The Battle That Made Britain?

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The battle that made Britain?

A study of the historiographical debate on the significance of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 for Scotland, Britain and the world

Sunniva Christina Ruthven Hatlestad-Hall

Master’s thesis in History at the Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Autumn 2019

The battle that made Britain?

A study of the historiographical debate on the significance of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 for Scotland, Britain and the world

III

Ó Sunniva Christina Ruthven Hatlestad-Hall

2019

The battle that made Britain? A study of the historiographical debate on the significance of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 for Scotland, Britain and the world

Sunniva Christina Ruthven Hatlestad-Hall http://www.duo.uio.no

Print: Webergs Printshop, Oslo

Illustration: Traditional depiction of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 called An Incident in the Rebellion of 1745 by David Morier (source: Wikimedia Commons)

IV Abstract

On the morning of 16th April 1746, the Jacobites fought a British army supported by the Government on Culloden Moor in northern Scotland. The battle was short, but brutal. Still, many historians claim that the battle was of major importance for consecutive Scottish, British and international politics, as well as the subsequent social and cultural development in Scotland. This thesis attempts to answer to what extent historians perceive the Battle of Culloden as significant, by exploring the political, social and cultural implications of the battle. It also tries to establish whether or not Culloden was ‘the battle that made Britain’. This is done by identifying three distinct scholarly views in the historiographical debate, categorising relevant historians within these traditions, and accordingly, using this as a basis for the discussion on the various claimed consequences of Jacobitism and Culloden. The conclusion drawn is that historians to a large extent perceive Culloden as a battle that accelerated and intensified important political, social and cultural developments of the subsequent period. For instance, Culloden is given credit for the defeat of the last domestic contestation of the 1707 Act of Union, the consolidation of the Union of Great Britain, the end to the clan system in Scotland, and for contributing to the forging of the British Empire and the development of Britain as a dominant world power. Most historians thus regard Culloden as a significant battle. The thesis also concludes that the Battle of Culloden was a catalytic factor in the creation of the British state, and consequently, definitely was ‘the battle that contributed to the making of Britain’.

VI Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Hans Jacob Orning, for excellent guidance and advice in this process. Thank you for letting me explore a topic I am very interested in and passionate about, and for believing in my project. We have had many invaluable talks and mail correspondences, helping me find my way in this bewildering world of Master’s thesis work and writing. I would also like to thank my amazing husband, Christoffer. Thank you for motivating me, for believing in me and for inexhaustible support. I would also like to thank you for bearing with me when I have been ranting over the complexity of this historiographical debate and all its controversies and disagreements. Thank you for proof reading parts of my thesis, for valuable discussions on the topic, and for always being ready to give me a hug whenever I need one. Thank you to my fantastic parents, Kristin and Jonathan, for endless support and encouragement. You have seemed genuinely interested in my thesis and have at times been more thrilled than I to discuss the Battle of Culloden. A special thanks to you both for proof reading parts of my thesis and giving useful comments. Thank you for always being there for me, especially these last few weeks. Last, but not least, thank you to my two brothers and my friends for putting up with me in this stressful and demanding period. Thank you for your caring messages and phone calls, and for much needed breaks from studying.

Sunniva C. R. Hatlestad-Hall November 2019

VII

VIII Figures

Figure 1: Culloden Moor today………………………………………………………………..6

Figure 2: Illustration of Charles Edward Stuart…………………………………………….....6

Figure 3: Memorial on Culloden Battlefield…………………………………………………95

X Contents

1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Presentation and research questions ...... 1 1.2 Historical background ...... 3 1.2.1 Who were the Jacobites? ...... 3 1.2.2 The Jacobite conflict ...... 4 1.2.3 The Battle of Culloden in 1746 ...... 5 1.3 Historiography and theory ...... 7 1.3.1 The Whig approach ...... 8 1.3.2 The romantic approach ...... 10 1.3.3 The revisionist approach ...... 12 1.4 Method ...... 13 1.5 Structure of the thesis ...... 13

2 Political implications for Scotland ...... 15 2.1 Chapter introduction ...... 15 2.2 Prevalence of Jacobitism in Scotland 1688-1746: The Highlands vs. the Lowlands ... 16 2.3 Was the Battle of Culloden in 1746 the end of the Jacobite movement in Scotland? . 23 2.4 Further consequences for Scottish politics ...... 30 2.5 Chapter conclusion ...... 32

3 Political implications for the British Isles ...... 34 3.1 Chapter introduction ...... 34 3.2 Prevalence of Jacobitism in the British Isles 1688-1746 ...... 35 3.3 What happened to the Jacobite movement in Ireland, Wales and England after the Battle of Culloden in 1746? ...... 41 3.4 Further political consequences for the Union of Great Britain and the British state . 43 3.5 Chapter conclusion ...... 48

4 International political implications ...... 51 4.1 Chapter introduction ...... 51 4.2 Prevalence of Jacobitism internationally 1688-1746 ...... 52 4.2.1 Involvement of foreign powers in the Jacobite conflict ...... 53 4.2.2 True or false Jacobites? ...... 56

XI 4.3 What happened to international Jacobitism after the Battle of Culloden in 1746? .... 60 4.4 Further consequences for international political affairs ...... 62 4.5 Chapter conclusion ...... 66

5 Social and cultural implications for Scotland ...... 68 5.1 Chapter introduction ...... 68 5.2 Immediate aftermath of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 ...... 69 5.2.1 Was Culloden the death of clanship? ...... 72 5.2.2 The end of the Highland way of life? ...... 75 5.2.3 Did a planned extinction of native Scottish Celts follow the Jacobite defeat at Culloden? 77 5.2.4 Did Culloden put an end to a distinct Scottish identity? ...... 81 5.3 The Scottish Clearances ...... 82 5.4 Chapter conclusion ...... 87

6 Conclusion ...... 90 6.1 Was Culloden a battle of significance? ...... 90 6.2 Was Culloden ‘the battle that made Britain’? ...... 92 6.3 Concluding thoughts ...... 94

Bibliography ...... 97

XII

1 Introduction

1.1 Presentation and research questions

The morning of 16th April 1746 the army of the British Government steadily advanced on the Jacobite Army on Culloden Moor in northern Scotland. The British Army led by William, Duke of Cumberland, and the Jacobite forces led by ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’, collided heavily on the damp moor outside Inverness.1 The battle that ensued was short but brutal. It was the last ever pitched battle on British soil and is by many academics considered to have had major impact on the subsequent development in both Scotland and Britain in its entirety.2 Some historians even claim that the battle was of international significance. The Jacobites had been revolting against Britain’s Hanoverian rule since the end of the 17th century, hoping to reinstate the royal House of Stuart (originally Stewart) on the British throne.3 The Jacobites lost the battle, and it has thus been regarded as the movement’s last decisive defeat. Even though the Battle of Culloden lasted less than an hour, it has been framed as a crucial event by many British historians and even been called ‘the battle that made Britain’.4 One of the reasons for this conception, is that the clash at Culloden has been viewed as the final blow to the last domestic contestation of the Union of England, Wales and Scotland, and hence the battle has been argued to in itself consolidate the Union of Great Britain.5 The Battle of Culloden has also traditionally marked the end of the Jacobites, the Scottish clan system and ‘the old’ Scotland, and thus represented a historic discontinuity.6 Despite these statements, the significance of the Jacobites and their final defeat at Culloden is a highly disputed topic. It is an ongoing discussion amongst historians today, ranging from historians portraying Culloden as ‘the hour that made the Pax Britannica’7 to those considering the battle as virtually insignificant. The debate is made even more complicated by factors such as nationalism, identity, cultural memory and politics. As the

1 Jeremy Black, A History of the British Isles (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 181-182. 2 Murray Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 2. 3 Jeremy Black, Culloden and the '45 (Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton, 1990), xiii. 4 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 4 & 117-118. 5 Ibid., 2. 6 Tony Pollard, "Introduction: The Battle of Culloden - More than a Difference of Opinion," in Culloden: The History and Archaeology of the Last Clan Battle, ed. Tony Pollard (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 11- 12; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden. 7 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 118.

1 historian Murray Pittock writes, the Battle of Culloden is still ‘a politically live topic’.8 The union of 1707 has been under pressure ever since its commencement and might be said to again be under as serious a threat today as it arguably was in the Jacobite era. Consequently, Jacobitism is a prevailing topic in current historical and political debates in Britain. This is, for instance, shown through the creation of the minor Scottish political party SJP, The Scottish Jacobite Party, that was politically active between 2005 and 2011, through the 270- years anniversary of the Battle of Culloden that was marked in 2016, through the British Union’s terms and conditions again being under strain due to Brexit, and through the political use which the Jacobite story is being put to in today’s struggle for Scottish independence.9 The Jacobites and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 have also become a huge part of Scottish national identity. Lastly, it is worth mentioning the hugely popular book series Outlander (1991-) written by Diana J. Gabaldon, and now the TV adaptation of this series that premiered in 2014, which has contributed to a renewed rise in popular interest in the Jacobite era. The significance of the Battle of Culloden is thus a topic of relevance and current interest. There is a substantial amount of research and writing done on the topic of Culloden, but it is an area of continual change. This thesis will delve into this diverse and extensive scholarly debate, and hopefully contribute new, interesting and useful viewpoints to this field of study. The thesis will attempt to answer the research questions: To what extent do historians perceive the Battle of Culloden in 1746 as significant? What were the political, social and cultural implications of the conflict? Was Culloden ‘the battle that made Britain’? These research questions will be explored by doing an in-depth study of the historiographical debate concerning the political implications of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden for Scottish, British and international politics, as well as the scholarly discussion on the social and cultural implications of Culloden for Scotland. The thesis will primarily discuss Culloden’s consequences for the consecutive period up until 1850, apart from a few comments on the battle’s relevance today.

8 Murray Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 3. 9 Murray Pittock, Jacobitism, ed. Jeremy Black, British History in Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 9; Great Battles: Culloden, 155.

1.2 Historical background

The Jacobite events were set in a century of great change. The conflict unfolded during the Age of Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. This was thus a century when ideals such as liberty, progress, constitutional government and the separation of church and state were advancing. People were opposed to the absolute monarchy and the fixed dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church, and the central doctrines of the time were individual liberty and religious tolerance. The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, writers and scientists became renowned, impacting the Enlightenment teleology of the time. Simultaneously, a large-scale colonisation of the world was taking place, and the late 18th century witnessed the fight for independence in America and the revolution in France. New constitutions were written, new nations were established, and the concepts of nationalism and nation states were becoming increasingly important. All in all, the Jacobite conflict unravelled in a century of considerable social, political, cultural, economic and industrial upheaval in the world. The long-standing enmity between Scotland and England was still causing problems. All these above-mentioned factors thus impacted the events of the Jacobite Rebellions and the successive issuing of historiography on the topic.

1.2.1 Who were the Jacobites? The Jacobite movement’s origin can be traced to the year of 1688.10 The name Jacobites derives from Jacobus, Latin for James. The name refers to the Jacobites support of James II Stuart of England (James VII of Scotland) and his successors, who they believed to be the rightful rulers of Britain. England and Scotland had been in a personal union since the Union of Crowns in 1603, and consequently they had the same king. During the reign of James II, he dissolved Parliament, tried to strengthen the monarchy, and worked for the introduction of Catholicism, as he was a Catholic king. Britain at the time was mainly Protestant, and these elements thus resulted in a growing dismay amongst the people of Britain and the Parliament. Eventually, William of Orange, who was married to James II’s daughter, Mary, was invited as an attempt at resolving matters. William of Orange, from the Netherlands, consequently invaded England, and at the news of this, James II fled to France. James II was accordingly disposed, and William III and Mary II became joint monarchs of Britain. These events have

10 Black, Culloden and the '45, xiii-xiv.

3 been termed the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689.11 Despite the dethronement of James II, and his consequent exile in France, the Jacobites continued to support the original royal house of Scotland. They thus supported the Stuart’s claim to the British throne at the expense of the Hanoverian rule. Exactly who the Jacobites were, is still disputed among historians today. The traditional representation of the Jacobites has been that they were a homogeneous group consisting of Catholic Celtic clansmen from the Highlands.12 They have also been perceived as a movement with clear mutual political goals and a shared ideology, mainly consisting of an aspiration to fight for Scottish independence, prevent the Union of 1707, and reinstate a Stuart on the throne.13 In recent years, this traditional conception has been challenged. A more nuanced view has become gradually more dominant, claiming that the Jacobites were a complex movement consisting of people with different nationalities, backgrounds, religions, motivations, ideologies and goals.14

1.2.2 The Jacobite conflict The events of the Jacobite conflict predominantly unfolded in the period between 1688 and 1746. According to one of the current leading historians within the field of Jacobite studies, Murray Pittock, the Jacobite conflict was not just a dynastic struggle, but also a conflict between two different visions. Even though Pittock is of the opinion that the support for these visions varied on both the conflicting sides of the conflict, he still asserts that both camps had their own distinct vision. One of the visions prevailed on what has been termed the British side of the conflict.15 This was the side that supported the British Government.16 Pittock alleges that these Brits primarily fought for a centralised British state, a state that would align itself with the Protestant interest in Europe, and for the marginality of Scotland, Ireland, and above all, Catholicism. He also acknowledges that many of the Presbyterian Scots, Presbyterianism being a stricter form of Protestantism, supported the Union and the British

11 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 13; Christopher Duffy, "The '45 Campaign," in Culloden: The History and Archaeology of the Last Clan Battle, ed. Tony Pollard (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 17. 12 Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 10. 13 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 131; Victoria Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, 1700-1750: Defending the Union, ed. Jeremy Black, Bloomsbury Studies in Military History (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 188. 14 Bob Harris, "Jacobitism," in 1707 to the Present: Volume I: The Transformation of Scotland, 1707-1850, ed. Anthony Cooke, et al., Modern Scottish History (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2007), 25. 15 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 2. 16 Christopher Sinclair-Stevenson, Inglorious Rebellion: The Jacobite Risings of 1708, 1715 and 1719 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971), 1.

side, because they considered the Union as a guarantee for Presbyterianism’s protection in Scotland.17 The opposite vision was held by the Jacobites, who, according to Pittock, were Scottish, Irish, Welsh and English.18 Amongst the Jacobites there were most likely many different reasons for their involvement in the Jacobite movement, and for many of the Jacobites, their involvement was most likely due to individual goals, wishes, motivation and ideas of personal profit.19 However, Pittock still argues that there existed one main Jacobite vision. This vision differed from country to country within the British Isles. In his book Jacobitism (1998), Pittock asserts that Scottish Jacobites, among others, wanted greater autonomy through a reinstatement of political institutions, such as the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh. Irish Jacobites allegedly desired Catholic hegemony and the end of Saxon rule in Ireland, whereas many English and Welsh Jacobites resisted the financial revolution occurring at this time, the increase in taxes, and the pro-Hanoverian foreign policy. Religion is also claimed to have been an important motive for involvement in Jacobitism.20 The Jacobites were by many considered a military and political movement, which rebelled numerous times between 1688 and 1746. The first Jacobite Rising occurred in 1689, not long after the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689. This rebellion is claimed to have had little support in the British population. After the Union of 1707, however, the support is said to have increased considerably. The backing of the uprisings in 1715, 1719 and 1745-46 was thus much more substantial among the British than earlier, and the Jacobites also received assistance from foreign powers. During the Jacobite Rising of 1689, the attempted invasion of England in 1708 and the last decisive rebellion in 1745-46, the Jacobites received military help from France, whereas in 1719, Spain was their ally.21

1.2.3 The Battle of Culloden in 1746 The Battle of Culloden, or Cùil Lodair, as is the name of the town in Gaelic, took place on Drumossie Moor, also called Culloden Moor, outside of Inverness in northern Scotland 16th April 1746.22 Figure 1 shows a picture of what Culloden battlefield looks like today. The Battle of Culloden was short, pitching the British Army led by William, Duke of

17 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 2-3. 18 Pittock, Jacobitism, 2. 19 Harris, "Jacobitism," 25. 20 Pittock, Jacobitism, 2. 21 Harris, "Jacobitism," 23-24 & 32-33; Duffy, "The '45 Campaign," 17-18. 22 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 1; Black, Culloden and the '45, 166-167.

5 Cumberland, against the Jacobite Army of Charles Edward Stuart (see figure 2). Charles Edward Stuart also went under the nicknames of ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’ and the ‘Young Pretender’.23 ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’ was trying to reinstate his father, the so-called ‘Old Pretender’, on the British throne. Figure 1: Not much resembles a bloody battle on Culloden Moor today (source: the author) He was thus not fighting for the position of king himself but would consequently inherit the throne if he succeeded. The Jacobites suffered a massive defeat at Culloden, and during the battle and in the immediate aftermath, large parts of the Jacobite Army is asserted to have been eradicated. The Duke of Cumberland is portrayed as showing no mercy after the battle, killing off all the wounded Jacobites. This ruthless treatment of wounded soldiers, as well as Cumberland’s and his army’s actions in the days following the battle, gained Cumberland the nickname ‘The Butcher’. These events have thus been referred to by many historians as a brutal massacre.24

Figure 2: Illustration of Charles Edward Stuart (source: Wikimedia Commons)

23 Black, A History of the British Isles, 181-182. 24 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 99-104.

1.3 Historiography and theory

Historiography is a term that has more than one meaning. It can be defined as ‘the writing of history’25, thus meaning the scholarly writing and debate on a certain historic topic. This then includes the entire amount of academic literature existing on the topic in question. On the other hand, the term historiography can also be used as ‘the study of the writing of history and of written histories’26. This denotes the study of scholarly literature (i.e. the historiography) in a particular field. In this thesis, both the definitions of historiography presented will be used, carrying out a historiographical analysis of the Jacobite historiography. Jacobitism has a long, extensive and complex historiography, and historians’ views on Culloden and the Jacobites have changed over the years. There can be argued to exist some distinct different scholarly views in the academic literature, but the divisions between them are not unambiguous and clear. Since not all of these views can be claimed to be properly developed, acknowledged and established as history schools (except for Whig history), but more trends and tendencies within the scholarly debate, I have decided to not use the term history school in this thesis. I will thus rather denote the different views as approaches, trends and traditions. The scholarly traditions within Jacobite studies also differ from country to country within the British Isles, but it is still possible to trace some shared patterns within this complex picture.27 In this thesis, I have identified three distinct scholarly approaches in the historiography based on the general tendencies: the Whig approach, the romantic approach and the revisionist approach. These different views on Jacobitism and its importance have dominated at different times, but all of these historiographical perspectives still exist today. The historians categorised within the same history tradition do not necessarily agree on everything, but they share some common features and beliefs in their historical studies. There are various ways to categorise the Jacobite historiography, and my choice of categorisation is thus only one of many. The terms Whig, romantic and revisionist are all in use in the scholarly debate, but they are not necessarily the best way to group historians or the most correct one. Nevertheless, it is the categorisation I found most instructive and valuable myself. I have categorised the relevant historians according to my own opinion, and

25 "Historiography," Oxford Dictionaries (2019), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/historiography. 26 Ibid. 27 Paul Monod, Murray Pittock, and Daniel Szechi, eds., Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad, Studies in Modern History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11.

7 other historians might therefore not agree on the names of the different categories or the historians I have placed within them. This is thus my own attempt at grasping a lively and heated scholarly debate. Due to the debate’s complex and continually changing nature, it is difficult to include all the different nuances of the historiography within the limit of a Master’s thesis. Some parts of the discussions might thus come across as more black and white than they are in reality, but I have tried to avoid this as much as possible.

1.3.1 The Whig approach Whig history is regarded as the traditional view on Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden, and was primarily dominant from 1688 until the 1770s, even though this scholarly view is still influencing the debate today.28 The term ‘Whig’ in this context is disputed.29 It refers to the political party that occurred at the end of the 17th century which was against James II becoming king. The ‘Whigs’ were in opposition to the ‘Tories’, who supported James II’s claim to the British throne and have often been seen in connection with the Jacobites. As the name suggests, Whig history has been accused of being an Anglocentric model of history constructed from an English Whig Party point of view.30 Historians who do not belong to this historiographical approach accuse it of being based on anti-Jacobite propaganda and of only observing the Jacobite conflict from the victors’ point of view.31 Whig history has also been called Whig presentism as criticism by disagreeing historians who claim that Whig historians have a tendency to interpret the Jacobite conflict in terms of modern values and concepts that were anachronistic of the time.32 Since Whig history to a large extent views the events from a political position, Whig historians mainly focus on the political level and see the conflict from ‘above’. Whig history is based on Scottish Enlightenment teleology developed by historians and philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Ferguson and William Robertson, even though these three themselves are not always understood to be Whig historians. They regard historical development as a stadial process, where the society evolves in the direction of ever more advanced, prosperous and civilised forms. The development goes from limitations, barbarity and savageness to progress, civility and modernity.33 This is called stadial history,

28 Ibid., 9. 29 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 132. 30 Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 9. 31 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 117 & 131. 32 Monod, Pittock, and Szechi, Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad, 9. 33 Pittock, Jacobitism, 3.

and in light of this theory, the Jacobites are considered backward, simple and primitive.34 Within the Whig interpretation, the Battle of Culloden is then perceived as modernism’s final victory over the Scots’ savagery and feudalism. Whig historians claim that a feudal society structure entered Scotland after the Norman invasion in 1066 and persisted until Culloden. An alleged English cultural superiority, and almost a calling to civilise the uncivilised were used as arguments for England’s intervention and good intentions. Hence, many Whig historians viewed England as the power that saved Scotland from barbarity and crudeness.35 In the case of the Jacobites, Whig historians claim that feudal barbarity gave way to capitalism, which according to these historians, was a necessary and unavoidable evolution. Historians belonging to this scholarly approach have traditionally characterised the Jacobite conflict in stark binary oppositional terms.36 According to Pittock, Whig historians have framed the conflict by describing it as ‘a clash between the old and the new, the traditional and the modern, the backward and the advanced, the tribe and the state, […] the Catholic and the Protestant, […] the brute and the civilised, the Celt and the Saxon’, and many other similar oppositions.37 Presumably, the Whig historians perceived the Jacobites thus, but Pittock claims that such a black and white representation of the conflict indicates a simple and primitive understanding of the topic.38 By this caricature of the Jacobites, the Whig historians ridiculed and marginalised this force, according to Pittock.39 Historians affiliated with this theoretical approach have been known to refer to the Jacobites in words such as ‘a small company of Desperados’, and have subsequently been accused of intentionally disparaging Jacobitism.40 Whig historiography is said to focus on the Jacobites’ defeat being the result of the British state’s greatness. These historians, therefore, frame the Jacobite rebellions in a bigger picture of the nation’s greatness, which was not only shown through the Jacobite movement’s downfall but also through British victories in wars on the continent and the advancement of the British Empire. Consequently, Whig history has been blamed of being normative rather than historical, and of not grounding their research in primary source material. Whig historiography has therefore been criticised for not qualifying as serious in-depth research and rather baring trace of cultural memory and political state agenda. This claimed lack of

34 Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 9. 35 Ibid., 3; Pittock, Jacobitism, 3; Great Battles: Culloden, 6 & 127-128. 36 Great Battles: Culloden, 130-131. 37 Ibid., 5. 38 Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 2-3. 39 Pittock, Jacobitism, 4. 40 Monod, Pittock, and Szechi, Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad, 10.

9 serious analytical study can partly be explained by the topic being so politically sensitive at the time and thus being deemed improper in academia from the 1740s. Jacobite beliefs were viewed as symptoms of emotional weakness or self-deception, and Jacobitism was, therefore, a topic not worthy of serious historical attention.41 The Whig historians presented in the preceding, are the traditional Whig historians. Some traditional Whig historians are still active in the Jacobite debate today, but there are a few current Whig historians who are more moderate in their assessments. In this thesis, I will thus distinguish between the traditional Whig historians and the recent more moderate Whig historians, since they differ in their views on some aspects of the Jacobite conflict. Many Whig historians are Unionists. They are thus very positive in questions concerning the British Union, and think it is important to keep and protect this alliance. This therefore impacts their views. Some of the historians I have categorised within this approach, and consequently will be discussing in this thesis are the traditional Whig historians Charles Chevenix Trench, George Macaulay Trevelyan and Michael Barthorp. I will also debate the more moderate Whig views of Paul Langford and Linda Colley.

1.3.2 The romantic approach There was also a more romantic tradition that emerged during the beginning of the 19th century. This view was particularly evident in fictional literature such as poems, and less in historical studies. Even so, some historians could be argued to belong within this approach, and they were often called sentimentalists. It was a matter of sentiment and nostalgia, where the Jacobites were portrayed as Highland heroes. These writers regarded Jacobitism as a thing of the heart, not the head. It was to a great extent used as literary entertainment and notable names in that connection were Robert Burns (1759-1796) and Sir Walter Scott (1771- 1832).42 At the time, this might have been one of the less political history approaches to the Jacobite conflict, but in later years the image of the Highland clan warrior has to a large extent become imprinted in cultural memory and Scottish nationalism. Today this approach is widely used in fiction and politics, and thus the romantic view can be argued to be today’s most political of the scholarly approaches discussed here.

41 Ibid., 9-11; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 117-120. 42 Monod, Pittock, and Szechi, Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad, 10 & 18-19; Pittock, Jacobitism, 4.

