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PEACE Info (February 8-10, 2020)

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PEACE Info (February 8-10, 2020) PEACE Info (February 8-10, 2020) − KNU condemns prohibition of public peace meeting by Tatmadaw − Arms abandonment not necessary for peace: ALP − Arakan Army denies holding Myanmar's ruling party official − Military MPs Oppose Merging Myanmar Charter-Change Proposals − Who Is Myanmar’s New Home Affairs Minister? − Another NLD Member Abducted by Unknown Armed Group in Western Myanmar − Minister launches survey in Kayin as govt prepares to close IDP camps − Rakhine issues ultimatum against illegal IDP camp − HARNESSING SALWEEN RIVER: Settlement through confrontation or cooperation? − �မန�မ��ဒ�မ��က�ရစ� �ရရ�ည�တည�တံ�ရန� �င�မ��ခ�မ���ရ���င�� ဖ�ံ��ဖ ���တ���တက��ရ�သည� အ�ရ��က��ဟ� သမ�တ ��ပ� − ���င�ငံ�တ��၏အတ��င�ပင�ခံပ�ဂ� ��လ� ပင�လ�ံ၌ လ�ထ��တ��ဆ�ံပ��လ�ပ�မည� − �ပည��ထ�င�စ�ထ�က မတ� က���ပ��မ�မ���က�� အင�အ��အ�ဖစ� စ�စည��ရန� အ�ရ��က��ဟ� အတ��င�ပင�ခံ��ပ� − လက�ရ��က�လ �င�မ��ခ�မ���ရ�မရရင� ဖ�ံ�ဖ ���တ���တက��ရ���င��ဒ�မ��က�ရစ� တည��ဆ�က��ရ�အတ�က� စ�န��ခ�မ�မ�����င�� ရင�ဆ��င�ရ���င�ဟ� ဝန��က��ခ��ပ� ဦ��ဖ ���မင��သ�န�� ��ပ� − က�����န�ဗ��င��ရပ�စ���က�င�� အစ���ရ��င�� ��မ�က�ပ��င���လ�ဖ��� �တ��ဆ�ံ�ရ� အခက�အခ��ဖစ��နဟ�ဆ�� − တပ�မ�တ��န�� �ကံ�ခ��င��ရ� ပ�တ�က ဖ���စည��ပ�ံ �ပင�ဆင��ရ� ဘ��တ� တင�သ�င��ထ��သလ� − ဖ���စည��ပ�ံ�ပင�ဆင��ရ� �ဖစ����င��ခ� �သ��ခ�က� ၂ ခ�က� − တပ�မ�တ��၏ အ��က�င��မ�� ပစ�ခတ�မ�မ�����က�င�� �ဒသခံရ��သ�� ထ�ခ��က�ဒဏ�ရရ��ဟ� KNU ��ပ� − ကရင�လ�ငယ��ခ�င���ဆ�င�မ��� �ပ�ထ�က��ရ� အ�လ�ထ��ပ� − ရမ���ဗ��မ ���နယ� အန�အယ�လ�ဒ�အလ�ပ�မ��ဆ�င� ဦ��ဇယ��မင��က�� �အ�အ ဖမ��ဆ�� − ရမ���ဗ� NLD အဖ���ဝင�က�� မဖမ����က�င�� AA ��ပ� − ဦ��ဇယ��မင��က�� ဖမ��သ���သည�� လက�နက�က��င�အဖ���က AA ဟ�တ�/မဟ�တ� စ�ံစမ���နသည�ဟ� NLD ��ပ� − ဘ��သ���တ�င�န�� ရ�သ��တ�င� တ��က�ပ���တ���က�င�� ဒ�က�သည� တစ��ထ�င��က��� တ���လ� − ဘ��သ���တ�င�ပစ�ခတ�မ�မ�� ��ခ�က���စ�သမ�� က�ည�ထ� − ပလက�ဝ၊ �က��က��တ�� တ��က�ပ���ပင��ထန� − �က��က��ဖ� မ�တ�စလင� ဒ�က�သည��တ� �မ ���ထ��ပန��ရ� ည����င���န − �မ�င��တ�တ�င� စ�တ��က�ဆ� ၉ သ�န���က��� ဖမ��မ� ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Page 1 of 42 KNU condemns prohibition of public peace meeting by Tatmadaw By Kyaw Wai Min | 08 February 2020 The KNU had condemned the prohibition of public peace meeting by the Tatmadaw. Karen National Union (KNU) issued a press statement which says that the organization condemns the prohibition of holding a public meeting for the awareness of peace work held in the KNU 3d Brigade controlled area by a 5- member team led by an officer of the Tatmadaw (government defence services). This mass meeting was held on February 4 by the KNU 7th Battalion at Bawkataw Camp in Sawhti Township but then the Tatmadaw Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 124 came and prohibited the meeting. Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) of ceasefire Secretary (1), Dr. Sui Kher, said, “Under the terms of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), these mass meetings must be held but we have to look into what type of mass meetings they held. Some meetings need prior permission from the concerned authority. We don’t know yet about it but they can hold mass meetings concerning peace and ceasefire affairs freely. Trust building is crucial in peace efforts. It will be very difficult to build trust when there are suspicions.” In the statement issued by KNU, it says that this act done by Tatmadaw is in fact forbidding the peace process and KNU assumes that Tatmadaw is not abiding by the terms agreed in NCA and results of bilateral talks between them. Regarding this incident, Mizzima contacted Tatmadaw True News Information Team Secretary Brig. Gen. Zaw Min Tun and Col. Kyaw Soe Moe from Southern Military Command by phone but to no avail. KNU is the signatory of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). http://www.mizzima.com/article/knu-condemns-prohibition-public-peace-meeting- tatmadaw ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Arms abandonment not necessary for peace: ALP Published 10 February 2020 | EMG They don’t need to abandon arms for the internal peace initiated in former President Thein Sein’s era, stated Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) in its formal letter, which was sent to mark 73rd Anniversary of Shan State Day on February 7. Page 2 of 42 The 73rd Anniversary of Shan State Day was held at Loi Tai Leng, Headquarter of Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) in Myanmar-Thailand border. “We had signed the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) to build a democratic federal union through political talks,” it said. It said some facts included in the NCA may make misunderstanding and it may lead to challenges. Informal discussions may bring close understanding and overcome the challenges. It said the RCSS is taking a leadership role in the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) and the RCSS can implement a treaty like the Panglong Agreement. