RICA vc;26 o no2 0 1996 ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R ISSN 02562804
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0 PRETORIA, South Africa 1
0 0001 2 Telephone: 27 + 12 + 3286970 Telefax: 27 + 12 + 323 8153 d
e e-mail: [email protected] t a d ( Council r e
h Mr J L Potloane (Chairman), prof C R M Diamini, Mr B Khumalo, prof T Lodge, s i
l prof E T Mokgokong, Dr S Moodley-Moore, Dr C J Scheffer, Ms N C Tisani, b
u Mr R S K Tucker and Prof M Wiechers P
e
h Advisory Panel on Publications t
y Fellows b
d Dr Adebayo Adedeji, Prof Sam Asante, Dr Louis Emmerij, Prof Denis Fair, Amb e t Ahmed Haggag, Prof Goran Hyden, Amb Bethuel Kiplagat, Dr Erich Leistner n
a (resident), Amb Edouard Maunick, Dr Thandika Mkandawire, Mr Olara Otunnu, Dr r g
Sadig Rasheed, Mr Douglas Rimmer and Prof Richard Sklar e c n
e Research Fellows c i l Prof Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, Dr' Daniel Bach, prof Willie Breytenbach, Prof Patrick r
e Chabal, Prof Fantu Cheru, prof Christopher Clapham, Dr Christian Coulon, Prof Sam d
n Decalo, Prof Andre du Pisani, Dr Stephen Ellis, Prof Richard Haines, Prof Jeffrey u Herbst, Mr Arnold Hughes, Prof Edmond Keller, Prof Guy Martin, Prof Gavin y
a Maasdorp, Prof Colin McCarthy, Dr John Makumbe, Dr Massimo Micarelli, Mr Patrick w
e Ncube, Prof Wilfred Ndongko, prof Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Prof Kings Phiri, Prof t
a Louis Picard, Dr Oliver Saasa, Prof Peter Vale and Prof Margaret Vogt G
t e Senior Staff n i
b Editor: Madeline Lass Executive Director Dr Denis Venter a S
Cartographer: Elize van As Administration and Finance Mr Barnie Fisher y
b Cover by William Steyn Communications Mr Kenneth Kotelo
d Layout by Al Graphics Current Affairs Mr Richard Cornwell e
c Printed by The Rustica Press Publications Mr Pieter Esterhuysen u d o r p e I R AFRICA vol 26 0 no 2 0 199 6
an independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa Contents
Lost prophets Comment 90 Richard Cornwell
The challenges of analysing and building civil society 92 Professor Goran Hyden
A foreign policy to die for: 107 South Africa's response to the Nigerian crisis Maxi van Aardt
Ghana's return to constitutional rule 120 Dr Joseph R A Ayee
Occupational health and safety in Swaziland 130 Dr 0 M Akinnusi
Attracting foreign investment to Africa: 140 The South African case )
0 Professor J Marx and Professor J Hough 1 0 2 Poverty among blacks in the Vaal Triangle 146 d e
t Measured in terms of income indicators a
d T J C S/abbert, J 0 van Wyk, M Levin and W Coetzee ( r e East African tourist trends 156 h s i
l Professor Denis Fair b u P
Regional security in sub-Saharan Africa 162 e
h Dr Denis Venter t y b
The Subia and Fwe of Caprivi 177 d e Any historical grounds lor a status 01 primus inter pares? t n Professor Chris Maritz a r g
e Africa focus 186 c n Richard Cornwell e c i l
r Africa in transItion to democracy 188 e
d Pieter Esterhuysen n u
y Bookshelf and Book review: State building and demo 194 a cracy in Southern Africa: Botswana, Zimbabwe and w e t South Africa by Pierre du T oit a G t Africa Institute news/Africa studies news 197 e n
i Dr Denis Venter b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R
J Lost prophets
common popular perception is labour and is not conducive to the growth Richard Cornwell that South Africa has the poten of the informal sector. Head of Current Affairs tial to become a rich, industrial A further inhibiting factor is the gen ized, developed country, com eral lack of investor confidence arising at the Africa Institute aparable to the affluent economies of the from uncertainty about future government of South Africa northern hemisphere. Brief acquaintance policy. This hesitancy partly reflects the with' the major cities, their striking sky generally disappointing, if not disastrous, lines and the suburban shopping malls experience of outside investors in Africa and mansions cherished by a small class following the optimism engendered by of conspicuous consumers lend a spuri the end of colonial rule in the 1960s.With ous credibility to this picture. ample investment opportunities available By African standards certainly, the in the Far East, Eastern Europe and else country has reached a high level of eco where in the world, South Africa will nomic development. Its GNP is more than come under close scrutiny before it re three times that of the other eleven mem ceives substantial inflows of private capi bers of the Southern African Development tal. Of course, inflows of capital, though Community (SAD C) put together, is three they may be a necessary condition are not times larger than that of Nigeria, and twen of themselves a sufficient condition of ty times larger than that of Zimbabwe. economic growth as conventionally mea In the global context, however, it is sured, let alone of development. a middle-ranking, semi-industrialized eco The volatility of the money markets nomy. Its GNP is only one-third that of the that has now propelled the government
) Netherlands, and 6% that of Germany. In into issuing its new macroeconomic blue 0
1 addition, and most importantly, it has one print in itself demonstrates the unprece 0 2
of the most skewed patterns of income dented mobility of capital, not to mention d
e distribution in the world. Some 51% of an the overriding importance of sentiment, t
a nual income goes to the richest 10% of rumour and anticipated profit or loss d
( households; less than 4% of annual income which drive the market. r
e goes to the poorest 40% of households. To some degree the new economic h
s The gap between the rich and poor policy marks South Africa's adoption 'of a i l
b in South Africa is a wide one. More signif self-imposed structural adjustment pro
u icantly, it has tended historically to corre gramme. The government obviously hopes P
e late closely with the racial classifications that apart from making the proper obei h
t until recently imposed by white-dominat sance to the idols of the free market, it
y ed governments on the national popula may also preserve the notion that South b
d tion. This has provided much of the dy Africa's government retains control or e
t namic of South African politics in the past, ownership of the development path to be n
a and attempts to redress these imbalances followed, rather than eventually accepting r
g and create a more equitable society will a similar package imposed by global fi
e
c continue to provide the leitmotif of the po nancial institutions. n
e litical economy for the foreseeable future. What remains to be seen is whether c
i According to many well-informed South Africa proves any more successful l
r foreign observers, South Africa has the than other African states at avoiding a slide e
d potential for striking economic success into more authoritarian political practices n
u over the next two decades and beyond, during the adjustment phase, with all the
y though the realization of this potential is distress that this implies for the poorer sec a tions of the society.
w by no means guaranteed. As the World e
t Bank noted recently, South Africa must Of course, this may be a matter of a cope with a number of obstacles in its small concern to the free-market funda G
t quest for faster growth in output and em mentalists among the local business and e
n banking sectors. Indeed, judging from
i ployment. Its production structure is high
b ly capital-intensive and inward looking; it some of the comment emanating from a S
has a largely untrained and under-edu those quarters, one is entitled to wonder y
b cated labour force; and its urban struc whether big business objected to the old
d ture inhibits the productivity of unskilled apartheid system because this was cruel e c u d o r p e R ~o AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 and inequitable, or because it was labour to object to the implementa further to ask whether the development simply economically wasteful and in tion of such programmes. Addressing trajectory of the wealthy nations will efficient. When one looks at the racial inequalities in terms of remu prove viable for them, even in the me labour practices tolerated in certain neration and responsibility in the clium run. The triumphalism of the free countries now the cynosure of foreign workplace will also have an initial im marketeers following the collapse of investment managers, one also won pact upon productivity levels. the Soviet Union and its satellite eco ders what other socioeconomic poli This points to a rudimentary nomies seems somewhat premature if cies might be advocated were they problem facing South Africa. On the one considers the social blight afflicting still int~rnationally legal. one hand, there is the powerful pres many post-industrial nations, the ero Perhaps the most striking aspect sure on government to improve black sion of the welfare state, and the steady of the new economic plan was its pro wages and living conditions in gener growth of a disaffected and often crim jection of the number of jobs it hoped al to more or lc;ss the levels prevailing inalized underclass in those societies. to create as an adjunct to economic among whites; on the other, the eco The current economic and finan growth of the order of 6% annually. nomy cannot grow at a rate suffi cial forces grouped under the rubric Certainly the employment crisis is the ciently high to finance the desired so "globalization" certainly have to be clearest indicator of the socio-politi cial spending, and to absorb the fast recognized. Whether their untram cal problem confronting South Africa. growing number of new work-seekers melled operation within the jurisdic In the ~arly 1960s, over 80% of new on terms satisfying their expectations. tion of the national state should be labour market entrants were absorb Perhaps a more fundamental permitted, however, is another mat ed into wage employment. In recent question ought to be raised. That is, ter. Acceptance of the view that it is, years this has fallen to less than 10%. whether the economic development after all, a tough world out there, is There has been a steady decline path being implied by the free-market relatively easy only for the affluent, )
0 in employment in the formal economy strategists is actually available to the besides serving them as a reassuring 1
0 since 1990. By the end of 1994 official mass of underdeveloped countries. A measure of their own talents and abili 2 estimates of those either registered as glance at the evidence would suggest ties to succeed. d e
t unemployed or earning a living in the that it is not, and that the promise of In the final analysis the forces of a informal sector amounted to 43% of . material progress implicit in the bar economic globalization are irrespon d ( the economically active population. gain being struck is every bit as his sible, in that they are responsible to r e This pr
P year. Although an economic upswing dicates that for all the unprecedented can retain its integrity while abdicating
e appears well under way, the relation growth of the global economy over the responsibility for the wellbeing of the h t
ship between macro-economic growth past few decades, the number of peo vast majority of its citizens to essen y
b and the expansion of employment is ple living in appalling poverty has in tially impersonal forces.
d by no means as direct as one would creased. It also points to the ever The South African Minister of e t wish. Since the beginning of econom widening gap between the very rich Finance has indicated that the basic n a ic recovery in mid-1993 employment and the mass of people, even in the philosophy outlined in the new eco r g
growth has been held in check by at developmentally advanced nations. nomic policy document is no longer e c tempts W improve productivity in an One of the more rivetting statistics con open for discussion. I doubt whether n e environment of rising labour costs. tained in the report was that the 385 Mr Manuel really believed that the pol c i l Thus, from the beginning of the re richest' people on the planet own more icy debate could be terminated unilat r
e covery .until the first quarter of 1995 than the combined annual incomes of erally, and this statement was probably d only 52 000 additional jobs had been nearly a half of the world's population. meant to reassure the international n u created, a gain tha t by no means com Of "catching up" or "trickle-down" business community that the govern
y pensated even for the loss of 420 000 there is little evidence. During the last ment had decided on the basic thrust a
w jobs during the recession of 1989-93. thirty years the world's GDP has ex of its economic programme. In work e t Certain stated government poli panded from $4 trillion to $23 trillion. ing out the details of the plan, how a
G cies may also complicate job creation. Over' the same period the share of ever, new tensions and differences will t
e The removal of protection and implicit world income for the poorest 20% of have to be addressed, not least those n i subsidies for nascent enterprises falls countries has declined from 2,3% to between the plan and the reality. How b
a into this category. The anticipated ra 1,4%. Simultaneously the share of the the government then reacts and takes S tionalization that generally accompa richest 20% grew from 70% to 85%. A decisions, will tell us more than the y b nies the privatization of state-run en similar progression is noted within decisions themselves about the pros
d terprises has already led organized countries. On this view one might go pects for our fledgling democracy. e c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 91. The challenges of and building
Prof Goran Hyden, he 1990s have witnessed a marked It appears as if analysts have ar immediate past president reorientation of both academic rived at this view of development from and political discourse on devel two different directions. One is the per of the African Studies opment. For thirty or so years, the ception - based on a broad range of tdevelopment debate focused on the experiences - that a "top-down" ap Association, Director of the Center for African Studies, state or the economic forces underlying proach to development does not work. a country's aspiration to make progress. For a long time, the basic premise was University of Florida, This was as true for the modernization that the state is a rational instrument of Gainesville, and Fellow of theorists of the 1960s as it was for sub controlling and promoting change. The the Africa Institute of sequent generations of neo-Marxist and state is indispensable to achieve growth neo-liberal thinkers in the 1970s and and redistribution in desired directions. South Africa, looks at the 1980s. The intellectual trend in the By the 1980s, however, confidence in philosophical origins of 1990s is new in that it focuses on what the state's ability to be such a powerful civil society and examines generically is referred to as "political instrument had been replaced by dis culture". This orientation differs from illusionment. From both a leftist and the contemporary issues earlier structuralist theories in that it at a rightist perspective, the state was associated with using the tributes a distinct role to human agency. viewed as an instrument of exploitation, concept of civil society. At the same time, it differs from the preempting popular or individual ini neo-liberal "rational choice" theory in tiative. As the pendulum has swung in that it acknowledges that human choice the opposite direction, analysts now is mediated by institutions. maintain that developmental wisdom is )
0 More specifically, development dis lodged not in government bureaucra 1 course has in recent years come to focus cies but in local communities and insti 0 2
on the relationship between democracy tutions. "Indigenous knowledge" and d e and development. An increasingly com "popular participation" are examples of t a mon premise of what is being said is concepts that have come to occupy in d (
that "democracy is good for develop creasing prominence in the debate. r e ment"; that it may be a causal factor of The other direction from which an h s
i development. It is in this perspective alysts of social capital and civil society l b that the concepts of "social capital" and have come is the problem of political ap u athy or lack of organization. Democracy
P "civil society" have come to acquire rel
e evance. The former refers to the norma requires organization; organization an h t
tive values and beliefs that citizens in interest in public affairs. During the y
b their everyday dealings share; what 1980s many people in countries around
d Tocqueville referred to as "habits of the the world had adopted a cynical and dis e t heart and the mind". These habits pro trustful attitude towards politics. Politi n a vide reasons and design criteria for all cians suffered from lack of credibility r g
sorts of rules. It is hard to imagine that in democracies and autocracies alike. e c constitutional arrangements, laws and Robert Putnam's study of the evolution n e regulations would work without being of civic values in Italy is an example of c i l embedded in, and reflecting, particular studies in this genre. I Contrasting what
r 2
e values and norms upheld by groups and Edward Banfield had identified as the d communities making up a given society. "amoral familism" of southern Italy with n u
"Civil society", therefore, is viewed as the rich associational life of Emilia y
a the forum in which habits of the heart Romagna and other regions of northern w and the mind are being nurtured and Italy, Putnam concludes that the general e t developed. In this sense, both social difference in development between a
G capital and civil society are analytical these two parts of the same country t e categories in their own right, indepen must be attributed to a difference in the n i dem of democracy. Yet, it is assumed presence of social capital and the b a that investments in both social capital strength of civil society. Thus, civil soci S and civil society are necessalY to achieve ety is more than just society. It is that y b
democracy and, by implication, devel part of society that connects individual d e opment. citizens with the public realm and the c u d o r p e R 92 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 analysing CIVIL SOCIETY
stare, Put in orher words. civi1 sociery is contemporalY deba te on civil society, the political :-;ide of society. Their significance, however. becomes The literature on social capital and clear if we cake a closer look at rhe civil society is not new, According ro philosophical origins of the concept. Saberri,3 the notion of social capiral can Drawing on ::le "founding fathers" be HiKed all the way back to the 19th of the civil society concept, it is possible cenrmy and the democratic currenrs to distinguish variations along two prin of the h;llian Hisorgimento movemenr, cipal pal';lmeters. The: firsl concerns the w h. :ch conceprualized valor sociale queslion whether civ: society is primar (ro'-" ghly 'translatable ;l S social capital) ily an economic or a sociological phe as the educative feature 0: :he growrh nomenon, whether (he focus is and practice of self-governing insrir'~ , on the extenr ro which eco- ...... ___ ~~~=!: rions. Civil sociery can also be trJcec' nomic activity is private back to the period when modern ideas ly controlled or the of elemocracy were beginning to rake role which associa roor. In ordcr to fully understand ,lnel tions playas in appreciare: l::e current arguments abolll termediaries be civil society :: i ~ imponanl to firsr tween individ ra ke a look a: j: s philosophica I origins, ual and srare. fol lowing suc :~ a historica: review, I The second s1:'.all examine rhe contempor ;~ :y issues concerns the )
0 associaled with using ti,e concept of relarionship 1
0 civil society. This will OCCLl ;)Y rhe rest of between state 2 rhis article and be divided ::1(0 sep,H d of where analys(s locate (heir investiga civil sociery is ( essentially au r tion when examining r:vil sociery. Thl' e orher idenrifies some :he challer.ge:s tonomous of the h 0:' s i l that analysIs and practirioners alike fa ce s(ate or the state b in opera tion;1lizing the concepr. Wha t and civil society are u P are the practical and poli(ical measures organically linked. Tak e thaI seem ro follow from using civil so ing a more careful look af h t ciety as the conceptual lens for under (he philosophical pioneers of che y b standing developmenl in various P;Jfts debare about civil sociery, we find (har d e of the world? each of the four pOSirions listed above t n has a master advocare. as indicared in a r Figure l. .... g ~hilosophical origins of the Locke's posicion. reminiscenL of e c cOl'ltemporary debate Hobbes', is that the srare arises from so n e The emergence of a concepl or civil so ciery and is needed to restrain conflict c i l ciety is historically connected wilh rhe between individu,ds; bur he emphasizes r e rise of capit;llism and the evolurion of a rhe neeel 10 limi( state sovereignry in d n modern srate in (he Weberi;m sense of order to preserve individual freedoms u rational-legal strucrures of governance. derived from natural law. In this per y a Thus, i( seems clear thar "civil SOCielY" spective. (he srate exists to protect civil w cannOt be viewed in isola(ion from ei society from des(l'ucrive conflict. Na(ural e t a ther market or s(;!£e . For example, a righls are r.ot ,, ':)solu(e and mus t be reg G tOlalirarian society in which the marker is ulated ro ..:n';Dle civil sociery to prosper. t e rendered inoperative leaves no space for A social conrract, or some constitutior. n i rhe growth of civil sociery. Similarly. in :.II arrangement. (haL is respecred by b a socieries where the srare in the sense de both slare and civil society. is the cor S nerstone of liberal democracy. Locke's y scribeel ;lbove does not exist. civil sod b ery cannot cievelop. These points ;Ire not posicion might bl' called social-liberal d e always cO l~sid e re<: by participant:; in the in thac ir recognize'S rn.e need to balance c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 93 .J IN' cu u.lln If .ULn'u ... IU 'L"'" "ilL toC'''' ,- ..__--".~ __ ...... _...... --- _K._ doo,,' .., ..... _.. _.. ",.....--- ...... '--''''''''''-''''Io>o,~,_ .... - - ...... ".'" .... _ "''''' ,~ doo "".. , j ; 7 ...... ""'" -. '" ... "''"''' p"'" .' • .....,. no. t." ~ "'" _ ...... '" 0 - ...... __ ... _01_,..- ..." 1 ...... 0 -...... d _ ...... e --- ~_ t .. 00. _"'l... .. __ ...-,,,~ ...... ( ...,.,.,...... ~...-"" -" "' .... r ._-., ...-._ .. _--,, - , A • e ...... ' .... ,,,. .... '" "'...... -...... ,... "" ...... <, ""' ...... - h ...... _ "" ... __ ... _01 , ~ , ..... ",",0" ...- ....'" ...... , s ...... i .. l ,.,,- pooh."'!uo ... ..-'" 01 ,,..-; , _,, ...."" ~ ... ""ut>. '" .... __ , ,w • ...... "' ,", ' ...... b ..... _ ... .. u "Y ."" .... ,to. """', '" ""'"du,1 "" ..." " .. , .~.... "'. {j., "".,, _ '''' m..,.., ,,.. ""Of'<'''' P "'fIO<...,." .. ,.... , ...... 1_ .. , cHI " " ~,"'" b.. ~..," _ ...... ~ . .. , ",••• "'"'" ...."""' OU •• ,,"' oW' e h ~" ~ -","" ' ...... -.... , ..;1 """'T •• ....,. ..' t ...... " ,,...... ,. ' " "'_"""'" '" --.oK'" ...... ~ ". ~- """"~ y ''''''.I!''' ,.... , ...... "" _ ...... ,...... ~ ... ~., .'"., ...... h .. b .. . ,.,.. -,~- ..... ~_ .. , ...... ""0 • d ...... -""" e , .... "'''''' .,1...... _., ...... ___ _ _. ,"...... "". _ 01.""_ t ...... _...... -_ n ,,-- "~",,"" a 01_...... , ..."._ ____ ... _w., ",._ ...... _.d ...... ,. .... , .."'01"_"" r "'lI"" · .....K' .. '_,.... , .... ,_" .. on,...... _· g T",...... _ ....-_ e c ...... ~---.y _ ___ ...... mol .... n - _, - """r ...... ", • po ,,"" _...... ,-_ ...... -'-. e c ..... t •• _ ...... "' .... ~M ...... 01«.. -.· i l ...... ,' ••"'~ , " ...... «>0«<,.,,' r _"'"l' ... ,.- --...... ,...... ""' ...... e - - .... ,..--. __ ~oI ..._ c ..... "" -ho, __- , .. "_"', ..,,. d ...... n __ ., "", ,,,. u ...... ,,.. ...,. """"''''' "" "" """""" '" ,~~ ...... u, >0<>« '" ~...... ~- l>«fl"'" _ ..,...,.,...... y . ««"""'",,- .".. -.,0, .. "",,,, ~.' a , - ~ ", """" ...... r.... oJ""--- ... " __...... ,...... , '" ~." ... """,,.-. A" ...... I .. """" . ,-.... "" ...... p"'. w e Coo ...... , ,.. "-.. ",;~ ,",,,, ~""'" t . , ~ 1>«>_' """" .... '" """", ,-, Y",,, ...... a .".. Tu ...... -" .-.-, on 01 " •• "" ..... "'"...,... ,... """"" ""' ..... ",. •• , """ 01 ,.... -.. G ,~j ...... _ .., _ .... 01 xii 01 ..." ..... ,..... t .. ""_n_ ...... -. .... e _..,.-, _ 0;..' "".... '-....., • • _ n ...... i ...... __ - ...... «MOod on _ ... 0,- b ...... ~._- ... ,..out...... "" ' a •• .w.., ...... __ .... _ • ..... """"" ...... n ... _ .,"_ " . .... ' hi • ..,._ ...... S y ... _d.. -..01 ...... <,,~_ .. ' ...... ~ ...... 01 , b ...___ , ...... _d' """ ...... ,. ~, ""~ _ ..... __ ", b ...... _n", tje.-. ..-...... __ d -. e ...... _ on ..",", ...... c ...... u "'- , "" .... _ d ...... o - - - r p e R I ...... _""- .. ,.,,- THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY the subject continue today. While terms of popular participation or hu in ways that permit the effective artic being a meeting-ground of the politi man rights Cor both), this agenda pre ulation and aggregation of societal in cal right and left, the discourse is re supposes an active civil society and terests. Like the American federalists, flective of points of contention that thus an expectation that these NGOs advocates of this position do not treat can be traced back to the four philo themselves can make a difference to the state and civil society as standing sophical schools identified above. the conditions under which a devel apart. They are concerned with insti Perhaps the most dominant is the opmental philosophy is being imple tuting constitutional and legal mecha group of authors who emphasize the mented. While the fear of mass poli nisms that limit the risks of abuse of importance of autonomous and active tics seems distant in the contemporary political power. associations. Examples of writers who debate, the arguments carry a distinct Students of regime transitions are reflect this largely Tocquevillean affinity with Tocqueville's view of civil particularly prominent within this position are Stepan5 and Diamond 6 society: active citizen participation is school. O'Donnell and Schmitterl3 set More specifically, civil society is here needed for the organization and func the tone for much of this writing by defined as the "realm of organized tioning of development activities; evaluating the Latin American experi social life" standing between individ communication of information and ences of transition from authoritarian uals and political institutions of repre ideas is needed to encourage partici to democratic rule in the early 1980s. sentation. For instance, according to pation and guard against abuses of The specific challenges of regime tran Diamond,7 civil society acts to streng state power. sition in Africa have been discussed then democracy by: The "associational" school can be by Bratton and van de \XTalle 14 'Some criticized on at least two principal of the literature on governance also • containing the power of the state grounds. The first is that it is based on falls into this category. Hyden,15 for through public scrutiny; rather simplistic version of pluralism: example, discusses the challenges fac • stimulating political participation groups organize to pursue a shared in ing African countries in terms of man by citizens; terest and countered by other groups aging regimes, here defined as the • developing such democratic norms that mobilize to pursue an opposing "rules of the political game". The dif as tolerance and compromise; interest, policy emerges from the bal ference between the "regime" and the • creating ways of articulating, ag ance of power among groups. The "associational" schools is that the for gregating and representing interests fuller pluralism argument developed mer concentrates its attention to the outside political parties, especially by Truman 11 and Dah[12 and others framework within which civil society at the local level; which recognized that resources are can grow, while the latter focuses on ) 0 • mitigating conflict through cross distributed unequally in society, but its content. One does not preclude the 1 0 cutting, or overlapping, interest; which also asserted that multiple, over other, as many organizations working 2 lapping interests of individuals would in this field recognize. For example, d • recruiting and training political e mitigate the impact of inequalities and many human rights organizations tend t leiders; a reduce conflict over policy, occupies a to spend their efforts on shaping and d • questioning and reforming existing ( relatively insignificant place in the con monitoring adherence to the law of r democratic institutions and proce e temporary debate. The second line of the land without denying the impor h dures; aod s i criticism levelled against this school, tance of the strength of associational l • disseminating information. b therefore, is its tendency not to explic life for democracy. A regime orienta u itly acknowledge that an associational tion is also naturally prevalent among P e Although the argument of this "asso focus makes its advocates blind to the the many constitutional bodies that h t ciational" approach to civil society risks of elite pluralism, ie a SOCiety in have been set up to facilitate the tran y 'acceptsb that the development of civil which resource-rich interests dominate. sition to democracy. In several coun d society is not sufficient for the con A second approach in the ongo tries, eg Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda e t solidation of democracy, its advocates ing debate draws its inspiration large in Africa, the government-appointed n a have a generally high expectation of ly from Locke. This school focuses on constitutional commissions have made r g the role that civil SOCiety can play in the nature of the regime and how rules a special effort to involve civil society e c achieving democracy. A critical func can be made more democratic. It re in constitution-making by holding spe n e tion of civil society is to promote the cognizes that the consolidation of cial hearings and inviting submissions c i 8 l principle of citizenship CSztompka democracy may require changes in from societal groups. In all these cases, r and Calhoun9 are also reflected in the both state and civil society. The there is a recognition that while con e d 10 writings of Robert Putnam ). The au "regime" school, therefore, tends to be taining state power is important, con n u thors belonging to the "associational" concerned specifically with the consti stitutionalizing relations among grou ps y school are generally optimistic about tutional issue of how state-society re in civil society may often be equally a w the opportunity for civil society to lations can be organized to promote important. Civil society is not auto e t make a difference to democracy and democracy. A constitution by itself, matically democratic. Many groups a G development. no matter how ingeniously designed, may be using the relative freedom of t e This assumption is also reflected no matter what formal arrangements civil society only to pursue anti-de n i in the position taken by many non of checks and balances admirably mocratic objectives. To the extent that b a governmental organizations, whose arranged, will not limit authoritarian state and civil society are viewed as S development agenda in recent years rule. To be effective, constitutions must linked to each other, citizens' rights y b has come to incorporate democra relate to the realities of society. They must be balanced by citizens' obliga d e tization goals. Whether expressed in must intertwine state and civil society tions. Furthermore, not all groups in c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 95 THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY civil society are ready to accept the ex ment. The ciearesl lesson from the col istence of others. Justice and tolerance, lapse of communism is to prosper, an therefore, are principles that civil society economy must be allowed to order it must learn to accept. self spontaneously in the main, accord The "associational" and the "re ing to the principles of competition and gime" schools both share a relatively voluntary exchange. The invisible hand, optimistic view of civil society and its in other words, works better than the ability to make a difference to develop visible boot. 17 On top of that can be ment. By largely ignoring the role of so added the importance of security of pri cial structures, they assume a lot of vate property, which analysts believe is scope for human agency. In this re more easily secured in a liberal eco spect, they differ from the remaining nomy. The anti-statist view has been two schools which take a more cautious particularly pronounced among dissi view of what civil society can achieve dents under communist rule in Eastern on its own. The "neo-liberal" school Europe. A liberal economy creates the which draws its inspiration especially conditions under which a civil society from Paine particularly emphasizes the of associations autonomous from the importance of structural reform to en state can flourish. An interesting twist to able private property to be strength the argument of the neo-liberal school ened. The historical relationship be is the notion that economic freedoms tween capitalism and democracy is well alone may be worth little unless sup known and has been explored in many ported by political ones. For example, different ways ever since Max Weber's Mancur Olson, drawing on the histori time. The issue became especially im cal experience of Europe, argues force portant again in the 1980s when devel fully that democracy is far more con opment analysts realized that "social en ducive to long-term economic growth gineering" using the state was a failure. than dictatorship, even of an apparent The many experiments, based on ly benevolent kind. 18 ) Keynesian ideas in Europe and Latin The fourth of the approaches dis America and on Leninist ideas in cussed here is the "post-Marxist" school. ) 1\ I 0 Eastern Europe and Africa, had proved Like its neo-liberal counterpart, it recog 1 0 untenable - more costly than beneficial nizes the importance of social structures 2 to society. "Structural adjustment", as formed by the dominant economy. In d e this policy of economic liberalization contrast, however, it has a more san t ~ /\~ a and financial stabilization has been guine view of the influence of structural d /J ( called in the past decade and a half, reforms. Such reforms might be feasible r e while not explicitly being introduced to but their effect is to reinforcesocial strat h j s i foster democracy, is seen by many as an ification and thus enhance elite interests. l Ii I' b important corollary to the ongoing po The point made by this school is that the u j I litical reform efforts. All the same, this ability to organize and participate is rela P ,,/ I e aspect of structural adjustment has re ted to socioeconomic status, so that pol h t ceived generally less attention than the icy-making is usually the province of a y b social costs perceived as associated with select minority with sufficient resources. d this approach. One reason may be that Lindblom,19 for example, reminds us of e t the relationship between market and Hegel, Marx and Gramsci when he n a democracy is by no means decisively speaks of government as two separate r g clear. 16 For example, economic reforms spheres of authority; business has a priv e c were initially in the 1980s most suc ileged position in politics because of the n e cessful in countries like South Korea, necessity for the production of material c i l Chile, Indonesia and Mexico, all of needs and its ability to more thoroughly r e which at that time had authoritarian socialize individuals in its non115. Authors d forms of government. One reason for like Bayart20 and Fatton21 echo this posi n u their success that was often cited was tion when they analyse civil society in y a that these governments did not have to terms of the power and domination ex w cope with the inflationary demands of ercised by specific social classes. In gen e t / strong pressure groups in society. A a eral, such writers are skeptical about on G / /1 weak civil society, therefore, was a going economic and political reform pro t e /,,/ /1 i boon rather than a bane. cesses. For them democratic transitions n v i i More recently, some economists represent only minor adjustments rather b a have come around to argue that eco than radical changes. Fundamental rela S y nomic freedoms are good for econom tions of power and privilege remain so b ic growth and, therefore, by implication lidified. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and d e in the neo-liberal view, for develop- Stephens,22 for example, examine how c u d o r p e R 96 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 i THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY L.__ .. ___ ..___ . __.• ______. __ ._._ .. ____....•. __ . __. ___ .___ ._. __.. __ ~ ______the capitalist mode of production trans the individual and the state. The conse forms society and the regimes that result quence of this outlook is that civil soci from different power relationships be ety tends to be analysed primarily in tween classes. They emphasize the im the context of a single country. The lat portant role that the working class has ter becomes the most common level of historically played in consolidating demo analysis. There are, however, at least cracy, but they also point to the impor two other levels of analysis which in tant influence of transnational power the contemporary context of building structures in the contemporary global set social capital and strengthening democ ting. In general, these authors maintain racy become important. One is the as that only the emergence of strong social sociationallevel. To fully appreciate the movements capable of challenging exist task of building social capital, it is im ing power structures provides hope for a portant to know what is going on with more fundamental change. Although in civil society associations. How de their role in certain parts of the develop mocratic are they? What norms or val ing world, notably Latin America,23 ues do they foster? How do they relate should not be underestimated, paradoxi to other associations? The other is the cally, such movements, eg feminist and global or transnational level. Many of ecologist, have been more evident in the organizations that are actively en post-materialist industrial societies than gaged in advocating certain issues op in developing and democratizing soci erate across national boundaries. They eties elsewhere. interpret issues in a global context and In summing up this review of how are interested in fostering civic values the contemporary debate relates to the that apply to the global arena. For ex philosophers pioneering the civil soci ample, many of the strongest develop ety concept, it may be worth empha ment NGOs are international. So what sizing that inherent in the four schools are the implications of this "globaliza identified above are also two distinct tion" of civil society? In this section, I roles that civil society tends to play in shall explore some of the specific is the context of democratization and de sues that arise at each of these three ) 0 velopment. The first is that it helps mo different levels of analysis. 1 0 bilize resources in ways that the state 2 alone is unable to do. Development The country level d e benefits from the freedoms that civil so The task of building social capital is al t (\ l a ciety provides because people can take ways mediated by existing social struc '/ d ( initiatives they would not otherwise do. tures. It is not possible to induce indi r e The second role is that of socializing in viduals to cooperate or respect each h s i dividuals in a democratic direction. Civil other without first paying attention to l b society associations are looking at the the institutions that make up society. u P power structure from the bottom up Neither pure self-interest nor altruism e and as a result they tend to instill a par alone explains why social capital is h t ticipatory philosophy in which checks being formed and why civil society may y b on abuses of power features promi flourish. One issue that has attracted at d nently. A vibrant civil society is a nec tention in the development literature is e t essary, although not sufficient condition how far traditional institutions can form n a for democracy. To fully appreciate the the basis for the growth of civil society. r •>i J g challenges of building social capital In their extensive review of the role of e c through civil society, it is necessary also local organizations in development, I' ! n e to examine the various levels at which Esman and Uphoff24 found that they c i l the relationship between civil society, often playa positive role. For example, r e democracy and development can be the Naam movement in Burkina Faso d analysed. grew out of existing institutions among n u the Mossi people. Traditional ways of y organizing may also serve as a model a Levels of analysing civil 25 w for new associations, as Dirven shows e t society and democracy with reference to rural trade unions in a 26 G The introductory section has confirmed Bolivia. Korten also adheres to this t e that civil society means different things position when he argues that new in n i to different people. Although there is stitutions should as much as possible b a no single view of the phenomenon, be made compatible with existing tra \ S there is a tendency for most analysts ditions and norms. This cluster of y ,',--~ "''-- b to define civil society as the realm of authors all take the position that civil d e organized social life standing between society cannot be created from the top c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 97 r THE CHAllENGES OF ANAL YSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY down. It has to grow organically from This position is more common among ing public policy-making. The impor below. Lodging development efforts developmentalist organizations for tance of a decentralized government in existing institutions while at the which the scope for bargaining with structure that provides opportunity for same time aaapting them to new tasks the authorities over policy issues is local communities to make decisions and working to make them more de also greater. Although this position is about resource allocation, manage mocratic seems to be the preferred ap sometimes being criticized as coward ment and distribution on their own has proach. ly, it has been common with NGOs also been stressed by Brautigam32 and There are others, however, who working in developing and democra Fox. 33 As the latter argues: pluralist maintain that traditional structures are tizing countries because it has pre politics must be learned, and sub-na hindrances to the evolution of a strong vented them from being banned. At tional governments make the best civil society. While indigenous organi stake here, therefore, has been the schooJ.34 Decentralization, however, is zations do not have to be controlled question of what to do when the as not a panacea. If local traditional by elites, Julie Fisher27 for example, sociational space is limited and civil patrons, for example, are able to con found that new organizations emerg society threatened. The most common trol the state apparatus at its lower ing from below are even less likely to answer has been that it is better to levels - as they do in many parts of the be dominated by the already powerful. move slowly and try to enlarge avail world - they may actually constitute a One of the best concrete examples of able space without invoking the rage strong impediment to the emergence how civil society associations can be of those in power. As Hadenius and of civil society associations. Decentral fostered to overcome traditional pat Uggla30 argue, however, such a posi ization sometimes becomes just an terns of non-cooperation is Uphoff's tion is also fraught with its own risks. other means of strengthening the cen study of the Gal Oya irrigation project Entering into a relationship that allows tral government by way of patronage. in Sri Lanka. 