Although the romantic approach is a lot more positive to the Jacobites and their cause, it is based on the same stadial history theory as the Whig historiography.43 They also regard historical development as a stadial process, where the society evolves through predetermined stages from barbarity and backwardness to progress, civility and modernity. The difference lies in the historians’ attitude towards the Jacobites. They romanticise the picture of the Jacobites and view them as great heroic warriors fighting for their nation, but who were really stuck in the past, and thus were predestined to fail their cause. Those belonging to this historiographical approach thus describe the Jacobite conflict and its participants in the exact stark binary oppositional terms as the Whig historians do. They paint the same black and white picture, but root for the tragic Jacobite heroes rather than the British Army. The romantic view can also be asserted to have experienced a revival in the 20th century that to some extent can be said to be the continuation of Sir Walter Scott. Along with more focus on cultural minorities and their rights, the Jacobites also received more romantic and sentimental attention.44 The historian Daniel Szechi calls this school ‘the optimists’ and regards it as a more serious historical approach than its romantic predecessor. Most of the historians I will be using in the discussion in this thesis, will be from this newer, more serious and more academic variant of the romantic approach. In certain parts of this thesis, I will thus distinguish between traditional romantic historians from the 18th and 19th centuries, and the more recent romantics from the 20th century and onwards. The historians I will be using as thus more modern and serious scholars than their predecessors but are still quite partisan on behalf of the Jacobites and sympathetic of the Jacobite cause. They are therefore also sentimentalists but base their views on more serious study of primary sources and more in- depth research than many of the initial romantic historians.45 It can be discussed if romantic is the right word to use about these historians today, but I have still decided to keep this term in the thesis, to link the historical approach to its initial origin. Many of these historians are to a great extent Scottish Nationalists, as opposed to the Unionist Whig historians. Many of them are thus negative to the Union of Great Britain and Scotland’s participation in it.46 Some of the historians I have categorised within this approach and will be using in the thesis discussion are Sir Charles Petrie, Allan I. Macinnes and John Prebble.

43 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 128. 44 Monod, Pittock, and Szechi, Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad, 29-30. 45 Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, ed. Mark Greengrass and John Stevenson, New Frontiers in History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 2-3. 46 Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, 1700-1750: Defending the Union, 187-188.

11 1.3.3 The revisionist approach As the name reveals, the revisionist view is based on a revision of earlier historiographical interpretations. The revisionists have conducted new research into primary source material, archaeological excavations and research projects on social conditions – aspects of Jacobitism Whig historians have tended to not offer a lot of attention.47 This scholarly approach generally views the Jacobite conflict in a wider British and international context, at the same time as it focuses more on social history and studies the Jacobite movement from ‘below’.48 This implies that many revisionist historians to a great extent analyse the social factors that motivated Jacobitism. The revisionist approach thus examines the conflict and the battle to a greater extent from ‘below’ than the other historiographical traditions do.49 The revisionist approach emerged as an opposing view to the other established history traditions within Jacobite historiography around 1970.50 It then continued to develop throughout the 21st century and is the view dominating the debate today.51 The revisionist approach has eventually emerged in the historical debate in all the countries in Britain, but has earlier to a large extent been dominated by English academics.52 Not all historians within this tradition agree on everything, but what they have in common, is that they all revise earlier prevailing Jacobite apprehensions and thus contribute to a re-thinking of the Jacobite conflict and the Battle of Culloden.53 The historians that often are categorised within the so-called critical approach, have in this thesis been included as part of the revisionist approach instead. This is because the revisionist approach largely emerged from the critical approach, and the traditions consequently have many similarities. The arguably critical historians are thus addressed as early revisionists in this thesis. The revisionists are often revisionist historians within specific fields such as political, military, cultural, social, religious and economic history. They are thus not necessarily revisionists in their approach to all aspects of the Jacobite conflict. Historians I will be discussing as part of the revisionist approach are, for instance, Murray Pittock, Daniel Szechi, Eveline Cruickshanks, Frank McLynn and Tom Devine.

47 Pollard, "Introduction: The Battle of Culloden - More than a Difference of Opinion."; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden. 48 Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 5. 49 Pittock, Jacobitism, 7; Great Battles: Culloden, 135. 50 Pittock, Jacobitism, 6. 51 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 134-136. 52 Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 24. 53 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 136; Jacobitism, 8.

1.4 Method

As presented at the beginning of this chapter, my research questions are: To what extent do historians perceive the Battle of Culloden in 1746 as significant? What were the political, social and cultural implications of the conflict? Was Culloden ‘the battle that made Britain’? These questions will be answered by doing a historiographical study of influential and renowned secondary works that has contributed to the shaping of the scholarly debate on Jacobitism. I will thus not do an empirical study of primary material. I have identified three distinct scholarly views within the historiographical debate, which I presented in part 1.3: the Whig approach, the romantic approach and the revisionist approach. Accordingly, I have categorised relevant historians as I see fit within these three traditions and will be using this as the basis for my discussion of the various claimed political, social and cultural implications of the Battle of Culloden. Most of this thesis will be devoted to the political implications of Culloden in a Scottish, British and international context, since this is the discussion which is currently most disputed and debated. The social and cultural implications for Scotland will also be addressed, but to a lesser extent. There are unfortunately some alleged implications of Jacobitism and Culloden I have had to exclude from my discussion due to certain limitations, but I will explore those implications I consider most decisive, relevant and disputed within the historiography. I have not been able to include all the historians either, and accordingly, I am sure some important ones are missing. However, I have tried to select the most influential, renowned, ground-breaking and significant scholars.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided into six chapters, where chapter one and six is introduction and conclusion respectively. Chapters two to four explore the implications of the Battle of Culloden for Scottish, British and international politics, in that order. To be able to understand the different scholarly views on the political implications of Culloden for Scotland, the British Isles and internationally, a discussion of historians’ conceptions of the prevalence of Jacobitism is necessary. How historians perceive Jacobitism’s political importance and Culloden’s political implications is so closely connected to the debate on prevalence. All three chapters on political implications, chapter 2-4, will thus include three sections, were the two first discuss the prevalence of Jacobitism before and after 1746

13 respectively. This is necessary to be able to understand the general debate on Culloden’s political implications, which will be further examined in the third part of these chapters. Chapter five discusses the social and cultural implications of Culloden for Scotland.

2 Political implications for Scotland

2.1 Chapter introduction

The Battle of Culloden’s political implications are a controversial matter which has been disputed among historians for centuries. Scotland has in large been blamed for the rise of Jacobitism, the Jacobite rebellions and the Battle of Culloden in 1746, and the Jacobite movement can thus be asserted to have affected Scotland in particular. Culloden more or less eradicated large parts of the Scottish Jacobite movement, and issued a period of extensive military occupation of the Highlands by the British Army and the subsequent enactment of a series of legal statutes to subdue Scottish Jacobites and their ideology. Arguably, the Battle of Culloden marked the final loss of Scotland’s independence and resulted in considerable political implications for the country, but there are disagreeing opinions. The Whig historians to a great extent view Culloden as having no or limited impact on consequent Scottish politics, while the romantic historians and the revisionists on the other hand, argue for a greater political significance. What were the political implications of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 for Scotland? Was Culloden of importance for consecutive political development in the country, or was it a negligible conflict? These questions will be explored in the following by examining historians’ views on the prevalence of Scottish Jacobitism in the period between 1688 and 1746. Was Jacobitism widespread in all of Scotland in this period, or was the country politically divided? This might give an indication of the Jacobite movement’s potential to impact Scottish politics, and thus shed light on the extent of Jacobitism’s political influence on Scottish affairs and the possible political threat it posed. Thereafter, the prevalence of Jacobitism in Scotland after the Battle of Culloden in 1746 will be discussed. Did the Scottish Jacobite movement persist as a political threat after 1746, or was Culloden in reality the end of Scottish Jacobitism? Conclusively, further political consequences of Culloden for Scotland, not yet addressed in the two preceding parts of the chapter, will be debated.

15 2.2 Prevalence of Jacobitism in Scotland 1688-1746: The Highlands vs. the Lowlands

The prevalence of Jacobitism in Scotland in the period between the ‘Glorious Revolution’ in 1688 and the Battle of Culloden in 1746, is a heated scholarly debate. Historians have contradicting opinions on the matter, and the constant research on and analysis of new primary source material, continuously provide new insight, approaches and understandings of the topic. One of the main arguments for rendering Jacobitism a more or less political insignificant force, is the claim that the Jacobites were almost entirely limited to Scottish Highlanders. Traditional Whig historiography advocates this belief and claims that these Celtic clansmen from the so-called ‘Highlands’ of Scotland did not cover a large area and were a primitive and barbaric force that was not able to pose a substantial political threat. The traditional Whig historians also emphasise that there was a stark divide between the Scottish Highlands and the Lowlands. They tend to distance the Lowlands from the Highlands and consider the 18th century Highlands as ‘backward Scotland’, while the Lowlands are regarded as ‘modern Scotland’. According to traditional Whig historiography, it was only ‘backward Scotland’, represented by the clans, that was involved in the Jacobite movement. The Lowlanders on the other hand, are by Whig historians considered to be modern and supporters of the Hanoverian rule.54 By limiting the Jacobite movement to Scotland alone, and then again to only encompass the Highland region, the historians of the Whig belief limit the scope of Jacobitism considerably, both geographically and in terms of number of supporters. A historian promoting this view, is Michael Barthorp (1928-2018). In The Jacobite Rebellions 1689-1745 (1982) Barthorp writes: ‘In the 17th and 18th centuries the Lowland Scots shared many of the feelings of the English, and had cause to hate and fear their fellow countrymen in the Highlands.’55 He even goes as far as to claim that ‘some of the most brutal treatment inflicted on rebellious Highlanders after the ’45 was the work of Lowland Scots’.56 Through these assertions Barthorp creates a clear divide between the Scottish Highlands and Lowlands, and more or less blames the ‘rebellious Highlanders’ for the ’45 and the Battle of Culloden. He states this even more explicitly by ascertaining that the Jacobites relied upon

54 The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 3, 10 & 13. 55 Michael Barthorp, The Jacobite Rebellions 1689-1745, ed. Martin Windrow, Men-at-arms series (London: Osprey Publishing, 1982), 16. 56 Ibid.

the Highland clans for their most reliable manpower.57 Barthorp thus maintains the traditional Whig understanding of the prevalence of Jacobitism in Scotland and the alleged stark divide between the two regions of the country. However, Barthorp does allow a slight leeway in his claims. He does briefly point out that there were a few Lowlanders participating in the ’15 and the ’45 but upholds that ‘they were the exceptions rather than the rule’.58 Barthorp is in agreement with the historian George Macaulay Trevelyan (1876-1962). In English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria (1944) Trevelyan clearly refers to a divided Scotland consisting of the two entities ‘Highlands’ and ‘Lowlands’. He highlights the Highlands as being the core of the Jacobite movement, in accordance with traditional Whig historiography and Barthorp. Yet, he is less traditional in his treatment of the Lowlands. In his work, Trevelyan points out that even the Lowlands were divided. The nobles in this part of the kingdom did not all agree, and the gentry were divided into Presbyterian and Episcopalian.59 According to Trevelyan, the division between Presbyterian and Episcopalian was ‘scarcely distinguishable from the political division of Whig and Jacobite’.60 He writes that the Revolution of 1688 had left the Episcopal Church in Scotland disestablished and not even tolerated by law. ‘Scottish Episcopalians, therefore, were necessarily Jacobites, looking to a counter-revolution for their relief.’61 This signifies that even though Trevelyan claims, in accordance with other Whig historians, that the core of Scottish Jacobitism was situated in the Highlands, he also acknowledges the existence of an element of Jacobitism in the Scottish Lowlands. He thus makes the picture more nuanced, and appears less traditional, despite his fairly staunch Whig beliefs. John L. Roberts, a current geologist specialising on the Highlands, seems to share Trevelyan’s view on the religious aspect of the claimed divide between the Highlands and the Lowlands. Overall, Roberts appears to have a more revisionist approach to his Jacobite studies, but he still emphasises the division between the Highlands and the Lowlands, similarly to Barthorp, Trevelyan and many other Whig historians. Thence, he does show some Whig tendencies in his contribution to the debate on the so-called ‘Highland Line’. This is evident in his work The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745 (2002). Here, Roberts focuses on the religious aspect of this alleged divide. He writes

57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 George Macaulay Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1944), 423-424. 60 Ibid., 424. 61 Ibid., 425.

17 that as the Jacobites wanted to restore a Catholic dynasty to the throne, the movement was supported by the Scottish Catholics. He acknowledges that many of these Catholic Scots lived in the Highlands, but whereas most Whig historians paint a picture of all Highland clansmen being staunch Catholics, Roberts points out that the Scottish Catholics were a very small minority in the country.62 On account of this Catholic dimension of the Jacobite cause, Jacobitism was thus ‘anathema to the Presbyterians’63, who Roberts claims were dominant in the Scottish Lowlands. According to Roberts, the support for the Jacobites was therefore poor in the Lowlands due to the Catholic nature of the cause. Still, he makes the picture more nuanced by claiming that Jacobitism got staunch backing of the Scottish Episcopalians, in accordance with the assertions presented by G. M. Trevelyan.64 Roberts writes that these Episcopalians were the predominant, ‘not only in the Scottish Highlands but throughout the country to the north of the River Tay’.65 This means that even though the Catholic support for the Jacobites and the alleged none-existing Presbyterian support for the movement to some extent followed the Highland Line, the Episcopalian support did not adhere to this divide, according to Roberts.66 Roberts hence claims that the Scottish Episcopalian Jacobites were from both the Highlands and the Lowlands. This last statement is more in accordance with the revisionist conception of the matter, as well as with Trevelyan. It thus indicates that on the subject of the Highland Line, some of the more recent Whig historians, such as Trevelyan and arguably Roberts, diverge moderately from traditional 18th and 19th centuries Whig notions.67 The division between the Highlands and the Lowlands that the Whig historians argue for, was not only a question of a division between the ‘backward’ and the ‘modern’,

62 John L. Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745 (Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh, 2002), xi; Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 10. 63 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, xi. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 The claimed divide between the Scottish Highlands and Lowlands is also commented upon in the primary source ‘Disarming Act’ (State Paper 54/26/25), which can be found online at The National Archives’ website: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/jacobite-1745/9128-2/. The primary source is an extract from a letter written by Lord Justice Clerk Thomas Fletcher to the Secretary of State for Scotland in September 1745. This was during the events of the ’45, and Thomas Fletcher writes that Scotland is divided into two parts. One is the Highlands, which is armed, and the other is the Lowlands, which is unarmed. He claims that the Highlands are the source of the Jacobite uprising in 1745, while the Lowlands are asserted to have nothing to do with it. This supports the Whig interpretation of the contemporary situation in Scotland. Even though this is written at the time of the events, the Lord Justice Clerk is likely to have had his own political sympathies and agenda considering his position in society, and it is therefore difficult to determine whether this primary source describes the reality or not. However, the primary source also acknowledges that there did exist Highland clans that were not Jacobites. So, even though Thomas Fletcher believes that the Lowlanders are not to blame at all, not all Highland clans are to blame either, in his opinion.

Catholics and Protestants, or Jacobites and Government supporters. According to Whig conviction, the Highland Line also represented an ethnic divide. A considerable amount of Whig literature asserts that all Highland Scots were Celts, while Lowland Scots, however, are claimed to be Germanic.68 The English themselves were considered to be a Germanic people, and thus Whig historians are of the opinion that the Lowland Scots and the English were of the same ethnic origin, while the Highland Scots were an alien ethnic group. A number of Whig historians therefore maintain that the divide between the Highlands and the Lowlands was an ethnic divide as well as a geographical, cultural, religious and political divide. Trevelyan, the more recent and less traditional Whig historian discussed in latter paragraphs, does not comment on this claimed ethnical divide. This might be on account of him being a 20th century historian, who thus presumably views the Jacobite events slightly differently than many of the 18th century Whig historians. Trevelyan does uphold the divide of the Highland Line, but he asserts that this division only was deep ‘on its political side’.69 He even argues for the presence of a common Scottish mentality and civilisation being shared by Highlanders and Lowlanders alike, which is quite unconventional for a Whig historian.70 In general, most Whig historians tend to limit the prevalence of Scottish Jacobitism to the Highlands alone. Consequently, they use this as an argument in the scholarly debate on the political significance of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden. According to Whig academics, the Jacobites were a limited force with few supporters, led by uncivilised, unorganised and barbaric Highland clansmen. As a result, they regard the Battle of Culloden as having no significant political implications for Scotland. Some Whig historians might concede that the Battle of Culloden had a slight impact on subsequent political development in the country, but they still consider this impact restricted and insignificant. The romantic historians more or less agree with the Whig historiography on the topic of the Highland Line. They primarily perceive the Scottish Highlands as the core of the Jacobite movement. However, whereas many Whig academics view the Jacobites as uncivilised ‘Highland rabble’ in need of civilising, the romantics chiefly see them as brave and heroic Highlanders acting as true patriotic Scots. The romantic academics might partially agree that the Jacobites were barbarians living an outdated way of life, but they still largely sympathise with these Celtic clansmen and regard the suppressors of the Jacobite movement as the savages rather than the Jacobites. Traditional 18th and 19th centuries romantic historians

68 Pittock, Jacobitism, 3. 69 Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria, 425. 70 Ibid.

19 claim that the Jacobites were tragic heroes doomed to lose this battle against progress, modernity and the always suppressing big brother England. Thereupon, the Hanoverian regime’s reactions to the Jacobite conflict are seen as a violation to the native Celts of Scotland. A number of recent romantic historians are Scottish Nationalists. They thus direct their attentions specifically towards the Highlander – a trend caused in part by a ‘desire to highlight everything distinctive about Scotland’.71 Among these historians is John Prebble (1915-2001). In his book Culloden (1961) he writes: ‘To an Englishman of the eighteenth century, and to most Lowland Scots, the Highlands of Scotland were a remote and unpleasant region peopled by barbarians who spoke an obscure tongue…’72 Through these words, Prebble clearly distances the Highlands from the Lowlands, and supports the divide of the Highland Line that the Whig historians argue for. He proceeds to assert that ‘the Highlanders were a constant threat to the people of the Lowlands, or were believed to be’73, and that the Lowland Scots also joined the English in the suppression of the Jacobite Rebellions.74 Prebble thus creates an even greater divide between the two Scottish regions and align the Lowlanders with the English. Even though Prebble refers to the Highlanders as barbarians, his book is largely sympathetic to the Jacobites. He seems to believe in the same stadial history theory as the Whig historians, where society evolves through predetermined stages from barbarity and backwardness to progress, civility and modernity. This might explain why he regards the Jacobites as barbarians who had no choice but to be overcome by the modern age. Still, Prebble appears to be partisan in his support for the Jacobites and refers to the suppression of the ’45 as ‘savagery’.75 He is hence considered a romantic historian in this thesis. Prebble is to a great extent supported by the historian Allan I. Macinnes. Macinnes writes in Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (1996) that all the major Jacobite risings ‘tended to begin and end in Scottish Gaeldom’.76 He continues to claim that this geographic circumstance, ‘together with the deliberate adoption of a Highland profile by the Jacobite armies […], has indelibly identified the clans as the people who primarily fought

71 Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, 1700-1750: Defending the Union, 187-188. 72 John Prebble, Culloden (London: Secker & Warburg, 1961), 34. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1996), 159.

and died for Jacobitism’.77 Macinnes thus singles out the Gaelic Highlanders as the core of the Scottish Jacobite movement, similarly to Prebble and many Whig historians. Nevertheless, Macinnes does not use this statement as an argument for the Jacobites’ and the Battle of Culloden’s political insignificance. On the contrary, he emphasises Jacobitism’s political importance and stresses that it was ‘a major preoccupation of Scottish politics over six decades’78. This is generally the case for many recent romantic historians – they argue for the political division between the Highlands and the Lowlands, but still attribute political significance to the Jacobite movement. Among the first historians to contradict this claim for the division between the Scottish Highlands and the Lowlands, were Alistair Tayler (1870-1937) and Henrietta Tayler (1869-1951). These two academics are often considered to be the predominant historians within the critical approach, but in this thesis the critical historians have rather been categorised as early revisionists, due to the similarities of the two views. Tayler and Tayler were two of the first historians to do systematic in-depth studies of primary source material existing on Jacobitism. Through their work on primary sources, they clearly demonstrated ‘what even many historians today seek to ignore, the importance and depth of Jacobitism among ordinary middle-class Lowland Scots’.79 They published extensive evidence for this claim in their works Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Rising of 1715 (1934), Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Forty-Five (1928), and Jacobite Epilogue: A Further Selection of Letters from Jacobites among the Stuart Papers at Windsor Published by the Gracious Permission of His Majesty the King (1941).80 In the Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Forty-Five, Tayler and Tayler write that ‘the previous Jacobite Rising of 1715 derived its main support from the two counties which are the subject of this monograph’81, and then proceed to demonstrate and argue for these counties’ considerable support for Charles Edward Stuart and their participation in the Rising of 1745. Aberdeenshire and Banffshire are both counties belonging to the Lowland region. Tayler and Tayler thus disagree with the Whig and romantic historians. They do not believe that

77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Pittock, Jacobitism, 5. 80 Alistair Tayler and Henrietta Tayler, Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Rising of 1715 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1934); Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Forty-Five (Aberdeen: Milne & Hutchison, 1928); Henrietta Tayler, ed. Jacobite Epilogue: A Further Selection of Letters from Jacobites among the Stuart Papers at Windsor published by the Gracious Permission of His Majesty The King (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1941). 81 Tayler and Tayler, Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Forty-Five, 2.

21 Jacobitism was only limited to the Scottish clansmen in the Highlands but assert that there was an important and deep element of Jacobitism prevailing in the Lowlands as well. This view is supported by Murray Pittock (1962-), a pronounced current revisionist. He argues that ‘the Jacobite Army of 1745 was as much a Lowland as a Highland force’.82 He asserts that the Scottish Jacobites were not only limited to the Highland clans, but that there existed many Lowland Jacobites as well.83 This claim is also endorsed by historians such as Christopher Duffy (1936-) and Stuart Reid (1954-).84 Duffy writes that in the Jacobite Army ‘the Lowland troops were […] the absolute majority at between 54 and 57 per cent’, and that ‘the Lowlanders and their leaders therefore made up the bedrock of the ‘Highland army’’.85 Duffy then more or less asserts that the Lowlanders were just as vital for the Jacobite Rising of 1745 as the Highlanders. Pittock, accompanied by many other academics of the revisionist approach, doubt that there was such an ethnic, cultural, economic and political division of Scotland into the two entities ‘Highlands’ and ‘Lowlands’. Both the historical geographer Charles Withers (1954-) and Pittock claim that these two parts of the Scottish kingdom were closely connected and integrated.86 Still, some revisionists do make use of the term ‘the Highland Line’, but for them it is purely a geographical term denoting a division between two geographic regions in Scotland. The revisionist historian Victoria Henshaw has also done studies on individuals of Highland and Lowland background, which have revealed similarities proving that ‘eighteenth-century Scottish gentlemen above and below the Highland Line had more in common with each other than is popularly suggested’.87 Henshaw is hence of the same belief as Tayler and Tayler, Duffy, Reid, Pittock and Withers. They all maintain that Scotland was not such a divided country as the Whig and romantic historians suggest, and that Jacobitism accordingly was widespread in the entire Scottish kingdom. The prevalence of Jacobitism in Scotland has now been discussed to a certain degree. Generally, historians on Jacobitism seem to be divided in two camps on this matter, where Whig and romantic historians tend to limit the Scottish Jacobite movement to the clansmen above the alleged Highland Line, whereas the revisionists to a great extent argue for the

82 Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745, 3. 83 Ibid. 84 Christopher Duffy, The ‘45: Bonnie Prince Charlie and the Untold Story of the Jacobite Rising (London: Cassell, 2003), 80; Stuart Reid, Culloden 1746: Battlefield Guide, Third ed. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2018), 114-130. 85 Duffy, The ‘45: Bonnie Prince Charlie and the Untold Story of the Jacobite Rising, 80. 86 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 131. 87 Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, 1700-1750: Defending the Union, 188.

existence of a considerable Jacobitism in the Lowlands as well. By asserting that Jacobitism was widespread in all of Scotland, the revisionist historians also recognise the Jacobite movement as a greater political force. However, the romantic historians do credit the Jacobite movement substantial influence on Scottish politics too, even though they largely limit the prevalence of Scottish Jacobitism to the Highlands alone.

2.3 Was the Battle of Culloden in 1746 the end of the Jacobite movement in Scotland?

Regardless of historians’ conflicting views on the prevalence of Jacobitism in Scotland, Scotland still undoubtably encompassed a certain number of Jacobites. But for how long did Jacobitism persist in Scotland as an influential political force? Did Jacobite dissatisfaction, beliefs, ideology and vigour all die down after the Battle of Culloden in 1746? Was the Battle of Culloden the end of the Jacobite movement in Scotland? Historians have varying opinions on whether or not Jacobitism disappeared as a significant political factor in Scotland after 1746. First of all, there are considerable disagreements concerning the actual casualties on the battlefield of Drumossie Moor. Traditionally, the numbers reported after the battle were 50 British soldiers and 2,000 Jacobites. Down the line, other numbers have also been suggested, but according to Pittock, there are good reasons to doubt them all, because many of the reported numbers to a great extent are based on self-interest and propaganda from both sides involved. Pittock himself believes it to be likely that around 200-250 British soldiers and approximately 1,000 Jacobites died on the battlefield. He then claims that both sides had rising casualties in the aftermath of the battle, due to high numbers of wounded soldiers dying the ensuing days.88 In the immediate aftermath of Culloden, the treatment of the Jacobites is said to have been brutal. Few of the wounded Jacobites were taken as prisoners, most of them were killed off by the Duke of Cumberland’s army. Many historians portray this behaviour as utterly barbaric atrocities, claiming that Cumberland sent out death squads to finish off the wounded Jacobites where they lay. Because of this ruthless treatment of wounded soldiers, and Cumberland’s horrific actions in the days to follow, he gained the nickname ‘The Butcher’. According to Pittock, the number of Jacobites dying on the battlefield or in the immediate

88 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 97-98.

