Ending the

Sumit Ganguly

Abstract: The Sri Lankan Civil War erupted in 1983 and dragged on until 2009. The origins of the con- flict can be traced to ’s colonial era and subsequent postcolonial policies that had significantly constrained the social and economic rights of the minority Tamil population. Convinced that political av- enues for redressing extant grievances were unlikely to yield any meaningful results, a segment of the Tamil community turned to violence precipitating the civil war. A number of domestic, regional, and interna- tional efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict all proved to be futile. A military strategy, which involved extraordinary brutality on the part of the Sri Lankan armed forces, brought it to a close. However, few policy initiatives have been undertaken in its wake to address the underlying grievances of the Tamil citizenry that had contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in the first place.

The Sri Lankan Civil War vividly demonstrates the potential brutality and tenuousness of efforts to end civil wars.1 In this case, war termination was the result of an outright military victory. But the conditions that made it possible to end the Sri Lankan Civil War may have been unique: a particular constellation of factors, at systemic, regional, and national levels, proved con- ducive for the pursuit of an unbridled military cam- paign that ended the war. At a systemic level, the ma- jor powers, including the United States and key Euro- pean nations, had tired of the conflict. The two major regional powers, the People’s Republic of China (prc) SUMIT GANGULY, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2017, is and , for differing reasons, chose to either sup- Professor of Political Science and port the Sri Lankan regime as it embarked on a mas- holds the Tagore Chair in Indian sive military onslaught against the rebels or to remain Cultures and Civilizations at Indi- aloof from the conflict. Domestically, the regime that ana University, Bloomington. He had recently assumed power concluded that it had is the author of The Oxford Short found an opportune moment to unleash the full might Introduction to Indian Foreign Policy of its military against the insurgents. Consequently, (2015), Deadly Impasse: Indo-Paki- stani Relations at the Dawn of a New it is unlikely that similar conditions will be present Century (2016), and Ascending India in other contexts. and Its State Capacity (with William In May 2009, after two and a half decades of spo- Thompson, 2017). radic violent conflict, the Sri Lankan Civil War, which

© 2018 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00475

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 arose from the animosity between the ma- when independence came to Sri Lanka in Sumit jority Sinhalese and the minority Tam- 1948 (largely as a consequence of British co- Ganguly il populations, finally drew to a close. The lonial withdrawal from India in 1947), Tam- end of this war was especially bloody, with ils were disproportionately represented in charges of rampant human rights violations public services, higher education, journal- on the part of the two principal parties, the ism, and the legal profession.5 Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation The Sinhala elite, who had worked with Tigers of Tamil (ltte). In the final the British from the early 1930s to bring military assault that lasted from January to about an eventual transfer of power, had early May 2009, some seven thousand eth- paid little heed to the inherently ethnical- nic were killed.2 But the total num- ly plural features of the country. When uni- ber killed in the civil war is a vigorously con- versal adult franchise was extended to all Sri tested subject. The United Nations puts the Lankans in 1931 under the Donoughmore death toll between eighty thousand and one Constitution, no provisions were includ- hundred thousand. The Sri Lankan govern- ed to guarantee minority rights. Not sur- ment, however, challenges those figures.3 prisingly, key members of both the Tam- Apart from the death toll, following the ter- il and Muslim communities had protest- mination of hostilities, as many as three ed the absence of clear-cut provisions for hundred thousand Tamils who had fled the protection of minority rights. Tamils, the war zone were interned in overcrowded unhappy with the constitutional dispen- camps.4 sation, boycotted the elections held un- This essay will discuss the origins of the der the aegis of this constitution. Even the Sri Lankan Civil War, briefly examine its subsequent Soulbury Constitution of 1947, international dimensions (including an which paved the way to independence, did abortive Indian effort to terminate the not include a bill of rights. It did, however, war between 1987 and 1989), discuss the include a clause that prohibited discrimi- third-party negotiations to conclude the nation against any citizen on the basis of conflict, and focus on the politico-military ethnicity or religion, but this constitution- strategy that led to its end. Finally, it will al provision proved to be rather tenuous. argue that the mode in which the war