28 Building on the lowest the state to influence associational pri Instead of being fostered, civil society common denominator - the propelty orities may undercut their autonomy. in this scenario is being choked. they held in common - a group of out Civil society leaders, furthermore, may side facilitators (a combination of become tempted to join the ranks of The associational level Cornell researchers and government "men of the state". What this debate The analysis at this level has largely staff from the Agrarian Research and underscores is that civil society asso centered on two questions: what insti Training Institute) managed to gradu ciations are likely to have very differ tutions make up civil society? what ally make farmers cooperate to im ent perceptions of strategy and tactics qualities must associations possess in prove the irrigation system so that in their relation with the state. order to foster the process of democra ) 0 water distribution dramatically im Yet another issue of importance tizatiun? The answers provided in re 1 0 proved and productivity on the land in the context of building civil society sponse to the first question can be di 2 rose. In this case, building social cap at the country level has been the ques vided between a "minimalist" and a d e ital involved circumventing traditional tion of how the state can be made to "maximali::t" position. The minimalist t a norms and authority, which became loosen its grip on society. Two major argument tends to limit the inclusion of d ( possible by institutionalizing new, ini strategies have been discussed. The civil society associations to those that r e tially informal, relations among the first is associated with breaking state are explicitly political or "civic" in the h s i farmers. monopoly over resource mobilization sense of fostering the nor111S of democ l b Another issue that tends to get and allocation. ·Strengthening the mar racy.35 In this perspective, there is a u P prominence in the literature analysing ket economy has been one way of del tendency to exclude those organiza e civil society at the country level is how egating authority to individuals and or tions that are engaged in economic or h t far associations should adopt a con ganizations outside the state realm. productive activities. Some make a dis y b frontational approach or not towards This is a conspicuous component of tinction, once made hy Aristotle, be d the state. This issue has arisen partic the strategy of the World Bank and tween human activities of "work" e t ularly in the literature on human rights other donors in their effort to promote (techne) and "interaction" (praxis), sug n a advocacy organizations. Because this more democratic forms of governance. gesting a communicative metaphor of r g type of association's first concern is Although this effort has been couched the public sphere juxtaposed against an e c with the defence of individual liber more often in the terms of limiting instrumentalist reading of manipulative n e ties against the state, they almost in "rent-seeking" by state officials, its im work-processes. The latter is not con c i l evitably get into a confrontational re plications also affect civil society. The genial to the development of democra r e lation with the authorities. There is no other strategy involves decentralization tic norms or the evolution of civil soci d scope for compromise on these issues; of developmental responsibilities to ety. Hannah Arendt, Juergen Habermas n u either an individual enjoys these rights local self-governing institutions. Elinor and Simone Weil have argued along y 31 a or he/she does not. Activist organiza Ostrom has been a particularly con this line thaI politics is a vibrant and w tions like Amnesty International and sistent advocate of the need for build unique human activity. Their critique of e t a various branches of Human Rights ing autonomous organizations at the modern society aims at freeing the sub G Watch uphold the principles of civil local level. This strategy, however, ject from the "unnatural" technical do t e and political rights of individuals at also requires a corollary devolution of mination that they resolutely associate n i any price.29 Others, however, suggest political authority to local government with work. Taken to a practical level, b a that taking an uncompromising ap institutions so that these autonomous this suggests that explicitly political or S y proach towards the state undercuts the "grassroots" organizations, many of "civic" associations possess an au b overall objective of building social which are quite limited in geographi tonomous capacity to shape the politi d e capital and strengthening civil society. cal scope, have a chance of influenc- cal sphere that other organizations lack. c u d o r p e R 98 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY l ____ . The maxima list position, on the "civic". In other words, there is a def ground in ways that foster tolerance other hand, makes no distinction be inite normative choice made by ana and respect of others. In these re tween political and other types of or lysts in favour of those criteria that are spects, open recruitment promotes a ganization. Here the spectrum ranges typically associated with democracy. democratic culture, one that is also from small, exclusively local organi Analysts have identified several strengthening civil society.39 zations in neighbourhoods to organi criteria that they consider important This last point is particularly im zations with a national orientation and for understanding what associations portant to emphasize because there is membership. The groups in question qualify to be part of civil society. One a tendency to look at non-governmen may organize anything from activities is autonomy. A civil SOciety associa tal organizations in developing coun mainly of a social or cultural nature, tion should be independent of the tries almost exclusively in terms of how eg elrama groups and sports clubs, to state in terms of decisional compe their role in development management profit-making or service provision, eg tence, recruitment of leaders and con can be strengthened. For example, the producer associations, trade unions trol of important economic and man primary emphasis is on creating net and private hospitals. Anything that agerial resources. It is no coincidence works or other forms of linkages. While takes place outside the state realm that authoritarian regimes have tried this is not unimportant, much of the counts as part of civil society and con to curb the activities of civil society by debate on the role of NGOs is too in tributes to building social capital. In circumscribing the autonomy of its as strumental and overlooks the inherent this context, the work of Robert sociations.38 A second criteria is that potential for democra tization that is Putnam is of particular interest. He these associations should internally be embedded in these organizations. They does indeed show that groups that democratically structured. They should are not merely resource mobilizers or have little directly to do with politics be microcosms of civil society itself, providers. They are also - at least po are all the same instrumental in fos so that members are socialized to have tentially - serving an important role as tering civil norms and thus building internalized values that are compati socializing agents. If they are democra social ca pita!. In his a ttempt to explain ble with democracy. The more hori tically constituted, they are likely to the developmental differences be zontal the decision-making structures make a significant contribution to the tween northern and southern Italy, he in the organization, the more likely it formation of a vibrant, but also tolerant arrives at the conclusion that organi will foster democratic values. Organi civil society, one that fosters democra zations like choral groups may have zations with a very hierarchical consti cy rather than autocracy. played an important role in building tution or those dominated by patron In sum, one can argue that civil trust and thus cooperation. client relations would be less likely to society is no better tha.n the sum of its ) 0 The second question focuses on contribute toward a democratic civil associations. The latter make it what it 1 0 the qualities of civil society associa society. Yet another criterion that is is. Little social capital of value for 2 tions. The point here is that not all important for fostering a democratic democracy will be built unless the as d e t these associations do necessarily pro organizational culture is accountabili sociations that make up civil society a mote democracy. Civil society associ ty. There must be procedural mecha themselves respect and adhere to de d ( ations may be places for egotistical nisms for members to hold leaders ac mocratic values in their own internal r e pursuitsY They may also be places in countable for their decisions and ac governance. Values and norms institu h s i which authoritarian values are being tions. Procedures, however, are not al tionalized at the micro-organizational l b nurtured. In short, civil society can ways enough. Action speaks louder level are likely to be the strongest bul u P undercut democracy if its associations than words and elected leaders must wark against attacks by the enemies of e pursue values that go against tolerance be ready to respect the principle of ac democracy. We know from the histor h t and respect for others. For example, in countability and voluntarily accept its ical experience of many countries that y b many societies currently undergoing significance in the context of fostering cooperative societies, trade unions and d democratization, its objectives are a stronger civil society. A fourth crite grassroots movements have served as e t being threatened by anti-democratic rion is open recruitment. This is par the vanguard of building democracy. It n a organizations. Russia is a case in pOint, ticularly important for the purpose of is in such associational contexts that r g where fascist tendencies have cropped social or national integration. Asso the social capital needed for democra e c up in the post-Soviet period. Many ciations that are exclusive and closed cy is being formed. n e women argue that civil society associ tend to be less democratically inclined. c i l The global level ations remain sexist and thus hamper They tend to become particularly r e participation by women in public af problematic in societies characterized One of the most interesting develop d fairs. Yet others focus on the racial or by cultural pluralism, ie places where ments in recent years has been the n u ethnic exclusivity of some of these or many ethniC, racial or religiOUS groups rapid growth of independent organi y zations that operate on a transnational a ganizations, maintaining that they live together in the same nation-state. w must be more inclusive in order to Organizations that do not transcend basis. The building of social capital to e t promote democracy. Although it is these boundaries usually have the ef strengthen civic and democratic norms a G possible, in line with the maxima list fect of polarizing civil SOciety, turning no longer takes place at the national t e position above, to argue that any as politics into a zero-sum game. Multiple level only. There are two aspects of n i sociation regardless of its internal char affiliation through open recruitment this globalization of the norms of b a acteristics is part of civil society, the enables individuals to be members of democracy that are particularly impor S tendency is to assume that these asso more than one association. Multiple tant here. The .first relates to the "uni y b ciations must have some distinct qual or cross-cutting membership encour versalization" of specific policy issues d e ities in order to qualify as "civil" or ages individuals to seek out common and the evolution of organizations c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 99 THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY serving as global advocates. Greenpeace point. There is now in existence a spe and Amnesty International are cases in cial global alliance for citizen participa point in the fields of environmental con tion, whose aim is to strengthen global servation and human rights respectively. civil society.42 We can see, therefore, The other concerns the growing role of that civil society is no longer just that donor agencies in pushing the democ slice of associational life that exists be ratic agenda in developing countries. In tween the individual and the state at the the 1990s, both bilateral and multilater country level but also across national al donors have increasingly stated that boundaries.43 When transnational ac development aid will be tied to the tivists direct their efforts beyond the readiness of developing country gov state, they are politicizing global civil so ernments to accept democratic norms of ciety. These efforts involve identifying governance. On this agenda, the notion and manipulating instruments of power of building social capital through for shaping collective life. In short, it is strengthening civil society has been very too limiting to think of NGOs in world prominent. The consequence of this affairs merely as transnational interest globalization of the discourse on civil groups. Their political relevance goes society is that pressures to democratize beyond this by forging new alliances no longer come only from within a given across national boundaries, reconceptu country but also from outside. The lob alizing public issues, and empowering byists for democracy are not only na local communities. They are building so tional but also international. This devel cial capital through long-distance rela opment also has interesting implications tions, thereby helping to promote what for the analysis of civil society. amounts to a "global civil society". Important in the context of this ar The other aspect of this process is ticle is that the transnational activist or that played by bilateral and multilateral ganizations are viewed not merely as donors who, by insisting on democrat agencies seeking to change state poli ic conditionalities for dispensing their cies or create conditions in the interna aid, often through international NGOs, tional system that enhance or diminish help foster the evolution of a new form ) 40 0 interstate cooperation. These organiza of global governance that encroaches 1 0 tions also work across societies, ie they on the previously sacred notion of state 2 help shape norms at the level of society sovereignty. By contracting funds to d e t as much as at that of the state. Accepting these NGOs, donors strengthen their a a definition of civil society which pre power vis-a-vis national governments, d ( supposes that it is the arena of social en- particularly in developing countries, r e gagement which exists above the indi and help provide the political space that h s i vidual yet below the state,41 it is, as sug enables these organizations to influence l b gested above, a complex network of not only individual governments, but u P economic, social, and cultural practices also civil society in these countries. In e based on friendship, family, the market fact, it can be argued that the influence h t and voluntary affiliation. This concept is of most international NGOs in develop y b increasingly beginning to make sense ing countries tends to be more at civil d not only at the national but also inter society than state level. For example, e t national level thanks to the interpene we know that many such NGOs have n a tration, the intermeshing of symbolic had a marked influence on how people r g meaning systems, and the proliferation in these countries view development in e c of transnational collective endeavours. new ways that have yet to be adopted n e For example, market forces shape the by governments. [n fields such as pub c i l way vast numbers of people in coun lic health and environmental conserva r e tries around the world think and act on tion, these donor-funded NGOs have d n specific public issues. Voluntary associ helped shape the character of public u ations or social movements based on re opinion and public life. y a ligion, eg Christian-based communities The prominence of the donors, w in Latin America, represent significant at however, is itself problematic in that e t a tempts to politicize various public arenas many of the beneficiaries of their fi G , and bring about change. Women orga nancial support tend to lose their auto t e ) . nized into movements or fora on an in nomy. They are not rooted in domestic n i ternational scale, as for example most conditions in these countries and there b a recently in the context of the huge NGO fore their ability to sustain collective ac S y Forum associated with the Fourth World tivities is often limited. Associationallife b Conference on Women in Beijing in in many of these places tends to be so d e September 1995, are other cases in dependent on donor funding that civil c u d o r p e R 100 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 THE CHALLENGES Of ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY C) society is very fragile. Thus, there is gence of democratic government. In If''~i \ sometimes a conflict between the am others, its rise has been facilitated by U\\ bition to foster civil society at the glob the introduction of a democratically al and the national level. The interna elected government. It has provided the tional NGOs tend to focus on the glob political space in which new forms of al level at the expense of their potential social capital can be built. We must rec contribution in fostering associational ognize, therefore, that the challenges of life at the national level. There is a limit building civil society are bound to vary to how far democracy in developing from place to place. countries can be built with the assis There are essentially three scenar tance of international actors, be they ios that can be sketched out here as NGOs or donors.44 This is an issue that constituting the range of challenges that needs to be fully recognized and further the world faces as it is moving towards studied. the 21st century. The first focuses on limiting the role of the state in the pub lic realm. In this scenario, civil society The challenges is already relatively strong and capable Building civil society, as was indicated of autonomous action to achieve this in the previous section, takes place at end. The second centres on the task of three levels and the various issues as strengthening civil society. Here civic sociated with this task can be meaning associations are weak and rarely able to fully studied at the same three levels. It challenge state authority. In the third is also important to recognize that ef scenario, the challenge is a dual one. forts at these different levels interact Here both state and civil society are with each other. They do not take place weak and in need of development. I in isolation. For example, the emer shall discuss each one of these in turn. gence of a social movement like the Greens with a democratic self-govern Limiting the state ing agenda influences the nature of civil This scenario takes on special signifi society in a given country but also in cance in the Latin American context ) vites alliances with similar movements where much of the recent democratiza , '."- 0 f 1 in other parts of the world. It would be tion can be attributed to the failure of 0 2 wrong to assume, however, that civic an authoritarian state to solve econom i' i\ d / \ e norms spread evenly throughout the ic and other problems in society. In t \' a world or that building civil society con these countries democracy is not a new d ( sists of a linear process from transition ideology nor practice. In fact, most Latin r e to consolidation. Strengthening civil so American countries have had at least h s ciety is essentially a political task and as one, in some cases rwo spells of demo i l such subject to constant contestation by cratic governance prior to the "wave" b u those for whom an open and account that began in the early 1980s. Although P e able associational life is a threat. The the pattern varies somewhat from coun h t evolution of civil society has always try to country, the Latin American re y been a long and contradictory process. gion has a tradition of relatively strong b d Yet, there are more and stronger trade unions. In the past two decades, e t social forces geared up to fulfil this task civil society has also been enriched by n a than ever before. The past two decades the emergence of social movements. r g have witnessed remarkable progress for These include Christian-based organi e c democracy. Since 1972, the number of zations drawing on liberation theology, n e democratic political systems has more feminism and environmental conserva c i l than doubled, from 44 to 107. Three out tion, notably of the bio-diverse Amazon r of five of the world's 187 countries basin. The frequent human rights abus e d today have adopted a democratic gov es by previous dictatorial regimes have n 45 u ernment. With the collapse of commu also served as an impetus for the emer y nism, moreover, democracy has reached gence of civil society associations. As a w every region of the world for the first can be gleaned from these examples, e t time in history. And, as Huntington46 has civil society has continued to grow in a G noted, it has become "the only legi strength in opposition to a powerful but t e timate and viable alternative to an au illegitimate state. n i thoritarian regime of any kind". Civil so The "attack" on the state has taken b a ciety has been both a cause and a con two forms. One has been the effort by S sequence of this process. In many civil society associations to consti y b places around the world, the rise of civil tutionalize power relations in new d e society has contributed to the emer- ways, ie to facilitate the introduction' of c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 101 I THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY democratic regimes in which civil and communist economy proved incapable velopment in ways it has not in Africa political liberties are guaranteed and of sustaining itself as division of labour or Latin America. Economic growth in public accountability effectively se became increasingly complex. Trans the Asian context has been achieved cured. Particularly good cases in point action costs simply became so heavy with a strong and interventionist state. here are both Argentina and Chile that the economy literally collapsed The economic successes of these where the legacy of excessive abuses under their weight. The withering countries were reached with strategies of power by the military in the 1970s away of central planning and direction that contradict those that the interna provided a rationale for the calls by paved the way for economic reform tional finance institutions have been civil society associations to delimit which in turn opened the doors for trying to get governments in other re the powers of the executive. In both civil society associations to grow in im gions of the world to adopt. Civil so these countries the democratic transi portance48 Again, the situation in the ciety has played a very minor role in tion in the past decade has been quite mid-1990s varies from country to coun paving the way for economic and so successful while it has been more try in this region, but it seems reason cial development in these countries. problematic, yet not unsuccessful, in able to suggest that civil society rests Their trade-based growth strategies other countries, eg Brazil, in the same on a stronger foundation in Latin have largely relied on state initiatives region. Other countries elsewhere, America than in Eastern Europe and and regulation. Most Asian leaders where a strong civil society has played the former Soviet Union. The prospect would agree that economic reform a catalytic role in the democratic tran of bringing about economic and polit must precede political reform. That is sition include the Philippines and ical reform, and thereby strengthening why, for instance Singapore's senior South Africa. civil society, seems somewhat easier minister, Lee Kuan Yew49 has been The other form has been the ef and brighter in the former as com campaigning against Western democ fort to privatize the economy so as to pared to the latter region. racy for countries like China and the reduce the role of the state in devel Philippines. Lee and others have been opment. The Keynesian tradition of an Strengthening civil society particularly skeptical of Western ad interventionist welfare state was in Not all governments in developing vice on this issue and have insisted herited in many Latin American coun countries see democra tiza tion as a that only incumbent governments can tries, eg Argentina, Chile, Mexico and positive phenomenon. This is espe decide on issues like the pace of re Uruguay for the same reasons as in cially true for governments in the form and the sequence to be followed Western Europe: to manage econom Muslim world and in many East and in developing their countries. Strength ic growth and control distribution of Southeast Asian countries. Western at ening civil society, like democracy, ) benefits and resources. Part of the tempts to motivate and pressure these therefore, does not feature on the list 0 1 transition in the past years in that part countries to adopt democracy have of top priorities in these Asian coun 0 2 of the world has centred on liberaliz met with little success. A growing tries. This is clear, for example, from d e ing the economy by reducing state sense of solidarity among these coun the final declaration of the Asian re t a control. Although it has been resisted tries makes it difficult for the interna gional human rights conference in d ( in many places and gone slow, some tional community to isolate or effec Bangkok, in which government rep r e countries, eg Argentina and Chile, tively pressure any single country. resentatives attest to the high premi h s have created much more opportunity Nonetheless, governments in Asia are um they place on sovereignty and i l 50 b for private business and reduced the coming to recognize that popular sov non-interference in domestic affairs. u opportunity for state officials to seek ereignty is a key component of polit The same position is also widely em P e "rents", ie add to the costs of provid ical legitimacy. At the non-govern braced by governments in the Muslim h t ing public services. In spite of the mental level, especially in Southeast world, where religious dogma is often y strong support in many of these coun Asia, there is a growing political con invoked to prevent the growth of civil b d tries for a state-led strategy of devel sciousness and increasing support for society associations. e t opment in the past, the failure of au both democracy and human rights. This reluctance, even outright n a thoritarian governments - military or The values of democracy and human opposition, among government lead r g civilian (as in Mexico) - in the 1970s rights are thus becoming part of the ers to the idea of building a stronger e c and early 1980s to bring back eco domestic political discourse and can and more democratic civil society n e nomic growth, reinforced the de no longer be excluded by fiat, except notwithstanding, there is a small but c i 47 l mands for regime transition. in a few places in the Muslim world. growing constituency for doing pre r This scenario also applies in Perhaps most important, nearly all cisely this - even in countries like e d somewhat different ways to Eastern governments now embrace the princi Indonesia, China and Burma. Despite n u Europe and the former Soviet Union. ples of a market economy. Because being labelled a "threat from the left" y One difference here is that there was economic growth frequently leads to by the Indonesian government and a a w no real tradition of a strong civil soci greater political openness, economic "threat from the right" by the Chinese e t ety, but in the 1980s, in particular, un liberalization is likely to have the government, democratic governance a G derground movements were develop greatest potential for inducing demo has become part of the contemporary t e ing in many of the communist coun cratic change in these countries. political discourse in these countries. n i tries challenging the totalitarian gov A strong reason for the reluc The Tianamen Square incident in 1989 b a ernments in the field of human rights. tance of leaders in East and Southeast shows that there is a constituency for S Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Asian countries to accept more plu strengthening civil society in China, al y b Czechoslovakia are the best known of ralist forms of governance is that the though it is difficult to gauge its size. d e these organizations. Another is that the state has proved to be a catalyst of de- It is also worth noting here that the c u d o r p e R I 102 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY meeting of Asian non-governmental some members believe that they stand ing a public as opposed to a private organizations that preceded the re above the law. A state in which this is realm. For example, in seeking legiti gional intergovernmental human rights the case is one where the rule of law mation, the neo-patrimonialist state meeting in Bangkok endorsed the sig is in question. In these countries, the refers to public norms and universal nificance of civil and political rights. task of building civil society cannot be ideologies. These provide a facade be Their starting point was the citizen, not seen in isolation from building the hind which patrimonialist values can government, the civil society not the state. If the latter lacks what Max be pursued. That is why we speak of state. Weber referred to as a "legal-rational" corruption in neo-patrimonial states, The existence and work of these foundation for its authority, building yet what is corruption from the point organizations and individuals, despite civil society is bound to run into spe of view of imported public norms is grave danger to their lives, families and cial problems. In the. contemporary not by the prevailing private norms in property refute, at least in part, the po context, this is the challenge particu these societies. sition taken by the governing elites that larly in sub-Saharan Africa. At the core of neo-patrimonial democracy and human rights are The reason for this complication ism in Africa is the tendency by the Western conceptions with no reso in the African context is the preva ruler to personalize power. This has nance in Asian political culture. De lence of what political analysts refer to been going on ever since indepen spite the growing salience of these as "neo-patrimonialism". 51 Drawing dence as part of the ambition to indi constituencies, their importance should again on Weber,52 patrimonialism can genize the rule of these societies. For not be exaggerated. These groups are be characterized as a system of rule in a long time, the rest of the world saw still relatively small. Through repres which all governmental authority and no reason to react to this trend, either sion, cooptation, and control over the the corresponding economic rights because it was believed to be a mat funding and activities of these emerg tend to be treated as privately appro ter of state sovereignty or there was a ing associations, governments in these priated economic advantages and belief that African societies must find countries closely control, both infor where governmental powers and the a way of their own to develop and mally and formally, civil society. In the associated advantages are treated as thus they should be allowed to ex short run, therefore, the prospects of private rights. This form of rule has periment. In recent years, however, these groups for influencing the system historically existed everywhere. Kings the pOSition of the outsiders has of government are limited. Compared and chiefs alike saw no difference be changed. There is no longer the same to the state, civil society remains weak tween the public and the private willingness to let the Africans contin and must be strengthened as a means realms. Taxes, or tributes, as they typ ue on their own, especially since these ) of obtaining greater respect for democ ically were called in those days, were outsiders believe that the limited im 0 1 racy and human rights in these coun retained by the ruler as part of his pact of their foreign aid can be attrib 0 2 tries. Over the long run, this may prove household even though they were col uted to inadequate forms of gover d e possible, particularly during a "crisis of lected by titular officials. Remnants of nance. Neo-patrimonialism, therefore, t a authority". Economic growth, indu1/tri the system are retained in the titles of is an attack from the outside. Many d ( alization, higher levels of education, British government officials. By rein Africans too, however, are fed up with r e and the accompanying growth of the ing in the powers of kings and con the private accumulation of wealth h s middle class are likely to sharpen the stitutionalizing relations between dif and power that has taken place in i l b public's political consciousness and in ferent groups or actors in society, a these neo-patrimonialist regimes. That u crease their awareness of the impor public realm was gradually estab is why there is a growing interest P e tance of popular sovereignty. These, lished. It was in this space that the among members of both the elite and h t however, are only long-term conse modern state arose and civil society the public at large in Africa to bring y quences and there is no guarantee that was being built. about the rule of law and the delin b d they will lead to greater acceptance of "Neo-patrimonialism" exists in eation of rights and obligations be e t democracy and human rights unless societies where the impact of the tween state and individuals so that the n a deliberate measures are taken by non modern state has been felt, but where task of building civil society can be r g governmental organizations to strength prevailing social norms make no such come reality also in their countries. e c en civil society. The latter objective distinction between private and pub This task, however, is not likely n e is likely to be a prerequisite for reduc lic realms. Former colonies, especial to prove easy. Neo-patrimonialism is a c i l ing authoritarian tendencies in these ly those in sub-Saharan Africa, where phenomenon that cannot be disposed r countries. the influence of the modern state was of overnight because the whole power e d confined temporally to 60 or 70 years structure in post-colonial African soci n Strengthening both state and u and spatially by virtue of the limited eties has rested on the assumption of y civil society number of colonial officers employed its general acceptance. Thus, calling it a w Civil society presupposes the existence in the enterprise, neo-patrimonialism into question or attempting to wipe it e t of a public realm in which there is a is particularly common. Here modern out is bound to be associated with po a G clear delineation of rights and obliga bureaucratic norms coexist with patri litical instability. The examples of t tions between individual citizens, on monial ones. Public policy is mediat Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia are often e n i the one hand, and the state, on the ed by the struggle between these two invoked - not always correctly - to b a other. There needs to be a legal and sets of norms. This situation is differ highlight the dangers of overthrowing S constitutional framework which ap ent from the patrimonialist society of neo-patrimonialism. Yet, this process y b the past, where there was no such is ongoing across the continent and plies to every one, big or small, man d the political battle lines in the past few e or woman. A society lacks in civility if contestation between norms uphold- c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 103 I THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY years, and probably in the next ones to "goods" but also the right to decide on come, are not likely to be between the the rules for allocating these goods takes "right" and the "left" but between advo time and requires a type of civic courage cates of neo-patrimonialism and those that has no precedent in these societies. of constitutionalism. The latter con In Africa, therefore, the task at the turn stituency is made up or those who be of the millennium is not to limit the lieve that peace and stability, democracy powers of the state but rather to create a L/ \ and development are only possible with public realm in which both a state, in the creation of a strong public realm in the legal-rational sense, and civil society which rights and obligations and known can be built. This double challenge is and protected. likely to be at the root of whether We have seen, however, that even African societies are going to develop or in countries that have not collapsed, fall further behind in the years to come. such as Cameroon, Kenya and Nigeria, neo-patrimonialism is not easily dis lodged. At the crucial junctures of elec Conclusions tions, there prove to be too many ways The rise of civil society is for the first that those in power can use to rig elec time a global phenomenon. It is no tions to their advantage. Electoral mon longer confined to a few economically itoring by external or internal groups advanced and privileged countries in the have not been able to prevent this from West. The idea that even the poor have happening. The ability of neo-patrimo rights and can exercise them is now nial rulers to survive and continue their being spread to all corners of the world. arbitrary rule has caused special con This is an important aspect of the ongo cern among donors who disapprove of ing process of globalization as we move their behaviour but who wish to aid the into the next century. A hundred years people of these countries because they ago this idea was being embraced by so are poor. The rendency has been to cial groups in Europe, eg workers and apply economic pressures on the gov women, who until then had been de ernments of these rulers but there is lit nied the right to participate in public af ) tle evidence that this leads to a change fairs. After years of imperialism and colo 0 1 of heart. Instead, as the case of Kenya il nialism, the principle that every human 0 2 lustrates, the whole exercise turns into being has the democratic right to partic d e a cat-and-mouse game, in which the ipate in public affairs through voluntary t a mouse (Kenya) tries as much as possi associations, ie in civil society, is finally d ( ble to escape the claws of the donors. being extended to those in the world r e Some of the same difficulties apply who have suffered most. To be sure, it h s also to the large number or international is being opposed and contested in many i l j b NGOs that nowadays work in Africa. places but by bemg on the global agen u / Unlike the donors, they cannot escape da, it will not easily disappear. Rulers P e the whims of neo-patrimonial rule but who deny the rights of their citizens are h t have to learn how to live with them. under increasing pressure to change. y Viewing themselves as part of the effort The idea that civil society is a b d to build civil society, do they try to help Western concept may still be invoked to e t reform African societies from within by refuse acceptance of the concept of civil n a accepting neo-patrimonialism or do they society (or any other aspect or democ r g take a confrontational approach refusing ratic governance, for that matter). There e c to accept these norms? The tendency will no doubt continue to be a struggle n e among development-oriented organiza between the "universal" and the "par c i l tions has been to work from within, ticular", ie the ideas that human values r using their development work as a cata and norms are shared by all regardless e d lyst to achieve change in the right direc of race, religion, etc, on the one hand, n u tion. Rights-based organizations, on the and that these norms and values are de y other hand, have taken a much more un termined by specific cultures, on the a w compromising stand and have typically other. This article has tried to demon e t ended up accusing the neo-patrimonial strate that although the effort to build a G regimes of serious human rights viola civil society is global it is characterized t e tions. Both these stands make practical by at least four different philosophical n i sense given the agendas of these types strands, it takes place at different levels b a of organizations. For no one, however, is from the global to the grassroots, and S there an easy victory because becoming that the specific challenges are likely to y b part of local African society in ways that differ from region to region, and often d e make the latter demand not only from country to country. It behoves c u d o r p e R I 104 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY analysts and practItIoners alike, there 10 Robert D Putnam, op cit. fore, to adopt a humble approach to the 11 David Truman, The governmental process, task ahead. It requires conviction but New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951. also ability to empathize, ie see the 12 Robert Dahl, Who governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. world from the side of those not yet 13 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C convinced. It requires strategy but also Schmitter, Transitions from authoritarian the ability to make tactical concessions. rule: Tentative conclusions about uncer None of this is easy; the risks of mis tain democracies, Baltimore: Johns takes many. Hopkins University Press, 1986. All the same, civil society will 14 Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de never become a global reality unless Walle, "Neopatrimonial regimes and polit there is networking and an exchange of ical transitions in Africa", World Politics, ideas. Local perceptions of what is right vol 46, no 4, 1994. pp 453-489. 15 Goran Hyden, "Governance and the study and wrong or how to do things must be of politics", in G Hyden and M Bratton allowed a voice and be listened to by (eds), Governance and politics in Africa, others before they are dismissed. Civil Boulder. Col: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992. society is not being built by ignoring 16 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the others or by shouting them down. It market, New York: Cambridge University comes about through tolerance and the Press, 1990. readiness to dialogue with others. This 17 "Democracy and growth", The Economist, is how the social ca pital is being formed 27 August 1994. that help develop countries. 18 Mancur Olson, op cit. 19 Charles E Lindblom. PolitiCS and markets, New York: Basic Books, 1977. 20 Jean Francois Bayart, op cit. Notes and references 21 Robert Fatton, Predatory rule: The state Robert D Putman, Making democracy and civil SOCiety in Africa, Boulder, Col: work: Civic traditions in modern Italy, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1993. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 22 Dietrich Ruesohemeyer, E H Stephens and 1993. J Stephens, Capitalist development and democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago ) 2 Edward C Banfield, The moral basis of 0 backward SOCiety, Chicago: The Free Press, Press, 1992. 1 23 See Arturo Escobar and Sonia E Alvarez 0 1958. 1 2 3 Filippo Sabetti, Democracy, social capital (eds), The making of social movements in \ d Latin America, Boulder, Col: Westview e II and unity of law: Some lessons from Italy , \ t a about interpreting social experiments, Press, 1992. ! \ d 24 Milton J Esman and Norman T Uphoff, ( Montreal: Dept of Political Science, McGill r Local organizations: Intermediaries in e University, nd. h rural development, Ithaca: Cornell Uni s 4 For example, Jean-Francois Medard, i l versity Press, 1984. "Conclusion: Etatisation et desetatisation en b 25 Martine Dirven, "Rural society: Its integra u Afrique noire", in J F Medard (ed), Etats P tion and disintegration", CEPALReview. no d'Afrique nOire:formations, mecanismes, et e 51, 1993. h crise, Paris: Karth'lla, 1991; Jean Francois t 26 David C Korten, Getting into the 21st Ba yart, The state in Africa: The politics of the y Century: Voluntary action and the global b belly, New York: Longman, 1992; and Dirk agenda, West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian d Bergslosser and Ralf Rytlewski, "Political e t Press, 1990. culture in Germany: A pragmatic case", in n 27 Julie Fisher. "Is the iron law of oligarchy a D Berg-Schlosser and R Rytlewski (eds), r rusting away in the Third World?", World g Political culture in Germany, New York: St Development, vol 22, no 2, 1994. e c Martin's Press, 1993. 28 Norman T Uphoff, Learningfrom Gal Oya, n 5 Alfred Stepan, "State power and the e Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992. c i strength of civil society in the southern l 29 Ronald Cohen, Goran Hyden and Winston cone of Latin America", in P Evans, D r Nagan, Human rights and governance in e Rueschemeyer and T Skocpol (eds), d Africa, Gainesville, FI: University Presses of n Bringing the state back in, Cambridge: Florida, 1993. u Cambridge University Press, 1985. y 30 Axel Hadenius and Fredrik Ugla, "Making a 6 Larry Diamond, "Towards democratic con civil society work", in A Hadenius (ed), w solidation", Journal of Democracy, vol 5, e Democracy's victory and crisis, London: t no 3, 1994. a Cambridge University Press, 1996. G 7 Ibid, P 6. 31 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: t 8 Piotr Sztompka, "The intangibles and im e The evolution of institutions for collective n ponderables of the transition to democra i action, New York: Cambridge University b cy", Studies in Comparative Communism, a Press, 1990. S vol 24, no 3, 1991, pp 3-20. 32 Deborah Brautigam, "Governance, econo y 9 Craig Calhoun, "Civil society and the pub b my and foreign aid", Studies in Com lic sphere", Public Culture, vol 5, no 3, d parative International Development, vol e 1993, pp 267-280. c 27, no 3, 1992. u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 105 I THE CHALLENGES OF ANALYSING AND BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY 33 Jonathan Fox, "Latin America's emerging 41 John Keane, Democracy and civil soci 46 Samuel P Huntington, The third wave, local politics", Journal ofDemocracy, vol ety, London: Verso Publishers, 1988; and Norman, Okl: Oklahoma University Press, 5, no 2, 1994. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil so 1992. 34 It is worth noting that this was also the ar ciety and political theory, Cambridge, 47 Joan Nelson, Fragile coalitions: The poli gument of officers in the British colonial Mass: MIT Press, 1992. tics of economic adjustment, New Bruns administration in the period leading up to 42 Miguel Darcy de Oliveira and Rajesh wick: Transaction Publications, 1989. decolonization. The idea that local gov Tandon (eds), Citizens strengthening glo 48 Piotr Sztompka, op cit. ernments were schools for learning de bal civil society, Washington, DC: Civicus, 49 Lee Kuan Yew, "Democracy and human mocratic norms, however, was deemed World Alliance for Citizen Participation, rights for the world", Media Asia, vol 20, too paternalist by African nationalists who 1994. no 1, 1993. 50 Mutiah Alagappa, Democratic transition at that time were more interested in seiz 43 Michael Walzer (ed), Towards a global in Asia: The role of the international ing national power while paying only civil society, Providence RI: Berghahn community, East-West Center Special Re little attention to how it was achieved. Books, 1995. ports no 3, Honolulu: East-West Center, 35 John Harbeson, Donald Rothchild and 44 Michael Bratton, International versus do October 1994, p 8. Naomi Chazan (eds), Civil society and mestic pressures for "democratization" in 51 For example, Jean-Francois Medard, "The the state in Africa, Boulder Col: Lynne Africa, Michigan State University underdeveloped state in Tropical Africa: Working Papers on Political Reform in Rienner Publisher, 1994. Political clientelism or neo-patrimonial 36 Robert D Putman, op cit. Africa no 12, East Lansing: Department ism", in C Clapham (ed), Private patron 37 Craig Calhoun, op cit. of Political Science, Michigan State age and public power: Political clientelism 38 Axel Hadenius and Fredrik Uggla, op cit. University, 1994; and Joel 0 Barkan, in the modern state, London: Frances 39 Claus Offe, "Micro-aspects of democratic "Can established democracies nurture Pinter, 1982: Thomas Callaghy, The state theory: What makes the deliberative com democracy abroad? Lessons from Africa", society struggle: Zaire in comparative per petency of the citizens'" in A Hadenius in Axel Hadenius (ed) , Democracy's vic spective, New York: Columbia University (ed), Democracy's victory and crisis, Lon tory and crisis, London: Cambridge Press, 1984; and, Michael Bratton and don: Cambridge University Press, 1996. University Press, 1996, p 136. Nicolas van de Walle, op cit. 40 Paul Wapner, "Politics beyond the state: 45 Doh Chull Shin, "On the third wave of 52 Max Weber, The theory ofsocial and eco Environmental activism and world civic democratization: A synthesis and evalu nomic organization, edited with an in politics", World Politics, vol 47, no 3, ation of recent theory and research", troduction by Talcott Parsons, New York: 1995, pp 311-340. World Politics, vol 47, no 1, 1994, P 136. The Free Press, 1947. ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R I 106 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 A foreign policy to die for: South Africa's response to the Nigerian crisis "'I<''' ,,"00, 'm. _ ",."" r.. m<""" "'" "" .....,. M'lti "m Almi', of lbe ,....""" """'''"' .. 'h< 0> ...._ ...... _.-l .,..,. d"., ...... '" I~"_'" of PoJitic,,1 01 ~lJo>.~. ,,_, • .,.j " """" ,... """'_"-" """ ...... t,"", 5(",/,... III 'IH Rm,d """" ""''''' ~ .....«>-~- ~ ....e """ _ "",._ ...... , .... 01 -1/" ..... ,,'" u.."ft'5ity I" .... --... ""' ...... ,..oIqo, A. ~~NtObM'fIa""a bn ..... _ ...... -_ _ ...... · _ r. _ •• 5! ,.01_ AJnc.o. ""- "-0'"'' G'-K_' I!XIYl 996 _ON ,/or G/oI)dI 5«.. ri,y "= ....-- ...... ,.. Tht • ....,.... -' ..,' w"'" '"_4 """'-" _ -y_ I e .." -.. r... ' 7 ..... _ _..... _d ... Oom/lnd,J<' ,,,,, ••,,,/oot .. _ ..... __ _ ""_' '1<'. "" ..... '70s"'''' _ ., ,."" -. """'" "". 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I A fOREIGN POLICY TO DIE fOR : SA ' S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA give but one example) will automati perso ns who are important foreign cally guarantee success in the area of policy actors. human rights. lI Furthermore, the evi International political economy dence that some states arc willing to theory exhibits an increasing aware relinquish some measure of econom ness of the limitations of the unitary ic sovereignty in order to promote actor model as either an analytical tool wellbeing resulting from international or an assumption that guides foreign cooperatiOn serves, for some, as proof poliCY aClions. Strange 17 and Stopford that states would al$(! be willing to and Strange,18 for instance, discuss in sacrifice elements of their domestic their work Ihe Mnew sides to diploma sovereignty in order to protect human cy ", namely those of state-firm diplo rights. macy and firm-firm diplomacy, imply Such linkages and analogies can ing that international relations are be misleading, if not downright incor conducted in a vastly more compli rect, as argued by Donnelly. t1 To im ca ted global arena than lhal suggest pose international human rights po[i ed by the unitary actor fiction. The cies by using a related instrument, rapid growth in the numbers of im moral suasiOn is the obvious means, portant and influential foreign policy aided by public criticism and instru actors is not only related 10 the in ments such as blackliSting. All were General Sani Abacha creaSingly sophisticated and interde used in the struggle aga inst aparl pendell! global economy, but can also l heid. } These instruments are seldom means of implementing international be explained, in the case of Africa, by effective. So other types of retaliation human rights poliCies are still very a matching phenomenon, the perSis have to be imported from other issue much non-existent (or at most in their tent ineffectiveness of Africa's numer areas, for inStance the economy. This infancy); an adherence to the princi ous weak Slates. These characteristics creates potential for an escalation of ple of sovereignty and the rule of non have made for Ihe emergence and de the conflict, or an increase in repres intervention actually reinforce the un velopment of actors in civil society sion, or, in the case of severing diplo willingness of many states to abide by who often playa "critical role in matic tics, of losing what COntact has international standards and principles. Africa n international reJations". 