23 aftermath mounted to around 3,000 altogether. Many historians have thus referred to these events as a brutal massacre.89 It is evident that the Jacobites suffered a massive defeat at Culloden, and according to Pittock’s numbers, a huge amount of the Jacobite Army was eradicated during the battle or in its immediate aftermath. The Jacobite Army was thus considerably weakened and wounded, but between 900 and 1,500 Jacobites are said to have reached the rallying point at Ruthven Barracks south of Inverness on 18th April, two days after the battle.90 There are many different accounts relating what happened next, but several of them claim that the Jacobite soldiers still alive were ready to continue fighting. They were awaiting word from Charles Edward Stuart what their next move would be, but for reasons historians greatly disagree on, Prince Charles ended up fleeing the country. He went back into exile in France and the Jacobites were left without their figurehead. Some accounts relate that the Jacobites at Ruthven received a letter from Prince Charles telling them to disperse, others say they decided to do so because they were without a proper command, whereas a few accounts blame starvation, but one way or another, the Jacobites at Ruthven broke up, and many Jacobites elsewhere in Scotland surrendered. Some historians still assert that this was considered a temporary solution, until the Jacobites again would gather and rebel against the Government.91 To subdue the surviving Jacobites, as well as the Jacobite sentiment, thoughts and ideology, the Government went to harsh measures. British troops occupied the Highlands, leaving Scotland under ‘extensive military occupation’92, and a series of legislation was enacted to ‘root out disaffection in the Highlands, once and for all’.93 In June 1746 an Act of Attainder was passed, declaring forty-one leading Jacobites guilty of high treason. The Disarming Act of 1746 ‘banned the possession of weapons of any sort’94, The Act of Proscription of 1746 forbade the use of Highland dress, as well as outlawing bagpipes and the teaching of Gaelic, and the Heritable Jurisdictions Act of 1747 abolished the judicial powers exercised by landowners over their tenants. This last act was an attempt to break the claimed feudal power of Clan chiefs over their tenants in the Highlands, to avoid the Jacobite chiefs

89 Ibid., 99-104. 90 Ibid., 98-99. 91 Jacqueline Riding, Jacobites: A New History of the ’45 Rebellion (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 429-439; Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980), 260-261; Katherine Tomasson and Francis Buist, Battles of the ‘45 (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1962), 203-205; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 98. 92 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 108-114. Quote on p. 114. 93 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 193. 94 Ibid.

ever again being able to call out their clansmen in arms against the government. Since the Jacobite support was allegedly connected to religious affiliation, laws were enacted to weaken certain religious faiths. Penal laws had been enacted against Catholics long ago, and ‘punitive legislation designed to undermine the Episcopalian Church in Scotland’95 was now being ratified. As a result of the military occupation and all the new authorised legislation, Jacobites were killed, imprisoned, dispossessed, exiled, transported to the colonies and sold as bound labourers, or forced to join the British Army. Many Jacobite estates were annexed by the Crown, and according to Pittock, castle strongholds were left to rot.96 So, was this the end of the entire Jacobite conflict? Was this the end of the Jacobite movement in Scotland? Traditional Whig historians have regarded the Battle of Culloden in 1746 as such. Barthorp asserts that 1746 was the final collapse of the Jacobite cause, and Trevelyan writes: ‘…after the liquidation of the Jacobite and Highland questions in 1745- 1746, Scotland sprang forward along the path towards happier days’.97 Trevelyan thus clearly regards the Jacobite ‘problem’ as solved in 1746, and views this as a beneficial and happy solution for Scotland. Roberts also points out that the Scottish Episcopalian Church was crushed so effectively after Culloden by, among others, penal laws. According to him, the support among Episcopalian Scots had been vital for the Jacobite cause. Hence, the breakdown of the Scottish Episcopalian Church left little Episcopalian support for Jacobitism, thereupon contributing to the demise of the Jacobite movement in Scotland.98 The traditional Whig historians thus seem to maintain that the Jacobites never were a serious political threat to and influence on Scottish politics, and if the movement could be argued to possess a slight political importance, it definitely died down after Culloden. The failure of the last Jacobite rebellion at Culloden in 1746 has in itself been used by many Whig historians as evidence of Jacobitism’s political insignificance.99 Especially Whig historians of the 18th century have claimed that this ‘easy’ defeat of the Jacobites at Culloden proved the Scottish Jacobite movement’s lack of significance. Still, it is a paradox that the Hanoverian Government went to such measures and trouble to subdue the Jacobites, if the movement truly was regarded as no political threat.

95 Ibid., 194. 96 Ibid., 193-195; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 109-114; Geoffrey Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire, ed. Daniel K. Richter and Kathleen M. Brown, Early American Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 3. 97 Barthorp, The Jacobite Rebellions 1689-1745; Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria, 418. 98 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, xi. 99 Ibid.

25 The romantic historians more or less agree with the Whig historians on Culloden being the end of the Jacobite movement in Scotland. Macinnes agrees that the Battle of Culloden was the final defeat of the Jacobite forces, and that this signalled the end of the rebellion in Scotland.100 But contrary to many Whig historians, Macinnes views Culloden and the final defeat of the Jacobites as the beginning of a big political and social upheaval in Scotland. Instead of regarding the defeat at Culloden as evidence of Jacobitism’s lack of political significance, Macinnes recognises Culloden as proof of the exact opposite. For early romantic historians of the 18th and 19th centuries, Jacobitism was viewed as a romantic lost cause, doomed to fail, and with no serious political importance, but for many of today’s romantics, however, such as Macinnes, the Battle of Culloden and its aftermath demonstrates the significance of Jacobitism’s political influence on Scottish politics. In 1746, the Jacobites had arguably been a source of trouble for the Hanoverian regime for more than 50 years, and many revisionist historians assert that they still had potential to continue to be so, at least for as long as Charles Edward Stuart was alive. Even though the Battle of Culloden was fought in April, the Duke of Cumberland is said to have noted as late as in July that ‘I tremble for fear that this vile spot may still be the ruin of this island and our family’.101 Apparently, Cumberland continued to fear the Jacobites even after their defeat at Culloden. This clearly contradicts the Whig and romantic historians’ belief in Culloden being the ultimate end to the Scottish Jacobite movement. The revisionist historian Pittock writes that there was unrest and resistance throughout Scotland after Culloden, not just in the Gaelic-speaking north and west. This was due to the military occupation of the country and the enactment of legal acts designed to ‘punish’ and further integrate the Scots.102 The historian Christopher Whatley (1948-) asserts that ‘Scotland was not settled until the 1750s, and then only through the imposition of ‘systematic state terrorism’ was […] Jacobitism finally defeated’.103 Whatley thus highlights the 1750s as the ending point for the Scottish Jacobite movement rather than the Battle of Culloden in 1746. Doron Zimmermann (1970-) is also a historian who is more revisionist in his approach. The principal conclusion of his book The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, 1746-1759 (2003) is that the Jacobite movement persisted as a viable threat to the

100 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788, 160. 101 William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, quoted in Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 99. 102 Ibid., 115. 103 Christopher A. Whatley, "Order and Disorder," in A History of Everyday Life in Scotland, 1600 to 1800, ed. Elizabeth Foyster and Christopher A. Whatley, A History of Everyday Life in Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 191.

British state, and was perceived as such by its opponents, to 1759.104 Zimmermann is supported by the revisionists Henrietta Tayler and Pittock. The reason for 1759 being singled out as the year of Jacobitism’s demise, is to be found in the Seven Years War of 1756-63. The Scots had been allied with the French through the ‘Auld Alliance’ since 1295 and helped by them on numerous occasions during the Jacobite rebellions. In the Seven Years War on the other hand, the two allies were forced to fight each other. According to Pittock, Scots from Highland areas were recruited to the Canadian front and forced to fight for the British Army against their historical allies, who also had many Scottish soldiers in their ranks. As Pittock writes, it was a classic case of ‘set a thief to catch a thief’105, resulting in supporters of Jacobitism having to fight each other and consequently a deterioration of their mutual support for the Jacobite cause. Pittock therefore views the Seven Years War as the ‘culmination of the aftermath of Culloden’.106 Tayler agrees with this statement and asserts further that the French Government had continued their efforts to replace a Catholic sovereign on the British throne even after the Jacobite defeat at the Battle of Culloden. According to Tayler, the French were still plotting an invasion of England in the Seven Years War. All idea of an invasion was abandoned, however, when Admiral Edward Hawke of the British Royal Navy defeated a French fleet at Quiberon Bay, off the coast of France, in 1759. The French navy then ceased to exist for some time, and according to Tayler, this put the coup de grâce, the deathblow, to both the French efforts and the Jacobite cause.107 Zimmermann, Tayler and Pittock thus agree that the Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759 marks the final disintegration of the Jacobite movement.108 Accordingly, Henrietta Tayler claims that Jacobitism continued to be a political influence in Scottish politics after Culloden, but that after 1759, ‘Jacobitism as a militant factor soon passed away’.109 Still, she continues to assert that ‘sentimentally it persisted for nearly thirty years more until the death in Rome of the weary old man who had once been “Bonnie Prince Charlie”’.110 Charles Edward Stuart himself is said never to have given up

104 Doron Zimmermann, The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, 1746-1759, ed. J. C. D. Clark, Studies in Modern History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 105 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 116. 106 Ibid. 107 Tayler, Jacobite Epilogue: A Further Selection of Letters from Jacobites among the Stuart Papers at Windsor published by the Gracious Permission of His Majesty The King, ix. 108 Zimmermann, The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, 1746-1759, 1; Tayler, Jacobite Epilogue: A Further Selection of Letters from Jacobites among the Stuart Papers at Windsor published by the Gracious Permission of His Majesty The King, ix; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 116. 109 Tayler, Jacobite Epilogue: A Further Selection of Letters from Jacobites among the Stuart Papers at Windsor published by the Gracious Permission of His Majesty The King, ix. 110 Ibid., ix-x.

27 hope. According to Pittock, Prince Charles continued for many years after 1746 to struggle to obtain the support from Europe’s courts required to mount another rising. He still had some faithful adherents until the end of his life, and he continued to meet with active Jacobites, both in Britain and on the Continent. Pittock writes that France was still supporting Charles Edward Stuart, but that they were considering helping restore the Stuarts to the throne of Scotland alone. Charles on the other hand, would not accept this solution, because he desired the House of Stuart to be the head of the entire British state.111 Bonnie Prince Charlie never succeeded in launching another uprising in Scotland and he eventually died in 1788. His brother, Henry Benedict Stuart, apparently never tried to claim or seize the British throne and was thus not a significant political threat. He died in 1807. Many revisionists therefore view 1759 or 1788 as the end of the physical and military presence of the Scottish Jacobite movement, but not necessarily the end of its political and ideological influence. The National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh, which could be deemed the Scottish national narrative, also use 1788 as the ending point of the Jacobite era. In their Jacobite exhibition, the Jacobite era is defined as a period of approximately hundred years from James VII of Scotland (James II of England) was deposed in 1688-1689 to Charles Edward Stuart’s death in 1788. According to this exhibition, Jacobitism lived on after 1746, but quickly became politically irrelevant. The national narrative expresses that: ‘It [the final rising of 1745-46], too, failed and the Jacobite cause quickly became a political irrelevance. Equally quickly, the mythology surrounding it grew. By the time of Prince Charles’s death in 1788, the Jacobite challenge had become a romantic lost cause’.112 Even though the national narrative considers the Jacobite era to be longer than the Whig historians and early romantic historians traditionally do, with the end being 1788 instead of 1746, it still shows signs of the Whig and early romantic interpretation of the events. The national narrative expresses that Jacobitism quickly became politically irrelevant after 1746, similarly to Whig and 18th and 19th centuries romantic historiography. Today’s romantic historians and many revisionists on the other hand, assert that the Scottish Jacobite movement was of political significance even after 1746, and some argue for a political influence beyond 1759 and 1788 as well. The preceding discussion indicates that the historians’ views and opinions are many and diverse concerning the question of the collapse of the Jacobite movement in Scotland and the end of the movement’s political significance. Whatever the conception, I believe it is safe

111 Ibid., x; Pittock, Jacobitism, 123-124. 112 Quote and information from the Jacobite exhibition at the National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh, Scotland, which I visited January 2019.

to say that the character of the Scottish Jacobite movement changed after the Battle of Culloden in 1746. The Jacobite movement in Scotland could be claimed to still exist after 1746, but especially given the Government’s harsh reactions in the aftermath of Culloden, the movement definitely changed. Even though many revisionists assert that the Jacobites continued to be an important political force after Culloden – Jacobite ideas and ideology still being alive and well and gathering support – Scottish supporters of Jacobitism were largely driven underground and scattered. Many were exiled, dispossessed or transported to the colonies as bound labourers. In consequence, the Jacobite movement in Scotland became even more secretive and dispersed. However, the Jacobite diaspora can also be alleged to have spread the Jacobite thoughts and ideas even further internationally, and consequently contributed to an increase in international Jacobitism. It can thus be asserted that the Scottish Jacobite movement changed, but still continued to be politically important. Scottish Jacobites arguably remained a significant political force, but a considerable number of them did so outside of British borders. In retrospect, it is now known that there never was another Jacobite uprising after the ’45, and it is thus valid to question Jacobitism’s political significance after Culloden. One way or another, the Scottish Jacobite movement eventually died down. Nevertheless, some revisionist historians still assert that it had political consequences for years to come. They claim that the Jacobites’ direct political influence could be said to have ended at a certain point in time, but that the Jacobite thoughts, ideology, spirit and ideas lived on even after the Jacobite movement’s demise, influencing Scottish politics both directly and indirectly. Moreover, it is possible to claim that the Jacobites have influenced Scottish politics to this day. Arguably, Jacobitism could be said to be present in current Scottish politics in, for instance, the minor Scottish Jacobite Party (SJP) that was active between 2005 and 2011, which clearly tried to affiliate itself with Scotland’s Jacobite past. Some might also assert that Jacobite thoughts are evident in the policies of the Scottish National Party (SNP), Scotland’s largest political party today, and in the collective memory of the country in matters such as Scottish independence and Brexit. In this sense, Jacobitism could be stated to have persisted as an influential political force in Scotland to this day, but undeniably, the exact amount of political significance of a movement such as this, is impossible to measure.

29 2.4 Further consequences for Scottish politics

Many of Culloden’s political implications for Scotland have already been remarked upon and discussed in previous parts of this chapter. Nonetheless, some further consequences for Scottish politics also deserve attention. The Whig historians uphold that the battle had no political implications of significance. As Trevelyan clearly expresses it, Jacobitism was defeated; ergo it could not have won. This movement could thus only ever occupy the margins of history and was not a decisive influence on Scottish politics.113 Sir Charles Petrie (1895-1977) on the other hand, disagrees. Petrie was a Roman Catholic and his sympathetic closeness to the Jacobite subject is apparent in his work. He can therefore be considered a romantic historian. Petrie defines the Jacobites as a definite political movement and is supported by many revisionists in this.114 A number of academics within the romantic and revisionist history approach argue that the integration of Scotland into the Union of Great Britain was an evident consequence of the Battle of Culloden. When the Acts of Union were ratified in 1707, Scotland became part of a joint kingdom with England and Wales, and Scottish politics gradually changed substantially. Scotland lost its sovereignty and independence and went through a legal subjugation.115 The ancient Scottish Parliament at Edinburgh was lost, power was centralised in the British state, and the new Kingdom of Great Britain was thus to be administered and governed by the new British Parliament at Westminster in London.116 From 1703 to the Treaty of Union in 1707, there had been an enhanced presence of Jacobites in the Scottish Estates (i.e. the Scottish Parliament).117 When the Estates were brought into an incorporating Union with the English Parliament in 1707, and the Scottish Privy Council was dissolved, Scotland as a consequence no longer had its own governance and did not hold the sole authority to pass its own laws.118 This alteration in Scottish politics made it possible for the British state to enact laws such as the Disarming Act of 1746, the Act of Proscription of 1747, and the Heritable Jurisdictions Act of 1747 (as previously presented), to subdue and

113 George Macaulay Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne: Blenheim, 3 vols., vol. 1, England under Queen Anne (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1930); England under Queen Anne: The Peace and the Protestant Succession, 3 vols., vol. 3, England under Queen Anne (London: Longman, Green and Company, 1946). 114 Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1959). 115 Allan I. Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3. 116 Linda Colley, Acts of Union and Disunion: What has held the UK together - and what is dividing it? (London: Profile Books, 2014), 89; Pittock, Jacobitism, 1-2. 117 Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707, 243-244. 118 Pittock, Jacobitism, 1-2.

further integrate the Scots after the Battle of Culloden.119 But were these political changes implications of Culloden? Were they not really consequences of the 1707 Acts of Union? Traditional Whig historiography contends that there was no connection between Culloden and these changes in politics in Scotland. They assert that these consequences were implications of the 1707 Acts of Union alone and could by no means be traced to Culloden. Culloden was more or less negligible for successive political development in Scotland. Contrarily, the romantics and revisionists claim differently. These historians argue that even though this process began in 1707, Culloden was a catalytic factor. The Jacobites posed a grave political threat to the Union, being ‘the last domestic contestation of the Union state’120, and according to Pittock, the battle of Culloden thus ‘ended the last armed conflict in which the nature of Britain – and indeed its existence – were at stake’.121 Consequently, when the Jacobite challenge arguably was crushed at Culloden, this accelerated the integration of Scotland into the Union of Great Britain. Alternatively, if the Jacobites had been victorious at Culloden in 1746, the tale could have been quite different. Many romantic and revisionist historians believe that these political changes then might have been reversed or changed completely. In their eyes, Culloden made the continued political development in Scotland in the direction of the British Union possible. According to these historians, the Battle of Culloden thus marks the final loss of Scotland’s sovereignty and independence, subsequent subjugation by the British Parliament, and the consolidation of the Union of 1707. Hence, the romantics and revisionists of this opinion assert that these political implications for Scotland hinge as much on 1746 as on 1707. Many romantic and revisionist historians have received criticism for statements like these, the reason being the counterfactual nature of their arguments. Other historians have criticised them of relying too much on historical ‘what-ifs’. Instead of focusing on the events that actually took place and determining their significance based on empirical and quantifiable evidence and facts, some romantics and revisionists are being blamed of giving ‘what could have happened, if history had turned out differently’, too much emphasis. Daniel Szechi (1956-), who can be considered a revisionist historian, states that ‘Jacobitism is a fertile source of some of the great ‘what-ifs’ of British history’.122 Among these ‘what-ifs’, is the continuously asked question: What if the Battle of Culloden had been fought at another

119 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 193-195; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 109-114. 120 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 2. 121 Ibid., 158. 122 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 1.

31 location? Many historians repeatedly assert that there was a possibility that the Jacobites would have defeated Cumberland and his army if the battle had ensued on the 17th April, instead of the 16th, and on the chosen field of Lord George Murray, one of the senior commanders of the Jacobite Army. These historians claim that, in this alternative scenario, it is likely that the outcome of the battle would have been different, and that the Jacobites would have been the victors.123 Scottish politics would then most likely have evolved in a different direction, leading to an outcome where Scotland had more autonomy, either within a reformed Union of Great Britain or as an independent country. However, this is not what happened in real life, and one does not actually know if a Jacobite victory at Culloden would have meant a final resolution of the Jacobite conflict and a Stuart back on the throne. With all probability, more battles and conflicts would have followed, where the outcome would have been uncertain. Szechi regards these ‘what-ifs’ as instructive.124 But how valid are such counterfactual arguments and statements? One implication of Culloden for Scottish politics that historians probably find it easier to agree on, no matter their perception of the Jacobite conflict, is Scotland’s shift in political orientation. The Scottish Reformation introduced the possibility of forming new political alignments based on Protestantism rather than Catholicism.125 Historically, Scotland had to a great extent been orientated politically towards France due to the ‘Auld Alliance’ of 1295 and the countries’ Catholic bond. The Reformation in Scotland in the 1500s, however, as well as the Union of 1707, the claimed consolidation of this union after the Jacobite defeat in 1746, and consequently the strengthening of the Protestant Hanoverian rule, could be asserted to have changed Scotland’s political orientation from France to England to a certain degree.

2.5 Chapter conclusion

In sum, the discussion in this chapter has demonstrated that the traditional Whig historians more or less limit the Scottish Jacobite movement entirely to the clansmen in the Highlands, and consequently view Jacobitism as a small and politically insignificant movement. According to these historians, Jacobitism had few supporters in Scotland, and those rebellious Jacobite Highlanders that did exist, were stopped effectively at the Battle of Culloden in 1746. Jacobitism was thus a negligible influence on Scottish affairs and barely

123 Black, Culloden and the '45, 167. 124 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 1. 125 Pittock, Jacobitism, 1.

impacted the consecutive political development in Scotland after Culloden. The romantic historians similarly assert that the main core of the Scottish Jacobite movement was situated in the Highlands, and that Scottish Jacobitism was more or less eliminated at Culloden in 1746, but these academics do not see these claims as valid arguments for the movement’s political insignificance. On the contrary, many romantics consider Jacobitism to have had major political implications for Scotland. The revisionists, however, regard the Scottish Jacobite movement as a great political force widespread in the entire country. They believe there were Jacobites in all parts of Scotland and within all levels of Scottish society, both among the lower and the upper classes, and in consequence, Jacobitism had considerable political influence on Scottish affairs. Many revisionists further uphold that Scottish Jacobitism continued to be an important political factor also after Culloden, at least until 1759, 1788, or even later. The revisionist historians therefore argue that the Scottish Jacobite movement posed a much more substantial and more persistent political threat to Scottish politics than Whig historians believe. Due to the romantic and revisionist historians’ conception of Scottish Jacobitism as a movement of greater political significance, they also allege that the Battle of Culloden in 1746 led to many political implications for Scotland. For instance, Culloden is claimed to have resulted in an eradication of much of the Jacobite Army, an extensive military occupation of Scotland, and the enactment of a series of legal acts to punish and integrate the Jacobites still alive and to prevent Jacobitism from spreading further. Additionally, these historians assert that Jacobitism endangered the political stability in Scotland, and that Culloden resulted in the final loss of Scotland’s sovereignty and independence, subsequent subjugation by the British Parliament, faster integration of Scotland into the Union of 1707, and a successive consolidation of this union. Many historians also acknowledge that Scotland’s partial shift in political orientation from France to England could be deemed a political implication of Culloden. Whether or not the Battle of Culloden in 1746 had major political implications for Scotland, depends on how the events are interpreted and what factors are emphasised. The Whig historians are being criticised for downplaying Jacobitism’s political influence immoderately, while the romantics and revisionists are being accused of relying too much on counterfactual arguments. Nevertheless, it seems credible to claim that the Jacobite movement did impact Scottish politics, but the exact political implications are hard to determine.

33 3 Political implications for the British Isles

3.1 Chapter introduction

One of the major disputes in the field of Jacobite studies, is the impact Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 had on the Union of Great Britain. Arguably, the political stability in the British Isles was endangered and the entire British state was at stake. Some historians even claim that the consolidation of the Hanoverian rule, the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the creation and development of the British Empire, and consequently the establishment of Britain as a global power, can be argued to hinge on Culloden. This chapter will thus address the political implications of the Battle of Culloden for the British Isles. What were the ramifications of Culloden for British politics? Do historians conceive this battle as politically significant in a British context? Firstly, historians’ opinions on the prevalence of Jacobitism in the British Isles in the period 1688 to 1746 will be discussed. Was Jacobitism only limited to Scotland, or did the Jacobite movement have supporters elsewhere in the British Isles as well? This might help establish the extent of Jacobitism’s influence on British political affairs. Afterwards, the prevalence of Jacobitism in Ireland, Wales and England after the Battle of Culloden in 1746 will be deliberated on. If the historians reckon that the Jacobite movement was extended to Ireland, Wales and England, what happened to the Jacobites in these countries after 1746? Lastly, further political consequences of Culloden for the Union of Great Britain and the British state, not yet addressed in the two prior parts, will be examined. Ireland did not become part of the United Kingdom before in 1801 but is still included in the discussions in the two initial parts of this chapter. This is due to Irish Jacobitism being asserted to also have affected the Union of Great Britain and the British state politically, even though Ireland was not part of the British state at this stage. 3.2 and 3.3 will thus address the prevalence of Jacobitism in the entire British Isles, including Ireland. 3.4, the last part before the chapter conclusion, however, will only discuss political consequences of Culloden for the Union of 1707 and the British state, which accordingly excludes Ireland from the debate.

