Ministry of the Environment, Environmental Assessment and Approvals Branch, 2 St. Clair Avenue West, Floor 12A, Toronto, Ontario M4V 1L5

To the Honourable John Gerrettsen,

Purpose

The contents of this document are to illustrate to The Crown, as clearly as possible, serious concerns and consequences of the proposal put forward by Metrolinx for the Georgetown South Service Expansion and Union-Pearson Rail Link, on the CN/GO Weston Subdivision between Bathurst Street and Goreway Drive.

Background

The Georgetown GO Corridor has been serviced by rail by GO Transit since 1974. It has been studied for expansion to full-day service for about 20 years. Studies and projections indicate the corridor has the highest potential for growth in the GO Transit rail network.

Metrolinx is a corporation of The Crown, setup to oversee the planning and implementation of a Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) for the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA). Metrolinx is the proponent of the Georgetown South Service Expansion (GSSE) project, including the Union-Pearson Rail Link (UPRL) as part of the same Environmental Assessment (EA).

The Crown’s initiative to have a body put into place for coordinating the various local transit agencies’ and GO Transit’s efforts to improve transit services in the GTHA is laudable. The Crown deserves credit for taking leadership on this issue after over a decade of neglect that started in the 1990s. The Crown setup the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority in June, 2006, branded it Metrolinx in December, 2007, and merged it with GO Transit in May, 2009. The RTP was adopted in November, 2008.

Metrolinx Complications

Things have not gone smoothly for Metrolinx, and there are indications that communication has been fragmented or, in some cases, absent. There is strong evidence to suggest that this has led to a lack of coordination, both within Metrolinx between departments, and between Metrolinx and other agencies and stakeholders.

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 The style of project management and public consultation employed by Metrolinx on the GSSE project also strongly implies a lack of vision to what transit can really do for both the region and, particularly, the local, directly impacted communities along the line when opportunities that the project presents are properly seized. Part of the evidence to support this is the absence of development of revenue generating tools for Metrolinx project by the Investment Strategy Division until recent action taken by Metrolinx President and CEO Robert Prichard in July, despite having already received over $10 billion from The Crown, straining its resources. The GSSE project has the opportunity to generate significant revenues and operational savings, especially long-term, if such opportunities are seized. Such revenues are needed for the long-term sustainable funding of the RTP.

Further to the lack of vision is a lack of preparation to carry out RTP projects. Despite backgrounder information published on the subject of Mobility Hubs during the consultations for development of the RTP, it was admitted at the July 13, 2009 Metrolinx Board meeting that Metrolinx staff in the Transportation Policy and Planning Division have not done much work on Mobility Hubs, and do not understand enough about them. This is critical information for a project as large and rich in growth as the GSSE, and Metrolinx cannot properly carry out the project without a high level of comfort with Mobility Hubs. This has a very high impact on the ridership that the project will attract once implemented, and fixing mistakes after the fact will be extraordinarily difficult and at extremely high expense. Related to Mobility Hubs is the impact of the GSSE project on a key RTP Anchor Hub: Union Station. This is an issue of the highest, most critical importance, and has been neither resolved, nor sufficiently addressed by the GSSE project team.

There is a strong perception by communities of unwillingness on the part of GSSE project team to work with affected partners on the GSSE project, despite Metrolinx preaching of cooperation through the media. Efforts to work with the City of Toronto, Toronto Public Health, the Toronto District School Board, and several local communities along the rail corridor such as Weston, Mount Dennis, The Junction, and Brockton Village, suggests inflexibility with the GSSE project team, and a breakdown in its communication with the public.

The Unrealized Potential of the GSSE Project

As someone that has experience in architectural design and working/construction drawings, followed urban planning in and around Toronto, familiarity with aspects of railway engineering, experience with other rail systems in other countries such as Japan (specifically Tokyo area, where railways are ubiquitous), a history as a life-long captive transit user, and been a frequent participant in public engagement by transit agencies, I have a high level of comfort with this kind of

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 subject matter, and I know that this has the potential to be a fantastic project. However, the proposal put forward, and the process used for developing the proposal, falls far short of the potential of this project. There are large and growing volumes of evidence that suggest that this project, as proposed by the GSSE project team, may in fact do more harm than good.

There is no doubt that a fantastic project is possible for the GSSE, and that The Crown wants a fantastic project for the GSSE. However, the GSSE project team has instead put forward a problem-laden proposal, problems that are not insurmountable if better engagement with the communities had been undertaken by the GSSE project team in earnest. It is reasonable to conclude that, as a result of the community engagement and project proposals to date, that there is a large and growing percentage of the public that has lost confidence in the capability of the project team Metrolinx has selected to do the work for the GSSE/UPRL project. The reasons, including additional reasons not listed above, are detailed in the attached report, and illustrate how this can be the fantastic project so many Ontarians want it to be. Hundreds of thousands of Ontarians will be affected by GSSE/UPRL projects.

Legend

This document contains a very large number of direct quotes from the GSSE Final Environmental Project Report. These quotes are enclosed and identified with a black band at the top indicating the section and heading, with a page number in brackets. If applicable, a date is also included.

1.2.3.4 Example Heading (EPR Pg. 1000) Subsection (December, 2008) Quoted connect from the GSSE Final Environmental Project Report.

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Table of Contents

VISION: THE BUILDING BLOCK OF A GREATER WHOLE ...... 3 REGIONAL VISION ...... 3 DETAILED CORRIDOR VISION ...... 3 COORDINATING AND UNIFYING VISIONS ...... 4 RELATIONS WITH PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS ...... 5 CITY OF TORONTO COUNCIL ...... 5 TORONTO PUBLIC HEALTH ...... 9 TORONTO DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD ...... 9 CITY OF TORONTO PARKS AND FORESTRY ...... 10 REGION OF PEEL ...... 10 ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT ...... 12 ONTARIO MINISTRY OF CULTURE ...... 15 PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT ...... 16 INTRODUCTION ...... 16 ELECTRIFICATION ...... 17 SNC-LAVALIN (SNC-L)...... 21 COMMUNITY IMPACTS ...... 22 JOHN STREET ...... 23 LIBERTY VILLAGE/PARKDALE GO STATION ...... 27 STRACHAN AVENUE ...... 30 MOBILITY HUBS AND ANCHOR HUBS ...... 32 ANCHOR HUBS ...... 32 MOBILITY HUBS ...... 33 Bloor ...... 33 Subway Connection ...... 33 Milton Service ...... 33 Street Connections ...... 33 Carlton Village ...... 33 Eglinton ...... 34 Weston ...... 34 Etobicoke North/Rexdale...... 34 Car Access Benefits (Highway Access and Parking) ...... 34 Bus Connections (TTC & GO) ...... 34 Etobicoke North/Woodbine ...... 35 OPPORTUNITIES AND RELATIONS TO OTHER PROJECTS ...... 36 GO TRANSIT ...... 36 Bolton ...... 36 Georgetown North ...... 36 Milton and Barrie Lines ...... 37 TTC TRANSIT CITY ...... 37 RENFORTH TERMINAL ...... 38 CONCLUSION ...... 39

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Appendices

1. Lakeshore Express Rail Benefits Case Analysis key excerpts 2. Modeling and projection figures compared to current traffic 3. City of Toronto Official Plan Map 4; Higher Order Transit Corridors 4. Weston-Mt.Dennis Alternative 5. Metrolinx on Cooperation 6. Etobicoke-Finch West LRT Highway 27 Extension 7. TTC services along Georgetown Corridor, GSSE EPR Figure 4.4.4-1 8. Woodbine Station Proposed in 1994 Georgetown Expansion Class EA 9. GSSE Final EPR Appendix A Traffic Plots 10. 2001 Lakeshore Corridor Electrification Study page ii excerpt 11. Transport Canada Documents on UPRL Fares 12. Response from Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health 13. Environ Response Commissioned by Toronto District School Board 14. Hatch Mott MacDonald October, 2008 Lakeshore Corridor Electrification Study excerpt 15. Woodbine Station, Eglinton Station, and Weston Station Track Layouts in GSSE Final EPR 16. Comment on Economics of Transit Infrastructure by Norman D. Wilson, December 9, 1957 17. Energy Consumption Rough Estimate 18. Graffiti on Barriers Along Railway Corridor 19. Design Charrette Misrepresentation 20. Transport Canada Documents on Track 1 Use 21. Transit City Corridors and Potential Future LRT Corridors by Ridership 22. GO Ridership Trends from Yonge North Subway Extension TTC Presentation, January, 2009 23. 501 Queen Streetcar Service Route Splitting and West Waterfront LRT Plans 24. TTC Transit City Stop Spacing Assessment 25. Parkdale Station 26. Union Station Rail Corridor Constraints by Major Landmarks 27. Highway 401/Islington Interchange

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Vision: The Building Block of a Greater Whole

Regional Vision

The RTP, overall, is a commendable vision, and its own recognition and acknowledgement of its existence as a living document that evolves with the environment it is supposed to integrate with, is a progressive vision that, properly managed, will reap great benefits for the GTHA and increase the quality of life in various ways: improved air quality; more time for family; healthier transportation habits; lower percentage of income spent on transportation, and; reductions in stress, to name just a few. While the RTP is not without some conflicts, these are manageable, and the RTP is an accomplishment that is a positive step forward for Metrolinx and The Crown.

The implementation strategies of the RTP, which are different for every corridor, will be what determine whether or not its goals are achieved. Implementation is more complex than the development of the overall plan itself, as more factors need to be accounted for and considered, and harmoniously resolved with the infrastructure design. This requires a detailed corridor vision for each project, with close and effective relationships with groups (community, political, business, property/rate-payers, etc.) affected by the infrastructure of the corridor, to guide its design.

Detailed Corridor Vision

The detailed implementation strategy of the RTP is where a serious disconnect appears to be taking place. The GSSE project team appears to recognize neither problems with the project nor opportunities with the project alike. This has created a long list of problems with the project proposal described in the GSSE Final EPR. The project will cause serious damage to a large number of communities and dramatically minimize the return on investment for The Crown. Proof includes a Metrolinx publication more recent than the GSSE Final EPR: The Lakeshore Express Rail Benefits Case Analysis (Appendix 1), that appeared on the Metrolinx website about a week later. The Metrolinx modeling figures (Appendix 2a) for ridership between Georgetown and Lakeshore East are comparable, and should be considered a key factor in electrification plans for the broader GO rail network.

A detailed vision for a corridor is far more important than the broader vision of the RTP for the GTHA region. It is true to the old saying “the devil is in the details,” and the execution of the details can have a dramatic impact on the corridor in various ways: Urban planning; ridership; finances (of The Crown and of the operator); public health, and; crime. These all influence how successful the corridor will, or will not, be.

There has been a growing amount of evidence, now reaching overwhelming levels, that the GSSE project team is not sufficiently addressing critical aspects of the project, including, but not limited to, the service, the areas it runs through and impacts thereon, and the broader context and role of the corridor within the City of Toronto and (to a lesser extent) the Region of Peel. An absence of acknowledging so much as the existence of the City of Toronto Official Plan Map 4; Higher-Order Transit Corridors (Appendix 3), is one of the many symptoms.

The GSSE project team is creating a potentially frightening liability for The Crown, as the project as described in the GSSE Final EPR is poised to implement several large mistakes that will be extremely expensive to fix (assuming it is even possible to fix after the damage is done, which is by no means guaranteed). There are ways to improve this project, but the GSSE project team has not acted on most of such input, some of which is among the appendices attached to this document, and includes submitted input that wasn’t even evaluated.

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Coordinating and Unifying Visions

4.2 Socio Economic Environment (EPR Pg. 169) 4.2.1 Land Use Land use along the corridor consists of developed/redeveloped residential and industrial/commercial areas. The rail corridor is primarily within the City of Toronto; however, west of Highway 401 the corridor is within the City of Mississauga (Region of Peel). It is important to note that this is an existing rail corridor and that commencement of operations in the rail corridor preceded the majority of the surrounding developments.

The previous existence of the rail corridor is not the important part; it is how much service has been running in the corridor and the magnitude of expansion proposed (Appendix 2b). Nothing anywhere near the level of service proposed in the GSSE project has ever been run on the corridor, nor on any rail corridor in North America, without electrification of most or all passenger rail services. Comparisons are presented for US cities with rail corridors of the highest passenger diesel rail vehicle traffic (New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco) in Appendix 2c.

The land uses along the corridor continue to evolve as the City of Toronto Official Plan guides changes to communities along the corridor, for which transit is an integral part, and it is therefore critical that the GSSE project is coordinated with the City of Toronto and its Official Plan. While land use maps of the Official Plan were used, the GSSE project team has not consulted the Official Plan’s Map 4; Higher-Order Transit Corridors (Appendix 3). Given the lack of reference to Map 4, there is no evidence any effort was made to coordinate the GSSE project with the Official Plan’s transit components.

In the above GSSE Final EPR reference, "Highway 401" should read "Highway 427," as that is the border between Toronto and Mississauga north of Highway 401. The GSSE project team should be expected to know the location of the border between Toronto and Mississauga.

