Naval War College Review Volume 59 Article 8 Number 3 Summer 2006 The Attack at Taranto Angelo N. Caravaggio Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Caravaggio, Angelo N. (2006) "The ttA ack at Taranto," Naval War College Review: Vol. 59 : No. 3 , Article 8. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen Caravaggio: The Attack at Taranto THE ATTACK AT TARANTO Tactical Success, Operational Failure Lieutenant Colonel Angelo N. Caravaggio, Canadian Forces he lack of a decisive British victory in the Mediterranean theater fundamen- Ttally affected British maritime strategy throughout the Second World War. The Royal Italian Navy, or Regia Marina Italiana (RMI), exerted a disproportion- ate influence on British strategy and fleet disposition, because its existence could not be ignored and British operations to eliminate it failed. On 11 November 1940, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, the British commander of naval forces in the Mediterranean, had the opportunity to eliminate the entire complement of battleships from the Italian order of battle, at Taranto. However, questionable de- cisions in the planning process, combined with Cunningham’s decision to launch a considerably reduced strike force, succeeded in only temporarily reducing the Italian battle fleet from six to two battleships.