end- In fact, it laid the foundation for what was ed may have damaged the prospects of a soon to emerge as a unitary and majoritar- lasting peace. ian state.6 Worse still, in the aftermath of inde- The origins of the Tamil-Sinhala conflict pendence, Sri Lanka’s first prime minis- can be traced back to Sri Lanka’s colonial ter, Don Stephen Senanayake, passed leg- history. During the period of British colo- islation that effectively disenfranchised a nial rule, which extended from 1815 to 1948, significant segment of the Tamil commu- the minority Tamil community seized var- nity, including the descendants of Tamils ious opportunities for economic advance- who had been brought to Sri Lanka in the ment. To that end, significant numbers of nineteenth century as tea and coffee plan- the community had availed themselves of a tation laborers. The passage of this legis- colonial education, primarily because they lation gave the Sinhalese an effective two- had limited economic opportunities in the thirds majority in Parliament, thereby en- regions in which they were located. The suring their dominance.7 dominant Sinhala community, with marked Senanayake’s successor, Solomon West exceptions, however, had distanced them- Ridgeway Bandaranaike, also exploited, un- selves from the British. Not surprisingly, til his death in 1952, the overrepresentation

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 Ending the of Tamils in both the governmental bureau- goal became moot. The ltte, however, re- Sri Lankan cracies and the private sector to stoke re- mained unalterably committed to the cre- Civil War sentment among the majority communi- ation of a separate Tamil state.11 ty. Among other matters, they argued that Prabhakaran had apparently conclud- since Tamils were disproportionately rep- ed that, after the “standardization” legis- resented in the field of higher education, lation of 1971 and the republican constitu- they were prone to favor fellow Tamils. Ul- tion of 1972, the rights of Tamils in the coun- timately, they passed the try were now under serious assault. He was of 1956, which effectively marginalized the hardly alone in embracing this view of mi- Tamil community in every possible sphere, nority rights. These sentiments were wide- from employment to higher education. ly shared among Tamil youth, who Prabha- Matters worsened over the next two de- karan steadily recruited to the cause of a vi- cades for the Tamil population of the coun- olent revolt against the country’s political try. One important turning point came in order.12 1971 when the regime of Prime Minister introduced a sys- The Civil War is frequently divided into tem of standardization in university ad- four distinct phases, starting in 1983 with missions. This procedure stipulated that the anti-Tamil in the capital city Sinhala students with lower scores could of . This first phase culminated be granted university admissions.8 Not with the Indian intervention in the con- surprisingly, this policy further alienated flict in 1987. The second phase started in Tamil youth and contributed to their radi- 1990 and ended in 1995 with the collapse of calization. Subsequently, in 1972, the coun- the direct talks between the ltte and the try adopted a new constitution. Under government of President Chandrika Ku- the terms of this constitution, Buddhism maratunga. The third phase, in turn, be- was given the foremost status, denigrat- gan in 1995 and ended with the final col- ing other faiths. This decision contribut- lapse of the cease-fire agreement in 2006. ed to a milieu of growing majoritarian sen- The fourth and final phase began shortly timent and created permissive conditions thereafter and lasted until 2009, when the for the growth of anti-Tamil commentary ltte was finally defeated. in public discourse.9 Even though the origins of the Civil War It was against this political backdrop are widely attributed to the anti-Tamil po- that, in 1976, a young Tamil, Velupillai grom that had swept through the capi- Prabhakaran, who had witnessed the anti- tal city of Colombo in July 1983, the cat- Tamil riots of 1958, created the Libera- alyst for the conflict had been set in mo- tion Tigers of as an alterna- tion somewhat earlier by the killing of four tive to the moderate and agitational poli- policemen, in 1979, allegedly by the ltte. tics of the Tamil United Liberation Front Immediately thereafter, the government (tulf).10 The ltte’s political goals were declared a state of emergency in the prov- ostensibly similar to those of the tulf: ince of and in two airports near Co- like the tulf, it had sought a separate lombo and, a week later, Parliament passed Tamil state. However, unlike the tulf, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, it was prepared to wage an armed strug- though modeled on British legislation, in- gle to achieve that goal. In any case, after cluded a number of highly controversial 1983, following the passage of a law that re- provisions. Among them were the author- quired legislators to uphold the territori- ity to imprison individuals accused of in- al integrity of Sri Lanka, the tulf’s stated volvement with terror for up to eighteen