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Relations with Partners/Stakeholders

City of Toronto Council

Table 3.3.1.4-1 Summary of Municipal Comments – Pre Notice of Commencement

City of Toronto Concern (EPR Pg. 60) Metrolinx Response Council Motion dated January 27, 2009 At this point, before consultation on design indicating that: options have taken place, the only road closure - City Council opposes any road closures along required is at John Street and community the route connectivity will be maintained by providing a pedestrian/cyclist overpass. Please refer to Section 5.2.2.3 for further details.

The GSSE project team is not working with the City of Toronto in good faith when they refuse to holistically evaluate options that would keep John Street open. The GSSE project team refuses to evaluate potential land-value enhancement (“value uplift”) opportunities, a subject that is touched on in section 7.2.4. Investment Strategy (Pg. 80) of “The Big Move,” that could yield significant returns for The Crown to help pay off the project debt in far less time than the 50 years outlined in MoveOntario2020. Such opportunities are an essential component for any holistic evaluation. No evaluation took place on such options even though such an option was put forward to the GSSE project team, in detail, and is attached to this document (Appendix 4).

Metrolinx preaches cooperation with its municipal partners (Appendix 5), yet the GSSE project team appears to be doing the opposite, as the needs of the City of Toronto are not being accommodated

City of Toronto Concern (EPR Pg. 60) Metrolinx Response Council Motion dated January 27, 2009 Comment noted. A stop in Weston has been indicating that: provided and the design of the corridor would - Addition of new stops, including a stop at enable stops at Eglinton and Woodbine should Weston demand or other circumstances warrant it.

The GSSE project team is not consulting Map 4 of the City of Toronto Official Plan (Appendix 3). The Woodbine Station location proposed by the GSSE project team is, at best, disconnected. The station is located between Carlingview Drive and Highway 427 in the GSSE Final EPR, whereas the City of Toronto Official Plan has a very logical and effective location a very short distance away at Highway 27. The GSSE project team makes no mention of the Official Plan in the GSSE Final EPR regarding Woodbine Station.

The Highway 27 location is particularly important for connecting the GSSE project to the Etobicoke-Finch West LRT that has a proposed extension from Finch south on Highway 27 (Appendix 6), which would cross the rail corridor. This is the kind of connection that the RTP is supportive of, and is indeed made elsewhere in the GSSE project, at Eglinton Avenue. Both Etobicoke-Finch West (which includes Highway 27) and Eglinton-Crosstown are identified by the RTP as “Rapid Transit” corridors. GO Transit also happens to run bus service along Highway 27 from Yorkdale, with which a GO rail station at Highway 27 could connect to. In addition, the TTC’s 191 Highway 27 Rocket from the Kipling subway station would also be able to service such a connection. Minor adjustments to some other TTC bus routes in the area could expand connections even more. This is the kind of service integration that has been lacking between local and regional services for such a long time in the GTHA region.

By contrast, there are no surface connections to speak of at Carlingview Drive where crossing the Georgetown Corridor, evident in Figure 4.4.4-1 in the GSSE Final EPR (Appendix 7), and it is very impractical, if even feasible, to connect to anything running on the 427 at the location proposed for

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Woodbine Station by the GSSE project team. No justification is included for the selected location of Woodbine Station (which cannot actually be named “Woodbine,” due to a subway station in the east end of the former City of Toronto with the same name, which the GSSE project team should have already been aware of).

GO Transit had proposed the Highway 27 location itself, 15 years ago, in a 1994 EA that coordinated the proposed station with LRT along the Highway 27 corridor as part of the corridor vision (Appendix 8), in addition to the redevelopments planned for the Highway 27 corridor. 15 years later, these developments are now taking shape, including the LRT thanks to funding from The Crown. The GSSE project team, curiously, does refer to the 1994 GO Transit EA in section 2.3.5.4 (EPR Pg. 40) for discussion regarding the background of the expansion for GO service along the Georgetown Corridor, but the proposal from the GSSE project team for Woodbine Station suggests that the GSSE project team has not looked at that EA’s contents beyond the introductory pages.

Also of significant note due to its absence is the City of Toronto Official Plan’s inclusion of a GO station in the Liberty Village area, at King Street West, which was also included in the 1994 EA (Appendix 8). Changes to the corridor at Strachan Avenue, which are positive changes, force Queen Street West to be used instead of King Street West, but this is addressed in detail later in this document.

Mount Dennis GO (at Eglinton Avenue West along the Georgetown South Corridor) is a station that should be constructed immediately as part of the GSSE project. It, too, is in the Official Plan, but more notable is the fact that The Crown has already funded the Eglinton Crosstown LRT project that would connect with the Georgetown GO service where the two corridors cross. The Eglinton Crosstown LRT is, with the exception of lower capacity, effectively a subway between Black Creek and the Don Valley, and thereby part of the Rapid Transit network of the TTC that should have a GO connection (even if such wasn’t in the Official Plan). How can the GSSE project team suggest that demand or other circumstances do not warrant such a station?

Also curious to note is the GSSE project team’s selection of the name “Eglinton” for this station instead of the obvious choice of “Mount Dennis.” Is the GSSE project team so unfamiliar with the GO Transit system that they do not realize that GO Transit already has a station called “Eglinton” in Scarborough on the Lakeshore East Corridor? GO Transit rarely uses street names for their stations, and the Lakeshore East Corridor’s Eglinton GO Station is no exception to this pattern (“Eglinton” is the name of a neighbourhood on the north side of the GO station).

The Official Plan inconsistencies are very problematic as they are out of sync with the growth plans for the City of Toronto, a growth plan with principles that The Crown is supportive of. The GSSE project team proposal does not achieve the goals of The Crown for sustainable and economical growth in the GTHA by creating such planning inconsistencies and proposing a corridor design that is not supported by those that it should be benefiting most, which are the communities along the corridor, not to the exclusive benefit of the Peel and Halton communities further west. The corridor is important to all communities, “416” communities and “905” communities alike. Transit corridors such as Georgetown South need to be corridors where growth concentrates, including within the City of Toronto, but the corridor design as proposed by the GSSE project team will surely poison the land, deterring any kind of desirable development along it. This is avoidable with a better design, including, but not limited to, electrification of the high frequency services in the corridor.

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City of Toronto Concern (EPR Pg. 61) Metrolinx Response Council Motion dated January 27, 2009 Electrification is not part of the scope for the indicating that: current project. Please refer to Section 3.3.2.1.2 - Metrolinx be requested to employ electric for further details regarding electrification of the vehicles corridor.

The GSSE project team has been inconsistent about the reasons for refusing to include electrification as part of the project, yet at the same time including provisions for future electrification, which include significant electrification-associated costs. Electrification costs beyond these provisions should be relatively low.

At first, it was claimed cost was the key impediment to immediate electrification, verbally citing the cost as “billions.” However, it was later revealed that the cost was not as high as claimed, especially considering the provisions that the GSSE project includes for future electrification are some of the most expensive elements anyway. These include, perhaps most notably, bridge height clearances, and to a lesser extent foundations for the overhead catenary system that carries the wires for electricity to be delivered to the trains. It should be noted that the costs of grade separations are not an electrification cost, but a cost associated with service frequency, only the additional height clearances are attributable to electrification. The cost of electrification for the GSSE is not “billions,” and should be well under half a billion for the GSSE project area from Highway 427 to Union Station. An additional minimum of approximately 10.5km of electrification to reach at least Brampton would also be required, but is part of a separate project (Georgetown North Service Expansion). This represents just under half as much electrification as required east of Highway 427 for the GSSE project.

There is a cost for additional vehicles to run the expanded service regardless of them being diesel or electric, meaning the markup in cost between diesel vehicles and electric vehicles is marginal. In fact, as illustrated by charts in the GSSE Final EPR’s Appendix A (Appendix 9a), the travel times of electric vehicles are faster, and this can result in fewer vehicles required for the same level of service, meaning a capital investment reduction, as well as reduced annual maintenance costs. Existing rolling stock that would be removed from the Georgetown Corridor for electric vehicles become project savings on other expansion projects, such as the proposed new Bolton service. However, expanding diesel fleet at the volumes required for this project, only to electrify later, will lead to wasteful investments in rolling stock, considering that Georgetown is certainly not the only corridor to be electrified in the network. It is therefore a net savings in the long-term to not expand the diesel fleet due to the scale required for the proposed project.

The GSSE project team changed its reason for refusing to consider immediate electrification in later public open houses to an issue of time involved to incorporate the design of electrification infrastructure into the current project. This raises some unsettling questions about the GSSE project team, because the project team has known since January 27, 2009, just under one week after releasing a revised project proposal on January 21, 2009, during which the design work was just beginning in earnest, that electrification was a key concern for the City of Toronto and its communities along the corridor. Had the GSSE project team been listening and working with the City of Toronto, electrification could have been incorporated in a timely manner. More unsettling is the claim made verbally by the GSSE project team during the April public open houses that revising the designs for including electrification would take 2-3 years, yet in a 2001 report (Appendix 10), it is stated very clearly that the timeline for design is 14 months for the Lakeshore Corridor (Aldershot-Oshawa), just over 1 year for a corridor over twice as long as the entire existing Georgetown Corridor (North and South).

Most shocking are the contents in the release of the Benefits Case Analysis (BCA) for Lakeshore Express Rail (Appendix 1), of which The Crown should be extraordinarily interested in, as it shows that electrification of rail service that has high demands, such as Milton, Georgetown and Lakeshore (Appendix 2a), pays for itself very quickly, and yields substantial long-term savings,

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 8 even in operations alone. The multiplier effects electrification brings are then a huge boon to The Crown, and the timing for making such an investment is as opportune as they come in the current economic climate that lowers the costs of labour and materials (and land if necessary). To be very clear: Now is the cheapest time in more than a generation to electrify rail services, and The Crown will save a fortune in both capital and long-term operational expenses if electrification is carried out immediately. This applies to both Lakeshore and Georgetown, and even Milton as well (although Milton may have significant track expansion requirements through the City of Mississauga). Why does the GSSE project team not acknowledge this important reality? With the level of expansion proposed, The Crown can’t afford not to electrify immediately.

Important to note in the prices outlined in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA (Appendix 1) is that it includes some costs for Lakeshore, such as grade separations, among others, that are already part of the GSSE project, in addition to Georgetown being a much shorter corridor, meaning that the incremental cost is much smaller than what is listed in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA.

The GSSE project team seems to have been oblivious to the existence of the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA work that had been going on at the same time as the GSSE/UPRL EA, and this raises serious questions beyond just the GSSE project team, but communication within Metrolinx in general. The Lakeshore Express Rail and GSSE project teams certainly should be talking to each other.

City of Toronto Concern (EPR Pg. 61) Metrolinx Response Council Motion dated January 27, 2009 The purposed Union-Pearson Rail Link will indicating that: provide a transit option to the airport (Terminal - Public transit alternatives in the Georgetown 1) with stops at the Weston GO Station, Bloor corridor and serving the airport be a component GO Station and Union Station. Please refer to of any service improvements Section 2.2 for details regarding other planned connections to the airport. Big Move #2 in the Regional Transportation Plan also addresses the need for higher order connectivity to the Airport and makes specific proposals for connections to other municipal transit services

The GSSE project team misinterprets the spirit of the motion, which deals with the service to the airport being provided by GO Transit with GO Transit’s fare structure. The UPRL is not “public transit” because it is priced way out of the market of “public transit.” “Public transit” cannot charge $14-$20 for a one-way ride, which is what has been proposed in past documents prepared by Transport Canada (Appendix 11) before the airport link project was handed to Ontario, although the GSSE project team insists that no decisions regarding fare have been made. Such high fares will not get many people out of their cars. 1.1 million cars per year is a small enough number as it is, but this number will be much lower with both the UPRL and the Eglinton Crosstown LRT serving Pearson Airport.

No study has been done on re-evaluating the business case for a private operator running the UPRL service since Transit City was announced in 2007 and, later, partially funded by The Crown. Transit City, particularly the fully Crown-funded Eglinton Crosstown LRT, destroys the business case of the UPRL as a P3 model, as it cannot compete with the high frequency, low fare, vast number of destinations, free connecting services that are included as part of the same low fare, and superior capacity of the comfortable, high-quality Eglinton Crosstown LRT service.

The capacity of the UPRL in one hour is what the capacity of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT is in 5 minutes. The Eglinton Crosstown LRT vehicles carry over twice as many passengers per car (130(+?) vs. 60), with more cars per train (3 vs. 2), and almost 4-fold as many trains per hour (~15 vs. 4) as the UPRL. Even when compared to a fare of $2.25 (the price when paying by token, but cash fares will be higher ($3?)), if the maximum capacities of each service are filled, the UPRL at $20 per one-way fare makes $9,600, compared to $13,162.5 for the Eglinton Crosstown LRT.

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Toronto Public Health

Table 3.3.2.4-1 Summary of Municipal Comments – Post Notice of Commencement

Toronto Public Health Concern (EPR Pg. 86) Metrolinx Response Interested in the potential impacts to air quality, Impacts to air quality, human health and noise human health and noise. have been addressed as part of this report and where appropriate mitigation measures and commitments to future work have been identified. Please refer to Sections 6.2.2 (noise), 6.2.4 (air quality), 6.2.5 (human health).

Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health, Dr. David McKeown, has expressed his objection to the expansion of diesel services in the Georgetown Corridor, and outlines several flaws and underestimations with the methodology used in the GSSE Final EPR, generating unacceptable health risks along the corridor, risks that are inappropriately downplayed in the summaries and conclusions of the GSSE Final EPR. Among the most striking shortcomings, according to Dr. McKeown, is the absence of electrification as a mitigation strategy for the pollution generated by the diesel service expansion. A copy of Dr. McKeown’s letter is attached as Appendix 12.