19 One ) remained with the transgressor and international relations theory has furthermore needs only turn 10 the 0 1 thereby losing potential influence. found it nOtoriously difficult to identi history of the struggle against apan- 0 Furthermore, the of implement 2 cost fy who makes foreign policy. Fer heid w hich took place on a global d ing human rights policies by making guson and Mansbach come to the con scale to rea lize the inadequacy of the e t use of instruments imported from an cluSion that "despite our increasing unitary actor model. Yet these insights a d other issue area may in th e long run theoretical sophistication and the ac are not really accounted for in tradi ( r damage the interests of the enforcer, cumulation of much more data since tional thinking on foreign policy; and e h as was demo nstrated by the high price the heyday of realism. we still afe far many stales, South Africa , ironically, s i l that apartheid Sou th Africa's neigh from knowillg who or what makes for among Ihem (see below), sl ill employ b u bours had to pay in the era of desta eign policy - or even how to go about this model in the conduct of their af P bilization. USing the analogy of mate finding out".IS Over time, a fiction, fairs with the outside world. e h rial interdependence and the basis it that of the unitary actor, based on the The unit:Hy actor fiction is of t y provides for international cooperatiOn, realist tradition in international rela course useful in the sense that it sim b reciprocity and accommodation or a tions, has developed and is regularly plifies the making o f foreign poliCy. II d e willingness to bargain or negotiate on utilized not only by analysts and in limits options that have to be consid t n an issue, do not necessarily hold for ternational rebtions scholars. but also ered in the deciSion-making process, a r human rights iss\les which are based by governmellis themselves, ie the de whether such policy is reactive or g e o n a perceived moral interdepen cision makers. The unitary :tClor fic proactive. I t therefore narrows down c n dence: ·differing bases for coopera tion posits that states are the aClors in the range of instruments and resources e c l ion are likely to lead to Significantly international politics and assumes that to commilled to implementing pol i be l r different international political pro these entities (called states) act on be icy and the number and range of ac e cesses ".14 Few states are willing to d half of and in the interest and name of tors to be targeted, The realist "rule of n take these risks over an issue that is. their citizens/ peoples and territories. parsimony" argued for by Waltz,2'O is u y however morally repugnant, usually Seldom does one find Ihe subtleties often, when it comes to explaining in a confined to the domestic domain of of, for instance, a Weberian approach ternational politiCS, il would seem, ap w e t the transgressor state and does not that views the state as "a set of plied by decision makers in the course a threaten international peace and sta administrative, policing and military of jonnulalitlg foreign policy. South G t bilit)l. Also, Ihe basis of cooperation in organizations headed by an execu Africa 's handling of its relations with e n the C3se of moral interdependence tive allthority" ,t6 and much less an Nigeria provides a good example. The i b may be more perceived (a case of acknowledgment that apart from the main, and, largely, only target identi a S w ishful thinking?) than rca l, and this rea list and Weberian approaches, ned by policy makers throughout the y makes for difficulty in identifying use b states often contain differing vigorous crisis (at least during the period under d ful, rel evant and credible instrumentS :.tnd highly innuential non-s tate, non consideration here) was the Nigerian e c of foreign policy. Clearly, effective governmental groups and individual government of General Abacha, in u d o r p e R I ttO AFRICAIN$IGHT VOL 26 No2 1996 A FOREIGN POLICY TO DIE FOR : SA 'S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA particular the General himself and his Abacha promised in his October Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Torn speech at the celebration of Nigeria 's Ikimi.21 Few, if any, other aClOrs, independence that he would return the whether states or even other govern country [0 democratic rule in three ment departments (other than that of years' lime. Surrounding the Abacha Foreign Affairs) or other organiza regime's mistreatment of ilS critics, and tions/interest groups who might have itS general disregard for civilian law, assisted in building a coalition for ac civilian courtS and human righlS, are tion, were identified and incorporated other issues equally important, but less into the process (see below). Actors publicized (and perhaps less under and targets are closely linked instru stood) by the rest of the world, at least ments and means and, together, ac in lenns of the potential they have to COunt for the options that states con ignite the whole of West AfriCl. These sider when formulating foreign policy. problems include the spill-over poten The difficulty in linking issues and im tia! of internal conflict in Nigeria}~ the porting instnnnents, especially those deep religious, ethnic and economic of retaliation, from other issue areas, cleavages in this society, and the extent also creates problems when identify of corruption and pillaging within the ing actors and targets. stat e bureaucracy which has lead to in The realist paradigm pays very Activist Ken Saro-Wiwa creasing bitterness and disillusionment liTtle attention to the implementation in the general population. Coupled to of foreign policy. The outputs of for South Africa's response to these problems are a number of OIhers eign policy are only implied, for in the Nigerian crisis: that impact seriously on Ihe options stance, in Holsti's discussion of the Four problem. open to outside forces 10 exercise in techniques of achieving one's foreign fluence. The most salient of lilese are Defore one can actually analyse and policy goals.zz This approach is under the Abacha regime's apparent beHef provide a full critique of the Sou th standable within a framework dealing that Nigeria is a special case that defies Africa n response/ s to and initiatives largely with foreign policy goals relat a Westminster-type clemocracy,25 there H concerning whal has, in a few short ed to "the national inlerest , but gives by justifying and rationalizing military months, become popularly known as ) little if any guidance as 10 what the ex rule; the difficulty of dealing with an 0 the ~N igerian problem" or the "Nige 1 pected outcomes of pursuing non-tra· autocratic, inexperienced leader who 0 rian crisis· , it is useful [0 sketch in the 2 ditional goals, such as human rights, does not opemte according to "interna background. At the same time it d might be. OutputS and outcomes are tionally accepted " rules or standards, e t should be noted that, apart from Ihe nOt the same, and OlJlcomes can and but who actually openly defies them; a lesotho constitutional crisis of Decem d 26 ( do often differ significantly from the and. lastly, a divided oPposi!ion. ber 1994. Ihe case of Nigeria must r intended outcome of a particular deci These difficulties, so diverse, and lile e surely rank as one of the first serious, h sion or policy. This is particularly true bloody and unstable history of Nigeria s i or rather, difficult and potentially con l of attempts at influencing sensitive over Ihe past three decades, already b tentious foreign policy challenges in u areas of the domestic policies of other provide part of lhe explanation as to P stat es. The intention of the Common Africa that has confronted the new why South Africa and, for that matter, e South African government (the GNU), h wealth's Eminent Persons' Group's lile rest of the world find it so difficult t and this because it tested the ANC's y ( EPG) visit to SoUlh Africa in 1986 was 10 address the Nigerian problem, b to promote political dialogue among external policy ideals and goals in a d e very practical and visible way (see South Africa's policy: t South Africans. An unforeseen, albeit n indirectly related. outcome to this visit below)?} Goals, formulation and problems a r After me annulmem of the 1993 g was the South African Defence Force According to Deputy Minister of For e atta ck on an alleged ANC basis in presidential electio ns in Nigeria, eign Affairs, Aziz Pahad. in an inter c n Gabarone while the EPG was still in General Aba cha, minister of defence view before the execution of Saro e c under General l3abangida, took conrrol i South Africa. The point is that even the Wiwa and his eight colleaguesP South l of the government and put an end to r most carefully crafted decisions and Africa 's ob;eClives were to prevent the e what little movement tOwards democ d policies can fail, or create unexpected executions of alleged coup plotters,Z8 n resullS. because they are often aimed at ratization had preceded Ihe elections. to secure Abiola's release, and to en u The supposed winner of the elections, y sovereign states who, should they so su re the success of the democratiza a wish, fail or refuse to comply with out Chief Moshood Abiola, was arrested tion process in Nigeria. These goals w e (he is still in prison) ,Ind in the follow t side attempts to influence them . The were all related to a(templS to change a result of such a failure, or a perceived ing months scores of other opposition the domestic po[(cies of Nigeria, not to G t lack of progress. is then blamed on leaders and meir supponers and other traditional goa ls of foreign policy. The e n some or ather wrong/bad/ incompe critics of Abacha were arrested. among instnlment chosen to achieve these 0b i b tent/ foreign policy. This is amply illus them General Obasanjo and later me jectives was that of quiet diplomacy_ a S trated in any study of the overall South writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and Different emissaries were sent to Ni y African foreign policy process vis-a-vis eight other activists from Ogoniland. In geria, while, as noted above, Nigerian b d Nigeria It is 10 a discussion of these what can be interpreted as a conces government representatives were also e c issues that I now Imn. sion to external pressure on his regime, given a hearing in South Africa. South u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA tNStGHT 111 I • 'OIlln nllu'o 011 ' 01. U " ~IUC"'1D . ,elOl ' ...... ,..... , I ...... d.... " . d .... ""'0<7 ... 9 .... ,._ ...... -'_ .-0.-100- __ --...... _1>" ._...... _ ...... -<11 s..o-..' ,w..... , ... """' __ ... poIio 1 - -- "'... 1ft K ' ...... 0 2 .... _, ...... d e ...... _- ...... t ,- __ a d ( I"U".. J ...... I· " ...._ ...... r - .-- e h ...... -,,"" s i -_ l , """'" b - ... u ..- P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a I_~ . foo S _"'. _.. _..-- -.... .-." • ,,"coo'''', y b ..... 100' ...,._.... ,--01 d fc ••_ .... _ ...... , . e c _.0# ... """ _ ,_.... _ u d o r p -- e R - A FOREIGN POLICY TO DIE FOR: SA'S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA policy formulation. Two other things ment departments and non-governmen should also be highlighted. The first is tal organizations were not involved. The Nigeria that despite pressure brought about by issue was not discussed at the SADC Federal Republic of - (especially) the media in the weeks be summit of late August. And no attempts fore the executions, government clearly were made to put pressure on Shell or to Independence: 1 October 1960. gave it little heed, except to defend its enlist its assistance in taking a strong Former British colony. policy of quiet diplomacy (see below)' stand on the Saro-Wiwa case. Foreign National Day: 1 October (Independence Day). thereby reinforcing perceptions that for policy action remained exclusively at bi eign policy making was continuing in lateral state-to-state level. The process Leader: Gen Sani Abacha, b 1943, Head of State since November "old style" apartheid era secrecy.32 Al up to 11 November clearly indicates a 1993. though there may be some truth in these failure to go beyond the identification of Capital: Abuja. Lagos is the largest perceptions, this policy-making style has traditionally accepted actors, whether as city and port. less to do with the apartheid past than allies or targets of foreign policy. Area: 923 768 km2. Population: 111 with the general operational techniques A last problem encountered by the mn (1995). of policy formulation within a realist South African government that explains Religions: Muslim (majority) and paradigm. International diplomatic its failed policy, and one also relevant Christians together about 85% of norms, standards and procedures influ to other states and organizations oper population. ence thinking and action perhaps more ating in the international arena, is that Languages: English (official), Hausa, than most would want to admit or real of ignorance and inexperience in for Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, Efik-Ibibio. ize, and acquiescence may be viewed as mulating effective policy on issues Life expectancy at birth: 52 years. a sign of status, prestige and equality which, however international in con Foreign trade: Imports: $6 600 mn; with other states. This would explain ception and support, are inherently do Exports: $10 650 mn (1994). why the ANC during its years of strug mestic in nature. One might agree with Principal exports: Oil (90%). gle employed unconventional foreign the statement of Weiss, Forsythe and GNP: $29 995 (1994). GNP/capita: policy techniques - it was not a state, Coate35 that "because of interdepen $280 (1994). but attempting to capture the state. Now dence involving sensitive relations [such Currency: $1 = Naira (N) 85,4 it is part of the international club of as human rightsl, some issues that were (March 1996). states and so it plays by the rules - for formerly considered domestic or incon Background: Africa's most populous many reasons, not least of which is self sequential have come to be redefined as country and leading oil producer has never been a single-party state but has interest. The second point concerns international or significant because of spent most of its independent life under ) 0 what is perhaps a more critical issue and the strength of transnational concern - military rule. A heavily regulated transi 1 tional programme for the restoration of 0 one that will have to be addressed, or at of either a material or moral nature". 2 least be critically examined by the ANC But this does not tell us how to deal democratic civilian rule commenced in d 1986 but came to naught when on 12 e specifically, that of the attitudinal prism with these issues in a system based on t June 1993 the military government can a colouring and/or bending input. In this the sovereignty of its units. Calls for an d celled the results of the presidential ( instance the prism is an item of ANC international boycott of Nigerian oil, for election. Gen Babangida nevertheless r e history, for it has been alleged that the instance, have not produced immediate transferred power to an interim civilian h s government, which was forced to resign i ANC did not wish to put too much pres results, mainly because such action l by the military when on 17 November b sure on Nigeria's regime, owing to the would have to be based on inter the defence minister, Gen Abacha, took u P support Nigeria had given it during its national consensus, something which over power. Meanwhile, public support e years of struggle against apartheid, and takes time to build. (This is a classic ex for Chief Moshood Abiola, the apparent h t winner of the presidential election and also because, it is rumoured, the ANC ample of the practical problems related y 33 who demanded to be installed as pres b was given a donation of R15 million to importing instruments from another ident, had created a highly unstable sit d for its election fund in 1994. Should issue area.) e uation. Following the imprisonment of t these allegations be true, and if a sense These kinds of argument do not Abiola and other leaders, including for n a of indebtedness indeed influenced pol bring one any closer to an answer as to mer head of state, Gen Olusegun r g Obasanjo, there were local and interna icy making, the government has a seri how states could or should deal with an e tional appeals for clemency. These ap c ous problem: such facts would indicate other state's domestic behaviour which, n peals were extended to include a group e an inability to distinguish between party for one or another reason, is unaccept of activists among the disadvantaged c i l and state, an inability that undermines 36 Ogoni community in the Niger Delta re able. Two approaches are currently r gion, who had been brought to trial be e democracy and points the way to one emerging. Both seem, at best, doubtful d party domination.34 in terms of effectiveness; and it must be fore a special tribunal. During the n Commonwealth leaders' conference in u A further explanation for the failure accepted that both demand an extended November 1995, nine Ogoni activists, y a of SA policy can be found in the choice process of development to be of use. including well-known author Ken Saro w of targets and allies identified by deci The first of these involves coalition Wiwa, were sentenced to death and ex e t building and multilateral diplomacy at ecuted. As a result, Nigeria's Common a sion makers, in other words, the actors wealth membership was immediately G who were involved in policy making. the level, in other words, a form of mass suspended, while some countries, in t e Scarcely any contact was made with the action by states. One example of this is cluding South Africa, proposed the im n i Nigerian opposition, as we have already the Commonwealth's creation of a position of sanctions on Nigeria. Mean b a mentioned. Archbishop Tutu's warnings watchdog group (of which South Africa while, in October 1995, Abacha had an S is to be a member), based on the nounced a lengthy transitional pro y and calls for sanctions were played gramme that would return Nigeria to de b clown, Parliament played no role (up to Millbrook Programme, that will examine mocratic, civilian rule in October 1998. d e mid-December at least). Other govern- and monitor the human rights records c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 113 I -. ----- A FOREIGN POLICY TO DIE FOR: SA'S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA of member states. This committee can rest are that "foreign policy belongs to ther inability to balance or reconcile recommend punitive action by the or South Africa's people,,4o - that foreign economic interests with moral princi ganization and its members. It would policy forms an integral part and an ples. It would seem that the ANC finds seem that the underlying principle is extension of national policy and in it difficult to base policy on principle that of safety/strength in numbers. terests. Again, the "essence of South when financial matters are involved. Cooperation and compliance, precon Africa's foreign policy is to promote Apart from the allegation that it re ditions that are crucial to collective ac and protect the interests and values of ceived money from Nigeria, there are tion, will determine the success of such its citizens" and to promote, specifi also allegations that financial contri measures. Should African states have to cally, the "economic interests of all butions from Taiwan playa role in the act against one of their "own", it is our people".41 Three of the principles cautious way the "Two Chinas" issue is doubtful whether this approach will stated by the ANC are of particular im a pproached; that contributions from prove successful. Furthermore, the portance to this discussion. These are, Morocco have prevented the govern strong realist emphasis on the sover firstly, a "belief in and preoccupation ment from recognizing the Polisario eignty, defence and promotion of the with Human Rights"; secondly that Front's Saharawi Republic; and that national interest of a state (and espe "just and lasting solutions to the prob economic ties with Indonesia are pre cially the price of economic sanctions lems of humankind can only come venting the government from taking to the enforcers) would seem to pre through the promotion of Democracy, a strong and public stand on the con sent a rather long-term learning curve world-wide"; and thirdly, a "belief that tinuing killings in East Timor. These for the international community. our foreign policy should effect the are difficult problems to grapple with The second approach, closely interests of the continent of Africa". when one wants to seen as a crusader linked to the first one - actually a These assumptions and princi for "the accomplishment of demo.crat broadening thereof - is one which ples created two problems for South ic ideals throughout the world" .44 The seems to attempt to (at least partially) Africa's Nigeria policy, based on what conception alone of such a role cre accommodate the principle of and the appear to be inherent contradictions ates high expectations because the im problems related to sovereignty. It in between assumptions and principles, preSSion it creates is that South Africa, volves an acknowledgment that exter between different principles, and be like the Lone Ranger, will, on its own, nal forces can at most facilitate and tween the theoretical or abstract world fight injustice wherever it occurs. Far create a favourable international cli of principles and ideals and the real too little attention is given in the ANC's mate for internal changes, adding that, world in which these have to be im policy document to explaining that in essence, "international solidarity can plemented and goals and objectives these ideals will be pursued through ) 0 only support action taken by the de have to be prioritized. These problems recognized international channels and 1 0 mocratic forces in any country. It can also underlie broader foreign policy fora created for this purpose. A com 2 not be the driving force".37 This ap concerns in South Africa (the second mitment to and active participation in d e t proach involves more actors than the one has to do with the country's po the strengthening of such organiza a former, and in non-traditional combi sition in Africa and will be discussed tions would be a far more realistic d ( nations. It implies state/state relations, in the next section). The first problem goal. Propaganda techniques - per r e but also cooperation between states/ lies in the time-honoured dilemma of haps one should rather use the phrase h s i governments and groups within their reconciling national interest, often ma "efficient communication and informa l b societies, between states/governments terially based and concerned with tion techniques" should furthermore u P and groups within other states, be tangibles, with altruistic concerns that be harnessed in publicizing and ex e tween different groups within the are morality based and involve intan plaining the government's standpoint h t same state, and between groups in dif gibles and uncertain outcomes. The and actions on these issues. The wall y b ferent states. Whether these approach point was mooted that South Africa of silence that greets every allegation d es will prove to be successful in the would be the party suffering the in the press is not contributing to the e t long term38 in addressing "new" for greater loss, not Nigeria, should eco ideal of transparency and the promise n a eign policy goals remains to be seen. 42 r nomic sanctions be implemented By that foreign policy belongs to the peo g implication, this would then serve as ple of South Africa. e c Ethics as basis of South Africa's an explanation of why South Africa Secondly - and this is a serious n e foreign policy chose quiet diplomacy and why it is iss)le confronting the government c i l The most obvious reason for the strong still not enthusiastic about introduc there is the fact that foreign policy, r e internal criticism of South Africa's ing sanctions as an instrument through despite the ideals of the ANC's policy d n "failed" Nigerian policy, and an expla which pressure might be brought to document, has, it would seem, been u nation of this perceived failure, can be bear upon Nigeria. Yet, as we now conceptualized largely in terms of y a related to the difference between the will see, this problem goes much trade and broader economic policy. w assumptions and declarations con e deeper than a mere opposition be Increasingly, the emphasis is on the t a tained in the ANC's foreign policy tween South Africa's economic inter advancement of the Reconstr~'ction G document,39 the reality of its treatment ests and what it might perceive as its and Development Programme (RDP), t e of the Nigerian issue and its visible pri moral obligation to "playa central role which embodies both moral and n i oritization of a number of foreign pol in this [Human Rights] campaign".43 material ideals and objectives, but b a icy issues. A number of comments are Firstly, it has to do with the ap which is very much a blueprint for S y relevant. parent inability to dis'tinguish between South Africa's national interests when b The basic assumptions on which state/government and the ANC as a placed in an international context. 45 d e the ANC's foreign policy principles political organization and with a fur- This has shifted the responsibility for c u d o r p e R I 114 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 A FOREIGN POLICY TO DIE FOR: SA'S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA the emphasis on, and the prionuza states in Africa. These two problems image of big brother and destabilizer tion of, foreign policy from the DFA to are closely linked. that characterized its continental rela the Department of Trade and Industry Point one above asks that it tions during the apartheid era. This is (DT!). Foreign policy in general is should firstly be kept in mind that the obviously difficult because, apart from being overseen by Deputy President abuse of human rights is, within a sys the regime change in the country, it is Mbeki, and the DFA has to a large ex tem of sovereign states, inherently a still an immensely strong, rich and de tent been marginalized when it comes domestic issue. International censure veloped member of the African com to driving, coordinating and renewing of such practices is therefore funda munity of states and has to tread care foreign policy.46 Now, a department mentally anti-government. Within the fully not to create an impression of act of trade and indu'stry is not geared for, pan-Africanist paradigm, an unwritten ing like or attempting to become a nor does it have the expertise or ex law, as it were, has developed over the hegemon. What makes this situation perience, to conduct foreign policy in years creating the tradition that African even more difficult for South Africa are such a way that a balance can be states do not turn on each other in in its aspirations to a permanent seat on found between the economic objec ternational fora, such as the UN, but the UN Security Council should a re tives generated by a concern for the close ranks when attacks are made structuring of the Council take place. national interests of a country and the against one or more of them. The issue Nigeria is of course another strong con moral principles and complex, every of human rights also clashes with the tender. It would seem that South Africa day political nuance's of international conception of the state as a unitary is battling to reconcile opposing ideals. relations. This is the task of a depart actor, because human rights abuses pit Taking a strong stand on human rights ment of foreign affairs. And such a government and citizens, or certain and other abuses implies taking on a balance can only be found when a groups within the state, against each leadership role, criticizing one's peers, broad foreign policy strategy exists in other. and working, in some instances with terms of which specific goals are pur South Africa infringed the solidar the North, in pursuit of these goals. At sued and specific instruments are ity rule to some extent (it was careful the same time, some of these goals identified and developed as key vehi not to speak out against Nigeria in the overlap the struggle of South versus cles for implementing the chosen UN) by its having been the only North and taking the lead is perceived strategy. Of course no overall strategy African country, and the only country to be disloyal, un-African, throwing can cover all eventualities or all the in the developing world, that recalled one's weight around and being the choices open to a country. But it is its high commissioner/ambassador lackey of the West.5.3 If human rights nevertheless necessary to develop from Nigeria in protest49 South Africa and other "new" foreign policy goals, ) 0 such a strategy47 in order to create was, and still is, in terms of its relations especially those that threaten not so 1 0 broad guidelines as to how policy with Africa, faced with the dilemma much sovereignty as undemocratic 2 principles and ideals will be trans that in striving to contribute to the im regimes, are to be realized in Africa, d e t formed into action and as to just how provement of the living conditions of certain traditions and rules will have to a d much will be sacrificed in pursuing the people of Africa, and pursuing the change. South Africa will have to find ( goals based on a perceived moral in human rights ideal, it is perceived to ways of working for such changes - r e terdependence and responsibility. attack "one of its own", thereby prov and doing so in a way that undermines h s i ing disloyal to the ideal of pan the unitary actor fiction. l b South Africa in Africa: Africanist unity. 50 What worsened u P Together we stand South Africa's position in Africa, apart Civil society and public opinion: To e Point one: certainly one of the most from the fact that it had actually gone whom does foreign policy belong? h t difficult problems South Africa faces "way ahead of the position of any In the long run perhaps the greatest y b when it looks at its international rela other African government",51 was the gain, or the most valuable lessons to d have been learnt, from the Nigeria e tions is that of its position in and atti perception that South Africa had been t n tude and approach to the rest of the set up by Western governments, no case will be from the problems it has a r continent. The Nigeria case provides a tably the USA and Britain, to take the raised surrounding the relationship g powerful illustration of this dilemma. lead on Nigeria. It is significant that at between civil society and foreign pol e c One of the basic principles of South the SADC summit called by President icy decision makers in South Africa. n e African foreign policy is that "it should Mandela on 11 December to discuss Although a detailed discussion of the c i l reflect the interests of the continent of SADC policy towards Nigeria, it was role of civil society, and the expecta r e Africa", and in the elaboration of this decided that the SADC would not take tions of the public in terms of what d n principle it is further stated that "we any further steps against Nigeria but South Africa might have accomplished u will strive to contribute towards im would leave this to the Common is impossible, a number of remarks y a proving the basic condition of all wealthY Before the SADC meeting, are relevant. w Africa's people,,48 What foreign poli the possibility of SADC sanctions was The South African press in par e t a cy makers are confronted with here is strongly mooted. In the event, the ticular (especially when compared to G the dilemma of pursuing goals which topic was not even on the agenda. the SABC considered as national inde t e clash fundamentally with many of South Africa was, it would seem, called pendent broadcaster) paid much at n i the practices and customs of African into line by its peers: solidarity. tention to events in Nigeria in the b a politics. Point two: further problems Point two above, it is clear course of 1995 and clearly made an S y are the role which South Africa sees enough, has to do with South Africa's effort to report on the government's b for itself within Africa, and the way in position and role within Africa. The handling of the Nigerian crisis. In this d e which this role is perceived by other country is striving to overcome the sense it made a huge contribution to c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 115 A FOREIGN POLICY TO DIE FOR: SA'S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA informing the reading public about the pecting great changes in Nigeria based situation. 54 At the same time a debate on what South Africa is doing/declar has been taking place within certain sec ing56 These expectations and demands tors of civil society, notably among aca stem from ignorance as to how the in demics and within institutes such as ternational system and relations between Idasa, with contributions from the and among states function. There also Portfolio Committee and sectors within seems to be over-confidence in the po DFA and the whole coordinated by the tential influenoe that South Africa in par Foundation for Global Dialogue, as to ticular can wield, drawing on the high how civil society could become in moral position it is at present occupying volved in foreign policy making, or, at and the international stature and prestige the very least, as to how the process of Mandela. The myriad of other factors could be structured in a more account influencing foreign policy decisions and able and transparent way. outcomes, and South Africa's position as The Nigerian crisis highlighted at a small - at most, medium - power in least two glaring shortcomings in realiz the international arena, preclude such ing the promise that South Africa's for grand and great gestures and achieve eign policy belonged to its people. ments. This is a lesson for civil SOCiety to Firstly, it proved that the Portfolio Com learn: On its own, and especially as far mittee on Foreign Affairs actually has as new international issues are con very little contact with or leverage with cerned, where we are actually charting decision makers when it comes to in unknown waters, South Africa cannot fluencing decision making, or even in necessarily exert any serious impact on merely extracting information from de events and situations. The ANC and its cision makers or the DFA. Yet this com alliance partners were at pains during mittee represents the very people to the first few weeks of December to ex whom policy is said to belong. The way plain publicly what the limitations on the in which South Africa chose to handle government were with respect to bring the Nigerian issue obviously damaged ing about change in Nigeria. the credibility of the committee, and it is The second assumption was that ) 0 known that the relationship between the civil society's involvement in foreign af 1 0 committee and DFA is under serious re fairs was restricted to criticism and de 2 view. The committee now seems to be mands of government to take certain ac d e t coming out more strongly in voicing tions. The government's "lethal miscal a concerns and opinions and suggesting culation on Nigeria",57 however, served d ( policy actions, not only on Nigeria.55 to get civil society actively involved in r e The Nigeria crisis has thus perhaps not working for change in Nigeria at non h s i only jolted the committee into life, but governmental level too. Trade union fed l b may in the long run prove an important erations, trade unions, civics, business, u P element in the strengthening of the po sports, religious, cultural, environmental, e tential (and actual) credibility and influ youth and women's organizations and h t ence of the committee itself and of the other interest groups came together and y b parliamentary committee system as a formed a committee for action. Nigerian d whole. It is doubtful whether serious pro-democracy exiles in South Africa are e t foreign policy issues and crises will be n also involved. This committee targets the a r treated so meekly by this body in future. Nigerian regime and Shell, and hopes to g A second shortcoming involves broaden and deepen contact with and e c the relationship between civil society assistance to opposition groups in n e and the state. In this respect two as Nigeria, as well as to build support and c i l sumptions held by the former became involvement in other African countries r e clear in the unfolding of the Nigeria cri for their campaigns. It is difficult to as d n sis, and especially in the aftermath of sess the potential for success that such u the executions. activity may have, but what is of impor y a The first assumption has to do with tance are (a) the possibility of strength w e the high expectations of and the some ening civil society in South Africa and in t a what unrealistic demands for action of Nigeria, and for that matter in the rest of G some sort in terms of what South Africa the continent, 58 and (b) the possibility of t e could possibly achieve in its Nigerian forging transnational links for the even n i policy. It would seem that groups and el b tual development of formal, organized a ements in civil society e~pected a much regional and continental non-govern S y more prominent and active role for mental ties between organizations which b South Africa; but more than this, they can share skills, knowledge and capa d e were (and in some cases still are) ex- city, and may in the long run impact c u d o r p e R I 116 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 A FOREIGN POLICY TO DIE FOR: SA'S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA seriously and positively on the Jives of ering in the background is one very real, Africa's people. This is a development crucial and ultimately determining factor not included in a realist paradigm of for in international relations: the issue of eign policy processes. It might prove, sovereignty. The challenge is to restruc however, able to provide certain an ture or re-think the meaning of this con swers to questions about the implemen cept which - for all the problems, chal tation of decisions regarding the internal lenges and benefits it has created - is position and policies of states that disre after all, in itself, only a social construct, gard international rules and norms in not a law of nature. their domestic affairs. Notes and references Conclusion One should perhaps use the term civil so South Africa's "Nigerian experience" ciety here in the sense of referring to the points to a number of challenges and "organized" general public. problems facing foreign policy in the 2 The analytical approach is utilized in such contemporary international arena, not well-known textbooks as the various edi only for South Africa but also for other tions of K J Holsti, International politics: A states. Foreign policy is, precisely be framework for analysis, the editions of C cause it occupies the space between the Kegley and E Wittkopf, World politics: domestic and the external environments, Trend and transformation; and Karl an immensely complex business which Deutsch, The analysis of international re can, because of the almost infinite num lations. Over the years, these textbooks be came standard fare in the course work of ber of variables involved, produce total students, many of whom eventually fol ly unintended outcomes. States must in lowed careers in the foreign services of creasingly face up to the challenges of their country. In this way, more than one new actors and new problems without generation of foreign policy decision mak having suitable instruments for dealing ers were trained (and still are being trained) with them. Multilateral diplomacy and within a realist paradigm. As far as the de its concomitants, international negotia scriptive approach is concerned, this is fol ) 0 tion, mediation and conflict resolution, lowed by Roy Macridis (ed), Foreign policy 1 0 are still evolving; and even when solu in world politics: States and regiOns. This 2 tions are reached, there always remains text does not cover the foreign policy of a d e single African country or region. Politics t the question of responsibility for imple a and society in contemporary Africa, edited mentation. Changing regimes or prac d ( by Naomi Chazan et ai., covers the subject tices inside states involves, in many in r matter, but does not purport to give more e stances, long-term after care in the form h than a cursory historical overview - it can s i of practical assistance and support. This l in no way be described as an analysis of b is one of the characteristics of the new the foreign policies of African states. u P foreign policy goals and ideals of the 3 K J Holsti, International politics: Aframe e post Cold War era: the issues on the in work for analysis C7th ed), Englewood h t ternational agenda demand long-term Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995. y b assistance and involvement if the moral 4 M Clarke and S Smith, "Perspectives on the d basis they are founded upon is to carry foreign policy system: Implementation ap e t proaches", in M Clarke and n White (eds), n any weight. Foreign policy decisions, in a Understanding foreign policy: The foreign r turn, therefore demand great care and g policy systems approach, Aldershot: prudence; otherwise an international e Edward Elgar, 1989, p 164. c concern with human rights, democracy, n 5 In their book on Understanding foreign pol e development, humanitarian relief and c icy (ibid), Clarke and White refer to foreign i l good governance will yield little more policy as a system (p vii), basically to em r e than Somalia-like intervention, creating phasize the complicated range and depth of d activities that comprise foreign policy ac n more damage than relief. u South Africa, and the rest of the tion. I prefer to use the term foreign policy y process, but understand it in much the same a world, are faced with changing foreign w policy agendas, while the foreign poli way as do Clarke and White, with perhaps e t the exception that I do not believe that a cy process is still conducted very much there is necessarily and always a noticed/ac G within a realist, and often constricted, t knowledged feedback that completes the e paradigm that offers insufficient scope n loop of a system. What is of importance is i for grappling with these new issues. Of b that whether one uses the term system or a particular importance is the develop S process, the essence of foreign policy analy y ment of new, or the adjustment of ex sis is that one does not restrict analysiS only b isting, instruments and skills appropriate to questions about the formulation of poli d e to the goals of foreign policy. And hov- cy, but that its outputs and outcomes are c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 117 I A FOREIGN POLICY TO DIE FOR: SA'S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA also raken into consideration. See discus world order" in C Kegley and E Wittkopf 23 The Department of Foreign Affairs is one sion towards the end of this section. (eds), The global agenda: Isslles and per of the few government departments, if 6 K J Holsti, op cit, pp 184-207. spectiues (4th ed), New York: McGraw not the only one, that, by the end of 7 K J Holsti, International politics: Aframe Hill, 1995. 1995, had not published a White Paper work for analysis (5th ed), Englewood 13 For an excellent overview of the sanc on its policy. It had not published even Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988, pp 92- 115. It tions campaign against apartheid South a Green Paper, which serves as a dis is interesting to note that in the 6th and Africa, see D Geldenhuys, Isolated states: cussion document on which a White 7th editions of Holsti's International pol A comparatiue analysis, Parklands: Pa per is then based. In order therefore to itics he no longer includes the chapter on Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1990. form an idea of the government's foreign "Foreign policy orientations and national 14 J Donnelly, op cit, pp 196-197. policy viewpoints and to evaluate its ac roles". Yet, "national roles" still seem to 15 Y Ferguson and R Mansbach, The elusiue lual policy decisions and outputs, one be the preoccupation of many states and quest: TheolY and international politics, has to accept that, as the majority party analysts. One can but turn to the post Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, in the Government of National Unity, the Cold War debate on the; role of the USA 1988, p 185. Emphasis in the originaL ANC's document entitled Foreign policy as "only remaining superpower", or to 16 T Skocpol, States and social reuolutions, perspectiue in a democratic South Africa, the struggle in the Arab world for lead Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, published in December 1994, is the clos ership (the rivalry between Libya and 1979, p 29. est one can get to an official statement Egypt, for instance, though this may be ] 7 S Strange, "Rethinking structural change on foreign policy principles, goals and an oversimplification of the causes of in the international political economy: objectives. their enmity), or that in the Muslim States, finns and diplomacy" in R Stubbs 24 There are fears that a boycott of Nigerian world, also for leadership, to realize that and G Underhill (eds), Political economy oil might result in internal turmoil. Oil Holsti's list of more than 15 role concep and the changing global order, London: represents between 80 and 90% of the tions is still as relevant today as it was Macmillan, 1994. country's exports. during the Cold War era. His exclusion of 18 J Stopford and S Strange, Riual states, 25 During Chief Ikimi's visit (see note 21), this discussion in particular results, I riualjlrms: Competitionfor world market he was at great pains to explain what he think, in the loss of a useful tool for shares, Cambridge: Cambridge University termed "Nigeria's special case and spe analysing the motives of states in the Press, 1994. cial problems" which he ascribed main conduct of their external relations. 19 Wm C Reed, "The New International ly to the ethnic diversity of that country. 8 K J Holsti, International politics. Oth Order: State, society and African inter One of the academics present remarked ed), op cit, national relations", Aji'ica InSight, vol 25, to the Foreign Minister that this kind of 9 For some views on this dilemma, see no 3, 1995, P 141. defence of authoritarianism sounded, to SAIIA Research Group, South Africa and 20 K Waltz, Man, the state and war, New South African ears at least, very much the two Chinas dilemma, JohanneslJurg: York: ColumlJia University Press, 1959. like that given to the outside world dur ) 0 SAIIA and FGD, 1995. 2] Chief Ikimi was provided with various ing the heyday of apartheid by South 1 0 10 K J Holsti, International politics ... Oth platforms from which to plead Nigeria's Africa's former prime ministers, notably 2 ed), op cit, pp 84-108. "special case" (as he put it) during an Verwoerd, Vorster and Botha. d e 11 The political conditions that the IMF and official visit to South Africa in August 26 This last reason was actually cited by t a other bilateral donors set African states 1995. The author was invited to two of South Africa's High Commissioner to d who face serious debt and economic re these meetings, the first of which took ( Nigeria, Mr George Nene, as one of the r structuring problems are used as an ex place at the South African Institute of problems in formulating their Nigeria e h ample. Many studies of structural adjust International Affairs, Johannesburg, and policy. See Mail and Guardian, 17-23 s i l ment programmes, however, place a which was attended by a number of aca November 1995, p 4. b question-mark over the real effectiveness demics and a journalist (apart from the 27 Mail and Guardian, 10-16 November u P of these programmes in promoting de Minister's entourage). Owing to the 1995, p 5. e mocratization, human rights and better Minister's loudly proclaimed dissatisfac 28 And presumably that of other activists, h t living standards. See eg E Altvater, K tion with the way in which he was treat such as Saro-Wiwa and political prisoners. y Hobner, J Lorentzen and R Rojas (eds), ed by the academics, he cancelled the 29 See Africa Conjldential, 17 November b The pouerty of nations, London: Zed second meeting. d 1995, p 1. e t Books, 1991. 22 K J Holsti, International politics. (7th 30 Mail and Guardian, 17-23 November n 12 J Donnelly, "Human rights in the new ed), op cit, Part Ill. 1995, p 4. a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R 118 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 A FOREIGN POLICY TO DIE FOR: SA'S RESPONSE TO NIGERIA 31 See discussion of Brecher's design in M Nigeria policy in the wake of the execu P 11, that Ghanaian President Jerry Clarke, "The foreign policy system: A tion of Saro-Wiwa and the other activists. Rawlings "had appealed to his Nigerian framework for analysis" in M Clarke and 41 Emphasis in the original. and South African counterparts to refrain D White, op cit. 42 See Beeld, 14 November 1995, Business from public recriminations and personal 32 Mail and Guardian, 17-23 November Section, p 2. Trade with Nigeria more attacks against each other." Yet the ideal 1995, p 5. than doubled between 1994 and 1995, and practice of solidarity on the basis of 33 The London Guardian reported on 8 with the balance in South Africa's favour. pan-Africanism have been abused fre December 1995 that the ANC had also South Africa, furthermore, does not im quently by dictators and authoritarian accepted donations from Morocco and port oil from Nigeria. regimes in Africa. Indonesia. Such reports lead, inevitably, 43 ANC, op cit, P 5. 51 A DFA source quoted in Mail and to accusations that foreign policy is not 44 Ibid. Guardian, 24-30 November 1995, p 4. based on principles, but on bribes. 45 An interesting illustration of this point is 52 Beeld, 12 December 1995, p 4. 34 A similar warning was sounded by the a speech made by Foreign Minister 53 It is interesting to note that the Western or at least the American, press seems to leader of the Democratic Party, Mr Tony Alfred Nzo in the National Assembly in be quite unaware of these tensions and Leon, in a press interview after the pub May 1995. He quotes President Man how much power (potential influence) lication of the allegations in The Guar dela: "The great challenge of our age ... they ascribe to President Mandela's dian. See Beeld, 9 December 1995, p 10. is to answer the question, given. the "enormous prestige" to get Britain, the 35 T Weiss, D Forsythe and R Coate, The interdependence of the world, What is it USA and Africa mobilized for action United Nations and changing world pol that we can and must do to ensure that against Nigeria. See for example Time itics, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p 5. democracy, peace and prosperity pre International, 27 November 1995. 36 Although the case of South Africa and vail everywhere?" and then particular 54 It would seem that most research insti the success of sanctions in bringing izes this statement to indicate that South tutions in the country, to the extent that about change are often Cited, it must be Africa will use its now favourable posi South Africa's foreign relations featured kept in mind that South Africa was con tion in the international community to in their conferences and workshops, sidered a threat to international peace "advance the well-being of our peoples were in 1995 largely preoccupied with and security. Apartheid was not per and fulfil their legitimate aspirations as the Two Chinas debate. A notable ex ceived or treated as a purely domestic embodied in the RDP". This speech is ception was the conference on "Re issue by the international community. contained as Appendix 3 in C Landsberg directing South Africa's Foreign Policy" 37 As explained by Ms Gill Marcus, ANC et al (eds), Mission impeifect: Re convened by the Foundation for Global Member of Parliament and chair of the directing South Africa's foreign policy, Dialogue and the Centre for Policy parliamentary finance committee in Johannesburg: Foundation for Global Studies in June 1995. Nigeria as a specific Sunday Times, December p Dialogue, 1995. 