The Israel-PLO War 1982

by Howard Adelman

operation Peace in the Calilee and the Beirut Siege constitute the first \l'ar Israel has fought agalllst the PLO. The Yarn Kippur War, the Six Day War, the '1956 Suez War and even the War of Independence were fought against Arab states. This does larger - the destruction of the force in Lebanese politics. not mean that the PLO (bd not enemy's capacity to fight. This military Palestinians arrived in Lebanon participate in previous battles, but aim did not apply to the Syrians as refugees of the 1948 war. Later a onlv that the pnnClpal military forces however; for them Israel sought the small number of Palestinian refugees \\'e(e those of Arab states not ident­ withdrawal of their military presence came after the 1967 war. A much ified as PLO Nor does it mean that from Lebanon, But the ousting of the larger number of militants arrived this war v\'as fought exclusively against Syrians was not undertaken by mili­ following King Hussein's suppression the PLO; we are all aware of the tary means, at least until now, In any of the PLO in Jordan during Black baltles fought with the Syrians in case it is clear that Israel's objective September in 1970, after 20,000 of the Bekail Valley, the reported 80 with respect to the Syrians is not the their number had been killed. By Syrian jets destroyed versus one destruction of their military capability. 1975 they had become an economic Israeli jet lost, and the capture of the That goal is confined to the PLO and social force in Lebanese politics. Beirut-Damascus highway from the operation, and notwithstanding this In the civil war of 1975-76 they Syrians. cutting off the supply lines limitation, it still constitutes a tall established themselves as the most of the PLO (and Syrians) in west order. potent militaly force among all the Beirut. But in the public mind -- and To accomplish the destruction of feuding factions in Lebanon. From in reality -- the war was fought an enemy's military capability, the despised refugees, the PLO had against the military forces of the PLO. military might of the enemy must be become the effective rulers of Israel fought and won a war against a so shattered, its alliances with its significa~t sectors of the Lebanese '"nation" which does not have a state. suppliers and supporters must be mosaic. And from that base their The war was unique in a number severed, internal cohesiveness and economic and social infrastructure of other respects. This was the first morale must be broken, so that the grew exponentially. Never before war in vvhich Israel's militalY objective idea of rebuilding or recreating a had the Israelis waged war to elimin­ was not simply the defeat of its military force capable of attacking ate the political infrastructure of their enemy in battle_ The goal was much Israel is universally perceived to be enemy even from territory which they one of Don Quixote's impossible captured and some hoped to annex. dreams. These tasks are all extremely And Lebanon was a territory over difficult endeavours, yet they are which they had no claims whatso­ nevertheless insufficient in them­ ever. selves to destroy an enemy's capacity The war had a second unique to fight. For the enemy must not only political aim. This was the first time be thoroughly defeated and routed Israel set as its objective the detenni­ in the field, but the field must be nation of the political character of an eliminated on which the enemy can adjacent political state - the estab­ wage a military battle. The Romans lishment of a strong central govern­ did this to the Jews in the Bar Kochba ment in Beirut. Previous wars had rebellion in 132 AD.; Israel's capacity been fought as clear exercises in self­ to fight was destroyed for almost defence when Israel was attacked or 2,GOO years. as pre-emptive battles to prevent The political objectives of the Israel from being attacked. They were war were also different, for not only defensive military wars in which the was the war intended to destroy the Israel Defense Forces (I D F) was clear­ ._------militaly capacity of the PLO, it was ly that, a citizen army of defense. -HO\\',\r(i ;\dcIIllJn is lJirf'<,Lor of (Il(' Craclllate also designed to liquidate the PLO's Although a case can be made for :;ro/;rdlll in I'hilo_Egypt and Kuneitra in Syria had be self-defensive. The PLO presence distortion of fact must be labelled ­ been levelled. But this was the first in Beirut could pose no significant is the fact that they were widely war in which the primary targets were immediate military threat to Israel. believed. Large numbers of North the PLO military installations en­ The destruction of the PLO in Beirut Americans and Europeans were pre­ sconsed in the urban landscapes of was required to meet a larger military pared to believe the worst