The attitude, following the release of Dr. McKeown’s letter of objection, displayed by the GSSE project team through the media disagreeing with someone more qualified than they, comes off as arrogant and unprofessional. This is emblematic of the problem that the GSSE project team has with its incapability of accepting input that would change their project.

There was also a submission made to the Toronto Board of Health on June 15, 2009 from the GSSE project team that repeatedly stated that GO Transit’s new MP40 locomotives were Tier 3, when in fact they are Tier 2.

There was an intent to meet with the Medical Officer of Health before the August 31, 2009 deadline for comments expressed by the GSSE project team, but this has also not taken place, and the GSSE Final EPR has not incorporated any communication from Dr. McKeown after June 15, 2009. I have confirmed this personally with Dr. McKeown’s office.

Toronto District School Board

A summary of the submission made by Environ is attached as Appendix 13.

Peer reviews of the air quality assessment and the human health impact study were conducted by Environ, commissioned by the Toronto District School Board out of the concern about the project impacts on their students at the several dozen schools that are near (or even immediately adjacent to) the corridor. The GSSE project team’s response to this review was very high on rhetoric and very low on substantive answers.

Claims that are known to be inherently false were made, such as reducing commuter traffic on highways through increased rail travel (it is known that capacity created on highways is quickly backfilled). There was also a favouring of the use of intensity-based emissions estimates, a known flawed approach, instead of using the protocols of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. There was also a response near the top of EPR Pg. 96 by the GSSE project team that suggested the afternoon peak period doesn’t exist in summer, which is actually part of the 10% missed in the use of the 90th percentile concentrations instead of the 98th percentile concentrations the experts have all said should have been used. The position of the GSSE project team can be summarized, reading between the lines, that summer afternoon rush hours aren’t important because it isn’t part of the 90th percentile and convenient for the GSSE project team’s case.

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City of Toronto Parks and Forestry

City of Toronto Parks, Forestry & Recreation Concern (EPR Pg. 87) Metrolinx Response Letter dated May 14, 2009 providing statistics on park usage for Information noted. Sorauren Park

If the information is noted, the GSSE project team apparently does not consider the information relevant, and, by extension, is satisfied with exposing the many users of this park (among many other parks in the City of Toronto), including large numbers of young children, to the dangerous levels of diesel rail traffic it proposes to implement, with all the dangerous levels of emissions it would create. Sorauren Park happens to be in the part of the corridor that has the highest rail traffic concentration north of King Street, with the combined traffic of Milton, Georgetown, UPRL, Bolton, and Bradford services (Appendix 2b) passing the northeast edge of Sorauren Park. Important parts of communities, parks like this, among others, are some of the reasons that electrification is such an important component of the project. Without electrification, communities like this will see urban decay and deteriorating health, a result that is directly contrary to the goals and policies of the City of Toronto, the Metrolinx RTP, and The Crown.

Region of Peel

Table 3.3.1.4-1 Summary of Municipal Comments – Pre Notice of Commencement

Region of Peel Concern (EPR Pg. 61) Metrolinx Response Report to Council dated February 27, 2009 Traffic operations have been considered during noted that: the assessment of alternatives as outlined in - The EA process should include the the Environmental Project Report. appropriate analysis of rail traffic operations in the Georgetown Corridor and at Union Station to ensure that the long term vision for GO service is not compromised.

This statement is in stark contrast with both the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA (Appendix 1) and with the Hatch Mott MacDonald study of Lakeshore Electrification in October, 2008 (Appendix 14). The impacts of the traffic analysis should conclude, as the other studies already have, that there is insufficient space at Union Station for the rail traffic volume that would be generated by this project when combined with the Lakeshore service expansion. The Lakeshore service expansion is planned to be in service by 2015, a very similar timeframe to that of the GSSE project. The Lakeshore service expansion may be a separate project, but it is an absolutely catastrophic error to not include the traffic needs of Lakeshore services at Union Station in 2015 as part of the GSSE project just because Lakeshore services would be “outside the study area.” That is not an excuse. That the GSSE project team is making a statement that is in direct contradiction with another document published by Metrolinx on its website about one week after the Final EPR was circulated, as well as a document that the GSSE project team has had access to since late 2008 before work had even started the current GSSE/UPRL EA, raises critical questions about how the GSSE project team is doing its work, and casts the credibility of the GSSE Final EPR into serious doubt. It is impossible for all three publications to be correct, and the GSSE Final EPR is outnumbered 2 to 1.

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Region of Peel Concern (EPR Pg. 61) Metrolinx Response Report to Council dated February 27, 2009 This project is not seeking approval for a noted that: Woodbine Station; however, it will be designed - Staff support the inclusion of a Woodbine to enable the construction of a future station Station in the current project. should demand or other circumstances warrant it. If a station at Woodbine is proposed at some point in the future it will be the subject of a future study and approval process.

Stating the tracks will be laid in a manner to accommodate a Woodbine Station in a specific location as part of the GSSE project while simultaneously stating the GSSE project is not seeking approval for a Woodbine Station is self-contradictory. If the tracks are being laid to accommodate a Woodbine Station in a specific location (Appendix 15a), it will be complex to change the location later, should it later be learned that another location is more appropriate (Appendix 8), especially since the Georgetown Corridor 1994 EA’s location for Woodbine Station would involve bridge work at Highway 27. Given that evident reality, the EA is effectively seeking approval of the station due to the impact the station provision has on track infrastructure layout. As the GSSE Final EPR would protect for Woodbine Station in what should be obvious as an inappropriate location (Appendix 7), this is a significant problem. Why does the GSSE project team not see this relationship?

With the Etobicoke-Finch West LRT expected to reach Highway 27 and the Georgetown South corridor when a RTP-endorsed extension from Humber College to Pearson Airport is implemented, this station makes sense sooner rather than later. In order to improve connectivity and regional transportation options, connections between high-order/rapid transit services must be made. More stops serviced increases ridership through the servicing of more destinations and connecting services, making transit more practical for more people. Not everybody is bound for Union Station, and the system must be designed to be usable for trips that aren’t bound for downtown Toronto in addition to those that are. As has been known for well over half a century, the most economical use of transit infrastructure is when it is used for a larger number of shorter trips all across the corridor (Appendix 16), as this nets the highest number of fares while maximizing the use of capacity across the length of the line. More stations and connections are required for such an economic benefit to be gained in GO Transit’s network. This transit fundamental is clearly being overlooked, and it is important to bear in mind that this can be done without negative impacts on GO’s longer-haul travel market through a multi-tier service model offering express and local trains, which is accommodated by the RTP’s Express Rail vision.

Table 3.3.2.4-1 Summary of Municipal Comments – Post Notice of Commencement

Region of Peel Concern (EPR Pg. 87) Metrolinx Response Letter dated July 13, 2009 outlining staff report comments presented Information noted. to the Region of Peel’s General Committee on February 27, 2009, The letter identified 3 key issues of interest: - The importance of the TPAP being completed as soon as possible. - Ensure sufficient track capacity is provided to accommodate long-term service in the corridor. - Providing rail access to Peel residents to Pearson Airport.

Community concerns related to human health impacts and the lack of an electrification initiative were also outlined.

The GSSE project team does not act on the issue of electrification despite the issue being raised by both the City of Toronto and the Region of Peel; the regions directly impacted by the GSSE project. This is not appropriate, especially in combination with the huge public outcry on the

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 12 same issue, with near, or possibly over, a thousand comments received on the electrification issue alone.

Rail service connecting Pearson Airport to Downtown Brampton, where a relatively small piece of infrastructure would accommodate that, has not even been evaluated. That small piece of infrastructure should be part of the RTP’s “Big Move #2.” Why has this not been evaluated by the GSSE project team? Related to that, why is the GSSE project team unable to answer questions regarding any electrification provisions for the airport spur? Is Metrolinx the proponent, or not?

Ontario Ministry of the Environment

Ministry of the Environment Concern (EPR Pg. 103) Metrolinx Response Chapter 5 – Recommended Transit Project Comment noted. Additional Section 5.1.7 – Electrification. details of electrification study have been added. Will any details of proposed electrification study (i.e. ToR) be Details on rational for not included in final EPR? pursuing electrification were currently are in the Can you provide any further commitments/details on the timing for document, however the electrification study? This section should provide more details additional details have on the rationale for not pursuing this option, such as the details been included. regarding technical constraints, physical challenges, costs, and if possible a comment on potential energy requirements/energy Section 5.1.7 has been supply issues? Specify whether electrification will be a completely moved Section 3.3.2.1.2. separate undertaking.

The GSSE project team has not addressed the Ministry of the Environment’s question by not being specific with regard to potential energy requirements (which can be roughly estimated in the range of 50MW at peak if electrified all the way to Georgetown (Appendix 17)), potential energy supply issues (there is currently a surplus of power generating capacity in Ontario, as it was recently reported by OPG in August, 2009, that Ontario’s energy demand fell by 19%), costs (for which a reasonably detailed example is available in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA (Appendix 1), although it must be remembered some costs in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA are already accounted for in the GSSE project), physical challenges (with bridge height clearances probably being the most significant, which are already addressed in the GSSE project), and technical constraints (Union Station is already having electrification compatibility put in as part of the renovation and restoration project, to be ready for accepting electric vehicles by around 2014, and foundations for overhead catenary system support posts are supposed to be part of the GSSE project). The GSSE Final EPR presents empty claims to the Ministry of the Environment in its responses in section 3.3.2.1.2, which are explained in detail later in this document.

Ministry of the Environment Concern Metrolinx Response (EPR Pg. 103) Chapter 6 – Detailed Assessment of the In accordance with the MOE/GO Noise Protocol, the Impacts, Mitigation, and Monitoring focus of the noise impact assessment is on the change Section 6.2.2 – Noise Impacts. in sound between the “Future with out the project” and Is there any indication in the the “Future with the project”. As such, the maps in the assessment of the existing noise EPR focus on summarizing those changes. conditions/levels? Having said that, Table 6.2.2-1 summarizes the The document speaks to increases in absolute sound levels with and without barriers and the decibels, but will there not be an stand alone noise reports provides additional noise influence of the impact depending on contour mapping. how high the existing levels of noise are? Changes to EPR Not required.

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The GSSE project team does not address the actual concern expressed by the Ministry of the Environment. The concern was that there has been no measurement of existing noise conditions/levels. The existing noise conditions have not been measured, and are instead using the projected noise levels generated by expanding service as much as practical without adding new infrastructure, which results in a lower incremental change than if compared to existing noise conditions/levels. The GSSE project team is confessing to this practice itself in its response to the Ministry’s concern, quoted above. The Ministry of the Environment and Energy/GO Noise Protocol states;

Ministry of the Environment and Energy/GO Noise Protocol 4.1.1 Objective The desirable objective is that the daytime (16 hour) Leq produced by the rail service operation of the GO Transit project does not exceed the higher of the ambient sound level, combined with the sound level from existing rail activity, or 55 dB Leq. Furthermore, that the nighttime (8 hour) Leq produced by the rail service operation of the GO Transit project does not exceed the higher of the ambient sound level, combined with the sound level from existing rail service, or 50dB Leq.

Clearly, the Ministry of the Environment should expect the GSSE project team to state the existing levels of noise generated by the rail activity, and should be displayed for both peak and off-peak period comparisons as the off-peak service expansion will be much more significant than the peak-period expansion due to two factors: a) The level of off-peak service varies between less than once every hour to no off-peak service. b) There are far more off-peak hours than peak hours, especially when weekends are included, as they receive no service today.

If expansion from today’s service level to theoretical practical maximum is included without the project, the changes in dB are obviously understated. That would mean the mitigation impact results are inaccurate if compared to today’s levels, and should be dismissed as unreliable.

The limiting factor on GO rail capacity on Georgetown today is that GO has a limited number of trains available at peak, combined with a limitation of only being able to run trains in one direction at higher frequencies during peak periods.

Ministry of the Environment and Energy/GO Noise Protocol 4.1.4 Mitigation When a ‘significant or greater’ [5dB and up] impact is predicted, the potential to mitigate will be evaluated based on administrative, operational, economic, and technical feasibility. If deemed feasible, the mitigation measures shall ensure that the predicted sound level from the GO Transit rail project is as close to, or lower than, the rail service objective..

As electrification would eliminate the largest source of noise; the locomotive engine, electrification should be considered a mitigation strategy since it has additional advantages in operations and economics, and is technically feasible since provisions are already being included. Administration should not pose a problem.

It should be noted noise barriers could invite problems, such as their attraction as a graffiti canvas. An example of barriers used for graffiti along the existing rail corridor can be found along Touchstone Drive (Appendix 18).

Ministry of the Environment Concern Metrolinx Response (EPR Pg. 103) Section 6.2.4 – Air Quality Impacts. Can you The air quality impact assessment examined all provide any details on the level of emissions trains in the corridor. It is not possible to easily predicted with both the proposed GO Transit separate the different trains (additional

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 14 and UPRL trains, in comparison to other types modeling would be required). In addition, we do of trains (i.e. different tiers)? Can you provide not feel that this would add any value to the any discussion of the change in emissions from assessment as we are assessing the having the project go forward with diesel trains, cumulative effect of all emission in the corridor. and taking cars off the road, versus the ‘future no build’ scenario? Changes to EPR Not required.

