Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments The Fatah–Hamas Reconciliation Agreement of October 2017 WP S An Opportunity to End Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis and Permanently Overcome the Blockade Muriel Asseburg Ten years after Hamas violently seized power in Gaza, and following a string of failures to reconcile the Palestinian factions, there are now signs of a rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas. In September 2017 the Hamas leadership announced it would dis- solve the administrative committee it had established in March, opening the way for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to take over the government in the Gaza Strip. In mid- October representatives of Hamas and Fatah signed an Egyptian-mediated reconcilia- tion agreement. On 1 November PA forces were deployed to the Palestinian side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt. Even if there are still major obstacles to merging the two security apparatuses, establishing a unity government, restoring the democratic process and achieving comprehensive reconciliation – the chances of the rapproche- ment preventing another round of armed conflict and improving the situation for the population in crisis-ridden Gaza are considerably better this time around. Germany and its European partners should help to accentuate the positive dynamics, support permanent improvements of the situation in Gaza through practical steps and work towards comprehensive reconciliation between the Palestinian factions. In practical terms the 12 October 2017 agree- further reconciliation measures are also to ment between the two largest Palestinian be discussed. On 21 November the smaller factions foresees the Palestinian Authority Palestinian factions are invited to put their assuming control of Gaza’s border crossings signatures to the agreement in Cairo, too. by 1 November 2017, taking over the gov- In the first week of December, also in Cairo, ernment of the Gaza Strip by 1 December a joint stocktaking will be held to assess 2017, and integrating staff appointed by progress and discuss next steps. Hamas over the last ten years (about 40,000, The May 2011 agreement between the roughly half in civilian functions, half in Palestinian factions serves as the basis and the security sector) by 1 February 2018. point of reference for the new document. Restructuring of security apparatuses and Acknowledging lessons learned from fail- Dr. Muriel Asseburg is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 44 November 2017 1 ures of implementing earlier agreements, Swiss support; these are now to be im- this time only steps subject to consensus are plemented by a committee set up for the to be implemented for now, while politi- purpose. The decisive factors behind the cally sensitive measures have been post- improved prospects for implementing poned until a later stage. This means that the reconciliation agreement this time are steps mentioned in the 2011 agreement, changes in the interests of Hamas and the such as forming a unity government, re- Palestinian president, Egypt’s active role in activating the Palestinian Legislative Coun- implementing the agreement, and a green cil, holding parliamentary and presidential light from the United States and Israel. elections, Hamas joining the PLO, and struc- tural and programmatic reforms within the PLO, have been kicked down the road. Yet Realpolitik in Hamas those are the measures that would be re- In the process of participating in elections quired to actually overcome the political rift. (local in 2004/2005 and parliamentary in 2006) – and thereby at least de facto recog- nising the framework of the Israeli-Pales- Chances Improved tinian Oslo Accords of the 1990s under It is therefore much too early to speak of which they were held – and governing from the intra-Palestinian division being over- 2006 onwards, Realpolitik has increasingly come, still less of a comprehensive recon- gained the upper hand within Hamas. Its ciliation between the factions. Even imple- representatives have come to realise that mentation of the concrete points agreed they will not be able to end the occupation upon will be a complex undertaking. Not (or even just the blockade of Gaza) through only do relations between Hamas and Fatah military action and on their own. This remain beset by rivalry and great mistrust. stance also aligns with the war-weary mood Ten years of separation have also created of Gaza’s populace, whose priorities are two parallel administrations, two judicial concrete improvements in living conditions systems and two security apparatuses. The and overcoming the Palestinian division. legal systems – which already stem from The Hamas leadership has also come to different traditions – have been levered realise that continuing to govern under further apart by Abbas’s presidential the Israeli-Egyptian blockade, far-reaching decrees on the one side and legislation international isolation, and sanctions im- adopted by Gaza’s rump parliament on posed by the PA is doomed to failure and the other (on the impacts of the West Bank/ greatly harms its