests R&D capacity cannot efficiently absorb addi- which the SD I Organization has estimated would have been made for the previously existing 13MD programs had SD I not tional resources, or 2) research reaches a tech- been formed. nology-limited funding level. Although some l~T]le High Frontier study, advocating early BMD deploy- of the approaches discussed above will be ment, is discussed in app. G. That study contains cost esti- clearly more expensive than others, in most mates, but others believe that the estimates given for its first space-based deployment should be considerably higher. cases it is not possible to associate a given *“A hypothetical range for such a program might be $1.5 to level of expenditure with a particular approach; $2.0 billion per year, with annual increases at, or a few percent above, the inflation rate. The modest annual increases, more most of the approaches are compatible with so than the funding level for any individual year, distinguish a range of funding levels. the funding-limited approach from the SD I approach. 251 — ———— is the way in which it is spent, and in particu- trade journal notes that “there is a school in lar the things on which it is not spent. Choices industry that takes the view that even if the made at the research and development stage U.S. falls short of its defensive strategy goals, constrain the range of possible outcomes, and the research program will be the biggest stim- the opportunity costs of forgoing certain in- ulant to technology in this country since the vestments in order to make others can have Apollo program. “22 Others are of the opinion a great impact on future BMD developments that BMD research will be so specialized to as well as on other areas. Since resources such military applications that spinoffs for the ci- as R&D facilities and talent are limited, other vilian sector would be better described as military and civilian R&D will suffer to the ex- “dripoffs.”23 tent that they are unable to compete against BMD research for those scarce resources. True Political Attributes opportunity costs are difficult to measure, since what would actually have been accom- The technical and the political aspects of a plished had some given amount of money been BMD research program, although related, are invested elsewhere cannot be predicted in quite distinct. The Strategic Defense Initia- detail. tive, for example, is much more than a cata- loged set of technology development programs. “Spinoffs” in a sense are the opposite of op- Officially described as “The President Stra- portunity costs —they might be described as tegic Defense Initiative, ’24 it receives unprece- “opportunity benefits” which have applica- dented attention from the highest levels of tions in areas other than those of direct inter- government. It has been described by the Sec- est for BMD research. Spinoffs may be more retary of Defense as “the only thing that offers important in the long run than a research pro- any real hope to the world, ’25 and it is meant gram’s direct applications. However, they sel- to set the groundwork for a fundamental shift dom constitute a justification for pursuing a in national strategy. It featured prominently defined objective that cannot otherwise be in the 1984 Presidential election campaign, supported. and it has become the focus of an ideological By nature serendipitous, spinoffs are even battle fought in the public pronouncements harder to predict than opportunity costs. and private negotiations of the United States, However, some generalizations can be made. the Soviet Union, our NATO allies, and other The more broad-based and basic a research nations. Although more difficult to quantify program is, the wider its results are likely to than the technical or even the economic attrib- be applied; the further advanced its develop- utes of BMD research and development, the ment, the less its results are likely to be uti- political aspects are nonetheless important lized outside of their intended application. For and very real. example, basic laser physics has applications throughout the civilian economy as well as in many defense areas; a multi-megawatt, space- —. qualified chemical laser would have little util- Zzwilliam Gregory, “Spark for Technology, ” A t’iation 11’eek ity outside a BMD or ASAT system.21 and Space Technology, May 27, 1985, p. 11. 23 For example, Lewis Branscomb, vice-president and chief Estimates of the impact that a vigorous scientist of IBM, and Dieter von Sanden, until recently head BMD research and technology development of the communications division of Siemens, Germany’s largest electronics company, as quoted in ‘‘The Diplomatic Round’ by program might have on the civilian sector vary John Newhouse, The New Yorker, July 22, 1985, p, 49, widely. An editorial in an aerospace industry “White House pamphlet, The President Strategic Defense ]nitiatiw?, January 1985, GPO : 19850-465-450 : QL 3 (emphasis added). “Plus whatever role it might have for other purposes of war “Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger; inter~riewed on such as space-to-air (e. g., anti-aircraft) or space-to-ground at- ABC TV’s “This Week With David Brinkley” (quoted in Cass tack, as discussed in the “Non-BMD Applications” section of Peterson, *’U.S. W’on’t Abandon ‘Star Wars’, ” The }{’ashing- ch. 7. ton Post, Dec. 21, 1984). 252

Political Impact on Others Adoption of an early deployment or inter- One way in which other countries will re- mediate deployment research strategy makes spond to our research will be by anticipating the connection between research and deploy- its possible outcomes. They cannot predict, ment explicit, and either one would certainly any more than we can, how successful our re- be expected to stimulate prompt Soviet research program will be or what future Con- actions. On the other hand, the funding- limited gresses and Administrations will decide. They and combination approaches, by relaxing the must instead consider a range of possibil- sense of urgency and minimizing the extent ities—and their reactions may start long be- to which technology experiments challenged fore we have decided on or initiated BMD de- ABM Treaty restrictions, might lessen much ployment. of the political impact that would be generated by the other approaches. Our policy pronouncements, implicitly as well as explicitly stated, will also affect their Nothing in this section is intended to sug- decisions. Their actions will be based on their gest that the United States should abandon perceptions of what we might do—perceptions a course of action judged to be in its own best which depend on their analyses of American interest because other parties-either allied or political processes as well as their estimates adversarial-might misinterpret our purposes. of American technological capabilities. Deci- In determining what is in our best interest, sions to be made by both the Soviet Union and however, the reactions of others must be taken our NATO allies regarding force moderniza- fully into account. tion (conventional and nuclear), arms control strategy (see the following section), alliance re- Effect on Arms Control lations, and international affairs will depend The political impact of the U.S. BMD re- in part on their estimates of our own future search program will perhaps be most strongly decisions. felt in the area of arms control, where alternative approaches to BMD research can have Reactions can be stimulated to some extent very different implications. The most direct even when no clear link is drawn between a re- effect on arms control of conducting BMD research program and BMD deployment. How- search concerns the compatibility of that ever, the likelihood and gravity of allied and research with the ABM Treaty. Most BMD Soviet responses will generally depend on how systems or components based on advanced strongly the U.S. BMD research program ap- technologies cannot be developed, tested, or pears to lead to deployment. In this respect, 27 deployed under the ABM Treaty regime. the SDI approach presents an ambiguous set of signals. It is intended to proceed as rapidly Since the distinction between technology de- as possible26 towards the decision point on velopment and component development is whether to enter full-scale development and highly controversial, the SD1 approach raises subsequent deployment, but it is explicitly not questions concerning the compatibility of cer- committed to crossing that threshold. Regard- tain technology experiments with Treaty con- less of U.S. statements, however, the Soviets straints on development and testing.28 More- may believe that a decision to deploy BMD over, with its sense of urgency and its high has already been made provided the technol- visibility, the SD I also raises political ques- ogy development proceeds favorably; it would tions concerning the degree to which the be surprising if they have not already started to analyze their possible options for respond- “While laboratory research into any type of BMD system ing to U.S. defensive deployments. is permitted under the ABM Treaty, there are severe limitations on field testing and development of ABM systems. Only fixed, land-based systems or components can be developed or tested, and only one specified fixed, land-based system can be deployed. See app. A. “E. g., at a “technology-limited” pace. ‘These compliance issues are specifically addressed in app. A. 253

United States is committed to maintaining the can be obtained only after the Soviets come ABM Treaty regime. If the Soviets perceive to believe that effective defenses will make that this U.S. commitment has indeed dimin- offensive forces less useful. ished, the probability that they will act in compliance with the Treaty is reduced. The role of arms control under the SD I approach would be to facilitate a safe transition Although the United States is permitted a to a state of highly constrained offenses cou- very limited BMD deployment under the pled with effective defenses. However, mak- ABM Treaty, many advocates of the early de- ing BMD deployment contingent on prior ployment approach find value in going beyond agreement with the Soviets in effect gives Treaty constraints and favor abandonment of them a “veto” over U.S. BMD deployment, the Treaty. The intermediate deployment ap- which the Reagan Administration has emphat- proach, by deferring deployment for a num- ically stated will not be permitted. This results ber of years, provides some time for negotia- in an inherent paradox: U.S. BMD develop- tions between the United States and the ments will continue even if the Soviets refuse U.S.S.R. which could lead to ABM Treaty to negotiate a cooperative transition, but such modifications to permit more extensive, but a cooperative agreement is necessary if the nevertheless limited, defensive deployments. long-term SDI goals are to be attained. More- However, should such an agreement be impos- over, such an agreement would certainly have sible to reach by the time deployments could to be negotiated before deployments start if be made, intermediate deployment advocates those deployments are to be regulated in an (like early deployment supporters) would prob- orderly manner. ably favor abandoning the Treaty and proceeding with BMD deployments. The feasibility of any such transition agreement is still very much in question. In addi- On the contrary, advocates of the funding- tion to regulating offensive and defensive de- limited and the combination approaches would ployments, it might have to regulate offensive strive not to damage the Treaty regime, at and defensive development and testing as well least not until we had identified a preferable in order to restrict preparations for prohibited alternative that we had confidence could be at- deployments. Nobody has yet suggested how tained. In their view, mutual U.S. and Soviet the problems of measuring, comparing, and adherence to the ABM Treaty would be worth monitoring disparate nuclear forces, problems the restrictions that such compliance might which have plagued past arms control nego- impose on our exploitation of BMD technol- tiations, could be satisfactorily resolved in the ogies. These approaches would relax the ur- far more difficult situation in which both offen- gency of BMD research, easing the political sive and defensive forces are to be closely reg- questions; to the extent that technology dem- ulated. onstrations were deemphasized, the questions of treaty compliance would be relaxed as well. Critics of the SD I point out that the SDI, rather than having driven the Soviets back to Possible effects of the alternative BMD re- arms control negotiations, might instead merely search approaches on arms control go beyond have provided them with a face-saving excuse their impact on the ABM Treaty. These effects for reversing their previous decision to walk on other aspects of arms control are highly out—a decision they now regret. The Soviets controversial, and they may arise even before now say that reductions in their offensive the ABM Treaty issues do. forces will be impossible as long as force in- Supporters of the Sill approach say that the creases might be needed to counter a U.S. de- Strategic Defense Initiative has already suc- fense. These statements may be only propa- ceeded in bringing the Soviets back to the bar- ganda, but they may also accurately describe gaining table to discuss offensive arms, and the initial Soviet reaction to a U.S. defensive that meaningful reductions in nuclear arsenals deployment. A logical response by the Soviets 254 to a U.S. near-term defense would indeed be Under the funding-limited and combination the addition of penetration aids and other approaches, negotiations with the Soviets offensive countermeasures, the proliferation which attempted to establish the boundaries of nuclear warheads, or both. Although the of permitted versus proscribed BMD research U.S. defensive deployments that such a Soviet would be desirable for the purposes of clarify- decision would anticipate might not be initi- ing activities by both sides. If the prospect of ated for a number of years, if ever, the conse- the United States’ developing advanced tech- quences of that Soviet decision for the mili- nologies under the SDI approach sufficiently tary balance and for arms control prospects concerns the Soviets, U.S. proposals for con- would start to be felt immediately. Potential straining BMD research and technology de- early Soviet reactions therefore affect our velopment by clarifying or extending provisions choice of near-term BMD research approach, of the ABM Treaty might have considerable as well as our longer term policy decisions. bargaining leverage. Such an agreement would almost certainly have to permit laboratory re- By deploying BMD in excess of ABM search, which would be extremely difficult to Treaty limits without waiting for the estab- ban verifiably, but it might constrain more ob- lishment of a replacement arms control re- servable activities such as demonstrations of gime, most early deployment approaches im- ABM “subcomponents” and other field exper- ply abandonment not only of the ABM Treaty iments which the Department of Defense ar- but of the entire strategic arms control proc- gues are currently not prohibited by the ABM ess. Not content with the condition of strate- Treaty (see appendix A). Although it might be gic parity prerequisite to arms control, or al- difficult to construct a verifiable and equitable ternatively believing that the Soviets are not agreement of this sort, the task would appear willing to settle for such a state, supporters easier than reaching agreement on the mutual of this approach would instead attempt to at- introduction of strategic defenses. tain and maintain strategic supremacy. intermediate deployment approaches may provide time for negotiation before BMD deployments Political Impact on Ourselves start. However, should negotiations not be A multibillion dollar U.S. program to study pursued, or should they not be satisfactorily ballistic missile defense technologies will have concluded, proceeding to deployment anyway a political impact not only on other countries, could denote abandonment of the strategic but also on our own subsequent policy deci- arms control process. sions. Creating any large institution also generates constituencies which benefit from that Many supporters of the funding-limited and institution’s continued existence. This is espe- the combination approaches believe that long- cially true if the institution, like the Strategic term improvement of the political relationship Defense Initiative Organization, exists primar- between the United States and the Soviet Un- ily to spend money for a particular purpose. ion, assisted by arms control agreements, However, quantifying this “institutional mo- would be the most promising way to reduce mentum” is difficult and controversial. Com- the risk of nuclear war. They oppose the SDI plex decisions are rarely documented with approach as focusing all U.S. efforts on arms itemized breakdowns specifying how influen- control and conflict avoidance into a single, tial each input criterion was. dubious direction. By lessening the emphasis placed on BMD research, their approaches Should ballistic missile defense research be would leave open other arms control options, greatly accelerated, it would become one of our such as the ones described in chapter 9. On the largest military programs. While some point other hand, if some SD I supporters are cor- to precedents for terminating large military rect in asserting that only U.S. defenses can programs, such as the cancellation of pro- compel the Soviets to agree to force reduc- grams for the DynaSoar lifting body, the tions, then these alternative approaches to Manned Orbiting Laboratory, and the nuclear- offensive arms control will not succeed. powered airplane, others question how easily 255

Congress and the executive branch would be able to terminate a future BMD program, even if the technology advances did not meet initial expectations or requirements.29 Since the full effects of “institutional momentum” are poorly understood, it is difficult to predict precisely how much each of the alternative research programs will suffer from it. Relevant factors, however, might include total program budget and the number of people supported by it, along with less tangible items such as visibility and level of attention. The more high-level interest there is in a program, and the more money and prestige that has been committed to it, the harder it will be to make decisions which revise or reverse earlier ones without “losing face. ”30

‘gDuring a floor debate on the MX missile, Senator Dale Bum- pers (D-Ark. ) told the Senate that he had been “trying to think . . . when the last time a weapons system was defeated here. Weapons systems have gotten where they are just like Rasputin–you cannot kill one. ” (Congressional Record, Mar. 20, 1985, p. S 3269.) Photo credit: Westinghouse $oAlong these lines, one observer has noted that “the program manager who will admit that 5 years of research and more than Westinghouse EMACK electromagnetic launcher during $20 billion have been wasted on an unworkable system prob- assembly and test, February 1982. BMD research ably has yet to be born. ” conducted with experimental apparatus of this size, –William E. Burrows, “Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illu- easily contained within a building, would be very sion of Security, ” Foreign Affai>s, spring 1984, p. 855. difficult to control under an arms control agreement.

4 n.”

..- — * .;+” - +“ . I //’

Photo credit U S Air Force Photo credit: U S Department of Defense Artist’s conception of the existing U.S. High Energy U.S. Defense Department drawing of the Soviet directed- Laser System Test Facility (H ELSTF) at White Sands energy research and development site at Sary Shagan Missile Range, New Mexico. proving ground. Compliance with arms control agreements regulating research, field development, and testing using facilities of the size shown here would be more easily verified than agreements attempting to regulate activities within laboratories. 256

ISSUES Other chapters of this report have dealt pri- ment) while explicitly and publicly preparing marily with issues concerning ballistic missile to decide whether to abandon it later, when defense deployment, for which decisions are we are ready—may be the most difficult to at least several years off (unless the early attain. deployment approach is adopted). Before then, The testing of new technologies on both Congress will need to address issues concern- sides could, in a few years, undermine the con- ing the U.S. program for BMD research and fidence of each that the other was not on the technology development. verge of abandoning the Treaty. Therefore, One set of issues concerns our choice of over- maintaining the BMD limitation regime may all approach to pursuing BMD research. require new treaty provisions or other forms Another group involves specifically those of agreement to reduce technical ambiguities BMD research programs which would prepare (see discussion above on “Effect on Arms options for deployment, or which were in- Control”). tended to permit a decision as to whether de- If the Treaty regime is to be sustained, ques- ployment options were sufficiently promising tions of Soviet compliance must be resolved to enter full-scale engineering development. A final set of issues pertains to any research and (see discussion of Soviet work on “traditional” BMD technologies, p. 243). technology development program in areas relevant to ballistic missile defense. On the other hand, if we decide to revise or withdraw from the ABM Treaty to permit U.S. BMD deployments, our goals should be Issues Concerning Choice well-defined and our course of action well- Research Approach planned. There may be a serious timing problem in carrying out a research program which The ABM Treaty will not violate the ABM Treaty, but which Most BMD systems based on advanced will give us enough information to decide with technologies which would be investigated by confidence that BMD deployment can meet the alternative R&D programs discussed our criteria. If we were to allow the ABM above could not be developed, tested, or de- Treaty regime to erode prematurely, and then ployed under the ABM Treaty regime. One is- learn from our BMD research that the new sue is whether or not our program of BMD re- BMD technologies will not fulfill our require- search is compatible with the ABM Treaty. ments, we could end up with the worst of both A more fundamental issue, however, is whether worlds: no arms control to limit Soviet BMD, or not the ABM Treaty continues to be compat- no effective U.S. BMD, and, quite possibly, ible with our national interest. One’s attitude proliferated Soviet offensive forces intended towards that Treaty, or more precisely one’s to overcome an anticipated U.S. BMD. attitude towards the concepts of national secu- An important issue for Congress to consider rity which it embodies, will in large part de- is how we can carry out our BMD research pro- termine which of the BMD research approaches gram so that it does not either prematurely com- described above one would choose. promise the ABM Treaty through technical am- Our current choices are to plan for revision biguities, or stimulate the Soviets to begin of or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, to at- testing and deploying BMD at a time more tempt to make it more effective, or to attempt advantageous to them than to us. At the same to find a middle ground. That middle ground– time, charges of Soviet noncompliance with the bolstering the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty must be addressed as well. If they can- Treaty in the short run (thereby preventing not be satisfactorily resolved, the United States near-term Soviet BMD testing and deploy- would effectively have adopted stricter stand- 257 ards of compliance than those observed by the might not be evident in the early stages of de- Soviets, which would put us at a competitive dis- ployment, let alone in the research stage. The advantage. effect that our choice of BMD research approach can have on future arms control possibilities is Congress may wish to review the standards highly significant, as was discussed in the sec- and the procedures by which U.S. and Soviet tion above on “Effect on Arms Control.” activities are judged to comply with existing treaty commitments—perhaps by requiring the establishment of an independent, non- Near-Term Soviet Breakout Potential partisan commission to review Soviet activi- Each of the research approaches needs to ac- ties and to advise Congress and the President count for the possibility of a Soviet breakout on compliance issues associated with tests pro- or ‘‘creepout from the ABM Treaty. The posed by the Defense Department. major issues in deterring or responding to a Soviet defensive breakout are how important an Anti-Satellite Weapon Arms Control ability to deploy “traditional” nuclear-armed In the 1985 U.S.-Soviet arms control nego- BMD technologies would be, whether more ad- tiations in Geneva, the Soviets emphasized the vanced but still near-term technologies could be importance they attach to limiting weapons relied on, or whether offensive countermeasures deployed in or directed at space. As both this alone would suffice. The SDI approach relies report and its companion Anti-Satellite Weap- on a combination of U.S. ability to penetrate ons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control in- Soviet defenses and an ability to deploy as-yet- dicate, anti-satellite weapon technologies are untested nonnuclear defense options; it has closely related to BMD weapon technologies. largely discontinued investigation of the “tra- Therefore, those favoring uninhibited research ditional” ballistic missile defenses of the sort on ballistic missile defense would find arms con- once deployed by ourselves and now deployed trol measures limiting anti-satellite weapon test- by the Soviets. The early and intermediate ing to be highly constrictive. Indeed, to attempt deployment approaches handle the threat of to remain compliant with the ABM Treaty, Soviet breakout essentially by preempting it. some experimental technology demonstrations The funding-limited approach would empha- proposed under the SD I will be conducted as size offensive countermeasures to counter a anti-satellite tests. On the other hand, those in- near-term breakout; this approach also holds terested in strengthening the testing provisions out the option of accelerating research in ad- in the ABM Treaty would find anti-satellite vanced technologies up to a technology-limited weapons test restrictions a useful tool in further pace in response to Soviet defensive deploy- constraining BMD development. ments. In addition to offensive countermeasures and the prospect of acceleration, the Offensive Weapons Arms Control combination approach would maintain options to deploy a near-term U.S. defense in response The long-term objective of deploying de- to Soviet near-term breakout. fenses–enabling deep reductions to be made in offensive forces by lessening their utility— directly conflicts with one of the most prob- Long-Term Soviet Breakout Potential able near-term reactions to a defensive deploy- The Soviets will almost certainly continue ment—strengthening offensive forces to over- their investigations of advanced BMD tech- whelm defenses. This strengthening might nologies. All the U.S. research approaches de- take the form of adding penetration aids or scribed here require as a minimum that suffi- other countermeasures, deploying additional cient U.S. research be done to understand offensive weapons, or both. Although these Soviet capabilities. (Some approaches go well changes might turn out to be a waste of re- beyond that.) The level of U.S. research in long- sources if the defense could overcome them at term BMD technologies should depend on a de- lesser cost, the final cost-exchange balance cision as to whether understanding potential 258

Soviet developments is deemed sufficient, or when all Department of Defense programs whether the existing U.S. advantage in ad- reach their major development milestones. vanced BMD technologies can and should be ex- However, even if not peculiar to the SDI, this ploited. It should also depend on evaluating potential problem may be more acute in the the likelihood that valuable capabilities will case of SDIO because of the novelty of the be forgone by the United States if it does not technologies involved, the lack of a base of his- pursue a more active BMD research program. torical experience to serve as a benchmark, the Giving up what might be valuable options possibility that a “streamlined” program will could disadvantage the United States even if bypass some of the stages of review that most the Soviets do not develop those options Defense Department programs must pass either. through, and the unusual amount of political prestige which both proponents and oppo- Issues Concerning Preparation of nents of SDI will have staked in advance upon Deployment Options the outcome. If our research program is not to be presumed R&D/Deployment Coupling to be a prelude to deployment, there must be a There is an inherent conflict between seeking clearly perceived threshold which requires a posi- the ability to make deployment decisions in the tive decision—not merely the lack of a negative near term and seeking to keep control over one—to cross. The limitations posed by the whether and when such a deployment might be ABM Treaty provide such a threshold. made. Vigorous U.S. R&D programs could Also required, however, is a set of clear de- lead the Soviets to infer an intent to deploy, cision criteria that must be met before BMD and might possibly stimulate them to preempt development continues past the point requir- such a deployment. Therefore, proposals for ing ABM Treaty renegotiation or abrogation. vigorous R&D programs should demonstrate As the level of effort devoted to BMD research the ability to cope with a Soviet defensive increases, a momentum or constituency will breakout and associated Soviet offensive ac- be created that will press for continuing and tions in a timely way. Offensive countermeas- enlarging the research effort, and then for ures probably contribute more than defensive moving from research to demonstrations to de- actions towards our ability to deter or respond ployment. For this reason, it would be easier to to Soviet defensive breakout. establish clear decision criteria before a few more The Strategic Defense Initiative Organiza- years of BMD research growth have occurred, tion (SDIO) has the primary responsibility and before the time comes to begin the actual both for directing BMD research and technol- decision process. ogy development, and for making the case to Congress and to the public that this R&D effort deserves support. It will be the principal Cost Estimates source of information about the quality, cost, It is not possible to estimate the cost of and adequacy of the technologies which are BMD deployments in the absence of either a thought to be ready for full-scale engineering system architecture or cost estimates for can- development, but at the same time it will have didate system elements. However, reliable a large psychological and organizational stake overall cost estimates must exist before an in- in an affirmative answer to the deployment formed development decision can be made. Cost question. This may create a problem when the information, required to determine whether a time comes for the Secretary of Defense, the possible BMD deployment will be affordable, President, and Congress to decide whether is part of any realistic system design. It is not BMD deployment is appropriate. possible to optimize a system unless there is There is nothing unusual about this situa- some way to measure whether a given ap- tion, which occurs to a greater or lesser extent proach is better or worse than another; the cri- 259 — terion usually utilized for this purpose is mini- In some discussions of BMD research or de- mum cost for various levels of effectiveness. ployment, it has been suggested that the United States might intentionally transfer Any research program leading up to a devel- BMD technologies to the Soviet Union to opment or deployment decision must have as a prove that the United States did not seek mil- principal priority the determination of credible itary superiority .32 Any such transfer would cost estimates for various levels of defensive ca- raise very significant issues. If BMD plans or pability. Those managing such a program must devices are transferred, potential adversaries be able to show whether any proposed defenses might be able to discover vulnerabilities, enabl- can be both affordable and cost-effective. ing them to circumvent or destroy our own BMD systems. If technological capability is trans- Relative Pace of Technology and ferred, rather than specific devices, the Ameri- Systems Studies can advantage which had enabled us to develop In an investigation of advanced ballistic that technology first would necessarily be com- missile defense intended to produce deploy- promised. Furthermore, many BMD-relevant ment options or to facilitate development de- technologies have applications in other military cisions, technology development and systems areas that we may not want to help the Soviets studies must proceed in parallel. Without develop. Approaches towards BMD which as- some understanding of technological potential, sume that we can and should maintain tech- effective systems cannot be designed. How- nological supremacy over the Soviets would ever, without some conception of how it might not be consistent with transfer of U.S. BMD be applied, technology development may not technology to them. be effective and may not even be meaningful. Such a research program needs to decide how Issues Pertaining to any to correlate technology development with sys- BMD Research Program tem studies, and needs to develop a policy regarding how far either should be allowed to Technology Experiments progress should unforeseen problems crop up in the other. Technology demonstration experiments are the most expensive and one of the most con- Technology Transfer troversial aspects of a BMD research program. Demonstrations may be useful to measure The ABM Treaty prohibits the “transfer to technical progress or to provide public evi- other states’ of ‘ABM systems or their com- dence that the technology effort in general is ponents, ” or of “technical descriptions or blue succeeding. Moreover, demonstrations are prints” worked out for their construction.31 sooner or later needed to determine whether These provisions prohibit the signatory na- some system components are feasible. On the tions from using their allies to circumvent other hand, advancing our understanding of ABM Treaty constraints. As a result, allied basic principles and technologies may be participation in a treaty-compliant research preferable to demonstrating the existing state program would have to be limited to research of the art. There is a risk that demonstrations which had not reached the “system” or ‘com- may “lock in” suboptimal levels of technology ponent” level. Allied participation would also and divert resources which would otherwise be affected by restrictions which the United go towards developing improved options. States itself might impose, as it does now, on the transfer of military technology to its al- Demonstrations of BMD technology are lies for fear that such technologies may even- particularly complicated by ABM Treaty con- tually reach the Soviet Union. straints on developing and testing ABM components or systems. Experiments that raise

‘l Article IX and Agreed Statement G, ABM Treaty. (See app. B.) “For example, see footnote 36, ch. 6. 260 — treaty compliance questions run the risk of foreign policy consequences which should be provoking a Soviet reaction that could elimi- taken into account in evaluating options. Most nate the option of deferring BMD deployment of our allies support U.S. BMD research as a until technology had advanced further. One counter to Soviet research, and some have in- possible way to assess whether this risk is quired how they can participate in this re- worth taking might be to require that before search. However, for the most part they have such demonstrations are approved, there deep reservations about the wisdom of deploy- should be developed both a plausible system ing a strategic defense. Whether the U.S. BMD architecture that would use the particular research program now, and any BMD deploy- technologies to be demonstrated and a cor- ment in the future, can be conducted so as to responding arms control approach. Congress avoid endangering the cohesion of our alliances may wish to satisfy itself beforehand that, if will be an important issue.33 the technologies are proven feasible, such an architecture and arms control regime appear Research and Development of Offensive Forces likely to meet satisfactorily whatever criteria There will be a role for U.S. strategic offen- are established for proceeding with BMD. sive nuclear forces for the foreseeable future in the absence of an agreement to forgo or Diversion of Other R&D Efforts drastically reduce them. To ensure their effec- Acceleration of BMD programs affects tiveness in the event that the Soviets deploy other military R&D by changing the empha- defenses, the United States will need to con- sis of some of those other programs to sup- tinue its development of penetration aids and port the BMD mission. Many BMD programs other countermeasures against defenses. By had originally been pursued for other applica- minimizing the potential effectiveness of So- tions, such as tactical weaponry (particle viet defenses, the existence of such counter- beams and lasers) or space surveillance (long- measures would help deter the Soviets from wave infrared detection). For example, a sys- abrogating the ABM Treaty or any subse- tem designed to provide early warning of mis- quent agreement limiting defenses. sile launch would be similar in many ways to However, prudence dictates that we should a system providing coarse pointing informa- assume any offensive countermeasure that can tion to BMD boost-phase weapons. However, be developed by the United States could also the two will not be identical. If plans to up- be available to the Soviets, and we therefore grade early warning satellites are subsumed must consider what such countermeasures within a longer range effort to develop a BMD would do if deployed against our defenses. De- tracking system, the original early warning velopment by either side of powerful offensive mission may suffer. The alternative, however, countermeasures conflicts with the long-term would probably be duplication of effort. goal of minimizing the role for offenses—a Even R&D in nominally unrelated areas can problem which is exacerbated if defensive be affected if it competes with BMD research technologies have applications in offensive for limited resources, such as highly trained roles (e.g., attacking satellites or aircraft, or personnel or specialized technical facilities, particularly attacking enemy defenses). which cannot be readily increased in the short run.