Yet this request would have answered one of “the fundamental questions” the GSSE project team had indicated needed to be answered before electrification can take place. Therefore, it would obviously add significant value to the assessment to have such information in section 3.2.2.1.2, as it would illustrate the value of electrification on this project in terms of air quality and carbon footprint. We know that freight services and VIA Rail Canada will not be electrified, nor would Bolton GO Rail service as a peak-only operation, but everything else along the Georgetown South Corridor is a valid candidate for electrification. While the freight trains are older and of lower tiers, they form a small percentage of the traffic, and that is predominantly in the part of the corridor between Dupont Street and the north end of the Weston area (approximately 7.5km out of a 21.7km corridor between Union Station and Highway 427).

Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health had made a very similar request as the Ministry (EPR Pg. 88).

.Ministry of the Environment Concern (EPR Pg. 107) Metrolinx Response The EPR shows that nitrogen oxides and acrolein A mitigation strategy has been added. 24-hour concentrations were above the O. Reg 419/05 standards. The proponent should discuss whether This has been added to Section 6.2.4. there any proposed mitigation measures to decrease these concentrations.

This “mitigation strategy” is quoted below.

6.2.4.5 Potential Operational and Maintenance Impacts and Proposed Mitigation Measures (EPR Pg. 407) Potential Mitigation Measures Short-Term An air quality monitoring/mitigation program will be developed in consultation with the Ministry of the Environment during detailed design. It is anticipated that the program will likely focus on Air quality monitoring at worst-case areas to verify the results of the air quality modelling given the very conservative assumptions made during the assessment.

This is not a “mitigation” strategy, but a “monitoring” strategy, and does nothing to protect the health and well being of the impacted communities. Monitoring is not a pro-active response, it is a re-active response, because no action will be taken until monitoring of actual future-build conditions confirms the same thing that the GSSE Final EPR, or confirms that, as Toronto’s Medical Officer of Health, Dr. David McKeown, has given evidence to indicate, actual future-build conditions will be worse than the GSSE Final EPR predicts. Environ drew a similar conclusion to Dr. McKeown. If the monitoring confirms the same thing as the GSSE Final EPR predicts, or measures worse conditions as other more qualified analysis predicts, then the service will have to be reduced, which means that the project, in fact, cannot proceed without electrification.

The projected air quality impacts may in fact be greatly understated as the GSSE Final EPR indicates on page 387 in section 6.2.4, the modeling only assumes service running at 5 days a week. This misses over one-third of off-peak emissions if it is assumed that there 6 peak hours during a weekday with 12 off-peak hours while weekends have 18 off-peak hours due to an absence of peak hours. 12 x 5 = 60, 18 x 2 = 36, 60 + 36 = 96, 36 / 96 = 37.5% of off-peak service unaccounted for. “The Big Move” makes no indication that weekends would not receive rail service. This raises a serious question about the accuracy of the projection model.

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The impact this has on The Crown’s finances is particular unsettling. The GSSE project team is proposing The Crown invest in new diesel fleet for the expanded service, only to later discover that they cannot use this fleet for the expanded service because their monitoring will confirm that the pollution generated by the expanded service will be too high. The GSSE project team proposes wasting at least 10s of millions (~$40 million for a new 12-car train) of The Crown’s treasury by going through with this project as they have proposed. As has been mentioned earlier and supported by the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA (Appendix 1), The Crown has a significant financial interest in proceeding with electrification immediately, and electrification is clearly, by an overwhelming margin, the best mitigation strategy available.

Ontario Ministry of Culture

Ministry of Culture Concern (EPR Pg. 114) Metrolinx Response Reference to any possible or forecasted impacts of this project to No impacts will occur as Union Station (which is a nationally, provincially and locally significant part of this project as the historic landmark) should also be mentioned in the Table. We study area starts at understand that a separate Environmental Assessment is currently Bathurst Street. involved with the renovation & alterations of Union Station, but there may be some overlap or influence of this project to the Union Station Changes to EPR Not undertaking. Therefore references of this Metrolinx EA being Required complimentary to the Union Station EA or vice versa, would be an appropriate inclusion in this Table 1.

It cannot seriously be said that there will be no impacts from this project on Union Station when all the trains on the proposed expanded service will go to Union Station. Every train that this expansion is designed to accommodate, which includes the provisions for Milton, Barrie, and Bolton lines, as well as VIA Rail Canada and UPRL services, on top of Georgetown service, will all be funneling into Union Station. Union will obviously be impacted, and it cannot be confirmed that Union Station can even handle the proposed peak-hour demands projected for the GSSE and UPRL due to limited track and platform capacity. Union Station has not been placed under such high stress before, and there is valid cause for concern about the impacts on the station from such stress. The current renovation and restoration project is being carried out to match the requirements outlined by GO Transit prior to the RTP prepared by Metrolinx, which have an enormous gap in the magnitude of ridership projections in 2020 and beyond.

The project “study area” terminating at Bathurst Street is irrelevant to the question from the Ministry of Culture. It makes absolutely no difference where the study area starts; all trains run to Union Station regardless, and the impact of that should be evaluated.

Union Station’s track level is one extraordinarily large bridge, a bridge that will be expected to take the abuse of the weight of several hundred 10-car bi-level trains (some of which will actually be 12-car bi-level trains) with overweight MP40 locomotives every day, and the adjoining historic station building will have to withstand the higher vibrations and emissions impacts generated by the traffic increase. There are windows from the Great Hall of the historic station structure that open towards the track vents in the train shed. Will these become permanently closed and soot-covered? These are questions that deserve answers, especially considering the funding that The Crown has put towards the Union Station project.

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Public Consultation and Project Management

Introduction

3.3.1.1 Summary of Public Comments (EPR Pg. 48) Introduction and Community Consultation Overview Metrolinx developed a broader community relations strategy for the entire rail corridor impacted by the service expansion. The success of any major infrastructure project depends on building strong community relationships to ensure the proponent (for this project, Metrolinx) understands local issues and can respond appropriately. Building these relationships also make sure communities stay engaged and informed.

As part of this project, Metrolinx implemented a Stakeholder Engagement Strategy that included broad outreach – community open houses, online consultations through state-of-the-art software, e-mail communications, web-based information, advertising and statutory notices, one-on-one meetings with individual citizens and proactive outreach to community groups.

The outreach conducted by the GSSE project team is a failure. The community relationships are volatile, dysfunctional, and unproductive, as they have produced great public distrust towards Metrolinx, and have not produced the necessary improvements to the project, as the GSSE project team seems more interested in resisting changes to the project, no matter how poor the project’s current state may be. The resistance to project alterations creates a dysfunctional result since the efforts would be inherently restrained from the outset before any outreach has even taken place.

The GSSE project team displays a lack of understanding of the local issues in the GSSE Final EPR, and as a result, has not responded appropriately. The proposal the GSSE project team has put forward is, as appropriately summarized by Toronto City Councillor Gord Perks at the June 15, 2009 meeting of the Toronto Board of Health, “…the clearest case of the wrong way to do public transit I have ever seen.”

Councillor Perks is correct. There has been far too little cooperation or meaningful dialogue between the GSSE project team and the communities along the corridor, with the exception of the Strachan Grade Separation, for which the credit appears to go single-handedly to Metrolinx President and CEO Robert Prichard, not the GSSE project team, as Mr. Prichard was the only new element capable of causing a cultural shift added to Metrolinx between April and June of 2009, when the Strachan Grade Separation change was made. The GSSE project team has, for most of the other major issues, ignored, and in some cases misrepresented (such as the case with the design charrette in Weston on May 30, 2009 (Appendix 19)), the positions and input of the affected communities. One example of input that was ignored, despite being very well received by the Weston community, is attached to this package (Appendix 4).

The online consultation portal, as a further example, strikes one as engineered, through its “state-of-the-art software,” to discourage participation and community input by making the navigation of the software needlessly complicated. It is not simple, it is not intuitive, it is not clear, and it is not convenient. As a person that has educated several others about the labyrinthine intricacies of the Metrolinx online consultation portal, including key involvement in designing an online walk-through guide to using the online Metrolinx consultation portal, this account of the difficulty the public has in understanding the system is first hand, from someone that has helped hundreds use the system.

The Crown should be very concerned about the image the GSSE project team is creating for it and the Metrolinx brand. It is negative, and is inconsistent with the goals of Metrolinx and The Crown by minimizing the value of the proposed service as well as the land the service is run on by not taking the public consultations seriously.

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Electrification

Metrolinx Responses to Electrification (890* Comments Received (189 by phone/E-mail)) February, 2009 (85) April, 2009 (70) June, 2009 (546) Service expansion to Metrolinx has Electrification is a critically important issue and the western part of announced an Metrolinx wants to get it right. Electric trains are just the region was electrification one component of an efficient regional rail system. We needed many years study of the entire want to make sure the choices are properly framed in ago. We need to GO Transit rail the context of our broader mandate to recommend the proceed now with system as a best possible investments to improve transportation, service improvement future alternative the environment, the quality of life and the economy in on this corridor. The to diesel trains the GTHA. Big Move lays out currently in plans for possible service. The On May 26, 2009 Metrolinx announced a study of future electrification study could electrification of its entire GO Transit rail system. on specific corridors, commence as including the early as this The final Terms of Reference will guide the Georgetown summer and be Electrification Study and serve as the basis for issuing Corridor. Metrolinx completed by any requests for proposals to undertake the Study. will work to design winter 2010. The Study itself will be completed in Winter 2010. now so as not to preclude While the study is In the meantime, GO Transit continues to deploy electrification in the being done, work clean diesel technology - an efficient and future will continue on cost-effective way of reducing congestion and moving the line using people to places quickly, comfortably and safely. design elements that would GO Transit has also been using ultra low sulphur accommodate diesel fuel for both its rail and bus services since both electric and 2006. In addition The MP40 diesel locomotives – diesel trains, which will be the locomotives on the Georgetown line such as – use the best, cleanest technology available, meeting designing all US Environmental Protection Act (EPA) Tier 2 structures Emission standards. (bridges and grade Canada is not the only country investing in clean separations) to diesel technology. Many nations known for their meet the height extensive transit systems and progressive requirements for environmental policies use clean diesel technology on electrification, or their rail networks: ensuring track - In London, UK, new Bombardier diesel multiple unit spacing is being (DMU) railcars will be delivered next year for use on designed to allow the Gospel Oak – Barking Line, an urban railway in for foundations greater London. and columns = In Denmark, 100 new Siemens-built DMUs have associated with been purchased for regional train service similar to the catenaries the type of service GO Transit operates. required for - In Germany, high-speed diesel train sets are used to electrification. operate 200 km/h service connecting Berlin, Hamburg and Copenhagen

*890 is only the total at the time the EPR was sent for print, which was prematurely done more than a week before consultations closed. Several dozen comments came in during the last week or so, the number of comments would surely hit at least 950, maybe even 1000. It is easily possible, and even probable speaking as someone that had been watching the numbers during the closing days, that over 100 comments on this important subject are not included in the Final

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EPR as part of the public record because the GSSE project team did not properly schedule and manage the process. If it were done properly, a week-and-a-half gap or so would have been scheduled between the closing of public comments and submission to the Ministry of Environment.

The suggestion by the GSSE project team that there is an urgent need to expand Georgetown GO service immediately without electrification doesn’t stand up to scrutiny because of the fact that, as stated in a presentation delivered at the July 13, 2009 Metrolinx Board meeting, the Georgetown North Service Expansion EA, which is required for any expansion to actually be implemented considering Bramalea GO Station is the eastern-most of the west-end termini the Georgetown Corridor uses, isn’t slated to commence until 2011. If service expansion in the Georgetown Corridor were so important, the Georgetown North Service Expansion EA would be happening at the same time as the GSSE.

It wasn’t until Robert Prichard took the reigns as President and CEO of Metrolinx that Metrolinx finally decided to even share past work on the subject of electrification. Requests that had been made by the Toronto Board of Health about the release of the 2008 Hatch Mott MacDonald electrification study for the Lakeshore Corridor, and Metrolinx refused such requests, until Mr. Prichard entered the corporation. Those studies revealed significant findings.

Electrification wouldn’t cause significant delay to the project, and further to this, the Electrification Study with an Advisory Committee appointed by Metrolinx has been exposed as a stall tactic by the release of the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA (Appendix 1), as it includes the more significant information needed for Georgetown to be electrified immediately, and the incremental cost would be quite low, much lower than what is estimated for the Lakeshore Corridor. The GSSE project team speaks to a need for studying electrification of the entire network before such work on Georgetown South can even begin, but this obviously is a non-issue for Lakeshore, so why would it be for Georgetown South? There is no logic, and is hypocritical in nature.