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 months without a trial and virtual immu- low Tamils in the southern state of Tamil Sumit nity for security forces from prosecution. Nadu. Beyond this domestic issue, which Ganguly But despite the passage of this draconi- no government in New Delhi could afford an legislation, matters continued to deteri- to ignore, Prime Minister orate. In mid-July 1983, Sri Lankan security was also concerned about growing Amer- forces killed Charles Anton, the head of the ican influence within Sri Lanka. India was, military wing of the ltte.13 Shortly there- for the most part, then at odds with the after, in retaliation for his killing, the ltte United States. It had, for reasons of both ambushed a Sri Lankan military patrol in regional politics as well as its strategic de- the northern Sri Lankan province of Jaff- pendence on the Soviet Union, refused to na and killed thirteen soldiers. The regime condemn the Soviet invasion and occupa- of President Junius Jayewardene chose to tion of Afghanistan.15 bring the bodies of the slain soldiers to Co- When Indian intelligence agencies re- lombo for a mass funeral. This act no doubt ported that the United States could be seek- inflamed Sinhala sentiments and likely cre- ing naval facilities in the eastern port of ated conducive conditions for a violent re- , New Delhi’s anxieties wors- prisal against the Tamil community. How- ened. Keen on asserting India’s influence ever, there is evidence that elements of the in the domestic while regime quickly became complicit in an or- simultaneously addressing the concerns chestrated attack on Tamils over the course of Indian Tamils, Prime Minister Gandhi of the next few days. Reliable reports sug- sent a diplomatic mission to Sri Lanka in gest that as many as two thousand Tamils November 1983. The individual chosen for were killed in the course of a week in Co- this task, G. Parthasarathy, was a veteran lombo and elsewhere. The police proved to Indian diplomat and the prime minister’s be passive spectators, and there is some ev- confidante. Parthasarathy was tasked with idence that members of the armed forces offering a plan for the devolution of power even participated in the violence.14 to elected regional councils in the Northern In the initial days after the pogrom, in- and Eastern Provinces, where Tamils made stead of offering some solace to the ag- up the majority. Various forms of opposi- grieved Tamil community, the regime of tion from across the political spectrum, but President Jayewardene focused on the re- primarily from the Sinhala parties, and the sentments of the Sinhala community. To lack of support from Sri Lankan President no particular surprise, in the wake of the Junius Jayewardene, effectively torpedoed pogrom and the governmental response, this Indian initiative.16 more than one hundred thousand Tamils In 1983, President Jayewardene gave free were rendered homeless, and several hun- rein to the country’s armed forces to sup- dred thousand fled the country to India over press Tamil militancy. The military crack- the next several years. More to the point, down led to significant casualties, includ- the incidents served as the basis of a sub- ing among the civilian population. Con- stantial recruitment tool for the ltte. In ef- cerned about the possible repercussions of fect, the origins of the full-blown civil war this military operation on the electoral poli- that came to engulf the country for the next tics in Tamil Nadu, Indira Gandhi conveyed thirty odd years can be traced to the tragic her concerns about Tamil civilian casual- events of July 1983. ties. Jayewardene, however, rebuffed her apprehensions. Not one to take kindly to The pogrom in Colombo inflamed public such a response, she granted formal autho- sentiments in India, especially among fel- rization to India’s principal counterintelli-

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 Ending the gence and counterespionage organization, ity of the various Tamil militant groups ac- Sri Lankan the Research and Analysis Wing, to provide ceded to the disarmament requirements and Civil War training and assistance to the various Tamil turned in their weaponry within the spec- militant groups.17 ified seventy-two hours. What India’s po- Over the next several years, the conflict litical leadership, not to mention its intelli- expanded and, in May 1987, the Sri Lan- gence services, had failed to recognize was kan government launched “Operation Lib- that the ltte was quite unreconciled to the eration” with the goal of evicting the ltte terms of the agreement; its members refused from the jungles of northern Sri Lanka. to disarm and quickly turned against the The military onslaught, which was bru- ipkf. As a consequence, the ipkf’s mission tal and included the use of barrel bombs metamorphosed from a peacekeeping to a by the Sri Lankan air force, contributed to peace-enforcement role. Initially, the force a large-scale flight of Tamil civilians seek- scored some notable successes against the ing sanctuary in Tamil Nadu.18 Faced with ltte. For example, in November 1987, after this exodus, the government in New Delhi the relentless offensive “,” embarked