Allied Relations ssAlli~ce i9sues in Pmticulm are discussed in Paul E. G~- lis, Mark M. Lowenth-d, and Marcia S. Smith, “The Strategic Beyond its effects on the ABM Treaty, the Defense Initiative and United States Alliance Strategy, Con- U.S. BMD research program can have other gressional Research Service Report No. 85-48 F, Feb. 1, 1985. Appendixes Appendix A Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty

Introduction as stated in Article I, are to “limit anti-b~listic missile (ABM) systems, ”4 and to prevent either This appendix examines the provisions of the party from deploying “ABM systems for a defense ] 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the limitations of the territory of its country. ”5 Although the these provisions place on development, testing, treaty does allow limited ABM deployments, such and deployment of ABM systems, and the some- deployments are restricted so that they could nei- times conflicting interpretations that have been ther provide a nationwide ABM defense nor serve applied to the key elements of the treaty. In addi- as the basis for deploying one. The effect of the tion, this appendix discusses the SDI program (as ABM Treaty is to leave essentially unimpaired the presented in the fiscal year 1986 authorization re- penetration capability of either side’s ballistic mis- quest) and the issues that this program raises with sile forces. respect to ABM Treaty compliance.2 Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and Soviet ballistic Major Provisions missile defense programs are not discussed.3 This appendix concludes that if one accepts the Article III of the ABM Treaty prohibits all Defense Department’s current interpretation of ABM deployments except those which are explicit- key terms of the ABM Treaty, one may also con- ly permitted. This article, as amended,’ allows one clude that the current SDI program is treaty com- fixed, land-based ABM site in each country to be pliant. Applying a more restrictive interpretation located either at the nation’s capital or at an ICBM to key treaty terms could have the opposite result. field. No more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers can be deployed at the allowed site. Treaty Overview If the national capital is chosen as the ABM site, no more than six radar complexes—each having Purpose a radius of no more than 3 kilometers-are allowed. A site to defend ICBM fields may have 2 large The ABM Treaty is an agreement of unlimited ABM radars and 18 smaller ABM radars, These duration between the United States and the So- provisions were designed to accommodate exist- viet Union which places restrictions on the devel- ing U.S. and Soviet ABM systems. opment, testing, and deployment of ballistic mis- The United States originally elected to deploy sile defense systems. The purposes of this treaty, its ABM system at the ICBM field at Grand

‘J’rea( } Ile( w een the [Jn]ted States of .Amer]ca and the LJnion of So- Forks, North Dakota. This system is no longer viet Soclztl!st Republics on the limitation of Ant.i-Llallistic M lssile S}. s- operational, although the acquisition radar is still tems, whl{h tnterecl into forct’ Oct. 3, 1972 App. B contains the full texts of tht ‘1 reaty, it> agreed Interpret at,ions, and its 1976 Protocol. used for early warning purposes. The Soviets ‘The Reagan Administration’s ~icv on compliance of the S1)1 pro- elected to deploy their ABM system around Mos- gram with the ABhI Treaty IS described in detail on pp. B-1 to R-9 of cow. This system is operational and is being mod- Report to (/](> (’ongrts~ {)n the Strategic I)efc~nse lnitiati~e. 198,5, issued b} [ hr I )epart n>t~nt of I)efense in April 198,5 ernized within the limits of the treaty. other ~iews on thi< Iwue are discussed in. Article IV permits testing, at designated test ● Ahram Cha}e~, Antonla C’hayes, and I+; liot Spitter, “Space \$’eap- sites, of certain systems not deployable under Ar- ons and 1 ntvrnat ional 1,aw, l)aedalus, summer 1985. ● Thomas K lmng~treth. John E Pike, and .John B Rhinelander, ‘I’he ticle III. However, systems permitted at test sites, impact of [ ‘.S and S’()}iet Balllstic Missile Ikfense Programs on as well as deployments, are severely constrained th( .4B.$f Treatj I \f’a+hin@,on, 1){’: National (’ampaign to Sa\re the A13\l ‘1 rpaty, h! zirch 1985) by Article V, in which “each party undertakes not w A Ian B Sherr, I,rgal ls,sues of the ‘‘S’t~r It’ars ‘“ Defense l+ogram to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or com- (Host on, !lI,l” l,aw’1’er’s Alhance for Nuclear Arms Control, Inc , ponents which are sea-based, air-based, space- ,Jum 19N41 ● f{. ,Jeffrc\ Smith, “ ‘Star \f’ars’ Tests and the AR\l ‘1’reatv, ” Science, .~ul~ 5, 1985, pp. 29-31 ‘[ bid., Article I (1). ‘F’or two diiferent wews on these subjects, see: Sotiet Jfilitzq Power, ‘Ibid., Article 1 (2), 19A:3, (; s I)(,partment of I )efense (W ashingtnn, I) C’: U.S. Go\wmmcnt ‘originally., the treaty had allowed each side one A B M site to defend Printin~ offlct. April 19H5): an[i Imngstrefh, et al., op. cit. So\iet F3hf I) its capital and another site to defend one ICB M field The treaty was rese,wch is ul

263 264 based, or mobile land-based. ” Only fixed, land- Definitions based systems can be developed or tested, and Ballistic missile defense involves a complicated only the fixed, land-based systems specified in Ar- and rapidly evolving set of technologies. Recog- ticle III can be deployed. The second part of Arti- nizing this, the drafters of the ABM Treaty tried cle V prohibits launchers capable of firing more than one interceptor as well as launchers capable to use language that was precise enough to effectively limit then-existing ABM systems, yet flex- of being rapidly reloaded. Agreed Statement E, ap- ible enough to constrain technologies which might proved by U.S. and U.S.S.R. delegation heads at be developed in the future. This attempt to con- the same time that the treaty was signed, makes trol potential ABM systems unavoidably intro- clear that Article V prohibits development, test- duces an element of ambiguity. The treaty lan- ing, or deployment of ABM interceptor missiles guage discussed below has been the focus of carrying more than one independently guided warhead. continued legal and technical scrutiny since the ABM Treaty was drafted; however, recent inter- Giving non-ABM systems ABM capabilities is prohibited in Article VI(a), as is the testing of non- est in advanced ABM systems has caused these 7 discussions to take on increased significance. The ABM systems “in an ABM mode.” Part (b) of Ar- relationship between these terms and the current ticle VI restricts ABM battle management radars SDI research program is discussed in the follow- by requiring early warning radars to be on the ing section. periphery of the country and oriented outward. The drafters of the ABM Treaty recognized that Agreed Statement F excludes radars used “for the ambiguities would arise, particularly with regard purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for to new technologies (the so-called “other physical use as national technical means of verification” principles” mentioned in Agreed Statement D), from the location and orientation restrictions in but they assumed that such ambiguities would be Article VI(b). dealt with in the context of the SCC or through Article XII prohibits interference with verifica- treaty amendment. The reason for this assumption tion of the treaty, both by banning interference is a practical one. Treaty language is the expres- with the national technical means used for verifi- sion of the agreed expectations of the parties. Put cation and by prohibiting “deliberate concealment simply, a treaty means what the parties have measures” which would impede verification by na- agreed that it means. Unilateral determinations of tional technical means. compliance-although essential to the domestic Article X1X1 establishes the Standing Consul- political debate–do not bind other parties. To the tative Commission (SCC) to handle questions re- extent that such determinations are inconsistent lating to treaty compliance, to consider possible with the expectations of other parties to a treaty, amendments, and to consider proposals for further then the basis of the treaty is eroded. This issue limiting strategic arms. Agreed Statement D reaffirms the parties’ in- of compliance is, of course, separate from broader considerations such as the U.S. determination of tentions not to deploy ABM systems or compo- the present and future value of the ABM Treaty. nents except those specifically allowed in Article 111. The Statement notes that ABM components “ABM Systems” based on “other physical principles” and capable of substituting for interceptors, launchers, or Article II of the ABM Treaty defines an anti- radars would be “subject to discussion” in the ballistic missile system as “a system to counter Standing Consultative Commission. “Specific limit- strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in ations” on such new systems and their compo- flight trajectory. ” This definition is followed by nents would require amendment of the treaty. In the words “currently consisting of” and then a list the absence of amendment, Article III of the of three items: ABM interceptor missiles, ABM Treaty would prohibit the deployment of such new launchers, and ABM radars. However, the treaty components. Article V would prohibit their devel- is not restricted to these specific systems. This opment, test or deployment if they were to be subject is discussed in greater detail below. space-, air-, sea-, or mobile land-based. The ABM system definition is limited to strategic weapons. Systems to counter tactical missiles are not covered at all. It is important to note ‘Although the treaty does not define “non-ABM systems, ” these could include air defense systems, anti-tactical ballistic missile systems, that the treaty defines an ABM as a system to strategic offensive missiles, or anti-satellite weapons. counter strategic weapons. It does not say “sys- 265 tern designed to counter, ” as the Soviets would interceptor missile”; a missile was “tested in an have liked, nor does it read “system capable of ABM mode” if it was “. . . flight tested against countering, which was the United States’ pre- a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with ferred wording. The United States was concerned characteristics Of a strategic ballistic missile flight that, by upgrading surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), trajectory . . . ’; and a radar was tested “in an the U.S.S.R. would be able to deploy a consider- ABM mode” if it “makes measurements on a co- able ABM capability. The Soviet Union, on the operative target vehicle [with a strategic ballistic other hand, was concerned that it would be forced missile flight trajectory] . . . or makes measure- to classify some 10,000 SAMs as ABM intercep- ments in conjunction with the test of an ABM in- tors.’ The current treaty language is, therefore, a terceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test compromise between the Soviet and U.S. posi- range. tions. The treaty lists the components of a then- In 1978, the United States and the Soviet Un- existing ABM system but is silent on the question ion reached an agreement in the SCC regarding the of how to characterize future technologies as ABM interpretation of the phrase “in an ABM mode’ ’;ll systems or components. Neither the U.S. “capa- however, the text of the 1978 Agreed Statement bilities” test nor the Soviet “intentions” test is remains classified. sanctioned by Article II of the Treaty.9 Some of the problems caused by the lack of a “Development” clear definition in Article II are solved by the pro- Because the path between research and deploy- hibition in Article VI against giving non-ABM systems ABM capabilities. As a result, all systems ment of any sophisticated weapon system is long which are ABM-capable, whether or not they were and complicated, considerable effort has gone into determining precisely what is meant by the designed for that purpose, are either considered treaty s ban on specific types of ABM develop- ABM systems under Article 11 or else are in vio- ment. Perhaps the clearest definition of the words lation of Article Vi(a), which prohibits giving ABM capability to non-ABM systems. “development” and “develop,” as referred to in Articles IV and V of the ABM Treaty, was provided by Gerard C. Smith, the chief U.S. negotia- Testing “in an ABM Mode” tor of the ABM Treaty. In testimony before the Although Article VI prohibits the testing of non- Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972, Am- ABM components “in an ABM mode, ” the ABM bassador Smith stated: treaty does not define these terms. The United The obligation not to develop [ABM] systems, States, in a unilateral statement attached to the devices or warheads would be applicable only to treaty, provided its interpretation of this phrase.10 that stage of development which follows labora- By the U.S. definition, a launcher was tested “in tory development and testing. The prohibitions on an ABM mode” if it was “used to launch an ABM development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process — where field testing is initiated on either a proto- ‘U.S. Congress, office of Technology Assessment, Arms Control in type or breadboard model. It was understood by Space: W’orkshop Proceedings (h”ashington, DC: U.S. Government both sides that the prohibition on ‘development’ Printing Office. May 1984), OT.A-BP-ISC-28, p. 33. Whe compromise language of the treaty does not resolve this still cur- applies to activities involved after a component rent and controt”ersial issue. The Report to Congress on the Strategic moves from the laboratory development and test- I)efense lnitiati~,e, 1985, op. cit., states on p. B-2 that “Compliance [with ing stage to the field testing stage, wherever per- the .AB\l ‘1’rcat~j must be based on objective assessments of capabili- formed. The fact that early stages of the develop- tiefi which support a single standard for both sides and not on subjec- tive judgments as to intent which could lead to a double standard of ment process, such as laboratory testing, would compliance. ” (Emphasis added. ) pose problems for verification by National Tech- ‘“(h Apr. 7, 1972, the LJ. S. Delegation made the following statement: nical Means is an important consideration in reach- ‘1’~, clarlfy our mterpretatlon of “tested m an ABM mode, ” we note that wc w (Iulci consldcr a launcher, mlsqlle or radar to he ‘tested m an ABI$l ing this definition. Exchanges with the Soviet mode If, for example, an~, of the followlng events occur ( I ) a launcher is Delegation made clear that this definition is also used to Iaunrh an AH hl ]nterreptor rrussdc, (21 an mterrx=ptor missile 1s the Soviet interpretation of the term ‘develop- fhght test~d a~amst a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with char- acttrlitlc+ of u str~tegrr balhqt)c mlssde fhght trajectory, or is fhght tested ment’.12 In con~unctlon w)th the te~t of an A B hl interceptor m]ssde or an ABM ra. dar at the >ame test range, or ]~ fhght tested to an altitude mcons]s~wtt with mterceptlnn of targets aga]nst which ar defenws are deployed, [,1) —. ——— a radar makes measurvrnents on a cooperatl~ e target > ehlcle of the kmd referred to ]n Iten) 12) aho~ e during the reentry port)on of Its trajector) ‘‘U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, SALT II Treaty: Back- or mak(. s n)eawr(, ment~ ]n conjunction with the test of an ,.\BNl intercep. ground Documents; “Miscellaneous Agreements Relating to the Stand- tor m]s~de or o A Blwf radar at the same test range Radars used for pur- ing Consultative Commission” forwarded from J, Brian Atwood, De- poses

ABM “Component” [the DOD] . . . interpretation of the difference between a “component” and an “adjunct,” all of The limitations of the ABM Treaty apply to these radars would be considered to be adjuncts “ABM systems or their components” and, under to one another, and none of them would be con- the terms of Agreed Statement D, to future sys- sidered to be a component.15 tems and components which might be substituted The debate on this issue reflects disagreement for these. This raises two related questions. First, as to whether the classification of something as how does one distinguish between an ABM com- an ABM system or component should be based ponent, the testing or deployment of which is pro- solely on its capabilities in isolation, or whether hibited, and a subcomponent or adjunct, the test- other factors should be examined, such as its ca- ing or deployment of which is allowed? Second, pability when combined with other devices or the how does one determine whether a system, com- apparent intentions of the parties (whether ponent, or subcomponent is capable of substitut- declared or evidenced by a clear pattern of activi- ing for a missile, a launcher, or a radar? The treaty ties). DOD is arguing that one looks to the capa- language and the Agreed Statements which ac- bilities of the tested systems alone to determine company the Treaty are silent on this point. whether they can substitute for ABM systems or It is the Defense Department position that the components; if they can, then they are banned by entire SDI research program as submitted in the the Treaty, if they cannot, then they are allowed. fiscal year 1986 authorization request is treaty Others maintain that this view is too restrictive. compliant. In its 1985 Report to Congress on the They argue that although capabilities are impor- Strategic Defense Initiative, DOD acknowledges tant, one must also examine the apparent intended that Ambassador Smith’s definition of “develop- application of a technology. Standing alone, indi- merit, ” combined with the limitations of Article vidual technologies may have no ABM capability; V, would prohibit the “field testing” of “ABM sys- however, in combination, they may have a signifi- tems” and “components,” or their “prototypes” cant ABM potential. and “breadboard models, ” which are other than In addition, the tested capabilities of specific fixed land-based. ” However, the Defense Depart- systems may not always be an adequate measure ment maintains that the experiments currently of potential. Lack of ABM capability may result planned for the SDI program “are designed to from true technological limitations, or from demonstrate technical feasibility that can be “treaty compliant” design features that could be established without involving ABM systems or easily altered (e.g., putting on wheels, inserting a components or devices with their capabilities. ’14 few additional electronic devices, or readjusting DOD is arguing that since they are testing sub- some control parameters). The distinction between components and not components, and since the these two cases must ultimately be made by the specific systems they are testing cannot be sub- other side with the help of its national technical stituted for an ABM missile, launcher, or radar, means of verification. It is unlikely that either side then this research is allowed under Ambassador will be content to rely on the word of the other that Smith’s interpretation of the Treaty. a given experiment is treaty compliant; presence Others disagree with DOD’s interpretation. or absence of ABM capability must be manifested They argue that this line of reasoning ignores the in ways which are amenable to verification. Ac- history of the treaty negotiations which clearly cording to the report of the National Campaign to suggests that the individual parts of an ABM sys- Save the ABM Treaty: tem need not perform the complete range of bat- The clear intention of Article V was to limit the tle functions to be considered an “ABM compo- development of new types of ABM technology at nent, ” A report by the National Campaign to Save the earliest possible stage, that is, at the time that they would become detectable by national techni- the ABM Treaty recently made the following ar- 16 gument: cal means. [The] early Nike-Zeus [U.S. ABM] system had not one or two, hut four separate types of radars, for target acquisition, decoy discrimination, target tracking and interceptor tracking. Under . . .

13Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiatit’e, 1985, op. cit., p. B-4. 1l.ongstreth, et al., op. cit , p. 29. “Ibid., p. B-2, “’Ibid,, p. 30. 267

U.S. Research Programs DOD is correct in arguing that the currently proposed BSTS system would be limited to an early and the ABM Treaty warning role. However, the issue of BSTS Treaty The SDI Program compliance stems not only from the system’s capabilities, but also from the changing nature of The purpose of this section is to examine spe- early warning systems. When the ABM Treaty cific elements of the current U.S. BMD research was drafted, early warning satellites were not con- programs and to determine whether they raise im- sidered to be ABM components, or part of an portant questions of ABM Treaty compliance. ABM system, because the satellites had limited However, there is no simple formula for deciding capabilities and BMD weapon systems had not yet what is and what is not banned by the 1972 ABM been conceived which could use the boost-phase Treaty. Previous sections have examined the lan- data these satellites produced.18 BSTS, like its guage of the treaty and described the controversy predecessors, is an early warning system; however, surrounding such terms as “ABM system, “com- unlike its predecessors, BSTS might eventually ponent, ” and “capable of substituting for. ” As this contribute to the effectiveness of a layered ABM discussion makes clear, the inherent limitations of system. Assuming the existence of BMD weapons language and the rapid pace of technology make which could use BSTS data to provide acquisition it impossible to develop clear, unambiguous, and and tracking information, BSTS would have to be objective standards by which to measure all pos- given closer scrutiny than it would if it could only sible research programs. As noted earIier, the gen- serve as an advanced early warning system. eral conclusion of this appendix is that if one Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS).– accepts the Defense Department’s current inter- Originally designed as an upgrade to the ground- pretation of key treaty terms, one may also rea- based Spacetrack satellite tracking network, SSTS sonably accept the conclusion that the current SD I will demonstrate the space-based technology nec- program is treaty compliant. Applying a different essary to track and identify objects already in interpretation to these key terms could have the space. 19 SSTS technology, if perfected, could be opposite result. used to support the U.S. ASAT weapon or to pro- With these caveats in mind, it is useful to ex- vide information for midcourse ABM interceptors. amine the actual elements of the SD I program. DOD maintains that the SSTS program is ABM Current SD I program plans call for 15 major ex- Treaty compliant because the “capabilities of any periments designed to demonstrate technologies demonstration satellites will be significantly less which may eventually have ABM applications. than those necessary to achieve ABM performance Three of the experiments will examine sensor tech- levels or substitute for an ABM component."20 nologies, four will involve directed-energy technol- If developed as originally conceived—i.e., as a ogies, three will study kinetic-energy technologies, component of our satellite tracking network— and five will involve the testing of fixed, ground- SSTS would probably not have raised serious based ABM components. ABM compliance issues even though such a sys- Sensor Programs: tem could have supplied information useful to Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS).– BMD research. However, now that SSTS is part BSTS is a space-based experiment to demonstrate of the SDI program, DOD’s assessment that it is technology for upgrading the current satellite not an ABM component will probably need to be early warning system. If successful, the experi- periodically reexamined as more specific informa- ments will permit a decision to proceed with simi- tion on testing procedures and system capabilities lar but more advanced technologies for ABM pur- becomes available. poses. BSTS will be capable of performing early Airborne Optical Adjunct (AOA).–The AOA ex- warning functions; however, DOD asserts that it periment will demonstrate the technical feasibil- “will be limited in capability so that it cannot sub- ity of using optical sensors on an airborne platform stitute for an ABM component. In particular, it for BMD applications. As part of its feasibility will not be given the capability to process launch demonstration, AOA will observe ballistic missile detection data in real time. For this reason, DOD claims that this system does not violate Article IRJ?arly warning radars, on the other hand, being similar in capabil- V(1) of the ABM Treaty which bans the develop- ity to .AB M battle management radars, are specifically limited by the ment, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM Treaty. components. 17 1 ~SS,lIS t ~ack5 and ident ifie5 objects in space; BSTS identifies launches and objects entering space. ( “Report to Con~res~ on the .Strategic Ikfensf’ Initiative. 1 %5, op ‘ ’ Jieport to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985, op. cit., p. B-6. cit., p. B-7. 268 tests at agreed ABM Test Ranges. DOD main- nent. These devices will also not be capable of tains that because of limitations on sensor and achieving ABM performance levels. ” platform performance, the AOA could not substi- As long as the ATP tests remain in the labora- tute for an ABM component and therefore does tory there would be no violation of the ABM not violate the ban in Article V(1) against devel- Treaty. The proposed space-based tests would vio- oping air-borne ABM components. late Article V(1)’s prohibition against testing Clearly, if AOA were designated as a “compo- space-based ABM components if they were consid- nent” rather than as an “adjunct,” the planned ered as “components” or as being able to substitute tests “in an ABM mode” would violate Article V(1) for ABM components. Administration officials of the ABM Treaty. Here, as in other SDI pro- have argued that these are generic experiments in- grams, the distinction between an adjunct or sub- vestigating pointing and tracking technologies component and an ABM component depends less which would have many applications and could not on objective determinations of capability than on substitute for ABM components. how one defines those terms. Integration of High-Powered Laser and Optical Directed-Energy Programs: Devices.–The Defense Department eventually ALPHA/LODE/LAMP. –ALPHA is a ground- plans to integrate ALPHA/LODE/LAMP, ATP, based laser designed to explore the potential of and perhaps other laser and optical subsystems chemical lasers in space-based BMD applications. into one “experimental device. ” This “experi- LODE (Large Optics Demonstration Experiment) mental device” will be used for “ground-based test- and LAMP (LODE Advanced Mirror Program) are ing against ground-based static targets. ” DOD experiments to demonstrate critical beam control claims that these “important subsystems . . . (sep- and optics. In the late 1980s, the LODE/LAMP arate or in whole) are not ABM components or pro- mirror is to be integrated with a high-power chem- totypes. ” This position rests on three arguments: ical laser using LODE beam control technology. 1) this “experimental device” is not capable of be- DOD reports that “All of these tests are under- ing based in space; 2) the power, optics, and laser roof experiments using devices incapable of wavelength are not compatible with atmospheric achieving ABM performance levels.” 21 propagation at ranges useful for ABM applica- The ALPHA/LODE/LAMP series of tests, if tions; and 3) tests are not planned against missiles conducted in the laboratory, would seem to be con- or their elements in flight. sistent with the generally accepted view that the This argument rests on the assumption that the ABM Treaty’s prohibitions on development only “experimental device” in question here, although apply “to that stage of development which follows more than a subsystem or adjunct, is still less than laboratory development and testing. ” a component or prototype. The ultimate credibil- Acquisition, Tracking and Pointing (ATP).–For ity of this assumption probably cannot be assessed the near term, ATP22 experiments will concentrate until more precise information becomes available on ground-based, laboratory-level experiments on on the nature of the “experimental device” and its the technology required for space- and ground- tests. based weapon sensors. In the future, “the meas- Ground-Based Laser Uplink. -These experi- urement of booster plumes from space is a distinct ments will use a ground-based laser to examine the possibility, “23 as are “experiments with passive effects of the atmosphere on beam propagation. sensors in the Shuttle bay. ”24 The Shuttle may also DOD maintains that the tests are treaty compli- be used in follow-on experiments “to explore point- ant because “the testing mode and capabilities are ing and tracking technology. “26 It is DOD’s posi- below the power level and beam quality required tion that “If conducted these experiments will use for a ground-based laser ABM weapon, and test- technologies which are only part of the set of tech- ing will not include strategic ballistic missiles or 26 nologies ultimately required for an ABM compo- their elements in flight. ” ’ The testing of ground-based lasers at agreed ——— ranges would not violate the terms of the ABM 2fIbid. IiThe ATp Prowam is a replacement for the now-canceled TA~~N Treaty. The testing of mirrors in space to redirect GOLD tracking telescope. Originally. TAI.ON GOLD was to have flown the beam of a ground-based laser would raise com- on the Shuttle to test the technology necessary to ensure that a laser pliance questions. was properly aimed at its target. 1sRePort t. Coneess on the Strategjc Defense Initiative, 19$5, oP. cit., p. B-6. “Ibid., p. B-i’. — *b Ibid. ‘“-Ibid. 269 —-——.—.————