libels Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut. The targets objective, i.e. the destruction of the about Israel while, at the same time, were cities and the ultimate target PLO's capacity to fight, as well as a Palestinians in south Lebanon, who was a capital city. Civilian casualties political objective involving the were available for interviews and were regrettable, yes, but an ineVi­ establishment of a strong central whom I later indeed did interview, table consequence of such a war Lebanese government which acknowledged that through the war however hard one tried to avoid required the elimination of the they had learned the realities about them. Traditional Israeli compassion PLO infrastructure. Clearly, these are the Israelis. They were neither mon­ which had made the Israelis the not objectives of an underdog. They sters, on the one hand, as they had highest contributors per capita to the are the goals of a state which is well been led to believe, nor supermen plight of Cambodians following the established as a regional power, on the other hand, as they feared. Vietnamese invasion of that hapless willing to use the military as an Rather, they were a sloppily dressed if country, that truly deep-felt sympathy alternative means of practicing poli­ effective military force, who by and for all loss of human life was, in this tics. large acted to avoid civilian casualties war, subsumed under military and If the objectives differed from in Operation Galilee. In spite of political objectives of a radically previous walS, the context did as these facts, which did not even need different order. well. This is generally acknowledged to be verified to be doubted since all The first days of the war pro­ as the first Israeli warfought without a of south Lebanon contained less duced a hero, Yekutiel (K:lti) Adam, national consensus of support. No than 700/000 inhabitants/ large who led the capture ot Beaufort doubt a majority -- perhaps even a numbers of individuals were pre­ Castle. As a member of Shelli, (the large one -- backed Begin's war. In pared to cast Israel beyond the pale Israeli party opposed to all aspects of fact, the support for Operation of civilization just as they were once the war), he was the highest ranking Galilee could be said to be over­ ready to believe blood libels against officer to die in the war and the only whelming. But even that fell far short Jews in Eastern Europe. What one perceived as a true war hero. of the traditional consensus. More shocked Israelis is not that such lies Every other Israeli war produced a importantly, the Labour Party ob­ were told, but that they were be­ galaxy of heroes. An Israeli soldier jected to the invasion of West Beirut, lieved. And the rhetoric used against stated his feelings most revealingly which Begin was clearly committed Israel included charges of "exter­ on an Israeli Friday evening lV to undertake if diplomacy failed to mination", a "final solution", "geno­ broadcast - 'in this war we don/t rout the PLO. One of Israel's young­ cide" -- the language of the holo­ feel like heroes'; and this, in spite est and most distinquished military caust now thrust at Jews themselves. of the fact that manv Israelis commanders resigned from the When the evidence "vas clearly died trying to avoid killing civilians. armed services rather than be faced available for everyone to know the Branded on Western media as civ­ with refusing a command to lead his truth, it was largely ignored, as ilian killers with pictures of injured troops into Beirut, an unprecedented attention shifted to Beirut. Israel was and maimed individuals being move. Rallies of close to ., 00,000 depicted as wantonly slaughtering rushed into West Beirut hospitals, opposing the war took place in Tel­ civilians, hitting schools and bomb­ presumably destroyed by Israeli Aviv, while Israeli soldiers were dying ing hospitals. It may be that while I shells, at the same time dubious of in the field. vvas in Lebanon and Beirut some the validity of the extensiveness of While Israelis were far from articles did appear in newspapers the war, and fighting an enemy the united in supporting the war, world and magazines accusing the PLO of destructive character of which clearly opinion was almost uniform in vilify­ holding civilians as hostages to save posed no real threat to Israel's ing Israel's conduct of the war. The some remnant of their power and existence though it threatened Israeli calumnies were bad enough -­ prestige. But the "moral" outrage life and property, Israelis could 700,000 refugees produced by the seemed to be overwhelmingly and acknowledge the results and even Israeli invasion of south Lebanon and uniformly directed at Israel. cheer the superior military skill of the 40,000 civilian casualties when, in All this happened while American Israeli pilots and their