on a humanitarian mission and it managed to mostly crush the ltte in the sent in a flotilla of ships with relief supplies. Jaffna Peninsula.21 This, however, did not The Sri Lankan navy, however, intercepted prove to be a decisive victory. The ltte suc- these vessels before they entered Sri Lank- cessfully regrouped and the ipkf became an waters. Faced with this rebuff, India’s embroiled in the Sri Lankan Civil War as policy-makers resorted to an airdrop of re- it sought to defeat the ltte. After a loss of lief supplies. The very next day, after giving 1,200 personnel and unable to make much the government in Colombo a mere thirty- military headway against the ltte, India five-minute notice, five Indian Antonov withdrew its forces in 1990 at the insistence An-32 aircraft accompanied by four Mirage of the newly elected government of Presi- fighters airdropped twenty-five tons of re- dent .22 In the waning lief supplies over Jaffna.19 days of the ipkf’s presence in Sri Lanka, the In an attempt to end the Sri Lankan Civil regime started talks with the ltte. These, War, while simultaneously appeasing a sig- however, did not amount to much and ulti- nificant domestic constituency in Tamil mately collapsed in June 1990.23 Nadu, the home of over sixty million Indi- an Tamils, Prime Minister – In the aftermath of the withdrawal of having assumed the office after the assas- the ipkf from Sri Lanka, the war wors- sination of his mother–sought to broker ened considerably as neither the Tamil a peace deal between the ltte, five other militants nor the Sri Lankan regime ap- smaller Tamil insurgent groups, and the peared interested in a political solution to regime of President Jayewardene. the conflict. After its military imbroglio, Under the terms of the accord, the Sri Lan- Indian policy-makers also lost interest in kan government would, following a refer- seeking a resolution to the conflict and In- endum, devolve power to the Northern and dian willingness to provide either moral Eastern Provinces; Tamil would be accord- support or material assistance to the Tam- ed the status of an ; the Sri ils effectively dried up. To curb any efforts Lankan armed forces would return to the bar- on the part of the Tamil Nadu government racks; and the Indian Peace Keeping Force to renew ties with the ltte, the Indian na- (ipkf) would disarm the rebel groups.20 tional government dismissed the state gov- To implement the accord, India sent in a ernment and chose to rule the state directly contingent of troops in 1987. The vast major- from New Delhi. The ltte’s involvement

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 in the assassination of Prime Minister Ra- terms of human life and property: an at- Sumit jiv Gandhi during the 1991 election cam- tack on the principal airport in Colombo Ganguly paign further alienated the government in that led to the destruction of nearly half of New Delhi from the Tamil cause. the fleet of the government-run Sri Lan- Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka, the ltte re- kan Airlines.28 In the wake of these vicious grouped once again and ratcheted up its attacks, the government of President Ku- military campaign. In 1993, it killed Presi- maratunga reached out to to me- dent Ranasinghe Premadasa in a bomb at- diate a peace process. The Norwegians be- tack. Indeed, it was not until the election of came involved in 2000 and started discus- President in Au- sions both with her regime and the ltte.29 gust 1994 that some hopes of a negotiat- In February 2002, for reasons that are not ed solution to the conflict were rekindled. entirely clear, the ltte held out the pros- In January 1995, the Kumaratunga govern- pect of a cease-fire, which Norwegian medi- ment reached a cease-fire agreement with ators managed to broker between the ltte the ltte. It also promised that a new set and the . Under the of proposals for the devolution of power aegis of this agreement, the road linking would soon be offered. This effort, however, Jaffna to the rest of Sri Lanka was opened proved to be futile when, in that same year, for the first time in twelve years, passen- the ltte sank a Sri Lankan naval craft.24 ger flights to Jaffna were resumed, and the In response, the Kumaratunga regime government lifted its ban on the ltte. Fur- launched a military operation against the thermore, at least in principle, the ltte ap- ltte bastions in Jaffna in October 1995. peared to have dropped its demand for the This military action, known as “Operation creation of a separate state.30 Riviresa” (“rays of sunlight”), was large- Altogether, Norway hosted six rounds of ly a tactical success. However, it left mul- talks, but the process collapsed in March tiple army brigades stranded on the pen- 2003.31 The talks unraveled largely because insula where they could only be supplied the United States had proscribed the ltte through the sea or air. The ltte was thus as a terrorist organization. Accordingly, it able to quickly isolate the Sri Lankan secu- was not permitted to participate in a pre- rity forces and overrun them.25 paratory donors’ conference in Washing- For the next several years, war raged in ton, D.C. Denied this opportunity and