Kinetic-Energy Programs: the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor Space-Based Kinetic-Kill Vehicles.–This pro- (HEDI) and the Exoatmospheric Reentry-Vehicle gram will be designed to prove the feasibility of Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS), will demonstrate rocket-propelled projectile launch and guidance. If the capability to intercept strategic ballistic mis- successful, this technology might be used as an sile warheads within and above the atmosphere. anti-satellite weapon or to defend against such Since such tests will be at agreed test ranges, weapons. In a more advanced form, space-based using fixed, ground-based launchers which cannot kinetic-kill vehicles might have applications as be rapidly reloaded, and since each interceptor mis- ABM interceptors. To attempt to ensure that this sile is not intended to deliver more than one inde- program does not violate the ABM Treaty, DOD pendently targetable warhead, these two pro- intends to limit the performance of the demonstra- grams are permitted by the ABM Treaty. tion hardware to satellite defense missions. Test- Terminal Imaging Radar (TIR). –TIR is a radar ing may include “intercepts of certain orbital tar- that will be tested “in an ABM mode. ” This ra- gets simulating anti-satellite weapons. ” dar will be used to discriminate between reentry The ABM Treaty does not ban anti-satellite vehicles and transfer this information to intercep- weapons or weapons used for satellite defense, un- tor missiles. DOD has announced that since the less those weapons are tested “in an ABM mode, ” TIR tests will be conducted at a designated ABM or could substitute for ABM systems or compo- test range from a fixed, land-based platform, they nents. However, it should be noted that the trajec- are treaty compliant. tory of a ballistic missile in flight-although not If TIR were mobile, testing it “in an ABM orbital-resembles in many ways that of a satel- mode” would violate Article V(1) of the Treaty. As lite. Anti-satellite weapons and other “gray area” this and similar technologies are developed, it will systems will be discussed in a later section. be necessary to distinguish between those systems Land-Based Electromagnetic Railgun. -This which are incapable of operation except when fixed program will demonstrate the capability to launch and land-based and those which are designed to unguided and guided projectiles from an electro- be fixed and land-based but could operate in a mo- magnetic accelerator know as a “railgun.” DOD bile mode with little or no redesign. claims that test devices will not be ABM compo- Long Wavelength Infrared (LWIR) Probe. –The nents, will not be tested “in an ABM mode, ” and LWIR probe appears to be designed to provide a will not have ABM capabilities. data base with which to evaluate optical system Testing a railgun in the laboratory or in a fixed, sensors, It is conceivable that this technology ground-based mode at an ABM test range would might also eventually substitute for current ABM not violate the terms of the ABM Treaty. radars. Even if operated as a “pop-up radar, ” sys- Space-Based Electromagnetic Railgun. -This tems based on the LWIR probe would not seem program would investigate the feasibility of space- to violate Article V(1)’s prohibition against sea-, based railgun operation. DOD claims that the pro- air-, space-, and mobile land-based ABM systems gram would “demonstrate a capability to defend and components. In any case, since DOD plans to against anti-satellite interceptors and will also per- conduct the LWIR tests from fixed, land-based mit a decision to be made on the applicability of launchers at agreed test ranges, this program does more advanced technology for ABM purposes. ” not seem to raise treaty compliance issues.27 However, ‘‘specific performance parameters . . . Integrated Demonstration. -DOD will eventu- will be established to satisfy Treaty compliant ally wish to test the HEDI and ERIS interceptors guidelines. ” with the Terminal Imaging Radar and associated As with space-based kinetic-kill vehicles, space- command, control, and communication systems to based railguns might be tested as ASAT weapons perform terminal defense engagements. If con- or satellite defense weapons without violating the ducted at agreed test ranges with fixed, ground- ABM Treaty. However, as discussed below, the based launchers and radars, and assuming no rap- distinctions between ASAT and BMD technol- idly reloadable launchers or multiple independ- ogies and applications become less clear as the sys- ently guided warheads, then such tests would be tems become more capable, allowed under the treaty, ABM Systems or Components: Fixed, Ground-Based ABM Launchers.–SDI also plans to conduct tests of “ABM components” “Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiatiire, 1985, op. at designated ABM test ranges. Two such tests, cit., p. B-$). 270

Other “Gray Area” Programs Agreed Statement F in the ABM Treaty ex- empts space-track radars, and radars used for na- In addition to the questions raised by current tional technical means of verification, from the sit- and proposed BMD programs, research into anti- ing restrictions on ABM and ear!y-warning radars. satellite weapons, anti-tactical ballistic missiles, ASAT development will certainly stimulate devel- and large phased-array radars also pose ABM opment and deployment of space monitoring ra- Treaty questions. In certain cases, parts of these dars and sensors. To the extent that the distinc- technologies could also function as components or tion between an early warning radar and a space adjuncts to BMD systems; in other cases, research track radar is ambiguous, confusion can result essential for non-ABM systems will supply infor- which raises additional ABM Treaty compliance mation critical to BMD research. questions. Anti-Satellite Weapons.–There is great overlap Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles.–Since the between BMD and ASAT technologies. In general, ABM Treaty prohibits defenses only against strat- even a poor anti-ballistic missile could be an ex- egic missiles, anti-tactical ballistic missiles cellent ASAT. The trajectory of a missile reentry (ATBM) systems are not prohibited. Anti-tactical vehicle while outside the atmosphere—peak alti- ballistic missiles were not included in the ABM tude on the order of 1,000 km and velocity slightly Treaty because the United States wished to pro- suborbital-is similar to that of a satellite. The So- tect SAM-D, a surface-to-air missile then under de- viet GALOSH ABM system was not designed as velopment. 28 Since the treaty was signed, the an ASAT but may have ASAT capability for sat- Soviets have developed and deployed a weapon ellites in orbits similar to ICBM trajectories. The similar to the original SAM-D. U.S. miniature homing vehicle ASAT weapon Aggressive ATBM development and deploy- evolved from a design originally intended for mid- ment might affect the continuing viability of the course BMD. ABM Treaty. Missiles deployed under the rubric Conversely, since technologies investigated for of anti-tactical ballistic missiles could have an im- ASAT may also be useful in a BMD role, aggres- pact on the penetrativity of both sides’ SLBMs. sive ASAT development could aid in the develop- Eventually, ATBM systems could become so ca- ment of advanced BMD systems. Technology de- pable as to completely undercut the provisions of velopment ostensibly for advanced ASAT systems the ABM Treaty which prevent the development might provide a loophole for undertaking BMD re- and deployment of systems to defend against search which might otherwise be considered a vio- ICBMs. lation of the ABM treaty. Developing an ASAT system which had BMD SDI and the Allies capability, or upgrading one to give it BMD capability, would be a violation of either Article V Under Article IX of the ABM Treaty, the United or VI of the ABM Treaty. Nonetheless, since in- States and the Soviet Union each agree not to formation valuable to ABM research could be ob- “transfer to other States, and not to deploy out- tained from tests “in an ASAT mode” even before side its national territory, ABM systems or their an ABM capability was achieved, ASAT weapon components limited by [the ABM] Treaty. ” Agreed development could help to erode the ABM Treaty. Statement G of the Treaty declares the intention Large Phased-Array Radars. -Another relevant of the signatories that Article IX’s provisions connection between ASAT systems and the ABM should extend to “technical descriptions or blue Treaty involves the large phased-array radars re- prints specially worked out for the construction quired for ASAT space surveillance and battle of ABM systems and their components . . . “ management. Space-track radars may be hard for The Reagan Administration has stated its inten- an adversary to distinguish from the early-warn- tion to “proceed with cooperative research with ing radars and ABM battle management radars the Allies in areas of technology that could con- which are currently limited by the ABM treaty. tribute to the SDI research program. ”29 However, In addition to their space surveillance and track- the Administration has assured Congress that ing role, such radars can also provide early warning of missile and bomber attack and would be es- “SAM-D was intended to have some capability against short-range sential components of any ABM system. Such tactical ballistic missiles as well as against aircraft. However, as SAM- systems may also be used to observe missile tests D developed (changing its name to ‘Patriot’), its anti-tactical missile capabilities were not pursued. in order to assist verifying compliance with treaty “Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985, op. obligations. cit., p. A-4. 271 such research will be “consistent with existing in- ABM system or component or how to character- ternational obligations including the ABM ize advanced ATBMs). The ABM Treaty does not Treaty, “3° and that “the United States will not constrain cooperative laboratory research efforts. seek to arrange for the Allies to do for the United The Treaty would, however, prevent joint devel- States what it cannot do under the Treaty. ”31 opment, testing, production, or deployment of Attempts to define the precise nature of Arti- ABM systems or components, including those— cle IX’s prohibitions encounter many of the diffi- e.g., fixed, land-based launchers and intercep- culties already discussed (e. g., how to define an tors–which the United States, acting alone, could ‘“Ibid, legally develop, test, produce, and deploy. ~’ Ibid. Appendix B Texts of the 1972 ABM Treaty, Its Agreed Interpretations, and Its 1976 Protocol*

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972 Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972 Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972 Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972 Entered into force October 3, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament, Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article I I I of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

*Taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, 1982 edition, pp. 139-147 and 162-163.

272 273 —

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode. 2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are: (a) operational; (b) under construction; (c) undergoing testing; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or (e) mothballed.

Article Ill

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that: (a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party’s national capital, a Party may deploy: (1 ) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and (b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article Ill shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers,

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes: 274

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article Vlll

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article Xl

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; 275

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; (9) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV 1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year internals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET OF AMERICA SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

President of the United General Secretary of the Central States of America Committee of the CPSU 276

Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Uni- lateral Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles

1. Agreed Statements

The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added);

AGREED STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which maybe deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article Ill of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million. [c] The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article Ill of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty. 277

[E]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[F]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles Ill, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

2. Common Understandings

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. Location of ICBM Defenses The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:

Article Ill of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: “The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers. ” In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement [C].)

B. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:

Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that “the limitations provided for in Article Ill shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. ” We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We Interpret the reference in Article IV to “additionally agreed test 278 — —

ranges” to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges.

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to “additionally agreed” test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

C. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article V(I) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side’s interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

D. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:

The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty’s Article Xlll on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement, ’ agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels. Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

E. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:

In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents. In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972:

‘See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed Sept. 30, 1971. 279

The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would ilke to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratificatlon or approval.

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

3. Unilateral Statements

The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement.

The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievlng agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the Iimitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivabiIity of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also Indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme Interests could be Jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It IS because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the Importance the U S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete Iimitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.

B Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article I I of the Joint Text Draft uses the term “tested in an ABM mode, ” in defining ABM components, and Article VI Includes certain obligations concerning such testing We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase, First, we would note that the testing previsions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, whiIe prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for 280

non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of “tested in an ABM mode,” we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be “tested in an ABM mode” if, for example, any of the following events occur (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria.

C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-t-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement. 281

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975 Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976 /instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976 Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976 Entered into force May 24, 1976

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972, Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security, Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided in Article I I I of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article Ill of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this Protocol. 2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article Ill(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article Ill(b) of the Treaty.

Article II

1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article Ill of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord 282

with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2,1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once. 2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article Ill(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article Ill(b) of the Treaty. 3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article Vlll of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article Ill

The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3,1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. 1. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Appendix C Effects of BMD Deployment on Existing Arms Control Treaties

The arms control treaties which are most phere, or under water. Although underground nu- directly relevant to BMD deployment are the 1972 clear explosions are permitted, it is very unlikely ABM Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the that the United States or the Soviet Union would 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1974 Thresh- deploy a BMD system which relies on space-based old Test Ban Treaty, and the 1970 Non-Prolifera- directed-energy weapons powered by nuclear ex- tion Treaty. ’ The ABM Treaty is discussed exten- plosions without having tested them in space. sively in chapters 6, 9, and 10, and in appendix A. Thus it is very likely that BMD deployments of The others are discussed briefly in this appendix. that type would require withdrawal from the Lim- ited Test Ban Treaty. Outer Space Treaty Threshold Test Ban Treaty Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty’ begins: States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to The Reagan Administration has reported to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carry- Congress that directed-energy weapons driven by ing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap- nuclear explosions may require nuclear explosive ons of mass destruction, install such weapons on devices on the order of 1,000 kilotons or higher.4 celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer This would be far above the 150-kiloton limit im- space in any other manner . . . posed by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty’ on tests Article IX includes the following provision: of such devices. The Administration also stated If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to be- in 1984 that “at this time there is no indication lieve that an activity or experiment planned by it of a need to test above 150 kt. ”6 or its nationals in outer space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration Non-Proliferation Treaty and use of outer space, . . . it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before While Article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty7 proceeding with any such activity or experiment. obliges the nonnuclear-weapon parties to refrain Depending on the specific nature of a BMD sys- from acquiring nuclear weapons, Article VI obliges tem deployment which utilizes space-based com- the parties which possess nuclear weapons to” . . . ponents, there may be a conflict with one or both pursue negotiations in good faith on effective of these provisions. For example, Article IV would measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms prohibit placing in orbit a BMD satellite which race at an early date . . . “ Most of the nonnuclear- contains a directed-energy weapon that is powered weapon parties believe that these two obligations by a nuclear explosive device. constitute a balanced deal. g In recent years they have been complaining strongly in international Limited Test Ban Treaty fora that they have been keeping their side of the —— Article I of the Limited Test Ban Treaty3 pro- 4’4Fiscal Year 1985 Arms Control Impact Statements, ” issued March 1984. U.S. Senate Print 98-149, p. 253, hibits each Party from carrying out any kind of “’Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of So- nuclear explosion in outer space, in the atmos- viet socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. ” This treaty was signed by President Nixon on July ‘The texts of these treaties and histories of their negotiations appear 3, 1974. Although it has not been ratified, both Parties have announced in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, U.S. Arms Control and their intention to observe its 150-kiloton limitation pending ratification. Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1982. ‘Ibid. “‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex- “’Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ” which en- ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes- tered into force March 5, 1970. It has about 120 parties, including the tial Bodies, ” which entered into force Oct. 10, 1967. It has over 80 par- United States and U.S.S.R. ties, including the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the People’s %ee, for example, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, U.S. Congress, Con- Republic of China. gressional Research Service, Washington, DC, September 1980, pp. 459- “’Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 496; Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds. ), International Arms Con- Space, and Under Water, ” which entered into force Oct. 10, 1963 It trol: Issues and Agreements (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, has about 100 parties, including the United States and U.S.S.R, 1984), pp. 153-159 and 169-172.

283 284 treaty’s bargain, but that there has been insuffi- withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, per- cient progress toward ending the superpowers’ nu- haps because the parties agree with that argument clear arms race.9 or because they still hope for progress toward nu- From an American viewpoint, the spread of nuclear disarmament. clear weapons to many additional countries would If the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative should not only constitute a serious threat to U.S. na- lead to a U.S.-Soviet agreement to reduce offen- tional security, but would also threaten the secu- sive nuclear forces and to amend the ABM Treaty rity of all states. Hence U.S. representatives have to permit deployment of nonnuclear defenses on argued, in the U.N. and elsewhere, that mutual aban agreed schedule, the nonnuclear-weapon states stinence from acquisition of nuclear weapons is in might well consider that a step toward “cessation the self interest of states not now possessing them, of the nuclear arms race. ” On the other hand, if regardless of when or whether the superpowers either the United States or the Soviet Union succeed in their efforts to halt and reverse their should abrogate the ABM Treaty before a U. S.- nuclear arms competition. To date no party has Soviet agreement is concluded on a new strategic arms control regime, the nonnuclear-weapon states would probably perceive little hope for progress ‘For example, in October 1984 the Nigerian delegate stated to the toward nuclear arms reductions. In that case, U.N. General Assembly, “The Non-Proliferation Treaty will continue to be a cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime only if all parties as- there would be a substantially increased risk that sume their responsibilities and obligations with sincerity. As long as some parties would withdraw from the Non-Pro- the nuclear Powers continue with their vertical proliferation of nuclear liferation Treaty, and it would become much more weapons, [nuclear weapon] threshold States will consider it their right and duty to keep their options open, and non-nuclear-weapon states will difficult to persuade additional states to adhere to doubt the wisdom of continued adherence to the Treaty. ” it. Appendix D Defense Requirements for Assured Survival

Opinion varies greatly on how much damage the not a prediction of casualties that would result United States could sustain from a Soviet nuclear from an attack on the United States. Casualties attack and still survive. Opinion also differs on need not be as high as shown here, and they might what is important in determining whether the be considerably lower. We assume that the Soviets United States has survived. Some believe that attack to maximize casualties and that no civil de- what matters is how well society would survive fense measures are taken. Different Soviet attack and reconstitute itself. Others argue that the na- tactics, evacuation of cities, and preferential de- tion will have survived if it recovers its superpower fense of the most heavily populated areas might status and its economy in some specified number all contribute to reducing casualties. On the other of years. Still others argue that survival is assured hand, long-term nuclear effects spreading far be- only if the number of casualties can confidently yond the immediate blast area might increase cas- be kept below some “limited” number. However, ualties, within this group opinions differ on what that OTA does not predict either that the required number is. Some believe that the nation can sus- defense levels are achievable or that they are not tain 10 million casualties or more, while others be- achievable. lieve that if the nation suffered hundreds of thou- This appendix presents a rather rudimentary sands of civilian deaths in a short period of time calculation in order to illustrate the problem. We it would be a catastrophe without precedent, and recognize that the results can be refined substan- the nation could certainly not be said to have tially by taking advantage of detailed, sophisti- survived. 1 cated information on population distribution, aim- This appendix illustrates how the number of cas- point uncertainties, and nuclear weapon effects. ualties might be related to defense capability if the It is assumed that since the United States has Soviets were to attempt to maximize U.S. casual- extremely capable defenses, the Soviets are denied ties. Most observers would probably agree that an the capability for a meaningful attack on U.S. mil- extremely capable defense would be required to itary assets, and they hence concentrate their keep casualties low if the Soviets decided to attack forces to produce the greatest number of casual- in an effort to maximize casualties. Because of the ties they can. A force of 9,000 RVs, roughly equal great destructive power of nuclear weapons and to the current Soviet force, is assumed. Each RV the concentration of U.S. population in major ur- is assumed to have a 750 kiloton (kt) yield. For sim- ban areas, a small number of nuclear weapons det- plicity, the attacking weapons are all ballistic mis- onating over populous areas would cause large sile RVs and the defense is BMD only. numbers of casualties. Planners seeking a defense The basic scenario is as follows. The Soviets to assure survival would most likely make “de- know about how capable the U.S. defense is. They fense conservative” estimates. They would give prepare a list of aimpoints such that the first is the offense a great benefit of the doubt and esti- the most densely populated part of the United mate the capability of their defense very conser- States, the second is the second most densely vatively in order to minimize the likelihood that populated part, and so on. They allocate their casualties would exceed their expectations. weapons against the most populous part of this This appendix illustrates how such worst-case list in a manner to be described and do not attack estimates of casualties might be made and how the rest of the United States. they would be related to defense capability. It is To illustrate some of the uncertainties in this cal- illustrative of an approach to the problem of de- culation, four cases have been examined. In two termining requirements for assured survival. It is cases, the worst for the United States, the Soviets are assumed to know exactly how good the U.S. ‘Some people believe that even if man~’ tens of millions of Americans defense is, and they allocate their weapons to died, society would remain intact (or rapidly reconstitute itself) and the achieve an expected one weapon penetrating to nation would have survived. Others believe that society can be de- each aimpoint. The number of aimpoints is equal stroyed even if casualties are relatively low. to 9,000 (1-Pk, where Pk is the probability that the

285 286 defense kills an RV attempting to penetrate it.’ As urban areas. A 1979 OTA report5 estimated that a worst case, we assume that they hit each aim- most of those exposed to 5 psi would be killed im- point. In actuality, some aimpoints would survive. mediately or seriously wounded, and that half of In the other two cases, the Soviets only know those exposed to 2 to 5 psi would be killed or seriously roughly how good the defense is, so they target wounded. Many of the wounded would eventually 100 RVs on each of 90 aimpoints. Their hits are die for lack of care. A 750 kt weapon detonated distributed randomly among the aimpoints. In at 2,000 feet above the ground would produce 5 each case, they begin with the most populous aim- psi or more overpressure over about 24 square point and allocate weapons in descending order un- miles and 3 psi or more over 50 square miles. til all their weapons are allocated. In order to understand how U.S. population is For each of the two cases described in the pre- distributed among the most populous parts of the ceding paragraph, we use two different kill criteria, nation we examined both the most populous cit- for a total of four cases. In two of the cases, the ies and the most densely populated counties and Soviets distribute their weapons to produce 3 cities. These are listed in tables D-1 and D-2, re- pounds per square inch (psi) overpressure over the spectively. The distributions of cumulative popu- entire area attacked. In the other two cases, they lation as a function of total area occupied obtained distribute their weapons to put 5 psi over the area from these were reasonably similar, despite the attacked. We assume in each case that everyone fact that there were many areas that appeared on living in the attacked area is killed. It is beyond one list but not on the other. the scope of this appendix to determine the minim- Figure D-1 shows the number of people living um overpressure that would kill everyone sub- in the most populous parts of the United States. jected to it, although it seems likely that the an- It is arrived at by summing down tables D-1 and swer is between 3 and 5 psi.3 A 1978 ACDA report4 D-2 in rank order, beginning with number 1. If the says that 3 to 5 psi would cause total burn out in Soviets wanted to maximize casualties, they would begin by allocating their weapons against the most heavily populated areas, and work their way up ‘(1-P~) is the probability that an RV gets through the defense, so the cumulative curves until they ran out of weap- 9,000 (1-PJ is the number of RVS they expect to get through the de- ons. Figure D-2 repeats figure D-1, but also shows fense. Hence, they aim at that number of aimpoints. An actual calculation of the number of aimpoints would probably be more sophisticated the number of detonations required to produce 5 than this, since some of the intended aimpoints will receive more than psi over a given area and the number of weapons one detonation while others will be successfully defended. The worst they can do, from the U.S. perspective, is to hit each intended aimpoint. required to produce 3 psi. For example, 40 deto- %me maintain that in either case the number of casualties is likely to exceed the population of the area attacked, because effectssuch as fallout and groundwater contamination, as well as destruction of vital ‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nu- services, would kill far beyond the blast area. clear War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 4“An Analysis of Civil Defense in Nuclear War’( December 1978. 1979), OTA-NS-89

Table D-1 .—Population, Area, and Population Density of the Most Populous U.S. Cities

Population Area Population per Rank City (thousands) (square miles) square mile 1 New York ...... 7,072 301.5 23,455 2 Chicago...... 3,005 228.1 13,174 3 Los Angeles ...... 2,967 464.7 6,384 4 Philadelphia ...... 1,688 136.0 12,413 5 Houston ...... 1,595 556.4 2,867 6 Detroit ...... 1,203 135,6 8,874 7 Dallas ...... 904 333.0 2,715 8 San Diego ...... 876 320.0 2,736 9 Phoenix ...... 790 324.0 2,437 10 Baltimore ...... 787 80.3 9,798 11 San Antonio , . . . ., ... , ...... 786 262.7 2,992 12 Indianapolis ...... 701 352.0 1,991 13 San Francisco ...... 679 46.4 14,633 14 Memphis ...... 646 264.1 2,447 15 Washington ...... 638 62.7 10,181 SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Populations are based on the 1980 census. 287

Table D.2.—The Most Densely Populated Counties and Independent Cities in the United Statess

