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Home , Democratic Party (Italy), Fatah, Gilad Shalit, Hamas, Hamas Covenant, Rafah Border Crossing

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

The – Reconciliation Agreement of October 2017 WP S An Opportunity to End Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis and Permanently Overcome the Blockade Muriel Asseburg

Ten years after Hamas violently seized power in Gaza, and following a string of failures to reconcile the Palestinian factions, there are now signs of a rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas. In September 2017 the Hamas leadership announced it would dis- solve the administrative committee it had established in March, opening the way for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to take over the government in the . In mid- October representatives of Hamas and Fatah signed an Egyptian-mediated reconcilia- tion agreement. On 1 November PA forces were deployed to the Palestinian side of the border crossing with . Even if there are still major obstacles to merging the two security apparatuses, establishing a unity government, restoring the democratic process and achieving comprehensive reconciliation – the chances of the rapproche- ment preventing another round of armed conflict and improving the situation for the population in crisis-ridden Gaza are considerably better this time around. and its European partners should help to accentuate the positive dynamics, support permanent improvements of the situation in Gaza through practical steps and work towards comprehensive reconciliation between the Palestinian factions.

In practical terms the 12 October 2017 agree- further reconciliation measures are also to ment between the two largest Palestinian be discussed. On 21 November the smaller factions foresees the Palestinian Authority Palestinian factions are invited to put their assuming control of Gaza’s border crossings signatures to the agreement in , too. by 1 November 2017, taking over the gov- In the first week of December, also in Cairo, ernment of the Gaza Strip by 1 December a joint stocktaking will be held to assess 2017, and integrating staff appointed by progress and discuss next steps. Hamas over the last ten years (about 40,000, The May 2011 agreement between the roughly half in civilian functions, half in Palestinian factions serves as the basis and the security sector) by 1 February 2018. point of reference for the new document. Restructuring of security apparatuses and Acknowledging lessons learned from fail-

Dr. Muriel Asseburg is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 44 November 2017

1 ures of implementing earlier agreements, Swiss support; these are now to be im- this time only steps subject to consensus are plemented by a committee set up for the to be implemented for now, while politi- purpose. The decisive factors behind the cally sensitive measures have been post- improved prospects for implementing poned until a later stage. This means that the reconciliation agreement this time are steps mentioned in the 2011 agreement, changes in the interests of Hamas and the such as forming a unity government, re- Palestinian president, Egypt’s active role in activating the Palestinian Legislative Coun- implementing the agreement, and a cil, holding parliamentary and presidential light from the and . elections, Hamas joining the PLO, and struc- tural and programmatic reforms within the PLO, have been kicked down the road. Yet Realpolitik in Hamas those are the measures that would be re- In the process of participating in elections quired to actually overcome the political rift. (local in 2004/2005 and parliamentary in 2006) – and thereby at least de facto recog- nising the framework of the Israeli-Pales- Chances Improved tinian of the 1990s under It is therefore much too early to speak of which they were held – and governing from the intra-Palestinian division being over- 2006 onwards, Realpolitik has increasingly come, still less of a comprehensive recon- gained the upper hand within Hamas. Its ciliation between the factions. Even imple- representatives have come to realise that mentation of the concrete points agreed they will not be able to end the occupation upon will be a complex undertaking. Not (or even just the blockade of Gaza) through only do relations between Hamas and Fatah military and on their own. This remain beset by rivalry and great mistrust. stance also aligns with the war-weary mood Ten years of separation have also created of Gaza’s populace, whose priorities are two parallel administrations, two judicial concrete improvements in living conditions systems and two security apparatuses. The and overcoming the Palestinian division. legal systems – which already stem from The Hamas leadership has also come to different traditions – have been levered realise that continuing to govern under further apart by Abbas’s presidential the Israeli-Egyptian blockade, far-reaching decrees on the one side and legislation international isolation, and sanctions im- adopted by Gaza’s rump parliament on posed by the PA is doomed to failure and the other (on the impacts of the / greatly harms its popularity. Additionally, Gaza split see SWP Comments 42/2017). the pressures of everyday crisis manage- Nevertheless, it currently looks as if ment distract from focusing on achieving the agreement signed on 12 October will national liberation. indeed be implemented. Concrete prepara- The narrowing scope of action of the de tions for the PA to assume administrative facto government in Gaza in recent years responsibility in Gaza were set in motion has certainly expedited these insights. immediately under the direction of the Abdelfattah al-Sisi’s accession to power in Egyptian intelligence service. In early Egypt in mid-2013 largely ended the flour- November the presidential guard was ishing trade through tunnels under the deployed to the as Egypt/Gaza border, depriving the de facto scheduled. Hamas also closed down its government of an important source of checkpoints next to the PA staffed termi- revenues in the form of levies on smuggled nals at the Erez and Kerem Shalom border goods and on the operation of tunnels. crossings as demanded by Israel. Detailed , which was the main sponsor of infra- plans for dealing with public sector em- structure projects in Gaza in recent years, ployees have already been drawn up with noticeably dialled back its support after the