3.2 Prevalence of Jacobitism in the British Isles 1688- 1746

Even though there is a huge debate on the extent of Jacobitism, its persistence and thus the seriousness of the threat it posed, the Jacobites have to a certain degree been recognised as a political threat to the Anglo-Scottish Union by more or less all historians on Jacobitism. Nevertheless, historians within the Whig approach still claim that the threat was not severe. The Jacobite movement was, according to traditional Whig historians, chiefly centred on Scotland, possibly also Ireland and Wales, but either way, the movement was only limited to the Celtic fringes. The threat was therefore marginal, and by no means a threat the English could not overcome, according to Whig belief.126 The romantic historians vary in their opinions on this matter. Some romantics, such as Macinnes, regard the Jacobite movement as a considerable influence on British politics, while other historians of the romantic conception, consider Jacobitism as a less important political factor in a British context.127 The revisionists on the other hand, disagree substantially with the Whig historians. The historian Jeremy Black (1955-), who arguably belongs to the revisionist approach, goes as far as to characterise the uprising in 1745-46 as ‘the most serious crisis to affect the eighteenth- century British state’.128 Pittock also describes the Battle of Culloden as ‘the birthplace of Britain’129 and writes that ‘Jacobitism was […] far more than a dynastic squabble: it was regarded by its contemporaries as a major military, political and religious threat to the existence of the state itself’.130 These revisionist historians thus view Jacobitism as a more substantial political threat to the British state than the Whig historians do, and argue that Culloden was a battle of great importance for British politics. The revisionists agree with the Whig historians on the topic of Irish and Welsh Jacobites. But whereas historians of the Whig belief merely tend to acknowledge that Jacobitism also had some supporters in Ireland and Wales, the revisionists recognise the presence of a considerable number of Jacobites in these two countries. However, Welsh Jacobitism have generally received limited attention in scholarly debate and will accordingly not be discussed in detail in the following. Irish Jacobitism on the other hand, has experienced an increase in attention and research in later years. Recent revisionist studies

126 Barthorp, The Jacobite Rebellions 1689-1745, 16; Pittock, Jacobitism, 7. 127 Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707, 243-250. 128 Black, Culloden and the '45, xiii. 129 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 140. 130 Pittock, Jacobitism, 2.

35 have shown that the element of Irish Jacobitism was more extensive than originally thought, and a number of romantic historians also accede to this. Romantic and revisionist historians assert that the Irish Jacobites were especially important in the first Jacobite Rising of 1689. During this rebellion, Ireland was the primary location of Jacobite military operations. In March 1689, James VII (James II of England) landed in Ireland to fight William of Orange. A series of conflicts, sieges and battles followed, where ‘tens of thousands of men’131 were involved, eventually culminating in the Battle of Boyne in July 1690. The Jacobite Army in Ireland lost the battle, but it took a large and efficient army under William of Orange, to do so. The Battle of Boyne is thus considered the end of the first Jacobite Rising, even though hostilities continued until the Treaty of Limerick in 1692. After the Battle of Boyne, the so-called ‘Flight of the Wild Geese’ ensued. This ‘flight’ was a wave of approximately 10,000-11,000 Irish Jacobites, who had been serving James VII in the Irish troops, going abroad into exile after 1690. Roberts, whom on the topic of Irish Jacobitism could be considered more a revisionist, writes that these Irish exiles included the descendants of what remained of the Catholic gentry in Ireland. Many of these exiles subsequently formed the Irish Brigade of the French army or went into the military service of Spain. Back in Ireland, the remaining Catholics were excluded from power and penal laws were enacted on their expense. As a consequence, the Catholic gentry was more or less rooted out, according to Roberts, and the Protestant Ascendancy was left dominant in Irish affairs.132 This development in Ireland could be seen as an implication of Jacobitism, but it was also part of a longer period of religious conflicts. Whereas the Whig historians might acknowledge the presence of Irish Jacobitism, romantic and revisionist historians to a greater extent regard the Irish Jacobite movement as an important element in British politics. Between 1688 and 1690, romantics and revisionists consider the Irish Jacobites as an important political force within the British Isles. After the Battle of Boyne in 1690 and the ‘Flight of the Wild Geese’ however, the revisionists perceive that ‘the exodus of Catholic gentry continued for decades and Jacobitism went into almost total eclipse in Ireland’.133 In one respect, the Battle of Boyne could hence be deemed

131 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 15. 132 Frank McLynn, The Jacobites (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 12-20; Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707, 244-245; Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 2-3; Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac, "The Irish Jacobite Regiments and the French Army: A Way to Integration," in Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad, ed. Paul Monod, Murray Pittock, and Daniel Szechi, Studies in Modern History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 206- 228; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 15-16. 133 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 3.

Ireland’s equivalent to Culloden. In spite of most Irish Jacobites leaving Ireland after 1690, revisionists still claim that the Irish Jacobite movement continued to play an important role abroad. Roberts asserts that ‘along with other exiles from England and, more especially, from Scotland, they [the Irish exiles] were the backbone of Jacobite support on the Continent for more than fifty years’.134 Contrarily to the Whig historians, revisionist historians and some romantic historians thus state that the Irish Jacobites were a significant factor in both British politics and the general Jacobite movement, both before and after the Battle of Boyne in 1690. Peter Harrington (1954-), a historian who arguably belongs to the revisionist approach, claims that there were Irish contingents in the Jacobite Army at Culloden in 1746.135 Ergo, he ascribes political significance to Irish Jacobitism as late as 1746, in accordance with many other revisionists. Although revisionists tend to regard Irish Jacobitism as an important factor in British political life in the period 1688-1746, the presence of an extensive English Jacobitism has been their crucial assertion in the scholarly debate. One of the main revisionist arguments for the political significance of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden, is that Jacobitism was much more widespread in England than traditional Whig historians believe. Pittock claims that there were Scottish, Irish, Welsh and English Jacobites.136 This claim is based on the position presented by the early revisionist historian Eveline Cruickshanks (1926-) in her book Political Untouchables: The Tories and the ’45 (1979). In her work, Cruickshanks contradicts the historical consensus on the condition of the Tory Party in the period 1715- 1760. The Tory Party, which historically supported James VII’s claim to the British throne, had traditionally been thought to have disappeared from the political scene in Britain after Queen Anne, the last reigning Stuart monarch, died in 1714. The reason for this, was arguably that a purge of Tories was carried out after Queen Anne’s death. In 1715, a complete proscription of Tories followed, excluding all Tories from political positions and offices in society. This proscription is said to have lasted until 1760, and the consensus amongst historians was thus traditionally that the Tory Party was non-existing between 1715 and 1760.137 This belief was challenged in 1979, when Cruickshanks in Political Untouchables argued that the Tory Party survived Queen Anne’s death in 1714 and was thereafter primarily a Jacobite party working to restore the House of Stuart with the means of

134 Ibid. 135 Peter Harrington, Culloden 1746: The Highland Clans’ Last Charge, ed. David G. Chandler, Campaign Series (London: Osprey Military, 1991), 40-43. 136 Pittock, Jacobitism, 2. 137 Eveline Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45 (London: Duckworth, 1979), 1-16.

37 an uprising with foreign assistance.138 She also claimed that the Tory Party not necessarily was Jacobite originally, but that the proscription more or less forced its members to embrace Jacobitism.139 Cruickshanks’ view was considered controversial when her book was first published in 1979, and to some extent still is, as many historians do not believe in ‘the effective survival of the Tories as a coherent party in the period after 1715’.140 The romantic historians are not particularly pronounced in this debate, but some of the current moderate Whig historians have entered the discussion. One of these historians, Linda Colley (1949-), expresses in her book In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-60 (1982) that she agrees with Cruickshanks on the presence of a continuing Tory Party in the period 1714- 1760, but not its Jacobitism.141 Many current revisionists, however, adhere with Cruickshanks’ argument and are thus of the opinion that a continuing Tory Party survived and did include an element of Jacobitism, albeit the extent of this Jacobite element is being disputed.142 The Tory Party that Cruickshanks argues for, was mainly an English political party. This suggests that if her research is correct, Jacobitism would also have had a strong standing in England, not just in the Celtic countries. The Whig historian Barthorp does not agree with this statement. He does admit that ‘there were many influential people in England with Jacobite sympathies’143, but according to Barthorp, few of these Englishmen ‘were prepared to hazard their positions’144, and in consequence, he does not view them as a serious political threat. Sir Charles Petrie, the romantic historian, is on accord with Barthorp on this. In The Jacobite Movement (1959) Petrie writes that many of the English clergy were Jacobites. He continues to assert that the English Jacobite movement thus became religious rather than political and that it was more or less politically insignificant.145 Despite these claims from Whig and romantic historians, Cruickshanks does receive support from many revisionists. Besides her research on the English Tory Party and its Jacobitism in the period 1714-1760, other revisionist studies of state and diplomatic archives, particularly on the Continent, and social history studies done from ‘below’, also uncover significant new evidence of a

138 Ibid. 139 Ibid., 6. 140 Pittock, Jacobitism, 6-7. 141 Linda Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-60 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 142 Pittock, Jacobitism, 7. 143 Barthorp, The Jacobite Rebellions 1689-1745, 16. 144 Ibid. 145 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 79.

substantial activity among English Jacobites.146 For instance, Paul Monod’s (1957-) study of the social history of English Jacobitism, as presented in Jacobitism and the English people, 1688-1788 (1989), to a great extent reveals a lot of popular support and acceptance for the Jacobite cause and its ideology at all levels of English society.147 Accordingly, revisionists ascertain that English Jacobitism was of a much stronger and considerable character than many of the Whig and romantic historians assume, and that its presence posed a severe political threat to the British state. Despite this claim for the existence of a significant Jacobite movement in England, Dana Huntley writes that the English Jacobites that had been predicted to help in the Jacobite attack on England in 1745, failed to materialise.148 Why was that? Were the English Jacobites only supporters in secret? Were they then a real political threat if they did not make themselves known or assist the other British Jacobites with military support? The Whig historian Charles Chenevix Trench (1914-2003) writes in George II (1973) that: ‘English Jacobites, willing enough to drink to ‘the King over the Water’, would not risk their necks for him, especially when his son arrived in command of a savage Highland horde, as alien to decent country squires as a war party of Iroquois’.149 Trench is thus of the opinion that the few existing English Jacobites only were supporters in secret and not really willing to actively fight for the Jacobite cause. Hence, English Jacobitism was not a military or political threat. The revisionists Szechi and Cruickshanks believe Trench’s assertions to be untrue. They uphold that the English Jacobites were willing to join the Jacobite Army in England in 1745, but that they were afraid of ending up on the wrong side of a civil war. According to Cruickshanks, the penalty for being caught on the wrong side was severe, and the English Jacobite movement was thus waiting for the Prince to descend on London and the French invasion to arrive, before they would partake in the strife. She continues to assert that when the Jacobite Army and the French eventually would come, the Tories were certainly ready to rise in support of Bonnie Prince Charlie.150 According to Szechi, ‘they came within a whisker of doing so’151, but as Charles Edward turned north at Derby and went back to Scotland, they never got the chance. The revisionist historian Frank McLynn (1941-) also points out that

146 Pittock, Jacobitism, 7. 147 Paul Kléber Monod, Jacobitism and the English people, 1688-1788 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 148 Dana Huntley, "Jacobite Dreams and the Uprising of ’45: Britain’s last romantic rebellion ends the Highland way of life," British Heritage 37, no. 3 (2016): 40. 149 Charles Chenevix Trench, George II (London: Allen Lane, 1973), 234. 150 Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45, 88-91. 151 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 3.

39 ‘the principal reason for their [the English Jacobites] failure to ‘come out’ was a lack of officers to lead their men’152, in combination with Charles Edward Stuart’s incapability to establish contact with the Jacobites in England, - not a lack of support.153 Even though the English Jacobites did not materialise during the Jacobite attack on England in 1745, the existence of English Jacobitism, and possibly also a growth in this English Jacobite movement in secret, could still pose a potential threat of a military attack by English Jacobites of a sizable and crucial character at a later stage. The revisionist Pittock also maintains that although English Jacobites were not very active in Jacobite military operations, their existence would entail the presence of Jacobite visions and ideology far closer to the political centre in England than Whig historians claim.154 Hence, the Jacobite movement had a more ample support in Britain in general than originally presumed, even among politicians, which Black and other agreeing revisionists assert that clearly indicates that Jacobite activity culminated in a great and serious political and military threat to the very existence of Hanoverian Britain.155 The discussion on the preceding pages have shown that revisionist historians tend to emphasise the presence of a considerable number of Jacobites in Ireland, Wales and England, as well as in Scotland. The romantic historians vary in their opinions on this matter, while Whig historians seem to downplay the importance of Jacobitism elsewhere than Scotland, even though they might acknowledge its existence to some extent. The Whig historian Colley’s statement in Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (2012) sums up the Whig historians’ view pretty well: ‘only […] a handful of Welshmen and some 300 Englishmen rallied to the Young Pretender’.156 Revisionists on the other hand, particularly stress the significance of English Jacobitism. Whig historians are often criticised for minimising the importance of the English Jacobite movement because they generally study the Jacobite events from ‘above’, from a political point of view. There is evidence that English Jacobites were terrified of being viewed as traitors and enemies of the state, and in consequence, they took great care in destroying their documents and papers. Political and personal records on English Jacobitism are thus scarce, at least in England.157 Accordingly, it is not much proof to

152 Frank McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England, 1745: The Final Campaign (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983), 13. 153 Ibid., 13-15. 154 Pittock, Jacobitism, 7; Great Battles: Culloden, 3. 155 Black, Culloden and the '45. 156 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 81. 157 Pittock, Jacobitism, 7.

find of the English Jacobite movement’s existence in the primary material that many Whig historians study, and they therefore dismiss English Jacobitism as irrelevant. The more recent moderate Whig historian Paul Langford (1945-2015) writes that ‘there is a great mass of ‘evidence’’158 in the Stuart papers supporting a widespread Jacobite conspiracy in England, but he writes this mockingly. He regards this ‘evidence’ as highly unreliable, not proving any of the sort.159 Recent revisionist historians, however, have studied the English Jacobite movement more from ‘below’, from a social point of view, and have discovered ground for an extensive element of English Jacobitism. Consequently, revisionists view Jacobitism as a much more comprehensive movement, with representatives all over the British Isles – also close to the British political centre, and thus regard the Jacobites as both a pivotal political influence and threat to the British state.

3.3 What happened to the Jacobite movement in Ireland, Wales and England after the Battle of Culloden in 1746?

Traditional Whig historians do not consider the possible Jacobite movement in Ireland, Wales and England as politically relevant, and are thus not interested in what happened to these Jacobites after Culloden. The revisionists, and some romantic historians, on the other hand, have devoted attention and research to Jacobitism in these countries after 1746. What happened to the Irish, Welsh and English Jacobites after the Battle of Culloden? Was 1746 the end of the Jacobite movement in these countries, or did Jacobitism survive as a significant political influence in the British Isles also after Culloden? Arguably, Irish and Welsh Jacobitism was not substantially affected by Culloden. The support in Wales was still evident, and many of the Irish Jacobites on the Continent had not been directly involved in the battle and were therefore still active. The Battle of Culloden in 1746 was of course a setback for the Jacobite movement as a whole, but nonetheless, Irish and Welsh Jacobitism did not die down right away, and many of these Jacobites were hoping and believing that the movement would recover. As the romantic historian Petrie writes: ‘The failure of The Forty-Five marked the end of Jacobitism as a factor in the political life of Great

158 Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783, ed. J. M. Roberts, The New Oxford History of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 200. 159 Ibid., 200-201.

41 Britain, but it by no means terminated the Movement itself, though it changed its character and drove it underground’.160 Whether or not Jacobitism actually ceased to exist as a factor in British politics in 1746, is highly disputed, but Petrie also asserts that the movement itself was not terminated. It thus lived on in both Ireland and Wales, even though it eventually weakened. In Ireland, the penal laws greatly affecting the Catholics in the country ‘were no longer enforced with their old rigour’161 after 1746, according to Petrie, and consequently, the resistance among Irish Jacobites, both in Ireland and on the Continent, lessened. Many revisionists claim that there were English Jacobites fighting for the Jacobite Army at Culloden in 1746, but similarly to Irish and Welsh Jacobitism, the English Jacobite movement as a whole was not heavily affected by the battle. The English Jacobites were thus still active after 1746. Pittock writes that Charles Edward Stuart met with fifty English Jacobites in London as late as 1750. In the wake of this meeting, a new plan was made for an attempt to overthrow the House of Hanover. This has been called the Elibank Plot, and its aim was to kidnap George II as part of a coup d’état. The coup was to be carried out by English Jacobites and Bonnie Prince Charlie, assisted by Prussian, Swedish and French forces. Their plans were betrayed by Young Glengarry (‘Pickle the Spy’), however, and the Elibank Plot was thus abandoned in 1753. Both the revisionist Pittock and the romantic Petrie therefore regard the abandonment of the Elibank Plot as the end to English Jacobitism – the movement clearly declining after this.162 According to Petrie, the Elibank Plot was ‘the last definite scheme to restore the Stuarts to the throne of Great Britain by means of a movement within the country itself’.163 Nevertheless, the English Jacobite movement did not cease to exist entirely. Pittock writes that Jacobite papers were still produced and distributed in England into the 1750s, and Petrie adds that individual Jacobites continued to exist in all three kingdoms after 1753, leading to an ‘occasional stirring of dry bones’.164 The early revisionist historian Cruickshanks regards the end to active English Jacobitism to be a few years later than Pittock and Petrie. Instead of 1753, she argues for 1760 being the year of English Jacobitism’s demise. Her assertion that the English Tory Party survived in the period 1715-1760, and was primarily a Jacobite party, suggests that the Jacobite threat in England also persisted after the Battle of Culloden. Cruickshanks thus claims that many of the Tories continued their Jacobite activity after 1746, but ultimately,

160 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 413. 161 Ibid., 415. 162 Ibid., 415-432; Pittock, Jacobitism, 123-124. 163 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 431. 164 Ibid., 432; Pittock, Jacobitism, 124.

‘the accession of George III completed the task of national reconciliation’.165 When George III became King of Great Britain in 1760, the proscription of the Tories was lifted, and according to Cruickshanks, the Tories’ discontent with Britain’s government died down. As Cruickshanks largely perceive English Jacobitism in connection with English Toryism, she hence asserts that English Jacobitism also dwindled after 1760.166 Nonetheless, the English Tory Party still lived on after 1760, and it is thus possible to argue that so did an incorporated Jacobite element, although this element was less pronounced after the end of the proscription. All in all, Whig historians do not consider Irish, Welsh and English Jacobitism as an important political influence on British politics, neither before nor after the Battle of Culloden in 1746, whereas many of the romantic and revisionist historians are of a contradicting opinion. These last-mentioned academics consider the Jacobite movement in Ireland, Wales and England to have persisted as a significant political impact at least until the abandonment of the Elibank Plot in 1753 or the end of the proscription of the Tories in England in 1760. Some revisionists, such as Szechi, even claim that Jacobitism in Ireland, Wales and England was of political importance until the death of Henry ‘IX’, Charles Edward Stuart’s brother, in 1807.167 According to Szechi, Jacobitism had up to this point been ‘the mortal enemy of the prevailing political order in the British Isles’168 for nearly seventy years. Since the revisionists assert that such a high number of Jacobites still existed in Ireland, Wales and England after the Battle of Culloden in 1746, they claim that Jacobitism still posed a political threat to the British state. Many revisionists consider it likely that the Jacobite movement could have recovered after Culloden in 1746 and rebelled anew, potentially shaking the grounds of British politics yet again, but as history has demonstrated, this was not, in the end, the case.

3.4 Further political consequences for the Union of Great Britain and the British state

The preceding discussion in the two prior parts of this chapter has demonstrated that there is particularly one major political implication of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden that is highly debated and disputed in the Jacobite historiography, namely the impact this movement

165 Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45, 113. 166 Ibid. 167 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 136. 168 Ibid.

43 had on the Union of Great Britain. The traditional Whig interpretation of the Jacobite conflict is either that it was a Scottish civil war with Highlanders pitched against Lowlanders, or a civil war between England and Scotland.169 The latter is the most common Whig assumption, thus viewing the Jacobite conflict as a strife within the union. Accordingly, Whig historians claim that the Jacobites’ aim after 1707 generally was to regain Scotland’s independence and reverse the outcome of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. These academics state that the Revolution of 1688 had safeguarded the nation’s greatness by terminating the Catholic threat, protecting the ‘Ancient Constitution’ and establishing hegemony over the Celts in the British Isles. Following from this, traditional Whig historians assert that the Jacobites worked to overthrow this settlement, did not want a centralised state, were against the Union of 1707, and were accordingly enemies of the British state and the British Empire. The traditional Whig conception is thus that the Jacobite conflict was a civil war between England and Scotland, where Scotland, represented by the Jacobites, wanted to leave the Union, no matter the cost.170 Many of the Whig historians are Unionists. They are thence very positive to the Union of Great Britain and believe that this was the best solution for both England and Scotland. Whig historians, such as Trevelyan, thus assert that Scotland was saved by England when England defeated the Jacobite movement. Trevelyan writes that Scotland was a poor country in terrible conditions, but that after the Acts of Union in 1707 and ‘the liquidation of the Jacobite and Highland questions in 1745-1746, Scotland sprang forward along the path towards happier days’.171 Accordingly, he claims that England did Scotland a favour by defeating Jacobitism, paving the way for a modern and prosperous country and consequently Scotland’s ‘golden age’.172 Even though traditional Whig historians generally tend not to grant Jacobitism any political significance, they still seem to regard the Jacobite events as an attempt at regaining Scottish independence. As Roberts writes, the ’45 ‘took on all the trappings of a national crusade to restore Scotland’s independence’.173 Hence, despite traditional Whig historians claiming that Jacobitism was not a severe threat to the Union of 1707, the defeat of this attempt at independence, resulting in a consolidation of the Union of Great Britain and an alleged subsequent ‘golden age’ in Scotland, could be deemed political

169 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783, 199; Pollard, "Introduction: The Battle of Culloden - More than a Difference of Opinion," 13-14. 170 Pittock, Jacobitism, 3-4; Great Battles: Culloden, 131 & 136. 171 Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria, 418. 172 Ibid., 419. 173 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, xi.

implications of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 for the British state, even from a Whig perspective. Many of the romantic historians agree with the Whig historians on the independence aspect of the Jacobite conflict. They also perceive the Jacobite events as a civil war between England and Scotland, and thus view the conflict as a fight for Scottish independence. But whereas the Whig historians largely are Unionists, many of the romantic historians are Scottish Nationalists. The romantics are thus to a large extent negative to the Union of 1707 and the consequences it entailed for Scotland. They therefore regard the defeat of Jacobitism, and the consequent consolidation of the Union of Great Britain and final loss of Scottish independence, as negative political implications of Culloden. The revisionist historians are usually neither Unionists nor Nationalists. They do not perceive the Jacobite conflict as a civil war either, but rather frame the events within a wider context of British and international politics.174 This international aspect of the Jacobite conflict will be explored further in chapter four. Interestingly, even though many revisionists consider Jacobitism as the last domestic contestation of the Union state, not all of these historians see the Jacobite rebellions as a fight for Scottish independence. They agree that the Jacobite conflict did comprise elements of struggle for independence in Scotland, but they do not view Jacobitism as solely a dispute over Scottish independence. According to Pittock, the regular Jacobite wanted the House of Stuart to be reinstated as monarchs in all three kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland, in a looser union where Scotland had more autonomy.175 According to this interpretation, the Jacobites were thus not wanting Scotland to leave the Union of Great Britain entirely, but they rather desired to reform the union and change its terms. However, there is disagreement about this, even amongst revisionists. The revisionist Stuart Reid writes: ‘Otherwise [than a genuine enthusiasm for the Jacobite cause or a strong objection to the present government], the single most important reason motivating the volunteers seems to have been a widespread desire to re-establish Scotland’s independence.’176 What seems to be certain, no matter historiographical affiliation, is that the Union of Great Britain was under political pressure and in a vulnerable position in the Jacobite era. Whether or not the Jacobites wanted total liberation from the Union of 1707 or merely to

174 Trevor Royle, Culloden: Scotland’s Last Battle and the Forging of the British Empire (London: Abacus, 2017), viii-xi. 175 Pittock, Jacobitism, 2; Great Battles: Culloden, 2-3. 176 Stuart Reid, "The Jacobite Army at Culloden," in Culloden: The History and Archaeology of the Last Clan Battle, ed. Tony Pollard (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 49.

