1 THE NAVY IN THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR Submitted by Michael James Lea-O’Mahoney, to the University of Exeter, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in September 2011. This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 2 ABSTRACT This thesis is concerned chiefly with the military role of sea power during the English Civil War. Parliament’s seizure of the Royal Navy in 1642 is examined in detail, with a discussion of the factors which led to the King’s loss of the fleet and the consequences thereafter. It is concluded that Charles I was outmanoeuvred politically, whilst Parliament’s choice to command the fleet, the Earl of Warwick, far surpassed him in popularity with the common seamen. The thesis then considers the advantages which control of the Navy provided for Parliament throughout the war, determining that the fleet’s protection of London, its ability to supply besieged outposts and its logistical support to Parliamentarian land forces was instrumental in preventing a Royalist victory. Furthermore, it is concluded that Warwick’s astute leadership went some way towards offsetting Parliament’s sporadic neglect of the Navy. The thesis demonstrates, however, that Parliament failed to establish the unchallenged command of the seas around the British Isles. This was because of the Royalists’ widespread privateering operations, aided in large part by the King’s capture of key ports in 1643, such as Dartmouth and Bristol. The Navy was able to block many, but not all, of the King’s arms shipments from abroad, thus permitting Charles to supply his armies in England. Close attention is paid to the Royalist shipping which landed reinforcements from Ireland in 1643-44. The King’s defeat in the First Civil War is then discussed, with the New Model Army, and greater resources, cited as the key factors behind Parliament’s victory, with recognition that the Navy provided essential support. Finally, the revolt of the fleet in 1648 is examined. It is concluded that the increasing radicalism of Parliament alienated a substantial section of the Navy, but that the Royalists failed to capitalise on their new- found maritime strength. 3 CONTENTS Abstract 2 Abbreviations 4 Acknowledgements 5 Introduction 6 Chapter 1: The King’s Loss of the Fleet 38 Chapter 2: The Struggle for Ports 56 Chapter 3: The Royalist Fightback 77 Chapter 4: Parliament Begins to Assert its Ascendancy 116 Chapter 5: The Parliamentarian Navy 138 Chapter 6: Royalist Sea Power 162 Chapter 7: The King Defeated 185 Chapter 8: The Naval Revolt of 1648 199 Conclusion 220 Bibliography 230 4 ABBREVIATIONS Bodleian Library: Bodl. British Library: BL Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series: CSPD Calendar of State Papers, Venice CSPV Journals of the House of Commons: CJ Cornwall Record Office: CRO Devon Record Office: DRO Historical Manuscripts Commission HMC Journals of the House of Lords: LJ National Archives: NA North Devon Record Office: NDRO Thomason Tract Collection: TT 5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I have incurred many debts of gratitude whilst writing this thesis. I owe particular thanks to my supervisor, Professor Jeremy Black, for commenting upon numerous drafts of work and for offering his unstinting support and encouragement. I owe similar gratitude to Professor Nicholas Rodger for his supervision during the first year of my studies, during which time he very generously allowed me access to the many rare books of his private library, whilst offering me invaluable advice on the idiosyncrasies of archives. I must also thank Dr. Michael Duffy for the loan of numerous books and articles. So too, I extend my thanks to Dr. Jonathan Barry and Dr. Sarah Hamilton for their comments on various iterations of this work. Dr. Helen Doe was very helpful in pointing me towards primary and secondary source material, in particular a forthcoming article on Cornwall by Professor Mark Stoyle. I thank him for permission to see a draft in advance of publication. Dr. Maria Fusaro provided me with very welcome advice when I first came to Exeter. Dr. James Mark offered useful insights into higher education and was very accommodating when compiling my teaching timetable, something for which I extend my sincere thanks. The staff of the various archives and libraries, where the bulk of my research was conducted, merit special thanks for their efforts in helping me find important and relevant material. Viscount De L’Isle gave me permission to consult the Sydney papers at the Centre for Kentish Studies and I owe him particular gratitude for his generosity. I would never have been able to undertake this thesis without the Centre for Maritime Historical Studies scholarship. I am very grateful to the University of Exeter for providing me with the opportunity. I owe an immense debt to my parents and my sister for their support throughout my studies. In particular, they have been very tolerant in the face of a house which is now overflowing with books and journals. I am very fortunate to be with a very understanding girlfriend. Kate has been with me since our degrees at Lancaster and deserves special praise for hearing rather more about the English Civil War than is perhaps healthy. Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to two members of my family who I miss deeply: to my Grandma, Evelyn Lea, and to my Uncle Terence, in memoriam . 6 THE NAVY IN THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR: INTRODUCTION In 1642 the escalating quarrels between Charles I and his Parliament erupted into a full-scale conflagration, the King’s raising of the royal standard at Nottingham on 22 August merely formalising what had already begun: the English Civil War. One of the key factors behind Charles’ eventual loss in the conflict was his failure to command the allegiance of the Navy at the outbreak of hostilities. Having devoted considerable efforts to raising an impressive fleet during his Personal Rule of the 1630s, Charles was dismayed when the service pledged its support to Parliament in 1642. The King had been confident of the sailors’ loyalty before the moment of reckoning, but was left outraged when the naval leadership defied his commands. Outmanoeuvred politically, Charles lost the chance to control the seas when a bungled attempt to dismiss Robert Rich, 2 nd Earl of Warwick, Parliament’s choice to command the fleet, forced a struggle for mastery which his own nominee, the aged Sir John Pennington, was unable to win. Thereafter, the King was at a considerable disadvantage: what ships remained loyal to him were few in number and presented little threat to the now Parliamentarian Navy. Clarendon’s famous remark on Charles’ failure to hold the fleet remains the starting point for any historical study of the topic: ‘this loss of the whole navy was of unspeakable ill consequence to the king’s affairs’.1 Contemporary documents testify to the Navy’s important contribution to the Civil War. Frequent references to shipping appear in the journals of Parliament, in State Papers, and in a plethora of other primary material. Surprisingly, though, many of the general works on the period pay scant attention to the Navy, but this study sets out to examine the importance of power at sea to the course of the war. The only significant published study of the subject is Robert Powell’s The Navy in the English Civil War, written in 1962. 2 With numerous alterations in historiography since then, a fresh look at the topic is worth undertaking. This thesis provides a link between two important works of maritime history: Andrew Thrush’s study of the Navy during the Personal Rule of Charles I and Bernard Capp’s extensive survey of the fleet during the Interregnum.3 Thrush’s investigation traced in detail the expansion of the Caroline fleet during the 1630s and concluded on the eve of the Civil War. This piece of work, then, assesses the next period of English 1 E. Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England To Which is Added an Historical View of the Affairs of Ireland (6 vols., Oxford, 1827), II, p.955 2 J. R. Powell, The Navy in the English Civil War (London, 1962) 3 A. Thrush, ‘The Navy under Charles I’ (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1991); B. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660 (Oxford, 1989) 7 naval history: Parliament’s employment of the fleet against Charles I and the King’s efforts to confront that challenge. It considers how Parliament attempted, not always with success, to respond to some of the problems which Thrush detected in Charles’ Navy, such as recruitment and finance. The study concludes at the end of 1648, with the King defeated in war for a second time and with England poised to become a republic. The fleet of the Interregnum (1649-1660) continued to battle the House of Stuart, but, whereas the events of the 1640s centred on a largely domestic war in which Parliament was ultimately victorious, in the 1650s the fleet undertook operations much further afield. War against foreign powers, in fact, took on more importance for the fleet than the threat from the Stuarts. The Navy grew in size significantly and was essential to the security of the republican regimes which governed England after the abolition of the monarchy.