The Israel-PLO War 1982 by Howard Adelman operation Peace in the Calilee and the Beirut Siege constitute the first \l'ar Israel has fought agalllst the PLO. The Yarn Kippur War, the Six Day War, the '1956 Suez War and even the War of Independence were fought against Arab states. This does larger - the destruction of the force in Lebanese politics. not mean that the PLO (bd not enemy's capacity to fight. This military Palestinians arrived in Lebanon participate in previous battles, but aim did not apply to the Syrians as refugees of the 1948 war. Later a onlv that the pnnClpal military forces however; for them Israel sought the small number of Palestinian refugees \\'e(e those of Arab states not ident­ withdrawal of their military presence came after the 1967 war. A much ified as PLO Nor does it mean that from Lebanon, But the ousting of the larger number of militants arrived this war v\'as fought exclusively against Syrians was not undertaken by mili­ following King Hussein's suppression the PLO; we are all aware of the tary means, at least until now, In any of the PLO in Jordan during Black baltles fought with the Syrians in case it is clear that Israel's objective September in 1970, after 20,000 of the Bekail Valley, the reported 80 with respect to the Syrians is not the their number had been killed. By Syrian jets destroyed versus one destruction of their military capability. 1975 they had become an economic Israeli jet lost, and the capture of the That goal is confined to the PLO and social force in Lebanese politics. Beirut-Damascus highway from the operation, and notwithstanding this In the civil war of 1975-76 they Syrians. cutting off the supply lines limitation, it still constitutes a tall established themselves as the most of the PLO (and Syrians) in west order. potent militaly force among all the Beirut. But in the public mind -- and To accomplish the destruction of feuding factions in Lebanon. From in reality -- the war was fought an enemy's military capability, the despised refugees, the PLO had against the military forces of the PLO. military might of the enemy must be become the effective rulers of Israel fought and won a war against a so shattered, its alliances with its significa~t sectors of the Lebanese '"nation" which does not have a state. suppliers and supporters must be mosaic. And from that base their The war was unique in a number severed, internal cohesiveness and economic and social infrastructure of other respects. This was the first morale must be broken, so that the grew exponentially. Never before war in vvhich Israel's militalY objective idea of rebuilding or recreating a had the Israelis waged war to elimin­ was not simply the defeat of its military force capable of attacking ate the political infrastructure of their enemy in battle_ The goal was much Israel is universally perceived to be enemy even from territory which they one of Don Quixote's impossible captured and some hoped to annex. dreams. These tasks are all extremely And Lebanon was a territory over difficult endeavours, yet they are which they had no claims whatso­ nevertheless insufficient in them­ ever. selves to destroy an enemy's capacity The war had a second unique to fight. For the enemy must not only political aim. This was the first time be thoroughly defeated and routed Israel set as its objective the detenni­ in the field, but the field must be nation of the political character of an eliminated on which the enemy can adjacent political state - the estab­ wage a military battle. The Romans lishment of a strong central govern­ did this to the Jews in the Bar Kochba ment in Beirut. Previous wars had rebellion in 132 AD.; Israel's capacity been fought as clear exercises in self­ to fight was destroyed for almost defence when Israel was attacked or 2,GOO years. as pre-emptive battles to prevent The political objectives of the Israel from being attacked. They were war were also different, for not only defensive military wars in which the was the war intended to destroy the Israel Defense Forces (I D F) was clear­ ._---------- militaly capacity of the PLO, it was ly that, a citizen army of defense. -HO\\',\r(i ;\dcIIllJn is lJirf'<,Lor of (Il(' Craclllate also designed to liquidate the PLO's Although a case can be made for :;ro/;rdlll in I'hilo_<ofJhy al York Uni\'el'sil)! and U!reUUi 0/ t!le I~cfllg<.'c f)o('lIllw/)Lalio/) infrastructure in Lebanon. The PLO Operation Calilee as a defensive war, Proi('Cl. \'()r~ l.Jnivl'!';it)'. was to be eliminated as a political (Israel's life was not at stake, but the peace and quiet and morale of its sequent correction appeared to my This was Israel's