45 reform its conditions, is hard to establish in hindsight, but whatever the case, I think it is safe to say that Jacobitism exerted pressure on the 1707 Act of Union, and that the union’s future to some extent can be asserted to have been determined in the fatal hour on Culloden Moor. Most historians will probably also acknowledge that Culloden was, until recently, the last domestic threat to the 1707 Act of Union, the last battle fought on British soil, and the last armed conflict where the existence of the British state was at stake.177 Another political implication of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden for the British state, is the dynastic aspect. Arguably the Battle of Culloden in 1746 consolidated the position of the House of Hanover as Britain’s ruling dynasty. From the ‘Glorious Revolution’ in 1688, when James II and VII was replaced by Mary II and William of Orange, and until 1746, there was a continuous dynastic struggle in Britain between the House of Hanover and the House of Stuart. Even though this dynastic conflict could be said to have continued at least until the death of Henry Benedict Stuart in 1807, Culloden might be deemed the beginning of the end of the House of Stuart’s contending claim to the British throne. The Whig historians do not recognise Jacobitism as important in a dynastic context. They do not consider the House of Hanover as seriously threatened in this period and claim that the Jacobite movement did not have adequate support and political influence to impact the dynastic settlement. In George II, the Whig historian Trench, paints a picture of a monarch who is not particularly concerned. He portrays George II as a calm and collected sovereign, who is actually absent much of the time during the Jacobite rebellion of 1745’s escalation. Trench claims that George II did not regard his dynastic position as challenged, not even when the Jacobites approached London in 1745.178 Trench writes that the Jacobites were ‘no longer a danger to the dynasty’.179 Other Whig historians generally tend to believe that this dynastic struggle was anachronistic to the time. As these historians believe in a stadial history theory where development progresses through predestined stages, some of them claim that it was a strange, unobtainable and backward project to fight for dynasties at a time when Britain was predetermined to progress towards parliamentarism.180 Absolutism, which Whig academics claim the Jacobites were fighting for, was, according to these academics, an outdated form of monarchy. This is in accordance with the contemporary Enlightenment ideas of the 18th

177 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 158. 178 Trench, George II, 232-234. 179 Ibid., 236. 180 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 2.

century, when there was an increased opposition among people towards the absolute monarchy. Whig historians assert that after the ‘Bill of Rights’ was enacted in 1689, which outlined basic civil rights, the rights of Parliament, and limited the powers of the monarch, Britain moved in the direction of Parliamentary sovereignty.181 This process, in which ‘England, and subsequently the other kingdoms of the British Isles steadily, nigh inexorably progressed towards the constitutional, Parliamentary democracy of the present day’182, had already begun long before the Jacobites entered the political scene. This development was thus only a process that the Jacobites were part of, not a development they could influence or change, according to Whig historians. Nevertheless, many revisionists consider Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden as a significant political influence in a dynastic context. The revisionist Trevor Royle (1945-) asserts that Culloden changed the course of British history by ending all hope of the Stuarts reclaiming the throne and cementing the Hanoverian rule.183 Szechi also agrees that Culloden signalled the beginning of the end of the struggle for the throne, which culminated in the demise of the last of Britain’s dynastic wars in 1807.184 As Pittock puts it: ‘Even if victory would not have reversed the outcome of the Rising, defeat was cataclysmic for its cause.’185 He thus states that the failure of the ’45 was a catastrophe for the possibility of reinstating the royal House of Stuart on the British throne. Consequently, Culloden can be seen as more or less the end to the threat by the Stuarts and the end to the dynastic struggle. The revisionist historian Szechi ascertains that many other events in British history also can be argued to hinge on Culloden. Among these historical events are ‘the creation of a stable polity, […] the onset of the industrial revolution, [and] the rise of the first British empire’.186 Royle supports Szechi on this, asserting that Culloden formed the bedrock for the creation of the British Empire and thus contributed to the beginning of a new global power.187 Hence, many revisionists maintain that Jacobitism had major political implications for the Union of Great Britain, the British state and the British Empire. As the revisionists Pittock and Geoffrey Plank (1960-) claim: ‘The rising was perceived as a crisis throughout the

181 Pittock, Jacobitism, 1. 182 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 5. 183 Royle, Culloden: Scotland’s Last Battle and the Forging of the British Empire. 184 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 136. 185 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 2. 186 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 1. 187 Royle, Culloden: Scotland’s Last Battle and the Forging of the British Empire.

47 British Empire’188, and many historians therefore regard the Jacobites as a threat to Britain’s colonial ambitions. By more or less defeating this so-called crisis and threat at Culloden, and thus to a large extent guaranteeing the continuation of a Protestant Hanoverian rule, Britain was able to continue its wars with France, as well as its colonial expansion. Revisionist academics assert that this might not have been the case if a Catholic and Francophile Stuart monarch had regained the British throne. Accordingly, Culloden is alleged to have contributed to the forging of the British Empire. The exact details of the international political affairs that form the basis for this revisionist claim, will be explored and explained further in the next chapter.

3.5 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has shown that the implications of Culloden for British politics can be asserted to have been many and considerable, or none at all. Whig historians do not consider Jacobitism as a significant political factor in a British context neither before nor after Culloden in 1746. This is clearly demonstrated in The Eighteenth Century, 1688-1815 (2002) edited by the moderate Whig historian Langford. This book deals with the development in the British Isles in the eighteenth century, but only briefly addresses Jacobitism, apparently regarding this movement as too insignificant to deserve much attention in regard to political development in the British Isles during this period.189 The Whig academics claim that Jacobitism was barely widespread anywhere else than in the Scottish Highlands, and that those supporters existing elsewhere in the British Isles, were few and not willing to sacrifice their positions by actively engaging in the Jacobite cause. Consequently, even though many Whig historians perceive the Jacobite conflict as a civil war between England and Scotland, they assert that the Jacobites were not a severe threat to the Union of 1707. According to these historians, the Jacobite conflict was part of a predetermined historical process, where society inexorably developed from barbarity to civility, and from absolutism to parliamentarism. Whig academics therefore state that this progress in society was predestined to occur independently of Jacobitism and was thus not a process the Jacobites could influence or change.

188 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire, 4; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 102. 189 Paul Langford, ed. The Eighteenth Century, 1688-1815, The Short Oxford History of the British Isles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Romantic historians vary in their opinions on the political significance of Culloden for Britain. Some of these academics acknowledge the presence of Jacobites in Ireland, Wales and England, as well as Scotland, and thus consider Jacobitism as politically important in a British context both before and, to some extent, after the Battle of Culloden in 1746. The romantic historian Macinnes is of this opinion, claiming that Jacobitism was ‘an irritant to successive British governments’.190 Still, the romantics do not regard English Jacobitism as such a decisive political element as the revisionist historians do. In general, as many of the romantic historians are Scottish Nationalists, they tend to focus more on the political significance of Culloden for Scotland than for the British state. In a British political context, the romantic academics thus often emphasise the negative political implications the defeat of Jacobitism at Culloden entailed for Scotland, such as the consequent consolidation of the Union of 1707 and the final loss of Scottish independence. The revisionists on the other hand, view Jacobitism as a substantial political movement with supporters all over the British Isles. They claim that the Jacobite movement elsewhere than Scotland was not considerably impacted by the Battle of Culloden, and consequently, Irish, Welsh and English Jacobites continued their activity even after 1746. Jacobitism was thus a significant political force in Britain at least until the abandonment of the Elibank Plot in 1753, the end of the proscription of Tories in England in 1760, or the death of Henry Benedict Stuart in 1807. The revisionists particularly stress English Jacobitism as especially important due to English Jacobites being active close to the British state’s political centre at Westminster, and accordingly, being able to influence British politics more directly. The revisionist historians might seem a bit contradictory. They assert that Culloden had major political implications for Britain on account of the battle ending as it did, at the same time as they also claim that Culloden would have led to great ramifications for the British state if the outcome of the battle had been reversed. In hindsight, historians now know that there were no more Jacobite risings after the ‘45. Revisionists therefore claim that Culloden more or less ended the possibility of a Stuart restoration and cemented the Hanoverian rule. The battle thus terminated the Stuart threat and the last dynastic war in Britain. Some revisionist historians assert that, as a result, Culloden initiated a period of relative peace within the British state, which again contributed to the creation of a stable polity, the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the forging and development of the British

190 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788, 159.

49 Empire, and accordingly, the birth of a new global power. At the same time, the revisionists also maintain that the Jacobite movement had potential to recover and rebel again after Culloden. They assert that if this had been the case, the Jacobites might have reversed the outcome of the Battle of Culloden, subsequently resulting in yet another set of substantial political consequences for the Union of Great Britain and the British state, but of a different kind. Conclusively, it seems hard to contradict that the Jacobite movement and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 exerted political pressure on the Union of 1707, leaving it in a vulnerable position. Culloden was the last battle fought on British soil with regular troops, and arguably, the last domestic contestation of the 1707 Act of Union. Still, whether or not all the political implications attributed to Jacobitism and Culloden by the revisionists in the preceding can be considered political ramifications of Culloden alone, is hard to say. The Battle of Culloden in 1746 did not occur in a vacuum void of influence and interference by other developments and processes transpiring in society at the time. This was a century of great change, and it is thus a challenge to separate the political implications of Culloden from other developments taking place at the same time. Accordingly, it is hard to determine whether Culloden was the cause of these political events unfolding in the 18th century, as some revisionists to a large extent allege, or if other factors were more decisive.

4 International political implications

4.1 Chapter introduction

The international significance of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 is probably one of the most controversial topics within the scholarly debate on Jacobitism. The international political implications of the Jacobite conflict are presumably also the hardest aspect of the conflict to find certain proof for in primary sources. The global perspective incorporates a multitude of variables and influential factors, making it problematic to obtain any definite conclusions. Traditionally, the Jacobite conflict has been viewed as a ‘local disturbance in northern Scotland’191, and thus regarded as solely a Scottish, or at best British, affair. The Jacobite events have not tended to be considered in an international context. In later years, however, many historians have begun to frame the Jacobite conflict within greater international circumstances, claiming that the Jacobites really were part of a larger global conflict. According to many revisionists, Jacobitism was an important component in international political affairs in the 18th century, thus influencing the international political stage. Hence, the Battle of Culloden in 1746 was not such a small and insignificant event as many Whig historians claim. Some revisionist historians assert that Culloden had political implications for international affairs, clearly indicating that this battle was not only of significance, but of global significance. These academics maintain that Jacobitism was an important element in other contemporary international conflicts such as the Nine Years War (1689-97), the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-15), and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48).192 The revisionist historian Murray Pittock even alleges that Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden could be argued to have impacted the Seven Years War (1756-63), the American War of Independence (1775-83), and the French Revolution in 1789.193 The international aspect of the Jacobite conflict is thus highly disputed, and accordingly, this chapter will explore the various scholarly views on the international

191 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire, 4. 192 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 78; Harris, "Jacobitism," 32; Black, Culloden and the '45, xiv; Daniel Szechi, "The Significance of Culloden," in Culloden: The History and Archaeology of the Last Clan Battle, ed. Tony Pollard (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 218-226; Royle, Culloden: Scotland’s Last Battle and the Forging of the British Empire, viii. 193 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 4-5.

51 political implications of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746. What were the consequences of Culloden for international political affairs? Was this battle of major global significance, as some revisionists claim, or was the Jacobite conflict more insignificant in an international political context? The first part of this chapter will address historians’ views on the prevalence of Jacobitism internationally in the period between 1688 and 1746. Did international Jacobites exist, or was the Jacobite movement limited to Britain alone? This might establish whether or not Jacobitism was capable of impacting international political affairs, having Jacobites fighting actively for the Jacobite cause outside of British borders, or if Jacobitism was too limited to have any global consequences. Secondly, the prevalence of international Jacobitism after the Battle of Culloden in 1746 will be discussed. If historians believe that an international Jacobite movement did exist, what happened to these Jacobites after the defeat at Culloden? Did they continue to be active, or did the international Jacobite movement more or less diminish and disappear? Conclusively, further international political implications of Culloden, not yet debated in the two antecedent parts, will be examined.

4.2 Prevalence of Jacobitism internationally 1688-1746

Traditional Whig historians categorically deny that international Jacobites existed. They uphold that Jacobitism was only limited to Scotland, at best to the Celtic fringes consisting of Scotland, Wales and Ireland, but no further abroad. However, it is difficult to overlook one pronounced element of the Jacobite conflict. A substantial amount of primary source material clearly states that the Jacobites received financial and military help, support and supplies from foreign powers on numerous occasions. Even on the opposing Hanoverian side there were other nationalities involved, and consequently, the Jacobite conflict was clearly related to international affairs. More recent moderate Whig historians and romantic historians might acknowledge the presence of this international factor but tend to vary in their opinions on the significance of it. Historians of the revisionist approach, however, ascribe much importance to both the involvement of foreign nations in the Jacobite conflict and Jacobitism’s impact on foreign affairs.

4.2.1 Involvement of foreign powers in the Jacobite conflict Many historians report that in the first Jacobite Rebellion of 1689 several different nations were involved. According to Pittock, the conflict engaged ‘tens of thousands of men’.194 Thousands of French and Swiss-Italian troops are asserted to have fought on the Jacobite side, whereas William of Orange’s army was supported by Danes and Dutchmen.195 The fighting in Ireland resulted in a Jacobite defeat, and a quieter period followed. When the Acts of Union were ratified in 1707, the dismay amongst the Jacobites grew, and the movement gained many supporters. Consequently, there was an attempted French invasion of Scotland in support of the Jacobites in 1708, but this invasion failed.196 Following the abortive invasion, another major Jacobite uprising erupted in 1715. The ‘15 might seem the only Jacobite Rebellion where foreign powers were not directly involved. However, the revisionist historian Steve Murdoch claims in Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746 (2006) that a Swedish-led invasion of Scotland was on the Jacobite agenda during the Rebellion of 1715. According to Murdoch, Jacobites in Stockholm sent many shiploads of victuals to Scotland and Ireland in August 1715, and they were planning to invade, but the ’15 ended before the intended Swedish attack materialised. Still, Murdoch asserts that there was a strong Jacobite network in Sweden working for the restoration of the Stuarts and collaborating with the Jacobites in Britain. The Swedish Jacobites consisted of many Jacobite exiles from Britain having taken refuge in Sweden, as well as other Swedish Jacobite sympathisers.197 Besides the Jacobites in Sweden, Murdoch claims that there was a considerable Jacobite network in Russia. This Russian network also incorporated many British Jacobite exiles, as well as other Russian Jacobite sympathisers. As Murdoch states, not all of the Jacobite exiles went to France or Spain, many of them went further north. The Jacobites in Sweden and Russia are asserted to have entered the Courts of these two countries. Murdoch alleges that the Swedish and Russian Jacobites were cooperating, trying to end the hostilities between the two nations in 1716, and rather make Sweden, Russia and the Jacobites join in

194 Ibid., 15. 195 McLynn, The Jacobites, 14; Duffy, "The '45 Campaign," 17-18; Harris, "Jacobitism," 32; Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 2; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 15. 196 Harris, "Jacobitism," 32. 197 Steve Murdoch, Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746, ed. Barbara Crawford, et al., vol. 18, The Northern World: North Europe and the Baltic c. 400-1700 AD: Peoples, Economies and Cultures (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 313-323.

53 an alliance against their mutual enemy, George I, King of Great Britain and ruler of the Duchy and Electorate of Hanover. According to Network North, there were serious negotiations, and a confederacy between Russia, Sweden, Prussia and the Jacobites was proposed. Murdoch further states that these foreign powers were planning that 10,000 Swedish troops were to invade England, backed by another 3,000-4,000 Swedish troops landing in Scotland, while the Prussians were to attack Hanover at the same time, to distract George I. If French support was assured, the Russian tsar allegedly indicated that Russia also would contribute 20,000 troops ‘to a campaign against Rostock which would force King George onto the continent and prevent the Dutch from interfering with any Jacobite action in Britain’.198 According to Murdoch, more extensive negotiations followed, and even a proposal of marriage between the tsar’s daughter, Grand Duchess Anne, and James Stuart, to improve Russo-Jacobite relations, but in the end, it all came to nothing.199 When the Jacobites rebelled again in 1719, the anticipated military support from Russia, Sweden, Prussia and France did not occur. Nevertheless, the Jacobites in Scotland did receive military help from Spain.200 Also this uprising failed, and consequently, there was more scheming for northern intervention from Sweden and Russia in the Jacobite conflict, according to Murdoch. However, the Jacobite-Russian intentions were revealed to George I by Hanoverian spies, and when the Russian tsar died in 1725, Murdoch asserts that more or less all hope of Russian intervention on the behalf of the Jacobites was extinguished.201 According to the historian Bob Harris, the Jacobite conflict was then isolated from European affairs for a while after this, until the French attempted an invasion of England in support of the Jacobites in 1744. This invasion ended in disaster, however, when most of the French fleet was destroyed or dispersed by a storm.202 Ultimately, the last Jacobite insurrection occurred in 1745. The revisionists claim that the French supported the Jacobites in this rebellion, sending ‘arms, ammunition, money, officers and a few troops to Scotland’.203 There was allegedly a larger scale French invasion planned, where French forces were to link up with and reinforce Charles Edward Stuart’s

198 Ibid., 321. 199 Ibid., 313-323. for the entire paragraph. 200 Ibid., 323; Duffy, "The '45 Campaign," 18; Harris, "Jacobitism," 32. 201 Murdoch, Network North: Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603- 1746, 18, 323-325. 202 Harris, "Jacobitism," 32-33; For more on the attempted French invasion in 1744 see Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45, 52-65. 203 Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45, 83.

Jacobite Army in southern England during the Jacobites’ English campaign.204 However, there is much debate among historians on whether or not this promise of a French invasion to support the Jacobites actually was sincere. Many historians claim that the reason for this French invasion not materialising, was that the French never planned to stay true to their word, and that the French invasion thus only was wishful thinking on account of Bonnie Prince Charlie. Nevertheless, the revisionist Frank McLynn is of another opinion. He asserts in France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (1981) that the French did their level best to assemble an invasion force, their promise and intentions being sincere. He blames the reason for its failure on Charles Edward Stuart’s decision to turn north again at Derby, resulting in the French forces missing him by a narrow margin.205 There were also other nationalities involved on the Government’s side during the ’45. According to the moderate Whig historian Paul Langford, 6,000 Dutch troops arrived in England to support General Wade and the Government’s anti-Jacobite operation.206 When this last Jacobite Rebellion ended with the decisive Battle of Culloden in 1746, there were also French contingents fighting for the Jacobite Army on Drumossie Moor, despite the larger French invasion not arriving, and the French assistance thus being less than anticipated.207 Though the Jacobites only took up arms in Britain, the revisionists claim that the Jacobite conflict was connected to international politics from the very beginning. The preceding discussion indicates that many historians believe that there were a variety of nations involved in Jacobite scheming, planning, invasions, events and battles, proving that Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 were not only a small Scottish or British affair, but a conflict closely intertwined in European power politics. As the revisionist historian Daniel Szechi writes, the Jacobites ‘were always connected to an exterior network of overseas exiles who lobbied foreign governments and smuggled arms, money, and propaganda into Scotland to promote the cause’.208 According to these academics, the Jacobite conflict thus had a much more international character than many historians, especially of the Whig belief, tend to assert.

204 Ibid.; Frank McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981). 205 McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745. 206 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783, 199-200. 207 Harrington, Culloden 1746: The Highland Clans’ Last Charge, 40-43. 208 Daniel Szechi, "Scottish Jacobitism in its International Context," ed. T. M. Devine and Jenny Wormald, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History (Oxford Handbooks Online: Oxford University Press, 2012), www.oxfordhandbooks.com. 1.

55 4.2.2 True or false Jacobites? Even though it can be argued that there were many nations involved in the support of Jacobitism, the main active military assistance came from France and, to some extent, Spain. France was naturally especially involved, due to the country’s historical alliance with Scotland through the Auld Alliance of 1295 and the fact that the Stuarts were exiles in France. France was thus considered ‘friends’ of the royal House of Stuart and consequently tried to assist it. The French and Spanish Jacobite support is so evident in the primary sources that more recent moderate Whig historians and romantic historians also recognise its presence. However, there is an ongoing scholarly debate on whether or not these Jacobites of foreign powers were ‘true’ Jacobites. Many Whig and romantic historians claim that France and Spain only took advantage of the Jacobite conflict to improve their own positions in European power politics, supporting the Jacobites to weaken Britain’s position at home and abroad simultaneously. Some revisionists disagree. Many historians explain the foreign powers’ interest in Jacobitism by emphasising the Jacobite events’ role in greater European conflicts, such as the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-15) and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48).209 Spain and France were fighting Britain in these two wars, as well as in a series of colonial conflicts. Many historians thus assert that these countries supported the Jacobites in the hope that this would result in an insurrection in Scotland that would divert Britain from the wars on the Continent, place the British in a difficult situation with wars on several fronts, and subsequently hopefully weaken Britain and its participation in the European wars.210 This interpretation of the political situation implies that neither the Spanish nor the French necessarily wanted a Stuart back on the British throne, but that they only exploited the Jacobite conflict to assert themselves in European power politics.211 This is exactly what many recent Whig historians claim, acknowledging the international aspect of the Jacobite conflict, but arguing that Jacobitism was more or less a minor insignificant sideshow in a greater global affair.212 The more recent moderate Whig historian Linda Colley alleges that the Stuart Pretender only was a pawn in a ‘worldwide struggle for commercial and imperial primacy between France and Britain’.213 Colley thus maintains that the French Jacobites not really were believers of the Jacobite ideology and not really fighting for a Stuart back on the British

209 Black, Culloden and the '45, xiv; Szechi, "The Significance of Culloden," 218-226; Harris, "Jacobitism," 32. 210 Szechi, "The Significance of Culloden," 221; Harris, "Jacobitism," 32-33. 211 Harris, "Jacobitism," 32. 212 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 2. 213 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 80.

throne. The French were ‘false’ Jacobites, in reality seeking to cause chaos in British affairs to improve their own lot. Colley continues to assert that ‘a restored Stuart dynasty would operate, whether it wanted to or not, under the shadow of French power and in support of French interests’.214 Hence, according to Colley, Jacobitism and the Stuarts were only a simple pawn in France’s power struggle for world dominion. The romantic historian Sir Charles Petrie to a large extent agrees with Colley on the aspect of the French Jacobites being ‘false’. In The Jacobite Movement Petrie writes that as a man, Louis, the French King, would do anything for the Stuart family, but as King of France ‘he regarded the question of a Stuart restoration solely from the point of view of French national interests’.215 Petrie maintains that Jacobitism was an immensely valuable weapon in the hands of French diplomacy, and even states that: ‘The truth was that at no time did the French Government really desire to see a Stuart back in the position which James had lost: they preferred the component parts of the British Isles to be divided among themselves, and so the whole kept weak.’216 Consequently, Petrie argues that the French encouraged the Jacobites to such an extent that the British Isles permanently were kept in a state of unrest, but without going as far as to actually effect a Stuart restoration. According to Petrie, the French did not want to restore the House of Stuart to all of Britain, only to Ireland or Scotland, to make sure that Britain did not become too united and powerful. This was thus against the Stuarts’ own wishes, who wanted a full restoration to the whole of the British Isles. Petrie therefore asserts that the French were reluctant to give more than a very limited assistance to the Stuarts and the Jacobites, and that this explains why a fair amount of the promised French resources and military support failed to materialise during more than one Jacobite attempt.217 Accordingly, many Whig and romantic historians do not regard international Jacobitism as a political threat to British or global politics, and do not consider Jacobitism generally as an influential factor on international political affairs. On the contrary, they view the international Jacobites as ‘false’, not really endeavouring for the Jacobites to succeed in Britain, but rather working to achieve the opposite. Instead of making sure the Stuarts were restored to all of the British Isles by entering the conflict with all possible resources, supplies and military assistance, many Whig and romantic historians claim that the French Jacobites,

214 Ibid., 78. 215 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 88. 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid., 88-90.

57 and to some extent the Spanish Jacobites, aimed to keep the British Jacobites restless and hopeful, but never completely successful. International Jacobitism was thus not a severe political threat, and the Jacobite movement and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 did not impact international politics to any significant degree, according to these academics. The international political implications of Culloden were thus limited. Some revisionists actually support the Whig and romantic historians’ assertion of France’s desire to use Jacobitism to split the British state, but they do not accordingly limit the international significance of Jacobitism and Culloden.218 Many revisionist academics, however, are of a contradictory opinion to the Whig and romantic historians, asserting that the French were ‘true’ Jacobites. The revisionist historian Daniel Szechi for instance, emphasises that France could derive great benefit from the reinstatement of a thankful and loyal Stuart dynasty on the British throne.219 He is supported by the revisionists Eveline Cruickshanks and McLynn, who believe the French Jacobites to have been sincere and actively working for the Jacobite cause to succeed. According to McLynn, the Jacobite events in Scotland and in Ireland were watched with intense interest from the Frenchmen across the Channel. All sections of French society allegedly followed the incidents during the campaign in Ireland ‘with as much excitement as if they had taken place in France itself’.220 McLynn continues to claim that ‘from 1689 onwards one of the dominant patterns in French foreign policy began to manifest itself: a strong ideological, though intermittent, support for the exiled Stuarts’.221 Although McLynn asserts that the French support for the British Jacobites and the Stuarts was intermittent, he still clearly expresses that the French assistance was sincere and that the French Jacobites truly believed in the Jacobite cause. McLynn’s statements are backed by Cruickshanks. She blames the traditional British historians of ignoring the European context of the Jacobite conflict, and of assuming that ‘for the French the rebellion was a useful ‘diversion’ from the war in Flanders, without taking any systematic look at French sources’.222 After doing considerable research on primary source material in France, Cruickshanks concludes that the French support of Jacobitism was honest and trustworthy, and that they consequently were ‘true’ Jacobites. According to Cruickshanks, France signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau with the Pretender in October 1745, by which the French ‘ceased to recognize the Elector of Hanover as King of Great Britain;

218 Pittock, Jacobitism, 124. 219 Szechi, "The Significance of Culloden," 223. 220 McLynn, The Jacobites, 21. 221 Ibid. 222 Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45, v.

promised to send military assistance to Charles Edward; recognised James VIII as King of Scotland and undertook to recognise him as King of England’.223 Cruickshanks thus asserts that these actions clearly illustrate how sincere the French intentions were, especially in the Jacobite Rising of 1745. Many revisionists also claim that the French and Spanish were ‘true’ Jacobites because many of them originally were Jacobite exiles from Britain. Several of the Jacobites in France and Spain were Irish exiles who went abroad during the ‘Flight of the Wild Geese’ following the defeat at the Battle of Boyne in 1690.224 Others were Jacobite exiles from Scotland, England and Wales. As the historian John L. Roberts writes, the exiles from England, Scotland and Ireland ‘were the backbone of Jacobite support on the Continent for more than fifty years’.225 Every new Jacobite uprising issued in a subsequent wave of British Jacobites going abroad into exile. Many revisionist historians thus claim that a substantial number of the French and Spanish Jacobites were part of the Jacobite diaspora. Hence, they were ‘true’ Jacobites actively and sincerely supporting the Jacobite cause. Other French and Spanish Jacobites, who were not exiles, could also be asserted to have been true believers of Jacobitism, due to influence by the exiled Stuarts, the exiled Jacobites, the Auld Alliance of 1295, and the religious bond many of these French, Spanish and British Jacobites shared through Catholicism. All in all, the revisionists tend to emphasise the importance of the international aspect of Jacobitism to a greater extent than many of the Whig and romantic historians. Currently, most historians acknowledge that foreign powers were involved in the Jacobite conflict, but Whig and romantic historians predominantly regard these foreign powers as ‘false’ Jacobites trying to use Jacobitism as a pawn in a greater global power struggle. Consequently, these academics claim that the other nations involved did not really care about the Jacobite cause. As a result, the international Jacobite support was minimal and did not constitute a serious political threat, according to Whig and romantic historians. They assert that Jacobitism was not able to impact global political affairs to any considerable degree either, having few international political implications of significance. Many Whig and romantic scholars thus maintain that the international aspect of the Jacobite conflict was of limited political importance.

