The American Response to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895
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University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1971 The iP gtail war : the American response to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. Jeffery M. Dorwart University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Dorwart, Jeffery M., "The iP gtail war : the American response to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895." (1971). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1315. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1315 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DATE DUE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS LIBRARY LD fee? 1971 D721 THE PIGTAIL WAR: THE AMF.RICAN RESPONSE TO TOE SING-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-1895 A Dissertation Presented by Jeffery H. Don-jart Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in degree of p?irtisl fulfilloaent of the requireneuts for the DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Kay 1971 History Jeffc-r>' H» Dorv;art 1 All Rights Reserved TliE PIGTAIL WAR: THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE SINO- JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-1895 A Dissertation By Jeffery M. Don^art Approved as to style and content by (Chaiman of Corauittee) (Head of Dspartment) (Mer.-.ber) ^^^^^ May 1971 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION .... ^ CHAPTER I. TtiE KOREAN CRISIS OF 1894 2> CHAPTER II. THE, UNDECLARED VJAR CHAPTER III. UNmSY NEUTRALITY ''^ CliAPTER IV. THE OPJ.)E.\L OF GOOD OFFICES AND YALU ^9 CHAPTER V. TAE BATTLES AT PING YANG 106 CHAPTER VI. BAPJkVRISM VERBIS CIVILIZATION J i 00? CE^^PTER VII. I'HE PORT ARTHUR MA.SSACRS . ASIA 144 OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EAST . CHAPTER VIII . THE PROTECTION PEACE PRELIMIMPJES 165 CHAPTER IX. TrIE AMERICAN ROLE IN 1^'^* CHAPTER X. JAPA>SSE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP 202 FOOTNOTES ' 238 SOURCES CONSULTED ..... INTRODUCTION imagined that Throughout the. ninateenth century wany Americans heathen temples and East Asia was a land of cruel varlords, opium dens, of vast masses of unwashed coolies. Now and then businessmen dreasned bold plans to convert and untapped m-arkets, and missionaries conceived journalists found Asia a source for Asians to Christienity . Travelling mysteries of the East for strange and exotic tales which perpetuated the States could do little the reading public. Asians living in the United long hours for meager wages, to alter the negative stereotypes. Working labor. Moreover, they retained they wore considered a menace to American pigtails and congregated their Oriental customs, refused to cut off their filthy ChiaaCowns in what /iniericans believed to be evil and largely unchanged America's popular image of the Orient ren'.ainec1 of 1894 China and Japan declared by the 1890's. Ihea in the early surnr.ar kingdom of Korea. Americans war, r.«ssxng their amrles in the small the issue of the present became intensely interested. "Whatever be likely that A...ericans will conflict," one conte.nporary observed, "it is have ever the next six n,onths than they know .-.ore of Chinese Asia during hastily-written books and articles cared to iearu before."^ They studied economics. Ihey looked into fasci- on Asian history, politics, art and for Ti.ey searched their maps nating analyses of the "Oriental mind." accounts mentioned in stirring newspaper Seoul, Chemulpo and other cities Tril^e noted in December 1894 that of the early fighting. The Mi XS^k generation. for the first time In a "in the year just closing Asia has. 2 alone is sufficient to been the scene of the world's chief interest. It ^3 roake 1894 an ever-memorable year." important domestic American interest was remarkable in view of the battles between strikers concerns. A terrible depression, accented by years. Aniericans feared the and soldiers, seemed likely to endure for socialism and Populism; but they B,enaces they perceived in immigration, by the trusts. Arguments were angry too over an economy monopolized more intense, while discontented over gold silver money daily grew Democrat warned President groups agitated for reforms. One llassachosetts new forces threatened to under- Grover Cleveland in July 1894 that theae bring about a violent revolution. =,ine the two-party system and might and all of a piece." he explained, ••Populisra. Coxeyism. and Debism are system."