17 1995, 22. case/issue did not feature. ) 38 One is reminded of Bennett's comment 46 See analysis in Southscan, vol 10, no 43, 0 55 SeeMaii and Guardian 1-7 December 1 that "a rising tide of revolutionary inter 17 November 1995, pp 333-334. 1995, p 5. 0 47 A useful framework which could shape 2 national problems is met with the slow, 56 The preSident of the Performing Art d evolutionary development of interna ideas around such a strategy, is that of D Workers' Equity (Pawe), demanded at a e t tional institutions." See A Ie Roy Bennett, .J Geldenhuys, "The international com public meeting that Nigeria be granted a d international organizations: Principles munity and South Africa: Penetration, in two months instead of two years in ( and issues Ord ed), Englewood Cliffs: tervention and isolation", International r which to restore democracy. See Beeld, e Prentice-Hall, 1984, p 3. Affairs Bulletin, vol 12, no 1, 1988. h 15 November 1995, p 2. s i 39 All references to the ANC's foreign poli 48 ANC, op cit, pp 4 and 8. 57 As it was referred to in the Mail and l b cy principles, ideals and goals are taken 49 The other governments who recalled Guardian, 17-23 November 1995, p 5. u from the party's document Foreign poli their representatives were all from the P 58 It will be interesting to see whether these e cy perspective in a democratic South developed world. Information provided groups and organizations will also, in h t Africa, issued in December 1994. (See by Mr Raymond Suttner, MP and chair time, link up with others, such as the y also endnote 23.) man of Parliament's Portfolio Committee American TransAfrica lobbying group b 40 This somewhat jargonist statement is of on Foreign Affairs, 2 December 1995. which also campaigns for change in d e t special importance when one considers 50 See for instance the report in the Mail Nigeria. See Time International, 3 April n public response/s to the government's and Guardian, 24-30 November 1995, 1995, p 39. a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 119 I GHANA's return to Dr joseph R A Ayee, he Provisional Nalionai Defence • to formulare for the consideration of Senior Lecturer in Public Council (PNDC), [he most durable governmenr a programme for a more posl-colonial regime (in power effective reillization of a lrue democ Administration Studies in from 31 December 1981 to 6 Janu racy in Ghana.! tary 1993) relurr ~ c<.l Ghana on 7 January the Department of Political SCience al the University of 1993 10 a consrirutional dispens(ltion, In rhe words of Ghana 's Information lhe Founh Republic, afler twelve years Services Departmenl, rhe NCO was not Ghana, traces Ghana's of aurhoritarian rule. This had been only established to design (\ "[fue return to constitutional preceded by the holding of preSiden democracy" bur also "to take into con ntle under jerry Rawlings tial and parliamenlary eJecrions on 3 siderarion our tradilion, hisrory and cul November 1992 and 29 December 1992 rll re ... cerrain "ocio-culrural va lues, and the PNDC respecrively. slIch as consulrarion, volu ntarism, par This ,uriele examines the formula tici pation , consensus and self-reliance lion and implemenlalion of rhe pro which we cherish as a people but which gramme (0 rerurn the country to consti we have failed 10 integrate inro the po tutional rule, wirh speciill emphasis on lilical order"2 The functions of lhe lhe problems encountered and rheir im Commission were furrher consolidared plications for the building of a democ in 1988 by PNDC La w 208. ralic (1 .llure in Ghana. Il first examines The estilblishmenr of the NCD did thc c:esign of the programme. Ir then nor change the caurion and hesit<1rion analyzes rhe stralegies and procedures <:virh which rhe PNDC approached rhe ) 0 devised for [he programme·s realizal[on. rransition ro constiturional rule. The re 1 0 Lasrly, ir discusses rhe elections, rhe gime slill asked its rhetorical quesrion, 2 performance of the civilian governmenr ·'Hand over to whom?' and continued d e t and prospecrs for the furure: ro ralk of crearing rhe necessary condi a d rions for rhe "redundancy·· or '·withering ( 3 r Formulation of transition <1way" of lhe PNDC. e Belween 1984 and 1987, rhe NCD h programme s i l invired the public to submir papers/ b Ghana·s lransition ro constillllional rule memoranda on the future form of gov u P under the PNDC began, slowly, with rhe ernment for lhe country. Seminars, s\'m e esrablishment of rhe National Commis h posia and durb<1rs were held by [he t sion for Democracy (NCD) by PNDC NCD ilnd other government functionar y b (Establishment) Proclamation of 1981. ies to discuss with lhe public rhe "ef d In 1982, PNDC Law 42, e feclive realiz;ltion of a l[lre democracy t Secrion 32, elaborated on n in Ghana":i These discussions led ro the a {he functions of the NCD, r launc!1ing of [he Blue Book - the doc g lisring lhem inter alia, as llOW:1r on the "Creation of districl polit e c follows: ical authority and moda lilies for dislricl n e • to creare wirhin the so c :evc' elections in Ghan;l·' - by Ghana·s i l ciery awareness of lhe ob \" umber Two, Mr Justice D f Annan, on r e jectives of rhe revolurion 1 July 1987 at Kumasi. On 11 November d n ary transformation of the 1988, PNDC Law 207, rhe Local Govern u society being embarked ment Law which concrerized rhe ideals y a upon by the PNDC in the enshrined in rhe Blue Book, was pro w inlerest of real democracy; e mulgated. This resulted in rhe holding t a • to assess for the infor of rhe District Assemblies (DAS) eJec G m;lrjon of lhe government tions between December 1988 and t e rhe limilarions ro rhe achievement of FebruMY 1989. n i rrue democracy ariSing from the ex The establishment of the DAs was b a isting inequalities between differenr regarded by rhe PNDC as <1n important S y SWllil of the population, and make re slep in [he government's programme b commendalions for redressing lhese "of evolVing nalional political authority d e inequalilies; through a democratic process".s c u d o r p e R I 120 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 constitutional rule The NCD was also charged wirh all Ihe DAs, provided clear evidence of the responsibility of "working out the the PNDC governmenr's inrention 10 sleps in rhe programme and also the re perpetuare irs power. The DAs called lalionships berween the District Assem for a no-party syslem of governmenl, blies and ulrimate national political for rhe election of members of the na instilulions"6 Consequently, the NCD or rional parliament by Ihe DAs (one third ganized a series of seminars in all Ihe len of whose members were nominated by regional capilals from 5 July to 9 July the PNDC), and for the elecrion of 1990 on "District Assemblies and the Rawlings as head of Slale. Evolving Democratic Process .. .7 The In order to expose the "hidden main reason for holding thes~ seminars ilgenda " of the PNDC, 10 call for a was to "invjle the views of II"'.e public on "proper, open" national debate, and to what next after the District Assemblies, work for the restoration of multi-party in fulfilmenr of the PNDCs commitment democracy and civilian rule in Ghana, LO involve the people in working out the Movement for Freedom and Justice programmes for the evolucion of the (MFJ) was formed on 1 August 1990 country's democralic process beyond the under Ihe chairmanship of Professor district level".f! Howevel', as it lurned out, Adu Boahen, who larer was lO become lhese regional fora ancl consullalions the preSidential cilndidale of the New President Jerry Rawlings failed to do so. They were often pre Patrioric Party (NPP) in the November ) sided over by PNDC officials and sym 1992 presidential elections. The de 0 1 pathizers, and were used nor only to mands of the MFJ included the release 0 2 canvass posirions favoured by Ihe gov of all polilical detainees, the granting of d ernment bur also as a platfonn for at an uncondilionill amnesty to all exiles, e t lacks upon the evils of rhe multi-party the drawing up of a constitulional a d system, the failure of past politicians, timetable, ilnd the lifting of Ihe ban on ( r and the sanctity of the coups of 4 June parry pol ilics. In order to creale a con e h 1979 and 31 December 1981 .9 Most genial atmosphere for the debate on the s i l Ghanaians remained unsure of rhe sort country'S furure political system, lhe b u of democratic process that was being MFJ, other pro-democracy forces such P ushered in. The ilddress of rhe chairman as the Bar Association, the National e h of Ihe PNDC, Rawlings, on 5 July 1990 Union of Ghana Siudenrs (NUGS). (he t y during the first seminar, a I Sunyani. did Catholic Bishops' Conference and the b nothing lO indicate thill the seminars Christian Council demanded the repeal d e were meant to discuss proposals for the of all repressive laws, especially the t n return of the country (0 constitutional Preventive Custody Law (PNDC Law 4) , a r rule, but rather that rhey were lO rrovide the Habeas Corpus Amendment Law g e an opportunity for an evaluation of the (PNDC Law 9l), the Newspaper c n DAs. However the process is regarded, Licensing law (PNDC Law 211) and Ihe e c the seminars "metamorphosed imo a de seClions of the Public Tribunal law i l r bate on the future governance of this (PNDC Law 78) which deal! wilh exe e counrry ... (which) .. ' was due to exter cution for political offences. Above all. d n nal ilnd imernal pressures as well as the the pro-democracy forces stressed (ha( u (0 y government's desire to give its end-prod the issue as whether (he counrry a uct some form of respeclilbility'·.lo ShOll d have a multi-party or a no-party w e Originally the seminars were re syslem of government should be decid t a stricted ro members of the Dislrici ed "rhrough a genuine national debate G t Assemblies (DAs) and invited bodies culminating in a national referendum e organized by an independenr body". II n and "progressive" organs sllch as the 31 i b December Women's Movement, the Despite increasing pressure, the a S Committees for Ihe Defence of the go vernment remained relucran( and y Revolution and Ihe June 4 Movement. hesitilnt (0 meet the demands of the b d This, plus the virtually identical nature pro-democracy forces. Continuing as e c of the constitutional proposals made by with some personal political agenda, u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1995 AFRICA INSIGHT 121 I Go.". ', ,"",. '0 ' •• """"•• " ,"'a I ~. . , '--'''' ru._ ,,..,...."'-, ... :.:.;.:.:~~~.~:~.~.;.:.:.,.."" . ""' ...... -'" .... ~ , " ...... "., ...,., """" ". , ...... ",-,..-. ..,. • '_I"" _ ~ ... ,0 """""'"- " ".DC • """ ,.. , Ig " ...... of e. _"k, of to""" "' ..... ' __ " "~ , " ..... '90' e. ", ofb"""...- _ ...... _ .""'~.~... ,,",OC , "' ...... ,.. , ' ... " .... of c.-" , A_ " ~ -, • ", ,~~ . , "" ___ -""'" Co ...... • _.. .m -- """' ... " . . ,...... 10 l'''''''' ,_ c."k"' , _"., ..... _, d''', __ ''''' _ __ ~ . "",,...... '" Il "' ..... ,~, " L..... , .., ...... ~...... " )C, ' ..' " _,-...... ,..... 0;",_, , " ,...... ,_~ ",. , .. , . '_.. - ...... --"' - .. -.-.. ------_- ' .w' " ~" In "" L J'""", 1991 ""·W '" '" ,,,,,,,.,,,~ ~·" h , "'"."", '" t .... "",h ., _ ,., ...."", ' """'''''. Yo" b.",_ ~ '" ' h< ."000 ...... '" ...."",.., [)O~. """1"''''' , . ~ ...... h< <'u,,,,""'. -.,." .. " ".., """ """. , ... ""D", ,,""",. _, "' .. ... kr, fo< .h< 0<.. ...,,"" '" A h~ • • "r .-.' "'''' b ) •".,. , "" 'h< ..._, fon ."" 10 "..,. ""'" ,O'UJ "'""", """ .. A,,"~ d._ ...... ""OC T)w,~ 0 1 ..... • " ,.., ,"" of ...«h 199' "' ... NY"'" '''91 ~ ..," Q"" " • 0 on.- ... '" >; ''''''' ...... D 2 ,,,,,",,,~y , .... h< "" "'" .,.,.",." ... ,.,..","""" "" 3' ! ..... , .... , ."'"' ,,,. d bo_ ,.,.. . , " "",,,,,",,, ",,""" 00 e ' NIX: 10 " . .."" , ...."...._ .. b.'L ,.n" ,'" .." .IL ..... "' " . ~"., t .." , ...... , , ~." _""", '" ' h< ",. ~ a ~ ~ ~-~ _ """,,'" """",,,,,,,,,,1 "' ...... d """'" """' ...... _",,,-- ~_~ ... 'W. '100 "'" PNOC, h< _ ...... c"."...... ,"" A""m"" (CA) ".,. ( .. ,ho r lobi,,,,",, " " . " n • ,,,. .hruo:' '''' l'NOC. " 001<<1 , ... , '" o< h",.,.'", ",,,",,,,,' d<"""", ~ d e "" _ .~ __ W"" "" ,,,,,,,,. '""". '" ''>';'. 1?<11. ' 969, "" ,."., t f"","eo,' " • ..J _~" ....". n ",t." a ...... « ... _ ..... ""-- • ... . .,.,.. of ... r _.,,,,1eo.n .... g ~ .-" ""' ."" ...... -.,.. Im"'. m. n ...... ot .... n."... n e ""' , ,., , , . '" "". r", """""""" en"",,, .... ' '" c ...... _,• .,me ... "NOC "",1«< Em"." . Y...., n e .... "'""""'._ ...... c "'. of _" "',...... ""... ~ . ~.,.' i - """"" l ~«'M •• ~,.• "'_ !<."'.. "" AO"""." ,"" _,," ""' .. "''''''''" r ' h< """'" .. ,ho NCO '" b ...... d '" ' ...... n • ., "'," ",.,," , ~, ''''''''''~ ",,"~,,,,,, '" ••• " .... rooonuy '" ,""",... _ , _~. ~" n ""'- ...., "" ,,..,~ .. ,,""',.,. "Ok , .. " '" "~ G ...... u ." ... w"".--.".,." -.- .-~ """" ~"""'" " y .. tud bo t 0< ,"" C""", I ~ , ,,,, A.""" .. , co ... e ""'"~, '" "''' '"" ,,...,' >,.-. ,.". ,"'''''' ... "" K R . "'''''' '" ""'"" n t.. " (If ,ho>,o ~ OO In ,,,., ,~~ 0· i bo'"",," b.. ,,,,,,, ...,,, ,,,1 "'''''''''." """" .""" .. 'x, " ,,,,,",,,, ..... b "".,...,."" ...... ,., ~. '''' "'" . Ii.. "" mIX t.. ." , ~,. Th< eomn...'o<' a _ ",.., up • """" '" "'''''''' S ",I«""", " '"'''' of ~_ ~, ~ , .""'.. .."" "" Cb>.... no! "'" , y ...... ,," ' "" - (If ' "' ."""'" In· A~ ,1 _ " , ",~ <>."""", b "''' .. w ,~i on GOCtl'V __ , ... m"",', ."""""... .. ' ""' .... """. d ." .-","" ... eomm_ .... """. 1""«<1 •., '" """.P''''' ,,,. I'T'OC _ e mo"Cp.oot, "~,,'" ',.,,' ~,w c '""".. "" """,,,,, ~,,.,, >Ie"" body - to itself have the final say on A final criticism levelled against This speech must be seen as an at the nature of the constitution. the Consultative Assembly was that it tempt to expedite the changes leading The second objection related to was not only packed but seemed also to constitutional rule, a necessity for the Assembly's composition, for here to have been gagged. This was evi Rawlings owing to mounting pres was revealed a haphazard but very real dent from Section 13 of PNDC Law sures from within Ghana and from in attempt to pack it with pro-government 253 establishing the CA which pro ternational donor agencies. elements. PNDC Law 253 stipulated vided that: The CA, owing to the volume of that the CA should consist of 117 per work it had to contend with, present sons elected by the District Assemblies, Nothing in this section shall be deemed ed its report to the government not to relieve any person from any action or 121 persons elected from 62 "identifi on 31 December 1991 as scheduled proceedings ... in respect of anything able bodies" listed under the Second said or done by him against the Head of but on 31 March 1992. It recommend Schedule of the Law, and not more State and Chairman of the Councilor ed an American style executive presi than 22 persons appointed by the any member of the Council of a PNDC dential system of government for the PNDC. It should be pointed out that Secretary.20 country. (Before the presentation of one third of the membership of the the report, an Interim National Elec DAs had already been appointed by The.Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and toral Commission (INEC) under the the PNDC so that it was likely that a the Movement for Freedom and justice chairmanship of Mr justice josiah majority, if not all of this huge 117- (MF]) , the two institutions which spear Ofori-Boateng, an Appeal Court judge, member bloc would be supporters and headed the criticism of the PNDC tran had been established on 11 November sympathizers of the PNDC. Nor, any sition programme, pointed out that the 1991 to conduct the referendum on where in PNDC Law 207 creating the refusal to accord unlimited immunity to the constitution and the presidential DAs, had the DAs been assigned con the members of the CA was a flagrant and parliamentary elections scheduled stitution-making functions or envisaged departure from the established consti for November and December 1992.) as electoral bodies. But it was widely tutional and parliamentary tradition of On 5 March 1992 in a broadcast believed that DA representatives would Ghana "which would have the effect of to the nation marking the 35th Inde undoubtedly help rubber-stamp what gagging all but the most daring mem pendence Anniversary, Rawlings, for ever the PNDC put before the CA. bers".21 These fears may have been the very first time, announced a A third criticism had to do with confirmed when a gagged Assembly timetable for the transition to consti the 62 bodies listed under the Second inserted Transitional Provisions in the tutional rule. He promised that "this Schedule to elect persons to the year [1992] will see the culmination of ) Fourth Republican Constitution that 0 Assembly. The definition of "identifi a process towards establishing a new 1 sought to indemnify the chairman and 0 able" bodies was not only fuzzy but al other members of the PNDC and its constitutional order". 24 He also ex 2 most bizarre. 19 While bodies like the tolled the virtue of the PNDC's ap d other appointees from prosecution by e t Butchers' Association, Hairdressers' any court or tribunal in Ghana for any proach to constitutional rule: a d Association and Bakers' Association act or omission during the administra ( From the onset of the 31st December r were included, the Ghana Institute of tion of the PNDC. This PNDC indem e Revolution, our conviction was that true h Management, the Ghana Veterinary nity clause appears to defeat the tenets s democracy required the meaningful par i l Medical Practitioners, the Public Re of accountability and probity preached ticipation of all Ghanaians in the struc b lations Association of Ghana and the u by the same PNDC. tures and practice of government. The P Hoteliers' Association were excluded. As a result of their serious mis steps we have taken so far in this e 2 ; h Twenty such associations queried their givings concerning the composition process do attest to this conviction t exclusion and were turned down. y and powers of the CA, the GBA and b A related criticism was the over NUGS boycotted it. And though some Rawlings then announced his time d e representation of some bodies in the assembly members asserted that their table: a referendum on 28 April 1992, t n CA. For instance, the armed forces with deliberations were not interfered with the lifting of the ban on politics from a r a total membership of 20 000 had eight excessively by the PNDC, others 18 May 1992, the holding of preSiden g tial and parliamentary elections on 3 e seats while the police service with a claimed that manipulation and inter- c workforce of 80 000 were given only 22 November 1992 and 8 December 1992 n ference did take place. . e c two. Again, it seemed manipulative to The inauguration of the CA on respectively, and inauguration of the i l 26 give the Committees for the Defence of 26 August 1991 by Rawlings was re Fourth Republic on 7 january 1993. r e the Revolution (CDRs) ten seats and garded as part of what the PNDC has This timetable, with the exception d n the Butchers' Association one seat: often called.-its "methodical march to of the parliamentary elections which u these bodies had never expressed any wards democratic rule": were postponed to 29 Deceinber y a interest in a return to constitutional 1992, was faithfully adhered to. w Any observer who has watched or par e rule. The 80 000 strong Ghana National The holding of the referendum t ticipated in events in this country over a Association of Teachers (GNAT), how was a contentious issue. Rawlings G the past nine and a half years will have ever, had but two seats; and the Bar provided four reasons. First, a refer t witnessed a 'consistent pattern, a se e Association, the Christian Council, the endum was considered to be an exer n quence moving towards the establish i cise not only to give the constitution b National Union of Ghana Students ment of a just and lasting democratic a the "stamp of approval" but also to S (NUGS) and the University Teachers system embodying the will of the peo y Association of Ghana - bodies which ple. This Consultative Assembly is the elicit the "readiness of Ghanaians to b had made persistent demands for con next logical step in this process which protect it" .27 Second, the referendum d e 23 was supposed to educate Ghanaians c stitutional rule - only one seat each. began on 31 December 1981. u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 123 I Ghana's return to constitutional rule concerning the provIsions in the draft Political Parties Law, PNDC Law 281 of Ghana constitution: "[this] must not be seen as 18 May 1992. Two requirements in the Republic of- an exercise in division but as the cre law were contested in the Supreme ation of a national consensus in line Court without success. The first was the Independence: 6 March 1957. with our traditional principle of arriving pegging of individual contributions to Former British Gold Coast. at a consensus which binds even the party funds at 200 000 cedis, a possible National Day: 6 March dissenter".28 Third, the approval of con tactic by the PNDC to starve the oppo (Independence Day). stitutions by referendum was currently sition of funds. The law was subse Leader: Jerry J Rawlings, b 1947, in vogue all over the world, including quently amended by the PNDC, em Military Head of State 1981-1992, countries in Africa and Eastern Europe. powering the INEC to set a figure - elected President November 1992. Fourth, the holding of the referendum raised, after consultations with potential Capital: Accra, largest city. Main was a significant innovation in the con party leaders, to one million cedis. 33 port, Tema, near Accra. stitutional history of the country: Higher the INEC would not go. Second, Area: 239 460 km 2. All our previous constitutions have af the outlawing of previously established Population: 17,3 mn (1995). firmed the sovereignty of the people as a party symbols seemed a setback to the Religions: Christians (majority) and supreme principle, but none has observed Busia-Danquah and Nkrumahist groups Muslims together about 80% of that prinCiple with the actual direct en who wanted some counter to the eagle population. dorsement of the people29 - the nation's symbol - taken over by Languages: English (official), Asante, the PNDC. Its familiarity to the elec Fante, Ewe. Ga, Dagombe. The opposition forces led by the MFJ torate was considered to give unfair ad and the GBA saw the holding of the re Life expectancy at birth: 56 years. vantage to the PNDC. ferendum as a dubious aspect of the Foreign trade: Imports: $1 600 mn; constitutional process on three grounds. Exports: $1 200 mn (1994). First, they did not see the wisdom in Presidential election Principal exports: Gold (45%), submitting a complex document such cocoa, timber and manganese. When the ban on politics was lifted, as the constitution, one dealing with seven political parties emerged to cam GNP: $7311 mn (1994). GNP/capita: such a variety of topics and having so paign for both presidential and parlia $430 (1994). many sections, for outright approval or mentary elections. They could be divid Currency: $1 = Cedi (C) 1 540 rejection on the basis of a simple "Yes" ed, superfiCially, into two groups: pro (March 1996). or "No". Second, should the outcome Rawlings parties - the National Demo ) 0 Background: Economic decline has of the referendum be "No", it was like cratic Congress (NDC), the National 1 since 1983 been tumed around to mod 0 ly that the PNDC would use this as an Convention Party (NCP) and the Every 2 erate growth through structural adjust excuse to prolong its rule. Third, the d Ghanaian Living Everywhere (Egle) e ment programmes guided by the World position taken by Rawlings himself on t Party; and anti-Rawlings parties - the a Bank and the IMF. Gold has overtaken the question of the referendum. When d cocoa as the principal export. Other New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by Adu ( asked by Africa Report for his view on r major exports are timber and man Boahen and descending from the e the call of the opposition groups for a h ganese. Following the lifting of restric Danquah-Busia tradition, and three par s i referendum to decide the simple ques l tions on political parties in May 1992, ties with Nkrumahist inclinations - the b the military established a political party tion of whether there should be a no People's National Convention (PNC) led u party or a multi-party system during the P the National Democratic Congress by former President Hilla Limann, e (NDC), and the military head of state, national debate between July and h Lt General (Rtd) Emmanuel Erskine's t Jerry Rawlings, became its presidential December 1990, Rawlings replied: People's Heritage Party (PHP) and y candidate. Although less than half of the b A referendum by its nature must be a yes multi-millionaire businessman Kwabena electorate voted in the presidential elec d and no affair or must deal with a very lim e Darko's National Independence Party t tion on 3 November 1992, 58% sup ited number of simple options. T fail to n ported Rawlings. As the main opposi (NIP). The NDC, NCP and Egle Party a see how the complex options presently r tion parties boycotted the National had J J Rawlings as their presidential g before Ghanaians can be reduced to such e Assembly elections on 29 December, terms. 30 candidate. This arrangement may have c the NDC obtained an overwhelming n given Rawlings an edge over the oppo e majority of seats. The country returned c It was the stand of the opposition forces sition parties since they remained frag i l to civilian rule when on 7 January 1993 that if the simple question of whether mented and failed to forge a common r e Rawlings was inaugurated as president. there should be a no-party or a multi front articulating a constructive vision of d The next elections are due to take place n party system of government should not a future Ghana. u towards the end of 1996. be decided by referendum, then there y Rawlings had a headstart and con a was just cause to be suspicious of the tinuing incumbent advantages over his w e PNDC wish to decide the issue of the en opponents. He controlled and manipu t a tire constitution in the same manner.31 lated the agenda and the timetable lead G t Despite the protests the govern ing up to the elections. In the words of e n ment went ahead with the referendum the International Foundation for Electoral i b on 28 April 1992. The constitution was Systems which monitored the 1992refer a S overwhelmingly endorsed by 92% of endum, Rawlings and the PNDC "remain y the 3680973 voters who turned out,32 the obvious source of political initiatives, b d whereafter the ban on politics was retaining their claim to the last word in e c lifted with the promulgation of the decisions that affect the forward move- u d o r p e R 124 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 Ghana's return to constitutional rule ment of Ghanaian policy".34 Rawlings BURKINA FASO used state resources at his disposal for .·.11:·-····_··· his campaign - money, government ve Navrongo Boigatanga hicles, helicopters, the press - while other parties, starved of funds and re- sources, could only complain biuerly to INEC of the disparity in resources before being allocated a limited number of ve- hicles. Rawlings and his PNDC also dom- -,\ .. ", inated the state-owned media and influ- "'""\ enced the way news and features were to be disseminated. And although the ban on politics was lifted only on 18 May 1992 Rawlings had for long been cam- paigning, even though he did not declare his intention to nm for election until the date for official nominations on 30 September 1992.35 The refusal of the PNDC to open up the voters' roll to those who had failed to register for the district assem blies elections of 1988/89, or for the partially updated register in 1991, meant that many opponents of the regime were left without a chance to participate in the elections. This was a source of concern to the International Foundation ./ of Electoral Systems team: " It is imperative that a re-registration of all \ ) 0 eligible voters be undertaken as quickly as 1 \ possible ... The list suffers from deficien 0 2 cies such as multiple entries, inconsistent \ d name order, failure to record corrections, e t and ghost entries. No attempt has been a d made to purge the list of deceased voters.36 ( r e h But Rawlings' greatest advantage, rem s i l iniscent of Busia's victory in 1969, was b ATLANTIC OCEAN u the fact that he had been in power, and P not for only Busia's three years but for e h over a decade. He had built up a sup t y port base in the CDRs, the DAs, the 31 b 100 150 km December Women's Movement and the o 50 d e Mobisquads who openly campaigned t n for him. These incumbency advantages, a r it must be pOinted out, are enjoyed all sage of the "continuity" of the PNDC's Ghana g e over the world, but their effect in the policies while opposition parties cam c n Ghanaian context may have proved de paigned for changes of government e c cisive in influencing the results of the personnel and some implied revenge. i l elections. Although well known to op r It is pertinent for us here to pause e position parties, this one great advan and ask why after eleven years in office d n tage was taken so lightly by them that Rawlings decided to contest the elec u y it spelt their doom. tions at all? The main reason was that a No sharp differences on issues given the revenge threats by some w e separated }he manifestoes of the con members of the opposition, Rawlings t a testing parties during the campaign pe and the PNDC thought they should con G t riod. All parties espoused private enter test the elections not only to ensure the e n prise, the free market economy and the "continuity" of their policies and to seek i b continuation of the Structural Adjust legitimacy but also to safeguard the a S ment Programme. All made promises on very lives of· certain officials and su p y health, education, employment and the porters. b d u pliftment of the standards of living of As the country approached the e c Ghanaians. Rawlings preached the mes- elections, fhere were indications that the u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 125 I Ghana's return to constitutional rule TABLE 2 1992 Presidential election region results in Ghana Region Turnout Valid ProfAAdu Dr Hilla MrKwabena Flt-Lt} } Lt-Gen E A Const Boahen Limann Darko Rawlings Erskine Entered (est.) Votes Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 01 Western Region 45,9 594286 89800 22,8 33700 0,6 21 924 5,6 239477 60,7 9525 2,4 19 02 Central Region 45,6 334 031 86683 26,0 5368 1.9 103J 35 222092 66,5 7312 2,2 17 03 Greater Accra Region 46,2 507445 187892 37,0 22038 4,3 20721 4,J 270933 53,4 5801 1,2 22 04 Volta Region 60,8 478417 17295 3,6 7431 1,6 5530 0,7 446365 93,3 3796 0,8 19 05 Eastern Region 50,9 516874 198744 38,5 9754 1.9 11730 2" 292983 56,7 3663 0,7 26 06 Ashanti Region 49,1 712 584 431 380 60,5 17620 2.5 25298 3,6 234 237 32,9 4049 0,6 53 07 Brong-Ahafo Region 43,2 392864 116 0If1 29,5 20646 5,3 8979 2,3 243361 61.9 3837 1,0 21 08 Northern Region 47,3 320973 52539 16,4 35452 1I,0 4682 1.5 203004 63,2 25296 7,9 23 09 Upper West Region 47,7 129600 II 535 8,9 4B 075 37,J 2329 1,8 66049 51,0 1 612 1,2 8 to Upper East Region 47,5 201 946 21 164 10,5 66644 32,5 2791 1,4 108999 54,0 3348 1,7 12 COUNTRY TOTAL 48,3 3989020 1 213 073 30,4 266728 6,7 1I3 615 2,8 2327 600 58,3 68099 1,7 200 Based on 200 constituencies out of 200 estimated giving 8 255 056 out of 8 255 056 registered voters Source: Office of the NatIOnal Electoral Commission, Accra, July 1993 elections would be a straight fight be tively; 61,9% in Brong Ahafo Region proven ability of Rawlings and the tween Rawlings of the NDC and Adu and 63,2% in the Northern Region). PNDC to deliver the goods by provid Boahen of the Npp. This again was a The only region where Rawlings fared ing roads, electricity and water in the manifestation of the two-camp factor, rather poorly was in the NpP strong rural areas. The provision of these the CPP in its many forms drifting es hold, the Ashanti Region, where he amenities in the rural areas (despite the sentially to Rawlings. The Rawlings polled only 32,9% of the votes against corresponding hardships brought by campaigns drew larger crowds than Adu Boahen's 60,5% (see Table 2). the SAP) remained indelibly in the ) the opposition presidential candidates, The outcome of the election was a minds of rural folk. Lastly, some have 0 1 particularly in the rural areas. The personal victory for Rawlings and a argued that Rawlings did not win the 0 2 press also became highly polarized. humiliating and devastating defeat for election: the opposition lost it! This d The state press supported Rawlings Adu Boahen. For Rawlings, clespite view neatly expresses the notion that e t and gave the polls to Rawlings and his the austerity measures pursued uncler after eleven years in office the anti a d NDC since they had "support in the the Structural Adjustment Programme Rawlings sentiment in the country ( r rural communities who see the exten (SAP), was able to divest himself of an could have been milked by any well e h sion of electricity, the provision of unpopular and repressive past and put organized party offering a credible al s i l potable water (and) good roads as a on the cloak appropriate to the first ternative to the PNDC. But, according b u way of improving their conditions of leader of an African military regime to to Gyan Appenteng: P living".37 The private press, on the win a competitive multi-party election. e '" the absence of a level playing fielel in h other hand, was generally anti-Raw How are we to explain the suc t a game in which the ruling junta was y lings and heavily tipped Adu Boahen cess of Rawlings at the polls? The first player, referee and linesman virtually b 4 to carry the day. For instance, in a factor was the incumbency advantages guaranteed failure for the opposition ! d e front page headline of the Ghanaian referred to above. The second factor t n Chronicle of 2 November 1992 the was the lack of unity among the op a r paper wrote: "So long Jerry; let's give position: the three-way split among g Rigged presidential e him a hand, let's try and forgive, but those who claimed to be the followers c elections? n let's save him from the Castle [the seat of Nkrumah meant a lack of focus for e c of governmentl".3B Even the renowned i those who would normally vote for The results of the presidential election l r Ghanaian astrologer, Dr Baldwin Bad an Nkrumahist party. More important were questioned by the opposition e d doo, predicted that Boahen had an was the success of the NDC (and its parties who cried foul and alleged n edge over Rawlings.39 allies) in presenting itself as the party massive rigging, To them, this Novem u y The results of the elections gave of Kwame Nkrumah, In the final lap, ber 1992 election was the "most con a Rawlings a clear majority - 58,3% of there were campaign advertisements in troversial in the nation's history" be w e t the votes cast in the whole country the press to drive home this very point. cause it was "fraudulently conducted a against Adu Boahen's 30,4% (see Table Rawlings visited Nkroful, Nkrumah's and its result fraudulently procured. ,,42 G t 2). These results obviated the need for birthplace, where he commissioned his The questioning of the validity of the e n a run-off election. Rawlings (now first nearly forgotten tomb twenty years result led to widespread disturbances i b President of the Fourth Republic) did after his death. What will be debated in in parts of the countlY such as Tamale, a S very well in the rural areas as well as the years to come is whether the split Sunyani and Kumasi. The Kumasi riots y in most parts of the country (93,3% in b within the Nkrumahist party was due led to the imposition of a 6 pm to 6 d the Volta Region; 66,5% and 60,7% in to Rawlings' "political savvy or chi am curfew for six days which was lift e c Western and Central Regions respec- canery",40 The third factor was the ed on 9 November. In the midst of the u d o r p e R 126 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 Ghana's return to constitutional rule confusion over the result that seemed Without a level playing field, elections a non-starter with ominous conse to threaten the security of the country, in this country will continue to produce quences that might get completely [thel tragic results of 3rd November 1992 three bombs exploded in different 'Jout of hand. - a stolen verdict.45 parts of Accra and Tema while the On 17 November 1992 four of Kwesimintsie constituency chairman But how justified were the opposition the opposition parties announced of the NDC in the Western Region was parties in questioning the validity of their intention of boycotting the par burned alive and later died at a the results of the elections described liamentary elections (rescheduled for London hospital from third degree by international observers as "free and 29 December 1992 to allow for sever burns. Most people doubted if these fair"? To some extent the charges of al efforts at mediation) unless the frightening acts of violence were the fraud and irregularities were con PNDC government agreed to compile work of the opposition. They saw firmed externally by the Carter Center a new voters' roll and issue Ghanaian them as yet further attempts to give Election Mission, which raised serious identification cards. The government's the opposition a bad name, or as at questions about the dated nature of refusal led to a boycott of the parlia tempts by certain persons to take un the voters' register, the absence of a mentary elections by these four op due advantage of the precarious post reliable and consistent procedure for position parties (NPP, PNC, NIP and election situation.43 identifying eligible voters, inconsis PHP) which now came together to On 5 November 1992 the oppo tency in determining what should be form an Inter-Party Coordinating Com sition parties called a press conference regarded as spoiled ballots, improper mittee OPCC). to provide proof of their allegations sealing of the ballot boxes, the undue This had left the field clear for that Rawlings had won the elections influence exerted by some polling the "Progressive Alliance" of the three through "fraudulent manipulations'; as agents, and the inability of security parties which had all presented well as "systematic rigging of the bal personnel to control voters. However, Rawlings as their presidential candi lots". It was attended by Adu Boahen despite these findings, the Carter date - the NDC, the NCP and the Egle of the NPP, Hilla Limann of the PNC, Center team observed that: Party. The results of the parliamentary E A Erskine of the PHP, and Naa elections were a foregone conclusion . ... despite the occurrences of serious ir Afarley Sackeyfio, who represented The NDC won 189 of the 200 parlia regularities in the election process, what Kwabena Darko of the NIP. Adu we have observed aoes not lead us to mentary seats; the NCP won 8 seats; Boahen showed the press what he question the validity of the results.46 the Egle Party one seat; and two seats said were 32 fraudulent ballot papers were won by women standing as in found on a rubbish dump in Kumasi The Commonwealth Observer Group dependent candidates. (Table 3 gives ) 0 by a school child: 29 out of the 32 bal also concluded that the election was a regional breakdown of the results.)48 1 0 lot papers were thumbprinted in less than "free and fair", although the The boycott of the parliamentary 2 d favour of the NDC and bore the INEC errors in the electoral roll, it believed, elections by the opposition panies nat e t stamp number 5363. This, to the op were the result of misinformation urally affected the turnout. Of the a d position, suggested that "someone, or rather than any attempt to affect the 7 336 346 registered voters, th~ num ( 47 r a group of persons, within the Interim results. These conclusions seem to ber voting in the 29 December elec e h National Electoral Commission had suggest that the international commu tions was 2 059415. Twenty-three con s i l been deeply involved in a conspiracy nity validated the outcome of the elec stituencies returned unopposed candi b to rig the elections" .44 tions more than did the country's op dates. The turnout represented 29% of u P To provide concrete evidence position parties. This may be con voters in the 117 constituencies. In the e h that the elections were rigged, the strued as an international-community earlier presidential elections, 3 989 075 t NPP came out with a publication, The attitude of "get on with the experi out of registered voters had y 8 255 056 b stolen verdict on 7 April 1993. The 89- ment" rather than their putting their voted in all the 200 constituencies, d e page publication, with its ten appen weight behind the dangerous alterna representing a 48% turnout. The votes t n dices, documents incidents of intimi tive of turning the whole business into cast in the parliamentary elections a r dation, ballot stuffing, impersonation, g e wrong computation of results, late c n opening of poll/early or late closing of TABLE 3 Regional breakdown of seats won in parliamentary elections e c poll, corrupt and illegal practices/ held on 29 December 1992 i l cheating by INEC officials, tampering r e with ballot boxes and pa pers, use of Region NDC NCP Independents Egle d n defective registers, ineligible voters, Central 16 1 0 0 u non-signature of result forms, and the y Volta 18 1 0 0 a dubious role of "revolutionary" or Upper East 11 0 1 0 w e gans, security personnel and state t Western 16 3 0 0 a owned media. The stolen verdict then Eastern 22 3 0 1 G ended on a sullen and cautious note: t Brong Ahafo 20 0 1 0 e n Ashanti 33 0 0 0 i The levelling of the electoral playing b field is, then, the litmus test of the com Greater Accra 22 0 0 0 a S mitment of Jerry John Rawlings and his Upper West 8 0 0 0 y colleagues, who remain in charge of the b Northern 23 0 0 0 d affairs of the nation, to multi-party 190 8 2 1 e "-,~ .'"- -.-~- c democracy and free and fair elections. u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 127 Ghana's return to constitutional rule were only 51,5% of those cast in the In both first and second session Serious Fraud Office, Value Added earlier presidential elections.49 addresses to Parliament in April 1993 Tax, Public Order, Public Holidays and January 1995, the President made and New Courts, generated much de it clear that his government would bate and controversy. These bills were Conclusion: Prospects for stick to policy directives chartered by passed because of the government's the future the PNDC government. These include majority; but a number of substantial Ghana's transition to constitutional economic liberalization, divestiture of changes had been made to them be rule was ridden with controversy at state enterprises, redeployment, pro fore they became Acts. every stage. This arose principally vision of basic amenities in the rural The judiciary has also been alive from the PNDC's dictating the democ areas, decentralization of the machin to its responsibilities. It gave three de ratization process and its timetable. ery of government, and the improve cisions against the Executive. The The timetable seemed to be manipu ment of productivity in the public sec Supreme Court ruled that demonstra lated in such a way as to enhance the tor. In line with constitutional provi tions could be held without police per electoral prospects of Rawlings. This sions, the President also presented to mits; that the Ghana Broadcasting naturally created mistrust in the mind the Speaker of Parliament in January Corporation (GBC) be ordered to give of opposition forces: they were cer 1995 the document entitled, Vision equal and fair coverage to the activities tainly all a ware of the biased nature of 2020, which sets out socioeconomic of all the political parties; and that the the electoral rolls and how the transi policies programmes to be pursued in appointments made by the president tion programme had been tailored and order to better the Ghanaian standard in August 1993 to the office of District manipulated to favour Rawlings. Why of living. Chief Executive for the 110 districts then did the opposition contest an The strained relationship be were unconstitutional. As a result of election they were bound to lose? Was tween the government and the oppo these legal defeats the Attorney it misplaced confidence? Or foolhar sition appears to have been eased, General resigned (April 1994). diness? it has been argued in some cir both parties pledging their readiness In what appears to have been a cles that the opposition parties lost the to do business with one another. This dress-rehearsal for the 1996 general presidential elections because they cooperative attitude was shown when elections, the government organized were not united. This may be wishful the NPP presented to the Speaker of non-partisan district-level elections on thinking, in the light of the fact that Parliament its reply to the 1993 budget 22 March 1994 in order to elect can looking at the scale of the Rawlings statement. This cooperation between didates for 103 DAs, four municipal ) victory, there was no guarantee that a government and opposition is reflect assemblies and three metropolitan as 0 1 united opposition would have made ed in the Inter-Party Committee formed semblies. In the Northern Region and 0 under the auspices of the National three other districts in the Volta Re 2 any difference to the outcome. d The opposition boycott of the Electoral Commission in 1993 to delib gion the elections were postponed be e t parliamentary elections has undoubted erate on the revision of the voters' rolls cause of ethnic violence erupting be a d ly made Ghana a de facto one-party and the introduction of voters' identity tween Konkombas and Namumbas on ( r state, and this seems to hold some im cards in preparation for the presiden 3 February. Although the elections e h plications for the performance of the tial and parliamentary elections in were non-partisan, party caucuses to s i l NDC government. President Rawlings 1996. support one candidate or another b u has on several occasions indicated that Two issues, however, have given were quietly formed. In Nima East, for P the constitution is not sacrosanct and rise to differences between govern instance, the NDC rallied around the e h could be amended to make it more ment and opposition. The first issue incumbent assembly member (a wo t y workable. Delivering his first session concerns the choice of day(s) on man), while the PNC and NPP ap b address to Parliament on 29 April 1993, which both elections are in future to pointed candidates to stand for them. d e the president emphasized that he be held. The government insists that Political parties had every reason to t n would establish regular interaction be the two elections be held on different support particular candidates, al a r tween the executive and legislature be days; the opposition and the Electoral though illegal, because they wanted g e yond the formal requirements of the Commission want both elections to be to muster the grassroots in their favour c n constitution. It is this rapport between held on the same day. The second in order to boost their chances during e c the two organs .of government that has issue has to do with the provision of the 1996 general elections. i l enabled bills to be passed to establish r identity cards to voters. While the gov Judging the performance of the e certain institutions such as the Electoral d ernment wants cards for all citizens NDC government by its adherence to n Commission, the Commission on Hu (too expensive to be accommodated the constitution, we can say that the de u y man Rights and Administrative Justice, before the 1996 elections), the oppo mocratic ethos is gradually being culti a the Minerals Commission, the District sition favours the provision of cards to vated. The cooling off in tensions be w e t Assemblies Common Fund and the those in urban constituencies (only) tween government and opposition, a Commission on Civic Education within before the important 1996 date. even if only temporary, can also be re G t six months of the constitution coming Contrary to expectations, the garded as a major government achieve e n into force. Some of these institutions NDC-dominated legislature has not ment. In this light, the prospects for the i b have offered avenues for the redeploy been a rubber stamp. When the gov establishment of constitutional rule are a S ment of friends and sympathizers of the ernment proposed to raise the price of brighter than ever before. During the y PNDC who gave loyal service but could petrol from 1 600 to 2 200 cedis, it was b second session, the Speaker noted that d not be accommodated in mainstream compelled to retreat. And the passage the present Parliament, unlike those of e c governmental machinery. of bills such as those concerning the 1969 and 1979, will run its full course. u d o r p e R 128 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 Ghana's return to constitutional rule This is because the "jinx that con 10 Kwame Boafo-Arthur, "Prelude to con 28 Ibid. tributed to the fall of the two previous stitutional rule: An assessment of the 29 Ibid. parliaments has been broken".50 This is process", in K A Ninsin and F K Drah 30 Africa Report, June 1991, pp 3-4. reassuring indeed. We can but hope Ceds), op cit, p 46. 