Sovereignty,International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth Andreas Osiander The350th anniversary of thePeace of Westphaliain 1998 was markedby a urry ofconferences and publications by historians, but it was largelyignored in the disciplineof internationalrelations (IR). Thisoversight is oddbecause in IRtheend ofthe Thirty Years’ War isregarded as the beginning of the international system withwhich the discipline has traditionallydealt. Indeed, the international system has beennamed for the1648 peace. 1 For sometime now, this “ Westphaliansystem,” alongwith the concept of sovereigntyat its core, has been a subjectof debate:Are the“ pillarsof the Westphalian temple decaying” ? 2 Are we moving“ beyond Westphalia”? 3 Inthis debate, “ Westphalia”constitutes the taken-for-granted template against whichcurrent change should be judged. I contend,however, that the discipline theorizesagainst the backdrop of apastthat is largelyimaginary. I showhere that theaccepted IR narrativeabout Westphalia is a myth. Inthe rst sectionof thearticle I discusswhat this narrative says about the Thirty Years’War. Inthe second section I discussthe alleged link between 1648 and the creationof a new,sovereignty-based international system. In the third section I discussthe Holy Roman Empire— with which, though this is seldom noted, the Peaceof Westphalia was almostexclusively concerned. In the process it will becomeclear that “ Westphalia”— shorthandfor anarrativepurportedly about the seventeenthcentury— is reallya productof the nineteenth- and twentieth-century xationon theconcept of sovereignty.I concludeby discussinghow what I callthe ideologyof sovereignty has hampered the development of IR theoryand by Iwishto express mygratitude both to the anonymous reviewers andto the editors of IO forinvaluable helpwith this article. 1.For a recent critiqueof thisusage from a non-Anglo-Saxonperspective, see Duchhardt1999. 2.Zacher 1992. 3.Lyons and Mastanduno 1995. InternationalOrganization 55,2, Spring 2001, pp. 251– 287 © 2001by TheIO Foundationand the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology 252 InternationalOrganization suggestingthat the historical phenomena analyzed in thisarticle may help us togain abettertheoretical understanding of contemporary international politics. The Thirty Years’War and the Problem ofHegemonialAmbition Accordingto thestandard view, the Thirty Years’ War was astrugglebetween two mainparties. On one side were the“ universalist”actors: the emperor and the Spanishking, both members of theHabsburg dynasty. Loyal to the Church of Rome, theyasserted their right, and that of thePope, to control Christendom in its entirety. Theiropponents were the“ particularist”actors, speci cally Denmark, the Dutch Republic,France, and Sweden, as well as the German princes.These actors rejected imperialoverlordship and (for themost part) the authority of the Pope, upholding insteadthe right of all states to full independence (“ sovereignty” ). Quotesshowing the prevalence of this view in IR areeasily adduced. David Boucherstates that the settlement “ was designedto undermine the hegemonic aspirationsof the Habsburgs.” 4 HedleyBull says that it “ markedthe end of Habsburgpretensions to universal monarchy.” 5 Accordingto Graham Evansand Jeffrey Newnham’s Dictionaryof World Politics, thesettlement “ markedthe culminationof the anti-hegemonic struggle against the Habsburg aspirations for a supranationalempire.” 6 For KalHolsti the war was mainlyfought over “ religious toleration. ..andthe hegemonic ambitions of the Hapsburg family complex.” 7 Accordingto MichaelSheehan, the peace “ refutedthe aspirations of thepapacy and theHoly Roman Empire to recreate a singleChristian imperium.” 8 Albeitwidely shared, this interpretation is dubious.It hinges on thenotion that the Habsburgswere athreatto the“ nascent”individual states. 9 But,quite apart from the factthat most of the states in question had been around for alongtime, neither their survivalnor even their independence was atstake in this war. Noneof the actors ghtingthe Habsburgs went to war for defensivepurposes, as I showin the remainderof this section. 10 4.Boucher 1998, 290. 5.Bull 1977, 32. 6.Evans and Newnham 1990,420. 7.Holsti 1991, 34. 8.Sheehan 1996, 38. 9.Holsti 1991, 26. 