brilliantly fact, there were less than 50,000 policy was never more dearly con­ executed battles against the Syrians, homeless Palestinians and Lebanese gruent with Israeli political and mili­ but for manv it was difficult to feel resulting from the initial operation tary goals, though diverging on heroic:. Thou'gh the war was fought and less than 4,000 casualties accord­ tactics. One reason for the lack of with political intelligence and excep­ ing to the official account of the Israeli consensus supporting the war tional technical skill, this was a war of municipal authorities. Yet at least two and overvvhelming outrage aimed at one of the best equipped and best rabbis, I. F. Stone, Stude Terkel, and Israel was yet another unique charac­ trained armies against a smaller and numerous other celebrities allowed teristic of this war. For the conduct of divided militaly force noted for its their names to be put under a the war was also radicallv different, as enormous stores of arms and am­ protesting advertisement. (No sub- were the objectives and the context. munitions, signs of conspicuOUS nsumption and striving for status Syrians were severely mauled. In the UNWRA-funded schools, clinics and cOthCl' than any evidence of the PLO's second they were made politically welfare services. The PLO not only ~ bility to use such armaments Inte-.I impotent in Lebanon after the cap­ prevented UNWRA from keeping ~gentlY dn,d..effectively in the vast ture of the Beirut-Damascus highway, track of refugees in the camps, but (uanutws ell-cumulated. and the capital was freed from the effectively determined the curricu­ I But the conduct of the war pressure of the Syrian military pres­ lum and staffing of the schools and differed in a much more important ence. More importantly, the PLO was clinics and how the rations were 'espect. For the first time in Israel's destroyed as a military force. Whether distributed. As one senior Palestinian :listo IV, the initiative was in the hands their military potential was also UNWRA official said to me in Sidon, ~f the nlilitary rather than in those of destroyed depends on develop­ I'we will carrv on and will not deal the politicians. It is widely believed ments in the West Bank and Caza, with the Israe'lis as long as our leaders ;hat ShJron tricked the hawkish Israeli but certainly their capacity to use are penned up in West Beirut", cabinet into going beyond the orig­ Lebanon as a military base was (where they still were at that time). inal 40 km goal of the war. On June eliminated. Operation Calilee began UNWRA is the American HEW 8th, Begin clearly assured Israelis that the process; the siege of Beirut (Health, Education and Welfare "the fighting will cease after Israel finished it. Agency) of the Palestinians, but one reaches 4() km." But Sharon plunged The PLO as an economic power financed by the international com­ on to the borders of Beirut, then to was also dealt a severe blow. The munity rather than domestic taxes. the Damascus··Beirut highway, on to various factions of the PLO controlled The PLO was thereby free to invest the airport and the Palestinian camps industries, financial institutions, real the monies from the Arab Gulf States, in the south of West Beirut, and then estate interests, as well as the ports of Iran and Libya into a surfeit of military to the museum and Hippodrome at Tyre, Si don, and Beirut, dominating supplies and reasonably well run if the museum checkpoint at the them far more effectively than the well protected business enterprises. entrance to the Champs Elysee of International L.ongshoremen's Union The war has not only affected the West Beirut. Though the cabinet ever controlled the east coast ports of military and economic structures of probably sanctioned the lalter moves the United States. The PLO-directed Palestinian life in L.ebanon, it has in principle, evidence seems to be Sidon steel works Uv1a'assase al­ freed the Lebanese from PLO that even the cdbinet and perhaps Mechanikiya al-Hadithl, which domination. More importantly, how­ Begin himself were surprised by the monopolized the Lebanese market, ever, it frees Palestinians from PLO earlier moves on Beirut. And finally, has since been expropriated by the control. For those anti-PLO Palestinians, by mid-August, Begin and the Israelis as enemy property. The Arab who arrived in Lebanon in 1948 and cabinet hJd to publiciy rein in Sharon Bank, more popularly known as the suffered with repressed rage at the following a sustained bombardment Fatah Bank, has had its human Johnny-come-Iatelys of 1967 and of Beirut. foundations torn away. It is unlikely 1970, were subjected to a force If the nature of the war differed, however, that the extensive real which controlled their lives. As one if its objectives were so qualitatively estate interests will be affected unless said to me, he was ready to speak at acids with previous wars, if dom­ the new Lebanese government out publicly against the PL.O as soon estic dissent and international public decides to expropriate them. In as the Israelis had destroyed .