popularity. Additionally, Gaza split see SWP Comments 42/2017). the pressures of everyday crisis manage- Nevertheless, it currently looks as if ment distract from focusing on achieving the agreement signed on 12 October will national liberation. indeed be implemented. Concrete prepara- The narrowing scope of action of the de tions for the PA to assume administrative facto government in Gaza in recent years responsibility in Gaza were set in motion has certainly expedited these insights. immediately under the direction of the Abdelfattah al-Sisi’s accession to power in Egyptian intelligence service. In early Egypt in mid-2013 largely ended the flour- November the presidential guard was ishing trade through tunnels under the deployed to the Rafah border crossing as Egypt/Gaza border, depriving the de facto scheduled. Hamas also closed down its government of an important source of checkpoints next to the PA staffed termi- revenues in the form of levies on smuggled nals at the Erez and Kerem Shalom border goods and on the operation of tunnels. crossings as demanded by Israel. Detailed Qatar, which was the main sponsor of infra- plans for dealing with public sector em- structure projects in Gaza in recent years, ployees have already been drawn up with noticeably dialled back its support after the SWP Comments 44 November 2017 2 embargo imposed in June 2017 by Saudi It was Arouri, who also originates from Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the military wing, who signed the recon- Egypt and others placed it under pressure ciliation agreement on behalf of Hamas. to also distance itself from Hamas (on the Qatar crisis see SWP Comments 25/2017). Sanctions imposed by Ramallah in response Abbas under Pressure to Hamas’s establishment of an administra- Three recent developments in particular tive committee in March 2017 caused a pressure President Mahmoud Abbas to pur- dramatic escalation of the humanitarian sue reconciliation with Hamas seriously crisis. Punitive measures included cutting this time. Firstly, his popularity has plum- the salaries paid to PA staff in Gaza, reduc- meted, especially in Gaza. In a survey con- ing payments to Israel for electricity for ducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy Gaza, and scaling back medical services and Survey Research (PSR) in mid-Septem- available to Gazans. ber 2017, about two-thirds of respondents Against this backdrop the Hamas leader- said they thought the president should ship now sees only one option for initiating stand down; the figure for Gaza was as positive change and at the same time main- high as 80 percent. If presidential elections taining a political role: reconcile with with two candidates, Abbas and Haniyeh, Ramallah, forego exclusive responsibility were held now, Abbas could expect to lose for governing in Gaza and mend fences against Hamas leader Haniyeh, with 42 per- with the Egyptian leadership, which in cent as against 50 percent. Abbas’s Fatah 2015 categorised it as a terrorist organisa- has also haemorrhaged support, above all tion and banned it from operating in Egypt. in Gaza where it fell from 40 percent at Although he continues to make radical the turn of the year to 28 percent in mid- statements on Israel, Yahya Sinwar stands September. for this pragmatic course. In October 2011 Secondly, since summer 2017 Egypt and he was released from imprisonment in the UAE have been fostering a reconcilia- Israel after twenty-two years, in the scope tion between Hamas and Fatah renegade of the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange, and Mohammed Dahlan, the former head of the in February 2017 elected leader of Hamas in Preventive Security Force in Gaza. This has the Gaza Strip (succeeding Ismail Haniyeh). brought one of the president’s most im- Local observers agree that Sinwar is deter- portant rivals back on the political stage. mined to stay his chosen course and will be Dahlan was one of the central figures on able to defend it against hardliners. It helps the Fatah side responsible for the armed that he comes from Hamas’s military wing, clashes of June 2007 that cost almost four the Izz-al-Din-al-Qassam Brigades, and can hundred lives, ended the short-lived ex- depend on their support. periment of the Palestinian National Unity At the same time, the election of Ismail Government, and initiated the division of Haniyeh as leader of Hamas’s political the Palestinian Territories into two entities bureau in May 2017 (succeeding Khaled with competing governments (for details Meshal) has shifted decision-making – and see SWP Comments 14/2007). Dahlan was thus the centre of interest – back from expelled from Fatah in June 2011 on charges Qatar to Gaza. And the election of Saleh including corruption and treason. The al-Arouri, a representative of Hamas in the motivation behind the expulsion appears West Bank now resident in Lebanon, as to have been massive accusations of involve- deputy leader of the political bureau in ment in corruption and extortion levelled early October 2017 is yet another indication by Dahlan against Abbas’s sons Tareq and of a shift in influence from representatives Yasser.