31 Boahen, speaking at the symposium on that the hostility and acrimony which 11 A Adu Boahen, speaking at the sympo Constitutional Process and Referendum, sium on Constitutional Process and formerly characterised the relationship op cit. Referendum organized by the Greater 32 West Africa, 11-17 May 1992, p 809. between government and opposition Accra Branch of the Ghana Bar Asso 33 See J R A Ayee, "Financing political par will give way to a lasting credibility and ciation, at the Law School, Accra, on 24 ties in Ghana: An exploratory study", in effectiveness on both sides to ensure, July 1991. See The Pioneer, 1 August, K A Ninsin and F K Drah Ceds), Political preserve and promote the norms of fair 1991. parties and democracy in Ghana's play on which all democratic societies 12 J J Rawlings, New Year broadcast to the Fourth Republic, Accra: Woeli Publishing are firmly built. If this happens, then nation, 1 January 1991. See the People's Services, 1993, pp 250':'251. the legitimacy Rawlings has earnestly Daily Graphic, 2 January 1991; and Re 34 Laurie Cooper, Fred Hayward and An tried to seek by returning Ghana to public of Ghana, Evolving a true demo thony Lee, Ghana: A pre-election assess cracy ... , op cit, P x. constitutional rule may have been ment report, June 1, 1992, Washington, 13 See People's Daily Graphic, 6 June 1991, achieved - even if only partially. As we DC: International Foundation for Elec pI. toral Systems, 1992, p 1. look forward to the 1996 elections, 14 Ibid. what are needed are patience, toler 35 See Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 15 Naomi Chazan, "Planning democracy in "The Ghanaian elections of 1992", ance and fair play from government, Africa: A comparative perspective on African Affairs, vol 92, no 368, July 1993, opposition and the general public. Nigeria and Ghana", Policy Science, vol pp' 331-366. See also David Abdulai, 22, 1989, P 345. "Rawlings 'wins' Ghana's presidential 16 The timetable for the transition to con elections: Establishing a new constitu stitutional rule in Table 1 was not a clear tional order", Africa Today, vol 39, no 4, Notes and references ly laid out and publicized one. It has 4th Quarter, 1992, p 70. Republic of Ghana, PNDCL 42: Provi been compiled by the author. 36 Laurie Cooper, Fred Hayward and sional National Defence Council (J:.sta 17 Republic of Ghana, Committee ofExperts Anthony Lee, op cit, p 45. blishment) Proclamation (Supplementary (Constitution) Law, PNDC Law 252, 37 TheMirrorCAccra), 31 October 1992, p 3. and Consequential Provisions) Law, Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 38 The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2 November Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1991. 1992, p 1. 1982, Section 32. 18 Republic of Ghana, Consultative Assembly 39 Baldwin Baddoo, People's Daily GraphiC, 2 Republic of Ghana, The search for true Law, Tema: Ghana Publishing Cor ) 3 November 1992, p 4. 0 democracy in Ghana, Accra: Information poration, 1991. 1 40 K Gyan-Appenteng, "Winners and losers", 0 Services Department, nd, pp 10-11. 19 Gyimah-Boadi, op cit, p 37. 2 West Africa, 16-22 November 1992, p 3 Brigadier J Nunoo-Mensah, the first Chief 20 Republic of Ghana, Consultative Assembly d 1962. See also Jeff Haynes, "Sustainable e of Defence Staff when asked at a press Law,opcit. t democracy in Ghana?: Problems and a conference in April 1982 as to when the 21 See statement by the Ghana Bar Asso d prospects", Third World Quarterly, vol 14, ( PNDC would return the country to con ciation at an emergency meeting held at no 3, 1993, pp 451-467. r stitutional rule, replied: "Hand over to the Law School, Accra on 31 July 1991. e 41 Ibid. h whom?" See Ghanaian Times, 4 April See The Pioneer, 2 August 1991. s i 42 New Patriotic Party, The stolen verdict, l 1982. 22 Interview with 70 members of the Con b 4 Republic of Ghana, Evolving a true sultative Assembly, in Accra, June Accra: NPP, 1993, P 9. u 43 Adjoa Yeboah-Afari, "Post-election P democracy: Summary of NCD's work to August 1992. e wards the establishment of a new demo 23 Republic of Ghana, "Constitution must be thought", West Africa, 16-22 November h t 1992, p 1963. cratic order. Tema: Ghana Publishing born by truth and integrity", address by y the Head of State and chairman of the 44 Ibid, P 1964. b Corporation, 1991, pix. 45 New Patriotic Party, The stolen verdict, d 5 Republic of Ghana, District political au PNDC on the occasion of the inaugura e t thority and modalities for district level tion of the Consultative Assembly in p 89. n elections, Tema: Ghana Publishing Cor Accra on 26 August 1991, Accra: Informa 46 Report of Carter Center: Ghana Election a r poration, 1987, pp 1-2. tion Services Department, 1991, p 4. Mission, 6 November 1992, p 1. g 47 Commonwealth Observer Group, Ghana e 6 Ibid. 24 Republic of Ghana, "Guidelines for c elections: Interim statement, 4 November n 7 Republic of Ghana, Evolving a true de Ghana's return to constitutional rule", na e 1992, pp 1-7. c mocracy ... , op cit, P x. tionwide broadcast by the Head of State i l 48 West Africa, 11-17 January 1993, p 13. 8 Ibid. on the eve of the 35th Independence r e 9 See E Gyimah-Boadi, "Tensions in Ghana's Anniversary, 5 March 1992, Accra: Infor 49 Ibid, P 13. 'r d transition to constitutional rule", in K A mation Services Department, 1992, p 2. r 50 Justice D F Annan, First Speaker of the n u Ninsin and F K Drah Ceds), Ghana's 25 Ibid, pp 2-3. Fourth Republican Parliament, address y transition to constitutional rule, Accra: 26 Ibid, pp 2-4. ing Parliament on 11 January 1995. See a Ghana Universities Press, 1991, p 36. 27 Ibid, P 3. People's Daily Graphic, 12 January 1995. w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 129 j , -, Reproduced by Sabinet Gateway under licence granted by the Publisher (dated 2010) ~ ... <:: :i?\i' III i ;;ag ~t:l I» 1 ~ - . " -.c--'"::..~,,~.,., -' ; .,.>- ! ""-'''' ;; ~'' ;' ;- , "'~ ~1"~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ."" ~ • ..."-".. '>'.~ - -~ " -~--- ~ , ~ , ~~S J: ~~~ ~~ ~::;.~ s. ~, ;;, ;- 3_ ~_ .. _~ ,' !"!'I''''I,i'j'!!il'I!':::J I'.h 1.f,nL""• ~i~ 1. r'.ff-.".~J_ ~ i ~ i'"~l!~i'",:- ~ l !l!'l""~,,,."l ';"'i',,! f ~ t "',',1'1,"~~~;r" l !" -!",'I'!' ~;-cqit .' " i _. =- i'l'II""t.,".- ,.!!!!!l,·" !"'!"',l.~ 0.", l ~ J, !~1~'~h~. i-!"""~ !~~~!HH1.- -:::II» "I»_ ~!lrtl~1~li~ilwi!ii[~!ii;ili c:a. .. '!;'~-"!I'I[t"1'l" = ,-"-Iff" J?.>=~' , .31 .f~ •• i.f I» elll ~.~~{~tjl~7~8i~ ·~t!~!' :::I • I .fi£kfl·l~!t! ~~~:5 - ~ : c:a. I,l. i ",.,. ~~ !,/,.. ..~'. l I,·t"'l"Ii. ,' ~, ii! li""LlIj'll!!. 'Fi!. "II::!':!!1q .. Bl't'lll!!!',' :0. • ~ 1- 'I!"~it . 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O]~. l ,g" ]~-~ ~- "l'd"-~ - ~ ~'''3··t, ~." - - .,''t!.," ,l. -", " ~ "1.!" • : 'li -~;~1,"lgl P ·,~ "t~L~, il ~~~§.!~~ S !Ld i ~ ~~~~[~ ~U~LB~l~_n •• ~ .... ~ ~~ . ~,~ ,,, l: ~t1_~U~Il" c .'] _ '''~§."~~ ~~ ~f;-dj~~Hiha.~~~{ ~~hHh~HHh~hLr.~$ ~ ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e • • • • R OCCUPATIONAL HEAL TH AND SAFETY IN SWAZILAND as an agricuhural and pastoral society; but during rhe last fifey years it has been transformed IOta a trading and semi-in dustrialized country based on forestry and agra-allied industries_ It has also developed an urban sector to which the aCllve population drifl for employmem and the good things of life. Of the 60444 who were employed in the pri vate sector in 1990, 81% were either semi-skilled or unskiUed. This 8]% were ;l lso semi-literate or illiterate, thus indi cating a high probability of encoumer ing Job-related stressors, accidents and diseases. The root cause of rhe wage eco nomy and th~ massive migration of younger men to the mines in South Africa was the appropriation of land from the loca l people by the senler farmers and colonial government which imposed heavy taxation. Thus a people who had been sel f-sufficient in food production before the 19305 became de pendent from the 19405/1950s on wages and remittances, ..vhich were meagre anu irregular, expoSing them to hunger and deprivation. Their situation wors ened when caule diseases wiped out sanitation. Workers livmg in these con most of theIr stock of ca tt le in the 1980s. ) 0 ditions probably arrive at the workplace 1 0 mort dead than :llive - that is, if they Poor organizational environments 2 ~tdl have jobs to go 10. Occupational 6 d Forssman has noted the prevalence of e t health and s3.fety arc also affected by small organizations (employing less than a the ava ilability or lack thereof o( med d ]00 persons) in most developing cDtm ( Ical personnel. public hea lth and hos r tries and their nOlOriety in neglecting. e pital (acilities. In most African cOllmries, h among other things, the health and safe s i the provision of these facilities is gross l ty of their employees. This is what hap b ly illOldeq ua te; and what facilitit:s do pened in Swaziland, where about 890/0 of u P exist are not well distributed and are to the registered compa nies (1992) had a e he found mostly In the urban areas. h nominal ca pital of E1 000 or le ss. Only t lastly, the standard of occupation 2% had a nommal capital of E10 000 and y b al health ;md safety (\·ould improve If above. d lIppropriale It:glslation were in phlce e In Swa;ziland, both small and large t ;lIId were enforced. Blum and Popoo la~ n organilations are often guilty of poor a note thllt in AfriC3, '· leglslation is fre r industrial relallons lind human resources g quently outdated, 100 g ... nera l. or in e n1;tnagement. For example. the study by c other ways inadequate·'. :-'either b the M;KFadden ~ painted a deplorable pic n e responSibility for administering these c ture of the housmg and working condI i l laws always properly deline e as a death trap, liuered with garbage, t a Factors contributing to the Jacking in sanitatiOn facilit ies and, con G sequently becommg a verita ble hot-bed t problem e of uisease. Matsebula,8 also concerned n i Transition from an agrarian to an about tbe deteriorating quality of life of b a industrialized economy the Swazis. remarked on .he existence S y Much of what is sa id above app l ie~ to of ·' make-shjft shelters in congested b the Kingdom of S \v ~l7.i l and. The King sl llln ureas or squa tt er settlements that d e dom up to the 1930s 1.:001 Id be described ;.Ire visible in virtually all of Swaziland's c u d o r p e R 132 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 ) OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY IN SWAZILAND core areas of economic activity". This i~ a feature sulI in eV Idence as I write. As will be discussed below. hea lt h ins pections have shown that workers both in the faclory and in the fields ,He often exposed to heallh hazards resuh ing, in some cases. til senous injuries. sicknesses or even permanent d isabill ties. These condItions, cou pled WIth :l lac k of job security. poor wages and an absence of social welfare. can only heighten the St res!> experienced by workers. Either through the absence of unions, or the presence of only weak ones, the hope of major improvement has seemed !ike a dream. The industrial umest of the 1960s and 1970s was a react ion to poor wages, discriminatory practices. unsafe bus 5elvices 3nd insanit3ry conditions in mining 3nd agriculture 9 The sup pression of the trade umon movement and the imposition of the Ndabau bantus appointed b~' the Swazi N:l1lonal Council and assigned to the large en terprises as "the local authority over all workers" improved neither the industri al relations silUa tio n nor the conditions of service of Ihe wo rkers. The :"idab:l2:a bantus lacked both the skills and the £ervlCCS whlch:tTe rde~anl and a(o!~s i lllf.'" ) to ~J1 0 credibility to aCI as spokespersons for 1 0 the workers, by whom they w ere not 2 trusted. The works councils (which I.audable th ough this objective be, any d e hopes of irs realization have proved il t were also promoted as altern;Hives to a lusory. although the efforts of govern d trade unions) were ineffective. :si nce ( ment ha ve been greally complemented r they were dominated by employers. e Thus. either in small organizations, by those of missionaries ilnd mdustry h s i and il few private individuals. In re l mostly owned and managed by indige b nous businesspeople who are known to viewing the accessihility and affordabi! u P 11J n one-person shO W .~,IO o r in medilltTl ity of hea lth services, Mhlongol1 nOlt'S e and la rge organizations, the standard of that dinics and hospitals are not only in h t occupational health and safel Y in Swazi sufficient, but thai their distnuution i:. y b most uneven. a situation compounded land can be said by modern standards 10 d by the fact that the ntr.1l population live e be Jow. ExceptiOns are, perhaps. 10 be t in widely di."persed, Single, individual n found in the few large multlnational cs a home:-.tead:s rather than in villages or r w bli",hmen1:> such as the SitTlllnye Suga r g Company, Ibe Mhlume Sligar Compnny hamlets where ht:a lth, education and e c and the U",utu Pulp Company. Th,-· .~ o..: or· other facilitie., cmild more easily be pro n e vided for larg.:: groups of people. The re c ganizations prOVide modern and beau i l tiful hOUSing esrates, including well sult is that two-thirds of rhe 83 physi r e equipped clinics, for their workers. The cians and half of the nurses In the d n majority of the working populace in the Kingdom work in urhan are;!:. which ac u Swazi Kingdom, however. depend upon count for no more than a qll;lrter of the y a the public health system, the state of tOla l poplilmion. In the llJral areas, the w ratio is one hospital bed to 1 4S0 people. e which I next review. t a compared to the nalional rario of one G Fragile health sector hospital bed 10 457 people. Some dis t e The objective of the Swaziland govern tricts with the la rgest population have n i ment as contained in the National no govemmem or specialized ho:,pllals b a Health Policyll was at all. or ha ve the least number or heahh S y 10 improve rho! hC31!h Stltus of Ihe Swal facility units b people by providing pre vent ive, promo In the ma tt er of afford 1 " 0 -~- , 2 _.01_ ...... ,-- __ "' ...... _ ..... ,d, ...... _ • d e t ..,....,.. ._ ,..,. a ...... d ( - "'--"'...... r ...... ,_...... ""' ,,,. e ,. h -_ s ""_""",,, ...... ".". ". <.0- i l ~ • • <>J """""" ~ . ,.. . "..-"'" b _ ","hr, ~" " ""'l u ,,., ....,.., P e <". 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"". -.t" ",."".,.,...... , .._ d ...... e - ~ .--.. t ...... ,... .. ,-._ a _---,- _-_ ...... - ...... _-- " ..., ...... d "" . ,,- ( ...... __... po,._ - ", •• ,,",,- ... -,,, .. ,, ... _'''''- r _ .._ h ...... __..... __.... .n ....,.., ... , ...... p. .• """...... po>'<.~"" s i ... l ,-_ _. , ...... _ .....-oJ """. • ." ....-.. 01 "" ...... -oJ ...... : b ...... -.,- u ...... '..,. 'WI '" .9'1', ..,,, b'a< 1lw So"" ,_, ~ -"' .... "" -~''''"' '."""", ..,,,, ., P -- - ...... 01 ~ too ,,,. ... ,,,,,,', ,..... '" e "".,...,...,-t", 1991_.", "''''',0' ",-,,, '" h t'" ..-.. "" """"'" _ueJ", .... t """-" "" ...... ,,,. ""'.,...... ,., «""""'~ y -~~,; .... """"" .. """"""", ...... " ...... "" 'ho ...... , ... b 0/.' nw...... __ "' ...... "'" ..... ,...... "'" ... -".,.,.... .~,- d _'--. "''',,,- ...... "' ...... -., e -... '" t.... .,., ...... __ __ .. t ___ d"''''''''-'_ .... n .-"" ...... ,'111, ..... ,..., .. _ "'m .. __...... _, hoi- .. a - _ r """' -. do"' __ .... --""..... , g 0"''" ""...... _" d ' ...... e ... 11.0_ "'I... ",. .01 To<· • ~ "''"'' -., <- '" -.. c '" ~ n ...... e ..... " ...• - ..""- roc.Hp--''''' c --"- ' : ,~ b«, '""" ""'" ,_,.,_ ...... i , .- ~- " l ...... · ...... do .. o...... ,...... _. • 1...... _ ...... !Th ....""" ...... r ---- - ."u. _ e , "",., , d ...... _. ...-, boO_. __. ... . ,~, n , b ___ "' ...... ,...... _ 'OS'''' ...... "'.... h>-,...... ""0 ..... u ---- wid '" y "'I OC<"~"'.'" I""" .,., ...... " • , ...... 00 """'-... .:0..,_" ... 1«' -,.to,v ... ' a boo.,."... ""..... "'" ,,., """'~. w • ... ,.... ~ ''><<<'"'' '" "•• -- ..." ,"" to 'n, " " """'" "", ,'" e , .... ~",...,.nd a "'"~""'loo- _"'I' ","" "",,,,-, .... .-.- ._~ ,0<, ..." .. ...""",,,,, '" ,t o< ",,""'" <0" G • _. n • ... _,.. i ""'" b .-. 01 _-...... """,_...... -.. " a - ...... _Uh• • do ...... _· S "" ...... ---,' y __ . ".~, ... '- I1otF""·'· _ ...... b ...... , d ,..,...... e ...... _...... -, ... "' h'Y c - _ -,_ _...... ,:0.. on n.. _ ... or u ... _00- ...... '" "" -...... ---- - d -... o r p e R I OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY IN SWAZILAND the WHO represen t;uive in Swazibnd Perhaps the most disturbing as· problem more terrifying is the fa ct that focused attention on mental heahh pect of this problem is the alarming the group most affected is the most and nOled that ra te al which it is spreading. Available productive group in the population. The issue of drug abuse is steadily be sl3tistics show that H1V inrection in When this important group is coming a caust!: for concern in [he Swazi creased rrom 3,9OAl in 19921021 ,9% in decimated by Aids, the ability of the ) society. Thert!: 3fe different iII.:gal sub 1993. This is the rigure for pregnant nation to reproduce itself and com· 0 1 stances Ih~t art!: taking root in Ihe 5wni women w hich is widely used as all in pete economically will be severely im 0 2 society. There are the drugs such ~s dication of the prevalence of Aids in paired. Alrelldy it is estimated that by d heroin. m;mJrax, and the local shrub of the general population.2~ the year 2006 there will be no less e t d3gg3. The abus~ of the~e drogs is as The projection appears equally a than 115000 Swazi orphans. These or d suming unimagimlble proportions ( alarming from a draft report prepared phans will not be able to support r by a team of consultants. By the year themseh'es al school, neither will they e Drunkenness and drug abl1se ha ve h it is projected (medium scenario), productive in the workplace. Z7 s 2006, be i been the major causes of sensell!'Ss l thaI Swaziland will have 180 022 0Jmu· Thus Swa7.iland will continue 10 suffer b .':itabbings, horrific murders, and many u lative HIV infected persons; 18 324 lle~... from its chronic workforce and illiter· P other criminal activities w hich make Aids cases per annum; 9000 TB pa· acy problem fo r a long time to come. e life so cheap t tients: and 18 033 Aids-related deaths The effects of the Aids epidemic today.n The frightening aspect hare is y per annum .2~ The implications of this in the workplace have not yet been es b that drug abuse. like drinking, is fast for the health sector were raised by the d taking rOOl among the most vulnerable tablished. In 1992, the industry·based e t then Minisler of Health, Vall Wissel , elas... in Swazi SOCIety. the school chil D Family Planning Sm/Aids project was n in the follOWing words: a dren, The extent of this problem Can initiated in collaboration w ith eight r g other non-governmental organiZations be seen from the overcrowding and New AIDS cases ,v,ll ,ncrease from 9500 e c congestion [lOW exrerienced in the in 1994 to 21,000 by 2000. E~ch of the~e which caflY out Aids/STD activities in n people wtll ~penJ between 20-40 days in Swaziland. This project's goal is, how e National Psychiatric Centre in Manzini. c i hos.pjt~1 Th is means I h~1 we havt!: 10 ever, limited to promoting children's l r Aids doub!e lhe number of beds in the nexi health and reducing unwanted ferti· e five }'e:lrs. ThiS, of course. means double d The last of the emerging health prob lily. Such health oriented organizations n slaff. double mcdicMlon lnd double u lems in Swaziland is the Aids epidem have yet, themselves, 10 come 10 grips everything in the he~lth services. The y ic. The first Aids infected person was with the imminent disaster of Aids, But a queSlion is: 1-101\' wililhe country cope?lI) it is imperative that they shortly come w identified in 1986, Government re e t acted promptly by taking measures to The socia l consequences of Aids can up with policies which can adequate a be imagined in terms of the trauma of ly cope with the tragedy forecasl as G determine the extent of the problem t ~nd, suffering and death, and also by a mo well as enhance the quality of life of e in 1990, began a campaign to n i promote H[V/ Aids awareness among ment's refl&tion upon the many or their employees. One way would be to b phans, widows and widowers and institute employee assistance pro a the populatiOn, The most receOl cam S paigns are being geared to behaviour other family members whom the Aids grammes (EAPs), which have been de· y b modification in order to reduce th e victims are lel1l1ing, or will be le::lVing, signed to prevent problems that in ter· d risk of infection. behind. What also ma kes the Aids fere with an employee's ability to e c u d o r p e R VOL26 1'0021996 AFRICAt NSIGHT 137 J • ".. .. ."., .. __ of dot 10. _."-_..- .-...... -.~_... <,..,. "'" ,-.,., ...." " ..- ..- -",_ '" ! ,"'" ...... """ .....,. 0(_ .,..-"'- -.. """" --do ...... , .,.,.,. .., ••, • - --- I -. '-...... -$' _-_ ...... ".-. ... I -_.. r...... __ __...... _ -- ...... -...... ~... "'" 'n n± 0_""...... - .. --- -- .".." , _. _01_..-._...... ;h:_:;'~:';------;.'<"": ...... iOb . ..., '" """",. ~ - .~ .., ...... '"iIf<,ct ...... I ~ " ot_ _ -f""III< .... ,,." _ .... .-. ... ';,.=."" ...... - ''""'" ) 0 1 0 '- 2 , , ... _- d ..... - - e _ "" ...... "".. 001 ...... 0 ' , t -- - _ or ..... _ ..... , .., ..... "' ...... oc. a d ( ~""'" -., r --- ...... _....- e , .. ,.~ - ...... h ...... s --- ... i - - , , E --«<"'~ l -- b -,...... '.., ~ ,."" """"" 00,,_... ,... u P --.... ,,,. """'" '"'" """".,. , II "" " e .- .,....,.. " .... ""',,'''''' '" ,bo K",.- h t ~- ...... '910 ""', _ ..' "'_...... y .. --~ --- b --. "' ... _...... ""- ...... d ...... ,_"'._ no ....-. e _.... t ----- 0" • .--_ "." .. _ ...... , ,,_,. 01 .... n ""~ a ...... -.. r _. _ ...... ,_,-,' 9& ... _ g e .. c ,_. __ ...... n e "_"' """"'" y a "".., """"" "" ""'" w ... _. e "''''''oy t - S "- _01_ ...... ,... "' ,...... <$ ...... y .... 01 " " b d ..._ .... _...... - ...... -..",OK "'" e c - u d o r p e R OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY IN SWAZILAND employing at least five or more Conclusion 11 Government of Swaziland, National health policy document, Mbabane: Ministry of people should contribute about The future of Swaziland (and, indeed, 10% of their annual budget to an Health, 1983. any country for that matter) depends Aids Relief Fund. The Fund should 12 T Mhlongo, "Extent to which modern greatly upon the health and wellbeing health services are accessible and af be used in Aids awareness cam of the Kingdom's citizens which, at fordable in Swaziland", in A Okove (ed), paigns and the treatment of Aids the moment, are seriously in jeopardy. Proceedings of the National Workshop on sufferers. To save the situation is a task that Population and Development: Focus on Swaziland, Mbabane: University of Swazi III Government has a major role to must be undertaken. It will demand land, Department of Statistics and Demo play in providing for the health of courage, vision, sacrifice and cooper graphy and the UNFPA/UNDESD-sup its citizens. Apart from enacting ation from all concerned. It is hoped ported Training Programme in Demo health and safety laws, the health that the suggestions above will go graphy, 1992, pp 136-145. budget must be substantially in some way to address the occupation 13 Ibid. creased, not only to cope with the al health and safety needs of the Swazi 14 Department of Labour, Annual Report immediate disaster of Aids, which kingdom. 1992, Mbabane: Kingdom of Swaziland, will very shortly be upon us, but to 1992, p 46. 15 Department of Labour, Annual Report arrest the long-term spread of the Notes and references 1990, Mbabane: Kingdom of Swaziland, disease and other health hazards. 1990, p 41. The distribution of health facilities PVC Pinnagoda, "Accidents at work", 16 Department of Labour, Annual Report World Health, November 1981, pp 6-9. throughout the Kingdom must also 1992, op cit, P 47. be rationalized. 2 International Labour Office, "Organiza 17 Ibid, P 50. tion of Occupational Health Services 18 Department of Labour, Annual Report III People themselves as parents, work in Developing countries", Occupational 1991, Mbabane: Kingdom of Swaziland, ers, etc must face reality and refrain Safety and Health Services, n07, Geneva: 1991, p 2. from exposing themselves and oth ILO, 1967. 19 See D M Akinnusi, Industrial relations ers to life threatening yet avoidable 3 Peter Blunt and Deji Popoola, Personnel and the development of SwaZi/and, habits and risks. This requires mass management in Africa, London and New 20 Department of Labour, Annual Report York: Longman, 1985. education and support services at 1992, op cil, P 37. 4 M A El Batawi, "Multiple risks", World grassroots, enterprise and govern 2] The Szuazi Observer, 9 March 1992. Health, November, 1981, pp 2-5. 22 Ibid, 10 October 1994. ment levels. 5 Peter Blunt and Deji Popoola, op cit, 23 A most heart-wrenching, life-long trau III Research into health and safety mat p ]42. matic experience of this sort was when ) 6 S Forssman, "Health in small industries", the author's seventeen-year-old son 0 ters by organizations, labour depart 1 World Health, November, 1981, pp 20-22. Oluwaseun, in his final year at high 0 ment, unions and the mass media is 2 7 Patricia MacFadden, "Women in wage school, was fatally stabbed on 30 July urgently required. As suggested by d labour in Swaziland: A focus on agricul 1993 by a schoolmate, Nikwa DI,lmini. e t Blunt and Popoola,29 technical, ture", South African Labour Bulletin: Nikwa is the son of the then Prime a medical and psychological research Focus on Swaziland, vol 6, no 2, 1982, d Minister of Swaziland, Mr Obed Dlamini. ( is badly needed in Africa. Examples pp 140-166. Nikwa is alleged to be drug addict and is r e of technical research include the 8 M S Matsebula, "Human resources devel a known psychiatric patient. He pleaded h s opment in Swaziland: The role of domes i investigation of the properties and guilty to culpable homicide and the court l tic and foreign sources in the context of a b characteristics of harmful materials, sentenced him to six strokes of the cane. u Basic Needs Approach", paper presented 24 W Dlamini and R Maziya, "HIV sero P the study of machine guards, the at the annual convention of the Swaziland prevalence and associated risk factors in e testing of respiratory masks and so h Institute of Personnel and Training Man TB patients, STD clients and pregnant t on. Medical research covers the agement, Ezulwini, 26 October 1984. Aids Newsletter, y women in Swaziland", b physiological and pathological ef 9 Bonginkosi Sikhondze, "The causes of vol 1, no 1, 1994, pp 7-11. d fects of technological and environ poor industrial relations in Swaziland: 25 Aids Newsletter (Swaziland), vol 2, no 1, e t A historical analysis, 1948-1963", paper 1994, P 2. n mental factors, and the physical a presented at the economic SOCiety of 26 Aids Newsletter (Swaziland), vol 2, no 1, r (bodily) circumstances in which ac g Swaziland forum, 1993. 1994, P 3. cidents are likely to occur. Psycho e 10 Imonite C Imoisili, "Industrial relations Aids Newsletter (Swaziland), vol 2, no 2, c logical research has to assess psy n in the informal sector: Problems and pro 1994, cover page. e chological factors - the effects of c spects", in Tayo Fashoyin (ed), Indus 27 Daily Times of Swaziland, 3 April 1995. i l personality, abilities, aptitudes, and trial relations and African development, 28 Peter Blunt and Deji Popoola, op cit, pp r e so forth on the frequency and nature New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1992, 153-155. d pp 154-166. 29 Ibid. n of accidents. u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 139 ATIRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO Profs} Ma'rx and} Hough outh Africa is emerging from Pacific Rim countries for foreign clirecr "8 isolation into a period o( op- investment. Moreover, foreign investors of Unisa 's Depanment of porrunilY" - Soulb Afrjcan seem ro be adopting <1 wair-and-see po Business Management President. Nelsoll Mandela. sition. (hat is. wailing to see what other surveyed a number of big investors do and whar happens to foreign misSions to find out J: is widely believed that Sourh Africa the determinants of foreign investment wi!; become the economic engine of the in Sourh A(rica. Some investors have whether they consider Southern Afnc<1n region. But, desrite even labelled foreign investment in South Africa to be an opportunities (or investment in and South Africa as "hugely po.';(ponable".l attractiue investment (rade with South Africa, many inrerna In a(rempting to ascertain what fac tional investors are carefully considering tors would make South Africa <1 more ar prospect, Ibeir responses their options. South Africa is comret:ng, tr ) equity guidel:nes, employment of ex 0 1 p;nriates a[1 (' exchange control 0 2 • infrastructure d e t • labour mauers a d • banking and finance ( r • public service bureaucracy e h • loc;ll business environment s i l • quality of life (medical facilities, hous b u ing, safety and security) P e h t With the above invesrment facrors in y minci, we sought to elicit and eva luate b d the perceptions of foreign (trade) rep e t resentatives regarding the political, eco n a nomic g Africa, This article examines the resulrs e c of Ollr evaluarion. n e c i l r Study design and methodology e d The survey was conducred during Janu n u ary and February 1995 among 86 foreign y representatives/ missions represented in a w South Africa, These (trade) representa e t tives are the first "links" between foreign a G investors and South Africa, Their objec t e tives are, inter alia, to promote trade be n i tween counrries and to inform foreign b a investors (usually) from rheir own coun S rries abour economic, poli[ical, techno y b logical and social issues in [he host d e counrry (in this case South Africa), c u d o r p e R 140 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 • lea The South African case ...... 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"" "'" ,...,_ ..,...... ,-" ..-. " e 01 _.~ ,_., ...... ,.p ...... 0 ...... _" '" ..._ ...... 0/1 .. _ "'- ""'.. _" n - i """ .• h __ , ...... - b """"~ .., ....., ..... a ...... """" . -.",...... _£1' • ... S ,..... ,00"1,-._ ..... -..w...... _..... _ ' --, ...... y d .... ".. IL ...... '"""'_ U_. ___ .... WI' ._ - b ..' "--"'...... "".. d : .. _ '" ',to... " , <_ .... __ ... _ ...s,..,...... _ . ... . """"..... J _ """ ___ d e c ...... ,...,. .... -"...... , <-. - - u ...... po""""'" ...... _ _- d o r p e R ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO AFRICA: THE SA CASE favourably and courteously. Govern that much has still to be done to pro investment", paper delivered at the E B M ment policy on capital transfers to the duce higher quality products. Research Conference, November 1994, investor's home country, foreign fi held at the Rand Afrikaans University, nancing of staff salaries, foreign ex Johannesburg. change control and import protection Conclusion 2 J Jegatesan, "The best of all possible worlds for investment", Business Times, are factors that affect international Investment in South Africa will in 7 November 1993, p 6. business. The attitude towards over crease significantly only once the fac 3 S Lunsche, "Confident South Africa ditch seas investors may be improved by in tors not conducive to investment have es its financial rand", Business Times, 12 troducing tax incentives and by relax been addressed to the satisfaction of March 1995, p 1. ing foreign exchange control measures. potential foreign investors. 4 Investor confidence was jolted at the Government has shown a will May 1996 World Economic Forum by Government policies ingness to tackle thorny economic Cosatu's disabling influence on govern Foreign missions awarded a mode problems and to restructure the South ment (Financidl Mail, 31 May 1996, p value of 5 to this factor. African economy to make it more "in 36). The reason for this uncertainty is The South African government's vestor friendly". Ideology has no place that the ANC has capitulated to Cosatu policies are aimed at improving the in the world of foreign investment and on the increase in the Vat rate, three clauses in the Constitution and on priva quality of life for all its citizens. To it is the South African government's re tization in the past. this end it has embarked on various sponsibility to create the right envi 5 D Rodney, "Serious crime - A lifestyle", policies, for example, the Reconstruc ronment for foreign investment and in Pretoria News, 26 January 1995, p 1. tion and Development Programme ternational business alliances in such a 6 A Hadland, "Troops and extra police de (RDP), affirmative action and black way that perceptions will change from ployed ro crack down on violem crime", empowerment. In terms of the RDP, "investment in South Africa is hugely Business Day, 28 February 1995, p 1. The the water supply to deprived commu postponable" (0 "investment in South perception that governmem has faileel to nities will be improved and low-cost Africa will add value to our business". satisfy business on crime, violence, so housing erected for the homeless, thus It is, however, not the exclusive cial order and creation of an environ opening up opportunities in the con responsibility of government to create ment conducive to job creation through struction industry. a climate that is conducive to foreign business activity (Business Day, 29 May investment. 1996, p 3) might be one of the reasons why foreign representatives view this Economic performance Labour unions will have to con area as highly unsatisfactory for promot Foreign missions awarded a mode tribute by tempering their demands ing foreign investment in South Africa. ) 0 value of 5 to this factor. for higher salaries and by playing a 7 D O'Flaherty and T Lukens, "Stability 1 0 South Africa had a gross domes constructive role in worker forums, as crucial to US investors' view of South 2 tic product (GDP) of $120 billion in envisaged by the proposed new la Africa", Business Day, 14 February 1995, d e 1994 and the highest GDP per capita in bour legislation. p 5. t a Southern Africa. In 1994 the GDP rose The management of South Afri 8 J de Jager, When the going gets tough. d ( by 2,3%, the first increase since 1988. can companies will have to ensure in Exporting South Africa, Supplement to r e South Africa's foreign debt in the year creased productivity and better quali Business Day, Ocrober 1994. h s 9 Jan Visser of the National Productivity i to March 1995 was 15% of GDP, while ty products. A participative manage l Institute is less technical in his assess b its national savings rate was 17,5% of ment style may enable both manage u ment. He said, "The region's productivi P GDP. The World Bank is nevertheless ment and labour to accomplish this. ty stinks" (Business Report, 28 May 1996). e of the opinion that the South African South Africa is viewed as a coun h 10 J Woods, "Foreigners taxed too heavily", t economy can grow at a sustainable 5% try with investment potential. Foreign Business Times,S February 1995, p 1. y 16 b per year. missions recommend investment in 11 D Tommey, "Message that South Africa is d Presently, 50% of South Africans South Africa, but require that South ready for business", e The Pretoria News t do not have formal jobs. To alleviate o Africa relax monetary restrictions, tem Business Report, n 1995, p 4. a this problem requires a savings rate of per labour demands, improve safety 12 G Steyn and M Soggot, "Stals raises bank r g 22%. Encouragingly, domestic invest and security, increase productivity, rale from today", Busilless Day, 21 e c ment rose by 7% in real terms during and maintain political stability, supply February 1995, p 1. n 13 L Carlisle, "In mineral reserves we're still e 1994/1995. However, South Africa information on investment opportuni c i tops", hxporting South Africa, Supple l needs foreign investment, entrepre ty, free regional trade and involve the r ment to Business Day, October 1994. e neurship and an increase in savings if it private sector in the expansion of af d 14 A Edwards. "Lack of beneficial goods", wants to sustain its economic growth. fordable infrastructure. n Exporting South Africa, Supplement to u Business Day, October 1994. y The quality o/South African products a 15 C Sunter, The world and SoUlh Africa in w Foreign missions awarded a mode Notes and references the 1990s, Cape Town: Human and e t value of 5 to this factor. It is clear that a J S van der Walt, "The prospects for for Rousseau, 1987. G South Africa's products are not always eign direct investment in South Africa 16 Economist, Survey: South Africa, '20-26 t e up to the international standard, and with special reference to foreign direct May 1995, pp 9-10. n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 145 J ert among blacks in the Vaal Triangle measured in terms of income indicators T J C Slabbert, J D van Wyk, Background Research methodology M Levin and W Coetzee overty in South Africa has a The research for this article was done with the aid of questionnaires in 1991 of Vista University examine strong racial dimension. A recent study by the World and 1994. Maps of the townships listed the incidence ofpoverty in Bank I shows that nearly 95% in Table 1 were obtained and a sample the Vaal Triangle, of South Africa's poor are stratification based on the geographical black,P 5% coloured and less than 1% distribution and concentration of peo measured in terms of are Asian or white. This article, there ple in the areas was designed. The var income indicators. fore, concentrates on blacks only. It is ious townships were divided into zones a case study of blacks residing in the and questionnaires were apportioned townships of the Vaal Triangle (VT). on a basis of approximately one ques tionnaire for every 164 inhabited sites. Geographical area and population A total of 303 and 309 questionnaires The Vaal Triangle is that area of inte were completed in 1991 and 1994 re grated economic cohesion and interde spectively, and on each occasion ap pendence that at the time of the study proximately 0,23% of the households in was under the jurisdiction of the Lekoa the area were covered. ) 0 Vaal Metropolitan Council, the Sasolburg About sixteen field workers were 1 0 (Transitional) Local Council and the deployed in each of the surveys. The ini 2 Deneysville-Refenkgotso Coordinating tial training was group-based, but some d e individuals received additional training. t Committee. Although Sasolburg and a Deneysville-Refenkgotso are located A research assistant was also available to d ( in the Free State and the Lekoa Vaal help solve problems encountered. The r e Metropolitan Area in the southern part of questionnaires were completed from 12 h s i Gauteng, these areas form an integral September to 31 October 1991 and from l b part of an economy that cannot be sep 15 January to 15 March 1994. On receiv u P arated by political boundaries. People ing the questionnaires from the field e who stay in Sasolburg, for example, workers, supervisors made spot checks h t work, shop or search for jobs in the on a random basis. Very few errors were y b Lekoa Vaal Metropolitan Area and vice found in the checked questionnaires. d versa. Poverty in the VT can be studied Dwellings (houses and shacks) at e t meaningfully only if all the relevant which field workers were to complete n a townships are included. (Table 1 gives a questionnaires were chosen individual r g summary of the population of the area.)2 ly from maps. In cases where the e c n e c i l TABLE 1 Estimated population of the black townships of the VT (1994) r e Estimated d Local authority Township Subtotal n population 1994 u y Western Vaal Metropolitan Sebokeng a 268133 346333 w Substructure Bophelong 48287 e t Boipatong 29913 a G t Vereeniging Kopanong Sharpeville 105046 329208 e n Metropolitan Substructure Evaton 224 162 i b a Deneysville-Refenkgotso Refenkgotso 9363 64651 S S'lsolburg Local Council Zamdela 55288 y b d Vaal Triangle TOTAL 740192 740 192 e c u d o r p e R 146 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e breadwinner (or the spouse) was not health, lirer e door households was inrerviewed, focuses only on income indicarors. In h t come indicarors are analysed in such a y way Definition and measurement d subde elements of poveny, Methods of e of poverty t analysis that are more sensitive than n a For (he purpose of this article. poverty rhose commonly used are employed to r g describe the extent and mtlgni[ude of is defined as the mability to attain a e c minimal standard oj living.) The stan poveny, n e dard of living is USlla Ily expressed in The more common merhods which c i l (~rms of households' income and ex use income as a yardstick to measure r pe.:1uirures; and is derermined by the in poveny are: comparing a household's e d come necessary to buy a quantity of income with a poverty line income n u goods thaI is sufficiently nurrition,lI (0 ( Household Subsistence Level (HSL) or y ensure survival. Poveny is rhus a stale Poveny Datum Line (POl) in South a w of conrinuous deprivation of basic nu Africa); the dependency nllio; [he head e t tri(ion;)1 and personal essenrials owing counr index; the poveI1y gap index; (he a G to insufficienl income as measured income distribution below Ihe pOVerty t e againsl the average consumption of the line, and [he concept of dominance. n i (otal communiry. b Household income compared to a A proper poveny profile should. S in fact. address all dimensions of pover the HSL y b ry, nor simply income and expenditure, The most frequently used method of d e bur also other aspects of welfare such as measuring poveny involves comparing a c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 147 J ' .... n ...... 0111 .. '"I UOL .. "II" • • • • • ....." ..... • • • • • .- .- --,-- . .. "', .... ,....,. ___.... _Iow ...... ""~_~ ) , 0 ...... 1 ,,"01,_",,-~---, ___ , ...... 0 ...... - __ 01_."',__ ,,,.- 2 - ~-< -~, d " e _ ... 01 ..., to...... 7 t ---"' ...... 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"'_ _ ' 991 " _ ...... , b u P """",.... _ ,. ,o. "1>..,,,. .. -- e h ~- t ...... - ...... y - .. - b _- d 1>0: • 4/ ..... e t 0... 01 "" 01 __ .. ... n <._ a ..... _01$00<_ ~, ...... t. .., r g e c n e T...... 0:0-<14.".-. .ogl ''''''liii04 c i l . ~ .~ r e • • d •• • .., n u - .-II,' .- ~ y .. l·U • p, a • ~ w • ~ e - t • a , .. .. ".. •• '" G ~ . ,. •• '. lOr' t .. • e 1-", U n i H. " " b a 1->,' " " " S " • " " y " U" b • " " ~ d " e c =. .. u -. d o - r p e R L '.. '''''''.~ """ ...... ,- ..... " ..... ",ACOI " ' II . .. , ..... UI ._. .1.'_' .... r ,-~ .... -,• • , ----... _... • , ..~,.,.". ..t.Q ..", - ...... , r", 1991 . ... , 99-; ,o.. '01 00 ...... J< .... ) ....fO' ~ ...... "''''''''' .., ""0' _ ...... " ... , ,,'" ',<' « OOu "," <), _,...,.. "" ...... ' .. ' 9111 to..., .. ]99<. _ ...... _ 0/ ...... , ""''''''' ,_ .... '.10" __ ...... -.~ -... ,,,,. """'- ...... ,- n."'O ',il . ... ,r ,_ ~) ... e 'l .-~ " .....J, -..... bro.... t ...-... ,...... , ... a _- ...... To .--""""""' ...... " •• d l'hoo ( /t" , ' ... "... _, CO, ,' .... _._ ..... ~ .... __...... l<00I0,,,, ~ .. r .. ---".--- e - ...--. .- '1< ''''' I (OIWI' _ ...... h _...... >< ...... __ '" .. " 0' :".", ''''' _ _ s i ...... "" ...... """ popoo e ,,,. _ _ • , .. " "" ,,,...... d h """"' " ,"' .", - .. ,'" -,. ""'.-< ...... - t .... 1>L e ,", t .. 1 ..... __.01_1 .. , d." 1ft ...... "" n __ l ,,,.... ,,., __ __ -" __ • d ddOUU .. .. _-, _ ..... In _ a <>-,"' _--' r g ... -..- .. JM, /', ...... """ e c n TI..... , ,""",,\IOI>Ud ' .. e --~~""''".-- 'IiIi'.., '_ c i " ••,, ""' ...... lor ___...... l _ "" ...... -_ 01"" r , -.... _ ...... 1__ - e ...... "" ...... _- d - <>to no ___-_ (_ "'" ,- , • (' n _"0 ) _ ...... 4· -._ • u y __ "' __"1' • a --- - ~ w 10 ... =, ...... _ ... ' •• e '" t ...... ' __ ... ..,. , II '" -"'" a ,., G 1 ... - - .. _ ..."...... .... , ~ ", ,., ,., ••~ t e " ' ". n "'" , .""",""' "- i T_;._·' ... ~ , - " b a ,..... _w_. , _...... "" "' ....,... 01 ,99' ..... OW< '" 0> , ...... __ S - ~_. _~ , ..&0 ...... IlIlAH ...... d "". y . . _.. __ , h._ ...... b cu ... _.oooI .. ____ ""'"'" d .d.. " '" '_ ...... , ...._ IJ ...... e c -- _- u d o r p e R I I POVERTY AMONG BLACKS IN THE VAAL TRIANGLE TABLE 8 Frequency distribution of poverty gap indexes for individual poor households: 1991 and 1994 Preq Freq GAl 0Jb Index· 1991 1994 1991 1994 15 1 0-,10 1 5 0,5 2._ 2 ,11-,20 9 13 4.9 ;.7 t 3 ,21-,30 16 16 8,8 7.0 C 4 31-,40 23 15 12,6 6,6 ~ 5 .41-.50 18 26 9,9 11.4 l. 6 ,51-,60 29 31 15,9 13.'5 7 ,61-,70 31 43 17,0 18.8 8 .71-,SO 17 26 9,3 11.4 9 .81-.90 20 30 11.0 13,1 LO ,91-.99 18 24 9,9 10,5 3 4 5 6 7 a Poverty gap Index categories TOTAL 182 229 100.0 100,0 _ 1991 _1994 "A larS'!r value or rhe Index indk~les onore ~v~re or deeper povcnl'. column 0», according to the number Ihe normal method is used. In fact, Ihe In table 8, rows 710 10 show thar of individuals. Iheir age and gender, in indexes are respectively 18,88% and in 1991 a greater percentage of house each household. The HSLlH for each 1253% higher. holds were in exlreme poverty com household is then divided by its own pared lO 1991. Some 53,8% of the household size to find ils own per Poverty gap index poor households had a poverty gap capita HSUH in column (4). The The extent of poverly is measured by between 0.61 and 0.99 in 1994 com HSLIH for earner and dependent(s) in calcula(ing the poverly gap index and pared to only 47,2% in 1991. column (5) is then calculated by lak income distribution below the pover ing the per capita HSU H for each in ry line. respectively. ) Income distribution below the 0 dividual household and mulliplying it The method Ihal was used to cal 1 by the dependency ralio of lhe spe poverty line 0 culate the poveny gap of each indi 2 cific household plus one (DRAlH + 1). vidual household is shown in rable 7. The severity of pOVerty depends on d e Column (6) then shows Ihe number To calculare (he poverty gap for an in how the poor are distributed below t a of income earners earning an income dividual household, (he total income Ihe poverty line income. Clustering of d ( less than the amount delermined in of each individu3\ household (1) is Ihe poor immedialely below the line is r e column (5). In olher words, poor in subtracted from irs own HSLlH for less serious Ihan a c/uslering far below h s come earners are those who receive lhe line. In (able 3 the income of evely i earner and dependents (column (2», l b e column (6). (hen divided by the amount of column households with an income of less h t The poor headcounl in column (2). In column (3) [he mean povert}' rhan their individual HSL, are analysed y (7) is then calculated by multiplying gap index of all the poor households further. b d Ihe number of poor income earners is given. Il shows Ihe frequencies and e t (6) by the mean of the dependency ra This method does not only give percentages of households that fell n a lios of all households (2). This ratio is a good indication of the deplh of wilhin specific income/ HSl brackets, r g based on the mean of individual poveny, bUI also caplures the severi ie 0% lO 10%; 11% (020%; elC in 1991 e c households (DRAfH). The headcounr lY of poverty, giving a resul( which and 1994 respectively. II shows that n e index of poverty (8) is (hen calculal also shows Ihe disrribution of poveny Ihe number and percentage of house c i l ed by dividing lhe poor headcount by (see table 8). The larger the value, the holds (hal fell in Ihe lower brackets r (he sample populalion (1) and by mul larger is the gap between the povere}' e (indicating more severe poverty) had d liplying it by 100. line income and rhe income of lhe increased since 1991. For insrance, in n u Table 6 shows that rhe samples' poor household, indicating a greater 1994 some 4 0.1%) households had y poor headcounr for was depth of poverty. The mean of the in a 1991 656,84, an income/HSL ratio in the 0-10% w and 886,46 for 1994, compared to dividual povel'ly gaps can then be brackel. In 1991, only 2 (2,1 %) house e t 552,64 and 787,71 calculaled with me laken as a measure to express the holds, were in Ihis bracker. In fact lhe a G usual method (method 1). The poverty deplh of poverty in general. last column of lable 9 shows a signif t e index for 1991 was 39,17 and for 1994 In these terms the overall pover icanl (rend of movement to the lower n i il was 52,36, compared to 32,95 and ty gap was 0,58 in 1991 and 0.60 in income/HSl brackets (more severe b a 46,53 when calculated with melhod 1. 1994. This means that [he gap between poverty) in 1994 as opposed to 1991. S A larger ponion of the roeal populalion the HSUH for earner and dependents Approached from a different y b can be regarded as poor when the and (he tOlal income received by lhe viewpOint, individual income earners d e more sensitive melhod is used (Q when household increased since 1991. and their dependents, ralher than c u d o r p e R I 152 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 ..... " ..... u"u ,. TI ...., .. " .... , ..... _,.... • ...... ,.. ~ ..... fa- l!i111"'" 1lIII0 • :I • • _. , ~ ,~ , - .. -'", ' - ," ' , ,,~•• ,• '.' , ".,. ,• , " ~" • ,,~ " ,,~ • " " • ,,~ • .," '" .~. " , ,- .," • .-tH. "• " "" .... , ".<'On ...... _0, -...... ,_. «\4""'- ,J ,'" ,""""'" '-" _" ,.0<01 '...... ,,,,* '0' PO"'" '-..,..- '" """'""" y> ) ' ,~ , , "" ,"-- , c-o .... «I """"""" 1'1'>1 .... 0 ...... _ ...... """ ...... 1 -.."", , " ","" .. '"'" 0 .. -"" ...... ,...... ,.-...... "" .. 2 ,,., ..... ,...... """,,', Coo_ •• ___,"' -n..,_-=-_. ... _ .... __0( - -"'.,..... - d .. , ... ~ ...... ,«I .." .... 'f ... _ -... _"""' _ e t c-." _ ~ _ .-"'.... _n.... __ 01--.-. a d ...... 0( ""'" ...-...... ( .... "" c." .... '" "")'""..,R ...... \IT" U "'" ...... " ."" • r --.---.-,.,.....,,""" ""'-, ... : ,..,oI'.!M_.n,..._ e ...... h -,,_ s _-, ...... ~, " i "'''''' ,", ,,, '"""' ...... """',",. "'" """'" ... l ..... "" ...... _,,~ W; t L'" ""'"""" 'r>' , "'"... ,.." " b -' -... ,..,. ... ""'" Ooo, ~~ u _. p"', " " "" ...... ,' too ...... ,'" ,""""...... "..,.,. .,. "".., P an ."""""N f>'>"""Y ,,'" ,"'''''"' ... q...".,. ~ -, e ""Q ._..... _."" ", ...... ,,~ .- h --, «I .....,,"', ""'.... , ...... ' ...... ~,~ ..... ' ...... '- ' M ~'''*' t ... -- y "''''''''''- '''' -- b d e t .....,. r l!i111"" ,_ ... g e c , n e ...... • ,~ c • i l '", '"' r , , , e - - .- u d , •• - n " • '.' u , u ...... " " y , n" 11•• .. U a ,,- " w " n.' e t • ".",, ~ " • .. ,,,, a • ,,~ G , " " 'u t , '" e ,,- " n • " i " "... b • '" , a " • '" '" S .. • • , , •• .. .. y ,~ ..... _ w ~ .. b _ -- =. "- _. d , ,- _.- e _._, c u ,'---- d o r p e R I "" ...... '..... ",,-," I ... IIU . " ... ' ""II '" TIl U .. U UU .. , ...... _,._01 ..., •• ", ... _,._ ,Il0l, .... ".... _.