con- the north and the east of the country. In cerned about its loss of legitimacy as an in- January 1998, three ltte suicide bombers ternational actor, the ltte announced attacked the most venerable Buddhist site, their unilateral withdrawal from the nego- the Temple of the Tooth, which, accord- tiations in April 2003.32 Furthermore, hav- ing to devout Buddhists, is the repository ing previously agreed with Colombo to “ex- of a tooth of the Lord Buddha. Retaliato- plore a solution founded on the principle ry raids on Tamil temples and homes fol- of internal self-determination in areas of lowed.26 Over the course of the next three historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking years, the ltte’s actions became even peoples, based on a federal structure within more brazen. Two incidents in particular a united Sri Lanka,” the ltte now made the are worth noting. The first was a mostly resumption of talks conditional on propos- abortive suicide attack on President Chan- als for an interim, independent governance drika Kumaratunga in December 1999, arrangement in the Northern and Eastern though it left her wounded and eventual- Provinces of Sri Lanka.33 Subsequent to the ly led to the loss of sight in one eye.27 The termination of these talks, some mediated second episode proved to be costly both in efforts took place in 2006. However, none

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 Ending the of these proved to be especially fruitful. One The fundamental difference between Sri Lankan of them, held in Geneva in February, saw the Rajapaksa regime and its predecessors, Civil War more mutual recriminations rather than however, lay in its willingness to grant carte meaningful dialogue. Another, scheduled blanche to the military to fight theltte to in Oslo in November 2006, saw the ltte the end, regardless of the economic, hu- withdraw as it deemed the Sri Lankan ne- man, and diplomatic costs. More specifi- gotiating team to be too low-ranking.34 The cally, it allowed the Sri Lankan military not fundamental problem with these negotia- to differentiate between the Tamil popu- tions was that the two sides faced an un- lation and ltte operatives in rebel-con- bridgeable chasm: they had radically dif- trolled areas. It also permitted anti-ltte ferent goals. The Sri Lankan government, Tamil militants to carry out punitive op- regardless of regime, wanted to preserve a erations at will. Furthermore, it relied on unitary state, and the ltte remained com- the state-controlled media to carry out a mitted to the creation of a separate Tamil deft propaganda campaign that grossly ex- state. It is worth noting here that, despite aggerated ltte casualties in an attempt the concerted Norwegian efforts to play to bolster both public support for mili- the role of an honest broker, they ultimate- tary operations and to boost the morale ly failed. The “treatment regime” for civil of its soldiers. Finally, the armed forces, wars clearly did not prove up to the task in for the first time, carried out a mixed-mil- the Sri Lankan context.35 itary strategy combining guerrilla warfare Following the collapse of negotiations, with large-scale artillery assaults support- the ltte periodically stepped up its at- ed by air raids. All of these factors created tacks, engaged in a series of successful and conducive conditions for the termination unsuccessful political assassinations (in- of the long, drawn-out civil war.37 cluding the killing of Tamil foreign min- ister Lakshman Kadirgamar at his home How did this brutal civil war finally come in Colombo in 2005), and fought off a va- to a close? In considerable part, it stemmed riety of military operations launched by from three sources. At an international level, the Sri Lankan regime. sympathy for the ltte had receded in the But then the Sri Lankan Supreme Court wake of the September 11 attacks on the ruled that President Kumaratunga’s term United States and global sentiment against had ended and in the new presidential elec- the use of terror had welled up. Earlier, in tion, a hard-line presidential candidate, 1996, the U.S. Department of State had , was elected to office. designated the ltte as a “foreign terror- Over the course of the next few years, Ra- ist organization,” and, in 2000, the Unit- japaksa, in conjunction with his brother, ed Kingdom followed suit. These decisions Gotabhaya, who was made the minister of hindered the fund-raising efforts of the or- defense, brought about significant changes ganization and hobbled transnational fi- in military organization and strategy that nancial transfers. would ring the eventual death-knell of the At a regional level, despite the presence ltte. The government, upon assuming of- of a substantial Tamil community in In- fice, had spelled out a two-track “peace dia, overt support for the ltte within the process” strategy. At one level, it pursued community had waned since the ltte’s in- an aggressive military strategy and, at an- volvement in the assassination of Prime other, it offered a narrow negotiating agen- Minister Rajiv Gandhi. No national gov- da on how to best implement an effective ernment in New Delhi had any residual cease-fire agreement.36 sympathy for the organization.