223 Ibid., 83. 224 Genet-Rouffiac, "The Irish Jacobite Regiments and the French Army: A Way to Integration," 206-228. 225 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 2-3.

59 Many revisionists, however, argue that there was a substantial Jacobite network in France, Spain, Prussia, Sweden and even Russia, as well as Britain. They also assert that Jacobitism was strong in certain parts of America.226 Consequently, Jacobitism was a widespread movement with a considerable following in a number of countries. Many revisionists thus claim that this proves the major political significance of Jacobitism globally, as well as for Scotland and the rest of the British Isles. According to these academics, the vast international support for the Jacobite movement made it a severe political threat, and with sincere Jacobites scheming and working inside the Courts of several of the leading nations of the time, Jacobitism impacted international political affairs substantially. In their eyes, the Jacobite movement was an important political factor in European power politics, and Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 accordingly had great international political implications.

4.3 What happened to international Jacobitism after the Battle of Culloden in 1746?

Since the Whig and romantic historians to a large extent do not consider Jacobitism as a political threat or a political influence in an international context, they do not give the international Jacobite movement much attention after 1746. However, the revisionists’ studies of primary source material on the Continent have proved that there was a considerable global Jacobite network. It is hard to deny that this network existed, at least in France and Spain, but most Whig historians and romantics still do not perceive it as particularly significant in relation to international political affairs. Nonetheless, the revisionist historians assert that this international Jacobite movement was of major political importance. What, then, happened to these Jacobites after the defeat at Culloden? Did they continue to be active, or did the international Jacobite movement more or less diminish and disappear? Arguably, international Jacobitism increased in numbers after 1746. There were French contingents fighting for the Jacobite Army at Culloden, which consequently were defeated in the battle, but international Jacobitism as a whole, was not heavily affected. Due to all the Jacobites who were dispossessed, exiled, and transported to the colonies and sold into servitude after Culloden, the international Jacobite movement could be claimed to have

226 Pittock, Jacobitism, 124; Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 79-82.

grown. Hence, an increase in international Jacobitism was allegedly an international political implication of Culloden. These Jacobites brought with them the Jacobite ideology, thoughts and ideas, and spread these even further to other parts of the world, especially France, Spain, America, the Netherlands, Russia and Sweden.227 The revisionist Pittock claims that ‘Jacobite exiles were responsible for building up the Russian armed forces in the eighteenth century’228, indicating that the Russian Jacobite network expanded even further after 1746, and arguably constituted an influential factor in foreign affairs. The revisionist historian Geoffrey Plank also asserts that the reform of the Scottish Highlands following Culloden, and the subsequent transportation of Jacobites to British dependencies, had ‘direct ramifications for the colonies’.229 This resulted in an accumulation of Jacobites in these colonial areas, contributing to a dispersion of British Jacobites, but also a spread of international Jacobitism. After 1746, there was thus, for instance, a ‘significant Jacobite presence in North America’230, and Jacobitism was accordingly strong in parts of what were to become the United States.231 According to academics of the revisionist conception, the French were still actively plotting and planning for another Jacobite attempt after the Battle of Culloden in 1746. They were, for instance, in on the planning of the Elibank Plot (previously described in chapter three). This scheme intended to involve Prussian, Swedish and French forces fighting alongside the English Jacobites, proving that international Jacobitism definitely had not disappeared as a significant political threat after 1746.232 The Elibank Plot was abandoned in 1753, however, but the French continued to plan an invasion of England during the Seven Years War (1756-63), according to the early revisionist historian Henrietta Tayler. She asserts that the French Government continued its efforts ‘to replace on the throne of Britain a Catholic sovereign who might have proved a useful ally’233, but that these efforts ended after the French defeat at the Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759, leading to ‘the final disintegration of the Jacobite Cause’.234 Tayler thus claims that this battle put the coup de grâce, the

227 Pittock, Jacobitism, 123-128. 228 Ibid., 126. 229 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire, 7. 230 Pittock, Jacobitism, 127. 231 Ibid., 124. 232 Petrie, The Jacobite Movement, 415-432. 233 Tayler, Jacobite Epilogue: A Further Selection of Letters from Jacobites among the Stuart Papers at Windsor published by the Gracious Permission of His Majesty The King, ix. 234 Ibid.

61 deathblow, to international Jacobitism, similarly to her claims about Scottish Jacobitism presented in chapter two.235 Nevertheless, Pittock alleges that as late as 1770, Duc de Choiseul, France’s foreign minister, considered the possibility of yet another Jacobite Rising.236 This never happened, but the revisionist Szechi asserts that ‘Jacobitism survived for as long as it did because various Continental powers encouraged and sustained it’.237 Even though there never was another Jacobite rebellion, and accordingly also the international Jacobite movement gradually became less pronounced and important, many revisionists maintain that the international Jacobite movement remained a significant component in international political affairs for a prolonged period of time after the Battle of Culloden in 1746.

4.4 Further consequences for international political affairs

Several of the alleged international political implications of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746 have already been addressed in the two preceding parts of this chapter, but in the following, a few more presumable ramifications will be explored. The traditional Whig historians generally do not consider the Jacobite conflict as relevant in an international political context, other than that the defeat of the Jacobites at Culloden, who by traditional Whig historians are perceived as Celtic clansmen, was part of Britain’s global fight against uncivilised native peoples.238 The Jacobites have by many early traditional Whig historians been regarded as ‘the Indians of Scotland’239, and the Jacobite conflict has thus been seen in relation to the colonisation of, for instance, America, Africa, India and Australia, and successive conflicts with native people there.240 However, some of the more recent Whig historians and romantic historians consider Jacobitism as important in an international context to a certain degree, whereas the revisionists clearly are the academics who emphasise Jacobitism’s and Culloden’s international significance the most. The romantic historian Allan Macinnes claims that the

235 Ibid. 236 Pittock, Jacobitism, 124. 237 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 138. 238 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 117 & 133. 239 Ibid., 126. 240 Ibid., 126-127 & 132-133.

Stuart restoration was ‘not just a peripheral theme in European diplomacy’241, giving Jacobitism credit for being more than just a sideshow in European affairs. Many historians on Jacobitism have in later years viewed the Jacobite conflict in relation to the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-15) and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), as mentioned earlier in this chapter.242 The Jacobite Risings have even been denominated the War of the British Succession, thus being deemed part of this series of succession wars. As the revisionist Trevor Royle writes: ‘It [the Battle of Culloden] has also come to be regarded – rightly so – as one of the battles in the contemporaneous War of the Austrian Succession (1740-8).’243 Royle continues to assert that the Battle of Culloden thus was part of a much larger campaign to protect the British Isles from the growing threat of a French invasion.244 Because of these conceptions, many historians, belonging to different history traditions within the field of Jacobite studies, have interpreted the Jacobite conflict as a struggle for world hegemony between Britain and other European powers, predominantly France.245 Even the more recent Whig historian Colley agrees with this interpretation. She states that the Jacobites were part of a ‘worldwide struggle for commercial and imperial primacy between France and Britain’.246 Colley further affirms that a Jacobite victory most likely would have been to the advantage of France in its competition with Britain in overseas trade and colonialism. Lastly, she writes: ‘Both the Nine Years War (1689-97) and the War of Spanish Succession (1702-13) had been fought, as far as Britain was concerned, in large part because the French monarch at that time, Louis XIV, had insisted on recognising the exiled James II and his son as the only rightful kings.’247 These are very interesting assertions, considering Colley’s clear, though moderate, Whig beliefs. Through these statements, Colley evidently expresses that Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden had political implications for international affairs, asserting that the Stuarts and the Jacobite movement to a large extent were the cause of British involvement in the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession. The revisionist historian Pittock asserts that it was the Glorious Revolution of 1688 that initiated the possibility of a struggle for world domination between Britain and France. He also maintains that the events in 1688, as well as Jacobitism and Culloden, laid the

241 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788, 159. 242 Harris, "Jacobitism," 32; Black, Culloden and the '45, xiv; Szechi, "The Significance of Culloden," 218-226. 243 Royle, Culloden: Scotland’s Last Battle and the Forging of the British Empire, viii. 244 Ibid. 245 Pollard, "Introduction: The Battle of Culloden - More than a Difference of Opinion," 13. 246 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 80. 247 Ibid., 78.

63 foundations for the development of a large-scale British Empire.248 In his book Great Battles: Culloden (2016) Pittock details the Jacobite conflict’s crucial role in these processes, coming across as the revisionist historian who ascribes the most global significance to Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746. Pittock claims that the defeat of the Jacobite movement at Culloden resulted in the British King remaining of the House of Hanover and remaining Protestant. This contributed to the Anglo-French hostility being maintained, and consequently urged Britain onwards in other wars with France, such as the Seven Years War (1756-63) and the American War of Independence (1775-83). Pittock states that the struggle with France for world hegemony accordingly was given a free rein to advance even further, subsequently impelling the forging of the British Empire. According to Pittock, this development, in combination with the consolidation of the Union of 1707 after Culloden, propelled Great Britain to be the dominant world power for the next one hundred and fifty years.249 Contrarily, if the Jacobites had been victorious at Culloden, the international political situation would have been very different, according to Pittock. He presents a theory suggesting that a possible reinstatement of a Stuart sovereign would have entailed that the British monarchy would have been much more benign towards France and probably thus would have tried to achieve an easing of tension with the French. Pittock further asserts that such a detente would have prevented the possibility of the Seven Years War and the advancement of British power in Canada and India. The understanding with France might have resulted in the British not fighting the French in North America, and consequently, the presence of considerable French forces in Quebec ‘would have been a powerful disincentive to any revolt in the American colonies in the 1770s’.250 Accordingly, the American War of Independence might not have transpired. Pittock continues to claim that the reduced military competition between France and Britain would have made it less likely that France overreached its budgets. A ramification of this, would have been that the financial crises in the French state did not occur, and consequently, the French Revolution of 1789 would have become less probable. In sum, Pittock argues that a Jacobite victory at Culloden in 1746 would have had major international political implications.251

248 Pittock, Jacobitism, 1. 249 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 4-5. 250 Ibid., 4. 251 Ibid., 4-5.

Pittock does make some reservations to his theory. For instance, he admits that domestic British antipathy to France might have caused problems for a Stuart monarch’s Francophile attitude and actions.252 Pittock thus acknowledges that not all these ramifications necessarily would have occurred as a consequence of a different outcome at Culloden, but he still claims that this chain of events would have been a possibility. How would this scenario have affected European power politics? If France had succeeded with its planned invasion of England in 1744-45, the Seven Years War, the American War of Independence and the French Revolution had not occurred, and the British Empire had not developed, international political affairs would presumably have looked quite different. Maybe France would have become the dominant world power instead of Britain, and consequently, French might have been the lingua franca of the world today? Many historians disagree with Pittock. One of these historians is Christopher Sinclair- Stevenson (1939-), who might be deemed more of a Whig historian. Even though Sinclair- Stevenson’s work Inglorious Rebellion: The Jacobite Risings of 1708, 1715 and 1719 (1971) is written earlier than Pittock’s books, it expresses many of the Whig historians’ views. Sinclair-Stevenson criticises history theories where the focus is on the significance of events that actually did not happen, i.e. counterfactual history. He claims that such interpretations are based too much on historical ‘what-ifs’, leading to historians exaggerating the political significance of the Jacobite Rebellions for England and for the European political scene. According to Sinclair-Stevenson, the Jacobite conflict and its actual course of events merely impacted the European power balance at all. He asserts that few European monarchs and politicians lost their positions as a consequence of this conflict.253 In any case, no matter historians’ perception of the conflict, it is difficult to know what would have happened if the Jacobites had won the Battle of Culloden in 1746. No one knows if a Jacobite victory in reality would have meant a final end to the Jacobite conflict, a Stuart back on the British throne, and subsequently resulted in great international political implications, or if a Jacobite victory at Culloden in fact would have constituted no decisive political difference at all. With all probability, more battles and conflicts would have followed, where the outcome would have been uncertain. The Whig historian Colley claims that the price for a Jacobite victory would ‘almost certainly have been prolonged civil war’.254 This is a counterfactual question, which is impossible to answer with certainty.

252 Ibid., 4. 253 Sinclair-Stevenson, Inglorious Rebellion: The Jacobite Risings of 1708, 1715 and 1719, 1-2. 254 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 76.

65 4.5 Chapter conclusion

From the very beginning, other nations were involved on both sides in the Jacobite conflict, with French and Swiss-Italian troops fighting alongside the Jacobites in Ireland, and Danes and Dutchmen supporting the Government Army. Already in 1689, Jacobitism was thus connected to international political affairs. As this chapter has demonstrated, historians disagree on how important this international relation was, but it is difficult to disregard the international political element altogether. Many revisionists emphasise Jacobitism’s and the Battle of Culloden’s global significance, asserting that the conflict resulted in far-reaching international political implications in the 18th century, and also would have done, if the outcome of Culloden had been reversed. Most Whig and romantic historians, on the other hand, tend to view Culloden as less significant in an international political context. Still, several of the more recent of these academics do acknowledge that the Jacobites were part of a bigger global power struggle, and that Jacobitism consequently exerted influence on international political affairs to a certain degree. Whether or not historians believe that Jacobitism was widespread internationally, the discussion earlier in this chapter has shown that revisionists allege to have established that there were elements of Jacobite support in as many as ten countries both before and after the Battle of Culloden in 1746. Arguably, there were Jacobites in France, Spain, America, Prussia, Sweden and Russia, as well as Scotland, England, Wales and Ireland. No matter the extent of this prevalence in number of supporters, or the sincerity of the supporters involved, this proves, in my opinion, that the Jacobite movement was an extensive political movement of major political significance, if one considers the revisionists’ research to be valid. Such a widespread military and political movement, with representatives within a number of prominent European Courts, definitely had potential to impact politics globally, as well as in Scotland and Britain. Another international element, which most historians agree on, is that France was involved in the Jacobite conflict. A lot of primary source material proves the country’s involvement in Jacobite affairs, even though it can be discussed to what extent the French participated actively. Arguably, the French involvement in the Jacobite cause made the Jacobite threat more severe, regardless of the French being ‘true’ Jacobites or not. The Jacobites and the French were working towards many of the same ends, and with support from French Jacobites, the Jacobite cause was more likely to succeed, regardless of France acting out of national French interests or Jacobite interests. Consequently, it might be

acceptable to regard the Jacobite conflict as part of a greater political power struggle between France and Britain. The international aspect of Jacobitism is seemingly one of the areas within Jacobite studies that is currently most debated and researched. It is a popular topic in today’s Jacobite conferences, controversial and widely disputed, and consequently arouses major debates. The Jacobite Rebellions might be regarded as an international conflict, considering the other European nations involved and the alleged impact Jacobitism had on both the development of the British Empire and the evolvement of Britain as a dominant world power. Arguably, Jacobitism and Culloden had many international political implications, leading to a further diffusion of the international Jacobite movement, impacting the political discourse in as many as ten countries, and, according to Whig historians, forming part of Britain’s global struggle against uncivilised native peoples. The Jacobites and the Battle of Culloden are also asserted to have influenced major international wars such as the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-15) and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48). The revisionist view’s apparent objectivity as a result of critical evaluation of substantial amounts of primary sources, archaeology and research, credits this conception credibility. Still, parts of the revisionist theories are to a great extent based on counterfactual history and can thus never be completely affirmed. Hence, it is difficult to reach any certain conclusions. However, these more recent revisionist studies do suggest that the Jacobite conflict most likely had a more substantial international political significance than what the earlier historical consensus has asserted, and Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden can thus at least be stated to not have been completely insignificant in an international context.

67 5 Social and cultural implications for Scotland

5.1 Chapter introduction

The social and cultural implications of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 for Scotland have received considerable attention in the scholarly debate, especially from the romantic historians. Culloden’s alleged social and cultural consequences are so closely linked to each other and will thus be addressed in the same chapter. The traditional conception has been that the social and cultural ramifications of Culloden for Scotland were substantial and greatly changed the Scottish society. The repercussions in the immediate aftermath of Culloden are considered to have been especially brutal for the Jacobites, the Scottish clans and the Highland region of Scotland. Many historians have also regarded the Scottish Clearances taking place in the late 18th and early 19th centuries as a direct consequence of the Battle of Culloden. During the so-called Age of the Clearances entire peasant communities were, arguably, removed and dispossessed. This is claimed to have been done for the benefit of sheep farming and an agricultural revolution. These evictions allegedly led to numerous Scottish towns and villages being cleared or abandoned, most of the families who had lived and worked the soil there being driven out, leaving the landscape derelict and never again to be inhabited.255 The traditional conception has thus been that the Battle of Culloden ended the Gaelic culture, the system of clanship and the Highland way of life. Arguably, it also affected religion, the use of Gaelic language and the sense of a Scottish identity. Lastly, Culloden has been asserted to have resulted in an extinction of the native Scottish Celts, and consequently, caused the demise of ‘old’ Scotland. The romantic academics have been particularly pronounced in the debate on Culloden’s social and cultural implications, largely determining its agenda, and seemingly being the historians who credit Culloden the most social and cultural significance. Accordingly, this chapter will explore historians’ differing opinions on the social and cultural implications of Culloden for Scotland. Was the Battle of Culloden in 1746 the end of

255 T. M. Devine, The Scottish Clearances: A History of the Dispossessed, 1600-1900 (London: Allen Lane, 2018), 3.

clanship, Gaelic culture, Gaelic language and the Highland way of life? How did the battle affect religion and Scottish identity? Did the Jacobite Rising of 1745 result in a subsequent extinction of the native Scottish Celts and the demise of ‘old’ Scotland? The first part of this chapter will focus on these questions in relation to the incidents in the immediate aftermath of Culloden, whereas the second part will address these questions within the context of the successive Scottish Clearances.

5.2 Immediate aftermath of the Battle of Culloden in 1746

The discussions in the preceding chapters of this thesis have revealed that there are great disagreements amongst historians on who the Jacobites were and who are to blame for the rise of Jacobitism. The Whig historians have generally tended to point out the Celtic clansmen in the Highlands as the ‘culprits’, accusing them of being the cause and the core of the Jacobite movement. This was also the conception at the time of the Jacobite events. According to Pittock, this was due to the Highlanders being regarded as most different, most the ‘other’, and accordingly were more easily demonised. The Jacobite conflict was thus largely portrayed as an outbreak of Gaelic nationalism and the ’45 consequently characterised as a ‘Highland’ Rising.256 The British Government therefore took measures to make sure the Highland clans were properly subdued after the Battle of Culloden in 1746. As the historian John L. Roberts writes: ‘By then, the Jacobite cause was firmly linked to the fate of the Jacobite clans, brutally suppressed by ‘Butcher’ Cumberland in the aftermath of his victory at Culloden, so bringing to an end the clan system.’257 Roberts’ statement represents many historians’ view on the matter. It is hard to deny, even for Whig historians, that the suppression of Jacobites in the immediate aftermath of Culloden was brutal, but what were in fact the social and cultural consequences? In the days following the Battle of Culloden, many wounded Jacobite soldiers are claimed to have been killed off by ‘The Butcher’ Cumberland’s men. Few of the Jacobites were thus taken as war prisoners.258 According to the historian Bruce Lenman (1938-), the Duke of Cumberland established himself at Fort Augustus, in the very heart of the Highlands,

256 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 112. 257 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, xi. 258 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 99-104.

69 wherefrom he ‘coordinated widespread mopping up and counter-insurgency operations’.259 Cumberland had at his disposal the regular soldiers of his army, many units of the Royal Navy, and two other substantial militia forces.260 Consequently, Scotland was pacified by an extensive military occupation both at land and sea. Lenman writes that: ‘For the first time the Highlands and Islands were at the mercy of the British government.’261 He also connects these military actions with the decline of clanship. Lenman asserts that this powerful British Army’s presence in the Highland area resulted in ‘the countervailing strength of the Jacobite clans’262 being decisively broken. Even though few war prisoners allegedly were taken in the immediate ensuing days of Culloden, Cumberland’s counter-insurgency operations resulted in some 3,000-3,500 Jacobite soldiers or supporters being imprisoned in the aftermath of the failed rising. Pittock further claims that approximately 120 officers and men were executed, others were transported to colonies such as the West Indies and North America. Most of the Jacobites being transported to the colonies were sold as bound labourers, and many historians thus assert that they were sold into slavery.263 Some Jacobites managed to escape into exile, whereas yet others, were ‘pardoned on enlistment’264, meaning that many convicted Jacobites were forced to join the British Army. According to Pittock, those who tried to desert the Army, were hanged out of hand and then later shot.265 A series of legal acts were enacted by the Parliament ‘for the disarmament of Highlanders, the reform of the region’s court system, the regulation of religious life, and the forfeiture of estates belonging to Jacobites’.266 The use of Highland dress, the use of bagpipes and the teaching of Gaelic were outlawed, and the Heritable Jurisdictions Act of 1747 abolished the judicial powers exercised by landowners over their tenants. The latter of these statutes has by many historians been regarded as a direct attack on the clans.267 Heritable jurisdictions meant that holders of baronies and regalities were able to determine ‘rights of life or death over their tenants in criminal cases’.268 This system of private courts was

259 Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746, 261. 260 Ibid. 261 Ibid. 262 Ibid. 263 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 109-110; Duffy, The ‘45: Bonnie Prince Charlie and the Untold Story of the Jacobite Rising, 527-528 & 534-539. 264 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 109. 265 Ibid., 110. 266 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire, 6. 267 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 193-195; Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 112-113. 268 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 113.

abolished, as well as military tenure and wardholding. Accordingly, the Clan chiefs’ powers were considerably weakened, making it difficult to control their subordinate clansmen to the same degree as before and problematic to raise substantial fighting forces.269 Many historians thus claim that this government policy broke up the clan system. The Jacobite conflict has also been viewed as part of the European Wars of Religion, a series of wars waged in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries where religious issues were involved. Some historians have interpreted the Jacobite events as a conflict between Protestantism on one side, and Catholicism, and to some extent Episcopalism, on the other. The Jacobite Rebellions were far from solely a religious conflict, but the religious aspect was definitely an important incentive. Jacobitism was considered a religious threat, and when the Jacobites were defeated at Culloden and Protestantism consequently ‘won’, a period of suppression of Catholics and Episcopalians arguably begun. Legislation was ratified to subdue the Roman Catholic Church and the Episcopal Church of Scotland.270 According to Pittock, Episcopalian meeting houses were burnt, and it became ‘effectively illegitimate for any priest not ordained by English or Irish Anglican bishops to minister in Scotland’.271 There were also attacks on Catholics, but they were already numerically much weaker than the Episcopalians.272 The suppression of Catholics and Episcopalians could thus be considered a social and cultural implication of Culloden. However, there are many historians contradicting this claim, stating that the suppression of Catholics and Episcopalians was not a new phenomenon occurring after Culloden. There were already many acts enacted before the ‘45 as part of a state policy of repression against the two religious communities. Still, several of these laws were ratified in the aftermath of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1715. The suppression of Catholics and Episcopalians was thus allegedly closely connected to Jacobitism, simultaneously as it was part of an already ongoing process. Whatever the conception, it is still possible to argue that Culloden intensified the suppression of Catholics and Episcopalians in Scotland, consequently contributing to the evolvement of Scotland as mainly a Presbyterian (form of Protestantism) country. As a consequence of this new legislation and Cumberland’s claimed ‘ruthless harrying of the Highlands’273, substantial amounts of Scots were killed, imprisoned, transported to the

269 Ibid. 270 Pittock, Jacobitism, 2; Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 194-195. 271 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 113. 272 Ibid. 273 Tomasson and Buist, Battles of the ‘45, 207.