SWP Comments 44 November 2017

2 embargo imposed in June 2017 by Saudi It was Arouri, who also originates from Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the military wing, who signed the recon- Egypt and others placed it under pressure ciliation agreement on behalf of Hamas. to also distance itself from Hamas (on the Qatar crisis see SWP Comments 25/2017). Sanctions imposed by in response Abbas under Pressure to Hamas’s establishment of an administra- Three recent developments in particular tive committee in March 2017 caused a pressure President to pur- dramatic escalation of the humanitarian sue reconciliation with Hamas seriously crisis. Punitive measures included cutting this time. Firstly, his popularity has plum- the salaries paid to PA staff in Gaza, reduc- meted, especially in Gaza. In a survey con- ing payments to Israel for electricity for ducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy Gaza, and scaling back medical services and Survey Research (PSR) in mid-Septem- available to Gazans. ber 2017, about two-thirds of respondents Against this backdrop the Hamas leader- said they thought the president should ship now sees only one option for initiating stand down; the figure for Gaza was as positive change and at the same time main- high as 80 percent. If presidential elections taining a political role: reconcile with with two candidates, Abbas and Haniyeh, Ramallah, forego exclusive responsibility were held now, Abbas could expect to lose for governing in Gaza and mend fences against Hamas leader Haniyeh, with 42 per- with the Egyptian leadership, which in cent as against 50 percent. Abbas’s Fatah 2015 categorised it as a terrorist organisa- has also haemorrhaged support, above all tion and banned it from operating in Egypt. in Gaza where it fell from 40 percent at Although he continues to make radical the turn of the year to 28 percent in mid- statements on Israel, stands September. for this pragmatic course. In October 2011 Secondly, since summer 2017 Egypt and he was released from imprisonment in the UAE have been fostering a reconcilia- Israel after twenty-two years, in the scope tion between Hamas and Fatah renegade of the prisoner exchange, and , the former head of the in February 2017 elected leader of Hamas in Preventive Security Force in Gaza. This has the Gaza Strip (succeeding ). brought one of the president’s most im- Local observers agree that Sinwar is deter- portant rivals back on the political stage. mined to stay his chosen course and will be Dahlan was one of the central figures on able to defend it against hardliners. It helps the Fatah side responsible for the armed that he comes from Hamas’s military wing, clashes of June 2007 that cost almost four the Izz-al-Din-al-Qassam Brigades, and can hundred lives, ended the short-lived ex- depend on their support. periment of the Palestinian National Unity At the same time, the election of Ismail Government, and initiated the division of Haniyeh as leader of Hamas’s political the into two entities bureau in May 2017 (succeeding Khaled with competing governments (for details Meshal) has shifted decision-making – and see SWP Comments 14/2007). Dahlan was thus the centre of interest – back from expelled from Fatah in June 2011 on charges Qatar to Gaza. And the election of Saleh including corruption and . The al-Arouri, a representative of Hamas in the motivation behind the expulsion appears West Bank now resident in , as to have been massive accusations of involve- deputy leader of the political bureau in ment in corruption and extortion levelled early October 2017 is yet another indication by Dahlan against Abbas’s sons Tareq and of a shift in influence from representatives Yasser. He was subsequently convicted on of the diaspora to representatives of the various charges by PA courts and sentenced Palestinian Territories in the Hamas organs. to fines and prison terms.