Population per Area Population Rank Name square mile (square miles) (thousands) 1 New York, NY...... 64,395 22 1,428 2 Kings, NY ...... 31,762 70 2,231 3 Bronx, NY ...... 28,006 42 1,169 4 Queens, NY ...... 17,411 109 1,891 5 San Francisco, CA ...... 14,636 46 679 6 Philadelphia, PA ...... 12,413 136 1,688 7 Hudson, NJ ...... 11,993 46 557 8 Suffolk, MA...... 11,472 57 650 9 Washington, DC ...... 10,181 63 638 10 Baltimore, MD (city) ...... 9,793 80 787 11 St. Louis, MO (city) ...... 7,379 61 453 12 Alexandria, VA (city) ...... 6,867 15 103 13 Essex, NJ ...... 6,696 127 851 14 Richmond, NY ...... 5,995 59 352 15 Arlington, VA ...... 5,878 26 153 16 Cook, IL...... 5,485 958 5,254 17 Norfolk, VA (city) ...... 5,037 53 267 18 Union, NJ ...... 4,886 103 504 19 Falls Church, VA (city) ...... 4,830 2 10 20 Nassau, NY, ...... 4,610 287 1,322 21 Denver CO...... 4,452 111 492 22 Milwaukee Wl ...... 3,997 241 965 23 Charlottesville, VA...... 3,827 10 40 24 Wayne, Ml...... 3,801 615 2,338 25 Richmond, VA (city) ...... 3,650 60 219 SOURCE County and City Data Book,1983 Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Population Data based on 1980 census

nations would be required to produce 3 psi over- ties would be if one believes that 3 psi is sufficient pressure over a total area of 2,000 square miles, to kill almost everyone, and figure D-4 shows what and 80 would be required to produce 5 psi over the the results would be if one believes that 5 psi is same area. The most populous 2,000 square miles necessary. contains about 17 million people. We can now calculate the expected number of casualties from an attack on our population, as a Basic Observations function of the effectiveness of our BMD as measured by the probability that an RV is killed by it, If the Soviets were intent on killing Americans, Pk. In the worst case, the Soviets use all their it would require an extremely capable defense to weapons against a number of aimpoints equal to keep casualties “low.” A defense that permitted the number of RVs they expect to penetrate the 1 percent of the Soviet weapons through might re- defense, 9,000( 1-Pk), and their weapons detonate sult in casualties well in excess of 10 million. It successfully at all of them. They pick the most would appear that keeping casualties below 1 mil- populous aimpoints. This provides an upper bound lion would require a defense that could stop in ex- on the number of prompt casualties, In the other cess of 99.9 percent of the Soviet attack. While we case, they allocate 100 of their weapons against would need defenses with these capabilities to be each of the 90 most lucrative aimpoints. In this confident that we could keep casualties low, lesser case the probability that any aimpoint is de- (but still quite capable) defenses might result in 100 stroyed is given by the expression 1-Pk . The casualties much lower than what is indicated in number of prompt casualties is this multiplied by this worst case analysis. Soviet weapons might not the total population at those aimpoints, which is be so heavily concentrated on a few cities, and pop- about 25 million for 3 psi coverage and about 20 ulations might evacuate or take other protective million for 5 psi coverage. measures, Finally, not everyone agrees that as- Figures D-3 and D-4 show the results for the four sured survival requires guaranteeing very low ex- cases. They show the number of casualties as a pected casualties. By some definitions, the nation function of the effectiveness of the U.S. BMD sys- would survive even if millions of Americans did tem. Figure D-3 shows what the number of casual- not. 288

u .7 Area 160 120 40 80 0

Number of weapons to produce at least 5 psi over entire area80 Note: Curves have been smoothed” 60 20 40 : 0 SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment’ Numbe r of weapons to produce at least 3 psi over entire area SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment I

1 I 1 I 100.0 0 ~ 99.6 99.8 99.0 99.2 99.4 BMD effectiveness in percent Soviets know exactly how capable U S. defense is and target accordingly They hit every city they target

defense IS and target accordingly aSoviets know exactly how capable U S SOURCE’ Office of Technology Assessment They hit every city they target

SOURCE” Office of Technology Assessment Appendix E Defense Capability Levels and U.S. Strategy Choices

This appendix describes how figure 5-4 in chap- and penetrate to their targets. There are different ter 5 was generated from the definitions of defense views on how many RVs must survive and pene- levels shown in table E-1 and the requirements to trate to support a credible retaliation-only strat- support the suggested strategies as listed below. egy. Countervailing generally requires that more In general, the requirements to underwrite or sup- RVs survive and penetrate, and that we be able port any of the suggested strategies-retaliation- to use those RVs for more than just punishment only, countervailing, prevailing, or assured sur- attacks. Prevailing would require that still more vival-are as follows: RVs be able to survive and penetrate, and that we . If we can absorb a Soviet first strike and in- be able to use them to attack a variety of impor- flict great damage on them, then we can have tant selected targets. Additionally, prevailing, un- a retaliation only strategy. like either retaliation-only or countervailing, gen- ● If we can absorb a first strike, inflict damage erates requirements for U.S. defenses to limit on the Soviets beyond the value of whatever damage to the United States.’ Assured survival they might hope to accomplish and deny them requires even more U.S. defenses than prevailing their goals, then we can have either a counter- does, but it has little or no requirement for RVs vailing strategy or a retaliation-only strategy. to survive and penetrate. . If we can defeat the Soviets while keeping our Each of these strategy choices implies either losses at a “tolerable” level, then we can adopt limits on Soviet defenses, requirements for U.S. either a prevailing strategy, a countervailing defenses, or both. These can be put in terms of the strategy, or a retaliation-only strategy four defense levels. . If we can survive a Soviet first strike, then we can have an assured survival strategy. ‘In the absence of Soviet defense, countervailing and retaliation-only Retaliating requires that some number of re- do not require defenses, but do not exclude them either. If the Soviets entry vehicles (RVs) survive a Soviet first strike have defense, countervailing may require defense.

Table E.1 .- Levels of Defense Capability

Region Level Description Offense-dominated O no defense 1 “some ICBMs”* A defense capable of ensuring the survival of a useful fraction of the ICBMs, but not capable of protecting cities Transition 2 “either/or” A defense (including BMD) that can ensure the survival of most ICBMs or a high degree of urban survival against a follow-on (or simultaneous) attack, but not both Defense-dominated 3 “most ICBMs/some A defense that ensures a high level of survival of cities” military targets. Massive damage can only be obtained by concentrating the entire offense against cities 4 “extremely capable” Ensures a high level of urban survival against a full attack. The attacker cannot have high confidence that any cities can be destroyed

“Terms in quotes are a shorthand used to identify the levels, NOTE: For simplicity the chapter often divides targets into ICBMs and cities. There are, of course, many other types of targets that might be attacked, but discussing them all in each case would greatly expand the text. ICBMs are representative of strategic military targets (although by no means an accurate model of them all). “Cities” is typically used as a short hand for people, economic assets, and social structure. A level 1 defense, for example, might be used to defend the C3 system rather than the ICBMs,

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The requirements for assured survival are the fore, if we had level 3 and they had level 2, pre- simplest to specify. We would need a level 4 de- vailing might not be a practical option. We could, fense regardless of what defense the Soviets built. however, countervails since they could not destroy Furthermore, if we had a level 4 defense that sup- our retaliatory forces in a first strike. ported an assured survival strategy, no Soviet de- With the exceptions noted above, a Soviet defense could undermine that strategy. fense at level 3 or above would limit our strategy Prevailing would require either a level 4 defense, choice to retaliation-only, unless we had a level 4 or, if we were to plan to strike first to reduce the defense that would support an assured survival Soviet offensive forces, a level 3 defense.2 How- strategy. The only targets we could expect to de- ever, this U.S. defense alone would not assure an stroy would be cities. A Soviet level 4 defense option to prevail. If the Soviet defense were suffi- would call into question our ability to retaliate. We ciently capable, it could keep us from having could not be certain that we could inflict great enough RVs surviving and penetrating to support damage on their cities. Therefore, if they had a a prevailing strategy. Level 4 Soviet defenses level 4 defense and we did not have assured sur- would certainly keep us from having a prevailing vival, our only option would be a retaliation-only strategy. Very few U.S. RVs would reach their tar- strategy, but it might not have much prospect of gets. A level 3 Soviet defense would keep us from being successful. Of course, if we also had a level attacking military targets, which would prevent 4 defense, neither side could be certain of its abil- us from satisfying the definition of prevailing. ity to damage the other, and the Soviets would However, if the Soviets had level 3 and we had have no advantage over us. level 4, we would have a large, possibly exploita- Currently, we have a countervailing strategy. If ble, advantage. This might be called an opportu- we add defense and the Soviets have none, we nity to prevail despite not being able to destroy could certainly continue to have this option. If the military targets. What we would call our strategy Soviets add a level 1 defense while the United would not be as significant as the large advantage. States has no defense, they could use it to deny If we had a level 3 defense we could strike first us the ability to retaliate against some military against a range of targets and defend against the targets, although we could still attack their cities. ragged retaliation, thereby limiting damage to our- We might no longer be able to countervails, al- selves, perhaps enough to prevail. However, if the though we could certainly retaliate. A U.S. level Soviets had a level 2 defense, they might prevent 1 defense would restore our ability to countervails us from destroying enough of their forces to keep by ensuring the survival of RVs to replace the ones our losses to their retaliation “tolerable. There- the Soviet defense might destroy. Higher levels of Soviet defense, however, could deny us the option ‘If we had level 2 and the Soviets had no defense, we might attempt to prevail by striking first. In order to defend our cities, we would have to countervails by protecting a range of military to leave military targets undefended against a Soviet retaliation, and civilian targets. Appendix F BMD and the Military R&D Budget

Funding Levels However, the periods covered by the above estimates are artifacts of the Pentagon’s planning Military research and development currently process. The budget for each fiscal year includes constitutes about two-thirds of all Federal spend- projections for the four subsequent years as well, ing on R&D. In fiscal year 1985, $34.7 billion of but provides no information beyond that. Ambas- the $52.0 billion total appropriated by Congress sador Paul Nitze, special advisor to the President for R&D went to defense-related activities in the and Secretary of State on arms control, has esti- Departments of Defense and Energy.’ mated that it will take “at least 10 years” (e.g., Ballistic missile defense technologies have been not before 1995) to determine whether a ballistic investigated with Department of Defense R&D missile defense can meet the tests of survivabil- funds since the 1950s. BMD funding (including de- ity and cost-effectiveness.4 The program would ployment costs) reached its highest level (in real take even longer if slowed by unanticipated dollars) in fiscal year 1972. After the ABM Treaty difficulties or congressional budget cuts. The to- was signed, overall BMD funding dropped. tal 10-year SD I cost from fiscal year 1984 through In the fiscal year 1984 budget, the most recent 1993 has been estimated to be $70 billion in nomi- one submitted before the Strategic Defense Initia- nal (uncorrected for inflation) dollars if it were to tive Organization was formed, just under $1 bil- proceed on budget and on schedule; delays and lion was appropriated for BMD research. Accord- overruns would further increase this totals ing to Defense Department funding projections at that time, BMD programs within DOD would have Defense Department R&D been allocated about $12 billion for fiscal years 1984 through 1989 had the SD I not been formed, Budget Categories with about $2 billion more to have been spent by The Department of Defense places R&D pro- the Department of Energy. Under the SDI fund- grams in five categories ranging from basic re- ing profile, DOD projections for the same period search to engineering and operational develop- totaled $26 billion.’ A more recent projection, ment. Basic research, category 6.1, is scientific which included an estimate for fiscal year 1990 and also accounted for congressional action on the fis- .— cal year 1985 request, gave a $33 billion total for over that time period had the SD I not been formed. The two budget requests for fiscal years 1984 through 1990, in millions of dollars, are: SD I for the seven fiscal years between fiscal years SDI Pre-SDI 1984 and 1990, inclusive.3 Fiscal Year (DOD) (DOD) (DOE) 1984 991 991 NA 1985 1,397 1,527 210 ‘Aggregate figures from table I of Willis Shapley, Albert Teich, and 1986 3,722 1,802 295 Jill Pace, Congressional Action on R&Din the FY 1985 Budget ( Wash- 1987 4,908 2,181 365 ington, DC: R&D Budget and Policy Project of the American Associa- 1988 6,165 2,699 439 1989 7,300 2,982 505 tion for the Advancement of Science in cooperation with the Intersoci- 1990 8,634 NA NA ety Working Group, November 1984). The R&D budget as requested Total 33,122 12,182 1,814 by the President, before being acted on by Congress, is analyzed in NA = not available. Note that the aggregate SDl figure is a 6-year sum whereas AAAS Report IX: Research and Development, FY 1985 Budget, by the the aggregate pre-SDI figure is only over 5 years Fiscal year 1984 and 1985 figures Intersociety Working Group, 1984. Data for this publication is drawn for the SD I budget represent appropriated, not requested, funds from SpeciaJ Amdysis K, prepared by the Office of Management and 4Quoted by Walter Pincus in “Decade of Study Seen for ‘Star Wars’, ” Budget, and from Federal Funds, prepared by the National Science The Washington Post, Apr. 27, 1985. Foundation. ‘John Pike, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Budget and Program “’Analysis of the Costs of the Administration’s Strategic Defense Ini- (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, Feb. 10, 1985), tiative, 1985 -1989,” Congressional Budget Office, May 1984. For plan. pp. 81-83. The FAS projection of $69 billion fell in between a $66 bil- ning puwoses, the Department of Defense annually prepares FiveYear lion estimate by the Electronic Industries Association and an $80 bil- Defense Plans which project future spending levels. However, the CBO lion estimate by DMS, a private market research firm. Budget estimates report based its projections beyond fiscal year 1986 on press reports, given in constant fiscal year 1986 dollars are 86 percent of the those since DOD typically does not provide its *’out-year” projections to cited here, which are in current-year (nominal) dollars. Congress. FAS cites Norman Augustine, President of Martin Marietta Denver ‘Departing from usual practice, in 1985 the Office of the Secretary Aerospace, as having frequently noted that defense development of Defense (Comptroller) released out-year SD I budget projections to projects typically take one-third longer and cost one-third more than Congress. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization has also com- initially estimated. This factor moves the FAS research and technol- piled a corresponding breakdown of what would have been requested ogy development estimate of $70 billion closer to $100 billion.

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study and experimentation directed toward acquir- research programs in category 6.1. Another 6.5 ing knowledge in those fields relating to long-term percent was requested for applied research, which national security needs. Category 6.2, exploratory is considered to be category 6.2 plus a portion development, refers to research directed towards “6.3A” of category 6.3 programs in the early solving specific military problems, short of major stages of advanced development. The overwhelm- development projects. It includes development of ing majority of DOD R&D funds, 90 percent in “brass-board” level hardware, intended to validate fiscal year 1985, were requested for development design concepts, which need not be to scale and activities in category 6,4 and the remainder of cat- which do not meet operational specifications. egory 6.3, with the final 1 percent being requested Advanced development, category 6.3, consists for R&D facilities.7 of projects which have moved into the development of prototypes in field configuration for tech- Department of Energy nical or operational testing. Projects at this stage are evaluated for their suitability for military use. Within the Department of Energy, $2.2 billion Category 6.4 is engineering development, and was allocated for defense-related R&D programs refers to systems meeting all military specifica- in fiscal year 1985. These programs include all de- tions for operational use which are destined for velopment of nuclear weapons, along with other production in the very near term. (If approved for items such as naval nuclear reactor development.8 production, weapons systems leave the R&D budget.) (Dual military/civilian nuclear power programs, The fifth category, 6.5, is for management support, such as nuclear power for space systems, are and it funds installations required for general R&D funded elsewhere in the DOE budget and are not use (i.e., testing ranges). Operational systems de- included in this total.) While the Department of velopment, or development conducted on systems Energy conducts research relevant to strategic de- which have already been deployed, does not appear fense, those programs are not formally part of the as a”6 category but is funded by line items else- Strategic Defense Initiative. where in the budget. The five program elements constituting the 7AAAS Repoti IX, note 1 above, table II-4. These figures are for the Strategic Defense Initiative were created by con- budget requested by the President; similar breakdowns for the budget solidating portions of 27 previous program ele- as enacted by Congress were not available but would differ only mar- ments spanning the range from 6.1 to 6.5,6 The ginally. “DOE does not use the 6.1 to 6.5 budget categories used by the De- resulting aggregates are therefore difficult to partment of Defense, and a breakdown of DOE R&D funds equivalent categorize, and they have been placed by DOD to the one above for DOD is not available. However, comparing table more or less arbitrarily in category 6.3, advanced I-7 (total defense expenditures of AAAS Report IX (supra, note 1 above) with table I I-4 (Department of Defense expenditures) yields a development. somewhat comparable anal~wis. These figures are for the fiscal year 1985 For the Department of Defense as a whole, only budget as submitted by the President; no such figures were compiled a small fraction of R&D funds (2.5 percent in the for the budget as enacted by Congress: Basic Research $0 fiscal year 1985 request) was requested for basic Applied Research 0.7 billion Development 1.3 billion Facilities O 5 billion — . Although this analysis shows that no DOE funds were attributed for “’Analysis of the Costs of the Administration’s Strategic Defense Ini- basic research in defense-related programs, $0.9 billion was allocated tiative, 1985 -1989,” Congressional Budget Office, May 1984 for basic research elsewhere within DOE (table I-9 of the AAAS Report). Appendix G Studies of the High Frontier Global Ballistic Missile Defense I

Deployment Costs cept as we understand it. Generally, those studies were associated with understanding the concept, High Frontier’ asserted that its GBMD I con- identifying the technical issues and risks; doing stellation of BMD satellites carrying kinetic-kill work to optimize the system and estimating the vehicles could be built using “off-the-shelf” tech- cost for a deployed system as well as its survivability. nology and could be “fully deployed in five or six *** years at a minimum cost of some $10-$15 billion. "2 While we believe that the technical capabilities However, the Department of Defense obtained of the system are certainly appropriately described a much higher estimate. Shortly after the High by the High Frontier, we do have some reserva- Frontier report was published, Dr. Robert Cooper, tions about the survivability of a system of the director of the Defense Advanced Research Proj- kind that has been described. ects Agency, commented on the High Frontier pro- *** posal for a subcommittee of the Senate Commit- We have looked at system components in some tee on Armed Services: detail. I would say that of the various elements . . . The DOD has worked with the High Fron- of the system—the spacecraft, the search and ac- tier analysts throughout the development of their quisition system, and the interception system–I concept and supports the basic Damage-Denial believe that the judgment is that the highest risk goal. However, as hardware developers of war would exist in the interception system and in the fighting systems, we do not share their optimism command and control that would be required to in being able to develop and field such a capabil- drive and control the whole system. ity within their timeframe and cost projections. *** We have conducted several in-house analyses and We have made estimates of the cost of such a have experienced some difficulties in ratifying the system, using the costing techniques that are com- existence of “off-the-shelf components or technol- mon to the Department of Defense for both defen- ogies” to provide the required surveillance, com- sive systems, space launches, and satellite sys- mand and control, and actually perform the inter- tems. It is on the basis of the cost estimates that cepts within the orbital and physical conditions estimates have been made ranging from $50 to $60 described. Our understanding of the systems im- billion, and to numbers considerably in excess of plications and costs would lead us to project ex- that ...4 penditures on the order of $200 to $300 billion in acquisition costs alone for the proposed system.3 R&D Costs A year later, John Gardner, Director for Defen- sive Systems in the Office of the Under Secretary Since the initial High Frontier deployments were of Defense for Research and Engineering, de- assumed not to require much further technical described some of the DOD analyses before a sub- velopment, High Frontier estimated that research committee of the Senate Committee on Armed and development of the entire GBMD I system Services: would cost only $1 billions This estimate for de- We have conducted studies, both in the Army veloping the entire GBMD I system can be com- and in the Air Force, on the High Frontier con- pared with $1.275 billion (in 1982 dollars) that the Air Force plans to have allocated over the 19 fis- ‘Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier, A New National Strategy ( Wash- ington, DC: High Frontier, 1982). cal years from 1972 to 1990 to develop the air- ‘I bid., p. 8. Estimates by High Frontier of the cost of its entire pro- launched and infrared-guided Miniature Vehicle gram, including terminal defense, two layers of space-based defense. improved space transportation, a space station, a high performance spaceplane, and a satellite power system, total $24 billion in the first 5 years and $40 billion for the first 8 years. The GBMD I portion along, the first space-based layer, is estimated to cost $10 to $15 billion. ‘Hearings before the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces subcom- ‘Response to question submitted for the record following Dr. Cooper’s mittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 23, 1983, Mar. 10, 1982, appearance before the Subcommittee on Strategic and printed in S. Hrg. 98-49, Part 5, Department of Defense Authorization Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, Senate Committee on Armed Hearings on S. 2248, DOD Authorization for Appropriations for Fis- Services, p. 2668-9. cal Year 1983, Part 7, p. 4635. bGraham, op cit., p. 128.

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ASAT weapon. 6 However, the ASAT weapon is launched, with no explanation of how the defense roughly equivalent to the GBMD I kill vehicle would know in advance when that launch would alone,’ and its development would not address the occur. Although the High Frontier study also dis- other requirements of the GBMD I system: the cusses interceptions during the post-boost period, carrier satellites, the system wide surveillance, ac- the kill vehicIe sensors postulated for the initial quisition, and kill assessment sensors, overall com- deployment (GBMD I) would not be appropriate mand and control, battle management software for phases following boost phase. Carter’s overall and hardware, on-orbit transportation and logisti- conclusion was that cal support, and system survivability. It would therefore appear that the technical char- Moreover, technology developed for the MV acteristics of the High Frontier scheme result in ASAT would most likely not be sufficient even for a defensive system of extremely limited capabil- the GBMD kill vehicle it corresponds to. The ity for boost phase intercept of present Soviet ASAT is designed to find satellites against the ICBMs and with no capability against future MX- like Soviet boosters, even with no Soviet effort to cold background of space; GBMD kill vehicles ll overcome the defense. must operate looking down against a warm earth. The booster’s exhaust plume, of course, is much hotter than either the booster or the earth back- Overall Capability ground, but a booster cannot be killed by attacking its exhaust. Either the kill vehicle will need to On February 21, 1985, 2 years after John Gard- ner had testified about High Frontier before a Sen- track some part of the booster itself, or it will need to know where the booster is relative to the ex- ate Armed Services subcommittee, Strategic De- haust–both of which are more difficult tasks than fense Initiative Organization Director James A. locating an isolated satellite with nothing behind Abrahamson appeared before the same subcom- it. In many cases, the kill vehicle would not be able mittee, Senator Sam Nunn asked Abrahamson to reach the booster before burnout, obviating about a recent High Frontier claim that a 95 plume tracking. percent-effective defense could be built using off- the-shelf technology in 5 to 6 years. Area of Coverage Abrahamson did not substantiate that assertion.12 He stated that the kinetic-kill vehicle con- In a background paper done for OTA,8 Ashton cept adopted by High Frontier is considered by Carter analyzed the High Frontier GBMD I sys- SDI to be one of the more mature BMD technol- tem. He states that, due to the slow speed (1 ogies, and that it could provide part of an initial, km/see) of the individual kill vehicles, they would partial capability for boost-phase intercept against not be able to travel very far during the boost current ballistic missiles. However, later on in his phase of a Soviet ICBM. “[Thousands of satellites testimony, Abrahamson indicated that the kinetic- would be needed worldwide for continuous cover- kill vehicles considered by the Strategic Defense age of Soviet ICBM fields, ” wrote Carter. “The Initiative would be solid-propelled rockets travel- High Frontier concept with only 432 satellites ing five to eight times faster than the High Fron- would therefore have meager coverage of Soviet tier design. Abrahamson also emphasized that it ICBM fields. ”9 He noted that in the only example takes more than a weapons concept to make an of boost-phase intercept given in the High Fron- overall ballistic missile defense. The full job re- tier report, ’” the kill vehicle would have been quires tracking, surveillance, and command and launched 53 seconds before its target ICBM was control, and is a more complex issue than was implied by the High Frontier publication that Sena- ‘From the Dec. 31, 1983 Comprehensive Selected Acquisition Report tor Nunn referred to. (SAR) on Space Defense and Operations (A SAT). Figures are corrected from the total given in the SAR (in 1977 dollars) to 1982 dollars using In his testimony, Abrahamson highlighted the the DOD Air Force RDT&E deflator. basic difference between the High Frontier ap- ‘According to John Gardner’s testimony, “the space-based component of [the High Frontier GBMD I defense] does postulate the use of proach and that being pursued by the SDI. He said defensive interceptors that take advantage of the technology that is currently being developed as part of the anti-satellite program. ” –Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, Mar. 23, 1983, p. 2667. 1 Ictiter, Op cit., p. 35. ACCOrding to the Department of Defense, the 8Ashton Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, back- Soviets are currently developing an ICBM, the SS-X-24, which is siti- ground paper prepared under contract for the Office of Technology lar in many characteristics to the MX. (Soviet Mifitmy Power, 1986. Assessment, April 1984. See pp. 29-30 for data on U.S. and Soviet ICBMS.) ‘Ibid., p. 35. ‘~estimony given below is paraphrased from General Abrahamson’s ‘“Graham, op cit., p. 122. spoken testimony. 296 that there were two dangerous consequences that earlier, Abrahamson explained that the SDI did could happen should the United States deploy only not yet know enough to be confident that a High a partial BMD capability and then stop. First, it Frontier-type system could not be countered or might drive the Soviets in precisely the wrong easily knocked out. He noted that General Graham direction, stimulating them to build up offensive did not have the resources available to him to in- forces if they thought that they could overwhelm vestigate all the countermeasure problems and the the defense. Second, if the U.S. system were based command and control difficulties. The High Fron- on a single concept, the entire system would be tier program could be a good start, Abrahamson vulnerable should the Soviets discover a counter- said, but he did not know if it would be the best measure to that concept. start. At present, he would not recommend that the United States proceed to deploy it. Alluding to the survivability problems mentioned about High Frontier by Gardner 2 years Appendix H Excerpts From Statements on BMD by Reagan Administration Officials

The conclusion of President Reagan’s March 23, human beings by threatt’nlng their esist- 1983, speech on Defense Spending and Defensive ence. F’eelin% this wa]. I belief e JYC> nlu~t Technology. thoroughly examine e~er? opportun lty for reducing tensions and for lntroclucln g grc’at - er st~bilit) into the ~trate,qlc calculL]s on Weekly Compilation of both sides, one of the most important contributions we can make 1s, of course, t o lower the Ie\el of All arms, md p.irtlcularl} nuclear Presidential arms. \f’e’re ~>ng~ged right now in sc>~ c>ral negotiations w’lth the So\iet (. ”nlon to bring about a mutual reduction of w capons. I will Documents report to ) ou a week from tomorrow m) thoughts on that ~core But let me just w?’, I’m totally committed to this course. If the So\iet L’nlon \\’ill join with us in our effort to achle~ e major arms reduction, we will ha~e succeeded In stabilizing the nuclear balance. Sc\ertheless, it w’111 still be necessary’ to rel; on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat. .4nd that’s A sad commentary’ on the human condition. \$’ouldn’t lt b(’ better to WIC li~ es than to a~enge them;~ .4re we not capable of demonstrating our peuceful intentions by appl}l- ing all our abilities ~nd our inqenuity’ to achie~inq a trul> lasting stabillty? I think Now, thus far tonight I've shared with we Are. Indeed, we must, you my thoughts on the problems of nation- .After careful consult:itlon with my ad\is- ers, including the Joint (;hiefs of Staff, I al security we must face together. My pred- - ecessors in the Oval office have appeared belie~e there is a way. Let me share with before you on other occasions to describe you a \islon of the future \\hich offers hope. the threat posed by Soviet power and have It is that we embark on a program to proposed steps to address that threat. But counter the awesome Soy iet mls~lle threat since the advent of nuclear weapons, those wrlth measures that are defensi~e Let us steps have been increasingly directed turn to the \ery’ ~trt~nqth~ in technolog} toward deterrence of aggression through that spawned our grc’at lndustri~l base And the promise of retaliation, that ha~e gi~’en us the qualit]’ of life me This approach to stability through offen- enjo)r today. sive threat has worked. We and our allies \T’hat if free people could Ii\e secure m have succeeded in preventing nuclear war the knowledge that their security did not for more than three decades, In recent rest upon the threat of instant C’. S. retali- months, however, my advisers, including in ation to deter a So\ iet ~ttack, that we could partlcular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have un- intercept and destro} strategic ballistic mis- cierwor(’d the n~w{’~~lt~ to brt’,ik out of a siles before they reached our own soil or (utur~’ th~t relic’~ ~c)l{’1) on c~tfen~l~ t’ rc~tall- that of our allies? dt ion for our ~(’curlt? I know this is a formidable, technical task, ()~er the c~jur~r of thest~ dl~cus~ions, 1‘~ e one that may not be accomplished before become znor( .Ind n]ort d(w p!) conllnced the end of this centur). l’et, current tech- th~t th(’ hum.in splrlt mu~t b<> (:ipab}cl of nology, has ~ttalned a le~el of sophistication rl~ln q ~bo~ (> ~it’.il!ng \\lth other n.ition~ ,ind where it’s reasonable for us to beg-m this

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effort. It will take years, probably decades in our country, those who gave us nuclear of effort on many fronts. There will be fail- weapons, to turn their great talents now to ures and setbacks, just as there will be suc- the cause of mankind and world peace, to cesses and breakthroughs. And as we pro- give us the means of rendering these nucle- ceed, we must remain constant in preserv- ar weapons impotent and obsolete. ing the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a Tonight, consistent with our obligations of solid capability for flexible response. But the ABM treaty and recognizing the need isn’t it worth every investment necessary’ to for closer consultation with our allies, I’m free the world from the threat of nuclear taking an important first step. I am direct- war? We know it is. ing a comprehensive and intensive effort to In the meantime, we will continue to define a long-term research and develop- pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, ne- ment program to begin to achieve our ulti- gotiating from a position of strength that mate goal of eliminating the threat posed can be ensured only by modernizing our by strategic nuclear missiles. This could strategic forces. At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conven- pave the way for arms control measures to tional military conflict escalating to nuclear eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek war by improving our non-nuclear capabili- neither military superiority nor political ad- ties. vantage, Our only purpose--one all people America does possess—now—the technol- share—is to search for ways to reduce the ogies to attain very significant improve- danger of nuclear war. ments in the effectiveness of our conven- My fellow Americans, tonight we’re tional, non-nuclear forces. Proceeding launching an effort which holds the promise boldly with these new technologies, we can of changing the course of human history. significantly reduce any incentive that the There will be risks, and results take time. Soviet Union may have to threaten attack But I believe we can do it. As we cross this against the United States or its allies. threshold, I ask for your prayers and your As we pursue our goal of defensive tech- support. nologies, we recognize that our allies rely Thank you, good night, and Cod bless upon our strategic offensive power to deter you. attacks against them. Their vital interests and ours are inextricably linked. Their Note: The President spoke at 8:02 p.m. from safety and ours are one. And no change in the Oval Office at the White House. The technology}’ can or will alter that reality. We address was broadcast live on nationwide must and shall continue to honor our com- radio and television. mitments. Following his remarks, the President met 1 clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems in the White House with a number of administration officials, including members and ambiguities. If paired with “offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an of the Cabinet, the White House staff, and aggressive policy, and no one wants that. the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former offi- But with these considerations firmly in cials of past administrations to discuss the mind, I call upon the scientific community address.