^ Ihese dcnestic crises they proposed to destroy the An^erican Richard Hofstadter, may have and frustrations, according to historian of Americans to foreign affairs been important in turning the attention excitins diversion from the con- during the 1890's, as a welcome and 5 plexities of trying tiraes. however, could scarcely be Cleveland's second administration, foreign policy. It had instigated called dramatic in its conduct of being Nicaragua, but by 1894 it v.. .inor interventions in Bra.il and spirit of the contrast to the adventurous called "cowardly" through its State Harrison and hie Secretary of preceding administration. Benj«.ln affairs . ^chUz exciteciPN-cited overc.ex foreign James G, Blaine had kept the Aiiiericau h.rdly subsided war scar, -with Italy ha. for several years. Harrison's Valparaiso threatened two An.erican sailors in in 1891 when the .urder of in F.waii rebellion by Americans living to lead to war with Chile. A 3 promised for a time to result in American annexation of the islands. Yet, despite Harrison's efforts, Congress postponed passage of his annexation bill; it was still pending when Cleveland entered the \Tnite House in Il^.rch 1893. Cleveland's victoi^ in 1892 V7as due partly to his long-f tanking reputation for honesty and morality in government. "It is better to be defeated battling for an honest principle than to v/in by covjardly eubter- 6 fuge," he told his follo:7ers. Cleveland campaigned by criticising the corruption and belligerency of the Republicans, promising not only financial and civil service reform^ but also the return to a less aggressive and less dangerous foreign policy- Cleveland consistently assured An-^ericans that his foreign policies would be based on "conscience, justice, peace, and neutrality," while "rejecting any share in foreign 7 broils and ambitions upon other continents." Cleveland's choice for Secretary of State, Walter Quintin Gresham, fully concurred with the President's foreign policy objectives. An Indiana Revpublican, Judge Greshasi had grown increasingly unhappy with and the corruption in his party. In 1892, he abandoned the Republicans supported Cleveland, realising that in all probability he had ended his Secretary political career. When the President-elect asked him to become would be criti- of State, Gresham hesitated, fearing that his appointment that because cized as a political deal. But Cleveland assured Gresham sincerity and of his "sturdy regard for political duty" and his "supreme nation as disinterestedness," he would contribute a vital service to his and travelled to the head of the State Department. Gresham accepted in him. Washington with a fcr\'ent intent to justify Cleveland's faith Though a novice in foreign affairs, Greshatn applied his background and knowledge of lav; and domestic politics to the formulation of foreign policies. He believed that in international relations there was right and wrong, good and evil; some policies were legal, others illegal, A diplomat was be^it served by his unswerving allegiance to principle. In 1894 he wrote a close Indiana friend that his foreign policies would oppose expaitsion into the Prxific, as well as the creation of a large army and navy. Never, for instance, v?ould Greshasi condone a foreign policy which aiiiied to enhance the deals and intrigues of business interests. Amarican ccrnnierce Must proceed according to the v/orkings of honest laissex-faire economics. A high tariff fostered a nurabcr of evlle and must be lowered or abolished to ensure friendly relations 9 between the United States and all other nations. The pending legislation concerning the annexation of Hawaii presented Cleveland and Gresham with their first najor foreign policy decision. Ihe President, prompted by Gresham, urged the Senate to delay Blount, could complete action until his special corrmissioner , James H. an investigation of the recent Hawaiian revolution. Blount discovered Honolulu, "irnproper" involvement on the part of the American minister in had been and this confirmed Gresham' s suspicion that the revolution Tne engineez-ed by "iirjnoral" Aiaerican business interests in Hawaii. and restore Secretary of State advised Cleveland to abandon annexation of the former the legitiniate government to power. Ihough restoration Cleveland regime failed, the President dropped the annexation treaty. for jusrlfi-d hU. decision by blaming Harrison and the Republicans a virulent having manufactured the Hawaiian problem, thereby initiating Viipat-tisan debate over the direction of American foreign policy vhich lasted throughout Clevelaad's entire second terra. Influenced by the need to provide a clear contrast with Republican foreign policy as well as by their ovn backgrounds, Cleveland and Greshain adopted policies V7hich, through incessant enunciation, appeared non-aggressive, anti" mindful of the rights of all nations. irr.perialist , straightforward and As Sino-Japanese hostilities began in East Asia in 1894, the prospGCt of titanic battles between battleship fleets and huge amies was enough, in itself, to capture the interest of the American public. Had Benjarain Harrison still been President, the audience might well have e^ipoctcd heightened drama in the for^n of some American connection the with the wiir. llo such policy, hov?ever, could be expected from current leadership; and no one was surprised when Cleveland and Gresham announced a policy of "strict neutrality." Having understood that their government would be strictly neutral, Americans were startled in June of 1894 when they learned that United and States marines and naval personnel had landed at Chemulpo, Korea, later marched some thirty miles to the capital at Seoul.