The length from Brampton Station to Union Station (34.3km) is about 30% of the length of the entire Lakeshore Corridor (~115km). It is about $1 billion more to electrify the Lakeshore Corridor compared to a diesel expansion for accommodating the 2015 traffic volumes, which, if extrapolated linearly by corridor length, would be around $300 million, some of which is already included in the current GSSE project. By another measure, 34.3km of route to Brampton, with 4 tracks along the route, at $2 million per track-km as estimated by Hatch Mott MacDonald in its October, 2008 study, would result in almost $275 million, some of which is already part of the GSSE project (foundations for the overhead catenary system supports), although a yard would need to be added to that (difficult to estimate as size required is unclear, but the worst case cost should be $150 million based on the Hatch Mott MacDonald study). It is also worth highlighting that the cost of electrification is cheaper now, due to the current economic climate, than it would be in 10-15 years in the future, and the savings in operations from electrification are substantial, especially with an unpredictable, potentially volatile oil market where nobody is sure when peak oil might hit. The operational savings combined with higher fare revenue collected as outlined in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA (Appendix 1) would exceed the capital investment in less than 10 years.

Electrification with electrical multiple unit vehicles also has substantial track maintenance benefits as well, as millions of tons of rolling stock can be taken off the rails annually, reducing track wear by a substantial amount. This comes from the combined impact of removing locomotives from the corridor, and the ability to adjust train lengths easily and efficiently to match demand at different times throughout the day.

The costs of electrification only go up (dramatically), if an expansion of diesel service is undertaken first. It is the most fiscally inefficient strategy for electrification that could possibly be suggested, and the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA (Appendix 1) highlights this very fact. A diesel expansion will hinder growth on the corridor compared to immediate electrification.

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As for the GSSE project team’s claim regarding other countries investing in diesel (“clean diesel” is an oxymoron that cannot be taken seriously by anyone with an understanding of high school chemistry) is inappropriate because the demand for service on the lines is very low compared to what the Georgetown South Corridor is projected to supply.

Gospel Oak – Barking Line has a frequency of once every 20 minutes at peak, and once every 30 minutes off-peak, and runs only 2-car trains at all times. In September, upgrades will be complete to allow a maximum frequency of one train every 15 minutes. 3-car trains are to be introduced in 2010. The obstacle to electrification of the Gospel Oak – Barking Line is a very large number of viaducts and bridges, an obstacle that is not applicable for the Georgetown South Corridor.

The contract Danish State Railways has entered with Siemens for 100 trains is also an inappropriate comparison. To compare that service as similar to GO Transit is far-fetched, as this is also a 2-car train operation, and the vehicle only carries 116 passengers, nowhere near the demands of GO. The line operates in an area known as Aarhus, Denmark’s second-largest city, with a population a little over 300,000, which is about 10% of the population of the City of Toronto. The Grenaabahn line [Grenaabanen] that these 2-car trains run on is considered a light rail operation run on former traditional railways, perhaps comparable to O-Train in Ottawa. This is not comparable to GO Transit in Toronto, and the GSSE project team should be ashamed of themselves for trying to pass this off as comparable.

The 200km/h DMUs operating in Germany, known as ICE-TD, are 4-car trains, and part of their main line involves a ferry that the train itself boards to cross the water. Not comparable to the Georgetown South Corridor, not even close. This grasping at straws by the GSSE project team is a display of desperation trying to prop up an indefensible position.

Interesting to note that of all the examples the GSSE project team provides of other diesel operations, that all are multiple unit operations, not locomotive operations like GO Transit is currently based on. The difference in horsepower, and by extension emissions, between the GO locomotives and the 2-car DMUs is at least a factor of 5.

GO Transit, for services to be running as frequently as proposed, should not only be electrified, but should also employ multiple unit vehicles, specifically electric multiple unit vehicles. This will be necessary for attaining the greater speed performance envisaged for Express Rail, especially with additional stops, as well as for managing the critical issue of capacity at Union Station.

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3.3.2.1.2 Electrification (EPR Pg. 83) Many comments were received during this study concerning possible early electrification of the corridor. However, at this time, none of the required and substantial technical decisions have been made that would allow electrification to proceed any time in the immediate future. Additionally, since there is a long overdue and pressing need to meet existing ridership demand in this corridor, this project is proposing using GO Transit’s new Tier 2 diesel locomotives in the early years of service expansion.

Although electrification of the corridor is not part of this project, and no funding has been approved for the implementation of electrification, the proposed project is being planned to not preclude electrification in the future. This includes providing required electrical vertical clearances at proposed structures along the corridor.

The table below shows a list of “fundamental questions” that must be answered before electrification can happen. However, these generally have been addressed already, and this is explained in italics in the right-hand column.

Prior to proceeding with electrification on any GO Transit corridor numerous fundamental questions need to be addressed, including: - Criteria to determine the staging of Ridership or frequency of service can be used electrification of GO Transit’s rail lines as the benchmark. The RTP outlines this. - Vehicle technology options and availability GO currently employs a custom design, there is no reason why a custom EMU could not be built. In fact, the existing Bi-Level design is believed to be compatible with conversion to EMU, a reason the sloped ends exist on the current model in operation. - Performance improvements for riders This is in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA - Power supply and distribution There is a surplus of electricity currently. - Union Station capacity Union Station capacity must be addressed before this project proceeds regardless of electrification. Union Station requirements for accepting electrification have already been addressed in the current renovation and restoration project. - Rail corridor ownership This is already resolved between Bramalea and Union Station, owned by Metrolinx. - Urban planning benefits It is known to have positive benefits, and is in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA. - Physical constraints These are known because the provisions for electrification in the future are supposedly already part of the GSSE. Is the project team - Infrastructure requirements being honest about those provisions if these are - Property impacts listed as a hindrance to electrification? - Operating and capital costs These are in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA. Georgetown is actually cheaper than Lakeshore since the original project includes the grade separations, which are expensive items. - Impacts on GO capital and operating costs These are in the Lakeshore Express Rail BCA. - Carbon footprint reduction This is not an impediment, and the GSSE project team has, in response to a concern from the Ministry of the Environment, stated that such calculations would be of little value. - Implementation staging This is what EAs are supposed to address.

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SNC-Lavalin (SNC-L)

Metrolinx Response to SNC-L Operating Union-Pearson Rail Link (83 Comments Received) February, 2009 The project is defined by GO Transit’s future operating needs. It also opens up the opportunity to offer the Air-Rail Link service on GO Transit Infrastructure. Contract negotiations are currently being conducted by Infrastructure Ontario with a private sector operator in a separate process. Questions concerning that process should be directed to Infrastructure Ontario.

There is valid concern, based on documents available in the public realm, that The Crown is getting a raw deal. The documents available strongly suggest that The Crown and the City of Toronto will be subsidizing SNC-L for the operation of the UPRL service in terms of maintenance of the infrastructure east of Highway 427, and The Crown would be subsidizing some of the capital expenditure of the UPRL east of Highway 427 as well, as a 4th track would be unnecessary without the UPRL.

The GSSE project team had consistently stated that the track capacity being created in the Georgetown corridor was all for just accommodating GO Transit service, not the UPRL service. The traffic charts in the GSSE Final EPR’s Appendix A (Appendix 9a) prove that the GSSE project team is mistaken on this subject. If GO Transit were the operator of the UPRL service, and ran both Georgetown service and the UPRL with electric multiple unit vehicles, trains could be coupled within Toronto to minimize space requirements on infrastructure, and would require only 3 tracks (but with frequent switches), proven in Scenario 1 (Appendix 9b).

If one has seen how other railways run similar operations in other parts of the world, it is evident the traffic management approach put forward by the GSSE project team is an inefficient one. Lines that have local and express tiers of service typically have the two service tiers in the same direction serving the same platform, which is not done in this project, and no reason is given for this. Typically, using the same track numbering method as in the GSSE Final EPR Appendix A, the model would be; Westbound Georgetown Local on track 1, Westbound Georgetown Express on track 2, Eastbound Georgetown Express on track 3, and Eastbound Georgetown Local on track 4. However, Metrolinx has gone with a model that has track 1 (southeast-bound) and 2 (northwest-bound) for local service, with track 3 (southeast-bound) and 4 (northwest-bound) for express service, which offers poor flexibility in the service model, especially if there’s an unexpected or sudden problem on a track. It is also unclear if this would change during the afternoon rush for accommodating the Bolton runs, as the GSSE Final EPR shows Bolton service arranged to avoid it crossing over other tracks when merging with the Georgetown corridors, which is of questionable feasibility for both morning and afternoon rush since management of having all trains reverse tracks at a certain point in the day is awkward, and possibly risky. The GSSE project team should confess that a fly-under around Rogers Road might be required for safely accommodating Bolton service in the very busy Georgetown corridor in an operationally efficient manner.

In addition to the benefits for the operator, there are also benefits for the customer in a typical model different from the GSSE Final EPR. It is important to note, from a customer service perspective, which Metrolinx and The Crown place a high level of importance on for increasing the competitiveness of transit, that the typical model allows seamless transfers between local and express trains, whereas the model put forward by the GSSE project team requires such transfers between local and express services to go up and down stairs to cross the tracks. This is very inefficient from the customer perspective. The system should allow the customer to board a local train, and then transfer to an express train in the same direction from the same platform. The GSSE Final EPR model segregates the two service tiers in a manner that damages customer service and rider convenience. The two should not be considered independent of one another, but considered as a pair.

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What’s more is that there is insufficient capacity at Union Station to accommodate the UPRL service, unless it is run by GO Transit, and UPRL trains attach [“couple”] to GO Trains in the northwest end of Etobicoke (at the first common station) to form one combined train into Union Station. The management of resources at Union Station should be of paramount concern to The Crown, as space is scarce and expansion is not physically feasible without the removal of major landmarks, including those of national significance. Electric multiple unit vehicles can mitigate this to the greatest extent possible for a solution from a fleet perspective.

The Transport Canada documents available from earlier incarnations of the UPRL project indicate that Track 1 (now Platform 3) would be dedicated to the UPRL service (Appendix 20). A 300+m platform dedicated to a 52m train that arrives once every 15 minutes in the situation Metrolinx finds itself with the capacity constraints is not sound. There should be an obligation for SNC-L, if it wants to run the UPRL service without coupling to GO trains, to build its own dedicated Union Station spur, with steep grades that locomotive-hauled trains cannot navigate (that would likely be necessary given the complex built form of the Union Station Rail Corridor), complete with a small platform that only its short trains would be able to service, all at SNC-L’s expense, given the reality that Metrolinx simply cannot afford to spare any resources it has at Union Station for a private luxury service. SNC-L should also be expected to run an electric rail service if running a rail service at all.

Community Impacts

Metrolinx Response to Community Impacts (100 Comments Received (5 by E-mail)) February, 2009 (67) June, 2009 (28) Our team of Over the past seven months, Metrolinx has been out in the communities, professionals is listening to neighbourhood groups and individual citizens all along the working on air, noise, corridor. There has been great interest and suggestions from everyone. vibration, human health and As a result of the huge amount of feedback, the Georgetown South construction impact Service Expansion proposal has been changed and refined to incorporate analysis. Results and these great ideas. Some of the improvements include: potential mitigation - Designing the new pedestrian bridge in Weston to be part of a new strategies will be community vision; shared once - Community revitalization opportunities afforded by the new Weston GO available. station

Described in detail below, the statement about a pedestrian bridge in Weston conflicts with the sentiment of the community. The community of Weston is vehemently against such a bridge, and expects the City of Toronto motion to be respected. Furthermore, there are no meaningful revitalization opportunities for the Weston GO Station without the station being put underground. The community has been clear on this, but the GSSE project team has consistently been unresponsive to the Weston community’s input.

Of the 6 grade separations that are part of the GSSE project, 2/3rds of those 6 are in Weston, a total of 4 grade separations, and all occur within about a 1-mile length of route, which also includes the grade-separated Lawrence Avenue West (Table 4.4.3-1 on EPR Pg. 206). The very close spacing of these crossings is linked to the long history in Weston, dating back to the mid-1800s when the population abandoned the west side of the Humber River in favour of the higher ground on the east side to escape common and severe floods, and the railway appeared very soon thereafter.

There are also multiple illegal crossings that have become typical for use between communities on opposing sides of the tracks. The important factor to recognize in this instance is not whether the crossings are illegal or not, but that connections between communities have been formed because one has not been provided. In the design for an expansion of the corridor, there is an opportunity

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 23 to enhance the existing connections and make them safe, instead of dividing communities that are currently connected, legally or illegally. Enhancements of such connections are elements of good city building, as such improved connectivity creates a tighter, more cohesive urban fabric, but there is no indication that the GSSE project team even knows where such illegal crossings currently exist. With a lack in understanding of the local issues, they have not developed an appropriate response. The GSSE project team should have, as part of their job, walked the corridor personally (not on the tracks, but along adjoining roads and streets) to survey the existing conditions along the corridor in detail, as I myself have done, in order to better understand what existing conditions and functions are like. John Street

Metrolinx Response to the John Street Crossing (38 Comments Received) February, 2009 Closing John Street to vehicles requires the least amount of property acquisition and is the most cost effective. Metrolinx will continue to work with the community and local businesses in the coming months to address safety, accessibility, and community sustainability concerns around the John Street Pedestrian Bridge.

The statement about requiring the least amount of property acquisition would be questionable if Denison Road property acquisition is included in the comparison. One can impact the other, and this is not acknowledged, however obvious it should be.