In a speech on March 29, 1985, President Rea- should never be misconstrued as just another l gan said: method of protecting missile silos. . . . Two years ago, I challenged our scientific . . . The means to intercept ballistic missiles dur- community to use their talents and energies to find ing their early-on boost phase of trajectory would a way that we might eventually rid ourselves of the enable us to fundamentally change our strategic need for nuclear weapons—starting with ICBMs, assumptions, permitting us to shift our emphasis We seek to render obsolete the balance of terror— from offense to defense. or Mutual Assured Destruction, as it’s called— . . . We’re not discussing a concept just to en- and replace it with a system incapable of initiat- hance deterrence, but rather a new kind of deter- ing armed conflict or causing mass destruction, yet rence; not just an addition to our offensive forces, effective in preventing war. Now, this is not and but research to determine the feasibility of a comprehensive nonnuclear defensive system–a shield that could prevent nuclear weapons from reach- ‘Speech to the National Space Club, Mar, 29, 1985. ing their targets. 299

The Administration has not presented in detail The United States does not view defensive meas- its view of how it thinks the U.S./U.S.S.R. strate- ures as a means of establishing military superi- gic relation would evolve as BMD developments ority. Because we have no ambitions in this regard, proceed and efforts are made to manage the evo- deployments of defensive systems would most use- lution. Administration spokesmen have, however, fully be done in the context of a cooperative, equitable, and verifiable arms control environment given broad descriptions of the major parts of that that regulates the offensive and defensive devel- evolution and the reasons why they believe it to opments and deployments of the United States be plausible. Some of these are excerpted in this and Soviet Union. Such an environment could be appendix. For a deeper understanding, the reader particularly useful in the period of transition from should read the sources in their entirety.2 a deterrent based on the threat of nuclear retalia- In a statement released January 3, 1985, and tion, through deterrence based on a balance of published in a White House pamphlet The Presi- offensive and defensive forces, to the period when dent Strategic Defense lnitiative, President Rea- adjustments to the basis of deterrence are com- gan said: 3 plete and advanced defensive systems are fully deployed. During the transition, arms control . . . The SDI research program will provide to agreements could help to manage and establish guide- a future President and a future Congress the tech- lines for the deployment of defensive systems. nical knowledge required to support, a decision on The SDI research program will complement and whether to develop and later deploy advanced support U.S. efforts to seek equitable, verifiable defensive systems. At the same time, the United States is commit- reductions in offensive nuclear forces through arms control negotiations. Such reductions would ted to the negotiation of equal and verifiable agree- make a useful contribution to stability, whether ments which bring real reductions in the power of in today’s deterrence environment or in a poten- the nuclear arsenals of both sides. To this end, my tial future deterrence environment in which Administration has proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of arms control proposals. We defenses played a leading role. A future decision to develop and deploy effec- are working tirelessly for the success of these efforts, but we can and must go further in trying tive defenses against ballistic missiles could support our policy of pursuing significant reductions to strengthen the peace. in ballistic missile forces. To the extent that defen- Our research under the Strategic Defense Ini- sive systems could reduce the effectiveness and, tiative complements our arms reduction efforts and helps to pave the way for creating a more sta- thus, value of ballistic missiles, they also could increase the incentives for negotiated reductions. ble and secure world. That the research we are un- Significant reductions in turn would serve to in- dertaking is consistent with all of our treaty obli- crease the effectiveness and deterrent potential of gations, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. defensive systems. In the near term, the SD I research program also This prediction has been explained by George A. Keyworth II, science advisor to President Reagan, responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti- 5 ballistic missile (ABM) effort, which includes ac- in the following terms: tual deployments. It provides a powerful deterrent Strategic defenses of the type we can reasonably to any Soviet decision to expand its ballistic mis- project–even in their early modes—can be vital sile defense capability beyond that permitted by catalysts for arms control . . . In fact, early and in- the ABM Treaty. And, in the long-term, we have termediate defenses will undoubtedly be imperfect, confidence that SDI will be a crucial means by and any nuclear weapon that makes it through to which both the United States and the Soviet its target will be devastating. While hardened mili- Union can safely agree to very deep reductions, tary assets can be very successfully defended by and eventually, even the elimination of ballistic these transition systems, civilian population missiles and the nuclear weapons they carry. [em- centers will still be hostage to a determined ad- phasis added] versary. Critics cite this as a major failing. In fact, The White House publication which accompa- it is crucial to stability during those transition nied this statement elaborated on the arms con- years, because as long as there is some leakage in trol implications of the Strategic Defense Initia- those transition defense technologies, there re- 4 mains a retaliatory deterrent against first strike. tive as follows: . . . But we will once again have a common ground for negotiating real weapons reductions. After all, realistic, survivable, retaliatory arsenals do not have to be enormous, not nearly as large —— — ‘(jeorge 4. Keyworth II, ‘“rrhe (’ase ~’or: An option for a World I)is- armed, ” IS.SU(JS in Sc;ence and Technology , fall 1984. pp. 42-44. 300

as the arsenals we now require to survive preemp- with other weapons, but in so doing we will be tive strikes (or in the Soviet case, to launch them). phasing out the most feared and most destabiliz- With the preemptive option clouded, or even re- ing of the nuclear weapons. This is the key issue moved, we would have an opportunity to negoti- and, to my mind, the strongest reason we have to ate major arms reductions that would still leave pursue the strategic defense initiative. With the each side with a strong retaliatory deterrent. ICBM tarnished and with the need to look to other At that point we would have accomplished two options to preserve national security, both the things, two goals that have eluded us for 20 years. Soviets and we will have a mutual basis to nego- We would have reduced both nations’ perceptions tiate reductions in ICBM forces. If ICBMs serve that the other could launch a successful disarm- only to retaliate in case the other side does attack ing first strike, and we would have drastically re- first, then both sides can consider truly massive duced the size of the arsenals. reductions in ICBM warheads. Ten or twenty nu- . . . These options will probably become available clear weapons are virtually all the retaliatory de- when the strategic nuclear forces we must build terrent that any country needs—and those are the today to maintain our near-term deterrence reach levels of weapons that arms controls ought to be the limits of their operational lifetimes. We then aiming for, have a new option: rather than replace them, let On February 13, 1985, the Director of the U,,s. each side retain only token nuclear forces for their Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth sole remaining purpose—restricted retaliation. Adelman, told the International Institute for St]ra- It is only at this point, in the presence of near- tegic Studies: zero arsenals, that arms control begins to have any [If SDI succeeds in making defenses more cost- real meaning in the minds of ordinary people. Only effective than offenses], SDI can then prove a real when the prospect of final world holocaust reverts incentive to deep reductions in offensive nuclear to “mere” catastrophe–that is, when the stock- systems through arms control. We hope for that piles can be measured in the dozens, rather than kind of incentive from SDI. in the tens of thousands-can we once again de- We must scrupulously guard against a vicious pend on the sun coming up the next day. cycle of defensive efforts—even research for Soviet habits, attitudes, and policies are the defense–spurring the other side onto more offen- product of a thousand years of brutal historical sive weapons in order to saturate prospective experience. There is no reason to believe that the defenses, and so on, and so on. That snowball ef- Soviet Union will suddenly become a country that fect would undercut stability and weaken de- we would trust to respect the legal requirements terrence, of a near-total disarmament treaty. That risk can be reduced and managed through . . . Strategic defense provides the option to the kind of overall strategic discussions Secretary break this cycle. Although we cannot disinvent nu- Shultz launched in Geneva last month and that clear weapons, and although nations will continue Ambassador Kampelman will take up further to distrust one another, heavily defended countries when the arms talks begin again next month. This could nonetheless realistically enter into treaties type of exchange with the Soviet Union—an in- to reduce nuclear forces to near zero. The scale of depth dialog about critical strategic relationships, cheating necessary to provide an arsenal capable strategic concepts, strategic stability-is in- of successfully engaging several layers of active dispensable to an effective SDI approach. defenses would be so large as to be impractical No one has a crystal ball in this complicated within the context of normal intelligence-gathering business. We need data to provide a sound basis capabilities, for decisions several years off on whether or not Strategic defense therefore provides an option to pursue strategic defensive systems further . . . for a world effectively disarmed of nuclear weap- [a] managed evolution–one involving the Soviets ons, yet still retaining national sovereignty and and the Allies intimately all along the way—could security, In fact, deployment of strategic defense lead to a safer world. is the only way in which the superpowers will be *** able to achieve these very deep arms reductions. In 6 Most broadly, we will be going ‘back to basics’ another article he wrote: in looking at the relationship between offensive When [the Soviets] look seriously at the loss of and defensive forces. We will be describing to the utility of their ICBMs as a preemptive force, they Soviets, in some detail and with some care, the will have no choice but to admit that the age of kind of strategic concept that will guide us in the the ICBM as the dominant weapon is passing, period ahead. We envision it as falling into three They, and we, will no doubt begin to replace ICBMs phases. During the first phases, deterrence will continue ‘c;eorge A, Keyworth II, “l’he Case for Arms Control and the Stra. to rest almost exclusively on offensive nuclear tegi c Defense Initiative, ” Arms ControJ Today, April 1985, p. 8. retaliatory capabilities. We believe that this can be done at greatly reduced levels of nuclear forces ation. We have little choice; today’s technology and with full compliance with the ABM Treaty, provides no alternative. and we will seek both. We hope the Soviets believe That being said, we will press for radical reduc- and will act likewise. This period could last ten or tions in the number and power of strategic and fifteen years, or longer or even indefinitely, de- intermediate-range nuclear arms. Offensive nu- pending largely on the progress and results of the clear arsenals on both sides are entirely too high on-going SD I research, and potentially destructive, particularly in the The second phase will be one of transition. Dur- more destabilizing categories such as the large ing this period, and assuming successful develop- MIRVed [multiple independently-targeted reentry ment of some effective non-nuclear defensive sys- vehicles] Soviet ICBM [intercontinental ballistic tems, we would begin to move towards a strategic missile] and SS-20 forces. posture with ever-greater reliance on defense, At the same time, we will seek to reverse the ero- rather than offense. A transition of indefinite du- sion that has occurred in the Anti-Ballistic Mis- ration, this period will help lay the technical and sile (ABM) Treaty regime—erosion that has re- political groundwork necessary for the ultimate sulted from Soviet actions over the last ten years. goal of eventually eliminating nuclear arms com- These include the construction of a large phased- pletely. array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia The last period is one with its hallmark being in violation of the ABM Treaty’s provisions re- the complete elimination of nuclear arms. The tech- garding the location and orientation of ballistic nical knowledge of how to make these weapons and missile early warning radars. the danger of cheating would persist. These risks, For the near term, we will be pursuing the SD I unfortunately, can never be eliminated, but effec- research program-in full compliance with the tive defenses would give insurance against them, ABM Treaty, which permits such research. Like- The enormous and depressing nuclear threat hang- wise, we expect the Soviets will continue their in- ing over the world could be lifted, vestigation of the possibilities of new defensive These three stages have to evolve gradually and, technologies, as they have for many years, as I have said, depend critically upon a coopera- We have offered to begin discussions in the up- tive effort between the United States, in consul- coming Geneva talks with the Soviets as to ho-w tation with its key Allies, and the Soviet Union. we might together make a transition to a more stable and reliable relationship based on an increas- This theme was elaborated on by Ambassador ing mix of defensive systems. Paul H. Nitze in a speech to the Philadelphia The Transition Period: Should new defensive World Affairs Council on February 20, 1985, He technologies prove feasible, we would want at summarized the strategic basis for the upcoming some future date to begin such a transition, dur- talks in Geneva as follows: ing which we would place greater reliance on defen- During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is sive systems for our protection and that of our a radical reduction in the power of existing and allies. planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the The criteria by which we will judge the feasibil- stabilization of the relationship between offensive ity of such technologies will be demanding. The and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or technologies must produce defensive systems that in space. We are even now looking forward to a are survivable; if not, the defenses would them- period of transition to a more stable world, with selves be tempting targets for a first strike. This greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an en- would decrease rather than enhance stability. hanced ability to deter war based upon an increas- New defensive systems must also be cost effec- ing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against tive at the margin-that is, it must be cheap offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition enough to add additional defensive capability so could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear that the other side has no incentive to add addi- arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free tional offensive capability to overcome the defense. of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which If this criterion is not met, the defensive systems we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can could encourage a proliferation of countermeasures agree. and additional offensive weapons to overcome deployed defenses, instead of a redirection of effort He then went on to say: from offense to defense. It would be worthwhile to dwell on this concept As I said, these criteria are demanding. If the in some detail. To begin with, it entails three time new technologies cannot meet these standards, we phases: the near term, a transition phase, and an are not about to deploy them. In the event, we ultimate phase. would have to continue to base deterrence on the The Near Term: For the immediate future—at ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. However, we least the next ten years—we will continue to base hope and have expectations that the scientific deterrence on the ultimate threat of nuclear retali- community can respond to the challenge. 302

We would see the transition period as a co- So our policy must be to first establish agree- operative endeavor with the Soviets. Arms con- ment between ourselves and the Russians on the trol would play a critical role. We would, for ex- value of defensive systems. Once we have reached ample, envisage continued reductions in offensive agreement on that, then we must establish a path nuclear arms. for the integration of these defensive systems into Concurrently, we would envisage the sides be- the force structure that will be stable. ginning to test, develop, and deploy survivable and In an interview on ABC Network television cost-effective defenses at a measured pace, with broadcast June 6, 1985, Secretary of Defense particular emphasis on non-nuclear defenses. De- Caspar Weinberger said: terrence would thus begin to rely more on a mix We’re working for a program that could be a of offensive nuclear and defensive systems instead thoroughly reliable defense that could indeed give of on offensive nuclear arms alone. The transition would continue for some time— us the confidence that all of these missiles could be destroyed. But if we get only a partial result, perhaps for decades. As the U.S. and Soviet stra- it still will be very worthwhile. tegic and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals declined significantly, we would need to negotiate re- In a speech on March 29, 1985, George Key- ductions in other types of nuclear weapons and worth described the goal of the SD I as follows: involve, in some manner, the other nuclear powers. Is the SDI the means to protect people or to pro- The Ultimate Period: Given the right technical tect weapons? Protecting people represents no and political conditions, we would hope to be able change in present policy. It simply strengthens— to continue the reduction of nuclear weapons down entrenches—the doctrine of Mutual Assured De- to zero. struction. Protecting people, on the other hand, The global elimination of nuclear weapons would holds out the promise of dramatic change.’ be accompanied by widespread deployments of ef- This clear purpose of the President has been fective non-nuclear defenses. These defenses would repeated time and time again by Cap Weinberger, provide assurance that were one country to cheat– Bud McFarlane, and myself. But the ambiguity for example, by clandestinely building ICBMs or over SDI’s real goal remains. It is fostered by shorter-range systems, such as SS-20s—it would three main tenets: First is the assertion, embraced not be able to achieve any exploitable military by those anxious to protect both past strategic advantage. To overcome the deployed defenses, doctrine and future nuclear systems, that “strength- cheating would have to be on such a large scale ening deterrence” must be the primary goal for that there would be sufficient notice so that coun- SDI. Second is that protecting weapons, especially termeasures could be taken. ICBM silos, is the nearer-term and most likely goal Were we to reach the ultimate phase, deterrence for SDI. And third is that defense of European mili- would be based on the ability of the defense to tary targets against tactical ballistic missiles is deny success to a potential aggressor’s attack. The the most politically attractive near-term goal for strategic relationship could then be characterized SDI. as one of mutual assured security. If these arguments continue to be used as the Ambassador Nitze then went on to say: basis to achieve Congressional and Allied support, We would have to avoid a mix of offensive and I believe the opportunity for strategic change– defensive systems that, in a crisis, would give one and the President’s objective—is lost. side or the other incentives to strike first. That *** is precisely why we would seek to make the transi- Terminal defenses within the SDI also can play tion a cooperative endeavor with the Soviets. . . a very real part in an overall “layered” defense, In an interview with U.S. News and World Re- But attempts to make terminal defense our first move, within the SDI, does not start us in the port printed March 18, 1985, National Security direction of the President’s objective. Adviser Robert McFarlane said:7 Following is the text of a “Fact Sheet” on the Now, there is a relationship between reductions of offensive systems and the integration of de- Strategic Defense Initiative, issued by The White fensive systems because of the potentially desta- House on June 1, 1985, and published by the De- bilizing effect of either side achieving a first-strike partment of State: capability through possession of both.

— “’Prospects Are Good for Arms Pact-But Not Soon, ” U.S. News ““l’he President Strategic Defense Initiative, ” remarks to the SDI() and World Report, Mar. 18, 1985, pp. 24-25, LJniversity Review Forum, Mar. 29, 1985. 303 —— ——— —

Special Report The Strategic NO. 129 Defense Initiative

June 1985

United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D.C.

In his speech of March 23, 1983, Presi- forces in particular, is to deter aggres- dent Reagan presented his vision of a sion and coercion based upon the threat future in which nations could live secure of military aggression. The deterrence in the knowledge that their national provided by U.S. and allied military security did not rest upon the threat of forces has permitted us to enjoy peace nuclear retaliation but rather on the and freedom. However, the nature of ability to defend against potential at- the military threat has changed and will tacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative continue to change in very fundamental (SDI) research program is designed to ways in the next decade. Unless we determine whether and, if so, how ad- adapt our response, deterrence will vanced defensive technologies could con- become much less stable and our suscep- tribute to the realization of this vision. tibility to coercion will increase dramatically. The Strategic Context Our Assumptions About Deter- rence. For the past 20 years, we have The U.S. SDI research program is based our assumptions on how deter- wholly compatible with the Anti-Ballistic rence can best be assured on the basic Missile (ABM) Treaty, is comparable to idea that if each side were able to main- research permitted by the ABM Treaty which the Soviets have been conducting tain the ability to threaten retaliation for many years, and is a prudent hedge against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor rests that were clearly against Soviet breakout from ABM Treaty limitations through the deploy- out of balance with any potential gains, ment of a territorial ballistic missile this would suffice to prevent conflict. Our idea of what our forces had to hold defense. These important facts deserve emphasis. However, the basic intent at risk to deter aggression has changed over time Nevertheless, our basic behind the Strategic Defense Initiative is best explained and understood in terms reliance on nuclear- retaliation provided of the strategic environment we face for by offensive nuclear forces, as the essen- the balance of this century and into the tial means of deterring aggression, has next. not changed over this period. This basic idea-that if each side The Challenges We Face. Our na- maintained roughly equal forces and tion and those nations allied with us face equal capability to retaliate against at- a number of challenges to our security. tack, stability and deterrence would be Each of these challenges imposes its maintained- also served as the founda- own demands and presents its own option for the U.S. approach to the portunities. Preserving peace and strategic arms limitation talks (SAI.T) freedom is, and always will be, our fun- process of the 1970s. At the time that damental goal. The essential purpose of process began, the United States con our military forces, and our nuclear 304