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services said ethnic armed groups need to abandon arms to build eternal peace through discussions in line with democracy. Moreover any attempt to make unilateral demands by holding arms in the name of peace talks is not in accorded with democracy and it will not be reached to federal and democracy goals desired by ethnics and the world will not be accepted it, stated the senior general in a formal letter sent to mark the 73rd Anniversary of Shan State Day. https://elevenmyanmar.com/news/arms-abandonment-not-necessary-for-peace-alp ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Arakan Army denies holding Myanmar's ruling party official Khin Myat Myat Wai | 10 Feb 2020 Rakhine refugees seen at the Dam Mar Yar Ma Monastery temporary camp in Sittwe, Rakhine. Photo: EPA The Arakan Army (AA) on Monday denied kidnapping a local official of the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) in strife-torn Rakhine State. U Zeya Min, the NLD’s finance officer in Kyaukphyu township, was allegedly seized by unidentified gunmen on Saturday while on his way home. AA spokesman U Khaing Thu Kha said his group did not detain the NLD official. "You can't blame AA every time someone is reported seized by an armed group,” he added. “He was reportedly arrested by people on motorbikes, so they might be from the government side." Page 3 of 42 Colonel Win Zaw Oo, staff officer of the Tatmadaw’s (military’s) Western Command, quoted a business person who was with the victim when he was seized by eight armed men as saying the AA carried out the kidnapping. “That person tried to stop the AA but was warned not to interfere. That person told us the AA abducted U Zeya Min because of the public rally held for the State Counsellor in Kyaukphyu township." The officer was referring to the rally held in Yanbye Island town in December to show support for State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s trip to the International Court of Justice in The Hague to defend the Tatmadaw against accusations of genocide committed against Rakhine Muslims. The AA has abducted dozens of people, including soldiers and policemen, since it began fighting the Tatmadaw in November 2018. Most of the captives have been released, including Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House) legislator U Hwei Tin, who was freed last month after nearly three months in captivity. – Translated https://www.mmtimes.com/news/arakan-army-denies-holding-myanmars-ruling-party- official.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Military MPs Oppose Merging Myanmar Charter-Change Proposals By San Yamin Aung | 10 February 2020 Military-appointed lawmakers arrive at the Lower House of Parliament on Jan. 27, 2020. / Htet Wai / The Irrawaddy YANGON—Military-appointed lawmakers opposed a proposal by the parliamentary Joint Bill Committee on Monday to merge the military’s constitutional amendment bills with those submitted by the National League for Democracy (NLD) for discussion by Parliament. The Joint Bill Committee is tasked with scrutinizing the constitutional amendment bills—two from the NLD and five from the military and USDP lawmakers—and reorganizing all the bills into two groups. The first group will consist of proposed amendments covered by Article 436(a), meaning they require approval by more than 75 percent of Parliament and over 50 percent support in a referendum. The second group would comprise proposed amendments covered by Article 436(b) requiring approval by more than 75 percent of Parliament but no referendum. The committee’s secretary, Dr. Myat Nyana Soe, said on Monday there are a total of 58 proposals covered by Article 436(a) and 84 proposals covered by Article 436(b) as reorganized by the committee. Page 4 of 42 Brigadier General Maung Maung and Brigadier General Aung San Chit stood up in Parliament and said they disagreed with the merger of the proposals, asking instead to discuss their bills separately. Rejecting their request, the Speaker warned that, “Now is not the time to debate.” The military-appointed lawmakers have raised strong objections and resisted all procedures initiated by the NLD to democratize the Constitution since last year. In January last year, the ruling NLD took its first official step toward amending the Constitution since taking power in 2016, submitting a proposal to form the committee to work on constitutional reform.
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