-01_._ .. - .. , ,~ ,.,...... _, "- .... Goo _"'"" w" '.7_ .. 19')' " , , • " , , 0 .. ,_...... 0._7 .. '99'1 'n_ '. 0 __ "","' .... <11 ____ .... ~ ""'" .... c.n. ,odI'u .. .. 2 ... _100 .. _ ·_...... _ _-_.-- d '_'''' ., 1 .. P'<-'_ "'_ ...... ' ..... e __ ...... '4 ..... _ . ... A ...... ,.. .. __ il _ ... _ ...... cd ... t a 01--~"'D • .....- • .,. ..,' .... '-' ...0 '''''_ __ '" __ ... ""'" no. d __ .... ( r"" ....,.,.." ...... r '"'* "" .... --...... _ ., ,p h "., _ ...... f_,'" """ . -_.- -._ s i ,,'-' ' .... ~ , ...... ,.,.. -.J _ .. ',.... """',...... of tIK .. l ...... _"'" 01 .""""" • ...,...... ,. '" ""' b _ ...... 01 ....,.,....,...... , ...... ""- ,I>< ",I><, , 0\< '" ,,... _ G.. u ",..-r~ -- ..'" '" "'". P roo,,",' , ..". _ ...... " .. " .... 0."'" ,991 _ ",,,,,,,, IU"of ,i'o< """ ,,, ... 01,,,,,.- _ e .",,,,,,,, _ G .. ...-~ ..... _. h '_"' .. 0 .... ;. ' .... """ ... _ • t ..... '- ,h. '''''' '" ...." ',,, ..... y .- '" ~ ""' ""' ...... , b ...... ,...,--- ...- "'" "".,. .. _-- "...--- d _ ...... ,10<,_ .. _ ...... -~ e --- t ""-' _-...... ".,~---.,-.... n ...... " .... '_ ...,_01 .. -" ...... a _ _· d ..... """",01 .._ ..__ ..• - _ r _-_ -_ ...... "" .... ~,_ "" PO"'''' ,_ g _. __ e c n e c i l r ... 01 __ e d n u y -- a -•- -- w ,. e • t a '. ,~•• G • t • e n • ". i b • no a S ~, • y • - b ~ d • e c .. u d o - r p e R 1 POVERTY AMONG BLACKS IN THE VAAL TRIANGLE blacks increased in the VT from 1991 Planning Research, 1994, p 69. Elizabeth: Employment Research Unit, to 1994. In as much as the poverty 6 J F Potgieter, Background and interpre 1993, p 11. amongst the black metropolitan pop tatian ... , ap cit, p 7. 15 World Bank, Paverty reductian hand ulation of the VT can be regarded as 7 T J C Slabbert, M Levin and W Coetzee, baak, Washington DC: World Bank, Profile af emplayed and unemployed a proxy of poverty among blacks in 1993. blacks in the Vaal Triangle Camplex: 16 M P Todaro, Ecanamic develapment in other metropolitan areas, stimulating March 1994, Research Report no 53, the Third Warld, C3 ed), New York: the economy is an urgent priority. Vanderbijlpark: Employment Research Longman, 1985, p 144. Unit, 1994, p 12. 17 T J C Siabbert, D Van wyk, M Levin and 8 T J C Siabbert and M Levin, "Black W Coetzee, Paverty prq/ile af black hause References households in the Vaal Triangle in eco halds in the Vaal Triangle Camplex: World Bank, Key indicatars afpaverty in nomic perspective", A/rica Insight, vol March 1994, Research Report no 59, Sauth A/rica, an analysis prepared for 24, no 2, 1994, P 154. Vanderbijlpark: Employment, Research the Office of the Reconstruction and 9 T J C Siabbert, M Levin and W Coetzee, Unit, ]995, p ]9. Development Programme, Johannes Incame and expenditure pallerns: Black 18 M P Todaro, ap cit, pp 145-147. burg: RDP office, 1995, p 2. hausehalds afthe Vaal Triangle Camplex: 19 T J C Siabbert, D Van wyk, M Levin and 2 Regional Development Association Re july 1994, Research Report no 52, W Coetzee, ap cit, p 20. port, Vaalrivierkampleks antwikkelings Vanderbijlpark: Employment Research vaal'stelle, Vereeniging, Regional Develop Unit, 1994, p 15. Further recommended reading ment Association, 1990. (Adapted for 10 Ibid, P 11. H Mashabela, Tawnships aJ the PWV; Johan 1994.) 11 J F Potgieter, Hausehald Subsistence Level nesburg: South African Institute' of Race 3 World Bank, Warld develapment repart: ... , ap cit, p 69. Relations, 1988. Paverty, Washington DC: Oxford Uni 12 T J C Siabbert, M Levin and W Coetzee, B Ismail, T N Sofisa and M Levin, 77.Je un versity Press, 1990, p 26. The unemplayment rate af blacks in the emplayment rate a/hlacks in the Pal1 Elizabeth 4 J F Potgieter, Background and interpre Vaal Triangle Camplex: March 1994, metropalitan area, Research Report no 45, Port tatian q/the Hausehald Suhsistence Level, Research Report no 46, Vanderbijlpark: Elizabeth: Employment Research Unit, 1995. Port Elizabeth: Institute for Planning Re Employment Research Unit, 1994, p 23. T J C Siabbert and M Levin, Tbe unem search, Undated, p 4. 13 Ihid, p 12. ployment rate of h/cicks in the Vaal Triangle 5 J F Potgieter, Hausehald Subsistence Level 14 M Levin and T N Sofisa, A paverty proji"le Complex: Octaber /991, Research Report no in the majar centres q/ the RSA, Fact af the Part Elizabetb/UitenhageiKirkwaad 34, Port Elizabeth: Employment Research Paper no 96, Port Elizabeth: Institute for regian, Research Report no 41, Port Unit, 1992. ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 155 J uri• t • Dr,,;, f,,,,. f"dlou, ~j ,be .l ,,~ ~"' «0- ".... "'''''''''' """" ,.... " '''' .. """"'" "'""" ;. "/rica f"''''' ''~, has """, < 0 0\1lIO ",-.01_- d.,_ ...~ ...... w ...... "'" .nd 1 0 r...n ..... _ ••• ".__ ...... _" .. """"n _ ... _ 2 d ...... ~- ...- ~ "-'- e _._.,.- ...... __ fill t '''r.· _. r. __ a ...... ,\100 In ,0\1'< _,"' ...... d ( --...... ""_ Ow ... '-'" '" .... "'" ,... ,'!9'0 ...... _ r ...... _.... ,.,.., or_. _...... e _ ~ .~ h "..., ,.,."",.,.,.."''''•• uoo., ... , .... 10 ...." ...... , ...... "' .. s i l •.u to_" /'J. ~ (!'" ,6 "","'nn' '''' .. 'Il< .... '""'_,,,.,., (."') d b ~ ..,_ ",," "" """... ,..... I""" u w_ " .,.><> ocroun ...... """ '.'" P 01 .." .... ., lJ "'''"'''''' ,," ~"""~ "'~ ~"" e ...... ''''''''' ... ,...... , ""'" .u,.. , .... 10 ~ """"',~, ' h ~- "'"'"'-' t "'" ...... ,. .... '" _' ~ _from..,_ ..... y '.. ... b .... "" ., ...-, ...... ~ "-to" "'_ ...... -' (_,'- ., .,...... Ah".-..... d __ fit< """'" _ - e aJ..,_ .. t ...... -' "'I' ,_" _'... n ...... _"..... - ,)<' ""' ...... -.. ... - a r u."".___ ...... _ ...... _ _6:,,,01. «"'_ ...... ,•. g of .... ,._ •., .... _.~·.nI...,.,_' e .... _.MOOI ...... · .. .. c ""...... _ ••cr .... __ d' .... ' ... n e _.a." ....., ...... c .....· .• ,...... ,_uoo ...... i """', 'e ...... "'_...... l a '" "" _ ...... ,...... r ...... e _ _ _- _ ._,...., ...... 01 ..... ',... d .... -...... n .. -- u .,.., "'" .,.,.... "'" '" , ...... y •. "~"""""'- a '" ---.""..;.""' ...... -.J ..... ""...... ",...-J .. ""'" , , w e ",,,b Hod '"'" t " .... ,.,,,,,'1, "",,,,"" a "'~~"'''' G ".....""' ""'","'" .... _"" d ...... , .._ " . _ , .... t e ~"".,,~, n ...... ,.... '" i ...... -,~ b "'"'" a .__ . _,...".. S ,._..- ...... y A .. U _...... __ -...... b ",",,,,, __ f""", _ '" _ ...... - d ~- - e ...... - , .....n .....'-'" .. a.- _ ..... c ...... -- ...... _...... u _ d o r p e R EAST AfR ICAN TOURI ST TREND S Kenya-s tOurist industry sOH(-d aft er indepen denc~ In 1963 when :u ri vals w ere 11 0200 and r ect:ipI ~ $25,2 million. Dunng the ! 970s the number continued to grow by an average of 12% 0 on the 1990 figu re, Recei pts fell in sym· velopment Plan 1989-93 It Indi<':,lled 1 0 pa thy by $26 million at a time w hen alarm at the growth of mass touri~m. ie 2 to urism wa s urgently needed to off:.el tile exp ment in both arrivals and receiptS wa ,~ v:mce to ov<.'rseas operators. AI the r e regIstered but the 867 000 \'is itor ,~ in same time Ihey Clused parks and beadl· h s i that yea r hardly matched the I 183 mil· es to be crowded out, thus threatening l b lion predicted for 1993 in the Na tional the vely resources uron which Ihe in· u P Development PI:ln 1989-93. Recenl e,~ dustry feeds, '"Tourism kills lou I'ism" in e timates, taking into account some StIlt these d rcumstance:-- and destroys the h t negative per<:eptions of the country, see charm and enjoyment of those :UC3S that y b ea rnings recovering gemly to $510 mil· tourists :.eek The government, in as:.o· d lion in 1997 after declining in 1995 :lnd ciatlon w ith the WIldlife Servil'e, aims e t a further dechne surmL"ed in 1996 7 to Rive less encouragement to package n a It is dear Ih:1( Sou th Africa, since tours and to maximize foreign extha nge r g its ch:mge in pOlitil" e ber from the 785000 which alone en launched a he<.lch ma nagement pro· d tcred South Afnca's leoding airpons of gramme in 1995 to counter cTlme and to n u Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. offset d:lJll:l,tle to the coastal eOlnron· y a Arrivals at these airports in 1995 in menr. It IS diversifying its tOl,lriSt re w creased by 42,3% to 1, 117 million w ith sources by promot ing deep-sea fiShing. e t a earnings ri:;i ng to S 1,6 billion. Estimatcs scuba diving and foot safa ris 'Lnd by en G now put tourists arriving by air at 3 mil couraging domestIC tourism Foreign in t e lion by Ihe yea r 2000, a figure gl'Owing vestment in the indllslly is already con n i steadily further away from Kenya's !>iderable and Lt 1:-- being further encour b a more modest prospects. The lotal num aged by simplifying mvestment proce S y ber of visitors arriving in South Affic:l by dun:'s, ft new international class hotel b road , ra il and all :l irpOrlS was 3,4 million has opened in Na irobi and the airport at d e in 1994 and over 4 million in 199 5.~ Momhasa has be,,",!) modernized,9 c u d o r p e R VOl 26 No 2 1996 AF RI CA INSIGHT 157 EAST AFRICAN TOURIST TRENO S Tanzania 11185 have been sounded of the over-con· T;lnza n i,I '::i rourisl po tential is consider· cenfration on th is route at the expense o f able. lis very poptlbr northern circuit the underdevcio ped SOuth and its Ruah a. 12 includes Mt Kilimanjaro. the Ngoro Mikumi and $elous parks. ngoro crfl ter. the Qlduvai gorge and the Tanzania's tourism tends 10 be a Sercngell p lain:., rich in wildlife, subSidiary of the wdl·developed Ken scenery and the h istory of e .. rl y hu yan industry with visitors arriving m;lin Iy by rO;ld and o n tours emanating fro m mankind_ It.~ beaches rival those of Ken Y;1 policy and an ambitious programme to Dar es Salaa m and rhe upgrading o f the d e <.:h ange the country's image. It estab t isl,md's international airport. Heaclion a lished [he Tourism Boa rd directing pub from Muslim fundamentalislS w ho <.:om d ( licil}' heavily towards Japan and p lained of the IhrClir ro rhe Isla m ic faith r e Southeast Asi:L At the instigalion of [he of the new W Promolio n Cenlre wa.~ esrablished. y Governmem panicip3llon was reduced b Uganda d and confined to providlllg "b,.1sic ncces e During the 19605 tourism was Uganda's t The Kenyan Masai Mara, with its :'i ilies and facilities". In 1996 the World n th ird largesr ea rner o f foreign exchange a unforgettable views of Kilimanjaro, Blmk helped to fund the upgrading of r after coffee ,md Calion, reaching a peak g remains an irre sistible lOurist the tourisl infraslructure. Improvements of 88 630 arrivals ill 1971. [n rhe ensuing e attraction c have been made to aC<':Olll modation in n ine years of rdi Amin's disasrrous nile it n e nat ional parks. road access to rourist c collapsed compleldy. It recovered slo w i l attractions and passenger facilities :H l y ro 27000 arrivllis in 1985 (5% o f r e airports and harbours. An amoull! of Kenya's aITiva!s), 69 000 in 1990 and then d n .5 70 milhon w as G 1 promoted. I t highesL Both are indiCllfions of the coun e Among the fir~ benefits from the try's touriS{ potential :m d the measures n i b new in;ection of capital :Ire the Shemton that h;J ve been {:lken to revive the in a S Howl opened in Dar es $.'1l a;l m in 1995 dustry.liS y :lnd Ihe Serena Group's <.:onst11J ction o f The potential lies in Ugand:l's b three luxuIY lodges and a rented camp d wildlife, including it ~ unique gorilla pop e c along the northern S:l fari circu il. \X/a m - ulation, and in the magnificent mountain u d o r p e R , 58 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 i 996 I tAIT " "CAN IIU"'ST '01 ' " _,..., ... ~ ...... ·"" ...... - ..- ...... -- ~ ...... -. ... _. t ••" ... __ """"" ,",__, ,_ ...... ' hOI, _ ...... ' , , _...... -...... "-" .... • .,.. •. 1oo!I_---_ ...... _'h . ~ _ .., .... ., ...... 0#<-' ~ to,- -...... 51" '4 ...... ' PO''' "'" __..... ,.._ ...... -~"""" .. "". . Co., ~ , .... ,," _ ...... ,..,.... , ~. " .. "'" PO' ,,«I, "'" ""-- ,,,,,," ""'-''' .. ,.... " ,,"'- , ~"" ",", "'"", -"..,. "" ..... ' ,",,,," , '...... , ,"",,, """ ,I>< :/6,'" '" ~_, r, ... " _- - r. ~. ~ • nn" I""" ~ """"""" ...."., ,,.._ ...... ,...... ,.. '''''' .... ~,,- '''' ...... _.. ",.."', ...... _. -..... "... " .. - .~ ...... V-" '" w"" ___ ,,,.,,, -...... ,...... ,...... - . ...._",_ ,0< ",..,.._hM*_. T",,,,,, Ole , .._, "'_ ,"'- ~....to t_ n ,.,.,.. of • .- ""'-- ...... ,,,ock_.. .• --,...... """ '" ...... '" _ ... "'n_ _...... _ _' -... ,,.. ,,,",,,,,,, ...,...... ",_ ","" ""' _ ...... "--K"'""",, ...... -, -_ 0/.,,, ...... " ...... " .,,".. -"'. ., ",,~, ,_. """ ... ","""",,'" of -.c, "n _ ..... ,", .... . -"0...... ' _ ..... "' .. K 0 o _-_ 1 TINo_-...... 0 _ ...... __ k'''" .. 2 ...... d - _- e t , a d ( r e , ~ . ,~ h -'" s • i l b u -- P e ~ .,~ h t ,~. '- ~ "''''''' .. .. y .. "., b .. "' d n.~ .... e t ~~ n ._.'"- ". a U ".' r -.' g ... .. "". e c , n -• e O-• n_ 0,' c .- i l D. ,.- ...... _.' 1 r '", .' e ...... d n .....-- • u ,...... ' " .... H. y 0_. a .. "", ....., e. ... M.' w ".", - '''' .. •• e t a - G t _.- , jjo Q)O e o. n .. i ... .~. I>" .. .~ b - a •• S - - '. y ---_. - b ..,,-,--- d ,---_ e ._--_._----_._--, ...... - ,"-- c .. ,- u d o r p e R r ""' ..... , ,- ..,..,. _ , ' .. I EAST AFR IC AN TOURI ST TREND S so that J[ can IIltervene where the main tenance of sta ndards and damage to the em'ironment IS threatened. The 1990-94 development pla n imposed a limit of 4000 hotel beds at anyone time on the three islands ot Mahe. Praslin and La Digue, with expansion being directed to the outer i :. l a n( Is.~2 In 1995 over 120000 arrivals Wert recorded, 150000 predICted for 1996 and 200 000 for the end of the decade. Government ascribes the increase to the promotional effons of the private sector. Of considerable importance. too. has been the break from a reliance on fo r eign air Gl l'flerS and the establishment of Air Seyehelle:. which now bring.~ to urists directly to the ishlnds from Europe. Afne,) and the Far East. B The Economist Intelligence Unit states that the fu ture of tourism depends upon the policy of the new government elected in 1993. A freer market econo my and greater private investmem is favoured . nwklllg the overa ll prospects of the industry "quite bright"· and its continued rote :IS the country's '"main engine of growth" assured.24 ) Conclusion 0 1 0 On the island of La Digue in the record levels in 1979, rece<;s ion in the The four counTries dealt w ith are obvi 2 Seychelles the pace is relaxed \'('esl. high oil price:. and an anempted ollsly heavily dependent upon tourism d e for their wellbeing But the trends in the t coup cau.sed lOunsm to suffer a -hody a blow- from which it began to recover indust!)' that have been described indl d ( only in the later 1980s.lO To offset the cal<:, how "elastic" a commooi£y it is, sub r e rev('rse the indust!)' W :I:' suhstantially ject to world politica l and economic h s i reformed in 1981 A tounsr board W3S evems beyond the control of African l b established and a liberalized and a pro governments lInd to domestic events, u P motional approach W;l S adopted. This good and bad, of thei r ow n making. e wa s followed by the 1984-89 develop Kenya and Scych.;: lles h m ent plan which gave consider;l ble em ded into a stea dy by unspectacular an y b phasis to the sector. But visitor nu m nual ra te of growth in both arrivals and d her.o; reached over 100 000 for the first earnings. Tanzania and Uganda, by con e t lime only in 1990, fallin!( again to trast. after .some yeMs of ideological and n a r 90000 and 98500 in 1991 and 1992, wilful neglect are r:lpidlr making up for g when the Gulf War hI! the mdust!)1 par lost time.n e c !I('ularly hard. Recovery in 1993 to East Africa has always witne...sed a n e 116000 3rrivais was ,lccompan ied n('v degree of nwlti-dimension tou rism. c i l enheless by a f e whICh further declined in 1994 . Blame some or tI ll of its neighbours. How to d n W;lS bid on an over-v:l lued rupee, over share this r('V ellue more equitably on ;1 u priced package holidays and "" reputa regional blSis without Kenya absorbing y a tion for cha rging 5-s tar prices for 3-st ar the lion's share is " current issue, cer w e servlce ~ Over the period 1985-94 the tainly in Uganda which has ~r el eased t a annual rate of growth in tourists was a new guidelines requiring foreign fimlS to G modest 4.7%. much the same as Ken register I()(.:ally or enter inlo partnership t e ya 's, and the ra te of earnings growth with a IOCHI tour ope r ator~. \X1hile Sout h n i 21 b 9.90-t. Africa is now competing as a destination a Governmenr control o f, and in S for tOllrists, grow ing numbers of South y vcst ment in, the industr), has to some Africans. in turn, are visiting Eas t Africa b cXlent been rela xed and more privale since th e removal of res trictions on their d e 26 c inveslment en~'o u r References 12 C FOO\1II. ' 'Tanl ~ ni3 goes fo r quality·, "'[ricon 8,ui.wss, January. 1995. p '1 0; Tourism nwrkel Inmds. A/rica 1994. A Versi, op cil. p '10 Madrid, Wo rld To urism Organil.anOn. 13 Ec onO ITH SI Inte ll igence UIlI!. TfNu:mli(l, 1995. Cou"t~)' Proftie 1 99~96. p 25: OOyowe, 2 R M Bird, "'T ~)(1I'8 tourism in dcv~lopins " T~nZ 0 9 Afdea ReSi'arch Illilielill. vol 29, no 7. 1992. p 12 181: n){' Couder. Seyc h~ l l es . opcil. p 41 1 P 11006; \"01 32 . no 8. 1995, P 12290: 22 D Venter. "Seychelles, An interview wilh fl· 0 2 S Wright lnd R A POilier, "TOUrism andec() n ~ nce minister Jame~ Michel·. A/rICa d nomic developmem in Afric;l·, TIT11UAJrica fllSlghl, e vol 20, no 2, 1990, P 81. Economist t a FOntm. \"018. no 1. 1991. P 23: I::cotourism Intelligence Unil, Seychel/c5. CO I "II~' d E t hi c~ 1 profits'". A/rican BuSiness. May Profile. ell. ( op p 57 r 1995. pp 36--38. C !'oonit. "Kenya's tourism 23 "Seychelles airlines POSt a profit". AfrielUl e h :It turning point", A/rican BU Siness. 8 ..s ill(.'$5, May 1993. pp '1 - 5: EconOmiSt A fiShing dhow off the Zanzibari s i Count'), coast continues centuries-Iong l December 1m, p 38.' Intelligence Unit, Seycbelles. b 10 A Versi , "Dawn of J new age". AiflccHi Repo,1, lsi q\laner, 1996, p 36. traditions u P Bu$im!SS, NOvember 1994. pp 40- 41. 24 ECOI)omist Imel1i gel1 ce Un it . Seycheiies, e C Arnold, op cil. I) 24. COllniry Profile, op e,t. p S8. h t II Bui/elill. 25 S Wright and R A Poil l('r, op dl, P 16. Africa Researcb \"01 29. no 9, y 1992. P 11007; vo131 , no 8, 199-t P 11&H; 26 EconomiSt Intelligence Unit, Ug(ltldll. b Cowt/')' Report. op cll. p 16. d vol 32. no 10, 1995. P 12364. e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R [ VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRIGA INSIGHT 161 J Regional security IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Dr Denis Venter, Executive rofound structural change in economic and social welfare, and above Director and Head, global society, precipitated by all, inter-communal harmony7 the end of the Cold War, pro This "new thinking" on security goes be Academic Programmes, vides a compelling reason to yond achieving merely an absence of Africa Institute of South rethink the concept of security P- now proven to have been ambiguous war to encompass the pursuit of demo Africa. This is the edited at best. It has often been defined in cracy, sustainable economic develop text of a public lecture terms of a reaction to threats to the ment, social justice, and protection of the environment. In this new thinking, given at the Headquarters state, or to state interests. 1 The conven military force remains a legitimate means of the Organization of tional military definition ossifies it in geopolitical terms as "the spatial exclu of defence against external aggression African Unity, Addis sion of threats,,2 In such circumstances, but is not an acceptable instrument for Ababa, Ethiopia on 30 "state security" or "national security" be conducting foreign policy and for the come mere code words for safeguard settling of disputes. States should, there April 1996. It was also pre fore, mitigate the security dilemma and sented at a conference, ing a political regime and its social elite. Traditionally, security has, almost ex promote regional stability by adopting a defensive military doctrine and posture8 jointly organized by the clusively, involved military issues and threats to the state; but today, in the de This article looks at the sources Department of African of regional insecurity in sub-Saharan Studies, St Petersburg State veloping world, the notion of collective security (in the form of traditional in Africa, at some of the possible mecha nisms for regional security regimes, at ) University and the terstate alliances) rarely offers peace 0 how regional security regimes may be 1 Scient~fic Council for the and security because it is very often 0 institutionalized, and suggests what 2 non-military internal and regional fac Problems of Economic, possible role there is for South Africa in d tors that are of decisive importance - e t Social, Political and the region south of the Sahara. Security a whether they be ecological, ethnic, ir d will be approached from a holistic, ( Cultural Development redentist, or sociaJ.3 r For many people, security is threat human angle and from, essentially, a e of African Countries, South African viewpoint. h s ened more often by the velY government i l Russian Academy of under whose sovereignty they live, ei b u Sciences, Moscow, held in ther through oppressive policies or its P incapacity to sustain a good life for al1. 4 Sources of regional insecurity e St Petersburg from 6 to 8 h t Governments, then, are not the only Over the past six years, the political en May 1996. Under the y agents of security; and this is all the vironment in sub-Saharan Africa has un b general conference title more true if a broad or holistic view of dergone substantial change. Most of the d e t of "Africa: Cultures, security is adopted. Broadening the se major historical conflicts in Southern n curity agenda to include political, eco Africa have been resolved or are in the a r Societies, Languages ", the g nomic, societal and environmental as process of being settled: Namibia has at e presentation was a pects with the military is to accept that tained independence; Cuban and South c n human security is ultimately more im African troops have been withdrawn e contribution to the sub c 5 i portant than the security of the state. from Angola; Mozambique'S Frelimo and l theme, "Political Genesis r Individual security, however, raises a Renamo have signed and implemented e in Africa and Alternatives d wider set of issues concerning human a peace agreement; and South Africa n rights, economic development, and gen has transformed itself into a multiracial u to the State in World y der, in addition to food security, job se democracy. Much of this progress has a History". . curity, resource security, and other as been a direct consequence of the demise w e t sociated matters; and global security rais of the Cold War, which led to the ces a es issues affecting, for example, the sation of superpower contestation on the G 6 t environment. It is therefore clear - as sub-continent, a brief flurry of joint US e n Gowher Rizvi, the South Asian strategist, Soviet efforts to resolve long-standing i b states - that: disputes in southwestern Africa, and a a S more prominent role for the United security no longer ... [canl be considered y Nations in regional and national conflict b exclusively within the military sphere; it is 9 d concerned not only with safeguarding ter resolution. There has been a concomi e c ritorial integrity, but also with political, tant attenuation of ideology as a source u d o r p e R I 162 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 of tension within and among African lsi;\r~d in :he Chobe River on the cOlmrrie.~lo and a bignificlnt movement Bor.<;wnna :)order. and Nigeria'~ claim rowards poliric:!1 pluralism throughour to the Bak:Jssi Peninsula on rhe coast the continenr. As one sUlVeys the broild of northwesrern Cameroon. er region of sub-Saharan Africa. (he pro.:-· • Inequit ) ment was rhrown into turmoil when 0 "Inu-invasion and squ;lHir~g ; pressure 1 Unira rejected the results of the 1992 0 of expl 2 elections; despite numerous peace efforrs declining water resources; and inter d the COlJn(lY rem;! ins poised on :he brink e state disputes over tracle. foreign aid t a of civil war. The newly elec:ed govero and investment. d ( menc of Lesotho was subjec(ed [0 a coup r • The pOlential for racial and lribal con e in 1994, and recm~~mlclion and develop h "liel is likely ro be l cern. especiall)' in countries with her b are threatened by on-going political and erogeneo ll ~ POp ulillions. Recent [)~as u criminal violence. 12 Moreover. the fledg P sacres of Tursis h Rwanda anc. Hurus e ling mulri-party systems in Malawi and h in Burundi are pertinent examples. t Zambia, and the SUSl;\inahil iry of demo y cracy in those countries. have come • Political pluralism may be a source of b conflict in countries such as Swazi d under serioLiS pressure as a result of slug e land or Ug ernment h~s :>lll iI que~lion mark against e thoritarian regimes of a ci\'ilian or c long l(~:'m ~)rospeC[s for democracy in n military nilture are rrying Iheir best to e rhal cOllntry. Swaziland is SI< f~ozen in c i .,molher any semblance of democra l nIlle on the polifiGiI dead-end d a no r ::c practice. Although Z e parry, feucbl monarchy. d Ma:awi have man:Jged to achieve As porential conflict arenas, the n seerr.ingly peaceLJ :~'"nsilion~ from u following musr be nOled: 13 y one p t merged conllicts m;ly resurface. The ::1 Z;1::1bia and Malawi :: ~ ew are signs e n main contlicrs are most likely to in o~ 5:~ess as people strugg:e to accepr i b volve border dbputes or territorial Ihe ethos of democraric pluralism and a S claims, buch at> Lesotho".:- claim to the tolerance. And i( must not be forgo( y conq uered territories in the eastern ren tha[ rapidly declining economies b d Free Stale Pro\'ince of South Africa, constitute yet another pressure on the e c Namihia'S claim to Sidudu/ Kasir VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 163 regional security in sub-saharan africa I Southern Africa (and, indeed, the broader region of sub-Saharan the International Monetary Fund, Africa south of the Sahara) are char Africa, in particular, large-scale inter which tie foreign loans and aid to acterized by certain strategic features14 nal repression has required vast sums prescribed economic and political that compellingly motivate the cre to be spent on defence at the expense reforms, impinge on the indepen ation of a common security regime in, of development and welfare services. dence of states, disadvantage the at least, the sub-region; and also offer The resulting impact on standards of poorest sections of society, and pointers to its agenda and orientation: living has further reduced the security have given rise to food riots and • Virtually all major threats to the of citizens and, in some instances, has other forms of protest. security of the region's peoples and intensified popular resistance against • Regional and national stability are states derive from internal rather the stateY This vicious circle has been undermined by internal political than external factors, although do described thus: and ethnic conflict, unstable civil mestic crises in some of these coun Very often, arms acquisitions by ... military relations (compounded by tries are severe enough to under countries in the interests of security are a proliferation of small arms and mine stability in neighbouring states: made at the apparent cost of primary or large numbers of demobilized sol examples are Angola, Rwanda, Bu basic needs in the area of social and diers who, in a state of destitution, rundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan economic well-being. Given the fragile turn to crime), an absence of ef economic base, which cannot sustain and Somalia. fective governance (leading to au the expenditure on arms, and the equal • The most serious security problems ly fragile political base, which requires thoritarian rule and a disregard for in the region are of a political, eco arms acquisition, self-preservation often human rights, and large numbers nomic; social and environmental dictates a choice of defence over devel of refugees and displaced persons). nature rather than military in origin opment. The non-military threats to • And then there are rampant dis and character. Although these pro security are thus neglected, creating ease, manifested by an Aids pan blems may give rise to violence, further cause for instability 18 demic, and environmental degra leading to the deployment of police dation, arising from human mis and military forces, solutions lie in But there are two further difficulties. management and limited resources socio-economic development and First, there is the difficulty of integrat (and compounded by natural dis the consolidation of fragile democ ing former guerrillas into civilian so asters such as drought). racies: examples are Benin and ciety; thousands of guerrillas who The first half of the 1990s witnessed Lesotho. were demobilized at independence in ) Southern Africa's most severe drought 0 • Certain critical issues (such as re Namibia and Zimbabwe (and, after the 1 in 80 years, threatening several mil 0 fugees and illegal immigrants, en April 1994 elections, in South Africa) 2 lion people with starvation, continu vironmental degradation, the de remain unemployed and have resort d ing civil wars in Angola and Mozam e t pletion of and competition over ed to banditry. This particular problem bique, warlordism and the self-inflict a scarce natural resources, the prolif d raises an especially frightening spectre ( ed break-up of the modern state in eration of small arms, and drug for post-civil war Angola. 19 Second, r Somalia, the free-fall of Liberia and e smuggling) are common to many, there is the difficulty that defence cuts h Sierra Leone into conflictual anarchy, s i if not all, of the region's countries l often lead to lower wages and deteri and human massacres of unimagin b and transcend national boundaries: orating conditions in the armed forces, u able proportions in Rwanda. Here the P examples are the borders between invoking a crisis of morale which, as bases for democratic government, and e Rwanda and Tanzania (refugees), in Ghana and Lesotho, is conducive to h t in some instances even for any kind and between Mozambique and coups or, as in Nigeria and Mozam y of government at all, seem to have b South Africa (illegal immigrants). bique, results in soldiers turning to been so thoroughly undermined that d e • In the absence of external military crime in order to supplement their in t these countries are facing an uncer n threats to individual states, or to the comes. tain and dismal future. These prob a r region as a whole, there is now the If these features are extrapolated g lems are exacerbated by sub-Saharan to the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, it e potential for disarmament (or, at Africa's growing marginalization in in c is clear that the entire region is racked n least, a substantial reduction in de ternational politics and the world e c fence budgets) in order to release by a range of formidable problems for i economy. Africa south of the Sahara l resources for development: for ex which there seem to be no immediate r has never presented an attractive op e ample, the defence budget of South solutions: 2o d portunity for foreign investment, and n Africa fell by as much as 44% in the • Efforts to redress chronic underde the ending of the Cold War has great u period 1989 to 1993, reducing its velopment, and the attendant con y ly diminished what little strategic a share of gross domestic product ditions of poverty, unemployment, value it once had. This situation has w e (GDP) from 4,3% to 2,6%.]5 illiteracy, malnutrition, and inade t been compounded, too, by the emer a quate social services, are inhibited gence of giant trading blocs in North G by staggering balance-of-payments t Disarmament and reduction in defence America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim e deficits, a debilitating debt crisis, a n budgets require further amplification. with which it cannot compete. i b In the Southern African sub-continent, net outflow of capital, and an un This state of affairs leads to some a S favourable international economic pertinent questions: can sub-Saharan the Southern African Development y climate. Africa be considered a group of states b Community (SADC) has resolved to d "free resources from military to pro • The structural adjustment pro (47 in all) forming several security e c ductive development activities" .16 In grammes of the World Bank and communities, where some form of u d o r p e R I 164 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 I regional security in sub-saharan africa I peace is predictable? Is there any pos speed of communication channels ing of the concept of sovereignty); sibility that the region south of the across sub-Saharan Africa are well third, the developing of institutional Sahara will develop in such a way that known. They result from geographi and analytical capacities within state war and the threat of war will be re cal, historical, economic and political and other bureaucracies; fourth, an jected as legitimate or possible instru factors; and they will not be easily expanding and improving transport ments of political power? However overcome. But if we believe that ulti infrastructure and other physical com distant it may seem, is there at least mately the best route to security is munications networks; and last, a the prospect of common securities de through community-building, then moulding of regional identities at both veloping in the region - the sort of one might consider that cheaper trans institutional and symbolic levels. common consciousness which in portation, efficient telecommunica As a beginning, certain admi volves the belief that security has to tions systems, increased cultural ex nistrative and institutional steps could be achieved with others, not against changes and so on should enjoy pri be taken to help accomplish these them? "Common security,,21 does not ority on the broadened security agen goals:26 ignore the fact that international rela da of governments in sub-Saharan • establishing schools of diplomacy 22 tions are characterized by competing Africa. This argument will sound in regional centres, emphasizing national interests and the risk of hos strange to those for whom security training in peace-making, conflict tilities. It seeks to minimize these risks equals defence equals military might. resolution, mediation, conciliation, by creating an environment in which But it is another way of thinking about arbitration, and sustainable devel disputes can be prevented through minimizing the dangers of insecurity. opment; early-warning mechanisms or be re • recasting military and police train solved without resort to force; and it The mechanics of a regional ing through region-specific military recognizes the interdependence of and police academies; states by engaging in joint problem security regime • formulating a new legal basis for solving, by developing collaborative The widely held expectation that environmental protection and sus programmes on security issues, and South Africa will become the econom tainable development, and launch by utilizing the potential for political ic engine not only of Southern Africa ing initiatives in these areas with and military cooperation (building but also of sub-Saharan Africa may be non-governmental organizations; military confidence and stability disappointed, partly because the post through disarmament and transparen apartheid state has to generate wealth • building a peace-making, monitor ing and peace-keeping capability, as ) cy on defence matters, and negotiat by external economic activities in 0 well as a conflict prevention, man 1 ing multilateral security agreements). areas as far removed as Western and 0 The acid test of a security com Eastern Europe, the Middle East and agement and resolution capacity,27 2 by utilizing the technical skills and d munity is whether or not the units tar the Pacific Rim. Nevertheless, existing e t get each other in a military sense. To regional economic organizations and political legitimacy of the United a Nations (UN) and the Common d what extent does Southern Africa meet relationships seem to provide relative ( wealth (although the Organization r these criteria? In the past, because of ly favourable conditions for the em e of African Unity (OAU) seems in h the offensive strategy employed by pirical development of mutually ad s i creasingly impotent in the face of vi l South African military forces, these cri vantageous cooperation. And the cur b olence and conflict, it nonetheless u teria were clearly not met. What will rent progressive status of South P encourages regional, organizational South Africa's strategy under a non Africa's economic relationships with e commitment to the peaceful settle h racial and democratic government be the rest of sub-Saharan Africa bodes t ment of disputes and conflicts y in the years to come? As it drops of well for cooperation in other fields. b through the good offices of bodies fensive for defensive doctrines, could The economic dynamic puts a pre d such as the Southern African De e the sub-region become an anomaly to mium on common security arrange t velopment Community (SADC) and n Deutsch's theory: that is, as we move ments, especially in the areas of power a the Economic Community of West r further into the post-apartheid era, generation, water supply, transport g African States (Ecowas), under the e will the region's separate units (while and communications, tourism, trade c umbrella of the newly created n refraining from targeting each other) promotion, and knowledge creation e OAU Mechanism for Conflict Pre c still not score highly in terms of value and exchange (especially in agricul i l compatibility, economic ties, level of ture).23 But, strangely, meaningful de vention, Management and Resolu r e transnational links, institution-build bate on novel security mechanisms has tion); and d n ing, responsiveness, and mutual pre lagged behind the diversity of debate • promoting regional conventions on u dictability in behaviour? Although the on economic and political issues.24 the monitoring, reduction, and ulti y a countries of the sub-region may not, For security regimes to be insti mate abolition of arms transfers, w e in future, pose any military threat to tu tionalized in sub-Saharan Africa, and working towards the de-nu t a their neighbours, they do face (as we several conditions25 will have to be clearization of Africa. G met, including: first, a strengthening t have seen) an enormous range of re e ~ sustaining of both national and Some elaboration is needed on the n gional problems. Is Southern Africa, i b therefore, not a security community intra-regional civil society; second, a issue of the de-nuclearization of sub a Saharan Africa. With South Africa's full S but a community of insecurity? conceiving of peace and security as y The essence of community-build social and relational phenomena tran subscription to the conditions of the b scending the jurisdiction of individual nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) d ing seems to be communication. The e c difficulties involving the cost and states (this, in turn, calls for a rethink- and the safeguards of the International u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 165 . J regional security in sub-saharan africa I Atomic Energy Agency (iAEA), the first and participatory democracy based on liest possible moment. In summary, critical steps towards a comprehensive public accountability; second, the de national security and stability (key el regional arms control agreement in velopment of agro-processing indus ements in regional security) largely Southern Africa have been taken. tries and alternative energy sources rest on the ability of individual coun South Africa's willingness to take this (such as solar power); third, the stim tries to improve social and economic initiative distinguishes the Southern ulation of economic activity and trade conditions for their peoples, their ob African region (and, indeed, Africa financing facilities; and last, the co servance and promotion of human south of the Sahara) from regions such ordination of resource management. rights, and their affording equal op as the Middle East and South Asia, The matter of resource manage portunity to all ethnic and other inter where there are potentially rival nu ment needs some further amplifica est groups to participate in the process clear powers. This might provide a tion. In some countries in sub-Saharan of political and economic decision useful platform for negotiating region Africa, with their growing populations making. 33 al agreements to regulate the trade and meagre agricultural resources, in, and supply of, anns in general. food security is of crucial importance, The theory and practice of The first objective of such agreements although the vital political dimensions regionalism should be to restrict the arms trade, of food supply (graphically underlined thus reducing military expenditure by recent droughts in the Sahel region Traditionally, regionalism implies co and the risk of fresh militarization28 of West Africa, in north-eastern Africa operation among states in geographi South Africa became a party, as a and in Southern Africa) are less often cally proximate and delimited areas non-nuclear state, to the nuclear Non considered. Food security is important for the pursuit of mutual gain in one Proliferation Treaty after having dis to South Africa, because it cannot be or more issue areas. 34 In most of the mantled (to the satisfaction of the IAEA secure or in a position to sustain its successful examples of regionalism, and the main sponsoring powers of the exports in a sub-region that is starv states that are already partners to solid NPT) the six nuclear devices, the exis ing. Regional planning requires South political processes (based on shared tence of which had been revealed by African data, especially with a view to and complementary values) devolve President F W de Klerk in March 1993. the planning of commercial exports or collective decisions to structures that This freed other African states to pro triangular food trade; and both early supplement rather than supplant na 35 ceed with the de-nuclearization of the warning crop failure and food distrib tional institutions. It is, therefore, no continent. Paradoxically, the Treaty ution mechanisms (including work coincidence: ) on the De-Nuclearization of Africa, and feeding programmes) are areas in '" that the most elaborate examples of 0 1 drafted in June 1995 at Pelindaba (the which an exchange of information can regionalism (the EC, NAFTA, ASEAN, 0 2 Mercosur) have occurred in regions seat of the South African Atomic Energy be useful to the entire region, not least d where state structures remain relatively e Commission), may transform the South to South Africa. Water-rights alloca t strong and where the legitimacy of both a African civil nuclear energy programme tion agreements on the Orange River d frontiers and regimes is not widely ( into a continental resource and a cata and in the Limpopo Basin, as well as r called into question .... Whilst regional e lyst for a real African peace dividend in on the cluster of rivers from Swaziland ism may over time lead to the creation h s i the form of the peaceful application of in the east to Namibia in the west, are of new political organizations, regional l b nuclear energy. Therefore, in drafting crucial to medium-term water plan ism and state strength do not stand in u opposition to each other, and states re P the Treaty, a conscious effort was made ning in a region where water is an in e to balance the non-proliferation com creasingly scarce resourceY Develop main the essential building-blocks with h t which regionalist arrangements are con mitment by African nations with the ment issues, too, are critical because y structed.36 b possibility of the peaceful uses of nu many types of development are not d clear energy29 Article 8(2) of the Treaty ecologically sustainable; nor are they e If the go,1\ of security in sub-Saharan t states: in the interests of the poor and other n Africa is to mitigate threats in the do a marginalized groups. While ecologi r As pan of their efforts to strengthen their mestic sphere, the least that could be g security, stability and development, the cal crises may be more diffuse than e expected of institution-building in an c Parties [to the Treaty] undertake to pro direct military threats, they are central n era of state collapse would be a secu e mote individually and collectively the to a more comprehenSive understand c rity regionalism aimed at problems left i l use of nuclear science and technology ing of security as they are seldom con unsolved by existing continental insti r for economic and social development. e fined within national boundaries. tutions. Security regionalism acknowl d To this end, they undertake to establish n Regional security must therefore edges that the political infrastructures u and strengthen mechanisms for cooper be conceptualized in terms of: first, y ation at the bilateral, sub-regional and for cooperation are still in their ele a regional levels. 