eluded that deterrence based on the strike. Even today, Soviet active de- very irnmediate and ominous conse- capability of offensive retaliatory forces fenses are extensive. For example, the quences. When operational, this radar, was not only sensible but necessary, Soviet Union possesses the world’s only due to its location, will increase the since we believed at the time that currently deployed antiballistic missile Soviet Union’s capability to deploy a ter- neither side could develop the system, deployed to protect Moscow. ritorial ballistic missile defense. technology for defensive systems which The Soviet Union is currently improving Recognizing that such radars would could effectively deter the other side. all elements of this system. It also has make such a contribution, the ABM Today, however, the situation is fun- the world’s only deployed antisatellite Treaty expressly banned the construc- damentally different. Scientific develop- (ASAT) capability. It has an extensive tion of such radars at such locations as ments and several emerging tech- air defense network, and it is ag- one of the primary mechanisms for en- nologies now do offer the possibility of gressively improving the quality of its suring the effectiveness of the treaty. defenses that did not exist and could radars, interceptor aircraft, and surface- The Soviet Union’s activity with respect hardly have been conceived earlier. The to-air missiles. It also has a very exten- to this radar is in direct violation of the state of the art of defense has now pro- sive network of ballistic missile early ABM Treaty. gressed to the point where it is reason- warning radars. All of these elements Against the backdrop of this Soviet able to investigate whether new tech- provide them an area of relative advan- pattern of noncompliance with existing nologies can yield options, especially tage in strategic defense today and, with arms control agreements, the Soviet non-nuclear options, which could permit logical evolutionary improvement, could Union is also taking other actions which us to turn to defense not only to provide the foundation of decisive ad- affect our ability to verify Soviet com- enhance deterrence but to allow us to vantage in the future. pliance. Some Soviet actions, like their move to a more secure and more stable increased use of encryption during Improvement in Soviet Passive long-term basis for deterrence. testing, are directly aimed at degrading Defenses, The Soviet Union is also our ability to monitor treaty compliance. Of equal importance, the Soviet spending significant resources on Other Soviet actions, too, contribute to Union has failed to show the type of passive defensive measures aimed at im- restraint, in both strategic offensive and the problems we face in monitoring proving the survivability of its own defensive forces, that was hoped for Soviet compliance. For example, Soviet forces, military command structure, and when the SALT process began. The increases in the number of their mobile national leadership. These efforts range ballistic missiles, especially those armed trends in the development of Soviet from providing rail and road mobility for with multiple, independently-targetable strategic offensive and defensive forces, its latest generation of ICBMs [intercon- reentry vehicles, and other mobile as well as the growing pattern of Soviet tinental ballistic missiles] to extensive systems, will make verification less and deception and of noncompliance with ex- hardening of various critical installa- less certain. If we fail to respond to isting agreements, if permitted to con- tions. tinue unchecked over the long term, will these trends, we could reach a point in undermine the essential military balance Soviet Research and Development the foreseeable future where we would and the mutuality of vulnerability on on Advanced Defenses. For over two have little confidence in our assessment which deterrence theory has rested. decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a of the state of the military balance or wide range of strategic defensive ef- imbalance, with all that implies for our Soviet Offensive Improvements. forts, integrating both active and pas- ability to control escalation during The Soviet Union remains the principal sive elements. The resulting trends have crises. threat to our security and that of our shown steady improvement and expan- allies. As a part of its wide-ranging ef- sion of Soviet defensive capability. Fur- fort further to increase its military thermore, current patterns of Soviet capabilities, the Soviet Union’s improve- research and development, including a ment of its ballistic missile force, pro- longstanding and intensive research providing increased prompt, hard-target kill gram in many of the same basic tech- capability, has increasingly threatened nological areas which our SDI program the survivability of forces we have will address, indicate that these trends deployed to deter aggression. It has will continue apace for the foreseeable posed an especially immediate challenge future. If unanswered, continued Soviet to our land-based retaliatory forces and defensive improvements will further to the leadership structure that com- erode the effectiveness of our own ex- mands them. It equally threatens many isting deterrent, based as it is now critical fixed installations in the United almost exclusively on the threat of States and in allied nations that support nuclear retaliation by offenseive forces, the nuclear retaliatory and conventional Therefore, this longstanding Soviet pro- forces which provide our collective abili- gram of defensive improvements, in ty to deter conflict and aggression. itself, poses a challenge to deterrence Improvement of Soviet Active which we must adress, Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet Soviet Noncompliance and Union has continued to pursue strategic Verification. Finally, the problem of advantage through the development and Soviet noncompliance with arms control improvement of active defenses. These agreements in both the offensive and active defenses provide the SOViet Union defensive areas, including the ABM a steadily increasing capability to Treaty, is a cause of very serious con- counter U. S. retaliatory forces and those cern. Soviet activity in constructing of our allies, especially if our forces either new. phased-array radar near were to be degraded by a Soviet first Krasnoyarsk, in Central Siberia, has 305 join us in negotiating significant reduc- The Soviet Union recognizes the move forward in a stable way. We have tions in the nuclear arsenals of both potential of advanced defense con- already begun the process of bilateral sides. cepts—especially those involving boost, discussion in Geneva needed to lay the In addition to the U.S. strategic postboost, and mid-course defenses—to foundation for the stable integration of modernization program, NATO is change the strategic situation. In our in- advanced defenses into the forces of modernizing its longer range vestigation of the potential these both sides at such time as the state of intermediate-range nuclear forces systems offer, we do not seek superiori- the art and other considerations may (LRINF). our British and French allies ty or to establish a unilateral advantage. mak% it desirable to do so. also have underway important programs However, if the promise of SDI tech- to improve their own national strategic nologies is proven, the destabilizing The Soviet Union’s View of SDI nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.S. SDI Soviet advantage can be redressed. And, research program does not negate the in the process, deterrence will be As noted above, the U.S.S.R. has long necessity of these U. S. and allied pro- strengthened significantly and placed on had a vigorous research, development, grams. Rather, the SDI research pro- a foundation made more stable by reduc- and deployment program in defensive gram depends upon our collective and ing the role of ballistic missile weapons systems of all kinds. In fact, over the national modernization efforts to main- and by placing greater reliance on last two decades the Soviet Union has tain peace and freedom today as we ex- defenses whicb threaten no one. invested as much overall in its strategic plore options for future decision on how Negotiation and Diplomacy. During defenses as it has in its massive we might enhance security and stability the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a strategic offensive buildup. As a result, over the longer term, today it enjoys certain important advan- radical reduction in the power of ex- tages in the area of active and passive New Deterrent Options. However, isting and planned offensive nuclear defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly over the long run, the trends set in mo- arms, as well as the stabilization of the attempt to protect this massive, long- tion by the pattern of Soviet activity, relationship between nuclear offensive term investment. and the Soviets’ persistence in that pat- and defensive arms, whether on earth or tern of activity, suggest that continued in space. We are even now looking for- long-term dependence on offensive ward to a period of transition to a more Allied Views Concerning SDI stable world, with greatly reduced levels forces may not provide a stable basis for Our allies understand the military con- of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability deterrence. In fact, should these trends text in which the Strategic Defense Ini- to deter war based upon the increasing be permitted to continue and the Soviet tiative was established and support the investment in both offensive and defen- contribution of non-nuclear defenses SDI research program. Our common against offensive nuclear arms. A world sive capability proceed unrestrained and understanding was reflected in the state- free of the threat of military aggression unanswered, the resultant condition ment issued following President and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate could destroy the theoretical and em- Reagan’s meeting with Prime Minister objective to which we, the Soviet Union, pirical foundation on which deterrence Thatcher in December, to the effect and all other nations can agree. has rested for a generation. that: Therefore, we must now also take To support these goals, we will con- steps to provide future options for en- tinue to pursue vigorously the negotia- First, the U.S. and Western aim suring deterrence and stability over the tion of equitable and verifiable agree- was not to achieve superiority but to long term, and we must do so in a way ments leading to significant reductions maintain the balance, taking account of that allows us both to negate the of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do Soviet developments; destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive so, we will continue to exercise flexibili- Second, that SDI-related deploy- forces and to channel longstanding ty concerning the mechanisms used to ment would, in view of treaty obliga- Soviet propensities for defenses toward achieve reductions but will judge these tions, have to be a matter for negotia- more stabilizing and mutually beneficial mechanisms on their abiiity to enhance tions; ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative is the security of the United States and Third, the overall aim is to enhance, specifically aimed toward these goals. In our allies, to strengthen strategic stabili- and not to undermine, deterrence; and, the near term, the SD1 program also ty, and to reduce tbe risk of war. Fourth, East-West negotiations responds directly to the ongo]ng and ex- At the same time, the SD] research should aim to achieve security with t(’r)s]~’(’ SOLIet antlt)all]stic miss]]e effort, pro~ram is and will be conducted in full reduced levels of offensive systems on i 11(’IuI i irl~ the ex)sti ng Soviet (ie~Iloy - compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the both sides. rt’search yields positive results, we will r~l~>r~ts ~wrnl]tte(i puder- the .A 13M Tr-~~tj’. 7’hls cwmrnon understanding is also ‘1’tl(’ S1 )[ rest’ ar(”h pr{)~rarn provides a consult with our allies about the poten- reflected in other- statements since r)(’(’(’ss:irj’ an(i ~)(!werfu] (iet~’rrent to any tial nex~ steps. We would then consult then-for example, the principles sug- I)(JAI’ I ($r II I S( )\r IOL (i(’(o IsI( )n to expand and negotiate, as appropriate, with the gested recently I)y the Federai Reput)]ic ral Il(ilj Its ar}t II K{]] ist IC rnlssilt’ (Iapat)ility Sovit’t Union, pursuant to the terms of of Germany that: t)(’}(~mi ttmt (or}t(’rr)pl:it( ~(i I)y the ABM the ABLM Treaty, which provide for such ‘1’rf’a~y ‘1’hts, 111 Its(’lL’, is a (>r]tlca[ Msk. consultations, on how deterrence might ● The existing NATO strate~q of [](JW’t’\’(’1”, L})L’ OY’C’rrl(liIlg, Iong-tt’rnl i~l- Iw strengthened through the phased in- flexit)le response must remain fully valid portar](c of S1 )] 1s that it f)fft’rs the tro(iuction of defensive systems into the for the alliance as long as there is no ~)1 ,sslt)lllt} ( )f r-ever-sing the (iangerous force structures of both sides. Th]s con)- more effective alternative for preventing III I 1 I [ the Smrkts a veto ()\fer the outcome ● The alliance’s politiml and rt’f)((’ :Ln(l t )y I Ir(~L.11~ I n~ II(IW and compel- any rn( )r(’ than t ht’ Sov]ets ha~’e u ~’et( ) st rat~y,nc unitj’ must be safqpardwi. 1 i t~~ Ir)(x’r)cli(’s I(I t})(’ S()\Ict I Jnion for otft~ r tJU r current stratcgl( am! I n Ler - There must he no zones of different s(IrI~ I I IS I L n(’~r( )t lat I n~ r( Y I IIct I( II)S II) (’x- m~wiiate-rangtl pr{)~wams. ( )ur m)mn]lt- ~ j tyq-(~es of swu rit y i n the al I ian(’e, and I > [ 1 I I g I ) i’t’( ‘ I 1> I i t’ ! i U(’](’; ( 1’ :1!’S[ ‘ 11;1] S rnc’ nL in this regard refit’(”ts ( )U r rec( )~n I h;uro~w’s se(urit) “must not be dw’~mp!ed t ior) that, If our rtwear(’h jIItJl(is :ip- from that of NI lrt h America I)to[)riatc results , W’t’ Sh( )lll(i S(wk to 306

SDI Key Points Some options which could provide in- defensive systems–whether ground- Following are a dozen key points that terim capabilities may be available based or space-based and with what capture the direction and scope of the earlier than others, and prudent plan- capabilities—that might prove feasible program: ning demands that we maintain options and desirable to develop and deploy. against a range of contingencies. How- Discussion of the various tech- 1. The aim of SDI is not to seek ever, the primary thrust of the SDI nologies under study is certainly needed superiority but to maintain the research program is not to focus on to give concreteness to the understand- strategic balance and thereby assure generating options for the earliest ing of the research program. However, stable deterrence. development/deployment decision but op- speculation about various types of defen- A central theme in Soviet propagan- tions which best meet our identified sive systems that might be deployed is da is the charge that SDI is designed to criteria. inappropriate at this time. The SDI is a secure military superiority for the broad-based research program in- United States. Put in the proper context 4. Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be vestigating many technologies. We cur- of the strategic challenge that we and rently see real merit in the potential of our allies face, our true goals become ob- desirable only if they are survivable and cost effective at the margin. advanced technologies providing for a vious and clear. Superiority is certainly layered defense, with the possibility of not our purpose. Nor is the SDI pro- Two areas of concern expressed about SDI are that deployment of defen- negating a ballistic missile at various gram offensive in nature. The SDI pro- points after launch. We feel that the gram is a research program aimed at sive systems would harm crisis stability and that it would fuel a runaway pro- possibility of a layered defense both seeking better ways to ensure U.S. and enhances confidence in the overall allied security, using the increased con- liferation of Soviet offensive arms. We have identified specific criteria to ad- system and compounds the problem of a tribution of defenses—defenses that potential aggressor in trying to defeat threaten no one. dress these fears appropriately and directly. such a defense. However, the paths to 2. Research will last for some Our survivability criterion responds such a defense are numerous. years. We intend to adhere strictly to to the first concern. If a defensive Along the same lines, some have ABM Treaty limitations and will insist system were not adequately survivable, asked about the role of nuclear-related that the Soviets do so as well. an adversary could very well have an in- research in the context of our ultimate We are conducting a broad-based centive in a crisis to strike first at goal of non-nuclear defenses. While our research program in full compliance vulnerable elements of the defense. Ap- current research program certainly em- with the ABM Treaty and with no deci- plication of this criterion will ensure that phasizes non-nuclear technologies, we sion made to proceed beyond research. such a vulnerable system would not be will continue to explore the promising The SDI research program is a complex deployed and, consequently, that the concepts which use nuclear energy to one that must be carried out on a broad Soviets would have no incentive or pros- power devices which could destroy front of technologies. It is not a pro- pect of overwhelming it. ballistic missiles at great distances. Fur- gram where all resource considerations Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ther, it is useful to study these concepts are secondary to a schedule. Instead, it ensure that any deployed defensive to determine the feasibility and effec- is a responsible, organized research pro- system would create a powerful incen- tiveness of similar defensive systems gram that is aggressively seeking cost- tive not to respond with additional offen- that an adversary may develop for use effective approaches for defending the sive arms, since those arms would cost against future U.S. surveillance and United States and our allies against the more than the additional defensive defensive or offensive systems. threat of nuclear-armed and conven- capability needed to defeat them. This is 6. The purpose of the defensive tionally armed ballistic missiles of all much more than an economic argument, options we seek is clear—to find a ranges. We expect that the research will although it is couched in economic means to destroy attacking ballistic proceed so that initial development deci- terms. We intend to consider, in our missiles before they can reach any of sions could be made in the early 1990s. evaluation of options generated by SDI their potential targets. 3. We do not have any precon- research, the degree to which certain We ultimately seek a future in which ceived notions about the defensive op- types of defensive systems, by their nations can live in peace and freedom, tions the research may generate. We nature, encourage an adversary to try secure in the knowledge that their na- will not proceed to development and simply to overwhelm them with additional security does not rest upon the deployment unless the research in- tional offensive capability while other threat of nuclear retaliation. Therefore, dicates that defenses meet strict systems can discourage such a counter the SDI research program will place its effort. We seek defensive options which criteria. emphasis on options which provide the The United States is pursuing the provide clear disincentives to attempts basis for eliminating the general threat to counter them with additional offen- broadly based SDI research program in posed by ballistic missiles. Thus, the goal sive forces. an objective manner. We have no pre- of our research is not, and cannot be, In addition, we are pressing to conceived notions about the outcome of simply to protect our retaliatory forces reduce offensive nuclear arms through the research program. We do not an- from attack. the negotiation of equitable and ticipate that we will be in a position to If a future president elects to move verifiable agreements. This effort in- approach any decision to proceed with toward a general defense against development or deployment based on the cludes reductions in the number of ballistic missiles, the technological op- warheads on ballistic missiles to equal results of this research for a number of tions that we explore will certainly also years. levels significantly lower than exist to- increase the survivability of our We have identified key criteria that day. retaliatory forces. This will require a stable concept and process to manage will be applied to the results of this re- 5. It is too early in our research search whenever they become available. program to speculate on the kinds of the transition to the future we seek. The —— . .—— - - —

307

concept anti pro(’ess must be I)ased upon search program, we will seek to pro{xwi mitments tt~ maintain the forces, hoth a realistic treatment of not onlj’ U.S. hut in a stable fashion with the Soviet nuclear and conventional, that provide Soviet forces and out-year prokg-ams, ( lni~,n today’s tieterrence. 7. U.S. and allied security remains 9. It is our intention and our hope 11. For the foreseeable future, of- indivisible. The SDI program is de- that, if new defensive technologies fensive nuclear forces and the pros- signed to enhance allied security as prove feasible, we (in close and con- pect of nuclear retaliation will remain welI as U.S. security. We will continuing consultation with our allies) the Itey element of deterrence. There- tinue to work closely with our allies and the Soviets will jointly manage a fore, we musi maintain modern, flexi- to ensure that, as our research pro- transition to a more defense-reliant ble, and credible strategic nuclear gresses, allied views are carefully con- balance. forces. sidered. Soviet propagandists have accused This point reflects the fact that we This has been a fundamental par-t of the (Jnited States of reneging on com- must simultaneously use a number of U.S. policy since the inception of the mitments to prevent an arms race in tools to achieve our goals today while Strategic Defense Initiative. We ha~e space. This is clearly not true. What we looking for better ways to achieve our made a serious commitment to consult, envision is not an arms race; rather, it is goats over tlw longer term It expresses and such consultations will precede any just the opposite–a jointly marlaged ap- our h~sic rationale for sustaining the steps taken relative to the SD] research proach designed to maintain, at all (J.S. strategic modernization program program which may affect our allies. times, control over the mix of offensive and the rationale for the critically and defensive systems of tx~th sides antj needed national m(dernimtion programs 8, If and when our research therx~by increase the confi(ienre of all na- bc’in~ conducted by the (Jnited Kingdom criteria are met, and following close tions in th(j effectiveness and stability of and Fr:intw. consultation with our allies, we intend the evolving strategic hal;incc, to consult and negotiate, as appro- 12. Our ultimate goaI is to priate, with the Soviets pursuant to 10. SDI represents no change in eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By the terms of the ABM Treaty, which our commitment to deterring war and necessity, this is a very long-term provide for such consultations, on how enhancing stability. goal, which requires, as we pursue deterrence could be enhanced through Successful SDI research and devel- our SDI research, equally energetic ef- a greater reliance by both sides on opment of defense options would not forts to diminish the threat posed by new defensive systems. This commit- lead to abandonment of dt*terrence but conventional arms imbalances, both ment should in no way be interpreted as rather to an enhancement of (iet,errence through conventional force improve- according the Soviets a veto over possi- and an evolution in the w’capons of ments and the negotiation of arms ble future defensive deployments. And, deterren(’c through the contribution of reductions and confidence-building in fact, we have already been trying to defensive systems that threaten no one. measures. initiate a discussion of the offense- We would dzter a potrntaal aggressor by We fully recognize the contribution defense relationship and stahility in the rnukzng zt rleur th.ut u!e could dmy h~ m nuclear weapons make to deterring con- defense and space talks underway in the gu~ n.s b m rjht othmw~~se h<)pp /(/ ventional aggression. We equally Geneva to lay the fr)un(hition to support wh~erw rwther than rnerelq thre(zterl in{~ rerog-nize the destructiveness of war by such future possible f’< )nsultati(~ns. him wtth c~wts {(lrgf~ enough t(I ()?ltw?g}~ conventional and chemical means, and If, at some future time, the ( ~nited those guins. the need both to deter such conflict and States, in close consultation with lts U.S. polity supports tht’ basic princip- to reduce the danger posed by the threat all ies, decides to pr(~(wd with (deploy- le that our existing meth(xi of deter- of aggression]] thr~)u~h such means. ~ ment of defensive systems, we intend to rc’n(”e and NAT()’s existin~ st rat~~~” ( )f utilize n~echanisms f(~r b’. S, - Sf~v iet u Jn- flexlble response remain full} \Talid, and Published hy the IJnlteti States Department s ultat ions ~~r< };i(lwi f< Ir if] tile A BA1 must be fullj’ sup~wrttd, as lt)ng as t ht~re of State . Bureau of Publlc Affwrs Treaty. Throug}l ~uch n~t(hanlsms, and is n<) mot-e effective alternatik.e for office t)f I’uhl Ic (’(jr~~n~~]r~l{.atl{~r~ . Editor}al taking full act’f~llnt of tht S(}vi(’t IJnion’s r~reventing war. Jt is in clear recognition I))vls]tm . W’ash]n~t,~n, D C. . June 1!)8,5 own ex ~~anslve iieft~nsi L’(J system rw of this ot)vif)us fact that the ( 1 nited ‘1’hls rnaterlal IS In tht~ I)uhl]c don]a]n and may Stat{’s (.ontlnues t{) pursut> so vi~tlr(}llsiy Iw rt’prf)(iu{,(,(i wit h{)u( [)(,rn)isslon; cltatlon of tt)ls w)urct, IS a[)l)rt,~l:lt(~(i its ~ ~wn strat(’~nt’ rn[~{i~~rn)zaf if )r) projq-am A!l(j so strl lngl~’ su~)~ )( )rts tbt’ f’ff{ )rts ( }f 1 ts :i 1 I It’s t( ) s~lsta i n t tl{’1 r < )W n (’~) m Appendix I List of Reagan Administration Statements on BMD

Abrahamson, James A., Director, Strategic De- icy, “Nuclear Strategy: Can There be a Happy fense Initiative Organization, Statement before Ending?” Foreign Affairs, spring 1985. the U.S. Senate Armed Services Subcommittee Keyworth, George A., II, Science Adviser to the on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Apr. President, Speech to the Armed Forces Commu- 24, 1984. nications and Electronics Association, Washing- Abrahamson, James A., Statement before the U.S. ton, DC, Oct. 13, 1983. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Apr. Keyworth, George A., II, “Reassessing Strategic 25, 1984. Defense, ” Speech to the Council on Foreign Re- Abrahamson, James A., Statement before the U.S. lations, Washington, DC, Feb. 15, 1984. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Sub- Keyworth, George A., II, “Ballistic Missile De- committee on International Security and Scien- fense: Current Issues, ” Speech to the Brookings tific Affairs, July 26, 1984, and subsequent Forum on the Future of Ballistic Missile De- responses to additional questions on pages fense, Washington, DC, Feb. 29, 1984. 441-466. Keyworth, George A., 11, “A Sense of Obliga- Abrahamson, James A., “The Strategic Defense tion—the Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Aero- Initiative, ” Defense/84, August 1984. space America, April 1984. Adelman, Kenneth L., Director, Arms Control and Keyworth, George A., II, Statement before the Disarmament Agency, “What’s Next for Stra- U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, tegic Stability and Arms Control, ” Speech to the Apr. 25, 1984. International Institute for Strategic Studies in Keyworth, George A., II, “Strategic Defense Ini- London, Feb. 13, 1985. tiative: The Rational Route to Effective Nuclear Cooper, Robert S., Director, Defense Advanced Arms Control, ” Government Executive, June Research Projects Agency, Statement before 1984. the U.S. Senate Armed Services Subcommittee Keyworth, George A., II, “Strategic Defense: A on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, May Catalyst for Arms Reductions, ” in Proceedings 2, 1983. of the Third Annual Seminar of the Center for DeLauer, Richard D., Under Secretary of Defense Law and National Security, University of Vir- for Research and Engineering, “The President’s ginia, Charlottesville, Va., June 23, 1984. Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Statement before Keyworth, George A., II, “The Case for Strategic the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Serv- Defense: An Option for a World Disarmed, ” is- ices Subcommittee on Research and Develop- sues in Science and Technology, fall 1984. ment, Mar. 1, 1984. Keyworth, George A., 11, “New Technologies: The DeLauer, Richard D., Statement before the U.S. Catalysts for Reductions in Nuclear Arms, ” Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 8, Speech at the University of Maryland, College 1984. Park, Md,, Sept. 5, 1984. Department of Defense, Overview of Strategic De- Keyworth, George A., II, “Today’s Big Stick: fense Initiative: Fact Sheet, Mar. 9, 1984. Technology, ” Speech to the Air Force Associa- Department of Defense, The Strategic Defense Ini- tion, Washington, DC, Sept. 17, 1984. tiative: Defensive Technologies Study, March Keyworth, George A., II, “The President’s Stra- 1984. tegic Defense Initiative, ” Speech to the SDIO Department of Defense, Defense Against Ballis- University Review Forum, Mar. 29, 1985, tic Missiles: An Assessment of Technologies and Keyworth, George A., II, “The Case for Arms Con- Policy Implications, April 1984. trol and the Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Arms Department of Defense, Report to the Congress Control Today, April 1985. on the Strategic Defense Initiative, April 1985. Keyworth, George A., II, “Security and Stability: Ikle, Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for Pol- The Role for Strategic Defense, ” Speech at the

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University of California, San Diego, May 1, Reagan, Ronald, The President Strategic De- 1985. fense Initiative, White House pamphlet issued Keyworth, George A., 11, “The President’s Stra- Jan. 3, 1985. tegic Defense Initiative, ” Speech to the Aero- Reagan, Ronald, Speech to the National Space space Association, May 21, 1985. Club, Washington, DC, Mar. 29, 1985. Keyworth, George A., 11, “SDI-Where Does the Shultz, George, Secretary of State, “Arms Con- United States Stand Now?” Speech to the Ameri- trol: Objectives and Prospects, ” Speech to the can Security Council Foundation, June 4, 1985. Austin, Texas, Council on Foreign Relations, McFarlane, Robert C., Assistant to the President Mar. 28, 1985. for National Security Affairs, “Strategic De- Weinberger, Caspar W., Secretary of Defense, fense Initiative, ” Speech to the Overseas News conference on the Strategic Defense Ini- Writers Association, Washington, DC, Mar. 7, tiative, Mar, 27, 1984. 1985. Weinberger, Caspar W., Speech at the Foreign McFarlane, Robert C., Interview, U.S. News and Press Center, Washington, DC, Dec. 19, 1984. World Report, Mar. 18, 1985, pp. 25-26. Weinberger, Caspar W., Speech to the American Nitze, Paul H., Special Adviser to the President Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, DC, and the Secretary of State for Arms Reductions, Apr. 11, 1985. “On the Road to a More Stable Peace, ” Speech White House, Fact Sheet on The Strategic Defense to the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, World Affairs Initiative, issued June 1, 1985, 11 pp. Council, Feb. 20, 1985. Yonas, Gerold, Chief Scientist, Strategic Defense Nitze, Paul H., “The Objectives of Arms Control, ” Initiative Organization, “The Reagan Strategic Speech to the International Institute for Stra- Defense Initiative, ” Daedalus, spring 1985. tegic Studies in London, Mar. 28, 1985. Yonas, Gerold, “Strategic Defense Initiative: The Reagan, Ronald, “Defense Spending and Defen- politics and science of weapons in space, ” sive Technology, ” Speech on nationwide tele- Physics Today, June 1985, pp. 24-32 vision, Mar. 23, 1983. Appendix J Articles by Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative

Ball, George, “The War for Star Wars, ” The New Drell, Sidney, Philip J. Farley, and David Hollo- York Review of Books, Apr. 11, 1985, pp. 38-44. way, “Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique Bethe, Hans A., et al., “Space-Based Ballistic Mis- of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative, ” In- sile Defense, ” Scientific American, October ternational Security, 9(2):51-91, fall, 1984. 1984, pp. 39-49. Drell, Sidney, and Wolfgang K.H, Panofsky, “The Boutwell, Jeffrey, and Richard A. Scribner, The Case Against Strategic Defense: Technical and Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Arms Con- Strategic Realities, ” Issues in Science and Tech- trol Implications, American Association for the nology, fall 1984. Advancement of Science, Washington, DC, May Garwin, Richard L., “Countermeasure: Defeating 1985, 44 pp. Space-based Defense, ” Arms Control Today, Brown, Harold, “The Strategic Defense Initiative: May 1985. Defensive Systems and the Strategic Debate, ” Garwin, Richard L., “How Many Orbiting Lasers Survival, March/April 1985, pp. 55-64. Also for Boost-Phase Intercept?” Nature, May 23, printed in Discussion Paper No. 104, California 1985, pp. 286-290. Seminar on International Security and Foreign Garwin, Richard L., et al., The Fallacy of Star Policy, Santa Monica, Calif., March 1985. Wars, Random House, 1984. Bundy, McGeorge, et al., “The President’s Choice: Garwin, Richard, et al., “Space Weapons, ” Bul]e- Star Wars or Arms Control, ” Foreign Affairs, tin of the Atom”c Scientists, May 1984. 63:264-278, winter 1984/85. Glaser, Charles L., “Why Even Good Defenses Burrows, William E., “Ballistic Missile Defense: May Be Bad, ” International Security 9(2):92- The Illusion of Security, ” Foreign Affairs, 123, fall 1984. Abridged version appears in Bul- 62:843-856, spring 1984. letin of the Atomu”c Scientists, March 1985, pp. Chayes, Abram, “Treaties and Legal Issues, ” 13-16. Speech on ballistic missile defense at Sympo- Hartung, William D., et al., The Strategic Defense sium on Space, National Security and C-cubed- Initiative: Costs, Contractors and Conse- 1, The Mitre Corporation, Bedford, Mass., Oct. quences, Council on Economic Priorities, New 25, 1984. Mitre Document M85-3, pp. 29-32. York, 1985. Clausen, Peter A., “SDI in Search of A Mission, ” Hoopes, Townsend, “The Star Wars Proposal, ” World Policy Journal, spring 1985, pp. 249-303, CIV9 Reports, The Committee for National Secu- Clifford, Clark, Testimony before the Committee rity, Washington, DC, winter 1985. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representa- Jacky, Jonathan, “The ‘Star Wars’ Defense Won’t tives, May 1, 1985. Compute, ” The Atlantic Monthly, June 1985, Drell, Sidney, and Thomas H. Johnson, eds., Stra- pp. 18-30. tegic Missile Defense: Necessities, Prospects, Kaiser, Robert G., “A Disarming Lack of Candor, ” and Dangers in the Near Term, Report of a The Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1985. workshop at the Center for International Secu- Krauthammer, Charles, “The Illusion of Stm- rity and Arms Control, Stanford University, Wars, ” The New Republic, May 14, 1984, pp. April 1985, 23 pp. Also printed in Hearings of 13-17. the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nu- League of Women Voters, “Space-Age Defense: clear Forces, Committee on Armed Services, Pipe Dream or Protection?” National Voter, U.S. Senate, March 19, 1985. League of Women Voters, Washington, DC, Drell, Sidney, Philip J. Farley, and David Hollo- spring 1985, pp. 1-8. way, The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Longstreth, Thomas K., John E. Pike, and John A Techm”cal, Poh”tical, and Arms Control Assess- B. Rhinelander, The Impact of U.S. and Soviet ment, Center for International Security and Bti”stic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Arms Control, Stanford University, 1984, 142 Treaty, National Campaign to Save the ABM PP” Treaty, Washington, DC, March 1985, 99 pp.