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 Finally, when the regime of President Ma- high-value targets, provided real-time in- Sumit hinda Rajapaksa chose to start the final mil- telligence, and disrupted the ltte’s lines Ganguly itary onslaught against the ltte, it found of resupply and communications. They significant support, especially in the form were also trained and authorized to call of substantial amounts of military equip- in precision air, artillery, and mortar at- ment, including six f7 fighter jets, from the tacks on ltte units.40 Additionally, the People’s Republic of China. The prc also Sri Lankan armed forces launched opera- provided millions of dollars’ worth of oth- tions that effectively hunted down and de- er military equipment and about $1 billion stroyed the ltte’s merchant navy. The de- in overall assistance.38All three factors, to ployment of high-speed coastal craft and varying degrees, played critical roles in en- accompanying tactics also led to the de- suring the success of the military campaign struction of the ltte’s substantial fleet of against the ltte. maritime suicide vessels.41 The critical turning point in ending the Military innovation alone, however, can- civil war came in 2006 when the ltte, be- not explain the battlefield success of the Sri lieving that military victory was actual- Lankan armed forces. As a number of repu- ly within its grasp, broke off the Norwe- table human rights organizations and news gian-brokered cease-fire agreement and outlets have shown, the military success started what is popularly referred to as must also be attributed to the sheer ruth- the Fourth Eelam War. It was at this point lessness of the tactics that were employed. that the Sri Lankan regime made a calcu- These tactics demonstrated a flagrant disre- lated decision to annihilate the ltte. To gard for established norms and conventions that end, the regime also decided to allo- governing the use of force. It involved the cate as much as 3.3 percent of its gdp in targeting of civilian areas where ltte cad- 2007 to military spending (up from 2.8 per- res may have taken refuge, the shelling of cent in 2006).39 This increase in the mili- hospitals where wounded ltte forces were tary budget also enabled an expansion of being treated, and the summary executions the armed forces from 120,000 personnel of any number of individuals suspected of in 2005 to 300,000 in 2009. being ltte sympathizers.42 Of course, the ltte, despite its decision The ltte also resorted to brutal military to resume fighting, had been weakened as tactics as the war drew to a close. Its lead- early as 2004 with the defection of an im- ers deliberately placed civilians in the line of portant leader, Vinayagamoorthy Mura- fire, fully expecting the enemy to fire upon litharan, popularly known as “Colonel them, causing substantial casualties.43 They Karuna,” along with some six thousand hoped these civilian losses would generate ltte cadres. Because he provided signif- international opprobrium against the gov- icant tactical intelligence to the Sri Lan- ernment and its security forces.44 kan armed forces, his defection was signif- Though the war resulted in the eviscera- icant militarily. The scale of the defection tion of the ltte, the underlying grievanc- also suggested to the Sri Lankan govern- es that had precipitated the civil war large- ment that the popular legitimacy that the ly remained unaddressed. Significantly, in ltte had once enjoyed was now waning. the wake of the military victory there was Battlefield innovation also aided the an unbridled sense of majoritarian ethnic Sri Lankan armed forces in its mission to triumphalism. Only under significant inter- crush the ltte. The army used small, high- national pressure did President Rajapaksa ly trained, mobile groups to infiltrate the appoint a Lessons Learned and Reconcili- ltte’s front lines. These groups attacked ation Commission in May 2010. The Com-

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 Ending the mission released an interim report in Sep- ly destroyed. As argued earlier, a combina- Sri Lankan tember 2011 and then a final report in No- tion of international, regional, and domes- Civil War vember of the same year, both of which tic forces all converged and facilitated the came under considerable criticism from military defeat of the ltte. The most sig- global human rights organizations for fail- nificant of these factors, however, was the ing to dispassionately examine allegations emergence of a regime in Sri Lanka pre- of rampant human rights violations during pared to brook no opposition in its goal to the final phases of the conflict. More to the terminate the protracted conflict. The suc- point, critics underscored a distinct progov- cessful defeat of the ltte and the concom- ernment bias in the final report.45 Its short- itant end to the civil war initially generat- comings aside, the report did have a range ed widespread support and popular enthu- of practical suggestions for promoting rec- siasm for the regime, especially among the onciliation. Among these were the need to Sinhala population of the country. bring