Knowledge and Community in Mathematics Jonathan Borwein1 and Terry Stanway2 Mathematical Knowledge - As We Knew It Each society has its regime of truth, its \general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as truth.3 (Michel Foucault) Henri Lebesgue once remarked that \a mathematician, in so far as he is a mathematician, need not preoccupy himself with philosophy." He went on to add that this was \an opinion, moreover, which has been expressed by many philosophers."4 The idea that mathematicians can do mathematics without a precise philosophical understanding of what they are doing is, by observation, mercifully true. However, while a neglect of philosophical issues does not impede mathematical discussion, discussion about mathematics tends to quickly become embroiled in philosophy and perforce, encompass the question of the nature of mathematical knowledge. Within this discussion, some attention has been paid to the resonance between the failure of twentieth century e®orts to enunciate a comprehensive, absolute foundation for mathematics and the postmodern deconstruction of meaning and its corresponding ban- 1Faculty of Computer Science, Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, Canada. B3H 1W5
[email protected] 2Centre for Experimental and Constructive Mathematics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada. V5A 1S6
[email protected] 3Michel Foucault, \Truth and Power", Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972- 1977, edited by Colin Gordon 4Freeman Dyson, \Mathematics in the Physical Sciences", Scienti¯c American 211, no.