Not Designated for Publication Barbara Perez
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION BARBARA PEREZ * NO. 2005-CA-0861 VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL SUSAN M. GELPI AND * FOURTH CIRCUIT ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY * STATE OF LOUISIANA * * * * * * * APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 97-22336, DIVISION “G-11” Honorable Robin M. Giarrusso, Judge * * * * * * JUDGE MAX N. TOBIAS, JR. * * * * * * (COURT COMPOSED OF JUDGE TERRI F. LOVE, JUDGE MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., AND JUDGE EDWIN A. LOMBARD) MARY ANN HAND SALVADOR E. GUTIERREZ, JR. GUTIERREZ & HAND 111 NORTH CAUSEWAY BOULEVARD SUITE 101 MANDEFILLE, LA 70448 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE WM. RYAN ACOMB CHAUNTIS T. JENKINS PORTEOUS, HAINKEL & JOHNSON 704 CARONDELET STREET NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130-3774 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; RENDERED. This case arises from an automobile accident on 24 February 1997 that occurred when the plaintiff, Barbara Perez (“Perez”), rear-ended a stalled, abandoned vehicle while merging onto the Pontchartrain Expressway, a portion of interstate highway where Interstate 10 East (“I- 10”) and Interstate 610 East (“I-610”) join. The stalled vehicle had broken down and been left in the far right lane of travel by the defendant, Susan Gelpi Joffrion (“Gelpi”), and her husband, Rene Joffrion (“Joffrion”), while they walked to their home to call a tow truck. Perez sustained neck and back injuries in the accident and filed suit against Gelpi and Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”), Gelpi’s automobile liability insurance carrier, on 23 December 1997. Prior to trial, Perez stipulated that her damages were no more than $50,000.00. As a result, the case proceeded to a bench trial on 16 February 2005. At trial, Gelpi, Joffrion, Perez, and her husband, Rene Vincent Perez (“Mr. Perez”), testified and Perez’s medical records were admitted into evidence. Gelpi testified at trial that at approximately 7:00 a.m. on the morning of the accident she and Joffrion had left their residence in New Orleans and attempted to merge onto I-10 using the Canal Boulevard entrance ramp. While in the far right merge lane, in attempting to enter the flow of traffic, the vehicle’s engine suddenly died. Joffrion was driving at the time and he let the vehicle roll to a stop in the right lane of travel. Gelpi testified that no shoulder was present on the road at the spot where their vehicle died. Because they thought it would be too dangerous to stay with the vehicle, Gelpi and Joffrion decided to walk back to their home to call a tow truck. Gelpi testified that they engaged the hazard lights on the vehicle before they began walking to their house. Although they both knew of the presence of the Troop B police station a few blocks away, they decided to walk to their house, which took them approximately 25 minutes. Once they arrived at their house, they called the towing company to remove the vehicle from the interstate. Perez testified that at approximately 8:40 a.m. on the day of the accident, she was merging onto the Pontchartrain Expressway en route to New Orleans East to visit her mother, when she suddenly hit a stopped, abandoned vehicle which had been left in the far right lane of traffic. Perez described the accident: It was early in the morning and the traffic was pretty heavy. I was in the right-hand lane, and people can merge on, and people that are going straight can merge off. So, I was trying to merge to the right to get on the interstate to make the loop, but there is a car that crossed in front of me. We kind of crisscrossed each other. As soon as I switched into that far right lane to get on the interstate turn, I just hit this stalled, abandoned vehicle. According to Perez, the vehicle did not have any hazard lights on, and displayed no sign, such as a raised hood, to give a warning to oncoming motorists that the vehicle was broken down. Further, while she admitted that no shoulder was present at the spot where the vehicle broke down in which to stop or push the car, she noted that a shoulder was present a short distance ahead. She testified that an elevated sidewalk existed right next to the site of the accident, from which she was able to flag down a motorist to assist her and who had called the police. She further testified that her husband, who had no prior knowledge of the accident (he came upon the scene and recognized his wife’s car), was able to pull over onto a shoulder on the side of the road just before the site of the accident. The police arrived shortly thereafter. Mr. Perez testified that he arrived at the scene approximately fifteen minutes after the accident had occurred. He testified that when he arrived, no headlights or flashing lights were on Gelpi’s vehicle, although he admitted that he did not know whether any lights on Gelpi’s vehicle had been engaged prior to the accident. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Perez, awarding her $50,000.00 plus costs and interest. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court found that Gelpi violated La. R.S. 32:141, which provides: A. Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district, no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part of the highway when it is practicable to stop, park or leave such vehicle off such part of said highway, but in every event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicles shall be available from a distance of two hundred feet in each direction upon such highway. B. The provisions of this Section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the main traveled portion of a highway so that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the vehicle in that position. C. The driver of any vehicle left parked, attended or unattended, on any highway, between sunset and sunrise, shall display appropriate signal lights thereon, sufficient to warn approaching traffic of its presence. D. In the event of a motor vehicle accident, if the driver is not prevented by injury and the vehicle is not disabled by the accident, or the accident has not resulted in serious injury or death of any person, the driver shall remove the vehicle from the travel lane of the highway to the nearest safe shoulder. Compliance with the provisions of this Subsection shall in no way be interpreted as a violation of the requirements to remain at the scene of an accident provided for in the Highway Regulatory Act or by R.S. 32:414. The court noted that neither Gelpi nor Joffrion made any attempt to flag down traffic or to timely warn traffic that their vehicle was obstructing the right lane. Further, they did not lift the hood of the vehicle to make it more visible. The trial court found that Gelpi and Joffrion acted unreasonably in walking to their house instead of the much closer Troop B station. No percentage of fault was attributed to Perez. Gelpi and Allstate appealed the judgment of the trial court, assigning two errors. First, Gelpi and Allstate assert that the trial court erred in not assigning Perez any fault, insofar as they assert that she failed to keep a proper lookout when she was changing lanes. Second, they challenge the quantum awarded by the trial court, insofar as they argue that Perez had pre- existing back injuries as well as back injuries subsequent to the accident for which the trial court compensated her, even though those injuries were not proximately caused by the accident. R.S. 32:141 clearly imposes a statutory duty on drivers of vehicles stalled on roadways to display signal lights to warn oncoming traffic between sundown and sunrise. It is undisputed that this accident occurred well after sunrise; therefore, Gelpi is not statutorily negligent in this regard. No statutory requirement exists to display signal lights during daylight hours. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Gelpi and Joffrion violated R.S. 32:141. In fact, one might read subsection (B) of that statute as exculpatory of Gelpi and Joffrion, insofar as it is undisputed that the vehicle was broken down and had to be left temporarily. Conversely, R.S. 32:79 provides, in pertinent part, the following: Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules, in addition to all others consistent herewith, shall apply. (1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. Perez’s own testimony establishes that she did not make sure that the right lane was clear before she merged into it. In fact, Perez admitted that she never saw Gelpi’s stalled vehicle before she hit it, because she had let another vehicle cross in front of her while she changed lanes. Although we recognize that this type of merging behavior is common, especially at these interchanges, it does not negate a driver’s duty to first ascertain that she may change lanes safely before doing so. As such, we agree with appellants that Perez violated R.S. 32:79. Therefore, given the uncontroverted testimony of the parties, we find that Gelpi was not statutorily negligent, while Perez was.