SWP Comments 44 November 2017

3 In recent years Dahlan has systematically Egypt as Active Mediator expanded his power base in the Gaza Strip The active participation of a third party to and refugee camps in the West Bank and oversee adherence to the agreed timetable neighbouring states, with financial support and put pressure on either side as needed from the UAE, where he is now based. While will be as vital for implementation of the he has demonstrated willingness to recon- reconciliation agreement as it was for its cile with the president, as demanded by creation. Egypt appears determined to Egypt, he is also pressing ahead with the make a success of what is now the seventh establishment of separate party structures reconciliation agreement between Fatah in the form of the Fatah Reformist and and Hamas. This is evidenced not least by . Dahlan’s rapprochement the prominent role played by Khaled Fawzi, with Hamas has further undermined Abbas’s the head of Egypt’s intelligence service. position. For example in June 2017 Dahlan Cairo is pursuing three principal inter- arranged for Egypt to supply diesel for Gaza’s ests. Firstly, it wants to get a grip on secu- power station, counteracting Ramallah’s rity in Sinai, which has been beset for years sanctions. He has also initiated a programme by armed clashes between the Egyptian of social reconciliation involving apologies army and jihadist groups. To that end it has and compensation for the families of those agreed close cooperation with Hamas on killed in the 2007 clashes. The process has fighting cross-border and active been making good progress. And surveys measures against jihadists in Gaza. In show Dahlan’s support in Gaza more than return it has raised the prospect of a regu- doubling since the beginning of the year to lar opening of the Rafah Crossing (now 23 percent. scheduled to start in mid-November), and Thirdly, Egypt is not alone in backing enabled Hamas cadres to travel via Egypt the reconciliation efforts. The United States and to resume a presence in there. Dahlan’s also appears to have given a green light, mediation and UAE backing were essential with the Trump Administration believing in working towards a reconciliation be- that its ambitions for “the ultimate deal” to tween Egypt and Hamas and concentrating end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only on shared interests – rather than focussing succeed if the PA president and PLO leader on conflicting interests as in earlier rounds. speaks for the entirety of the Palestinian But the rapprochement only became pos- Territories. Washington therefore regards sible after Hamas distanced itself from its the PA assuming responsibility for govern- parent organisation, the Muslim Brother- ment and security in Gaza as the first step hood, which is public enemy number one towards an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. in Egypt (see below for more on the Hamas Other regional powers like policy document). have also given their backing to Egypt’s Secondly, with Washington signalising mediation efforts. Even the Israeli govern- engagement for an Israeli-Palestinian peace ment, which is concerned to contain spill- agreement, Egypt would like to position over effects from the crisis in Gaza and itself as an indispensable partner and rele- avoid undermining Egypt, has mostly re- vant regional power. In this context Cairo frained from disrupting the reconciliation also regards the Fatah-Hamas agreement process – while reiterating its refusal to and the factional reconciliation under its negotiate with a Hamas-backed govern- auspices as an opportunity to minimise ment. Altogether, therefore, Abbas can no the influence of Qatar and in its im- longer find backers for his intransigent mediate neighbourhood and to strengthen stance. ties with the UAE. Thirdly, Egypt must be interested in pre- paring the succession to Abbas – who is over eighty – in order to avoid chaos ensuing