3o coordination at the diplomatic level; mentary stages. And as states deal with w e second, joint mechanisms for the pre the outcomes of failed nationhood and t a But all the measures suggested above vention and combat of crime; and last, are increasingly consumed by primary G will have little meaning (and, indeed, exchange of security intelligence and t conflicts of civil and secessionist wars, e social peace will be impossible) with information - not only on criminal n arrangements for security regionalism i 3 b out: ! first, appropriate programmes matters such as drug trafficking, but need to be modest measures for the a S for poverty alleviation, migration con also on such potentially explosive is prevention and containment of certain y trol,- basic food security, primary sues as uncontrolled (illegal) immi conflicts rather than the construction b health care, regional tourism, gender d gration - in an attempt to eliminate of elaborate institutional mechanisms. e c equity, human resource development, the root causes of conflicr at the ear- The focus needs to be on looser struc- u d o r p e R 166 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No2 1996 I regional security in sub-saharan africa I tures of cooperation, ones which can and the Ecowas Ceasefire Monitoring regime in Nigeria has implications stabilize relations, prevent the spill Group (Ecomog), demonstrates this for future discourse on the domestic over of conflicts, secure emerging com form of leadership. Though it operat underpinnings of regional leadership. mon values and, perhaps, lay the foun ed under the many limitations im The emerging debate marks "an im dation for nascent security regimesY posed by a constrained multilateral portant, though subtle, transition from (Experience has shown that "outside mandate, Nigeria's considerable re the continental norm-building of state Southern Africa, there have been geo sources enabled it to contribute dis sovereignty, to a new ... [norml of graphical proximities without shared proportionately to peace-keeping and sovereignty as domestic responsibili purposes, borders without bounded peace-making42 South Africa's .diplo ty" 45 But while it is understandable ness, and regions without regimes'd8 matic intervention in the Lesotho crisis that South Africa's multilateral sanc In other words, instead of regions in (albeit in concert with Botswana and tions campaign was targeted at pow sub-Saharan Africa forming the organi Zimbabwe) reveals a related theme erful international economic actors, its zational bases for policy formulation of leadership, compelling a return to failure to build a strong constituency on a whole range of issues, they have normality in that country by judicious for sanctions outside Southern Africa become sources of strife and enmity.)39 ly using a mix of incentives and disin left it exposed to "populist charges of While states in sub-Saharan Africa centives. This case also shows that collusion with 'imperialists"'. The re should remain the central agents of se hegemony works best when it can ex sult was that Abacha emerged, almost curity in their domestic settings, they ploit geographical vulnerability and by default, as the "champion of the should be in a position to "sub-con structural weakness. Equally impor black man" 46 In this regard, the reac tract" certain functions to regional in tant, leadership conducted within re tion of Liberia's interim government stitutions when they run into difficul gional multilateral structures (under was quite instructive: ties. Security regionalism, therefore, SADC auspices, and utilizing some To see President Mandela, who hac! been flows from a desire to arrest some of elements of the frontline states con in jail for 27 years, come out and set out the outcomes of state collapse. This cept) avoids the perceptions of diktat, a campaign against Nigeria in such a hor sub-contracting of security functions is particularly by multilateral partners rific and terrible manner is very shocking already happening by default as weak (like Zimbabwe) who might be future to us. We are calling on Ecowas and states and their domestic opponents candidates for similar (or other) modes other African countries to prevail on appeal to diverse sources for external of intervention.43 President Mandela not to allow South Africa to be used in the division and un help.4o The participation of Executive The lessons of Nigeria in Liberia, dermining of African solidarity.47 ) Outcomes in the civil wars in Angola and South Africa in Lesotho, point to 0 1 and Sierra Leone, and the coup-making other avenues in rethinking leadership Surely, this comment must rank as the 0 of the renegade mercenary forces of and security. First, there are few re pinnacle of hypocrisy, coming from a 2 d Bob Denard in the Comores, serve as gional hegemons in sub-Saharan Africa country which is experiencing almost e t reminders. Instead of leaving an open . beyond South Africa and Nigeria - at total state collapse and appears to be in a d ing for bodies like Executive Out the minimum, leadership entails the an unstoppable free-fall to oblivion. ( r comes, contiguous states should take possession of sufficient military power How many atrocities, perpetrated by e h on the responsibility for separating, to deploy in external fire-brigade situ African regimes against their own citi s i l isolating and conciliating domestic ations, a reasonably viable economy to zc;ns, have been wiped under the car b u combatants. sustain such deployment, and political pet or papered over by invoking this P elites imbued with a sense of regional rather handy notion of "African solidar e h mission. Second, through sustained ity"? Yet even as the Mandela-Abacha t Regionalism and leadership y leadership, South Africa and Nigeria stand-off shows up the limitations and b Nigeria and South Africa: Regional could nurture the already existing in whittles down the remnants of the du d e hegemons, continental adversaries? frastructure in West Africa (Ecowas) bious consensus on "African solutions t n The leadership role in security re and in Southern Africa (the SADC) for for African problems", it hardly resolves a r gionalism points to hegemons assum building forms of regionalism lying be the demands for leadership in West g e ing the roles of sub-contractors on be yond the realm of security; for the most Africa, particularly in on-going con c n half of their weaker neighbours. All part, therefore, patterns of prior inter flicts. Thus the lukewarm response of e c regionalisms thrive on strong leader action are conducive to regionalization. the Francophone West African coun i l ship supported by political and eco South Africa, more so than Nigeria, has tries to Mandela's spirited campaign r e nomic resources; and this feature is the domestic institutional capacity clearly shows that international eco d n even more pertinent in the security needed for the kind of sustained lead nomic isolation cannot reduce Nigeria's u realm for providing direction and ership necessary to effect any en leadership role in West Africa.48 y a order. At times, leadership might also hanced form of regionalism. But with The Nigerian case exemplifies the w e serve to mobilize external actors will out the moral stature that comes from intimate ties between regional projec t a ing to lend much-needed support. a strong sense of nationhood and do tion of military power and domestic G mestic legitimacy, regionalism as hege militarization, a relation that might be t Since sub-Saharan Africa is still prone e mony has the potential to degenerate severed in a post-Abacha Nigeria. The n to conflict, leadership as hegemony i b could best find application in the con into the cruder forms of power over burdens of hegemony might be erod a S tainment of conflicts within regional extension long associated with sub-re ed as regional powers become more y sub-systems.41 gional troublemakers.44 accountable domestically, leading per b South Africa's role in the sanc haps to reluctant hegemons. Thus we d Nigeria's role in the Liberian civil e c war under the auspices of Ecowas tions campaign against the Abacha should not expect South Africa or u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 167 J I regional security in sub-saharan africa I Nigeria to play leadership roles when the IGADD initiative began in Septem reflects the shifts in Mobutu's domes their taxpayers demand a reduction in ber 1993 on the optimistic note of a fo tic and international fortunes,55 what appears to them to be wasteful cused intervention to restore peace to The central question for leader 'foreign intervention,49 In fact, when war-torn southern Sudan, Overall, the ship is how to insulate conflict resolu elites engage their people in foreign IGADD process contained some of the tion from mere image-making, When policy debates, taxpayers - while gen salient elements of security regional conflicts such as that in Rwanda inten erally against grandiose foreign inter ism, viewed as pooled leadership, First, sify from elementary concerns about ventions, such as massive airlifts of it symbolized the spreading recogni the repatriation of refugees to the sec food and the deployment of soldiers in tion of the urgent primacy of security ondary ones of rehabilitating and em unfamiliar political terrain - are likely over purely functional issues in region bellishing Zaire's external image, re to su pport a restricted use of resources al cooperation, Second, for regional gional solutions become more elusive, for judicious contractual security roles, actors it entailed very limited com And the inclusion of multiple state ac In the short term, through such limited mitments, since the principal task tors in concerted bids to find solutions contractual security engagements, re revolved around getting the major par to this conflict, points to some of the gional leaders force their neighbours ties to the negotiating table, Finally, dangers of conflict actually expanding to take more responsibility for manag IGADD sought to build on the proxim through the practices of brinkman ing their own affairs; and in the long ity of member states to the conflict as ship, uncoordinated regionalism and term they create the shared reciprocity a critical means of entry into the pro mere summitry: Kenya's initiatives to for constructing institutionalized re cess of conflict management.52 But by convene regional summits on Rwan gionalism,50 September 1994, the IGADD initiative dese reconstruction failed, largely at had petered out, caught up and smoth the point when they became Moi Kenya and Uganda: ered in the intricate web of Kenya Museveni leadership contests, Where Regional spoilers Uganda, Uganda-Sudan, Sudan-Eritrea, political brinkmanship in exercising In most regional sub-systems in sub Ethiopia-Sudan and Somalia-Ethiopia leadershi p infuses regionalism, fail Saharan Africa, conflicts and insecurity conflicts: in an experiment to broaden ures such as these underscore the are more often than not the conse its functional role to also include secu larger scope of personality-based an quence of either pretence to, or the rity concerns, IGADD had veered ever tagonisms in East and Central Africa, quest for, leadership, As the fulcrum further from its original character and antagonisms that usually have no of the larger East African security sys purposes to the detriment of regional bearing on the real conflict, 56 ) tem, Kenya and Uganda illustrate how security,53 It is against this background Security regionalism as a matter of 0 1 the unchecked quest for leadership that there have been proposals by sub-contracting should target specific 0 becomes a source of instability, East some IGADD members to create a issues that are urgent and amenable to 2 d Africa once boasted one of the most frontline of countries against Sudan be compromise, The formula of most-af e t favourable socio-cultural infrastruc cause of its domestic racial policies and fected nations (that is, selective man a d tures for incipient forms of regional regional destabilization, 54 agement of conflicts by states which re ( r ism, with the prospect of evolving into gard such conflicts as germane to e Zaire: Regional troublemaker h broad-based integration schemes, Yet them), corresponds to issue-based ver s i l these homogenizing and integrative el Geographically capable of decisive sions of collective leadership, There is b u ements fell victim to the fragmentary leadership in the Great Lakes and no logic, for example, in a regional so P forces of politics, Since the mid-1980s, Southern African regions, Zaire's poli lution to the Rwanda and Burundi con e h ventures to re-establish the many dif cies have for long played second fid flicts that should directly involve states t y ferent ties which existed under the dle to Franco-Belgian and American such as Kenya; neither does Malawi b now defunct East African Community interests, But the end of the Cold War need to mediate conflicts between d e have foundered on the rocks of the coincided with a groundswell of agi Uganda and Sudan (although Malawi t n Moi-Museveni conflict. Today, purely tation for domestic change away from was, at the time of attempted media a r domestic insecurities seem to translate Mobutu's authoritarianism, Although a tion, exercising the chairmanship of g e into regional power conflicts, stifling collapsed political economy has dissi Comesa), However, the recent meeting c n the emergence of governments that pated the energies of Za'irian leader of leaders of Rwanda, Burundi, Za'ire, e c can be partners in peace and making a ship, and years of political turmoil Uganda and Tanzania in Cairo, under i l mockery of any regional initiatives pur have left Za'ire's transition to democ the chairmanship of former US Presi r e porting to settle conflicts, 51 racy in a sad and stagnant state, con d dent Jimmy Carter, is a good example n Proximate states, in their rush to flicts in the neighbourhood have not of purposeful selective regionalism, u y pre-empt conflicts before being affect lessened Mobutu's regional relevance, The summit, initiated by Uganda, Tan a ed themselves, may sometimes only Thus in the Angolan conflict, Mobutu's zania and Za'ire, had geographical w e t exacerbate and expand the range of ties with the Unita movement have proximity to Rwanda and Burundi as a such conflicts, A glance at the regional been instrumental in his continued in the primary qualification for selection, G t mediation of the Sudan conflict, con fluence over the nature of any settle Apart from their pledge to take joint ac e n ducted under the auspices of the Inter ment. In Rwanda, the outcome of the tion to advance regional peace, justice, i b Governmental Authority on Drought Hutu pogroms of 1994 fortuitously es reconciliation, stability and develop a S and Development (IGADD), captures tablished Za'ire's strategic position as a ment, the summit sought to negotiate y some of the pitfalls of local mediators, host to countless refugees, Rwandese broad-based governments of national b d Comprising Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, refugees have become an indispens unity in both Rwanda and Burundi. The e c Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, able Za'irian policy tool, which now meeting recognized that a more fruitful u d o r p e R 168 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 I regional security in sub-saharan africa I approach to the Rwanda/Burundi con tributes 78% of the total GNP of the re the sub-region's many midgets. Re flicts would need to involve only the gion; its GNP per capita is three times luctant to share the country's compar two principal parties, extra-regional that of the average for the other SADC ative advantage, successive South Afri third-party actors merely giving assis states (only Mauritius has a higher GNP can regimes may in future dominate. tance in resolving certain outstanding per capita), and is roughly three-and-a the sub-region with a carrot and stick issues. 57 half times larger than that of the aver approach.67 age for the Common Market of Eastern In both economic and security and Southern Africa (Comesa) and fields, the sub-region will have to find Institutionalizing peace and other SADC countries combined (again, ways to accommodate, manage, even security only Mauritius and Seychelles have curb South Africa's superior strength. It has been postulated that the most higher GNP figures per capita).60 Ultimately, the principal challenge lies likely scenario for future relations in South Africa's economic do in the fact that this strength needs to be the Southern African region may be minance raises the question of the creatively channelled in the interests of neo-regionalism (meaning that centre country's ambitions and, more specifi the region as a whole;68 remembering, hinterland relationships will continue, cally, the likelihood that it might relish in particular, that several states in the though with South Africa still the over its role as the regional giant and use its sub-region have suffered directly from all centre of gravity), as opposed to position to enhance its own political, South Africa's military might in the re the alternatives of regional re-stabi diplomatic and economic power61 By cent past. So whatever the character of lization and regional break-up and pe the late 1980s, "giantism" had devel the South African government, its neigh ripheralization. 58 This scenario pre oped into one of some ten crises in bours will always feel some unease supposes a negotiated regional regime South Africa's external relations62 and about its aims unless steps are taken to which would necessitate replacing by now, the mid-1990s, Southern Africa mitigate, or ultimately transcend, the some South African goods and services has indeed reached its "unipolar mo pressures of the security dilemma. A by other sources from within the sub ment".63 In many ways, this is what the security regime would achieve the for region (for example, Zimbabwe could sub-region has always feared. The mer, a security community the latter.69 become an important supplier of man strong resistance to the infamous Con With South Africa now a member of ufactured products) and reducing stellation of Southern African States the regional fraternity, its role in the transport dependence on South Africa (Consas) idea was mainly about sup sub-region will have to be defined by through the upgrading of infrastruc ping with the apartheid devil, but it its own national interests as a "region ture in Mozambique and Angola. To was also concerned with fear of South al superpower"70 ) 0 be meaningful, therefore, neo-region African domination. Clearly, pre-1992 1 0 alism would require that states tran SADCC planning, which always en 2 The debate on regional scend their national goals and inter deavoured to draw South Africa into d security in Southern Africa e ests by acting and thinking regionally. its cooperative net rather than the t a other way around, was aimed precise Peace presents Southern Africa with a d ( 64 ly at auenuating this very domination. paradox. On the one hand, people r South Africa, Southern Africa e But no good intentions, no de need to be liberated from the state; h and beyond s i termination to create a mutually ben on the other hand, it is purely acade l b A South Africa that exhibits even min eficial and non-dependent regional mic to conceive of rudimentary peace, u economic cooperation system, will security and development in the ab P imal calm and continuity is likely to re e main the dominant force and the major prevent South Africa's continuing sence of strong, legitimate states. Con h t 65 economic, technical, financial, and domination of Southern Africa. The sequently, building institutional ca y b military power in the Southern African frustration experienced by the small pacity seems a necessary though still d sub-region, contributing decisively to states of the sub-continent brings to insufficient condition for peace and e t the sub-continent's security but per mind the lament of Mexican President security in the sub-region: interstate n a petuating the existing fears of neigh (1876-1911) Porfirio Diaz: "Poor cooperation and coordination must be r g bouring states concerning its pre-emi Mexico, so far from God, so near to strengthened toO.71 e c nence.59 Although the states of the the United States". South Africa's dom At the time of writing, a formal n e sub-region appear to have pledged ination of its neighbours became even framework for regional security may c i l themselves to cooperation and build greater during its long and damaging not seem as premature as it did some r 66 72 e ing harmonious relations, the statistics destabilization of the region. Should three years ago. Certain scholars have d show exactly how lopsided the re the unequal distribution of power en argued the need for confidence-build n u ing measures in the region; the legacy gional equation really is. dure, Southern Africa's unipolar mo y ment might well become a permanent left by destabilization seems to neces a Militarily and, even more, eco w nomically, South Africa is the giant not feature of the sub-regional scene. sitate such a strategy. But the end of e t just of Southern Africa but of Africa Now, for a number of reasons, South the Cold War and the resultant disen a G south of the Sahara, accounting for 41 % Africa views the sub-region with as gagement from regional conflicts by the t e of sub-Saharan Africa's gross national much uncertainty and incredulity as superpowers have left the way clear for n i product (GNP). South Africa's GNP is its neighbours view it. But as all sides local initiatives to fill the power vacu b a 72% greater than that of its nearest sub in Southern Africa recall their experi um with negotiated arrangements. S Saharan African rival, Nigeria. South ences, their hopes and their fears, any Nevertheless, it should constantly be y b Africa's economic dominance of South mathematical equation must surely set borne in mind that the future of South d e ern Africa is widely known: it con- the sub-continent's colossus beside Africa is still very precariously bal- c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 169 I I regional security in sub-saharan africa I anced, as it faces socio-economic prob curity in the sub-region were further how transferable are institutions such lems of gigantic proportions; and that explored. Significantly, similar ideas as the CSCE? Although some ideas and the entire sub-region is in a state of found fertile ground within the SADCC: practices may be transferable, they flux, with Malawi seemingly peacefully witness the yearly Conference on must be transplanted with care and reconstituted as a multi-party democra Peace and Security in Eastern and with an eye to regional particularities78 cy, Mozambique and Angola at quite Southern Africa held in Arusha, Tan Is what is known as the security dilem different signposts on their roads to zania. As early as 1991, South African ma relevant to the Southern African wards democratization, Zambia and President F W de Klerk expressed the context and to the wider sub-Saharan Zimbabwe apparently unable to come view that thought should be given "to region? Apparently, it is not.79 The level to grips with the true meaning of the idea of multilateral regional talks of external security is relatively high democracy, Lesotho racked by unstable [in Southern Africa] to foster confi because of geographical remoteness civil-military relations, and Swaziland dence, economic growth, and security from the centre of world affairs, the in still tied to an essentially autocratic along lines similar to the ... CSCE".74 difference of outside powers, and the system of government. It would there Academics have also contributed general powerlessness of states within fore be unwise for any state to leave to the debate. Weimer75 sees the value the region - provided, that is, that regional security to chance. There is the of a CSSDCA process in Southern Africa there is a clear reduction in the South danger that, in another year or two, op principally in a social and developmen African threat to the Southern African portunity to properly consider regional tal context. Drawing attention to pover region as a result of Pretoria's post security and cooperation may well ty, hunger, unemployment, and socio apartheid foreign policy, and in the have passed us by. cultural deprivation in the region, he Nigerian threat to the West African re Looking at the wider canvas of regards a security regime within the gion arising from that country's con sub-Saharan Africa, proposals for a framework of something broadly simi tinuing political instability under a re Conference on Security, Stability, De lar to the CSSDCA as the best way for pressive and essentially undemocratic velopment and Cooperation in Africa ward. Vale76 reminds us of the new military regime. (CSSDCA) have been mooted under the perils and challenges awaiting the re [n terms of international politics, aegis of the African Leadership Forum gion after the end of apartheid, includ therefore, the states of sub-Saharan and at the initiative of African leaders ing "near uncontrollable migration" and Africa are relatively secure legal enti such as former Nigerian President, an imperative to restructure existing re ties, with no significant external securi General Olusegun Obasanjo, former gional institutions such as the Southern ty dilemma pressures. Internally, how Executive Secretary of the UN Eco African Customs Union (SACU) and the ever, the situation has been much less ) 0 nomic Commission for Africa (Uneca), SADC for "the common good". He adds satisfactory. Sovereignty is threatened 1 0 Adebayo Adedeji, and the Secretary that the region as a whole will have to more from within than from without: 2 General of the Organization of African develop and maximize its relative there have been instances of significant d e Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim. strengths in a world in which Africa (in domestic instability brought about by t a Indeed, the Kampala Forum was an at cluding sub-Saharan Africa) will be in tribal and clan-induced anarchy in d ( tempt to renew the search for endoge creasingly marginalized, and states the states such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and r e nous solutions to the continent's crises underlying logic of, and rationale for, a Somalia; long-standing irredentist, h s i of inseCUrity, instability and underde Conference on Security and Coopera armed rebellion in Sudan; catastrophic l b velopment. [n essence, the CSSDCA tion in Southern Africa (CSCSA) as fol ethnic massacres in Rwanda and Bu u P was a carefully constructed showcase lows: rundi; suppression of human rights anel e for a concept that in recent years has the basic principles of democracy by h By embarking on a series of multilater t steadily advanced to the centre of al talks along the lines of the ... CSCE, the military regime in Nigeria, and by y b African political thought and strategy: Southern African states will enable an civilian variants in Kenya, Cameroon, d that without democracy, human rights exploration of individual fears while si Za·ire and Zimbabwe; clearly undemo e t and popular participation, and without multaneously promoting regional ac cratic no-party systems in Uganda and n a an end to cross-border and civil wars, cord. The underlying motive is rudi Swaziland (where trades union-in r g mentary: while economic development there can be neither security and sta spired civil disobedience is putting the e in the region is essential, security ques c bility nor economic growth - and, feudal Swazi monarchy under pres n tions for individual states are para e therefore, no release for the continent sure); continuing scars of decades of c mount. By catering for these at separate i l from the tightening grip of violence, protracted civil war in Angola and but parallel talks, a series of common r e hunger and debt. Without that release, understandings on the region's future Mozambique; seemingly endemic local d Africa as a bloc will politically and eco 77 n can be reached political violence in the KwaZulu Natal u nomically become even more margin Province of South Africa; and factional y a alized in a new global oreler - one in In the security field, as elsewhere, it is clashes in the Lesotho armed forces, w which success is determined by eco necessary for us to think about the ex threatening an as yet fragile democratic e t a nomic strength rather than by military tent to which we can generalize and rebirth. G 3 power or by ideological affiliation.7 apply concepts from one part of the Now, if sub-Saharan Africa is re t e But to return to Southern Africa: world to another. For example, how latively free of external security dilem n i at a conference held in Maputo, Mo relevant are the traditional concepts of ma pressures, the implications for se b a zambique in 1990, the Conference on statecraft such as national security or curity policy are enormous, meaning S y Security and Cooperation in Europe balance of power?; how applicable are that priority has to be given to the b (CSCE) example and other concepts they to the different contexts of South domestic sources of instability. Se d e relevant to confidence-building and se- ern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa?; and curity policy must be both more multi- c u d o r p e R 170 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 I regional security in sub-saharan africa I levelled and multi-faceted: in other a forum for the exchange of ideas and backdrop of increasing insecurity, in words, it must deal not primarily with comparisons regarding domestic issues stability and economic decline in many states or with issues of military strate related to state-society relationships. African countries. The realization was gy but with a whole range of threats And last, it could contribute to the in indeed spreading throughout the con to a nation's wellbeing. It follows, stitutionalization of regional structures, tinent that Africa, with the end of the then, that traditional security regimes, the establishment of which could fur Cold War, needed to respond appro designed to mitigate security dilem ther equity-based regional cooperation priately to the new challenges facing mas, will not be as relevant to the fu over a wide range of issues, including it, especially in matters such as conflict ture of sub-Saharan Africa (or, more those in the economic field. resolution, economic development and specifically, to Southern Africa) as Using the CSCE model, Vale84 democratization; and, to this end, the some might think. suggests eight complementary region Addis Ababa OAU Summit of July 1990 One of the attractions of the al baskets: security, economic devel passed the "Declaration on Funda CSCE model may be its non-tradition opment, law and human rights, educa mental Changes in the World and their al elements. Although this model was tion and technology, migration, health, Implications for Africa". This "paradigm essentially statist in inspiration, its gender issues, and agriculture. But he shift", in the words of Thomas Kuhn,85 human rights provisions escaped from is mute on the tougher question of was marked by new inter-state and this bind; and its various baskets ap how, in practice, a CSCSA could be in intra-state relations in Africa and led to proach the security problem in a stitutionalized. What, if anything, can the creation of the Division for Conflict multi-faceted way.80 Within the wider Southern Africa learn from European Prevention, Management and Resolu sub-Saharan context, the Southern experience with the CSCE? And, more tion in the General Secretariat of the African sub-continent might be good importantly, can such a framework be OAU in March 1992. This was followed ground on which to experiment with sustained in the context of soft, vul by the establishment of the Mechanism new modes of crisis control and con nerable states? Although South Africa for Conflict Prevention, Management flict prevention and, in so doing, may be harder, in relative terms, than and Resolution at the Cairo OAU move away from the traditional em the other states of the region, it too is Summit in June 199386 phasis on formal organizations with a soft state in view of its doubtful ca This development isa bold con rigid structures and agendas, which pacity to meet existing and future do ceptual step towards intervention in has usually precluded the establish mestic socio-economic demands, its domestic conflicts; and the main focus ment of an open forum for the dis obvious inability to mobilize sufficient of the OAU Mechanism is, most ap cussion of problems, dangers and in internal resources commensurate with propriately, preventive action through ) 8l 87 0 cipient trends. Thus it may be help its development needs, and the pro early warning The Central Organ of 1 ful to think of a complex of different spect that it may not be a particularly the Mechanism is composed of states 0 2 regimes, each one attempting to deal well-consolidated state for years to which are members of the Bureau of d e with different but overlapping sectors come. the OAU Assembly of Heads of State t a of the security problem. One advan A CSSDCA or CSCSA process in and Government, the current OAU d ( tage of seeking such a combination of Southern Africa will be difficult to in Chairman (Cameroon), the outgOing r e regimes is that complex structures are stitutionalize without due considera Chairman (Ethiopia) and the incom h s always likely to be able to take more tion of these imponderables. But this ing Chairman (Zimbabwe), with the i l b strain. Another advantage is that it does not mean that it should not be at OAU Secretary-General and General u may well prove easier to negotiate a tempted. Clearly, it may prove to be Secretariat forming its operational P e series of single-issue regimes than a even tougher than the European expe arm. The Central Organ assumes over h t single comprehensive one. Indeed, rience, which had a relatively long all direction and coordination of the y b progress at one level might ease pro genesis. There is also the additional activities of the Mechanism between d gress at another as a result of spill consideration that post-apartheid South ordinary sessions of the Assembly of e t over effects.82 Africa might attempt to manipulate re Heads of State and Government, and n a A CSCE process involving South gional institutions for its own particu functions at three levels: annual meet r g Africa on equal terms with other coun lar purposes. Then, these institutions ings of its members at heads-of-state e c tries in Southern Africa - based on the might well become an arena for com and-government level, biannual meet n e idea of different baskets dealing with peting social groups; and this would ings at foreign ministerial level, and c i l security and disarmament; trade, pro effectively immobilize them and detract monthly meetings at ambassadorial r e duction and labour; general issues from their non-material functions. This level - with special meetings called, if d linked to institutional forms for eco is an important consideration, for peace necessary, to deal with crises88 n u nomic cooperation; refugees and mi and security are also about non-mater Subsequent endeavours by OAU y ial, intangible things such as identity, Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim a gration; and human rights, clilture and w education - is appealing for a number social space and human dignity. and the United Nations to expand the e t of reasons.83 First, it would be an ex OAU's capabilities in peace-keeping a G cellent instrument for confidence operations have received only luke t Institutions for regional e building and increased transparency warm support from the majority of n security in Southern Africa i in matters concerning armed forces African countries. At the June 1995 b and sub-Saharan Africa a and threat projections. Second, it could Addis Ababa OAU Summit on peace S provide a useful framework for re Towards the end of 1989 and during keeping issues, leaders grudgingly y b gional conflict management and con the first months of 1990, calls to review agreed to set lip peace-keeping units d e flict resolution. Third, it could serve as the OAU's role were made against a within existing armies for peace-obser- c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 171 I regional security in sub-saharan africa I vation roles only, instead of the wide analysing information to facilitate de reduction in military force levels and ly anticipated African intervention cision-making and timely, pre-emptive expenditures; the introduction of con force for peace-keeping.89 And clearly, political action by the relevant organs fidence and security-building mea the Central Organ will have to coordi of the Mechanism. (Early warning is sures; and the ratification of key prin nate its activities with peace-keeping essentially a tool for preparedness, ciples of international law governing initiatives in the different sub-regions. and for the prevention and mitigation interstate relations.98 In July 1994, the For example, the SADC (which has a of conflict, its efficiency being predi SADC convened a ministerial work formal mandate from member states to cated upon a clear methodology for shop on democracy, peace and securi promote regional cooperation in the data collection, analysis and informa ty which recommended the formation areas of politics, defence and security) tion exchange. And there should be a of a human rights commission headed has, almost simultaneously, begun to healthy realization that the poor state by judges and other eminent persons; assume regional security responsibili of Africa's telecommunications and a conflict resolution forum, comprising ties with its proposal to establish fo other high-technology support sys foreign ministers; a security and de rums for conflict resolution, and secu tems poses formidable obstacles in the fence forum, composed of ministers re rity and defence.9o However, there' is way of any efficient early warning ca sponsible for defence, policing and in no evidence that the prevailing appre pability.)93 telligence; an SADC sector on security hension among African states toward Turning back to Southern Africa, and defence; and an autonomous in enhanced multilateralism in security the SADCC was replaced in 1992 by stitute for strategic studies99 In de matters will change in the immediate the SADC. This new institution differs fending the proposals of this work future. from its predecessor in three impor shop, South African First Deputy Presi The past two years have wit tant respects: it includes the regional dent Thabo Mbeki argued that events nessed the OAU's grappling with mea superpower, South Africa; its primary in Rwanda demanded the existence of sures to strengthen the capacity of the goal goes beyond economic coordi a regional security system in Southern Mechanism to respond more rapidly nation to higher levels of regional in Africa which enjoyed the consensus and effectively to the scourge of con tegration;94 and its mandate extends agreement of members to intervene in flict. These attempts have been made to the political, military and security a conflict situation in the interests of in recognition of the fact that Africa realms. The following motivation is peace and security. South Africa also has to bear the primary responsibility advanced for this broad mandate: had to show its neighbours that it was for taking charge of its own problems. Good and strengthened political rela adopting a non-threatening posture. Concurrently, a firm belief has taken tions among the countries of the region, The Windhoek recommendations, ) 0 root that early action would contain and peace and mutual security, are crit therefore, included a non-aggression 1 0 conflicts and prevent their deteriora ical components of the total environ and mutual defence pact, a new role 2 tion to a point where the OAU would ment for regional cooperation and inte for military forces and defence indus d e gration. The region needs, therefore, to t be compelled to resort to complex and tries in meeting civilian needs, and the a resource-demanding peace-keeping establish a framework and mechanisms creation of a security sector in the d ( to strengthen regional solidarity and lOO operations which it would find difficult SADC. r provide for mutual peace and security95 e to finance. 91 It also became apparent The August 1994 Gaborone h s i that the Mechanism suffered from op On the grounds that political and mil SADC Summit was presented with two l b erational limitations of an infrastruc itary stability are essential prerequi proposals concerning the establish u P tural, logistical, human resource and sites for development, the SADC's ob ment of an appropriate forum to facil e financial nature and, more important jectives include "the evolution of com itate regional cooperation in the secu h t ly, from lack of an early warning ca mon political values and institutions" rity sphere: the SADC Council of y b pability: an efficient system, by which and "the promotion of peace and se Ministers recommended the creation d the Mechanism could be timeously curity".96 The SADC Treaty identifies of a "sector on political cooperation, e t alerted to potential disputes, could in "politics, diplomacy, international re democracy, peace and security"; and n a form itself quickly on incipient con lations, peace and security" as one of r the foreign ministers of the frontline g flicts, and respond speedily, pro-ac the seven areas of regional coopera states proposed the formation of an e c tively and decisively to crisis situ a tion,97 the others being food security, Association of Southern African States n e tions.92 land and agriculture; infrastructure (ASAS) as the successor to the front c i l What has been foremost in the and services; human resources devel line-states grouping. The summit de r e minds of African leaders was the opment, science and technology; in cided that these proposals should be d n growing conviction that they must dustry, trade, investment and finance; merged in order to avoid overlap and u 101 strengthen the preventive capacity of natural resources and the environ duplication. In August 1995, the y a the Mechanism by establishing an ment; and social welfare, information Johannesburg SADC Summit deferred w e OAU Conflict Management Centre to and culture. the resolution of this question for a t a act as the focal point of an Early In its programme for 1993, the further year. The key arguments for G Warning System Network on conflict SADC proposed a number of strategies adopting the ASAS option was that it t e situations in Africa. Emphasis was to for advancing regional security: the would allow direct access to heads of n i be put on the anticipation (prediction, adoption of a "new approach to secu b state and government, it would be a even) and prevention of conflict, and rity" emphasizing the non-military di more flexible and informal than the S y concerted action in peace-making. mensions of security, including the se other SADC sectors, it would ensure a b Such a coordinating facility would curity of people; the creation of a higher level of confidentiality, and it d e have to be capable of gathering and forum for mediation and arbitration; a c would facilitate rapid response to a u d o r p e R 172 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 I regional, security in sub-saharan africa I I crisis situation. In a relatively short pe Zimbabwe) successfully applied pres and about putting its military capacity riod of time, the focus of the SADC's sure to end the King's coup and re at the disposal of warring factions else deliberations on regional peace and store Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle to where on the continent. They argue security had thus moved from princi power; in the Mozambican case, they that South Africa could not, by military ples, to strategies, and on to mecha were able to muster their number at involvement, have rescued the mas nisms.102 considerable speed and firmly push sacre victims in Rwanda, or have put It was further agreed that the mid-election Mozambique back on the an end to the continuing civil war in frontline states grouping, formed in road to participatory democracy. In the Angola, or have restored order in a 1974, would disband, all its operations business of politics, preventive diplo war-ravaged pre-election Mozambique, being integrated into a yet to-be macy and conflict resolution, such or have created a semblance of stabil established political and security sec speed is necessary. It is to the credit of ity in Lesotho - and it did not attempt tor. The frontline states had had a Southern African leaders that this line to do so. Where South Africa's interests strictly political vocation, to be an al of thinking has prevailed and is now do lie is in stabilizing not only the liance fighting apartheid and white incorporated into the procedures for Southern African sub-region but also minority rule in Southern Africa. All an embryonic regional security re sub-Saharan Africa - if only to stop the its meetings had been off-the-record gime. 104 vast and destabilizing flood of refugees and held in camera. In response to In Southern Africa, the focus in and economic migrants across its own South Africa's policy of destabilization security must be on conflict prevention borders. But that does not require mil in the region, this informal grouping through preventive diplomacy, a con itary adventures or costly, and usually had functioned flexibly, assembling cept popularized by United Nations futile, peace-keeping operations. only when speaking with a single Secretary-General Boutros Boutros If in the wider world it is in South voice on regional and international is Ghali who defined it as "action to pre Africa's interest to make no enemies, to sues was necessary. 103 Although now vent disputes from arising between trade wherever it is to its advantage to formally dissolved, no other joint parties, to prevent existing disputes do so, and to give its modest support commission of African leaders had from escalating into conflicts, and to to international endeavours, its main acted with such cohesion, had exhib limit the spread of ". [conflicts] when interest still remains: to stabilize both ited such a degree of permanence, they occur". 105 Preventive diplomacy is Southern Africa and also the broader and had enjoyed so much respect. more cost-effective than other forms of region south of the Sahara. This calls Building on the frontline-states intervention. It involves information for patient diplomacy, to play the role concept, essentially drawing on the ex gathering and disbursement for the of facilitator and mediator as in Angola. ) 0 perience and expertise of this club of purpose of early warning, the use of It does not require armed excursions, 1 0 heads of state and government and the the "good offices" of a particular gov nor does it require South Africa to em 2 SADC's equally long-standing sectoral ernment leader or international states ulate others in the futile exercise of d e t approach, it was resolved at the man, and confidence-building mea throwing money at unstable societies. a January 1996 Consultative Meeting of sures between groups of states. 106 Caution has served South Africa well in d ( the SADC in Johannesburg to establish the recent past, and it should remain its r .e an Organ on Politics, Defence and guiding principle: although South h s Conclusion i Security. This Organ will report direct Africa has been called upon to inter l b ly to the annual SADC Heads-of-State Sub-Saharan Africa has acquired a re vene militarily in both Rwanda and u P and-Government Meeting, and the putation for the intractability of its Lesotho in recent times, it has wisely e chairmanship will revolve alphabeti problems, and outside countries are resisted, agreeing only to provide hu h t cally and annually among the 12 mem showing a particular reluctance to be manitarian aid to Rwandan refugees y b ber states. It will, to all intents and pur drawn into its peace-keeping opera and play the role of facilitator (in con d poses, be the political arm of the SADC tions. Fortunately for South Africa, it cert with Zimbabwe and Botswana) in e t (working on the troika principle of cur assumes its regional and continental the political crisis in Lesotho. n a rent, outgOing and incoming SADC responsibilities at a time when a new Southern Africa is arguably the r g chairpersons), will function indepen sense of realism about peace-keeping only part of the African continent that e c dently of the SADC Secretariat (the al is emerging in Africa. Something must can look forward to a truly regional n e ready existing Inter-State Defence and be done to limit conflict in sub-Saharan dynamic. But this dynamic will be c i l Security Committee (IDS C) will now be Africa, which is more ravaged by civil forthcoming only if there is genuine r e the Organ's secretariat), and its main war and other forms of armed conflict and constructive cooperation among d than any other part of the world. the countries of the region. SACU is, n responsibility will be to deal with con u flict prevention, management and res Current thinking is shifting towards po significantly, regarded as the most vi y a olution in the Southern African region. litical rather than military intervention, able and most effective instrument of w More importantly, it will work in a flex to conflict prevention (through pre trade facilitation and customs man e t a ible and informal manner and will be ventive diplomacy) rather than conflict agement, in the Southern African re G able to respond rapidly to incidents of management or conflict resolution. gion certainly, if not in sub-Saharan t e regional insecurity, its inspiration being South Africa seems poised to play Africa as a whole. South Africa should n i the conflict prevention achieved in its expected role in regional security, therefore use its energies to draw its b a August-September 1994 in Lesotho and but some observers suggest that it must neighbours into a functioning system S y in October 1994 in Mozambique. In the be cautious about being made the po of security and prosperity which must b Lesotho crisis, the troika of heads of liceman of the Southern African region extend real benefits. Moreover, re d e state (South Africa, Botswana and or the gendarme of sub-Saharan Africa, gional cooperation and development c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 173 I I regional security in sub-saharan africa I integration, rather than purely eco (ed) , New thinking about strategy and in states, Windhoek, 1992, P 5; and SADC nomic integration, should initially ternational security, London: Harper Secretariat, Southern Alrica: A frame guide the future of Southern Africa; Collins, 1991, pp 267-274. work and strategy for building the com policy should concentrate on devel 5 Barry Buzan, People, states andfear: An munity, Harare, 1993, p 25. agenda /01' international secun'ty stud 17 See C Thomas, op cit, pp 267-274. oping and extending regional techni ies in the post-Cold War era, Boulder: 18 Quoted in Peter Vale, "War and peace in cal-functional networks in transport, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991, pp 26- the Third World", in W Mailman (ed), telecommunications, water manage 28. Armaments and disannament, Stuttgart: ment and power generation. 6 Larry Benjamin, ''The Third World and its Berg, 1992. The capability to cope with the security dilemma", International Affairs 19 See, for example, R Preston (ed), The aftermath of civil war and violent de Bulletin, vol 14, no 3, 1990, P 20; and integration ol returned exiles, former vastation, economic decline, colonial Ken Booth, op cit. P 8. combatants and other war-affected ism, and apartheid in the Southern 7 Quoted in Peter Vale, "Southern Africa's Namihians, Report of the Namibian Insti African region has to be developed. security: something old, something tute for Social and Economic Research, new", South A/rican Defence Review, no University of Namibia, Windhoek, 1993. Steps to consolidate security in an 9, 1993, P 33. 20 Laurie Nathan, "With open anns" ". op cit, holistic sense (much broader than a 8 Laurie Nathan, Formalizing con./liCl res pp 4-5; and Laurie Nathan, Fonnalizing narrOw military interpretation), to re olution and security arrangements in COil/lict resolution and securi(y arrange store law and order, and to prevent a Southern Africa, Paper presented at the ments in Southern Africa, op cit, p 2. recurrence of conflict are, however, Second Acdess Workshop on "South 21 Laurie Nathan, FormaliZing con./lict res likely to demand greater application Africa within Africa: Emerging policy olution and security arrangements in and persistence than achieving the frameworks", held in Johannesburg from Southern Africa, op cit, p 5. economic recovery that they will 24 to 27 January 1996, p 4. 22 Ken Booth, op cit, pp 16-17. help make possible. Be that as it may, 9 Laurie Nathan, "With open arms": Con 23 William Gutteridge, "Prospects for re fidence and security-huilding measures gional security in Southern Africa", South the processes of political change in in Southern Africa, Paper presented at Africa International, vol 22, no 3, Southern Africa have made possible the Seminar on Confidence and security January 1992, pp 128-129; and Reginald the creation of a mechanism to man building in Southern Africa, organized H Green, Soutb Africa, Southern Africa age a regional security regime: the by the United Nations Office for Dis and beyond: Explorations tOlVard re newly established SADC Organ on armament Affairs, and held in Windhoek, gional integration, Paper presented at Politics, Defence and Security. This Namibia, 1993, pp 3-4. the Second Acdess Workshop on "South development makes the SADC unique 10 Adebayo Adedeji, "Statement to the Africa within Africa: Emerging P<;>licy Kampala Forum on security, stability, de Frameworks", held in Johannesburg from ) among regional institutions in sub 0 velopment and cooperation in Africa 24 to 27 January 1996, p 6. 1 Saharan Africa. 