71 colonies, exiled, or forced to enlist in the British Army. Many Jacobite estates were annexed by the Crown. Other castle strongholds were, according to Pittock, left to rot, due to their owners being exiled or dispossessed. The military occupation of the country also led to already existing fortifications being taken over by the Hanoverian Army and subsequently reinforced. The Hanoverian regime also built new strongholds, such as Fort George. This military fortification policy was all part of the government’s attempt to control the Scottish population.274 All of the changes discussed in the preceding, can be claimed to have been implications of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden. Arguably, this treatment of the Jacobites, and consequently of the Highlands and Scotland as a whole, resulted in severe social and cultural alterations in the country.

5.2.1 Was Culloden the death of clanship? The Battle of Culloden has traditionally been portrayed as the end of the clan system in Scotland, and many current historians still claim that this was in fact the case. Nevertheless, a few alternative perspectives have emerged in the scholarly debate in recent years. Generally, the Whig and romantic historians tend to uphold the traditional conception of the demise of clanship in Scotland being an implication of Culloden, whereas the more opposing views have usually been presented by the revisionist camp. The Whig historian George Macaulay Trevelyan clearly relates the decline of clanship to the Battle of Culloden. He writes that ‘the country was opened by the breaking of the clans after Culloden’275, indicating that Culloden was the death of clanship. He elaborates on this claim by arguing that the aftermath of the ’45 effectively put down tribalism by ‘military and political invasion from the south’.276 According to Trevelyan, tribalism, which is how he addresses clanship, was a feudalistic system. This social and political structure was in his eyes greatly outdated and was finally put to an end after the enactment of the Heritable Jurisdictions Act. Trevelyan thus indicates that this legislation was the reason for the clan system’s final demise, and wholeheartedly asserts that this was a positive development. His views are clearly stated in English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria (1944), where he writes: ‘The last evils of moribund feudalism, which survived in Scotland for centuries after they had ceased in England, were abolished in 1748

274 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 113-115. 275 Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria, 454. 276 Ibid., 448.

by the Act which put an end to ‘heritable jurisdictions’.’277 Trevelyan also presents a more positive account of the government’s actions in the aftermath of Culloden than the one presented previously. His narration of the events is much the same, but he describes them in a more positive light. He believes that these changes were beneficial and to the best for Scotland, helping the country in a favourable direction. For instance, Trevelyan portrays the inclusion of Scots in the British Army as a more voluntary action and claims that most Scots moving out of the country after Culloden, did so out of an independent wish to emigrate. Conclusively, Trevelyan alleges that clanship was terminated as a consequence of Culloden, resulting in the Scots finally being free men.278 The romantic historians agree with the Whig historians on Culloden resulting in the end of clanship. Some romantics claim that the process of weakening the clans had started earlier on during the Jacobite conflict, being intensified after the Rebellion of 1715, but that Culloden put the final end to the clan system. The romantic historian John Prebble alleges that: ‘In the three years following Culloden Parliament revised some of the laws that had been passed after the ‘Fifteen and enacted new ones that were to destroy for ever the Clan System and the feudal power of its chiefs.’279 Prebble thus also relates the decline of the clans to the enactment of new legislation after Culloden and the subsequent execution of these laws. Although many of the early traditional romantic historians believed in the stadial history theory and consequently maintained that the end to clanship was an inevitable development destined to occur at some time or another, the more recent romantics do not necessarily agree with this conception. Prebble thus blames Parliament for the harsh suppression of the Highlanders, viewing this as an atrocious development, asserting that by brutality ‘the Highlands were subdued, the glens emptied, [and] the clans destroyed’.280 The romantic historian Allan I. Macinnes largely agrees with Prebble. He claims that after Culloden the government ‘embarked upon a legislative as well as a military offensive to eradicate all cultural vestiges of clanship’.281 The Gaels were to be assimilated, and in the process, clanship had to go. Macinnes asserts that the government to a great extent succeeded in this plan, due to the clan chiefs and the leading gentry abandoning their traditional obligations as protectors and patrons ‘in pursuit of their commercial aspirations as

277 Ibid., 453. 278 Ibid., 453-455. 279 Prebble, Culloden, 325. 280 Ibid. 281 Allan I. Macinnes, "The Aftermath of the ‘45," in 1745: Charles Edward Stuart and the Jacobites, ed. Robert C. Woosnam-Savage (Edinburgh: Glasgow Museums, 1995), 103.

73 proprietors’.282 Macinnes thus blames the clan chiefs’ transition into so-called ‘commercial landlordism’283, as well as measures taken by the government, for the decline in clanship.284 Still, Macinnes states that this was a gradual development from clanship to commercialism that started as early as the Union of Crowns in 1603, but that was intensified and completed in the aftermath of Culloden.285 Most revisionists, however, are of a more reserved opinion. The revisionist historian Tom M. Devine (1945-) is in agreement with the romantic historians on the aftermath of Culloden being ‘a massive military, judicial and political assault on the clan society which had spawned subversion’.286 However, he warns against the temptation of seeing a clear cause and effect relationship between Culloden and the demise of clanship.287 Devine claims that the Hanoverian forces’ harrowing actually seems to have produced little more than a stubborn defiance in the Scottish people, and that consequently, in the short run, there were more disturbances in Jacobite areas during the aftermath of Culloden than usual. According to Devine, the new legislation, such as the Heritable Jurisdictions Act, also made little headway as ‘clan loyalties were matters of the mind and heart rather than the law’.288 Legislation does not always reflect the reality. Devine thus asserts that the government’s measures did not result in a social and economic revolution in Scotland, as many Whig and romantic historians claim. Still, he admits that the Scottish society seems to have changed in the decades after Culloden but does not believe that Jacobitism and Culloden were the cause of it. Devine alleges that the Highlands were in the anguish of a long transition from clanship to commercialism long before the ’45. He points to the same development as Macinnes, where the gentry of the clans transitioned from chieftains to a position close to landlords. Devine acknowledges that the pacification of the Highlands after Culloden accelerated this process but claims that ‘it was effective precisely because clanship was already in decline’.289 Nonetheless, Devine’s final conclusion disregards the new laws and the military occupation as crucial factors to clanship’s end. Instead he concludes: ‘What finally and irrevocably transformed social relations in the Highlands were the irresistible market pressures emanating from Lowland industrialisation and urbanisation in the second half of the eighteenth

282 Ibid. 283 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788, 221-228. 284 Macinnes, "The Aftermath of the ‘45," 103. 285 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788, 234. 286 T. M. Devine, Clanship to Crofters’ War: The social transformation of the Scottish Highlands (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 28. 287 Ibid., 30. 288 Ibid. 289 Ibid., 30-31. Quote on p. 31

century.’290 Devine thus states that the economic revolution in the south, which gathered speed in the 1760s and 1770s, was the cause of the termination of the clan system, not Culloden.291 In sum, the Whig historians to a great extent regard Culloden as the death of clanship and perceive this development as beneficial and positive for both Scotland and Britain as a whole. The romantic historians also connect the decline of clanship to Culloden but consider the demise of the clan system as a terrible implication of the aftermath of the battle. The revisionists, however, are generally more neutral in the matter. All three historical views agree that there was a substantial social upheaval in Scotland after the Battle of Culloden in 1746, and that clanship rapidly declined. But whereas Whig and romantic historians largely contribute this development to Jacobitism, Culloden and its aftermath, several revisionists rather consider other contemporary factors to have been the decisive cause. Some revisionists, such as the archaeologist Tony Pollard (1965-), consider Culloden to have been more influential on the termination of clanship than Devine asserts, but these academics still tend to include other factors in their analysis as well, and thus conceive Culloden as more of a contributing aspect rather than the final cause.292

5.2.2 The end of the Highland way of life? Many historians claim that Culloden not only ended the clan system, but the entire Highland way of life. The Whig historian Trevelyan is of this belief. He writes in English Social History: ‘In the years following the suppression of the ‘forty-five,’ the whole manner of life and society, which had prevailed in the mountains of Scotland with little change since prehistoric times, was swept away at a blow.’293 He continues to claim that ‘the tribal system, the kilted warrior with broadsword and target, the patriarchal rule of the chief, vanished for ever’.294 Even though Trevelyan asserts that Culloden ended the Highland way of life, he also alleges that this process started earlier with Lowland influences entering the hills before the ’45. Trevelyan thus states that the decline in the Highland way of life would have occurred anyway, but that it would have happened more gradually, had it not been for the government losing its patience with the ‘raiding tribes’ in the Highlands due to the Jacobite Rebellions.295

290 Ibid., 31. 291 Ibid. 292 Pollard, "Introduction: The Battle of Culloden - More than a Difference of Opinion," 12. 293 Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria, 453. 294 Ibid. 295 Ibid., 453-454.

75 The romantic historian Prebble also asserts, in accordance with Trevelyan, that Culloden terminated the Highland way of life. Prebble writes that ‘the legislation which most immediately destroyed the Highland way of life was that which took from its people the kilt, plaid and clothing of tartan weave’296, i.e. the Dress Act which was part of the Act of Proscription of 1746. According to Prebble, anyone who was found guilty of wearing the Highland dress would be imprisoned without bail and then liable to be ‘transported to any of His Majesty’s plantations beyond the sea, for seven years’.297 The Act banning the Highland dress was actually lifted again in 1782.298 Nevertheless, the damage was already done, according to Prebble. He claims that by 1782 the old attachment to the Highland dress had died, the old patterns were forgotten, and the skill of making dyes from the herbs of the hills was also long gone.299 There was later a romantic revival of the Highland dress in the 1820s, but this revival had little to do with the original Highland dress that had been used by the Highlanders as everyday clothing. It became more of a national symbol instead, for special occasions, most popular among the highest levels of society.300 The Highland dress was thus no longer what it used to be, and according to Prebble, ‘tartans were invented and ascribed to this clan or that’301, resulting in clan patterns being created that no Highlander at Culloden would have recognised. Consequently, Prebble concludes that the Highland way of life was lost with the Battle of Culloden. The banning of the Highland dress took away the clans’ pride and sense of belonging. Prebble also emphasises that the Act of Proscription of 1747, prohibiting the teaching of Gaelic, resulted in the number of Gaelic speakers declining. The English language was promoted at the expense of Gaelic, and consequently the use of Gaelic diminished. The abolishment of the Highland dress, in combination with the ban of the bagpipe and the dwindling of the Gaelic language, thus resulted in a decline of the Gaelic culture, according to Prebble. The Heritable Jurisdictions Act destroyed the political and social system of clanship, and in total, Prebble asserts that these changes ended the Highland way of life.302 Most of the revisionists have quite a similar approach to this matter as to the question of the decline of clanship. They agree that there was a big social upheaval in Scotland after

296 Prebble, Culloden, 327. 297 Ibid., 328. 298 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 193; Prebble, Culloden, 330. 299 Prebble, Culloden, 330. 300 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745, 194. 301 Prebble, Culloden, 330-331. 302 Ibid., 331.

Culloden, changing the Highland way of life considerably. Still, most revisionist academics do not blame Culloden alone for this development but perceive Jacobitism and the battle of Culloden as part of many contributing factors. The revisionist Lenman, for instance, regards the banning of the Highland dress as ‘a sad rather than an epoch-making event’.303 Consequently, Lenman does not consider the Act of Proscription as being of severe effect for the Highlands. However, he perceives the abolition of the heritable jurisdictions as epoch- making.304 Hence, Lenman attributes the Heritable Jurisdictions Act considerable significance in the diminish of the Highland way of life but does not consider it the cause alone. All in all, the Whig and romantic academics largely perceive the Battle of Culloden as the final destruction of the entire Highland way of life. However, many Whig historians claim that this development would have occurred one way or another anyway, whereas the romantic historians to a great extent view this as a direct social and cultural implication of Culloden, purposely executed by the government to violate the Scots. The revisionists on the other hand, are more reserved in their interpretation of the events, viewing Culloden as a contributing factor, but not the crucial element that caused the definite end to the Highland way of life.

5.2.3 Did a planned extinction of native Scottish Celts follow the Jacobite defeat at Culloden? Many historians have claimed that the Battle of Culloden not only resulted in the death of clanship and the end to the Highland way of life, but that it also led to a subsequent extinction of the native Celts of Scotland, planned and executed through government policies. In the immediate aftermath of Culloden, it has thus been asserted that the government tried to break Scotland’s cultural divergence from the wider British polity by systematically removing and assimilating the Scottish Celts. Chevalier de Johnstone, an ex-Jacobite who had fought in the British forces in North America after Culloden, allegedly noted on returning to France, that almost a ‘total extermination of the race of Highlanders’305 had since Culloden taken place. Apparently, Chevalier de Johnstone blamed this on the policy of the British Government, the emigration of Scots to the colonies, and on the numerous Highland regiments in the British

303 Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746, 277. 304 Ibid. 305 Chevalier de Johnstone quoted in Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 116.

77 Army. The Highland regiments predominantly consisted of Jacobites forced to join their ranks, and, according to Chevalier de Johnstone, these units were to a large extent cut to pieces in successive wars after Culloden, such as the Seven Years War.306 Traditionally, it has thus been argued that a social and cultural implication of Culloden was the extinction of the native Celts of Scotland. But was this the case? Do historians perceive Culloden as the end to the native Scottish Celts as well? The claim for this systematic extinction of the Celts can be comprehended in relation to the other alleged social and cultural implications of Culloden already discussed in this chapter, as well as in connection to the political implications debated in the three preceding chapters. Many Whig historians admit that an extinction of native Scottish Celts to some extent occurred after Culloden, but that this was a necessary development. According to the Whig historian Charles Chenevix Trench, this partly extinction of the Celts was essential to bring the Highlands into the modern world, to increase the prosperity of Scotland, and to smother the spirit of rebellion.307 Trevelyan is also of this opinion.308 According to historians of the Whig belief, this was a development that was predetermined to happen, and that was part of England’s calling to civilise the uncivilised. Many traditional Whig historians assert that the English were cultural superior, regarding the Scottish Celts as ‘a war party of Iroquois’.309 The government’s treatment of, and arguably extinction of, the Celts, was thus on accord with the conduct towards native peoples elsewhere in the world in the 18th century. For instance, many parallels can be drawn to the actions carried out against Native Americans. This treatment of native peoples was not only executed by Britain at the time, but also by other colonial powers, such as France. The Whig historians therefore to a large extent consider the behaviour towards the Scottish Celts within the context of Britain’s global fight against uncivilised native peoples, especially in the colonies.310 Accordingly, traditional Whig historians maintain that the almost extinction of the Celts was a considerate act by the government aimed at helping Scotland. Many of the early traditional romantic historians regard the claimed extinction of the Celts after Culloden to have been tragic, but still a ‘beneficial defeat of an outmoded way of life by modernity’.311 The more recent romantic historians, however, perceive the events very

306 Ibid. 307 Trench, George II, 242. 308 Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria, 418. 309 Trench, George II, 234. 310 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 117, 126-127 & 132-133. 311 Ibid., 10.

differently. They agree with the Whig historians and the early romantic historians that Culloden resulted in a partial extinction of the Celts of Scotland, but they consider these actions as totally horrendous. The recent romantic historians also go much further in their analysis and interpretation, not being content with the conclusion of ‘partial extinction’. The romantic historian Macinnes writes: ‘The immediate aftermath of the ‘Forty-Five was marked by systematic state terrorism, characterised by a genocidal intent that verged on ethnic cleansing.’312 Macinnes, and many other romantics with him, for instance Prebble, thus characterise the events in the aftermath of Culloden as a planned genocide on the Scottish Celts. Most revisionists would not deem the aftermath of Culloden as ethnic cleansing, believing this term to be too strong, but still agreeing that the aftermath had elements of it. The revisionist Pittock claims that the charge of genocide, presented by several romantic historians, might be seen by some as inflammatory. He does therefore not describe the aftermath of Culloden as such himself, but still asserts that ‘what might now be termed ‘ethnic cleansing’ was certainly considered in the aftermath of Culloden and to a limited and unsystematic degree took place’.313 Among others, Pittock emphasises that a lot of the Jacobites who were forced to enlist in the British Army, were sent to dangerous and disease- ridden colonies such as Antigua and Jamaica, as well as to the Canadian front.314 He claims that the casualty rates among infantry from ex-Jacobite areas in the Canadian war were extremely high, and according to Pittock, this was a deliberate policy from the government. He alleges that the British during the Seven Years War (1756-63) had a policy of ‘internal clearance of native peoples and francophones’315, and consequently also intentionally exposed the ex-Jacobite soldiery to the most dangerous missions. Arguably, this could be viewed as part of the government’s attempt to get rid of the Celts. Pittock also criticises the Whig historians’ assertions of the partial extinction of the Scottish Celts being necessary to modernise Scotland. He asserts that Culloden was not ‘a catalyst for the triumph of British modernity’316, and believe Whig historians’ conception of modernity to be wrong. Pittock claims that Jacobitism in itself was a ‘variant form of modernity’317, and that ‘the Jacobite army was a much more modern fighting unit than it is

312 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788, 211. 313 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 112. 314 Ibid., 109 & 116. 315 Ibid., 116. 316 Ibid., 158. 317 Ibid., 5.

79 given credit for’.318 Pittock is thus neither of the opinion that the aftermath of Culloden modernised Scotland, nor that the claimed partial extinction of Scottish Celts was necessary. Geoffrey Plank, who arguably has a revisionist approach, further remarks that ‘the operations of Cumberland’s army after 1745 represented the continuation of a long historical process’.319 As Plank asserts, the attempt at reforming the Celts was a pursuit various kings and queens of England and Scotland had been alternately battling and trying to achieve for centuries. According to Plank, this ‘civilising process’ had been attempted at since the Middle Ages, and not just in Scotland, but also in Cornwall, Wales and Ireland, due to the Celtic peoples living there. The endeavour of civilising and assimilating the Scottish Celts was thus not a new one, although Plank to some extent agrees that the measures taken by the government after Culloden were more harsh and extreme than before.320 Plank does not seem to believe that a planned extinction of the Celts of Scotland took place, but that this still might have happened to a certain degree due to other factors impacting the government’s measures. If we believe Devine’s statements presented earlier, the reason why the civilising attempt verging on extinction of the Scottish Celts might have worked better this time, was that clanship already was in decline, and that the Scottish society was in the midst of an ongoing process of change due to other social and economic pressures.321 Accordingly, an extinction of Scottish Celts might to some extent have occurred, but not as a direct result of Culloden and the government’s actions alone. Interestingly, most historians, no matter scholarly affiliation, seem to assert that an extinction of the Celts of Scotland happened to a certain degree after the Battle of Culloden. Both the Whig and romantic academics are of the opinion that this was a deliberate policy from the government. However, the Whig historians believe this was a development that would have happened at some point or another anyway, whereas the romantic historians see the attack on the Scottish Celts as a direct social and cultural implication of Culloden. Moreover, Whig history portrays these incidents as merciful actions designed to help Scotland. The romantic historians, on the other hand, perceive them as cruel deeds carried out to punish, weaken and crush Scotland. Lastly, Whig historians further claim that the extinction was only partial and beneficial for Scotland, whereas the romantics consider these events as an atrocious genocide. Contrarily, the revisionists do not believe that a planned

318 Ibid. 319 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire, 8. 320 Ibid., 8-9. 321 Devine, Clanship to Crofters’ War: The social transformation of the Scottish Highlands, 30-31.

extinction of Celts was carried through after Culloden, but that it to a limited degree happened without being carefully planned. The aftermath of Culloden thus incorporated elements of what might be deemed ‘ethnic cleansing’, but the revisionists believe that this occurred unsystematically and to a restricted extent. Some revisionists also assert that this development not necessarily was a direct consequence of Culloden alone.

5.2.4 Did Culloden put an end to a distinct Scottish identity? Many historians also maintain that the Battle of Culloden in 1746 was followed by an attempt to suppress the sense of a Scottish national identity, and rather create a British identity to unify the entire British state. The more recent moderate Whig historian Linda Colley argues that the 18th century witnessed an official effort to construct a new understanding of a British nationality and identity. According to Colley, this new sense of Britishness was endeavouring to accommodate various English, Scottish and Welsh traditions, and unite the peoples of Britain against a few shared antagonisms, particularly France and the Catholic Church. Nationalism and the concept of nation states were generally gaining a foothold in Europe at this time, and Britain was no exception. The creation of a British nationalism and identity was thus attempted.322 The revisionist historian Pollard to a large extent agrees with Colley. He alleges that no matter if the aftermath of Culloden resulted in an ethnic cleansing or not, the Union of 1707, Jacobitism and Culloden certainly brought with them ‘an attempt to suppress any expression of Scottish national identity’.323 The Scottish identity was suppressed, while the creation of a British identity was sought instead. Pollard further asserts that ‘this perhaps most obviously manifested itself through the renaming of the country as ‘North Britain’ on maps of the period’.324 In other words, another implication of the Union of 1707 and Culloden was that the name ‘Scotland’ was lost on maps and in documents of the period and rather substituted with ‘North Britain’. This clearly demonstrates an attempt to create a sense of ‘Britain’ and suppress Scotland’s own national identity. The revisionist Pittock, however, does not agree. He asserts that Culloden ‘no more ended Scotland and Scottish identity than it encapsulated it’.325

322 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 86-98. 323 Pollard, "Introduction: The Battle of Culloden - More than a Difference of Opinion," 15. 324 Ibid. 325 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 158.

81 Daniel Szechi, another revisionist academic, alleges that Jacobitism helped create British patriotism.326 Paradoxically, he also points out that Jacobitism simultaneously might have been ‘instrumental in laying the first seeds of the disintegration of the very British patriotism it helped create’.327 This last statement is very true, especially today, when Jacobitism definitely could be asserted to have contributed to the creation of a strong Scottish nationalism, Scottish national identity and Scottish patriotism. Today, the Jacobites are an important part of the distinct Scottish identity. The cultural memory of the Jacobites as true Scottish patriots has been diligently used in the growing national Scottish movement working for Scottish independence today, and consequently contributed to a disintegration of the British identity. It can thus be claimed that the tables have turned. Jacobitism and Culloden might initially have led to a suppression of Scottish identity and the creation of Britishness but have in the post-Culloden centuries counteracted this process, by playing an important role in the creation of today’s Scottish identity, nationalism and patriotism. Many present-day Scots thus feel very strongly that they are Scottish, not British.

5.3 The Scottish Clearances

Several historians have regarded the Scottish Clearances occurring in the late 18th and early 19th centuries as a direct consequence of the Battle of Culloden and its aftermath. This was a period of time from the 1760s when large parts of the Scottish population were removed from vast areas in Scotland. This is a highly controversial topic, with great disagreements within the scholarly debate. Historians dispute why these clearances occurred, and whether or not the Scottish population being dispossessed was forced or moved voluntarily. Arguably, the Scottish population was dispersed across the seas, leaving the hills and glens completely empty, never again to be inhabited to this day. Some historians argue that this was a circumstance only occurring in the Highlands, thus denominating the process the Highland Clearances, whereas other historians allege that the Clearances also included the Lowlands, and consequently label the period the Scottish Clearances. Were the Clearances a social implication of the Battle of Culloden in 1746? Were these evictions carried out as part of a conscious effort to remove Celts from Scotland, or were they purely a result of economic and social factors leading to population decline in rural Scotland? Can the Clearances be

326 Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788, 137. 327 Ibid.

considered a continuation of the alleged extinction process of Scottish Celts following Culloden? The romantic historians are very distinct in their understanding of the Clearances. The romantic academic Prebble regards the Clearances as a direct consequence of Culloden and its aftermath. He claims that these evictions only occurred in the Highlands, and that they were a conscious effort from the government to remove Highlanders and Islanders from Scotland. His position in this matter is made clear at the outset of his book The Highland Clearances (1963): ‘This book, then, is the story of how the Highlanders were deserted and then betrayed. It concerns itself with people, how sheep were preferred to them, and how bayonet, truncheon and fire were used to drive them from their homes.’328 Prebble thus asserts that the Clearances were a result of conscious British policies to empty the Highlands. According to him, the government largely achieved their goal. However, Prebble does not blame the government alone, he also denunciates the Scottish landlords who carried out the government’s policies and consequently the evictions. He has a Marxist view on the matter, claiming that the chieftains betrayed and exploited their tenants to achieve commercial profit. Prebble therefore ascertains that the Clearances were a direct social implication of Culloden, functioning as a continuation of the extinction process Prebble believes occurred in the immediate aftermath of the battle, leading to what Prebble more or less describes as a holocaust on Scottish Celts.329 The romantic historian Macinnes is also of much of the same opinion as Prebble. He states that the ‘traumatic aftermath of the ‘Forty-Five’330 led to an acceleration of Clearance. Macinnes might seem slightly less fierce in his conception of the events, but he still appears to view the Scottish Clearances as a continuation of the alleged ‘genocidal intent’331 on the part of the government. Macinnes also maintains that the Clearances, as well as the ‘decisive shift from demand- to resource-management within Gaeldom’332, confirmed ‘the demise of clanship as a distinctive social, economic, administrative, political and cultural entity’.333 The historian Gordon Donaldson (1913-1993) allegedly declared Prebble’s book on the Clearances to be ‘utter rubbish’. Donaldson is somewhat difficult to categorise within the three historical views discussed in this thesis, but he seems to have Whig tendencies in his

328 John Prebble, The Highland Clearances (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), 8. 329 Ibid. 330 Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788, 233. 331 Ibid., 211. 332 Ibid., 234. 333 Ibid.