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McNamara, Robert S., and Hans A. Bethe, “Re- M85-3, pp. 55-62. See also pp. 959-961 in Mr. ducing the Risk of Nuclear War, ” The Atlantic Schlesinger’s article “The Eagle and the Bear, ” Monthly, July 1985, pp. 43-51. Foreign Affaks, summer 1985. McNamara, Robert S., Testimony before the Com- Sedacca, Sandra, and Robert DeGrasse, Star mittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Rep- Wars: Questions and Answers on the Space resentatives, May 1, 1985. Weapons Debate, Common Cause, Washington, Paine, Christopher, “The ABM Treaty: Looking DC, February 1985, 36 pp. for Loopholes, ” Bulletin of the Atonu”c Scien- Sewall, Sarah, “Militarizing the Last Frontier: The tists, August/September 1983, pp. 13-16. Space Weapons Race,’” Defense Monitor, Vol. Pike, John, The Strate~”c Defense Im”tiative 12, No. 5, 1983, Center for Defense Information, Budget and Program, Federation of American Washington, DC, 8 pp. Scientists, Washington, DC, July 1985. Sherr, Alan B., Legal Issues of the “Star Wars” Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., “The Strategic De- Defense Program, Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear fense Initiative: Perception vs Reality, ” Physics Arms Control, Inc., Boston, Mass., June 1984. Today, June 1985, pp. 34-45. Stein, Jonathan, From Z1-Bomb to Star Wars: The Rathjens, George, and Jack Ruina, “The Uncer- Politics of Strategic Decision Making, Lexing- tainty of Ballistic Missile Defense, ” DaecfaZus, ton Books, 1984. summer 1985. Stone, Jeremy, “The Four Faces of Star Wars: Rathjens, George, “The Strategic Defense Initia- Anatomy of a Debate, ” F.A.S. Public Interest tive: The Imperfections of ‘Perfect Defense ’,” Report: Journal of the Federation of American Environment, June 1984, pp. 6-13. Scientists, March 1985, Rhinelander, John B., “How to Save the ABM Articles by Richard L. Garwin, Spurgeon M. Treaty, ” Arms Control Today, May 1985. Keeny, Jr., and George Rathjens in Ashton B. Schlesinger, James R., Speech on ballistic missile Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds,, Ballistic defense at Symposium on Space, National Secu- Missile Defense, The Brookings Institution, rity and C-cubed-I, The Mitre Corporation, Bed- 1984. ford, Mass., Oct. 25, 1984. Mitre Document Appendix K Excerpts From Soviet Statements on BMD

The Soviet reaction to President Reagan’s Our conclusion is quite pessimistic; It will lead to March 23, 1983, speech was prompt and strongly a new round in the arms race and will increase the 2 negative. Four days after the speech was given, emphasis on developing first-strike weapons. the Soviet President, Yuri Andropov, denounced Following are excerpts from an article by President Reagan’s proposal to develop new types another prominent Soviet scientist, Yevgeny P. of BMD systems, Andropov said the idea of defen- Velikhov, a vice-president of the Soviet Academy sive measures might seem attractive to the unin- of Sciences: formed, but: . . . [The deployment of a BMD system] would In fact, the strategic offensive forces of the significantly complicate the maintenance of deter- United States will continue to be developed and rence, making it highly unstable, for it would stim- upgraded at full tilt and along quite a definite line ulate the illusion of advantages (damage limitation at that, namely that of acquiring a nuclear first and even a chance for surviving nuclear war) asso- strike capability. Under these conditions, the in- ciated with a first strike. . . . [I]f both sides pos- tention to secure itself the possibility of destroy- sessed space-based [BMD] systems the destabilizing, with the help of the ABM defenses, the cor- ing effect would be much greater than if such responding strategic systems of the other side, systems were available to only one side. In the con- that is, of rendering it unable to deal a retaliatory text of strategic logic (without considering psycho- strike, is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the logical and political aspects) this thinking arises face of the U.S. nuclear threat. . . [It] is only from the fact that if both sides had these systems, mutual restraint in the field of ABM defenses that their impetus for a preemptive first strike would will allow progress in limiting and reducing of- be greater, since each side could hope to secure an fensive weapons, that is in checking and reversing advantage by striking first. the strategic arms race as a whole. Today, how- . . . The development of [space-based anti- ever, the United States intends to sever this inter- missile systems] could stimulate an increase in the connection. Should this conception be converted arsenals of strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear into reality, this would actually open the flood- warheads, for example, strategic cruise missiles, gates of a runaway race of all types of strategic including sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles arms, both offensive and defensive. Such is the real . . . If tests of the space-based systems were to be- purport, the seamy side, so to say, of Washing- gin, to say nothing of their actual deployment, the ton’s “defensive conception.”* permanent ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, would be threatened. . . . It is hard to overestimate These themes have been reiterated vigorously the importance of this U.S.-Soviet Treaty today and persistently ever since by Soviet newspaper for it remains the only ratified and acting agree- commentators, scientists, diplomats, and senior ment in the area of strategic arms limitation, . . . officials. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty would in turn In an interview with U.S. News and World Re- undoubtedly lessen chances for reaching mutually port in April 1984, the Director of the Soviet In- beneficial strategic arms limitation and reduction stitute of Space Research, Roald Sagdeyev, com- agreements in the near future. The stabilizing re- mented on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative gime created by the 1972 ABM Treaty could be as follows: strengthened significantly by agreements on the non-deployment in space of any weapons and the We have made a detailed analysis. We believe non-use of force in space. that even if it would be possible to build such a *** system—a very expensive system—it would not [Space-based BMD systems] would inevitably prove to be an absolute shield. Its penetrability become a serious obstacle for U.S.-Soviet cooper- would remain quite high. ation in the peaceful uses of space, Yet the poten- It will always be possible–and at a lower cost– tial value of such cooperation is important from to interfere with such a system or to foil it by in- economic, scientific and technological points of creasing the number of attacking weapons, view, because of the many mutually complemen- A space-based defense system would prove to tary characteristics of the Soviet and U.S. space be extraordinarily destabilizing. When those who programs. Cooperation in this area could be a very command such a system understand that it does positive factor, politically and psychologically, in not provide 100 percent protection, they might be improving U.S.-Soviet relations in general, and in seduced by the idea of attempting a first strike, —— — ‘FFrom I)ra}’da, Mar. 27, 1983. 2U. S. News and N’orld Report, Apr. 23, 1984, p. 50.

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strengthening the confidence between the peoples amining the question of . . . averting an arms race and the leaders of the two great powers. in space. In the end the American side agreed to The potential impact of a large-scale space-based adopt such a viewpoint. This fact is a positive one. anti-missile program on the strategic balance . . . [Preventing “militarization of space” means] would be to substantially increase both the risk arms intended for use against targets in space of a preemptive strike and the likelihood of wrong should be banned categorically and also that arms and fatal decisions in crises. Hence even if rough intended for use from space against. . . targets on parity in strategic forces were preserved, strate- the ground, in the sea and in the air should be gic stability would be seriously undermined.’ banned categorically. In August 1983 the Soviet Union formally pro- *** posed at the United Nations General Assembly a [If] accords [on preventing militarization of revised draft treaty on “The Prohibition of the Use space] became clear, then it would be possible to of Force in Outer Space and From Space Against move forward also on questions of strategic arma- the Earth.’” The provisions of this draft would ban ments. The Soviet Union would be willing not only space-based weapons, anti-satellite systems, and to examine this problem of strategic armaments military use of manned spacecraft. but would also be willing to reduce them sharply. Former Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko . . . And on the contrary, if there were no movement forward in space questions, then it would be issued several statements on ballistic missile de- superfluous even to speak about the possibility of fense. Following are illustrative excerpts: a reduction in strategic armaments. We are resolutely against the development of *** broad-scale antimissile defense systems, which cannot be viewed in any other way than as aimed We are told this: After all, the United States at the unpunished perpetration of nuclear aggres- does not have the intention of striking a blow at sion. There is an indefinite Soviet-American treaty the Soviet Union. We tell them: Well, then, it fol- on antimissile defense, prohibiting the creation of lows that the Soviet Union must rely on your con- such systems. It must be rigorously observed. s science, on the conscience of Washington. Well, first of all, we are not very convinced that Wash- Today, no limitation and, all the more, no reduc- ington has very great reserves of this merchan- tion of nuclear arms can be attained without ef- dise. . . . And second, if we were to mentally trade fective measures that would prevent the militari- places with you, . . . if we were trying to create zation of outer space. . . Using the term “defense” such a system, corresponding statements, state- is juggling with words. In its substance, this is an ments to the effect that: You should rely on our . . . aggressive concept. The aim is to try to dis- conscience. Would they be sufficient for you? Si- arm the other side and deprive it of a capability lence. Silence. to retaliate in the event of nuclear aggression *** against it. To put it simply, the aim is to acquire a capa- [The] chief barrier that separates the policy of bility to deliver a nuclear strike, counting on im- the Soviet Union from that of the United States punity with an anti-ballistic missile shield to pro- is atomic weapons. . . . [Reaching agreement at the tect oneself from retaliation. . . . [U.S. BMD Geneva negotiations] would therefore undoubtedly deployment not only would mean] the end of the denote a big step forward in matters relating to process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction, improving bilateral Soviet- U.S. relations, espe- but [it] would become a catalyst of an uncontrolled cially if one takes account of the fact that both arms race in all fields.6 sides are major powers with broad-ranging inter- In a lengthy interview on Moscow television national interests. January 13, 1985, then Soviet Foreign Minister The June 4, 1985, issue of Pravda contained a Andrei Gromyko discussed the results of his Jan- long article on the ABM Treaty by Marshal Ser- uary 7-8 meeting with Secretary of State George gei F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General Shultz. The following excerpts refer to space Staff. Excerpts follow: weapons: The limitation, still more the reduction, of nu- . . . [It] is impossible to examine either the ques- clear arms is inconceivable in conditions of the tion of strategic armaments or the question of militarization of space. The creation and deploy- intermediate-range nuclear weapons without ex- ment in space of strike arms will inevitably lead to an increase in the quantity of, and to the qualita- ‘Yevgenlr P, Velikho\, “Effect on Strategic Stability, ” Bulletin of the tive improvement of, strategic nuclear arms. . . . Atomic .’+ientists, hlay 1984. The creation of the large-scale space ABM system 41J. N. General Assembly Document No. A138 194 ‘TASS, Dec 20, 1984. contemplated in the United States has a clear ag- “’C’hernenko Again L$’arns U.S on Space Plan, ” ,\Tet+ l’ork Times, gressive point: This system is a most important Feb. 1, 1985, p. 3. element in the integrated offensive potential of the 314

side that has created it, undermines strategic arms. The Soviet Union has already proposed a equilibrium, and provides the opportunity for the reduction of strategic offensive arms by one- United States to deliver a first strike in the hope fourth. Given the non-militarization of space, it is that the retaliatory strike against U.S. territory possible to carry out even more profound reduc- can be averted. tions. . . . For its part, the Soviet Union will per- How is the other side, the Soviet Union, sup- sistently seek in Geneva specific, mutually accept- posed to behave under these conditions? It is left able agreements that would make it possible to put with no choice; it will be forced to ensure the res- an end to the arms race and carry forward the toration of the strategic balance and to build up cause of disarmament. its own strategic offensive forces, supplementing In a speech7 in May 1985, Soviet General Chair- them with means of defense. Therefore, any at- man Mikhail S. Gorbachev said: tempts to limit strategic offensive armaments There are no people in the world who are not wor- while creating space strike means are futile. ried by the U.S. plans to militarize space. This The military-political significance of the worry is well grounded. Let us take a realistic view Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty is extremely great. This of matters: the implementation of these plans treaty is one of the foundations on which relations would thwart disarmament talks. between the sides are based. By signing it the So- Moreover, it would dramatically increase the viet Union and the United States recognized that threat of a truly global, all-destroying military con- in the nuclear age only mutual restraint in the flict. Anyone capable of an unbiased analysis of sphere of ABM systems will make it possible to the situation and sincerely wishing to safeguard advance along the path of limiting and reducing peace cannot help opposing “star wars. ” nuclear arms, that is, to curb the strategic arms race as a whole, In a nationally televised speech June 26, 1985, . . . If the [ABM Treaty] were to lapse for any Chairman Gorbachev said: reason, the foundation on which talks between the We are prepared to seek accord not only about sides on nuclear arms limitation could be based ending the arms race, but about the greatest of and conducted would disappear. This would effec- arms reductions—right up to general and complete tively mean the collapse of talks and an uncon- disarmament. At present, as you know, we are trolled arms race for decades. holding talks with the United States in Geneva. ... The U.S. Administration’s actions in creat- The task before them, as the Soviet leadership un- ing a new class of weapons—space strike means— derstands it, is to end the arms race on earth and are incompatible with the principles forming the prevent one in space, We embarked upon the ne- foundation of the ABM Treaty. By proclaiming gotiations in order to achieve these aims in prac- the “Strategic Defense Initiative” and embarking tice. But all the indications are that this is pre- on the practical implementation of a large-scale cisely what the U.S. Administration, and the anti-ballistic missile system with space-based ele- military-industrial complex which it serves, do not ments, Washington is effectively working directly want. The attainment of serious accords evidently to undermine the treaty. does not enter into their plans, They are continu- *** ing to implement their gigantic program of forcing through the production of more and more new [U.S. leaders] are saying that the U.S. actions types of weapons of mass destruction in the hope running counter to the treaty can somehow be of achieving superiority over the countries of so- legitimized, for instance, by revising this docu- cialism, and dictating their will to them. The ment and making amendments to it agreed with Americans have not only failed to put forward any the Soviet side. . . . serious proposals in Geneva for curtailing the arms All this is merely an unworthy ploy aimed at race, but on the contrary, are taking steps that reassuring public opinion. . . . The United States make such a curtailment impossible. I am think- is working toward changing the meaning of the ing of the so-called “star wars” program to cre- Treaty itself and emasculating it of its main ate offensive space weapons. Talk of its supposed content—the ban on the deployment of an ABM defensive nature is, of course, a fairy tale for the defense of the country’s territory. gullible. The idea is to attempt to paralyze the So- The Soviet Union, of course, will not coun- viet Union’s strategic arms and guarantee the op- tenance the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Sys- portunity of an unpunished nuclear strike against tems being transformed into a cover for U.S. pol- our country. icy aimed at ensuring an arms race in the sphere This is the essence of the matter, and one which of space anti-ballistic missile systems. we cannot fail to take into account. If the Soviet . . . If space strike arms are banned, and prep- Union is faced with a real threat from space, it will arations for their creation are halted at the stage find a way to effectively counter it. Let no one, and of scientific research work, broad opportunities will be opened up for a radical reduction of nuclear ‘TASS, May 27, 1985, — —

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I say this quite definitely, doubt this. For the time and deployment of space attack systems. Such a being, one thing is clear –that is, that the Ameri- ban would make it possible not only to preserve can program for the militarization of space plays outer space for peaceful development, research, the role of a blank wall. barring the way to the and scientific discoveries, but also to launch the achievement in Geneva of the relevant accords. process of sharply reducing, then eliminating nu- By its militarist policy the U.S. Administration clear weapons. is assuming a grave responsibility to mankind. If We have also repeatedly taken unilateral steps our partners at the Geneva talks continue with which have been called upon to set a good exam- their line of playing for time at the meetings of ple to the United States. It is for two years now the delegations, avoiding a solution of the ques- that the Soviet Union has maintained its morato- tions for which they have assembled and using this rium on the placement of anti-satellite weapons in time to push ahead with their military programs outer space, and it will continue abiding by it for in space, on the ground, and at sea, we shall then as long as the other states will be acting in the of course have t o assess the whole situation anew. same way. Lying on the table in Washington is our We simply cannot allow the talks to be used again proposal for both sides to put a total end to efforts to divert attention and to cover up military prep- to develop new anti-satellite systems and for such arations, whose purpose is to secure U.S. strate- systems already possessed by the U.S.S.R. and the gic superiority}’ and achieve world dominance. In United States, including those whose testing has rebuffing these schemes, I am confident that we not yet been completed, to be scrapped. The ac- will be supported by the really peace-loving forces tions of the American side wilt show already in the throughout the whole world and that we will be near future which decision the U.S. Administra- supported by the Soviet people. tion will prefer. In a letter’ sent July 5, 1985, to American scien- Strategic stability and trust would, no doubt, tists, Chairman Gorbachev said: be strengthened if the United States agreed to- . . . on behalf of the Soviet leadership I want to gether with the U.S.S.R. in a binding form to re- state in all definiteness that the Soviet Union will affirm commitment to the regime of the Treaty on not be the first to make a step into outer space the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, with weapons. We shall make every effort to con- a treaty of unlimited duration. vince other countries, and above all the United The Soviet Union is not developing attack space States of America, not to make such a fatal step weapons or a large-scale ABM system, just as it which would inevitably increase the threat of nu- is not laying the foundation for such a defense. It clear war and would give an impetus to the uncon- strictly adheres to its obligations under the treaty trolled arms race in all directions. as a whole and, in its particular aspects, unswerv- Proceeding from this goal, the Soviet Union, as ingly observes the spirit and the letter of that doc- you evidently know, has made a radical proposal ument of paramount importance. We invite the in the United Nations organization, tabling a draft American leadership to join us in that undertak- treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in ing, [and] renounce the plans of space militariza- space and from space against earth. If the United tion that are now in the making, plans which would States joined the vast majority of states that have invariably lead to the breakup of that document— supported this initiative, the issue of space weap- the key link of the entire process of nuclear arms ons could be closed once and for all. limitations. At the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and The U.S.S.R. proceeds from the premise that the space arms in Geneva we are seeking to come to practical fulfillment of the task of preventing an terms on a full ban on the development, testing, arms race in space and terminating it on earth is possible given the political will and sincere desire of both sides to work toward attaining that historic goal. The Soviet Union has such a desire and such a will. . . . Appendix L References on Strategic Nuclear Policy

This list represents an effort to select a repre- ment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Cen- sentative sampling of the voluminous literature on ter for International Security and Arms Control, this subject. Lawrence Freedman’s book contains 1984.) an extensive bibliography. Dyson, Freeman, Weapons and Hope (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). Books Ford, Daniel, The Button: The Pentagon Stra- Allison, Graham T., Albert Carnesale, and Joseph te~”c Command and Control System (New York: S. Nye, Jr., eds., Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Simon and Schuster, 1985). Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York: Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear W. W. Norton, 1985). Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981). Berman, Robert P., and John C. Baker, Soviet Frei, Daniel, and Christian Catrina, Risks of Um”n- Strate@”c Forces: Requirements and Responses tentiond Nuclear War (London: Taylor and (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982). Francis, 1982). Blair, Bruce G., Strategic Command and Control: Gallis, Paul E., Mark M. Lowenthal, and Marcia Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington: S. Smith, The Strate~”c Defense Initiative and The Brookings Institution, 1985). United States AU”ance Strategy, Report No. 85- Blechman, Barry M., cd., Rethinking the U.S. 48-F (Washington: Congressional Research Strategic Posture (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, Service, U.S. Congress, February 1, 1985). 1982). Garwin, Richard L., Kurt Gottfried, and Henry W. Boutwell, Jeffrey, Donald Hafner, and Franklin A. Kendall, The Fallacy of Star Wars (New York: Long, eds., Weapons in Space: The Politics and Random House, 1984). Technology of Balh”stic Missile Defense and Gompert, David C., et al., Nuclear Weapons and Anti-Satellite Weapons (New York: W.W. Nor- World Politics: Alternatives for the Future (New ton, 1985). (Also published in the spring 1985 York: McGraw-Hill, 1977). and summer 1985 issues of Daeda.Zus.) Graham, Daniel O., High Frontier: A New Na- Bracken, Paul, The Command and Control of Nu- tiomd Strategy (Washington: High Frontier, clear Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale University 1982). Press, 1983. Graham, Daniel O., and Gregory A. Fossedal, A Brodie, Bernard, Escalation and the Nuclear Op- Defense That Defends; Blocking Nuclear Attack tion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, (Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1983). 1966). Gray, Colin S., Nuclear Strategy and Strate~”c Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security Planning (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research —Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous Institute, 1984.) World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983). Green, Philip, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nu- Brown, Harold, and Lynn E. Davis, Nuclear Arms clear Deterrence (Columbus, OH: Ohio State Control Choices (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, University Press, 1966). 1984). Hartung, William D., et al, The Strate~”c Defense Carnesale, Albert, et al., Living with Nuclear Initiative: Costs, Contractors and Consequences Weapons (New York: Bantam Books, 1983). (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, Carter, Ashton B., and David N. Schwartz, eds., 1985), BaL%tic Missile Defense (Washington: The Herspring, Dale, and Robin Laird, The Soviet Brookings Institution, 1984). Union and Strate~”c Arms (Boulder, CO: West- Chayes, Abram, amd Jerome B. Wiesner, eds., view Press, 1984). ABM (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Davis, Jacquelyn K., et al, The Soviet Union and Race (New Haven, CO: Yale University Press, Bti”stic Missile Defense (Cambridge, MA: In- 1983). stitute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980). Huntington, Samuel P., cd., The Strate~”c Imper- Drell, Sidney D., Philip J. Farley, and David Hollo- ative: New Policies for American Security (Cam- way, The Reagan Strateg”c Defense Initiative: bridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982). A Technical, Poh’tical, and Arms Control Assess- Jasani, Bhupendra, cd., Space Weapons–The

316 317 .

Arms Control Dilemma (London: Taylor and Payne, Keith B., Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet Francis, 1984). Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). Jasani, 13hupendra, and Christopher Lee, Count- Schneider, William, Jr., et al., U.S. Strate~”c- down to Space War (London: Taylor and Francis, Nuclear Policy and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1984). The 1980s and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: Insti- Jastrow, Robert, How to Make Nuclear Weapons tute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980), Obsolete (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., Smith, Gerard, Doubletalk: The Story of the First 1985). Strate~”c Arms Limitation Talks (New York: Jervis, Robert, The Illo~”c of American Nuclear Doubleday, 1980). Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Smoke, Richard, National Securit&y and the Nu- 1984). cZear Dilemma (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, Kahan, Jerome H., Security in the Nuclear Age– 1984). Developing U.S. Strate~”c Arms Policy (Wash- Smoke, Richard, War: Controlling Escalation ington: The Brookings Institution, 1975). (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Pat McGowan, eds,, 1977). Foreign Policy: USA/U.S.S.R. (Beverly Hills, Stein, Jonathan B., From H-Bomb to Star Wars: CA: Sage Publications, 1982). The Poh”tics of Strategic Decision Making (I.ex- Kennan, George F., The Nuclear Delusion (New ington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984). York: Pantheon, 1982). Stockholm International Peace Research Insti- Krepon, Michael, Strate~”c StaZemate: Nuclear tute, The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1984 Rt’capons and Arms Control in American Poli- (London: Taylor and Francis, 1984. tics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984). Ury, William L., and Richard Smoke, Becyond the Kolkowicz, Roman, and Neil Joeck, eds., Arms Hotline: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis (Cam- Control and International Securit-v (Boulder, bridge, MA: Nuclear Negotiation Project, Har-

C(): Westview Press, 1984). vard IJaw School, 1984). I.ebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War; The Weinberger, Caspar W., Report of the Secretary Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, MD: of Defense to the Congress (Washington: De- Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). partment of Defense, February 4, 1985). Leebaert, Derek, cd., Soviet Military Thinking Weston, Burns H., cd., Toward ILTuclear Disarma- (London: George A1len and Unwin, 1981. ment and Global Securitwv: A Search for Alter- Mandelbaum, Michael, The Nuclear Question: The natives (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). Um”ted States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976 White, Ralph K., Fearful Warriors: A Ps~cholog”- (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). cal Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations (New York: Martin, Laurence, cd., Strate~”c Thought in the The Free Press, 1984). Nuc]ear Age (Baltimore, MD: ,Johns Hopkins Woito, Robert S., To End War: A New Approach University Press, 1979). to International Conflict (New York: Pilgrim MchTamara, Robert S., The Essence of Security: Press, 1982). Reflections in Office (New York: Harper and Yanarella, Ernest J., The Missile Defense Con- ROW, 1968). troversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, Nacht, Michael, The Age of Vulnerability: Threats 1955-1972 (Lexington, KY: University Press of to Nuclear Stalemate (Washington: The Brook- Kentucky, 1977). ings Institution, 1985). Yost, David S., NATO Strateg”c Options: Arms National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Arms Con- Control and Defense (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon troZ: Background and Issues (Washington: Na- Press, 1982). tional Academy Press, 1985). Nincic, Miroslav, The Arms Race: The Political Articles Economy of MiZitary Growth (New York: Prae- Abrahamson, James A., “The Strategic Defense ger, 1982). Initiative, ” Defense/84, August 1984. O’Neill, Robert and D.M. Homer, eds,, New Direc- AuCoin, Les, “Nailing Shut the Window of Vul- tions in Strategic Thinking (London: George nerability, ” Arms Control Toda~~. September Allen and Unwin, 1981). 1984. Palme, Olof, et al., Common Securit&y: A Programme Ball, Desmond, “Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?” for Disarznament (London: Pan Books Ltd., Adelphi Paper No. 169, International Institute 1982). for Strategic Studies, I.ondon, 1981. 318