The GSSE project team also has too narrow a perspective of cost effectiveness; because the GSSE project team did not evaluate any land-value enhancement (”value uplift”) opportunities that can accelerate the project paying off its debt. Cheaper capital does not necessarily result in quicker debt repayment, because of return on investment impacts hampered by cutting corners on capital investment. This should be important considering the Investment Strategy Division has yet to develop revenue generating tools and strategies/opportunities for Metrolinx project funding, although at the July 13, 2009 Metrolinx Board meeting, Metrolinx CEO and President Robert Prichard made a very prudent push for development of such an Investment Strategy to get underway immediately. The absence of an Investment Strategy currently, however, is causing Metrolinx and The Crown to miss substantial potential revenue opportunities with the GSSE project.

The capital costs of burying the Weston GO Station are high, as is the case with any underground infrastructure, but the land-value enhancement potential for the area that the Georgetown South Corridor would be underground is also high, and should be able to pay for itself in less than 20 years if high-rise developments are incorporated into the infrastructure when the corridor is buried. The development that this would create is in line with the City of Toronto Official Plan and “The Avenues,” and is in line with the Places to Grow Act. By raising the CP line as part of the same project, additional commercial or other non-residential land-value enhancement is generated and connectivity between communities improves dramatically, enhancing the transit-oriented quality of the area, improving mobility, and promoting more active transportation.

3.3.2.1.1 John Street Crossing Design Charrette (EPR Pg. 78) To get a better sense of the local interests and potential opportunities, Metrolinx hosted a John Street Crossing Design Charrette on May 30, 2009.

(See EPR for other background information)

Priority community design principals that emerged included: - Examining how the rail services expansion could act as a stimulus for improving the public realm and creating commercial opportunities; - How to use this opportunity to stimulate larger joint planning exercise between the citizens of Weston and the City of Toronto;

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- Using the John Street crossing as an opportunity to establish a public space/centre for the community and improve community connectivity; - How to maximize the new GO station as an integrated multi-use transit hub.

If the GSSE project team wants to examine the possibilities of stimulus from infrastructure expansion and commercial opportunities, burying the rail corridor achieves this to the highest degree by an immeasurable margin. Amazingly, such a concept was not evaluated when put forward (the concept is attached). Such “larger joint planning” thinking would go a long way towards successfully marrying the GSSE project with the City of Toronto Official Plan.

It is impossible for the GSSE project team to seriously talk about improving community connectivity when they are proposing John Street be downgraded. Nothing can change the reality that John Street would be downgraded by proposing a restriction of uses from its current setup, which in this case is vehicular traffic.

Maximizing the new Weston GO Station as an integrated multi-use transit hub requires far more dramatic thinking than the GSSE project team has displayed. One of the evident oversights made by the GSSE project team is the lack of an analysis of the Lawrence West corridor, particularly between Lawrence West subway station and Weston Road, which, compared in the context of the broader TTC network, has a ridership high enough to be considered for a future LRT route (Appendix 21) after the Transit City lines are built. Given such, it would be prudent to seize the opportunity to ensure the height clearance at Lawrence Avenue and the railways meets LRT design requirements now, as it would certainly be more complex and costly to do so later. This has been addressed in the attached concept that the GSSE project team did not evaluate (Appendix 4).

John Street Opportunities for Future Exploration (EPR Pg. 82) A key theme emanating from the charrette was the need to blend possible development proposals, community revitalization initiatives and land use policy to the John Street alternatives.

Many of these recommendations are beyond the scope of the Metrolinx mandate. However, where feasible, Metrolinx will facilitate further discussions to explore where there are opportunities for further joint cooperation with citizens of Weston, Metrolinx and the City of Toronto.

If what was proposed at the charrette went beyond the scope of the Metrolinx mandate, then Metrolinx has not been given a broad enough scope to fulfill its mandate. Transit is not so one-dimensional; getting the service running is only one of many components for making transit successful. The GSSE project team has not proven that they understand this with the proposal they have put forward in the GSSE Final EPR. As has been mentioned earlier, there are many impacts with such a major project, such as (but not limited to): Urban planning; ridership; finances (of The Crown and of the operator (Metrolinx)); public health, and; crime. This project must be looked at as one of both city building and region building, and not managed in isolation as appears to have been the case under the GSSE project team.

John Street Conclusion (EPR Pg. 82) A number of proposals were identified at the Design Charrette. Based on an analysis of the community proposals from the Charrette, it was concluded that an accessible pedestrian/ bicycle bridge would move forward as the recommended option for the project. It will be the least disruptive to the community, while still providing connectivity and functionality.

Where opportunities for future collaboration have been identified, Metrolinx will continue to seek community input as the project moves into detailed design and construction.

The pedestrian/bicycle bridge does not have the appropriate functionality, and the GSSE project team has drawn a conclusion to which the community is ubiquitous in its opposition, making one wonder what the point of the charrette was.

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The GSSE project team has to look at the final product more than the construction impacts. Construction impacts are temporary, the final product is permanent, and it should be obvious that the permanent final product is more important than the temporary construction impacts. “No pain, no gain.” If construction impacts were the end-all, be-all, subway and light rail lines would never be built anywhere in the region, because they are too disruptive to the community during construction! If the GSSE project team can’t properly prioritize criteria, how can their evaluations be considered credible?

5.1.4 Weston Corridor Alternatives Alternative C Corridor Requirements (EPR Pg. 253) The platforms at Weston GO Station would be 15 metres (50’) below ground; requiring stairs, escalators, elevators and additional property for pedestrian access.

Stairs, escalators and elevators are not unique to underground stations, and this should be blatantly obvious to any capable engineer. Vertical transportation is required regardless of the station being at grade, below grade, or elevated, as that is the only means of accessing the different platforms located between tracks. Is the GSSE project team seriously suggesting that in their proposal, passengers are expected to cross the tracks at grade with such high frequencies of train service (that would have safety crossing arms permanently down during rush hour)? This is an empty argument.

The station does not have to be as deep as proposed by the GSSE project team, because Lawrence Avenue West does not have to remain at its current grade if the CP MacTier Subdivision is elevated (Appendix 4), an option that was never evaluated in the GSSE Final EPR.

5.1.4 Weston Corridor Alternatives Alternative C Corridor Requirements (EPR Pg. 253, 266) The required connections between CN, CP and GO tracks are not possible with this design. This would impact the viability of the Proposed GO Bolton service.

This is inconsistent with the design plates provided in the GSSE Final EPR showing the new track layout. The GSSE Final EPR shows the switch between CN/GO Weston and CP MacTier is proposed south of Eglinton (Appendix 15b). The existing switch in the corridor today is south of Lawrence, but the design plates indicate that this is not being adjusted with the relocated CP tracks, and is in fact partially covered over by part of the new proposed platform, meaning that it proposes to remove that existing switch (Appendix 15c). Does the GSSE project team lack this much familiarity with their project? What else about this project are they also so unfamiliar with? How can The Crown and the Metrolinx Board be expected to rely on information prepared by such a project team?

5.1.4 Weston Corridor Alternatives Alternative C Corridor Requirements (EPR Pg. 253) There would be major construction impacts including the construction of the proposed lowered Lawrence Avenue West – likely to require the closure of Lawrence Avenue West and temporary detours during construction. Possible property acquisition would be required to accommodate the temporary detours.

Why does Lawrence Avenue West need to be lowered further from its existing level? Furthermore, if this opportunity were seized to widen Lawrence Avenue West for a future LRT provision that is likely to become required in future, the widening process can minimize road traffic disruptions substantially. If expanded towards the south, property acquisition should be very

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 26 minimal, but must take care to meet the needs of the adjacent EMS facility (which may involve a new EMS facility, possibly built into the underside of a new elevated CP MacTier Subdivision (Appendix 4)).

5.1.4 Weston Corridor Alternatives Alternative C Corridor Requirements (EPR Pg. 253) The extent of the depth of the proposed depressed corridor is likely to require special construction methods that would impact adjacent properties.

"Special construction methods" are not defined, and the statement is therefore meaningless deflection. Contractors familiar with subway construction in urban areas should be capable of constructing such a tunnel with minimal property impacts. The depth need not be as deep as the GSSE project team claims by adopting a holistic alternative approach (Appendix 4). A fundamental problem with the evaluations taking place is that each crossing is evaluated in isolation. For all the attention given to property impacts at Lawrence Avenue West by an extended underground run, the GSSE project team does not acknowledge the impact avoided at Denison Road by an extended underground run, which should be an obvious chain reaction, and is of significant benefit to the community. Denison Road also impacts Sam Frustaglio Drive, another road that the GSSE project team has proposed to be closed at its intersection with Denison Road, which goes against the City of Toronto motion from January 27, 2009.

5.1.4 Weston Corridor Alternatives Impact Assessment for Alternative C (EPR Pg. 262) Closure of Lawrence Avenue in order to construct the new Lawrence Avenue structure would affect transit routes 52 and 58 (all branches).

Staged construction can prevent closure of entire street at once, and this is particularly true of Lawerence Avenue West if widening the street for future LRT provision. By widening to the south, which will avoid residential property impacts, Lawrence Avenue West would not have to have all lanes closed during construction.

The GSSE project claim that the John Street pedestrian/cyclist bridge provides “better potential" (EPR Pg. 263 in Transportation Summary) is completely unsupported given the enormous community opposition to it. If the pedestrian/cyclist bridge had any potential, it would not encounter anywhere near the level of opposition it has. The GSSE project team claimed to understand what’s involved at the top of section 3.3.1.1 (EPR Pg. 48); “The success of any major infrastructure project depends on building strong community relationships to ensure the proponent (for this project, Metrolinx) understands local issues and can respond appropriately.” There cannot be such overwhelming opposition if strong community relationships had been built with the GSSE project team to develop an appropriate response by understanding the local issues.

There is evidence quoting police officials that suggests a shocking lack of contact with Toronto Police Services in review of the safety of the designs proposed, such as curved underground passageways that have unacceptably poor sightlines. The demographics, such as seniors in the community, have not been adequately considered. There is a very negative impact on access to community resources that deal with at-risk youth and other important social issues, such as the Ethiopian Christian Orthodox Church at Denison Road. Rich opportunities for better promotion of active transportation with the community are neglected in the GSSE Final EPR.

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5.1.4 Weston Corridor Alternatives Impact Assessment (EPR Pg. 266) Alternative C would cost an additional $400 million or more than Alternative A

How much tunneling is saved by not having to tunnel the Denison Road grade separation? Was this subtracted against the extended tunnel?

How much would the same tunnel cost if designed to be usable only by electric vehicles and their lower ventilation requirements? This requires an evaluation as it has a cost impact that has not taken place, applicable to both capital and operations.

Why is there no assessment of land-value enhancement opportunities as part of the process?

Liberty Village/Parkdale GO Station

King Street/Queen Street Station (152 Comments Received (40 by E-mail)) February, 2009 (38) April, 2009 (53) June, 2009 (21) The TTC currently Efficient, The Georgetown South service expansion also provides frequent effective, and needs to balance demands for increased regional service along King Street safe rail service with local needs. West and Queen Street operations West that connects preclude The GO Georgetown Service and the UPRL service travelers to GO Transit stations at will stop at Union Station, Bloor GO Weston within at both Union and Bloor Liberty Village City of Toronto limits. Stations. GO Transit’s and King Street regional trip times would in an area that is While there is strong local support for a also be slower if well served by GSSE/UPRL stop at either King or Queen Street, additional stops were municipal transit there are a number of technical challenges that added. preclude a GO stop at either location. King Street There are a number of The corridor is very narrow at King Street. To accommodate a platform, technical challenges that the corridor would have to be widened outside the existing rail property preclude a GO stop at lines and would require large scale property acquisition and the either a King or Queen replacement of the entire King Street railway structure. Street West location, including large scale Queen Street disruption to the Neither Queen Street nor the new Dufferin Jog structure could streetscape, acquisition accommodate the extra width required for a new platform. Also, of adjacent properties, building a platform would result in significant property requirements and the challenge of and road regrading. fitting a platform on the curve. Both locations would also result in platforms on a curve which can result in unsafe rail operating conditions.

The above displays an evident, critical lack of understanding in the current challenges facing the network, and the opportunities of interaction within the network and with the City of Toronto Official Plan.

Of the current challenges, the TTC is really struggling to keep up with demand on King St. West, particularly between Dufferin Street and Bay Street. Queen Street West also sees considerable traffic, although it runs larger vehicles at less frequency compared to the King service. Furthermore, a look at the existing track layout reveals a connection between the King and Queen streetcar services at Dufferin Street. The combined network connectivity and high traffic of these routes makes for an ideal mobility hub. However, as the Transportation Policy and Planning

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Division at Metrolinx has failed to work on Mobility Hubs, which was confessed to at the Metrolinx Board meeting on July 13, 2009, it is not surprising that the GSSE project team would not understand the opportunity before them.

The GSSE project team is incorrect to state that the King Street West streetcar or the Queen Street West streetcar goes to Union Station. Neither one does (carhouse movements excluded), and shows a disturbing lack of knowledge held by the GSSE project team about services that cross the Georgetown South Corridor. The King streetcar does go to the Bloor GO station area, but the Queen streetcar does not. These people are supposed to be transportation planners?

The GSSE project team is also incorrect to state that GO Transit’s regional trip times would increase too much if a station were added in this area. If that were true, why is there is a station at Exhibition on the Lakeshore Corridor? This is an almost identical distance from Union Station. By the GSSE project team’s logic, Exhibition GO Station should be closed immediately for slowing down commuters from Port Credit!