SWP Comments 44 November 2017

4 when he dies. In this vein, it is in Cairo’s implies not only continuing to observe the interest to block any potential Israeli ini- cease-fire in Gaza, but also refraining from tiatives in such a situation (such as annex- armed attacks in the West Bank (which has ing parts of the West Bank or altering the been Hamas practice anyway since summer status quo at the / 2014). al-Sharif) that could lead to further regional destabilisation and would endanger the increasingly close Egyptian-Israeli security Adjusting the Political Programme cooperation. The preamble to the reconciliation agree- ment names as its objective – in line with the PLO charter – the aspirations of the Disarming Hamas? Palestinian people to a sovereign state in It is unrealistic to expect Hamas to disband the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, its military wing, generally renounce vio- with as its capital, and the return lence or break off ties with against the of the refugees. backdrop of the continuing Israeli occu- In May 2017 Hamas had already pub- pation and the sobering example of Fatah. lished a new policy document based on in- While renouncing violence, recognising tense and controversial internal discus- Israel and engaging in security cooperation sions. It supplements the with the occupying power have allowed of 1988 and now serves as the organisa- Fatah to acquire international acceptance, tion’s official ideological platform. Even if it has been unable to make any progress Hamas continues to define itself as a resist- towards independence or even towards ance movement, upholds the long-term lasting improvements in living conditions. goal of “the full and complete liberation Still, since the 2014 military confronta- of ” (meaning the territory of the tions in Gaza Hamas has demonstrated that former British mandate for Palestine), it is certainly able to reconcile the rhetoric refuses to renounce violence, and declines of resistance with the assumption of secu- to recognise Israel’s legitimacy, the docu- rity responsibilities. It has since then – as ment nevertheless contains important acknowledged by the Israeli security estab- shifts towards Realpolitik. Hamas now lishment – observed the cease-fire and largely locates itself within the “national [Palestin- prevented other groups from in- ian] consensus” by accepting a Palestinian filtrating or attacking Israel from Gaza. State within the 1967 borders, at least as After its reconciliation with Egypt in an interim solution. And the document no summer 2017, Hamas also began creating longer speaks of the destruction of Israel. a buffer zone along the border with Sinai Additionally, the Israeli-Palestinian con- and taking active measures to stop militant flict is no longer framed as a religious one. jihadists, who had previously been able to Hamas, the document asserts, “does not operate largely unhindered across the bor- wage a struggle against the because der. Both the Israeli and the Egyptian secu- they are Jewish” but rejects and rity establishments are well aware that not occupation. It recognises the PLO as the only are Hamas’s Qassam Brigades vital to “national framework for the Palestinian any operation against radical forces in the people” and accepts the role of the PA, even Gaza Strip, but also that dissolving them if it rejects the Oslo Accords on the grounds would leave disbanded fighters outside cen- that they contravene by tral control and potentially turning to generating “commitments that violate the more radical groups. inalienable rights of the Palestinian people”. Fatah and Hamas have also agreed ver- Furthermore, this document no longer bally in October 2017 to avoid any actions references ties to Hamas’s parent organisa- that could endanger their agreement. This tion, the , but instead