Barkenbus, Jack N., and Alvin M. Weinberg, May Be Bad, ” International Security 9(2):92- “Defense-Protected Build-Down, ” Bulletin of 123, fall 1984. Abridged version appears in the Atomic Scientists, October 1984, pp. 18-23. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1985, Bethe, Hans A., et al, “Space-Based Ballistic Mis- pp. 13-16. sile Defense, Scientific American, October Gray, Colin S., “Strategic Stability Reconsidered, ” 1984, pp. 39-49. Daedalus (Journal of the American Academy of Broad, William J., “Allies in Europe Are Appre- Arts and Sciences), 109 (4):135-154, fall 1980. hensive About Benefits of ‘Star Wars’ Plan, ” Hafner, Donald, “The Strategic Defense Initiative New York Times, May 13, 1985, pp. A-1, A-6. and Nuclear Deterrence, Daedalus, spring Brown, Harold, “The Strategic Defense Initiative: 1985. Defensive Systems and the Strategic Debate, ” Hart, Douglas M., “Soviet Approaches to Crisis Survival, March/April 1985, pp. 55-64. Also Management: The Military Dimension, ” Sur- printed in Discussion Paper No. 104, California vival, 26:214-223, September/October 1984. Seminar on International Security and Foreign Howe, Sir Geoffrey, “Defence and Security in the Policy, Santa Monica, Calif., March 1985. Nuclear Age, ” Speech to the Royal United Serv- Brown, Harold, and Lynn E. Davis, “Nuclear ices Institute in London, Mar. 15, 1985. Arms Control: Where Do We Stand?” Foreign Ikle, Fred C., “Nuclear Strategy: Can There be a Affairs, 62:1145-1160, summer 1984. Happy Ending?” Foreign Affa”rs, spring 1985, Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Robert Jastrow, and Max pp. 810-826. M. Kampelman, “Defense in Space is Not Star Ikle, Fred C., “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out Wars, ” New York Times Magazine, Jan. 27, the Century?” Foreign Affairs, winter 1973. 1985. Keyworth, George A., II, “A Sense of Obliga- Bundy, McGeorge, et al, “The President’s Choice: tion—The Strategic Defense Initiative, ” Aero- Star Wars or Arms Control, ” Foreign Affa”rs, space America, April 1984, pp. 56-62. 63:264-278, winter 1984/85. Keyworth, George A., 11, “Strategic Defense Ini- Bundy, McGeorge, et al, “Nuclear Weapons and tiative: The Rational Route to Effective Nuclear the Atlantic Alliance, ” Foreign Affav”rs, 60:753- Arms Control, ” Government Executive, June 768, spring 1982. 1984. Burrows, William Il., “Ballistic Missile Defense: Keyworth, George A., II, “The Case For Strate- The Illusion of Security, ” Foreign Affa”rs, gic Defense: An Option For a World Disarmed, ” 62:843-856, spring 1984. Issues in Science and Technology, fall 1984. Clifford, Clark M., Testimony before the Commit- Krauthammer, Charles, “The Illusion of Star tee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Represent- Wars, ” The New Republic, May 14, 1984, pp. atives, May 1, 1985. 13-17. Drell, Sidney D., and Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Kupperman, Robert H., and Harvey A. Smith, “The Case Against Strategic Defense: Techni- “Strategies of Mutual Deterrence, ” Science, cal and Strat~gic Realities;’ Issues in Science 176:18-23, Apr. 7, 1972. and Technology, fall 1984, pp. 45-65. McNamara, Robert S., and Hans A. Bethe, “Re- Drell, Sidney D., Philip J. Farley, and David Hol- ducing the Risk of Nuclear War, ” The Atlantic loway, “Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique Monthly, July 1985, pp. 43-51. of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative, In- McNamara, Robert S,, Testimony before the Com- ternational Security, 9(2):51-91, fall 1984. mittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Rep- Forsberg, Randall, “Confining the Military to De- resentatives, May 1, 1985. fense as a Route to Disarmament, ” World Pol- McNamara, Robert S., “The Military Role of Nu- icy Journal, 1:285-318, winter 1984. clear Weapons: Perceptions and Mispercep- Garthoff, Raymond L., “Mutual Deterrence and tions, ” Foreign Affairs, fall 1983. Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy,” In- Murray, Russell, 2nd, “Consequences of Nuclear ternatiozxd Security, 3(1):1 12-147, summer 1978. Warfare, ” Testimony before the Joint Economic Garwin, Richard, et al, “Space Weapons, ” Bulle- Committee, U.S. Congress, July 11, 1984. tin of the Atom”c Scientists, May 1984. Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., “The Mutual Hostage George, Alexander L., “Crisis Management: The Relationship between America and Russia, ” Interaction of Political and Military Considera- Foreign Affm”rs, 52 (1):109-118, October 1973. tions, ” Survival, 26:223-235, September/October Payne, Keith B., et al, “The Strategic Defense Ini- 1984. tiative,” Orbis, summer 1984, pp. 215-256. Glaser, Charles I.., “Why Even Good Defenses Rathjens, George, and Jack Ruina, “The Uncer- 319 .

tainty of Ballistic Missile Defense, ” Daedalus, Beyond, ed. by Mason Willrich and John B. Summer 1985. Rhinelander, (New York: The Free Press, 1974). Rathjens, George, “The Strategic Defense Initia- Steinbruner, John D,, and Thomas M. Garwin, tive: The Imperfections of ‘Perfect Defense ’,” “Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance Between Environment, June 1984, pp. 6-13. Prudence and Paranoia, ” International Securitj’, Schlesinger, James R., Speech on ballistic missile 1(1):138-170, Summer 1976. defense at Symposium on Space, National Secu- Steinbruner, John D., “National Security and the rity and C-cubed-I, The Mitre Corporation, Bed- Concept of Strategic Stabilit y, Journal of Con- ford, Mass., October 25, 1984. Mitre Document flict Resolution, 22:411-428, September 1978. M85-3, pp. 55-62, Toomay, John, “The Utility of Ballistic Missile De- Scowcroft, Brent, et al, “Report of the President’s fense, ” Daedalus, Summer 1985. Commission on Strategic Forces, ” April 6, 1983. Warnke, Paul C., “Consequences of Nuclear War- Scowcroft, Brent, et al, “Second Report of the fare, ” Testimony before the Joint Economic President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, ” Committee, U.S. Congress, July 11, 1984. March 21, 1984. Yost, David S,, “Ballistic Missile Defense and the Shulman, Marshall D., “SALT and the Soviet Un- Atlantic Alliance, ” International Securit~V, Fall ion, in SALT: The Moscow Agreements and 1982, pp 143-174. Appendix M References on Soviet Strategic Policy

Berman, Robert P., and John C. Baker, Soviet Hart, Douglas M., “Soviet Approaches to Crisis Strategk Forces: Requirements and Responses Management: The Military Dimension, ” Sur- (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982). vival, 26:214-223, September/October 1984. Davis, Jacquelyn K., et al, The Soviet Um”on and Herspring, Dale, and Robin Laird, The Soviet Un- Ballistic Missile Defense (Cambridge, MA: In- ion and Strate~”c Arms (Boulder, CO: Westview stitute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980). Press, 1984), Deane, Michael J., The Role of Strategic Defense Holloway, David, “The Soviet Union and the in Sow”et Strategy (Coral Gables, FL: Advanced SDI, ” Daedalus, summer 1985. International Studies Institute in association Holloway, David, The Soviet Um”on and the Arms with the University of Miami, 1980). Race (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, Ermarth, Fritz W., “Contrasts in American and 1983). Soviet Strategic Policies, ” International Secu- Leebaert, Derek, cd., Soviet Military Thinking rity, fall 1978. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981). Garthoff, Raymond L., Detente and Confronta- Lockwood, Jonathan S., The Soviet View of U.S. tion: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Strate~”c Doctrine: Implications for Decision Reagan (Washington: The Brookings Institu- Making (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction tion, 1985). Books, 1983). Garthoff, Raymond L., “BMD and East-West Re- Meyer, Stephen M., “Soviet Military Programs lations, ” in Ashton B. Carter and David N. and the New High Ground, ” Survival, Septem- Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Wash- ber 1983, pp. 204-215. ington: The Brookings Institution, 1984). Shenfield, Stephen, “Soviets May Not Imitate Garthoff, Raymond L., “Mutual Deterrence and Star Wars, ” Bulletin of the Atom”c Scientists, Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy, ” In- June/July 1985, pp. 38-39. ternatiomd Security, 3(1):112-147, summer 1978. Shulman, Marshall D., “U.S.-Soviet Relations and Goure, Daniel, and Gordon H. McCormick, “So- the Control of Nuclear Weapons, ” in Rethink- viet Strategic Defense: The Neglected Dimen- ing the U.S. Strategic Posture, ed. by Barry M. sion of the U.S.-Soviet Balance, Orbis, spring Blechman (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982). 1980. Shulman, Marshall D., “SALT and the Soviet Un- Gray beal, Sidney, and Daniel Goure, “Soviet Bal- ion, ‘‘ in SALT: The Moscow Agreements and listic Missile Defense Objectives: Past, Present, Beyond, ed. by Mason Willrich and John B. and Future, ‘‘ in U.S. Arms Control Objectives Rhinelander (New York: The Free Press, 1974), and the Implications for Ballistic Missile De- Strode, Dan L., and Rebecca V. Strode, “Diplo- fense, Proceedings of a symposium at Harvard macy and Defense in Soviet National Security University in November, 1979 (Cambridge, MA: Policy, ” International Security, 8(2):91-1 16, fall Harvard University Center for Science and In- 1983. ternational Affairs, 1980). Walt, Stephen M., Interpreting Soviet Military Green, William C., Soviet Nuclear Weapons Pol- Statements: A Methodological Analysis, Report icy: A Research Guide (Boulder, CO: Westview No. CNA-81-O26O,1O, Center for Naval Analy- Press, 1985). ses, Alexandria, Va., December, 1983.

320 Appendix N Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

List of Acronyms Acquisition: Detection of a potential target by the sensors of a weapons system. ABM —anti-ballistic missile Active Sensor: One that illuminates a target, pro- ALCM —air-launched cruise missile ducing return secondary radiation, which is ASAT —anti-satellite then detected in order to track and/or identify BMD –ballistic missile defense the target. An example is ladar (cf.). C3I —command, control, communications, Adaptive Optics: Optical systems which can be and intelligence modified (e.g., by controlling the shape of a CONUS –continental United States mirror) to compensate for distortions. An ex- DEW –directed-energy weapon ample is the use of information from a beam of DSAT –defensive satellite light, passing through the atmosphere to com- GLCM –ground-launched cruise missile pensate for the distortion suffered by another ICBM —intercontinental ballistic missile beam of light on its passage through the atmos- IR —infrared phere. Used to eliminate the “twinkling” of IRBM —intermediate-range ballistic missile stars in observational astronomy and to reduce KEW —kinetic-energy weapon the dispersive effect of the atmosphere on laser KKV –kinetic-kill vehicle beam weapons. LWIR –long-wave infrared Air-breathing: Describing a flying weapon that MaRV —maneuverable reentry vehicle travels through the atmosphere and uses air in MIRV —multiple independently targeted its propulsion system. Examples are jet aircraft reentry vehicle and cruise missiles. Specifically does not include MILSAT–military satellite ballistic missiles. MPS —multiple protective shelters, once to Analog Processing: Problem solving in a computer be used for basing MX by means of direct manipulation of the magni- MWIR —medium-wave infrared tudes of a physical quantity. For example, the MX —experimental missile, newest addi- sizes of different voltage pulses may be com- tion to U.S. ICBM arsenal, also pared, added, subtracted, etc., in the course of called “Peacekeeper” solving a problem (cf. digital processing). PBV –post-boost vehicle Anti-satellite Weapon (ASAT): A weapon to de- RV —reentry vehicle stroy satellites in space. SDI –Strategic Defense Initiative Anti-simulation: Deceiving adversary sensors by SDIO –Strategic Defense Initiative Orga- making a strategic target look like a decoy. nization Area Defense: An ABM defense covering a large SLBM —submarine-launched ballistic missile area. Usually implies the capability to protect SLCM —sea-launched cruise missile “soft” (i.e. not hardened missile silos or bunkers) SWIR —short-wave infrared targets. UV —ultraviolet Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): A defense system that is designed to protect territory from attacking ballistic missiles. Usually conceived as Definitions of Terms having several independent layers. Battle Management: The set of instructions and Ablative Shield: A shield that evaporates when rules and the corresponding hardware control- heated, absorbing laser energy and protecting ling the operation of a BMD system, Sensors the object which is behind it from heat damage. and interceptors are allocated by the system, ABM Treaty: A Treaty of 1972, signed and ratified and the updated battle results are presented to by the Soviet Union and the United States, the (human) command for analysis and possible prohibiting development of many types of anti- intervention. ballistic missile systems and limiting deploy- Birth-to-death Tracking: The tracking of objects ments on each side to a specified number of from the time that they are deployed from a land-based units, which use only rocket inter- booster or post-boost vehicle until they are ceptors and ground-based radar. killed or detonated.

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Bistatic Radar: Radar systems in which the re- is intended to defend satellites in space by de- ceiver and transmitter are separated. stroying attacking ASAT weapons, Blackout: The disabling of radar by means of a nu- Defensive Technologies Study Team (DTST): A clear explosion. The intense electromagnetic committee, generally known as the “Fletcher energy released generates a large background Panel, ” after its Chair, appointed by President that obscures signals and renders many types Reagan to investigate the technologies of poten- of radar useless for minutes or longer. tial BMD systems. Boost Phase: The phase of a missile trajectory Diffraction: The spreading out of electromagnetic from launch to burnout of the final stage. For radiation as it leaves an aperture, such as a mir- ICBMs, this phase typically lasts from 3 to 5 ror. The angle of spread, which cannot be elimi- minutes, but studies indicate that reductions to nated by focusing, is proportional to the ratio the order of 1 minute could be possible. of the wavelength of radiation to the diameter Brightness: In this report, the amount of power of the aperture. that can be delivered per unit solid angle by a Digital Processing: The most familiar type of com- directed-energy weapon. puting, in which problems are solved through Coherence: The matching, in space and time, of the the mathematical manipulation of streams of wave structure of different parallel rays of a numbers. single frequency of electromagnetic radiation. Directed-Energy Weapon: A weapon that kills its This results in the mutual reinforcing of the target by delivering energy to it at or near the energy of these different components of a larger speed of light. Includes lasers and particle beam beam. Lasers can produce coherent radiation. weapons. Command Guidance: The steering and control of Discrimination: The ability of a defensive system a missile by transmitting commands to it. to differentiate decoys or other nonthreatening Common Mode Failure: Refers to a type of system objects from targets, e.g., a threatening booster failure in which diverse components are disabled rocket, post-boost vehicle, or RV. by the same single cause. Early Warning: In this report, early detection of Constellation Size: The number of defensive weap- an enemy ballistic missile launch, usually by on satellites placed in orbit about the Earth as means of surveillance satellites and long-range part of a BMD system. radar. Counter-countermeasures: In this report, meas- Electromagnetic Radiation: A form of propagated ures taken by the defense to defeat offensive energy, arising from electric charges in motion, countermeasures. that produces a simultaneous wavelike varia- Countermeasures: In this report, measures taken tion of electric and magnetic fields in space. The by the offense to overcome aspects of a BMD highest frequencies (or shortest wavelengths) of system. such radiation are possessed by gamma rays, Cruise Missile: A missile traveling within the which originate from processes within atomic atmosphere at aircraft speeds and, usually, low nuclei. As one goes to lower frequencies, the altitude, whose trajectory is preprogrammed. It electromagnetic spectrum includes X-rays, is capable of achieving high accuracy in strik- ultraviolet light, visible light, infrared light, ing a distant target. It is maneuverable during microwaves, and radio waves. flight, is constantly propelled, and therefore Electron-volt: The energy gained by an electron in does not follow a ballistic trajectory. Cruise mis- passing through a potential difference of one siles may be nuclear armed, but do not have to volt. be. Endoatmospheric: Within the atmosphere; an en- Dazzling: In this report, the temporary blinding doatmospheric interceptor reaches its target of a sensor by overloading it with an intense sig- within the atmosphere. nal of electromagnetic radiation, e.g., from a la- Exoatmospheric: Outside the atmosphere; an exo- ser or a nuclear explosion. atmospheric interceptor reaches its target in Decoy: An object that is designed to make an ob- space. server believe that the object is more valuable Fast-Burn Booster: A ballistic missile that can than is actually the case. Usually, in this report, burnout much more quickly than current ver- a decoy refers to a light object, not containing sions, possibly before exiting the atmosphere a warhead, designed to look like a nuclear-armed entirely. Such rapid burnout complicates a reentry vehicle. boost-phase defense. Defensive Satellite Weapon (DSAT): A device that Fission: The breaking apart of the nucleus of an 323

atom, usually by means of a neutron. For very Ionization: The removal or addition of one or more heavy elements, such as uranium, a significant electrons to a neutral atom, forming a charged amount of energy is produced by this process, ion. When controlled, this process yields energy Keep-out Zone: A volume around a space asset, off which may be extracted for civilian uses, such limits to parties not owners of the asset. Keep- as commercial electric generation. When uncon- out zones could be negotiated or unilaterally trolled, energy is liberated very rapidly: such declared. The right to defend such a zone by fission is the energy source of uranium- and force and the legality of unilaterally declared plutonium-based nuclear weapons; it also pro- zones under the Outer Space Treaty remain to vides the trigger for fusion weapons. be determined. Fratricide: The destructive effect of the earlier- Kill Assessment: The detection and assimilation detonating weapons in a barrage on those weap- of information indicating the destruction of an ons which arrive later. object under attack. Kill assessment is one of Functional Kill: The destruction of a target by dis- the many functions to be performed by a bat- abling vital components in a way not immedi- tle management system. ately detectable, but nevertheless able to pre- Kinetic-Energy Weapon: A weapon that uses ki- vent the target from functioning properly. An netic energy, or energy of motion, to kill an ob- example is the destruction of electronics in a ject. Weapons that use kinetic energy are a guidance system by a neutral particle beam. rock, a bullet, a nonexplosively armed rocket, Fusion: The fusing of two atomic nuclei, usually and an electromagnetic railgun. of light elements, such as hydrogen. For light Ladar: A technique analogous to radar, but which elements, energy is liberated by this process. uses laser light rather than radio or microwaves. Hydrogen bombs produce most of their energy The light is bounced off a target and then de- through the fusion of hydrogen into helium. tected, with the return beam providing informa- Geosynchronous Orbit: An orbit about 35,800 km tion on the distance and velocity of the target. above the Equator. A satellite placed in such Laddering Down: A hypothetical technique for an orbit revolves around the Earth once per day, overcoming a terminal phase missile defense. maintaining the same position relative to the Successive salvos of salvage-fused (cf.) RVs at- surface of the Earth. It then appears to be sta- tack. The detonations of one salvo disable local tionary, and is useful as a communications re- ABM abilities so that following salvos are able lay or as a surveillance post. to approach the target more closely before be- Hard Kill: Destruction of a target in such a way ing, in turn, intercepted. Eventually, by repeat- as to produce unambiguous visible evidence of ing the process, the target is reached and de- its neutralization. stroyed. Hardness: In this report, a property of a target, Lasant: A material that can be stimulated to pro- measured by the power needed per unit area to duce laser light. destroy the target by means of a directed- Laser: A device that produces a narrow beam of energy weapon. A hard target is more difficult coherent radiation through a physical process to kill than a soft target. known as stimulated emission. Lasers are able Homing Device: A device, mounted on a missile, to focus large quantities of energy at great dis- that uses sensors to detect the position or to tances, and are among the leading candidates help predict the future position of a target, and for BMD weapons. then directs the missile to intercept the target. Layered Defenses: The use of several layers of It usually updates frequently during the flight BMD at different phases of the missile trajec- of the missile. tory. Each layer is designed to be as independ- Impulse Kill: The destruction of a target, using ent as possible of the others, and each would directed energy, by ablative shock. The inten- probably use its own, distinctive set of missile sity of directed energy is such that the surface defense technologies. of the target violently and rapidly boils off, de- Leverage: In this report, refers to the advantage livering a mechanical shock wave to the rest of gained by boost-phase intercept, when a single the target and causing structural failure. booster kill may eliminate many RVs and de- Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR): A type coys before they are deployed. This could proof radar similar to synthetic aperture radar (cf.), vide a favorable cost-exchange ratio for the de- but which uses information from the motion of fense, and would reduce stress on later layers targets in order to provide high resolution. of the defense system. 324 — . .- — —

Limited Test Ban Treaty: The multilateral Treaty Penetration Aid: In this report, a device mounted signed and ratified by the United States and the on a post-boost vehicle with RVs, that is used U.S.S.R. in 1963 which prohibits nuclear tests to confuse defenses, It may be a decoy or any- in all locations except underground. thing else that renders more difficult the de- Megawatt: One million watts; a unit of power. A fense’s job of detecting and killing the RVs or typical commercial electric plant generates the PBV. about 500 to 1,000 megawatts. Phased-Array Radar (PAR): A radar with elements Mev: One million electron-volts. A unit of energy that are physically stationary, but with a beam usually used in reference to nuclear processes. that is electronically steerable and can switch It is equivalent to the energy that an electron rapidly from one target to another. Used for gains in crossing a potential of 1 million volts. tracking many objects, often at great distances. Micron: One-millionth of a meter (equivalently, Pointing: The aiming of sensors or defense weap- one-thousandth of a millimeter). Roughly twice ons at a target with sufficient accuracy either the wavelength of visible light. to track the target or to aim with sufficient ac- Midcourse Phase: The phase of a ballistic missile curacy to destroy it. trajectory in which the RVs travel through Post-boost Phase: The phase of a missile trajec- space on a ballistic course towards their targets. tory, after the booster’s stages have finished fir- This phase lasts up to 20 minutes. ing, in which the various RVs are independently Military Satellite (MILSAT): A satellite used for placed on ballistic trajectories towards their tar- military purposes, such as navigation or intel- gets. In addition, penetration aids (cf.) are dis- ligence gathering. pensed from the post-boost vehicle. The length Monostatic Radar: A radar system in which the of this phase is typically 3 to 5 minutes, but receiver and transmitter are colocated. could be drastically reduced. Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehi- Power Supply: In this report, a source of energy cle (MIRV): One of several RVs on the same for a BMD component. It may be ground- or post-boost vehicle that can be independently space-based, and may range from commercial placed on a ballistic course towards a target af- electric plants to space-based nuclear reactors. ter completion of the boost phase. Preferential Defense: The concentration of (usu- Multiple Phenomenology: A system using really limited) defensive assets on a subset of sites peated observations of potential targets by in order to assure the survival of some of them. means of different physical principles and differ- Preferential Offense: The concentration of offen- ent sensor systems. In the case of sensor sys- sive assets on a subset of targets. tems, the use of multiple phenomenology makes Pumping: In this report, the raising of the mole- it more difficult for an adversary to deceive cules or atoms of a lasant (cf.) to an energy state them. above the normal lowest state, in order to pro- Multistatic Radar: A radar system with a trans- duce laser light. This results when they fall back mitter and several receivers, all separated. to a lower state. Pumping may be done using Optical Processing: A type of analog processing electrical, chemical, or nuclear energy. (q.v.) in which the behavior of light beams, Redout: The blinding or dazzling of infrared detec- passed through optical systems, is used in prob- tors due to high levels of infrared radiation lem solving. produced in the upper atmosphere by a nuclear Outer Space Treaty of 1967: A signed and ratified explosion. agreement between the Soviet Union, the Reentry: The return of objects, originally launched United States, and other nations, forbidding the from Earth, into the atmosphere. basing of nuclear or other weapons of mass de- Reentry Vehicle (RV): As used in this report, reen- struction in space. try vehicles are small containers containing nu- Parallel Processing: The use of different paths in clear warheads. They are released from the last a computer to work simultaneously on different stage of a booster rocket or from a post-boost calculations needed to solve a single problem, vehicle (cf.) early in the ballistic trajectory. They thus reducing the time needed for the overall are thermally insulated to survive rapid heat- calculation. ing during the high velocities of reentry into the Passive Sensor: One that detects naturally occur- atmosphere, and are designed to protect their ring emissions from a target for tracking and/or contents until detonation at their targets. identification purposes. Responsive Threat: The threat (cf.) after taking 325

into account modernization and BMD counter- terceptor used in Safeguard/Sentinel systems measures. (cf.). Robust: In this report, describing a system, in- Sprint: Nuclear-armed short-range interceptor dicating its ability to endure and perform its used in Safeguard/Sentinel systems (cf.). mission against a reactive adversary. Also used SS-18: Largest ICBM in current Soviet inventory, to indicate ability to survive under direct credited with carrying 10 RVs, but capable of attack. holding many more. Safeguard: A U.S. midcourse and terminal-phase Stimulated Emission: Physical process by which defense for ICBMs, deployed in 1975 and deac- an excited molecule is induced by incident ra- tivated in 1976 due to its limited cost-effec- diation to emit radiation at an identical fre- tiveness. quency and in phase with the incident radiation. Salvage-fused: Describing a warhead that is set to Lasers operate by stimulated emission. detonate when it is attacked. Usually refers to Structured Attack: An attack in which the arrival a nuclear warhead. of warheads on their diverse targets is precisely Selectivity: In this report, refers to choosing a sub- timed for maximum strategic impact. set of targets, either for attack or defense. See Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR): A radar tech- preferential defense and preferential offense. nique that processes echoes of signals emitted Semi-active Sensor: One that does not generate ra- at different points along a satellite’s orbit. The diation itself, but that detects radiation re- highest resolution achievable by such a system flected by targets when they are illuminated by is theoretically equivalent to that of a single other BMD components. Such devices are used large antenna as wide as the distance between for tracking and identification and can operate the most widely spaced points along the orbit without revealing their own locations. that are used for transmitting positions. Sensors: Electronic instruments that can detect ra- Terminal Phase: The final phase of a ballistic mis- diation from objects at great distances. The in- sile trajectory, lasting about a minute or less, formation can be used for tracking, aiming, dis- in which the RVs reenter the atmosphere and crimination, attacking, kill assessment, or all of detonate at their targets. the above. Sensors may detect any type of elec- Thermal Kill: The destruction of a target by heat- tromagnetic radiation or several types of nu- ing it, using directed energy, to the degree that clear particles. structural components fail. Sentinel: ABM system designed for light area de- Threat: The anticipated inventory of enemy weap- fense against a low-level ballistic missile attack ons. In the context of this report, the inventory on the United States. Developed into the Safe- is of nuclear weapons and their delivery sys- guard (cf. ) system in late 1960s. tems, as well as of decoys, penetration aids, and Shoot-back: In this report, the technique of defend- other BMD countermeasures. ing a space asset by shooting at an attacker. Track File: Information stored in computer mem- Signature: Distinctive type of radiation emitted ory containing position coordinates and veloc- or reflected by a target, which can be used to ity components of a target. In this report, refers identify that target. to such information concerning offensive weap- Simulation: The art of making a decoy look like ons during their trajectories: e.g., boosters, a more valuable strategic target (cf. anti-simu- RVs, decoys. lation). Tracking: The monitoring of the course of a mov- Slew Time: The time needed for a weapon to reaim ing target. Ballistic objects may have their at a new target after having just fired at a pre- tracks predicted by the defensive system, using vious one. several observations and physical laws. Soft Kill: Same as functional kill. Transition: In this report, the period in which the Space Mines: Hypothetical devices that can track world strategic balance would shift from of- and follow a target in orbit, with the capability fense-dominance to defense-dominance. of exploding on command or by pre-program, Warhead: A weapon, usually a nuclear weapon, in order to destroy the target. contained in the payload of a missile. Spartan: Nuclear-armed long-range midcourse in-