When the Metrolinx RTP envisions Express Rail on the Georgetown Corridor, why doesn’t the GSSE project team understand that there would be two levels of service, express and local, and possibly a semi-express as well? An understanding of this is even included in the GSSE EPR Appendix A (Appendix 9a), so why does the GSSE project team contradict itself with the above? It is astounding that such arguments, displaying a lack of understanding about the very project they are working on, are put forward on behalf of an agency that is supposed to be representing the interests of The Crown.

A critical element is the City of Toronto Official Plan conflict attached to the exclusion of this station, which is not mentioned at all in the GSSE Final EPR. This area, Liberty Village, is a growing employment area with lots of redevelopment taking place. It is a sustainable new community in Toronto, formerly industrial land, with a harmonious mix of employment and residential development unfolding. Key to its long-term success and sustainability is good transit for both long-haul and short-haul travel. Streetcar services are only good for short-haul trips. What if there are people in Liberty Village who work in, for example, Etobicoke or Malton? Are they supposed to take the streetcar to Bloor first? That approach is clearly not conductive to increasing transit use in the region, and the GSSE project team should be expected to know this. This is also the kind of reverse-peak ridership that is ideally generated for maximizing the economic sustainability of the expanded service (Appendix 16).

As GO Transit was well aware of over the last decade or so before merging with Metrolinx, increasing the number of stations on an existing line, without extending the line, increases the ridership on that line. Excluding extensions, GO had almost doubled the number of stations on the Stouffville and Barrie (then Bradford) lines before merging with Metrolinx, with ridership increases to match (Appendix 22). It is therefore not surprising that a possible station at King Street West was included in the 1994 Georgetown Corridor EA (Appendix 8).

The claim that adding a station in the Liberty Village area is neither efficient nor effective for operations could not be farther from the truth. Adding stations improves the efficiency and effectiveness of transit as it increases the number of origins and destinations serviceable along a corridor, thereby increasing accessibility and attractiveness of the corridor’s service. With a multi-tier service model providing local and express services, the long-haul riders are not impacted, and the service’s speed advantage is preserved while the medium-haul riders benefit from improved service through the additional stations. However, it should not be neglected that with the large number of potential connections that can be created at such a station given the existing infrastructure there, as well as the potential for additional future infrastructure such as the RTP’s Downtown Relief Line envisaged as crossing the corridor around this point, combined with the employment targets of the area, that a not so insignificant demand can be generated by such a station, which can alleviate demands at Union Station.

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Perhaps of the most significant benefit to GO Transit operations with such a station is the benefit it can potentially have on managing the demands and challenges at Union Station. A second downtown station before Union Station, with potentially several TTC connections (network changes are in development in this area already (Appendix 23)), would allow passengers bound for the west end of downtown to alight before Union Station, and save those same passengers excessive backtracking from Union Station. This can shorten dwell times at Union Station, especially if combined with an east-end downtown station in the Distillery District, on which the City of Toronto is currently engaged in discussions with GO Transit (in conjunction with Waterfront Toronto projects). With shorter dwell times at Union Station afforded by the additional stations within downtown Toronto on either side of Union, the per-hour capacity of Union to funnel trains through it increases, while ridership increases at the same time via servicing more destinations. This must be looked at as part of the broader strategy of capacity management in downtown. Union Station is important, but it is not the only location in downtown worth stopping at, and it is clearly unrealistic to expect absolutely everybody coming from the 905 (and to a lesser extent the “outer-416” as well) to alight only at Union. Distribution of alighting passengers in different parts of the downtown is key to balancing the needs of local and regional needs. The more downtown employment destinations serviced by the Georgetown GO Corridor, the more people will use the service. Of particularly high importance to note as well, is that Liberty Village/Parkdale Station could be serviced by not only the Georgetown service, but by the Milton and Bradford services as well, taking further strain off of Union Station and getting even more trains through. Potentially, Bolton trains could also service the station (but ultimately depends on detailed schedules).

This is one of the elements that led to the decision of more frequent stops at slightly slower operating speeds being adopted by the TTC for Transit City over the less frequent stops with slightly higher operating speeds (Appendix 24). Fewer stops increased dwell times at the farther-apart stations, and those higher dwell times slowed the service down anyway.

Another component for alleviating Union Station demand and reducing dwell times, while simultaneously maximizing capital savings, would be having the Downtown Relief Line subway connect and terminate at the Liberty Village/Parkdale Station. The savings in subway construction would surely be several hundred million dollars, perhaps even a billion dollars, as around 3km of subway capital would not need to be spent with such a GO station connecting to it in western downtown. Properly designed, this can also ensure a sufficient demand for the subway in both directions to make the investment east of Dufferin Street pay off. It is important for Metrolinx and The Crown to consider this seriously since it has been confirmed that studies on the Downtown Relief Line will begin in earnest this fall.

The same factor plays a role in what makes the Yonge Subway so popular south of Bloor. College through King stations are all very heavily used. The ability of the Yonge Subway to service many downtown destinations allows its loads to be distributed across the downtown core, which makes it more attractive to more people, and keeps dwell times down. If there were no stations at Dundas and King along the Yonge line, which might have made sense to some people back in the late 1940s and early 1950s (even though today Dundas and King are (or have recently been) more heavily used than Queen or College), those two stations would have unacceptable crowding, long dwell times, cause service “bunching,” and lead to lower overall ridership on the Yonge Subway through reduced accessibility and convenience of the service combined with poor service quality.

The GSSE project team must recognize both the local communities’ voices and the various voices within City Hall of the City of Toronto that support a station in the Liberty Village/Parkdale area. The GSSE project team must also stop making inaccurate conclusions the feasibility of such a station, and start thinking three-dimensionally, which clearly has not been taking place. An illustration is attached showing a three-dimensional solution (Appendix 25).

The GSSE project team is correct that a station at King Street West is not possible, particularly given what has now been decided with the much-improved Strachan Avenue grade separation.

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This was the preferred location in the City of Toronto Official Plan (Appendix 3).

The GSSE project team is incorrect, however, to state that a station at Queen Street West is not possible. A Queen Street West station is absolutely possible, as it can meet all the criteria that had been identified as technical hindrances by the GSSE project team. The station can be straight, and the station can avoid expropriation of large properties. The existing track profile grade at Queen Street West is about the same as at the present Etobicoke North Station. There previously was a train station in this area of Parkdale, dating back to the late 1800s, and lasted almost a century.

Required for such a station is the middle 4 tracks (all of the Georgetown Corridor tracks) to be raised via a structure that is approximately 1km in length between, but excluding, the bridges at Brock Avenue and King Street West. This opens up space for a platform beneath the raised tracks. Sufficient space for platforms at the outer sides of the corridor can, if necessary, be acquired on the southwest side through expropriation of smaller properties, while the north side has space available. This setup allows Milton and Barrie trains to service the Queen Street and Dufferin Street intersection. The different track profiles between the corridors are illustrated in Appendix 25.

Georgetown trains can also service this station with the proper switches added at the west side of Brock Avenue and the north side of King Street West. However, not necessarily every Georgetown train can service it at peak period due to inevitable occasional conflicts with counter-peak trains on Milton or Barrie lines. Such conflicts would have select Georgetown trains that normally would stop at Parkdale skip the station, similar to how select Lakeshore West trains skip only Exhibition Station.

With the feasibility of such a station proven, there is no excuse for its exclusion, as the benefits it can offer are too significant to not make the investment required for it, and the GSSE project team must do better to work with the communities and respect the City of Toronto Official Plan.

Strachan Avenue

Strachan Grade Separation (615 Comments Received (353 by E-mail)) April, 2009 Upon hearing the concerns of residents in April, the Metrolinx technical team began to search for a different solution in collaboration with the City of Toronto. The recommended option now addresses neighbourhood concerns and meets GO operational requirements. The highlights of the new proposal are: - A design that lowers the rail corridor at the Wellington Street West/Douro intersection to a deeper level in order to allow for a gentler grade for the road - All of the streets are kept open. Douro and Wellington West are no longer impacted. Commercial trucks will not have to be rerouted onto residential streets - A flatter design, more conducive to safe pedestrian and cycling traffic flows, was proposed - The grade separation provides for bicycle lanes - There will be opportunities for beautification in the rail corridor

What’s striking is that the GSSE project team claims to recognize important issues in the Fort York area, yet does not recognize the same sort of issues in the Weston-Mt.Dennis area. A similar approach taken in Weston would be able to achieve at least similar benefits, likely much greater given the Weston GO Station element and the opportunities it offers, in combination with the resolution of the 4 at-grade crossings were a longer tunnel implemented with immediately electrified service.

Why is it that the GSSE project team will work with one community and not the other? Why is it

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 31 willing to propose spending money in one area and not another? The land-value enhancement opportunity at Strachan Avenue is far less than what is available in Weston-Mt.Dennis due to how narrow the corridor is at Strachan. Safety is considered for Strachan Avenue, but not for John Street and Denison Road. A real opportunity for revitalization is made at Strachan Avenue (although revitalization has been well underway for some time already), but not in Weston-Mt.Dennis. How does the GSSE project team explain or justify such hypocrisy?

Also worth noting is the number of comments received. About 50% (or possibly greater) more comments were received for immediate electrification, yet neither any accommodation nor adequate response has been made to address immediate electrification. In addition, two local government bodies had requested electrification, as has the Toronto Board of Health. When the road closures and immediate electrification motions have come before Toronto governing bodies (Council and Board of Health, as well as Planning and Growth Management), they have passed unanimously. The GSSE project team’s response for not including immediate electrification in this project despite the overwhelming response does not stand to scrutiny, and cannot be considered adequate.

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 32

Mobility Hubs and Anchor Hubs

Anchor Hubs

2.3.5.3 Union Station (EPR Pg. 40) The expansion of GO Transit services and additional rail services would require update/retrofit to be undertaken at Union Station in order for it to be able to accommodate the additional tracks required to serve the various commuter lines. These modifications would include additional platforms and track capacity.

The GSSE project team makes the unsupported claim that addressing the impossible challenge of expanding Union Station is a non-issue in the GSSE Final EPR. The Hatch Mott Macdonald study on Lakeshore Corridor electrification in October, 2008 (Appendix 14), and the Metrolinx BCA for Lakeshore Express Rail put up on the Metrolinx website in August, 2009 (Appendix 1), indicate that it is a very serious and dauntingly challenging issue that has not been resolved. The recent GSSE Final EPR is not consistent with another, even more recent Metrolinx publication. No explanation for this has been offered whatsoever.

There are several major impediments to expanding capacity at Union Station, including major landmarks right beside the Union Station Rail Corridor (USRC), on both sides of the USRC, at its narrowest points (Appendix 26). Other impediments include the skywalk, road overpasses, road underpasses, underground parking garages, and the existing Union Station structures.

It would be a disaster to have the project go ahead only to find out after the GSSE is built that Union Station is not capable of handling the traffic. The capacity constraints at Union Station must be dealt with first, and as recommended by Hatch Mott MacDonald (Appendix 14), this must be dealt with in great detail. A failure to address this will cause a major domino effect and impact the entire GO Transit rail network, and would surely impact future expansion plans. There is a high probability that part of the solution involves electrification as a requirement in order to increase the speed trains can enter and exit Union Station. Electric multiple unit vehicles will deliver the highest performance for this benefit.

Pearson Airport (EPR Pg. 207) The extent of services provided to Pearson Airport by GO Transit, Mississauga Transit and TTC are relatively modest and focused on employee demand rather than passenger and well wisher demand. Services by Pacific Western (Airport Express) are targeted to the Pearson Airport passenger demand between the Airport and the central area of Toronto.

It is quite difficult to believe that “well wishers” will use the UPRL. “Well wishers” would not pay the round-trip fare when a one-way fare is $14-$20 or possibly even higher. “Well wishers” will clearly continue to drive, or take the new TTC rail services to Pearson, as they will be cheap, frequent, and comfortable rapid transit segregated from traffic, and therefore competitive with the private automobile.

Passengers that originate in Toronto and call Toronto home are also unlikely to use the URPL for their journey, especially with the Eglinton Crosstown LRT in operation, and even more so with the Pearson extension of the Etobicoke-Finch West LRT in operation. Locals familiar with the options available to reach the airport, of which there are proposed to be many, will chose the cheapest option as long as the trip can be made within a certain amount of time (which will vary by trip origin and the individual rider’s standards/expectations).

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 33

Mobility Hubs

Bloor

Subway Connection Proposals for improving the connection between the Bloor GO Station and the TTC Dundas West Station on the Bloor-Danforth Line go back 20 years, to 1989. It’s a plan that resurfaced about 10 years ago when studies were moving forward for earlier incarnations of the UPRL, led by Transport Canada.

It was a great design that would arguably create the most convenient subway connection to a GO Train anywhere in the existing network. Yet the GSSE project team has ignored this laudable design, and proposes an unimaginative covered walkway without explanation of how the GO Galt Subdivision would be traversed, nor how Dundas Street West would be safely crossed at a location that does not currently have a traffic signal.