SWP Comments 44 November 2017

5 emphasises the movement’s national objec- That means first clearly communicat- tives and rejects intervention in the inter- ing to the the expectation nal affairs of other states – both of which that they implement the planned steps in are clear messages to Egypt. accordance with the timetable and spirit of the agreement, and pressing Israel to refrain from torpedoing the efforts. That Policy Recommendations also includes the lifting of sanctions against In important dimensions of the reconcilia- Gaza promised by the Palestinian president, tion process agreement has yet to be reached which will be crucial for achieving a rapid between Hamas and Fatah. Merging appa- improvement in living conditions for the ratuses under the auspices of the PA will population there. be a tricky undertaking. And there are Beyond this it is crucial to help ensure other major obstacles to a comprehensive that concrete steps stemming from the reconciliation. In particular, the Palestinian agreement, such as merging the two public president and his Fatah party may lack sectors, do not fail for lack of resources. To motivation to hold elections, in view of the that end the EU, in close coordination with splits within the party and loss of popular- Egypt, and Gulf Arab donors ity. Also, integrating Hamas into the PLO, should backstop public sector salaries for reforming the organisation and revising its the coming months. At the same time it charter would all be potentially explosive should help prepare plans to ensure that a manoeuvres against the backdrop of the slimming down of the bloated public appa- failure of the Oslo Process. ratus does not produce losers and lead to At the same time, the regional dynamics impoverishment, but instead proceeds in have placed Fatah and Hamas – and the gov- step with the creation of employment in ernments in Ramallah and – the private sector. Appropriate severance under pressure to reconcile. Egypt appears and pension arrangements will also need determined to make a success of the 12 to be found. October agreement. This opens up an op- The EU and its member states should portunity to prevent another military con- also express their expectation that Pales- frontation in the Gaza Strip, to tackle the tinian reconciliation will lead, via elections humanitarian crisis there, and to create and the reestablishment of an effective the basis for sustainable economic develop- division of powers, to a restoration of the ment. Whether the factional division can democratic process (as postulated in the also be overcome will depend decisively on preamble to the reconciliation agreement). the behaviour of the regional actors (espe- In this connection they should offer not cially Egypt and Israel) and the internation- only technical support for staging and al community (above all the United States monitoring elections. They should also seek and the ). to get Washington on board, in order to The EU and its member states should guarantee the political conditions for elec- actively support the Palestinian rapproche- tions to take place. That means in particu- ment and signalise interest in its success lar leaning on Israel to permit free, fair to all sides, rather than simply watching and competitive elections (albeit under the as events unfold. After all, they have been restrictive conditions of ongoing occupa- calling on the Palestinians to overcome the tion) in and the West Bank. division since 2007. Palestinian unity is also At the same time, the EU and its member a precondition for returning to the demo- states should unambiguously signal their cratic process in the Palestinian Territories, willingness to cooperate with a consensus for upholding the option of a two-state settle- government supported by both Fatah and ment, and for the legitimacy of any Pales- Hamas and with a future government of tinian negotiating team in future talks. national unity including representatives

SWP Comments 44 November 2017

6 of both factions. In this connection it should step Germany should, in close consultation refrain from imposing new conditions and with Egypt, offer its good offices to mediate instead abide by the terms for cooperation an exchange of prisoners and a long-term already formulated in EU Council Conclu- cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. sions of May 2011 and July 2014: namely, Last but not least, measures aiming to that the should improve the concrete situation in Gaza respect existing agreements with Israel, have to be part and parcel of a European renounce violence and recognise Israel’s policy focused on ending the occupation of right to exist. the Palestinian territories and achieving a EU member states should also work to settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reinforce the pragmatic current in Hamas (for detail on concrete measures see SWP by relaxing the “no contact policy” adopted Comments 36/2017). by the Middle East Quartet (United States, Russian Federation, European Union and

United Nations) after the 2006 Palestinian © Stiftung Wissenschaft und elections. Even if the EU continues to clas- Politik, 2017 sify Hamas as a terrorist organisation, that All rights reserved need not preclude political and civil society These Comments reflect exchange. The expansion of contacts should the author’s views. not be made contingent upon unrealistic SWP conditions or paying lip-service, nor should Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik it come at the expense of dialogue with German Institute for representatives of other Palestinian parties. International and Security Affairs Rather it should occur within the frame- work of multi-party delegations (for ex- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 ample mixed parliamentary groups) and by 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 including moderate representatives of the Fax +49 30 880 07-100 movement in civil society dialogues. Along- www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] side implementation of the reconciliation agreement, important topics for such con- ISSN 1861-1761 tacts would also include improving the Translation by Meredith Dale situation and expanding the (English version of space open to civil society. SWP-Aktuell 73/2017) EU member states should also grasp the reconciliation agreement as an opportunity to overcome the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and to transform circumstances there in such a way as to enable comprehensive reconstruction, sustainable economic devel- opment and tackling the grave environmen- tal problems. That will necessitate lifting the blockade and enabling permanent free- dom of movement for people and goods. In this connection should offer contri- butions designed to reconcile the needs of Gaza’s population with Israel’s security in- terests, for example by deploying observers and training border officials in the scope of a border mission, by supplying equipment for screening export goods etc. As a first

SWP Comments 44 November 2017

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