about a reconciliation with the Tam- Despite its popularity in the aftermath of il politicians of the Northern and Eastern the civil war, the Rajapaksa regime suffered Provinces, the election of provincial gov- an unexpected defeat in 2015. The common ernments, the resettling of the internal- opposition candidate, Maithripala Sirise- ly displaced, and suitable Tamil represen- na, received 51.3 percent of the popular vote. tation in the armed forces and the govern- Rajapaksa’s ethnic triumphalism had alien- ment.46 These recommendations, for the ated both the Tamil and Muslim minorities most part, have yet to be implemented. and his grasp on the Sinhalese majority had slipped due to charges of widespread cor- An extremely determined and single- ruption and nepotism.48 minded military effort, facilitated by region- Despite the evisceration of the ltte and al and international conditions, brought an the emergence of a new regime, the per- end to the civil war. The military offensive ceived injustices of the Tamil community of the Sri Lankan armed forces against the that had set in motion the social and po- ltte took place against a particular political litical forces precipitating the civil war, for backdrop and at a specific historical junc- the most part, remain unaddressed. The ture; it was a moment when global toler- new regime, to its credit, established a new ance for any political movement embracing Office of National Unity and Reconcili- terror was at its lowest ebb in years. ation, which primarily deals with the re- Globally, the United States and the Eu- lease of detainees and the return of civilian ropean Union did little to rein in the Sri land that the military had occupied. The Lankan government as it embarked on the office has only been partially successful final stages of its military offensive. Region- in addressing these matters. Yet the Pre- al states, such as the prc and Pakistan, ac- vention of Terrorism Act, which granted tively supported the government.47 India, the government sweeping powers of arrest which could have exerted some restraint and detention, still remains in force, and on the regime, chose not to do so. The mil- many who had been incarcerated under its itary victory of the Sri Lankan armed forces auspices have yet to be released.49 over the ltte was complete and unequivo- Much disaffection with the present Sri cal. Obviously, seeking the total destruction Lankan regime of Maithripala Sirisena of an adversary is one possible strategy for still pervades the commu- successful civil war termination. nities.50 His stated willingness to address There is little or no question that the ltte the concerns of the diaspora notwithstand- as a viable military force has been effective- ing, it is far from certain that he will be able

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 to win the necessary domestic political sup- the role and the scope of the armed forces Sumit port to effectively pursue such a strategy. will prove to be no easy task.52 Under cur- Ganguly Significant social forces and institution- rent conditions, it is hard to envisage how al barriers that remain could hobble any a renewed violent Tamil opposition could steps toward reconciliation. One of these, again emerge. In the absence of concert- of course, is the Buddhist clergy, who re- ed efforts to address the human and mate- main a significant political entity in the rial costs of the civil war and its anteced- country and have little sympathy for their ents, Sri Lanka is likely to remain a deeply Tamil compatriots.51 fractured nation riven with profound eth- Another institutional barrier in the path- nic cleavages. The shared sense of nation- way toward reconciliation is the uniformed al identity that Francis Fukuyama deems so military. Over the course of this protract- necessary to underpin a state’s legitimacy ed civil war and especially during the re- does not exist in Sri Lanka.53 Instead, sig- gime of President Rajapaksa, the military nificant segments of the Tamil community became a vital political actor. The leeway remain disaffected from the Sinhala-domi- it was granted contributed dramatically to nated Sri Lankan state. the militarization of the country. Shrinking

endnotes 1 James D. Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017). 2 Matthew Weaver and Gethin Chamberlain, “Sri Lanka Declares End to the Tamil Tigers,” The Guardian, May 19, 2009. 3 See International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “Crisis in Sri Lanka,” http:// www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-sri-lanka. 4 Somini Sengupta, “War’s End in Sri Lanka: Bloody Family Triumph,” The New York Times, May 19, 2009. 5 Stanley J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1986). 6 David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994), 54–55. 7 Ibid., 56. 8 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-Up of Sri Lanka: The Tamil-Sinhala Conflict (: C. Hurst and Company, 1988), 131. 9 Neil DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 49 (6) (2009): 1021–1051. 10 For a detailed discussion of the ltte’s adoption of a terrorist strategy, see P. Sahadevan, “On Not Becoming a Democrat: The ltte’s Commitment to Armed Struggle,” International Studies 32 (2) (1995): 249–281. 