Milton Service Milton line trains should service the Bloor GO Station in order to enhance the connectivity between GO lines and to make more convenient connections and faster overall trip times between Milton GO service and TTC service for destinations that aren’t in the downtown core. By modifying the design from two island platforms dedicated to the Georgetown service to one island platform for each service, both services can be accommodated. GO Express Rail trains and VIA Rail Canada trains to Brampton would skip the Bloor GO Station anyway, so there is no need for all 4 Georgetown tracks to have platform access. It is a more efficient use of infrastructure space and funds to accommodate the Milton service at Bloor GO Station.

Street Connections To promote active transportation, in line with the goals of the RTP, a connection to Randolph Avenue should be included with the adoption of the 1989 GO-TTC subway connection design to make for more convenient access to the GO station for the community east and northeast of the station. This would also be considered a customer service improvement. This improves access for both GO and TTC services for various travel patterns. Where practical opportunities present themselves, such as the case with Randolph Avenue, it is good practice to provide access to stations from both ends of the platform, especially when platforms are a few hundred metres long.

Carlton Village

St. Clair Avenue West is a very popular, very vibrant street, and a historically transit-oriented community, originally built with a dedicated streetcar right-of-way that was later converted to mixed traffic operation during the Great Depression. As St. Clair Avenue West regains the dedicated streetcar lanes once more, with completion of the project expected in early 2010, to be followed by an extension of the line westward, the future of this corridor, neighbourhood, and “Avenue” (as defined in the City of Toronto Official Plan) is looking strong, and with it, the ridership along and from the corridor, that GO Transit service can cash in on. Worth noting is that an Earlscourt Station has been floated for the Barrie Line as well.

As a popular corridor (when the streetcar is running) with a vibrant mixed-use community, there is good reason for a connection with Georgetown services here. Multiple bus routes, in addition to the streetcar, can also connect with such a station.

A station added here would allow most communities close along the corridor, east of the Humber River, to be within about a kilometer of a station, which is close to the distance some studies have indicated people are willing to walk (up to 800m) to access Rapid Transit. With the Rail Path cycling component of the project as well, it can have substantial active transportation benefits, in line with the goals of the RTP.

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 34

Eglinton

Credit is due for the altered station platform location from the Draft EPR, although this change was not noted among the other changes listed in the GSSE Final EPR. Although the platform location has shifted, there is no indication of any connection to Ray Avenue. Such a connection should be constructed to promote active transportation and connections with the communities to the north of the station. A connection with Locust Street should also be explored. These are line with the goals of the RTP.

4.4.5 Park and Ride (EPR Pg. 208) Existing Park and Ride lots at the following stations will be incorporated into the design: Weston GO Station Etobicoke North GO Station Existing parking provision is 110 parking spaces. Improvements to Existing parking The new Weston GO Station location will provide existing park and ride provision is 530 space for approximately 400 parking spaces. The facilities and the shifting parking spaces. current parking spaces leased from a City of Toronto of the proposed new Parking Lot will no longer be required and will station nearer to the become available for local business uses. parking provision

Weston

The Weston GO Station and surrounding area has been discussed at length and is discussed further in Appendix 4. However, it is worth noting that expanding parking in urban areas such as this is contrary to the goals of the RTP and goes against recent GO policy of trying to increase the percentage of passengers that do not use their car to reach the station. The land would be far better used for a bus terminal, kiss and ride, and smart growth dense mixed-use development. Not to suggest that no parking should be provided (it can be incorporated into a larger development for better land use), but to almost quadruple the amount of available parking with a surface lot in an urban area is clearly the wrong direction for this project, and will serve to increase congestion and poison land that is ideal for development as a successful mobility hub and possibly beyond.

Etobicoke North/Rexdale

The history of Etobicoke North Station is interesting as the station was an addition after the line had already entered service. The location of the station is poor, however, as its only purpose when built was to provide for more parking. The location is not transit-oriented, and if any money is going to be spent on this station, it should be done so in a manner that makes it more transit-oriented.

Etobicoke North can get both more parking and vastly more bus traffic with a relocated station on the opposite side of the 401, at Islington Avenue. Despite the inclusion of a map from the Ride Guide in the GSSE Final EPR (Appendix 7), the GSSE project team has not noticed this. To free up the name for use at Woodbine Station (and avoid the name “Woodbine” by using “Etobicoke North” instead), the relocated Etobicoke North GO Station at Islington could be called “Rexdale.”

Car Access Benefits (Highway Access and Parking) The connections to the highway network are far more convenient at Islington than at Kipling. One direction is missing at Islington and 401 for access from a GO Station at such a location, but this can be seen as an opportunity to enhance the existing interchange for all users (Appendix 27). The land that could be used for parking is more plentiful at Islington than at Kipling, and at a location that is at a highway interchange, this is a location where parking makes the most sense.

Bus Connections (TTC & GO) The potential bus connections at such a station are not only with TTC routes, but GO bus routes

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 35 from the Yorkdale terminal as well. At least 4 GO bus routes would be able to connect with a station at Islington, but it is very awkward for such to be done with the location at Kipling (although one of the bus routes, to Bolton, does make the Kipling connection). Depending on fare integration models and whether some routes are modified to better connect TTC bus routes with the GO rail network, the potential of such a station to receive large volumes of bus traffic (potentially over a dozen routes) is far higher than anything the current Kipling location could ever hope to achieve. This is important for the goals of GO’s policies for increasing the percentage of riders that don’t use their car to access GO rail stations. What makes the opportunity at Islington interesting is that it can maximize the convenience of all users to the station, whether they arrive by bus, by car, by bike, etc.

Etobicoke North/Woodbine

This has already been discussed with regard to the 1994 Georgetown Corridor EA proposal. However, to reiterate what was stated about the Rexdale Station, the station name “Rexdale” frees up the station name “Etobicoke North,” and should be used so that Toronto doesn’t get stuck with a “Woodbine GO Station” in the northwest end of Toronto and a “Woodbine Subway Station” in the southeast end of Toronto.

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510 36

Opportunities and Relations to Other Projects

GO Transit

Bolton

2.3.5.1 Bolton (EPR Pg. 39) A feasibility study on the rail corridor to Bolton is currently underway and is expected to report by the end of the year.

The platform configuration for the station at Eglinton is clearly designed for accommodating Bolton trains on the CP MacTier Subdivision on the eastern-most platform, even though the feasibility study isn’t complete? Order of operations seems flawed.

What is further flawed, however, is that Bolton trains should stop at Weston on the elevated CP MacTier Subdivision described in Appendix 4. Bolton trains could then proceed non-stop to either Liberty Village/Parkdale or Union Station. Passengers bound for Bloor, Mount Dennis, and Carlton Village, could transfer to an electrified Georgetown service at the underground level of Weston Station (as described in Appendix 4) that is better suited for servicing frequent stops.

Georgetown North

2.3.5.4 Georgetown North (EPR Pg. 40) The section of the Georgetown Corridor between Goreway Drive and Georgetown GO Station is referred to as the Georgetown North Corridor.

A long term full service rail improvements were developed and assessed as part of the Full Service Study and the Class EA Study in 1991 and 1994. A Georgetown Corridor Planning Study in 2002 was undertaken with the long term purpose of planning and designing infrastructure necessary to allow GO Transit to expand its current peak period peak direction commuter train service in the Georgetown Corridor to full (all day two way) service. However, as the EA for the expansion of the Georgetown North Corridor was completed before the publication of Metrolinx’s Big Move, additional study will be required to incorporate the priorities outlined in the Big Move into the expansion proposals of the Georgetown North Corridor.

There is a reference to the 1994 study on the Georgetown Corridor, yet the location for Woodbine Station in the GSSE Final EPR is quite different from what was proposed in 1994 (Appendix 8). The 1994 location, at Highway 27, is superior, by a wide margin, to the proposed location put forward by the GSSE project team, 15 years later. This has already been covered, but it is worth noting that the GSSE project team has access to the superior proposal, and should therefore have known about that proposal and elaborate on the reasoning for not adopting what was soundly proposed in 1994. The 1994 proposal even included LRT on Highway 27, like the RTP.

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Milton and Barrie Lines

2.3.5.5 Service Expansion on the Milton and Barrie Lines (EPR Pg. 41) The RTP proposes service expansion on the Milton and Barrie lines. The track capacity to support this service within the Georgetown South Corridor has been included in the project. In addition, the train movements have been included in the noise, vibration and air quality impact assessment.

There are inadequate provisions being made for the expanded service on the Milton and Barrie lines. The Queen Street and Dufferin Street area should have a station that would be serviceable by both of these lines in addition to the Georgetown Corridor. The City of Toronto Official Plan is being ignored by not making this station (although originally envisaged at King Street, which is not feasible) happen now as the corridor is expanded.

TTC Transit City

2.3.5.6 Transit City (EPR Pg. 41, 210) Transit City is an initiative by the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) that will introduce seven new Light Rail Transit (LRT) lines to many Toronto neighbourhoods. It is designed to provide new direct high quality transit links to areas that are currently far removed from rapid transit, including north, west, and eastern areas of Toronto shown in Figure 2.3.5.5-1. This initiative has received endorsement from the TTC, City of Toronto and the Government of Ontario. The projects identified in Transit City were incorporated into the Metrolinx RTP.

All of the seven routes have been chosen to connect with existing TTC subway system, GO rail stations, other Transit City routes, and planned rapid transit lines in the regions of Durham, York and Peel. The Government of Ontario has recently announced funding for the construction of four of the lines: Eglinton Crosstown LRT, Etobicoke – Finch West LRT, Scarborough LRT and Sheppard East LRT.

Three of the proposed lines are likely to interact with the GO Georgetown South corridor: Eglinton Crosstown LRT Etobicoke – Finch West LRT Jane LRT This is a 31 km line linking This 18 km route will connect 17 km route which will stretch Kennedy Station in the east Finch Station with north Etobicoke; from Jane Street from the with the airport and provide direct service to Humber Bloor-Danforth subway to the Mississauga Transitway in College and could ultimately be new Steeles West Station on the west. extended to Mississauga, the the Spadina Subway and Woodbine race track or Pearson potentially further into York International Airport. Region. The Eglinton LRT and the Finch West LRT have recently received capital funding from the Province of Ontario and will be in operation within the next 5 to 10 years

The Eglinton Crosstown LRT is the only Transit City line that has a real connection proposed with the GSSE project as described in the GSSE Final EPR.

The Finch West LRT will not interact with the GO Georgetown South Corridor because the project team decided, without justification, to locate the Woodbine Station at Highway 427 instead of Highway 27, missing the connection between the two services. This is not consistent with the objectives of the Metrolinx RTP. Had the GSSE project team gone with the 1994 proposal (Appendix 8), a connection would be possible with the Etobicoke-Finch West LRT.

The Jane LRT has no interaction with the GO Georgetown South Corridor, as there is no station along the Georgetown GO Corridor at Jane Street, neither existing nor proposed. Is the GSSE project team trying to suggest that riders can do the impossible, and transfer between lines without a station being present at the point the two lines cross?

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Renforth Terminal

Renforth Station Development (EPR Pg. 211) Metrolinx, the Ontario Ministry of Transportation,(MTO), the Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA), GO Transit, Toronto, and Mississauga have all been involved in developing various plans for both interim and long-term transit plans for the entire Renforth / 427 / 401 / Airport area. The currently proposed site and layout of the Renforth station will continue to evolve as the Highway 427 / 401 interchange reconfiguration; Eglinton Avenue LRT; Pearson International Airport transit access study; and adjacent office development proposals progress Metrolinx will be involved in coordinating various aspects of those studies. The key to the Renforth Station effectiveness will be its accessibility to and from all roads, transit, LRT, and HOV facilities in all directions.

At the present time, the location and design details of the Renforth Station facility is subject to consultation with all the stakeholders and a final decision awaits the results of these discussions and consultations.

Renforth & 401 is a very poor site for a transit hub. Any transit facility should not be this close to a major 400-series highway, especially a junction between 2 400-series highways. Not only is this area sterile for transit-oriented development from highways, but also the hydro corridor that this station is to be built on also sterilizes the land from transit-oriented development. Such a location is only good for developing large commuter parking lots, which is not what the region needs to solve its transit challenges, and is in fact counter productive and known to be a problematic practice.

The problems with this site are many. It’s a very isolated location due to the various surrounding heavy infrastructure. It is difficult to build much north or west of this terminal, and the south and east are established, stable low-density neighbourhoods unlikely to see redevelopment. If any kind of transit facility were to be built here, transferring would be just about the only activity that takes place. The Metrolinx RTP states that this is the kind of thing that should be avoided with Mobility Hubs.

Renforth & 401 is an area that is difficult to create an atmosphere of security in. The accessibility to an isolated location like this can be prone to inviting unwanted activity, no matter how many measures are taken to prevent or discourage such. This is partly due to the likelihood that such a station will be very prone to being a dead zone, particularly during late hours.

With the RTP referring to Pearson International Airport as a regional anchor hub, the relevance of a Renforth Station becomes questionable. Previous master plans for the airport area had the Airport People Mover (known as “LINK”) extending to the Renforth & 401 terminal, but this is known to not be feasible with the technology implemented for LINK. That means a critical element of the concept for such a terminal has vanished. It should make more sense to just take all services into Pearson, as that is in line with “Big Move #2.”

The past objectives of the Renforth Station concept are rooted in outdated planning practices and municipal boundaries requiring extra fares. These are the types of problems Metrolinx was created to rectify, not propagate.

Karl Junkin 416-316-4510