- not opinion distinquished the contE-~xt of Aabda, just north of Sidon, where a removed -- the militants in Beirut. this war from all other Israeli wars, if Lebanese official living in the area Why not earlier? He did not want to the conduct and control of initiatives told me that 75% of the apartment feel thev could sneak back into the had shifted to the military, how buildings are owned by Palestinians, region ~nd assassinate him as they woulcl all of this be reflected in terms it will be hard to distinquish betvveen had once killed his brother. The PLO of consequences? Repeatedly, news those owned by PLO and those exodus from Beirut does allow comments on the war reiterated the representing the investments of the Palestinian to disagree with Palestinian refrain that though a complete mili­ hard-earned savings of Palestinians on the use of force, and does free the tary victory, the war was politically returning from Abu Dhabi or Kuwait. Lebanese from PLO control - both lIseless. Israeli commentators did not However, the capitalist powers of which would never have been go so far. They frequently dis­ of the PLO did not compare to its possible if Israeli military action had tinquished between the results of control of labour, evidenced by the been restricted to 40 km. And Operation Galilee and the siege of fact that the port workers were Lebanese freedom from PLO control Beirut. For example, Abba Eban ovelwhelmingly Palestinian. Through refers not onlv to the Christians. Two declared that "the war in Beirut. .. has PLO control of the ports, not only months before the Israeli invasion, Ilot brought Israel a single gain that were arms and imports effectively the Shiites led bv AMAL, turned was not in our hands when the first managed, but also duties were levied against their former allies, the PLO. phase was ended in mid-June." to put competitors out of business Some Lebanese and Palestinians are (Jerusa/em Post, Aug. 6, 1982). and to give the PLO an economic willing to sacrifice the last drop of Whether or not one agrees with monopoly in one economic ~ector Israeli blood to get rid. of the the siege of Beirut. it did bring after another. swaggering domination of the PL.O. Conscquences that went well beyond But if the PLO military power was The psychological effects of the the results of Operation Calilee; destroyed and PLO economic power war on the PLO is even more [whether one considers them gains was severely damJged, its social sign ificant. The '1948 Palestin ian Or not depends on one's perspec­ power remains largely intact. For the refugees in Lebanon, who almost all tives!. In the first phase of the war, the base of the PLO social services is the came from the villages and cities \·vhich are now part of northern Israel, in an area which gives obeisance to the PLO for leading them dOwn a retained the dream of returning to the man with the gun, this is an garden path to a wasteland. their village plots and old homes. The important factor. However, they are now in a Pl.O military seemed to make the It remains an open question posi~io.r~, .if they are clever ab?ut their real ization of that dream feasible. whether Syrian forces will withdraw pOSSibIlities and do not cdntlllue the Israel's complete military victory has entirely from Lebanon or whether self-destructive illusions of their now destroyed this illusion. In days Lebanon will be able to form a strong twentieth century history, to develop ahead, if extensive family visits are central government. Bashir Gemayel's a position politically stronger than permitted between Palestinians in ordering of a draft for all l8-year old ever before. For along with the Lebanon and Arab Israelis, even the Maronite youth points to a Christian destruction of the PLO has also illusion that this is a desirable goal daminated state in Lebanon to paral­ cl issolved Israel's argu ment regarding may disappear. For in the last 25 lel the Jewish dominated state of pressing consideration for her security years, their Palestinian cousins in Israel. Even if a plausible future needs, WhICh, though With de­ Israel have become more Israeli, just scenario can be drawn from direct creasing effect, still tended to Over­ as they have become more Lebanese. consequences of the war, one can at shadow the Palestinian demands for :viany Palestinians in Lebanon best only speculate about indirect self-determination in the West Bank already know that they would not results. The most relevant scenario is and Gaza. want to settle in an independent the loss of the West Bank and Gaza as The combination of the particu­ Palestinian state in