11 Paul Moorcraft, Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers: The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka’s Long War (Barn- sley, United Kingdom: Pen and Sword, 2012), 13. 12 M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1995), 49–92. 13 Thomas A. Marks and Tej Pratap Singh Brar, “Sri Lanka: State Response to the Liberation Ti- gers of Tamil Eelam as an Illicit Power Structure,” in Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 Ending the Transition, ed. Michelle Hughes and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, D.C.: Center for Com- Sri Lankan plex Operations, National Defense University, 2016). Civil War 14 Charles Haviland, “Remembering Sri Lanka’s July,” bbc News, July 23, 2013, http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23402727. See also Marks and Brar, “Sri Lanka.” 15 Sumit Ganguly, The Oxford Short Introduction to Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2014). 16 Much of this discussion has been derived from Rajat Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Lessons from South Asia (New Delhi: Sage, 1998). 17 Harkirat Singh, Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 22. 18 Swamy, Tigers of Lanka, 235. 19 Ibid., 236. 20 Ralph P. Premdas and S. W. R. Samarsinghe, “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord,” Asian Survey 28 (6) (June 1988): 676–690. 21 Dilip Bobb, “A Bloodied Accord,” India Today, November 15, 1987. 22 Singh, Intervention in Sri Lanka. 23 Gamini Keerawalla, Post-War Sri Lanka: Is Peace a Hostage of Military Victory? Dilemmas of Recon- ciliation, Ethnic Cohesion and Peace-Building, Research Paper No. 8 (Colombo: International Cen- ter for Ethnic Studies, 2013), 4. 24 John F. Burns, “Rebels Hijack Civilian Ferry in Sri Lanka,” The New York Times, August 31, 1995. 25 Marks and Brar, “Sri Lanka.” 26 “Eleven Killed in Truck Bombing at Sri Lanka Buddhist Site,” The New York Times, January 26, 1998. 27 Dexter Filkins and Waruna Karunatilake, “Sri Lankan President Wounded in Suicide Bomber Attack,” The Los Angeles Times, December 19, 1999. 28 Nirupama Subramanian, “ltte Storms Colombo Airport, Destroys 11 Planes,” The Hindu, July 25, 2001. 29 Gunnar Sørbø, Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, et al., Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009 (Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2011), 33–34. 30 The sincerity of this shift is debatable. Sandra Destradi and Johannes Vullers, The Consequences of Failed Mediation in Civil Wars: Assessing the Sri Lankan Case, giga Working Papers 202 (Ham- burg: German Institute for International and Area Studies, 2012). 31 Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 91. 32 Sørbø et al., Pawns of Peace, 44. 33 Ibid., 41. 34 Destradi and Vullers, The Consequences of Failed Mediation in Civil Wars, 11. 35 Richard Gowan and Stephen John Stedman, “The International Regime for Treating Civil War: 1988–2017,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 36 Albert Wesley Harris, “War Termination in Sri Lanka,” Studies in Sociology of Science 3 (3) (2012): 68–78. 37 DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” 1042. 38 Peter Popham, “How Beijing Won Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” The Independent, May 22, 2010.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_a_00475 by guest on 28 September 2021 39 Saroja Selvanathan and Eliyathamby A. Selvanathan, “Defence Expenditures and Economic Sumit Growth: A Case Study of Sri Lanka Using Causal Analysis,” International Journal of Development Ganguly Studies 4 (2) (2014): 69–76. 40 Many of these operational details have been drawn from Peter Layton, “How Sri Lanka Won the War,” The Diplomat, April 9, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/how-sri-lanka-won -the-war/. 41 Marks and Brar, “Sri Lanka.” 42 Harris, “War Termination in Sri Lanka,” 73. 43 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Sri Lanka in 2009: From Civil War to Political Uncertainties,” Asian Survey 50 (1) (2010): 104. 44 Harris, “War Termination in Sri Lanka,” 72. 45 Amnesty International, When Will They Get Justice? Failures of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learned and Rec- onciliation Commission (London: Amnesty International, 2011). 46 Alyssa Ayres, “Sri Lanka’s Victory for Democracy,” Forbes, January 9, 2015, http://www .forbes.com/sites/alyssaayres/2015/01/09/sri-lankas-victory-for-democracy/#55a940a02572. 47 Popham, “How Beijing Won Sri Lanka’s Civil War.” 48 Chandra R. De Silva, “Sri Lanka in 2015: A Year of Change,” Asian Survey 56 (1) (2016): 199–203. 49 Ibid., 202. 50 “Sri Lankan Govt Keen to Reconcile with Tamil Diaspora Including Extremist Groups,” and Analysis, June 13, 2015. 51 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 52 Taylor Hibbert, “Militarization in Sri Lanka Continues,” The Diplomat, February 9, 2016, http:// thediplomat.com/2016/02/militarization-in-sri-lanka-continues/. 53 Francis Fukuyama, “The Last English Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018).

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