10.Recent treatments ofthewar includeAsch 1997;Burkhardt 1992 and 1998; Schmidt 1998; and Schormann1993. While I am indebtedto these works,in terms ofinterpretationthe synthesis offered here is my own. TheWestphalian Myth 253 TheBohemian Secession and the Near Collapse of Habsburg Power inCentral Europe Theoriginal Bohemian crisis did not break out because the Habsburgs were powerful,but because in important respects they were weak.In the early seven- teenthcentury the system of governmentthroughout much of Europe,including the Habsburgterritories in central Europe, was “dualist”(the technical term employed byhistorians).Power was sharedbetween the prince and the notables of therealm, knownas the estates. The “ balanceof power”between these two poles might favor oneside or the other; in the case of the Habsburg kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungaryit had increasingly come to favorthe estates. While the dynasty remained Catholic,the estates were largelyProtestant. Anxious to forestallany attempt by the crownto limit their religious freedom, the Bohemian and Hungarian estates took advantageof aquarrelwithin the dynasty to strengthen their constitutional position. Toconsolidate those gains and to maintain their own in uence, in 1618 the radicalsamong the Bohemian estates initiated an uprising that sidelined the pro-Habsburg“ doves”and eliminated any remaining power of the Habsburg-held crown.Eventually, following the death of EmperorMatthew, a Habsburg,in 1619, theBohemian estates deposed his heir, Ferdinand, and persuaded the elector PalatineFrederick, a German Protestant,to be their king. The Hungarian estates also electeda Protestant,Ga ´borBethlen, to replace Ferdinand. The Habsburgs seemed setnow to losethe imperial title as well.The Bohemian king was amemberof the seven-strongelectoral college by which the emperor was chosen.With the Bohe- miancrown in Protestant hands, there would be aProtestantmajority in thecollege. TheHabsburg position in central Europe was thuson thebrink of collapse.Twice in1619 rebel troops reached the suburbs of Vienna. The Spanish king sent both moneyand troops, but the imminent resumption of the Spanish-Dutch war (atthe expiryin 1621of atwelve-yeartruce) made it difcult for himto put his full military weightbehind Ferdinand. In this situation, a crucialquestion was whatthe German princeswould do. Some Protestant princes and free citiesof theempire had formed ananti-Catholic alliance, called the “ Union.”Its leaderwas noneother than the electorPalatine, soon to be the new Bohemian king. A counteralliancenamed the “League”was headedby the duke of Bavaria, the most powerful of the Catholic Germanprinces. In the past, he hadplayed second ddleto the Habsburgs but had donehis best to rivaltheir in uence in theempire. Now, withFerdinand (to whom hewas alsoclosely related) in a desperatesituation and dependent on League support,the ambitious duke found himself an arbiter of hiskinsman’ s fate. As itturned out, rather than welcome the opportunity to bring the Habsburgs down,the German princes,including, crucially, both the Protestant ones and Bavaria,instead distanced themselves from Frederick.His collusionwith rebels againsttheir legitimate ruler alienated his fellow princes. Moreover, he was expectedto take advantage of the religious dimension of the con ict and use his positionas headof theUnion to defendhis “ill-gotten”royal title. This would almost 254 InternationalOrganization certainlylead to war inthe empire at large between the Union and the League, a prospectuniversally dreaded. Whenthe imperial throne was leftvacant by thedeath of EmperorMatthew, the electoralcollege elected Ferdinand emperor in August1619. Signi cantly, it didso unanimously,with all three Protestant votes going to Ferdinand. A memberof the college,Frederick sought to delay the proceedings until after the Bohemian estates haddeposed Ferdinand. But though they did so a few daysbefore the election, Ferdinand,not Frederick, was allowedto castthe Bohemian vote. Contrary to what Frederickhad hoped and worked for, the duke of Bavariarefused to bea candidate againstFerdinand. In the end, Frederick voted for Ferdinandhimself to avoid a gratuitousfurther provocation. AlthoughFrederick did mount the Bohemian throne, he failed to obtain the Britishand Dutch support on which he had counted. In Germany, the Union eventuallyput its desire to prevent the crisis from spreadingto therest of the empire aheadof other considerations. Despite Frederick’ s positionas itsleader, the Union accepteda nonaggressionpact with the Catholic League. This enabled the League toassist Ferdinand against the elector Palatine. The Union then fell apart: while religiousaf liation always played an important role in the con ict, at no point between1618 and 1648 did it producestable cleavages along religious lines. Aided notonly by the duke of Bavaria and League troops but also by troops of the Protestantelector of Saxony, Ferdinand reconquered the Bohemian capital in November1620 and drove Frederick into exile. Ga ´borBethlen stepped down as rulerof Hungary and made peace with Ferdinand. TheHabsburgs thus preserved their position in central Europe, but, inevitably, Ferdinandemerged from thecrisis a somewhatdiminished gure.He was emperor now,but the power of that of ce was