the West Bank part of Israel. In spite of all the larization of Palestinian interests with and Gaza, let alone a partially auton­ enormous gains Begin has made as a the loss of credibility of the Israeli OIllOUS one, because they recognize result of the war, and in face of the security argument can become the that they would be regarded as moral superego attacks of the ex­ most powerful of political arguments outsiders. Citizenship status in treme doves and the helpless thrash­ in the international community and LC'banon is thus preferable if it can be ing about of the moderate ones, within Israeli public opinion, if and ,lttained. They are Lebanese in many Begin may have sown the seeds for only if the means chosen to pursue of their attitudes and habits and have the loss of his most cherished ideal ­ the goal of self-determination is learned to benefit from the Milton the effective annexation and integra­ consistent with real Palestinian Friedman-world of Lebanese econ­ tion of the West Bank Uudea and' interests and a non-threatening stand omic life. The potential thus exists for Samaria) and Gaza into Israel. towards Israel. If the Palestinians on a severe fracturing of the PLO, not on The reasons are simple. The the West Bank show that they are its traditional ideological lines (though ideology of the PLO is dominated by determining their own destinies and that may also happen), but on those who needed to prove that they are not being led by goals and territorial ones. For, once the goal of could sOlve all Palestinians by satisfy­ methods which are counterpro­ eliminating Israel as a state is clearly ing the dream of return for even ductive to their own interests, if they seen to be unrealizable, then the those who came from Wh,lt is now use peaceful means to give witness Lebanese Palestinians can go their Israel. ~ow with the shattering of the to this will to self-determination, then own way - provided there is a real military forces of the PLO, different in spite of the enormous gains of the way to go -- while the Palestinians of groups of Palestinians in different Begin and Sharon audacious siege of Gaza and the West Bank can truly territories are free to pursue their own Beirut, the long term goals of annex­ seck national self-determination in a particular interests. Lebanese ation may in fact be lost, as the reasonably clearly defined territory Palestinians, who have not yet been toothless lion and the paper tiger join without needing to retain the objec­ able to get Lebanese citizenship can together with other members of the tive of eliminating Israel. One clearly seek that objective. The international community to increase important consequence then of the absolute loyalty of Jordanian Pales­ the pressure to allow re'al autonomy Israeli-PLO war of '1982 is the tinians to Jordan will be less suspect. for West Bank and Caza Palestinians. severe damaging of the structural At the same time, the Gaza and West The reduction of the Palestinians underpinnings of PLO ideology. Bank Arabs can begin to seek their to a minority of inferior status within There are, of course, significant own interests without the debilitating an enlarged Israel is nevertheless also shifts in the politics of the region. It weakness of the claims of the PLO possible. If the Palestinians opt to try Illay be true that on the one hand covenant requ iring the destruction of to create a new field of battle in the the PLO resents the Arab states for Israel. West Bank and Gaza, one can abandoning them when they were At the present time, depression imagine the expulsion of Arabs just as trapped. However, on the other hand, is rampant among West Bank and the Jews WE~re expelled by the the Arab oil states can now feel free Gaza Arabs. Their helplessness as Romans from the same territories from PLO military blackmail, though their brothers in Lebanon were about 2,000 years ago. However, perhaps not moral blackmail. The severelv beaten is a cause for wide­ with a change of strategy, the Pales­ Soviet Union has shown itself to be a spread' guilt. They did not even tinians can turn a military defeat into paper tiger, while the United States manage to organize any significant a political victory. The Israel-PLO war has revealed its character as a tooth­ strikes or demonstrations to at least of '1982 might prove to be one of the less lion unable to limit the actions of express their support, which may most important turning points in its ally, Israel. What Israel has lost in have perhaps drawn away some of Israel's history for reasons quite prestige as a moral power in inter­ the military resources of Israel. Thev different than the immediate objec­ national eyes, it has gained in status are resented by some, and, som~ tives of the war. as a military power in the region. And resent in turn, the military fiction of