83 interpretation of the Scottish Clearances. Donaldson argues that the social structure of the Highlands was outdated, and that a transformation of Highland life had begun long before 1745. He thus asserts that this change was not related to either the Battle of Culloden or the Clearances, claiming that the process started much earlier and would have been completed regardless of Jacobitism. According to Donaldson, it was the industrial revolution and the desire for an increased economic efficiency that caused the Clearances. Donaldson states that the Clearances led to a considerable number of people being moved to crofts on the coasts to engage in fishing rather than farming, as part of an initiative to make room for large sheep- farms. He also admits that in this process some needless brutality was used but alleges that the development overall was positive for Scotland, and that it in no way was associated with any kind of ethnic cleansing.334 There are certain disagreements within the Whig camp. For instance, the Whig historian Christopher Sinclair-Stevenson blames the Jacobite threat for holding back the progress of Scotland for a century and a half. Accordingly, he writes: ‘If the spirit of the Union had been allowed to flourish, economic, political and agricultural development would have advanced rapidly.’335 According to Sinclair-Stevenson, Jacobitism prevented this development from unfolding, and consequently, the Jacobite conflict led to the Clearances being necessary. Had it not been for Jacobitism, ‘the Highland Clearances would not have taken place’.336 However, the Whig historian Trevelyan is of a slightly different opinion. He does not believe that the Highlanders were dispossessed against their will during the Clearances, but that they rather emigrated because they wanted to and finally had realised the existence of this option. According to Trevelyan, the Clearances were thus not a forced dispossession of Scots by the government, but a period of large-scale voluntary emigration following Culloden.337 The revisionists also have varying opinions on the matter. Pittock asserts that limited clearances occurred in the immediate aftermath of Culloden, as an attempt to control the Jacobites after the battle. He also claims that Cumberland was influenced by colonial policy, getting ideas from actions done to people in the colonies, such as to native or francophone peoples in Canada. These people were ‘driven out’, and according to Pittock, Cumberland got the idea of clearances from such colonial incidents. Cumberland thus initially considered

334 Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: The Shaping of a Nation (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1980), 166-170. 335 Sinclair-Stevenson, Inglorious Rebellion: The Jacobite Risings of 1708, 1715 and 1719, 2. 336 Ibid. 337 Trevelyan, English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries: Chaucer to Queen Victoria, 454-455.

transporting the entire population of certain districts of Scotland, to get the upper hand with the Jacobites. Pittock consequently alleges that Culloden and the Clearances were indeed historically linked, although he claims that there were not solely Jacobites or solely Celts that were dispossessed. Hence, Pittock asserts that Culloden and the subsequent Clearances were related, but that the Clearances still to a great extent occurred due to economic considerations. The Clearances were not a conscious planned and systematic extinction of Scottish Celts either, according to Pittock, as the evictions affected larger parts of the Scottish society.338 The revisionist Pollard also states that ‘it is an oversimplification to regard them [the Clearances] as a direct result of the ’45 and Culloden’.339 He agrees with Pittock that there was a link between the Clearances and Culloden, but similarly to Pittock, Pollard ascertains that there were many other factors leading up to the Clearances as well, and there was thus not a direct cause and effect relationship between the two. The revisionist historian Devine criticises Prebble’s The Highland Clearances for being under-researched and lacking in critical perspective. In his own book The Scottish Clearances: A History of the Dispossessed, 1600-1900 (2018), Devine presents a revised account of the Clearances. He asserts that lots of lives changed in the interests of economic efficiency in this period but claims that these events were not connected to Jacobitism and Culloden. According to Devine, there had been a series of clearances in Scotland preceding Culloden, and the Scottish Clearances in the late 18th and early 19th centuries were thus part of a development spanning centuries. Devine further asserts that the Clearances did not have as dreadful consequences as the romantic historians claim. According to Devine, it is true that many people were forced to leave their homes, causing depopulation in certain areas, but not necessarily in all parts of the Scottish regions. The historical records actually show that, as a whole, there was population growth in the Highland regions during the period of the Clearances. Consequently, the Clearances did not empty the Highlands completely, as many romantic academics assert. However, Devine alleges that the Highlands to some extent were ‘emptied’ later on. He claims that after the 1850s, many more Gaels left the Highlands, and the population in these regions consequently fell into decline. According to Devine, this depopulation was then due to voluntary emigration occurring after the Era of the Clearances, not the evictions during the Clearances themselves. This development was similar to what happened in many other European countries in the 19th century, such as, for instance, in

338 Pittock, Great Battles: Culloden, 111-112. 339 Pollard, "Introduction: The Battle of Culloden - More than a Difference of Opinion," 11.

85 Norway. Many Scots emigrated to countries such as America to achieve a better life and the ‘American Dream’. Devine is also of the opinion that the Era of the Clearance was a period which saw dispossessions in both the Highlands and the Lowlands alike. Hence, Devine refers to the period as the Scottish Clearances. Conclusively, Devine does not consider the Clearances as a social implication of Culloden. He rather believes that these evictions were a process occurring due to economic factors, not Jacobitism or Culloden. They affected all of Scotland, and consequently, Devine does not perceive the Clearances as part of a planned extinction of native Celts.340 The revisionist historian Eric Richards (1940-) also acknowledges the abiding paradox of the fact that ‘the population of the Highlands continued to rise throughout the classic years of the Clearances until 1851’341, at the same time as the dispossessions were carried through. He offers an explanation for this, emphasising that many of the displaced Highlanders resettled within the region, thus not leaving the region or the country entirely. Hence, Richards contradicts the claim of a total extinction of native Celts occurring in the Era of the Clearances.342 Still, Richards asserts that the Clearances coincided with a steep decline of the entire Gaelic culture and language.343 He states that the numbers of Gaelic-speakers fell considerably in this period due to an ‘inexorable incursion of the English language’.344 Thus, even though Richards does not regard the Clearances as an extinction of the native Celts of Scotland, he considers these evictions to have been paralleled by a deterioration of the Gaelic culture and language. In conclusion, there are great disagreements in the scholarly debate on the Scottish Clearances in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, also within the various historical approaches. The discussion is not black and white with clear cut divisions between academics, and it is thus possible to find historians within different camps agreeing on many elements. For instance, the Whig historian Donaldson and the revisionist historian Devine are in accordance with each other on certain aspects of the debate. Still, overall, the romantic historians tend to consider the Clearances as a direct social implication of Culloden. They claim that the evictions were designed as a conscious effort from the government to remove the Scottish Celts as part of the planned extinction process initiated in the immediate

340 Devine, The Scottish Clearances: A History of the Dispossessed, 1600-1900, 1-14. 341 Eric Richards, Debating the Highland Clearances, ed. Steve Boardman and Ewen Cameron, Debates and Documents in Scottish History (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 5. 342 Ibid. 343 Ibid., 3 & 7. 344 Ibid., 85.

aftermath of Culloden. The Whig historians, on the other hand, are not entirely in agreement. Sinclair-Stevenson and Trevelyan regard the Clearances as a consequence of Jacobitism and Culloden, whereas Donaldson does not see them as a social implication of the battle. However, they all concede that the Clearances were not an ethnic cleansing of Celts, Donaldson claiming that the dispossessions were a result of economic factors, whereas Trevelyan maintains that they were a question of voluntary emigration. Lastly, some revisionists, such as Pittock and Pollard, detect a historical link between Culloden and the Clearances, but perceive it as an oversimplification to regard it as a direct cause and effect relationship. Devine, however, asserts that the Scottish Clearances were not a social implication of Culloden, but were solely caused by interests of economic efficiency. Nevertheless, all the revisionist historians agree that the Clearances were no conscious effort from the government’s side to achieve an extinction of the native Celts of Scotland.

5.4 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has shown that the social and cultural implications of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 are a complicated matter. The opinions are many, and vary greatly, also within the three different scholarly views. All historians agree that the period succeeding Culloden was a time of considerable social and cultural upheaval in Scotland and could certainly be claimed to represent a historic discontinuity. However, they disagree on what caused these extensive changes, and to what extent they can be reckoned as implications of Culloden. In general, the romantic historians consider the end to the clan system, the decline in Gaelic culture and language, the depopulation of Scotland, and consequently, the final destruction of the Highland way of life, as direct social and cultural consequences of the Battle of Culloden. They further assert that the depopulation was no arbitrary incident, but the result of the government’s attempt at eradicating the Scottish Celts through measures taken in the immediate aftermath of Culloden and the Scottish Clearances. Accordingly, romantic historians claim that this treatment of the Celts more or less resembled a genocide or a holocaust. These changes were thus very negative for Scotland and are viewed by the romantics as a violation of Scottish society and culture. The Whig historians also relate the above-mentioned social and cultural changes to Culloden, alleging that the battle accelerated and intensified these processes. However, they assert that these alterations of the Scottish society were part of a predetermined development that would have occurred anyway, regardless of Culloden. According to the Whig academics,

87 a partial extinction of the Celts did transpire in the immediate aftermath of Culloden, but they do not consider the Clearances an attempt at ethnic cleansing. Overall, Whig historians reckon that the social and cultural changes after Culloden were a beneficial and positive development for Scotland, assisted by the British Government. The revisionist historians, on the other hand, seem to regard the social and cultural transformations within a wider context. They also concede that all these changes to the Scottish society and culture did occur after Culloden, in accordance with the Whig and romantic historians, but they do not perceive them as direct consequences of the battle. According to most revisionists, the Battle of Culloden contributed to these developments in Scotland but was not the sole cause. These social and cultural alterations were part of an already ongoing and complex process affected by a variety of factors. The revisionist historians also admit that a depopulation transpired in Scotland after Culloden. Still, they claim that this was not a planned effort to achieve an ethnic cleansing of Celts, despite some elements of this occurring to an unsystematic and limited degree. Besides, some revisionists assert that most of the depopulation actually occurred after the immediate aftermath of Culloden and the Clearances. Most historians also seem to maintain that Jacobitism and Culloden had religious implications, resulting in an intensification of the suppression of Catholics and Episcopalians. The Jacobite conflict was arguably part of a series of wars and conflicts where religious issues were involved, and Culloden’s religious impact was thus also part of an already ongoing process. However, Culloden intensified and accelerated this development by resulting in major legislation being enacted to subdue ‘rebellious’ religious faiths. Consequently, Culloden could be asserted to have contributed to the evolvement of Scotland as a mainly Presbyterian country. As well as the religious suppression, there was also evidently an attempt from the government to suppress Scottish national identity and create a new British identity after Culloden. However, in the long run, this does not seem to have worked as intended. To conclude that the immediate aftermath of Culloden and the Scottish Clearances resulted in a total extinction of the Scottish Celts, seems to be an overstatement, considering the existence of direct descendants of Celts in Scotland today. However, there is no doubt that the post-Culloden period experienced a considerable decline in the Gaelic population, language and culture. All historians also seem to agree that the clan system ended after Culloden, and that the traditional Highland way of life dwindled. The Scottish society experienced a radical social and cultural alteration. Hence, even though there are

disagreements on whether or not the Scottish Clearances were a social implication of Culloden, few would contradict that the aftermath of Culloden and the Clearances as a whole, did contribute to a depopulation and cultural decline in Scotland. In sum, it is apparent that the suppression of certain religious faiths and a distinct Scottish national identity, the decline in Gaelic culture and language, the depopulation of Scotland, and the end to the clan system and the Highland way of life, in the 18th and 19th centuries, terminated what has been deemed ‘old’ Scotland. Scotland changed substantially, and experienced a huge political, economic, social and cultural upheaval. Nevertheless, this was most likely a gradual process and not a rapid turmoil caused by Culloden alone. The implications of Culloden and the Clearances seem to have been part of an ongoing process and were thus closely intertwined with other contemporary events and their results. Generally, the 18th and 19th centuries were a period of great change all over Europe, with the Enlightenment ideas and the Industrial Revolution leaving their marks. However, since Culloden was the last pitched battle on British soil and the last conflict where many Scots participated organised in clans, it also represents the last time the arguably ‘old’ system and structure of Scotland was at work. After Culloden, the decline of the ‘old’ Scotland was seen more evidently. It is thus presumably safe to assert that Culloden contributed to and accelerated these social and cultural changes in Scotland. Consequently, the battle assisted the decline of ‘old’ Scotland, definitely being significant in a social and cultural context, but Culloden was most likely not the sole cause of this development.

89 6 Conclusion

This thesis has explored the significance of the Battle of Culloden in 1746 by discussing historians’ views on the political, social and cultural implications of the battle. The introductory chapter identified three distinct scholarly views within the historiographical debate: the Whig approach, the romantic approach and the revisionist approach. Accordingly, I have categorised relevant historians as I see fit within these three traditions and used this as a basis for my discussion of the various claimed consequences of Jacobitism and Culloden. The thesis has consequently, to the best of its ability, answered these questions: To what extent do historians perceive the Battle of Culloden in 1746 as significant? What were the political, social and cultural implications of the conflict? Was Culloden ‘the battle that made Britain’? Conclusively, I will try to recapitulate the results of my research.

6.1 Was Culloden a battle of significance?

The discussion in this thesis has proved that the Battle of Culloden’s significance is a highly disputed topic. The Whig historians generally tend to be more subdued in their assessment of Culloden’s importance, maintaining that the claimed implications of Culloden were part of an already ongoing and predestined process. Consequently, Culloden in itself, was more or less a negligible battle. The romantic and revisionist historians, however, perceive Culloden as a battle of major significance, but for different reasons. The romantic historians greatly emphasise Culloden’s political, social and cultural importance for Scotland. They might also agree that the battle was significant to a certain degree for British and international politics, but it is the consequences for Scotland they stress the most. The romantic historians thus assert that Culloden resulted in political implications for Scotland, such as the final loss of Scotland’s independence, an extensive military occupation of the country, and the enactment of a series of legal acts to punish and integrate the Scots. According to the romantics, these political changes caused a major social and cultural upheaval resulting in the end of the clan system, the decline in Gaelic culture and language, the final destruction of the Highland way of life, and a genocide on Scottish Celts. Hence, the romantic academics conclude that Culloden was of considerable significance for the development in Scotland, causing a set of negative implications, that more or less destroyed the traditional Scottish society and culture.

The revisionist historians, on the other hand, also consider Culloden to be a battle of significance. However, they specifically emphasise Culloden’s importance in a political context. The revisionists tend to regard Culloden as an epoch-making battle in Scottish, British and even international politics. In a Scottish context, the revisionist academics claim that Culloden endangered the political stability in Scotland and led to the final loss of Scotland’s sovereignty and independence, a subjugation by the British Parliament, a faster integration of Scotland into the Union of 1707, and consequently a consolidation of this union. Within British politics, many revisionist historians also consider Jacobitism and Culloden as an important factor, especially due to the extensive activity they claim to have uncovered among English Jacobites. Accordingly, many revisionists assert that Culloden ended the possibility of a Stuart restoration, cemented the Hanoverian rule, and consequently, terminated the last dynastic war in Britain. Some revisionists also allege that Culloden initiated a period of relative peace in the British state, and contributed to the creation of a stable polity, the onset of the Industrial Revolution, the forging and development of the British Empire, and the birth of Britain as a new global power. Lastly, and maybe most controversially, some revisionist historians state that Culloden had major global significance. They claim to have found evidence of a substantial Jacobite support in as many as ten countries, resulting in the Jacobites having representatives within a number of prominent European Courts. Some revisionists also argue that the Battle of Culloden caused a diffusion and growth in the international Jacobite movement. Further they allege that the Jacobite conflict impacted the War of the Spanish Succession and the War of the Austrian succession, and consequently was part of a greater power struggle between Britain and other European nations, predominantly France, propelling Britain on as a dominant world power and colonial power. In addition, some revisionists use counterfactual arguments in their discussions, claiming that Culloden also would have had great political implications if the outcome at Culloden had been reversed. All in all, the revisionists consider Culloden to be a battle of major significance, especially within political affairs. After delving into this diverse and extensive scholarly debate on the significance of Jacobitism and the Battle of Culloden in 1746, the conflict appears to have been relatively significant for the political, social and cultural development in the consequent period until 1850, which is the period I have been studying in this thesis. The topic is still sensitive, debated, controversial and disputed to this day, which emphasises these events’ importance. In a Scottish and British political context, historians seem to agree that Culloden exerted political pressure on the Union of 1707, leaving it in a vulnerable position, and arguably,

91 determining its future development and existence. According to the historian Linda Colley, the Battle of Culloden was the last time a British or English monarch had to repel a Scottish invasion of England, chose to invade Scotland because of disruption, or both.345 In my opinion, this demonstrates that Culloden initiated a period of relative peace within the British state by ending the last domestic contestation of the 1707 Act of Union. Consequently, the Union of Great Britain was consolidated and the enmity between Scotland and England seemingly ‘calmed down’ to some extent. Culloden also introduced a period of dynastic peace, being the last dynastic war in Britain. In hindsight, it also seems to be clear that the ‘old’ Scotland was ended after Culloden, arguably never to be seen in its splendour again. After researching this topic, I find it likely to believe that Culloden and its alleged implications were part of an ongoing, gradual and complex process which was closely intertwined with other contemporary events and their results. The developments discussed in this thesis were thus influenced by a range of contributing factors. I do not regard the counterfactual arguments of the revisionists as particularly valid, since they refer to a non-existing reality and accordingly cannot be tested. However, even by excluding this counterfactual potential, it is still, in my opinion, fair to assert that Culloden accelerated and intensified all these political, social and cultural developments, without doubt being a contributing factor, but most likely not the sole cause. Conclusively, Culloden was thus definitely a battle of significance.

6.2 Was Culloden ‘the battle that made Britain’?

There are many ways to interpret and understand the phrase ‘the battle that made Britain’, and the answer to my research question above will thus differ accordingly. From a Whig perspective, Culloden is viewed as a battle that accelerated the integration process of the Scots, although the battle was part of a predetermined process. Culloden and its aftermath accelerated the introduction of Scotland into the modern age, the civilising of the Highland savages, the destruction of the feudalistic and outdated clan system, and the partial extinction of Scottish Celts. Consequently, Whig historians perceive Culloden as a factor which helped subdue Scotland, bring Scotland more in line with England, and thus facilitate the integration of the country into the Union of Great Britain. From a Whig perspective, Culloden assisted in making Scotland more similar to England politically, economically, ethnically, as well as in

345 Colley, Acts of Union and Disunion: What has held the UK together - and what is dividing it?, 87.

social structure, language and culture. The Scots were forced to become more English, and accordingly, they seemed less alien from an English point of view. From a Whig perspective, Culloden could consequently be argued to ‘make Britain’ by making room for modern Britain and getting rid of the ‘old’, and accordingly, help facilitate the continued development of the British nation as a dominant world power. Romantic historians might also to a large extent perceive Culloden as ‘the battle that made Britain’, but regard this ‘making of Britain’ as a negative consequence of the battle. Many of the nationalistic romantic academics wish Scotland had stayed independent and not become part of the British state. These historians therefore see Culloden as the making of Britain in the sense that Culloden led to the final loss of Scotland’s sovereignty and independence, and that Scotland consequently was ‘forced’ under British rule and into the union. Scotland also became more aligned with England in religion, due to the penal laws enacted in the immediate aftermath of Culloden leading to a suppression of Catholics and Episcopalians, and consequently helped Presbyterianism gain more ground. England was largely an Anglican country, whereas Scotland became mainly Presbyterian, but both are forms of Protestantism, and the two countries thus became more religiously aligned. According to the romantic historians, the Celts became more or less extinct as an implication of Culloden, and the English language was forced on the remaining Scots. Accordingly, England and Scotland became further aligned in ethnicity, culture and language. With the clan system and the Highland way of life also disappearing, the ‘making’ of Britain was complete in the romantic historians’ eyes, but at huge expense of Scotland. The romantic historians thus concede that Culloden was ‘the battle that made Britain’ for many of the same reasons as the Whig historians might agree to this. But whereas Whig historians perceive this as a positive development, many of them being Unionists, most romantics are Scottish Nationalists, and consequently consider the same development as negative. Many revisionists might be even more convinced that Culloden was ‘the battle that made Britain’, but solely in a political context. They assert that Culloden defeated the last domestic contestation of the 1707 Act of Union, and consequently consolidated the Union of Great Britain. Many revisionists claim that the Jacobites were a threat to the very existence of the British state, and by defeating this Jacobite threat, the existence of Britain was assured. They thus allege that the Union was ‘saved’ and that the integration of Scotland into the Union was accelerated. From a revisionist perspective, Culloden could therefore be argued to ‘make Britain’ by consolidating the Union. They also allege that Culloden enabled the industrial revolution and laid the foundations for the forging of the British Empire. Hence, in

93 addition, Culloden could be argued to have ‘made Britain’ in the sense that the battle contributed to the development of Britain as a dominant colonial world power on the international stage. Even though the preceding discussion shows that there are many ways to interpret Culloden as ‘the battle that made Britain’, it would probably be slightly naïve and not very well informed to give Culloden the full credit for this creation alone. There were evidently many other factors also influencing the ‘making of Britain’. Anyhow, in my opinion, and I am sure many historians would agree with me, Culloden definitely was a catalytic factor in the creation of today’s British state. So, if Culloden cannot be claimed to have been ‘the battle that made Britain’, it was certainly, in my opinion, ‘the battle that contributed to the making of Britain’.

6.3 Concluding thoughts

One of the most considerable implications of the Battle of Culloden might actually be argued to be the life this battle has obtained outside of scholarly debate. Culloden has lived its own life in the Scottish people’s collective cultural memory in these nearly 300 years since the actual battle. Much of this cultural memory of the battle can be contributed to the romantic approach. Sir Walter Scott arguably founded the romantic view with his historical novel Waverley (1814), even though he himself cannot be deemed a historian. From the 20th century this view has become a more serious and academic scholarly approach but is has still functioned as part of the basis for an ever-growing nationalism in Scotland. Culloden, Jacobitism and this romantic view’s opinions on the events that unfolded, have in combination led to great implications when it comes to Scottish national identity, nationalism and politics. So even though this scholarly view might not be behind these trends anymore, it still helped create them. In this sense, the cultural implications of Culloden were thus far greater than anyone could possibly imagine. I am sure no one at the time of the battle realised what an important role Culloden and the Jacobites would later come to represent in the creation of a Scottish identity, Scottish nationalism and nationalist Scottish history. Today, many Scots are very conscious of their Scottish identity. I have experienced myself to be told off in Scotland for using the word British, a word some Scots solely address as the B-word, more or less indicating that it is a swear word. Many Scots consider themselves to be Scottish, not British. Traditionally, in the ensuing years after Culloden, the

Jacobites were described in words such as ‘the infection of the Jacobites’346, and Culloden was considered a ‘happy extinction’347 and a ‘glorious victory’348. However, this changed with the creation of the romantic view in the 19th century and is thus very different today. If you travel to Culloden Battlefield nowadays, you can visit a memorial put up in memory of the Jacobites (see figure 3). On this memorial cairn is written: ‘The Battle of Culloden was fought on this moor 16th April 1746. The graves of the gallant Highlanders who fought for Scotland & Prince Charlie are marked by the names of their clans.’349 This memorial expresses what might be Figure 3: Memorial on Culloden deemed the national narrative in Battlefield (source: the author) Scotland. This national narrative is very close to the romantic historians’ view on the Battle of Culloden. Like the romantic academics, the memorial singles out the Highlanders as those who fought and died for Jacobitism and describes them in positive words such as ‘gallant’. The text on the cairn also expresses that the Highlanders ‘fought for Scotland’, clearly upholding the nationalistic view that the Jacobites fought for all of Scotland, for the country’s independence, and that the battle to a large extent was a civil war between England and Scotland. This memorial thus illustrates how the Jacobites are remembered in the cultural memory of the Scots, and what an impression Jacobitism, the Battle of Culloden and the romantic view have made.

346 A Minister of the Church of England M.D., "An Antidote against the Infection of the Jacobites, occasioned by the last Papers of Sir John Friend, Sir William Parkins, Mr. Cranburne, &c. who pretend to die in the Communion of the Church of England," in The British Library (London: J. D., 1696), 1. 347 "The History of the Rebellion Raised against His Majesty King George II. From its Rise in August 1745, to its Happy Extinction, by the Glorious Victory at Culloden, On the 16th of April, 1746. Illustrated with Plans of the Battles of Falkirk and Culloden," ibid. (Dublin: A. Reilly, 1746). 348 Ibid. 349 See figure 3.

95 Consequently, Jacobitism and Culloden could be claimed to have contributed to a considerable Scottish nationalism. This nationalism is arguably also an important factor pulling Scotland and England apart today. Even though a devolution process has transpired over the centuries, resulting in Scotland regaining some of its autonomy and a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh, the enmity between the two countries is still present to a certain degree. Many Scots are currently fighting for Scotland’s independence, and Scottish nationalism is still a significant element in this struggle. Arguably, the nationalistic aspect of Jacobitism and Culloden, and the interpretation of the Battle of Culloden as a fight for Scottish independence, might be claimed to play a part in today’s political threat to the British state. If Brexit is executed, and Britain thus leaves the EU as planned, Scotland has indicated that the country will call for a new referendum on Scottish independence. If the results of this vote are in favour of an independent Scotland, this will affect the British state considerably. Brexit is obviously not a battle in the same way as Culloden, but it is definitely a conflict posing a political threat to today’s United Kingdom. If the Battle of Culloden in 1746, at least partially, can be asserted to be ‘the battle that made Britain’, maybe Brexit in the not so distant future will become ‘the battle that broke Britain’?

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