first urban war. It northern settlements in Israel were), knowledge.) And what is worse than is true that in previous wars, Port Suez the Beirut siege could not be said to the lies - for that is what such gross in Egypt and Kuneitra in Syria had be self-defensive. The PLO presence distortion of fact must be labelled ­ been levelled. But this was the first in Beirut could pose no significant is the fact that they were widely war in which the primary targets were immediate military threat to Israel. believed. Large numbers of North the PLO military installations en­ The destruction of the PLO in Beirut Americans and Europeans were pre­ sconsed in the urban landscapes of was required to meet a larger military pared to believe the worst libels Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut. The targets objective, i.e. the destruction of the about Israel while, at the same time, were cities and the ultimate target PLO's capacity to fight, as well as a Palestinians in south Lebanon, who was a capital city. Civilian casualties political objective involving the were available for interviews and were regrettable, yes, but an ineVi­ establishment of a strong central whom I later indeed did interview, table consequence of such a war Lebanese government which acknowledged that through the war however hard one tried to avoid required the elimination of the they had learned the realities about them. Traditional Israeli compassion PLO infrastructure. Clearly, these are the Israelis. They were neither mon­ which had made the Israelis the not objectives of an underdog. They sters, on the one hand, as they had highest contributors per capita to the are the goals of a state which is well been led to believe, nor supermen plight of Cambodians following the established as a regional power, on the other hand, as they feared. Vietnamese invasion of that hapless willing to use the military as an Rather, they were a sloppily dressed if country, that truly deep-felt sympathy alternative means of practicing poli­ effective military force, who by and for all loss of human life was, in this tics. large acted to avoid civilian casualties war, subsumed under military and If the objectives differed from in Operation Galilee. In spite of political objectives of a radically previous walS, the context did as these facts, which did not even need different order. well. This is generally acknowledged to be verified to be doubted since all The first days of the war pro­ as the first Israeli warfought without a of south Lebanon contained less duced a hero, Yekutiel (K:lti) Adam, national consensus of support. No than 700/000 inhabitants/ large who led the capture ot Beaufort doubt a majority -- perhaps even a numbers of individuals were pre­ Castle. As a member of Shelli, (the large one -- backed Begin's war. In pared to cast Israel beyond the pale Israeli party opposed to all aspects of fact, the support for Operation of civilization just as they were once the war), he was the highest ranking Galilee could be said to be over­ ready to believe blood libels against officer to die in the war and the only whelming. But even that fell far short Jews in Eastern Europe. What one perceived as a true war hero. of the traditional consensus. More shocked Israelis is not that such lies Every other Israeli war produced a importantly, the Labour Party ob­ were told, but that they were be­ galaxy of heroes. An Israeli soldier jected to the invasion of West Beirut, lieved. And the rhetoric used against stated his feelings most revealingly which Begin was clearly committed Israel included charges of "exter­ on an Israeli Friday evening lV to undertake if diplomacy failed to mination", a "final solution", "geno­ broadcast - 'in this war we don/t rout the PLO. One of Israel's young­ cide" -- the language of the holo­ feel like heroes'; and this, in spite est and most distinquished military caust now thrust at Jews themselves. of the fact that manv Israelis commanders resigned from the When the evidence "vas clearly died trying to avoid killing civilians. armed services rather than be faced available for everyone to know the Branded on Western media as civ­ with refusing a command to lead his truth, it was largely ignored, as ilian killers with pictures of injured troops into Beirut, an unprecedented attention shifted to Beirut. Israel was and maimed individuals being move. Rallies of close to ., 00,000 depicted as wantonly slaughtering rushed into West Beirut hospitals, opposing the war took place in Tel­ civilians, hitting schools and bomb­ presumably destroyed by Israeli Aviv, while Israeli soldiers were dying ing hospitals.