0 (CSSDCA), 19 May 1991", in Olusegun 24 Gilbert M Khadiagala, Regionalism and 2 Obasanjo and Felix G N Mosha (eds), leadership in A/rican secun'ty, Paper pre d e Africa: Rise to the challenge - Towards sented at the Second Acdess Workshop t a Notes and references a conference on security, stability, devel on "South Africa within Africa: Emerging d ( Policy Frameworks", held in Johannes opment and cooperation in A/rica (CSS r Andre du Pisani, "Security and peace in e DCA), Abeokuta and New York: Africa burg from 24 to 27 January 1996, p 1. h post-apartheid South Africa", Inter 25 Andre du Pisani, op cit, p 11. s Leadership Forum, 1992, p 297. i l national Affairs Bulletin, vol 16, no 3, II Christopher Clapham, and John A Wise 26 See ibid, pp 11-13: b 1992, P 5. u man, "Assessing the prospects for the 27 See Laurie Nathan and Joao Honwana, P 2 Simon Dalby, "Security, modernity, ecol consolidation of democracy in Africa", in The estahlishment of SADC forums for e ogy: The dilemmas of post-Cold War se h John A Wiseman, (ed), Democracy and conflict resoilltion, and defence and se· t curity discourse", Alternatives, vol 17, political change in sub-Saharan Africa, curity, Paper presented at the Eighth y 1992, P 98. b London: Routledge, 1995, pp 231 and Conference on Peace and Security in d 3 See Lloyd .I Ching'ambo, "Towards a de 232. Eastern and Southern Africa, organized e t fence alliance in Southern Africa?", 12 Laurie Nathan, Formalizing COil/lief res by the Centre for Foreign Relations, Dar n Southern Africa Political and Economic a olution and security arrangements in es Salaam, and the Centre for Southern r Monthly, vol 5, no 8, May 1992, pp g Southern Africa, Paper presented at the African Studies, University of the Western e 33-36; and Willie Breytenbach, "Conflict Second Acdess Workshop on "South Cape, Bellville, and held in Arusha, c n in Southern Africa: Whither collective se Africa within Africa: Emerging policy Tanzania from 22 to 24 August 1994. e c curity", Africa Insight, vol 24, no 1, 1994, frameworks", held in Johannesburg from 28 William Gutteridge, op cit, p 131. i l pp 26-37. 24 to 27 January 1996, p 2. 29 Olu Adeniji, op cit, p 14. r e 4 See Ken Booth. A security regime in 13 Lloyd .I Ching'ambo, op cit, pp 35-36. 30 Quoted in ibid, pp 14-15. d n Southern Africa: Theoretical considera 14 Laurie Nathan, rormalizing cOllfiiCl res 31 Andre du Pisani, "Post-settlement South u tions (Paper presented at a Conference olulion and security arrangements in Africa and the future of Southern Africa", y a on Security, Development and Co Southern Africa, op cit. Issue: A Journal of Opinion, vol 21, no w operation in Southern Africa, organized 15 Olu Adeniji, Disarmament in A./i'ican se 1/2, 1993, pp 67-68. e t by the Foundation for Development and curity and development, Paper presented 32 Reginald H Green, op cit, p 7. a Peace, Bonn, in collaboration with the G at the Second Acdess Workshop on 33 Fernando Gon\:alves, "Southern Africa: In t Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, and e "South Africa within Africa: Emerging search of a common security?", Southen1 n the Centre for Southern African Studies, i policy frameworks", held in Johannes Africa Political and Economic Month~y, b University of the Western Cape, Bellville, burg from 24 to 27 January 1996, p 14. vol 8, no 7, April 1995, p 8. a S and held at Midgard, Namibia from 23 to See SADC Secretariat, Towards the Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and con 16 34 y 27 May 1993), pp 4 and 6; and C Thomas, Southern African development commu flict management: A framework for analy b "New directions in thinking about securi nity: A declaration by the beads Cilstate sis", Review of International Studies, vol d e ty in the Third World", in Ken Booth, c and government 0/ Southern African 21, 1995, P 362. u d o r p e R 174 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 I regional security in sub-saharan africa I 35 Gilbert M Khadiagala, op cit, p 7. 55 New York Times (New York), 26 Novem- Affairs, Johannesburg, and held at Broe 36 Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the resur ber 1995. derstroom from 15 to 19 April 1991; gence of regionalism in world politics", 56 Ibid. William Gutteridge, op cit, pp 128-132; Review oj International Studies, vol 21, 57 Gilbert M Khadiagala, op cit, p 15. and Laurie Nathan, "With open arms" ... , 1995, P 254. 58 William G Martin, "The future of Southern op cit. 37 Gilbert M Khadiagala, op cit, p 7. Africa: What prospects after majority 73 Denis Venter, AJrica and the New World 38 Ibid, pp 7-8. rule?", Review oj AJrican Political Eco Order: From marginalization to regen 39 See Terrence Lyons, "Regional dynam- nomy, no 50, March 1991, pp 120-12l. eration?, Paper presented at the confer ics", in Francis Deng, et ai, Sovereignty as 59 Greg Mills and Christopher Clapham, ence of the India International Centre on responsibility: Conflict management in Southern AJrica after apartheid: A Jrame "Understanding Contemporary Africa: Africa, Washington, DC: The Brookings workJor analysis, Working Paper Series, India and South-South Co-operation", Institution, 1996. Bellville: Centre for Southern African held in New Delhi from 15 to 17 Feb 40 Gilbert M Khadiagala, op cit, p 8. Studies, University of the Western Cape, ruary 1996, pp 29 and 30. 41 Ibid, P 9. April 1991, P 6; and Hasu H Patel, Peace 74 F W de Klerk, The international road 42 See George K Kieh, "The obstacles to the and security in a changing Southern aheadJor South AJrica, Occasional Paper, peaceful settlement and resolution of the AJrica: A Jrontline view, Working Paper Johannesburg: South African Institute of Liberian civil conflict", Studies in Coriflict Series, Bellville: Centre for Southern International Affairs, 1991, p 5. and Terrorism, vol 17, no 1, 1994, pp African Studies, University of the Western 75 See Bernhard Weimer, "Eine 'Konferenz 97-108; William O'Neill, "Liberia: An un Cape, April 1992, p 18. ueber Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit avoidable tragedy", Current History, vol 60 See Pieter Esterhuysen, AJrica at a im suedlichen Afrika'?", op cit, pp 92, no 574,1993, pp 213-217; and Daleep Glance 1995/96: Facts and Figures, 415-420. Singh, Regional initiatives in economic Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 76 See Peter Vale, "The case for a confer cooperation and conflict resolution: A 1995, pp 42-43. ence for security and cooperation in case study oj Ecowas, Paper presented at 61 Peter Vale, Hoping against hope: The Southern Africa (CSCSA)", in Anthofii the conference of the India International prospects Jor South AJrica 's post-apartheid van Nieuwkerk and Gary van Staden Centre on "Understanding Contemporary regional policy, Working Paper Series, (eds), Southern AJrica at the crossroads: Africa: India and South-South Coopera Bellville: Centre for Southern African Prospects Jor the political economy oj the tion", held in New Delhi from 15 to 17 Studies, University of the Western Cape, region, Johannesburg: South African Febmary 1996. July 1992, p 11; and Hasu H Patel, op cil, Institute of International Affairs, 1991, pp 43 See Khabele Matlosa, "The military after p 18. 148-153. the election: Confronting the new demo 62 Deon Geldenhuys, "Ten crises in South 77 Ibid, P 15l. cracy", in Roger Southall and Tsoeu Africa's external relations", International 78 Ken Booth, op cit, p 23. Petlane (eds), Democratization and de AJJairs Bulletin, vol 13, no 3, 1989, 79 See Robert H Jackson, "The security ) 0 militarization in Lesotbo: The general elec pp 91-92. dilemma in Africa", in Brian L Job (ed), 1 0 tion oj 1993 and its aftennatb, Pretoria: 63 Charles Krauthammer, "The unipolar mo The insecurity dilemma: National seClI 2 Africa Institute of South Africa, 1995, pp me~t", in Graham Allison and Gregory F rity oJThird World states, Boulder: Lynne d e 118-139; and Pontso S Sekatle, Civil-mili Treverton (eds), Rethinking America's Rienner Publishers, 1992. t a tary relations in Lesotbo, Unpublished security: Beyond the Cold War to a New 80 Ken Booth, op cit, p 25. d ( PhD Dissertation, University of Natal, World Order, New York: W W Norton, 81 William Gutteridge, op cit, p 131. r Durban, 1996. 1992, p 297. 82 Ken Booth, op cit, p 13. e 44h Gilbert M Khadiagala, op cit, pp 9-10. 64 Peter Vale, op cit, p 11. 83 Thomas Ohlson and Stephen J Stedman, s i 45l Ibid, P 10. 65 See, for example, Hasu H Patel, op cit, Trick or treat? The end qf hipolarity and 46b Ibid. p 18. coriflict resolution in Southern AJrica, u 47P Purnell Murdock, "Liberia: Nigeria sanc 66 See Denis Venter, South AJrica and the Working Paper Series, Bellville: Centre e tions", Voice oj America (Correspon AJrican comity oj nations: From isola for Southern African Studies, University of h t dent's Report, Abidjan), 7 December tion to integration, Research Paper, no the Western Cape, December 1991, p 25. y b 1995. 56, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South 84 Peter Vale, "The case for a conference 48d Gilbert M Khadiagala, op cit, p 10. For a Africa, March 1992, pp 14-34. for security and cooperation in Southern e t critique of both the South African and 67 Peter Vale, op cil, pp 12 and 16. Africa (CSCSA)", op cit, pp 152-153. n Nigerian pOSitions, see Denis Venter, 68 William Gutteridge, op cit, p 128. 85 See Thomas S Kuhn, The structure oJsci a r "South Africa and Africa: Relations in a entific revolutions, Chicago: University g 69 Ken Booth, op cit, pp 25-26. e time of change", in Walter Carlsnaes and 70 Fernando Gon\;alves, op cit, p 7. 'of Chicago Press, 1970. c n Marie Muller (eds), Change and South 71 Andre du Pisani, "Security and peace ... ", 86 William G Nhara, Early warning and e c AJrican external relations, Johannes op cit, p 13. conflict in AJrica, lOP Papers, no 1, i l burg: Thomson International Publishers, 72 See Bernhard Weimer, "South Africa and Midrand: Institute for Defence Policy, r e 1996 (forthcoming); and Maxi van Aardt, the Frontline States: From confrontation February 1996, p 1. d "A Foreign Policy 'To Die For': South to confidence-building", Southern AJrica 87 Olu Adeniji, op cit, p 17. n u Africa's Response to the Nigerian Crisis", Political and Economic Monthly, vol 3, 88 Resolving Conflicts (OAU Conflict y in Africa Insight, vol 26, no 2, 1996. no 11, August 1990, pp 22-28; Bernhard Management Bulletin), vol 1, no 1, a 49w Gilbert M Khadiagala, op cit, p 11. Weimer, "Eine 'Konferenz ueber Sicher December 1995/January 1996, p 6. e 50t See Andrew Hurrell, op cit, pp 341-344. heit und Zusammenarbeit im suedlichen 89 See Mark Thomas, "OAU approves 51a Gilbert M Khadiagala, op cit, p 12. Afrika'?", AJrika Spectrum, vol 26, no 3, peace-keeping units", AJrica Recovery, G 52t Ibid, P 13. 1991, pp 415-420; Andre dL! Pisani, vol 9, no 2, August 1995, pp 1 and 4-5; e 53n See "Eritrea and Sudan: We won't take Ventures into the interior: Continuity and Raymond W Copson, AJrican con i b any more", The Economist, vol 337, no and change in South AJrica's regional flict prevention and peace-keeping: US a and other major donor efforts, current S 7936,14-20 October 1995, pp 60 and 65. policy, 1948 to 1991, Paper presented at 54y See "Horn of Africa: Special IGADD a conference on "South Africa into the issues, Paper presented at the African b Summit", Indian Ocean Newsletter, no 1990s and beyond", organized by the Studies Association Meeting, Orlando, d e 664, March 25, 1995, P 2. South African Institute of International Florida, 3 to 6 November 1995. c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 175 I regional security in sub-saharan africa I 90 See SADC Secretariat, Windhoek Com African Studies, University of the 102 Laurie Nathan, formalizing con/lict res munique, Workshop on Democracy, Western Cape, 1992. olution and security arrangements in Peace and Security, organized by the 95 SADC Secretariat, Towards the Southern Southern Africa, op cit, p S. SADC Secretariat in Windhoek, Namibia African development community: A dec 103 Tandeka Nkiwane-Muzenda, Regionalism from 11 to 16 July 1994; and Laurie laration by the Heads of State and and preventive diplomacy in the cun,mt Nathan and Joao Honwana, op cit. Government of Southern African States, peace and con/lict resolution process in 91 Resolving Conflicts (OAU Conflict 1992, Windhoek, pp 9-10. Southern Africa, Paper presented at the Management Bulletin), vol 1, no 1, 96 SADC Secretariat, Treaty of the Southern Second Acdess Workshop on "South December 1995/January 1996, pp 1 and 2. African Development Communi(y, 1992, Africa within Africa: Emerging Policy 92 Ibid P 3. Articles 5 (1) (b) and (c). Frameworks", held in Johannesburg from 93 Ibid, pp 3 and 4; see also, Jakkie Cilliers, 97 Ibid, Article 21 (3) (g). 24 to 27 January 1996, p 7. Conflict, crisis areas and regional secu 98 See SADC Secretariat, Southern Africa: A 104 Discussions by the author with the n·ty cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa, framework and strategyfor building the Tanzanian High Commissioner to South Paper presented at the conference of the communi(y, Harare, 1993, pp 24-26. Africa, Mr Ami Mpungwe, on 26 January India International Centre on "Under 99 See SADC Secretariat, Windhoek Com 1996 in Pretoria, and with Mr Hermann standing contemporary Africa: India and munique, Workshop on Democracy, Hanekom and Mr Horst Brammer of the South-South cooperation", held in New Peace and Security, organized by the Multilateral Division, Africa Section, Delhi from 15 to 17 February 1996, es SADC Secretariat in Windhoek, Namibia Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria pecially pp 1-17. from 11 to 16 July 1994. on 27 March 1996; see also, Jakkie 94 See Robert Davies, Integration or coop 100 Olu Adeniji, op cit, p 2I. Cilliers, op cit, especially pp 17-25. eration in a post-apartheid Southern 101 See SADC Secretariat, Political coopera 105 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An agenda for Africa: Some reflections on an emerging tion, democracy, peace and security: A peace, New York: Department for Public debate, Southern African Perspectives, note from the secretariat, Johannesburg, Information, United Nations, 1992, p II. no IS, Bellville: Centre for Southern August 1995. 106 Tandeka Nkiwane-Muzenda, op cit, p 4. ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R 176 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 ~ 996 The @O£J@O@J and Fwe of Caprivi Any historical grounds for a status of primus inter pares? ince the beginning of this cen tion R261 of 1971,8 recognized the exis Prof Chris Maritz of the tury there has been periodic tence of a so-called "tribal government" Department of Development conflict in the Caprivi region of (likuta) for each of them. But other than S Namibia between the Mafwe usual, the Proclamation did not describe Studies at the Rand (Fwe) and Masubia (Subia). A variety of the geographical areas of the so-called Afrikaans University, issues have contributed to the struggle "tribal authorities". The reason for this johannesburg, traces the between these two ethnic groups: occu seems to be twofold: on the one hand, pational and user-rights on land; ap documentary proof could not be (and history of the Caprivi as well pointments, positions and promotions in still has not been) found that a compe as the histories of both the the joint regional administration; admis tent authority had geographically deter Subia and Fwe under vari sion to and use of existing facilities; the mined a political boundary between the question of whether the Fwe is a single Fwe and Subia and, consequently, gov ous rulers and comes to the group or not, and the appointment of ernment acted as if the whole of Eastern conclusion that no grounds certain teachers in different areas. At the Caprivi was jointly inhabited and owned exist to substantiate the heart of this conflict apparently lies what by both groups, in spite of the implicit claim of the Subia to Cohen and Middleton call "indigenous and administrative recognition of "tribal ness": who settled first in the area and, areas". On the other hand, the Subia ve hegemony in this particularly, who was the first original hemently deny that there is any such region of Namibia. authority in this region, because" ... con boundary; they claim that the Fwe is not quest seems to set a baseline in cultural a single group but is made up of differ time) for indigenousness".1 ent groups, and that these groups are 0 1 In regard to the Caprivi, this refers subordinate, or should be subordinate, 0 to2 a repeated claim by the Subia that the to the Subia - as the application to the Fwed are (or should be) subordinate to court indicates. Nevertheless: from the e thet Subia, and that the Subia chief is (or a government's side the Fwe and Subia shouldd be) the ruler (munintenge)2 of ( have throughout been accepted as ther Caprivi and its inhabitants. Claims equals and treated as such, and it has e andh demal)ds of this nature have been s been accepted that there is in existence i raisedl many times in the past and were a social border, which cannot be legal b periodicallyu mediated - only to be reiter ly enforced in geographical terms. P ated more vehemently by the Subia. The It is, under the circumstances, ac e latesth example of such a peace agree t cepted that the issue of "indigenous menty is what is known as the Katima ness" (as referred to above) can clarify b Declaration on National Reconciliation of the merits of the positions of the two d e 3 Mayt 1993. The repeated Subia claim has groups. To establish this would require alreadyn led to numerous official investi that greater clarity be reached about the a gationsr 4 as well as an application in the g origin, movement and settlement of the Supremee Court in Windhoek in 1983 Fwe and the Subia in the region which c (withn appeal to the Appellate Division later became known as the Eastern e c ini Bloemfontein).5 The Supreme Court Caprivi - a region about which little is l rejectedr the application of the Subia chief known before the first Luyi/Luyana/Lozi e tod be declared munintenge on the kingdom was established (in what is groundsn that it would not be consistent now southwest Zambia) and of which u 6 withy the prevailing legislation. The the Caprivi formed part. court,a however, did not go into historical w e groundst on which the claim rests, and thus,a did not consider the claim from that G The origin of Caprivi perspective.t e The first Lozi kingdom n As shown below, since the era of i Germanb rule over the Caprivi it has been Viewed in retrospect, four phases in the a acceptedS that Eastern Caprivi (see map) historical course can be distinguished to isy inhabited by two district groups, which cursory attention will be given, b namelyd the Fwe and the Subia.7 The namely the first Lozi (Luyi, Luyana) e Southc African government's Proclama- kingdom, the Kololo kingdom, second u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 177 I THE SUBIA AND FWE OF CAPRIV\ Lozi kingdom and while hegemony Sangwali (in the soulhweslem corner of (German and SOllth African conlrol).9 the laler easrern Capriv;) LO guard the ) ) nonhern groupings within Ihe Lozi conSidered to be an encroachment on 0 1 territOry (being Ihe nuclei established Lozi sovereignty and inrerests, and in 0 2 through, respectively, Mwanarnbinyi lerference in internal Lozi affairs. Ir is d and Mboo) under a Single Lozi chief Iherefore understa nda ble Ihal the firsr e t laincy. Wirh that he prepared the way miliLalY clash between rhe Lozi and the a d ( for a powerful expansion of the Lozi northbound Kololo took place after the r kingdom by rhe sixth Lozi ruler, Ngo latter crossed the Linyanri River from e h mbala (172S-1775). 16 .lalla poinls our Ihe present-day Botswana 10 settle in s i l thaLlhe regiments of Ngombala moved the Linyanti area . The Loz; warriors b u from Nakaywe via Siome to Sesheke were defeated by Lhe Kololo, com P and Kazungula, and also plundered Ihe manded by Mbololo, a few kilomelres e h 2 t Toka and Leya before they advanced north of Linyanri in abour 1830. ) 17 y southwest LO the Linyanri Rlve ... Ac b cording 10 the Fwe sources of Prerorills, The Kololo d e t . gombala appointed a represenrarive More dara exist on the northward trek of n named Linyanli aL the present-clay the Bafokeng or Sebetwane from the a r g present-day r r c.~ Srale, and their even e tual settlemenr in l3ulozi. 22 Staled briefly: c n Seberwane and his followers moved e c i northwards from Ihe present southern l r Free Srare during the difaqane period; in e d 1823 rhey panicipared in an arrack on n the Tlhaping capiral near rhe presenr u y Kuruman; numerous Tswana groupings a in Ihe western Transvaal and Botswana w e t were plundered by Seberwane and there a were also clashes with the Matabele of G t Mzilikazi before he crossed the Linyanril e n Chobe and settled in the Linyanli area i b (where he fought the Lozi and won the a S ballle). Because of malaria and tsetse fly, y SebeLwane moved east and nonheast b d Tlhe (traoitional) courtroom of the kula (tribal councillcourt) of the Mafwe at along the Chobe River until he reached e c Linyanti (1984) PhOlO. M W Pnnsloo rhe confluence with rhe Zambezi River u d o r p e R I 178 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 ------THE SUBIA AND FWE OF CAPRIVI ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ANGOLA .. ,-" WESTERN To M'':l!!...\---,~'on9'1Ja< '-. ' CAPRIVI BOTSWANA BOTSWANA ~ FO ~ cST RESERVE Gaha Htll! ~ SW"' MP .. Sa:bu&e on his way ro [he Taka highland. On re lew who.·was young, unsure of himself, quest of the Subia under Nsundano, he a nd extremely d isrrustful, a ppoinred became) involved in a tribal dispure be only Kololo in posirions of authoriry 0 rween1 the Subia and Leya, crossed rhe and killed all possible rivals wirhin the 0 Zambezi2 ar KilZungula with the help of kingdom. thed Taka of Mosokutwane and srarred Wirhin rhe Kololo, as well as the e t Lozi and orher subordinate groups, re toa subjugate paris of Bulozi nonh of rhe d Zambezi( - a kingdom that was at rhar sislance aga inst rhe rule of Sekeleru pointr in rime weakened as a resulr of in gradually grew, and this weakened the e h ternals dissenr and civil war. Afrer con kingdom from within. Sekelelu died of i queringl rhe capiral of the I.ozi kingdom leprosy in 1863. Leadership was taken b andu esrablishing his authority over the over by Mbololo, a member of Ihe rul P ethniC groups within the kingdom, he ing group who had defeated rhe Lozi in e h againt moved sourhwards, punished rhe 1830. He moved the imperial head Subiay and Toka for helping the Marabele quarters from Linyami ro (old) Sesheke b (of Mzilikazi) during an arrack on the (now Mwandi in Zambia) on rhe nonh d e Kololo,t and finally seuled ar Linyanti ern bank of the Zambezi, and rhus to a (Sangwali)n in 1850, where Sebetwane pOinl outside the present-day Caprivi. a r diedg on 7 July 1BS1, after meeting Living At Ihar srage, SipopJ, a L02i prince who stonee . lived for some time at rht: courts of c n Under the leadership of Seberwane, Seberwant: and Sekeletu at Linyanti,23 e c rhei Kololo kingdom was expanded in started a campaign LO overthrow Kololo l suchr a way rhat ir exceeded the borders rule. Sipopa's ngambe/a (chief council e ofd the former Lozi kingdom ro the north lor), Njekwa, in particular played an andn sourh. The groupings within rhe Lozi active role in rhe onslaught and rhe u kingdomy and under conlrol of rhe Lozi Kololo kingdom was overthrown in duringa the reign of the Lozi kings (in 1864. After rhis, Njekwa and his lieu w e cludingt the Fwe and Subia of the present renants sniffed out all Kololo men in Capria vi) thus came under rhe authority rhe kingdom and killed rhem.24 Kololo G oft the Kololo. The obligation to pay rrib women and children were absorbed by e uten to the Kololo ruler was maimained. the Lozi. i b After the dearh of Sebetwane, he a S The second L02i kingdom was succeeded by his daughler, Mma y mochisane,b who abdicated and :rans Afler the take-over by Sipopa, the Lozi ferredd rhe ch ieftainship ro Seke:c:.I, son h:ld to reimpose their authority on cer e (possiblyc stepson) of Sebetwane. Seke- tain groups (including the Subia) which u d o r p e R L_ VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 179 I THE SUBIA AND FWE OF CAPRIVI were of the opmlOn that the end of of the initial power relationship be of South Africa. Proclamation 12 of Kololo hegemony meant the end of the tween Seluka and Mamili (Simataa 1922 gave effect to this decision. Pro 25 empire. The system of Lozi territorial Kabende) is unclear. 27 Jaba/Chaba, clamation 23 of 1922 (SA) declared the administration was re-established. It Mayuni and Ingenda were appointed as laws of the Bechuanaland Protectorate meant that Sipopa divided the king subordinates of Seluka at the Mashi/ binding on the Caprivi, a dispensation dom under two semi-independent cap Kwando River. Three provincial likuta which remained valid until 31 August itals, namely Namuso in the north and were formed for the outlying areas: at 1929. A subsequent proclamation 096 Lwambi in the south, with the 'under Sesheke, Kaunga and Libonda. At Se of 1929) transferred control of the standing that a female relative would sheke the son of Lewanika, Litia (Yeta), area, as from 1 September 1929, to the rule in the south, but would not suc was placed in charge, while Kaunga Administrator of South West Africa, ceed in the north. The two administra was the seat of authority for the Mashi and stipulated that legislation applica tive areas were further divided into area under control of Litianyana, son of ble on South West Africa would also provinces, which were subdivided into Lewanika's brother, Wamunungo.28 apply to the Caprivi. However, in lilala (wards) under manduna (head terms of Proclamation 147 of 1939, the men). The practice of paying tribute to White rule administration of the Caprivi became the Lozi king was resumed. _ There was no physical German pres the responsibility of the Minister of Sipopa was killed in 1876 during ence in the Caprivi until 1909,29 in spite Native Affairs of South Africa. This dis a rebellion within Lozi ranks and was of the fact that it was under German pensation remained valid until 31 succeeded by Mwanawina, who had authority from 1890 in terms of an in August 1977, when Proclamation 181 to flee to the Toka in 1878. Prince ternational agreement. Apparently, as of 1977 empowered the Administrator Lubosi became king, but was over far as the Lozi were concerned, the sta General of South West Africa to pro thrown during a rebellion in 1884 and tus qua ante still prevailed. mulgate legislation for Caprivi. The sit found refuge with Libebe, chief of the Hauptmann Streitwolf30 arrived uation remained thus until the inde Mbukushu at' Andara in the present from Gobabis in Caprivi in January pendence of Namibia in 1990. Kavango. The instigator of this rebel 1909 as representative of the German Against this background and lion, Mataa, appointed another royal, Imperial government. He found the within the context of the above-men Tatila Akufuna, as king of the Lozi in area almost uninhabited. All livestock tioned historical process, the ethno September 1884. In November 1885 were taken over the Zambezi on in histories of the Fwe and Subia have to Lubosi returned from Andara with a struction of Lewanika. At Linyanti, be viewed more closely. Two givens, ) military force, defeated the rebels and Streitwolf met the aged Lozi legate, however, must be underlined in ad 0 1 resumed his position as king of the Mamili, and confirmed his position as vance: first, that the area which was 0 2 Lozi. From this pOint onwards, he be head over the non-Subia part of the later to become known as Caprivi was d came known by the honorary name Caprivi,31 Streitwolf moved along the continuously, since the rule of Ngo e t which, freely translated, a Lewanika, Kwando and explained the new situa mbala (the sixth Lozi ruler - 1725- d ( means conqueror. 26 He ruled over tion to the inhabitants, namely that the 1775) under Lozi and Kololo control; r Caprivi as an integral part of the Lozi Lozi would no longer have authority and secondly, that no sign of domina e h s kingdom, until the arrival of Haupt over the Caprivi. To the subordinates tion by the Subia over the Fwe is ap i l mann Streitwolf in 1909 as represen of Seluka who lived in Caprivi, the parent from the historical record. b u tative of the German imperial govern choice was given to either move over P ment in the area. the (new) border to Northern Rhodesia e h The Mafwe (Fwe) t As mentioned above, representa (now Zambia) and thus remain subjects y tives were appointed or confirmed of Seluka, or to stay on in Caprivi but The group which is known as the Fwe, b throughout the kingdom at the start of then under the authority of Mamili. is of heterogeneous origin and it is d e t the second Lozi kingdom. In essence, They chose to accept Mamili as their probably for this reason that Pretorius n new chief. 32 During his short stay in wrote: "The Fwe ... is historically ... a this implied the continuation of a prac r g tice followed during the first Lozi king Caprivi, Streitwolf managed to bring the least known tribe",33 In essence, e dom and also during the time of Kololo back the livestock, to demarcate·boun the group represents a product of fu c n rule. As far as Caprivi was concerned, daries, to appoint a former Subia head sion between "real" Fwe, Yeeyi, Totela, e c i the governmental system evolved as man, Chikamatondo, as chief of the Mbukushu, Lozi and Kwengo, under l r follows: By the end of the first Lozi Subia, and to establish a rudimentary Lozi leadership but under the name of e d kingdom, Mwamba Seluka was the administration at Schuckmansburg, op the Fwe. C E Kruger, who for many n only representative with authority over posite (old) Sesheke (Mwandi). years was the magistrate of the area, u y the southern area, stretching from Ba German authority over Caprivi explained that when Pretoria took over a gani (at the Kavango River) to Mpalila was ended by Rhodesian troops in in 1939 from Windhoek, the group was w e t Island (Kazungula), thus including Ca September 1914, during World War I. officially described as Mafwe (Bayeyi). a privi. He had subordinates (representa After the war South Africa was en Later the name Bayeyi was left out, ap G t tives) at the different communities. trusted with the League of Nations parently with everyone's approvaJ.34 e n Shortly after the start of the second Lozi mandate for South West Africa. Out of The catalyst for the fusion process was i b kingdom (1864), Simataa Kabende was practical considerations, however, it obviously the Lozi legate at Linyanti a S appointed by the Lozi ruler himself (not was decided that the Caprivi should from 1865, namely Simataa Kabende y (Muyongo) with the honorary name of b by Seluka) as his representative in the rather be administered by the British d Linyanti area and conferred the hon High Commissioner (as part of the Mamili. He is still remembered by e c orary title of Mamili on him. The nature Bechuanaland Protectorate) on behalf these segments as "our first chief". The u d o r p e R I 180 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 THE SUBIA ANO FWE OF CAPRIVI "rea]" Fwe indicates an origin from rhe credentials which are required for Shanjo;35 the Torela point ro a heart chieftainship, namely royal authOrity. land direcrly norrh of Katima MuJilo;36 From Simataa (Mamili) onwards. rhe Yeeyi acknowledge ries with the there is a clear line of succession. Suc Koba (of BOlSwana),37 and the Mbu cessive lozi rulers apparently accepled kushu refer co Mwanambinyi and rhe him as their representative in the areas of Katima Muli]o, Kwando and Linyanti area. Wirh the arrival or Streit Andara as areas of origin.38 Before wolf, Simataa was acknowledged as Simataa Kabende, there were thus sep chief of the Fwe (including the Yeeyi, arare histories for the segmenrs; under Totda, Hambukushu and Makwengo). his rule rhey started to now togerher. Prerorius srates that "Srreitwolf con Therefore, the ethno-history of the Fwe firmed Simataa Mamili's pOSition as "starts" with Simataa Kabende - but chief and extended his jurisdiction with the understanding rhat the deputy over rhe entire non-Subiya area of of Ngombala, Linyanri, and his succes Caprivi .. ".jj sors, and also rhe Kololo, played a role After Simataa rhere was conrinu in this fusion process. ous succession in rhe royal house of StreiC\Volf reckoned that Simataa rhe Fwe: Lifasi (1909-1931); Simaraa was about 10 years old when the 0932-1938; 1939-1944); Simasiku Kololo arrived. He lived at the coun of 0944-1970; Richard Temuso Mu Sebetwane at Linyanti; experienced rhe hinda 0971-1987) and Bonif:lce Beebi fall of the Kololo kingdom; stayed lrue 0987-). Afrer the appointmenr of to Lubosi when he had to nee ro Simataa Kabende (Mamill) by Streir Anchua and fought bravely on the side wolf. all furrher chiefs were apparenr of Lubosi's forces in the barrie of Lealui, Iy selecled as such by Ihe Fwe and ap through which Lubosi had won back pointed by the compe(ent authority. his posicion as Lozi ruler. 39 According AuthorilY was granted ro rhem, which ro Fwe testimony, Simataa was a Lozi of if it did nor expressly refer ro "rhe area noble descenr, and was appointed as of the Mafwe rribe", in any case im "sub-chief") (or headman) al Lwena in MamP: V, Richard Temuso Muhinda, plied rhe existence of an area of Fwe 0 the1 present Zambia, afrer rhe lake-over fifth Ch ef (mfumu) of the MaFwe legitimacy. The record of succession of0 power by Sipopa in Shorrly (1971 1987) Photo. MW PI... 5100 2 1864. also shows no occurrence or phase in thereafterd - probably in 1865 - he was the history of rhe Fwe from which it e appoinredt as "chief" in the Linyanri (Fwe, Yeeyi, Totela, Hambukushu and can be concluded that the Subia at any a area,d partly as a resulr of !.he facr rhat he Makwengo) and Lozi representative st:lge had authoriry over the Fwe. The ( stayedr in the Linyanri area earlier. His Mamifi (Simalaa Kabende) grew view of Kruger can rhus be endorsed: e taskh was ro guard the southern border stronger. Living together, suffering ro "The conclusion reached is that, as far s i ofl rhe kingdom againsr invaders. Wirh gether and fighting together (against as we can see, no Subia chief ever put b hisu appointment (and in accordance Marabele and Tswana from rhe south) sovereign step in the land of the Ma P with Lozi tradirion), the official (and susrained the process or fusion under fwe and jf perchance one strayed that e honorary)h name of iHamili was given Mamili. way all imprinl of ir will long since t roy him by the Lozi ruler, also bearing In rhis process, the role of tradi have been oblirerated by the march of b reference to the earlier resident Kololo tion and polirical culrure should not be events".~5 Unde!" Sourh Arrican admin d sub-chiefe (or headman) of the Linyanri underestimated, while relative isolation iSlrarion the rwo groups and their t 46 area.'wn Thus Simataa Kabende was would also have played a pan. Bec:luse chiefs were accorded equal st:lLUS. a henceforthr known as sub-chief or in or Lozi dominance, Lo'li culture and g l duncte Mamili. By the end of the previ tradirion would have been the rrame of c The Masubia (Subia) ousn cenrury, rwo Lozi provinces en reference for non-Lozi elements. Se e closedc the terricory of the present condly, it is pan of the LOli (and Ko- The most comprehensive exposition of i l 1010) political culture thar (he ruling lin the elhno-history of Ihe Subia is lO be Caprivi:r the Sesheke province under Letiae with Mamili and (according to eage (rribal head, paramount chief, round in the contribution of Shamu d Srreitwolf)n Tjikamatondo as representa ruler) had to be or royal origin. Various kuni 10 Botswana notes and records . ~7 u rivesy in, respectively, the southwesrern examples exisr in rhe Lozi history of The racr thac Shamukuni, according anda easrern parts; and rhe Kaunga "non-royals" who unseared kings or 10 all indications, is a Subia himselr, w provincee (which included the north rulers (Njekwa and Mataa) bur did not places his contribucion in a special t westerna part) under Letianyana with take over the ~", i :lgship themselves - contexr. What he presents can thus be G Mwambat Seluka as royal represenra they "recruited" a royal (Sipopa and seen as (he Subia interpretation of their e H riven Fwe testimony has it that the Tarila Akufuna) to take the ruler'S history. i 43 areab over which Mantili was appointed sear. The question of whether Simataa Shamukuni stans off by stating a byS Sipopa, was hencerorth no more Kabende was in reality a Lozi royal is, rhat the Subia a re serried ar five dwell undery !.he au!.horiry or Seluka. undei' the circumstances, nOl of grear ing places/areas, namely the Caprivi, b d In the course of rime, the identi importance: in the minds of those con Chobe district (Botswana), Sesheke e ficarionc between rhe va rious segments cerned, he was accepted as having the area in Zambia, Rakops (Borlerie, u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 181 I THE SUBIA AND FWE OF CAPRIVI Borswana) and Gomare (Botswana). further understood from Shamukuni" They accept Goha Hills (or Gowa) in thar there was a representative of Sebe rhe north of Borswana as rheir earliest twane at Nkonkwena's court. After the known dwelling place. Here they ovenhrow of the Kololo kingdom by stayed during the rule of Shanjo (also Sipopa (in 1864). Nkonkwena and his known as Sancho), while Yeeyi (under followers fled from his island around Masarasara) and Mbukushu (under IB76 to seule at Rakops near the Makga Dibebe) also lived rhere. It is denied digadi Pan in what is now Borswana , rhac rhe Subia branched off from rhe Here he stayed as a guesr, for it was rhe Mbukushu or Totela, but grounds exist area of Khama III of the Ngwaro. His to suspeCl that rhey are relared to the son, Mafwira, broke away wich a num Damara.48 ber of followers and established himself From the Goha Hills the Subia at Tlhale, Ngamiland, in rhe area of Mo moved ro rhe Chobe River. During the remi, chief of the Tawana. At the rime of journey, Shanjo died and was succeed Ihe RighI of Nkonkwena OUI of rhe ed by his son, Mafwira I, who after a Caprivi, his sister, Ntolwe, stayed be sholl rule was succeeded by his broth hind at Isuswa, where she "ruled".56 er, Nsundano 1.,\') Nsundano I is seen as Afrer her death the question arose "as to "the founder of icenge" (kingdom) and it who would slICceed her as chief of Ihe Flat flood plains are the dominant was during his rule that "the Basubiya baSubia in the Caprivi",s7 She was even geographical characteristic of most idenrified them as an independent rually succeeded by a regenr, Chika of the Caprivi Strip area rribe".so According to che same source, matondo, after which Liswaninyana "Nsundano I found the baToteia and rhe rook over. baFwe around rhe presem Katima Mulilo Though unclear when, a number and Linyanri respectively. These small of Subia lefr Rakops and seHled at tribes were not powerful and did not Munga (nonhern Borswana. sourheast have recognised chiefs. Soon they came of the Liambezi lake). In 1901 Chika II I under Nsundano I. ... Nsundano I had Liswani III became head of rhis group, heard of the warlike Matebele to the He rerired and was succeeded in 1923 ) Sourh-easr of Chuengwe-namuririma (the by his son, Nsundano II, who was de 0 1 Victoria Falls), possibly from Bushmen. posed in 1925. Ch ika Il/Liswani III filled 0 2 He (Nsundano) rhen esrablished his the position again until his dearh in d Roya) Village of Luchindo on the north 1927, He was succeeded by Simvula, e t ern bank of the Chobe River about five son of Nkonkwena, in 1928, who was a d succeeded in by his son, Moffat ( miles east of Ngoma, in the presenr 1969 r Caprivi strip".)] Here Nsundano I be Maiba Simvula, who is seen by aurhor e h came known as Liberenge/Libelenge Shamukuni as rhe 111 ttninlenge, thar is s i l and rhe borders of his kingdom were as rhe "rightful chief of the baSubia".5B b u foHows: Sakapani south of Goha as rhe As far as rhe lsuswa group is con P mosr southern poim; Nunga ro the cerned: Liswaninyana died in 1937, after e h soucheasr ; Victoria Falls ro the easr; which Chikamatondo again acred as t y along the Zambezi upstream as far north chief of rhe Subia in rhe Caprivi until his b as Sioma, and to the west downsrream dearh in 1945, and was succeeded by Si d e t along the Kwando, through Kaunga and mvula Maiba, The laller srayed at Kabbe n Singalamwe, past Sabute (Savuri) and where he died in 1965. He was rhe bio a r g down ro Sakapani. These borders em :ogical farher of Mutwa Josiah Muhango, e braced a territory which included the who, wirh his appointment as chief of c n whole of Easrern Caprivi (with excep the Subia in Caprivi, accepted Ihe name e c i tion of the part west of the Kwando). Maiba Moraliswan;. He is srill chief of l r According to Shamukuni. Nsundano I the Subia in Eastern Caprivi today. e d WilS the conremporary of the Lozi ruler, Prerorius' account of the Subia his n Mulambwa52 (]7BO- IB30).53 IOry59 is consistent with Shamukuni's. u y Nsundano I was killed by the Leya, and it is also clear rhar Prerorius relied a and was succeeded by Liswani I, his heavily on Subia sources, especially on w e t nephew, Liswani I established himself the interpreration of a prinCipal of a at Isuswa, colluded wirh the Matabele, Kanono schoo!.6/) Starements such as that G t and was later killed by Sebetwane, the rhe Subia "who lived belWeen the con e n Kololo chief. According ro SiJlery,S4 it i fluence of the Chobe and Lyambai b was With the blessing of Sebetwane that (Zambezi) and along the nonhern bank a S Nkonkwena (known as Liswani /I) suc of rhe Lyambai as far norrh as Katima y b ceeded Liswani I. Nkonkwena estab Mulilo, was politically and milirarily the d lished himself on Mpalila Island where dominanr tribe"; that Nsundano con e c the Chobe flows into the Zambezi. Ir is quered large areas; that (the Subia claim) u d o r p e R I 182 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 THE SUBIA AND FWE OF CAPRIVI "rhey have always ruled over rhe entire Easrern Caprivi Zipfel and as far west as the Okavango River". and rhat they "also provided Ihe present ruling dynasty of the Mafwe",61 are in line with (he (su:) jeClive) interprelation [:~.ar rhe Subia give to historical evenls. Evaluation Some of the sraremenlS of rhe Subia have ro be quesrioned . Firstly. that Nsundano, who is seen as rhe founder of the Subia kingdom Utenge), would have subjected the whole Easrern Caprivi, includ-ing Ihe Fwe. Pretorius6l as well as Mainga63 refer ro the conquesrs of Lozi King Ngombala ( who, according to Prerorius. ruled be tween 1725--1775) during whose reign some of rhese Subia rerurned under A Caprivi man with his mukoro rhe Subia were subjugated. Royal repre leadership of Chikamarondo and re (canoe) - the essenlia mechanism sematives were appointed by Ngoma ques[ed Mamili (the representalive of for Iranspor1 over :he Zambiz.i bala in all the conquered areas, lO guard the L02i king in Linyanti) for land. Ma (Lyambail Lyambaye) and swamps in the region. Pholo, M W Prinsloo over Lozi inreresrs. Since Ihal lime mili sene a message to rhe king (Lewa (±1750) Ihe presenl Easlem Caprivi has nika), who indicared rhar Mamili should been continuously under Lon. or Kololo allocate land to these Subia "who like [Q or while control. The contemporaJY of Slay in rhe swamps" in the e 1820d and 1830, bur ir was only in 1837 trol unt:i Gem1an concrol became effec e t rhara they moved to Bulawayo from rive), it was not possible for the Subia ro d where( they exerred pressure on the obGlin exclusive polirical comrol over rhe r Zambezie region. The references (in the present Easrern Caprivi m any stage - h Subias version) ro Mulambwa and the even less over [he a rea as indicated by i Marabelel therefore point, at (he earliest. allthor Shamukuni and which is referred b rou rhe period afrer 1800, al which time to as itenge. P Ihee Easlern Caprivi had already been Thirdly, because of his disloyalry, h undert Lozi rule for roughly 50 years. No Liswani 1 was killed by Sebetwane. Ac sourcey could be found confirming that cording 10 Subia sources, his death lIsh b ered in rhe disintegration of the '·tribe". rhed Lozi were anacked and conquered e byt Nsundano I, or that Ihe area indical According to Fwe sources, however. n ;l eda by the Subia as ilenge. was ceded [0 Liswani I was only headmanlinduna r rheg Subia by rhe Lozi. If il did happen. under rhe L02i (wi(h (he implic whye did rhe Lozi (and nor the Subia) ar there was or could have been orhers), c lackn the Kololo of Sebetwane when the while Lozi SOllrces also do not mention e c laneri crossed the Linyanti/ Chobe in the lha( hI" was acknowledged as the chief l larer 1820s?66 of t[-.f' (['lllS all) Subia . Nkonkwena suc e d Fwe Sources give a differenr ex ceeded Liswani I ~nd estab,ished him· n self at Mpalil afrery Sipopa defeated the Kololo (1864), account rhal Uswani W Sipopa.t ''Then Sipopa descended on the period of 26 years - if he was indeed e Subian headmen implicated in rhe plor "chief" of rhe Subia and acknowledged i andb murdered them in cold blood . ~ 67 as such. Such evidence could not be a S The Fwe funher maintain that Nko found; on the contmry, mention is made y nkwenab and his ruling lineage (of the Ihat Sipopa in 1865-1866 killed rhe re 68 Subia)d then f.ed OLiI of fear to Borswa na. bellious Subia headmen. Srals wriles e Afterc the ovpnr.row of Sipopa (1876). thar with the arrival of Srreirwolf in the u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 183 I _THE S!JBJA AND FWE OF CAPRIVI Caprivi, the groups did not have chiefs sponds with the remark of Stals, name Notes and references and that authority was vested in the ly that the Subia were subjects of the R Cohen andJ Middleton, "Introduction", hands of the different village head Rotse (Lozi) and thus had certain oblig in R Cohen and J Middleton, From tribe 69 men. ations towards Lewanika and his son to nation in Africa: Studies in incorpo From this it can be concluded that Letia of Sesheke.73 ration processes, Maynard MA: Chandler, the Subia interpretation of their own Sixthly, the nature of the basis for 1970, p 13. history contains a degree of romanti the Subia argument that the ruling lin 2 The concept munintenge is often used by cism. All that can be said with certain eage of the Mafwe had its origins in the the Subia to refer to the sovereign, king, ty, as far as the existence of the Subia Subia,74 is not clear, but it could be ruler or "owner" of a Subia kingdom as an "independent" group in Caprivi is that sisters of Subia rulers were also (named itenge) which, allegedly, included concerned, is what Kruger wrote in mothers of Fwe chiefs. Vorster in his the present Caprivi, and which existed before the Luyana, Kololo and successive 1963: "Their independence and status genealogy of the Fwe chiefs,75 does white administrators exercised authority as a recognized separate tribe dates show that the mother of Simataa Ka over the region. See D M Shamukuni, back ... to the time the German Resi bende (the first Mamili of the present "The Basubia", Botswana notes and dent appointed Chikamkatondo .... "70 lineage) was a Subia and that the records, vol 4, 1972, P 163 et seq. Fourthly, with the flight of Nko mother of his successor (Lifasi) was 3 See Die Republikein, 26 May 1993; 28 nkwena to the area of the Ngwato (in also a Subia (of Sesheke). The birth May 1993. On 19 July 1993, Die Botswana), a spatial removal of Subia status of these women is not known. If Republikein reported that the Caprivi out of the Caprivi took place. If Nko they (or one of them) were from "roy peace was on "shaky legs" after the po nkwena was indeed the primus inter alty", their sons would, from the view lice used teargas on 12 July to bring ares amongst the Subia, the senior lin point of the traditionally stronger ma order in Katima Mulilo between the Fwe eage of the Subia has been outside the trilineally orientated Subia, have had and Subia. Apparently the friction was Eastern Caprivi since 1865/1876. Con to be chiefs - and hence possibly the over the interpretation of the agreement of May and its consequences. (See The firmation of this is also found in a let claim. Seen from the patrilineally ori Namibian, 13 July 1995; New Era, 8-14 ter of Liswani III of Chobe, Botswana, entated Fwe viewpoint, however, it is July 1993; New Era, 15-20 July 1993.) to the Resident Magistrate of Kasane in the father (not the mother) that deter 4 In addition to investigations by local of 1924. (It was during the time that the mines the status of the child. There ficials at different times, a commission administration of Caprivi was seated in fore, from the viewpoint of the Fwe, (the Budack Commission) had been ap Kasane. Thus the Subia of Caprivi and such a possible Subia claim is invalid. pointed on 10 February 1982 to investi ) the Subia of the Chobe area - of Bo Moreover, the patrilineal line was ap gate the matter, while Judge Levy had 0 1 tswana - were practically administered parently followed in the appointment been appointed on 31 October 1991 to 0 2 investigate protests with reference to as a single unit.) Liswani III wrote, of the present Subia chief. d 71 promotion of certain officials, and which e interalia: " ... I am complaining why t basically focused on the same issue. See, a I am called Headman. If I am Headman d Conclusion "Commission of inquiry into the cause ( who is the proper chief? (of the Subia) of resistance by certain members of the r e ... there is no letter being received In view of the above, the reason for Caprivi community to the appointment h s from the Government which shows the "Royal House Declaration" of the i of certain senior public servants [Edu l b that Sondano (son of Liswani III) is Subia on 19 October 199176 is difficult cationl", (Levy Report), Windhoek [no u now a Chief; he is also written Head to appreciate. The available material datesl, as well as TEMPO, 18 July 1993; P e man, if so, who is the proper Chief of on the Caprivi does not point to dom Die Republikein, 9 September 1992; New h t the Basubia? ... There is no other big ination of the Fwe by the Subia at any Era, 15-22 July 1993; The Namibian, 16 y Chief of the Basubia except Sondano. point. In fact, both groups were July 1993. b 5 LevY Report, op cit, p 15 et seq. d Chika-Matondo (then chief in the throughout treated as groups of equal e 6 op cit, pp 17-18; M W Prinsloo, "Morali t Caprivi) is under Sondano". And in status. From the ethno-history of the n swani v Mamili: Aanspraak op opper a closing: " ... I wish Sondano (of Chobe) Fwe as well as that of the Subia it is r hoofskap in Caprivi", TSAR, no 3, 1987, g clear that there does not exist known to be known by the Government as the P 379, et seq. e c only Chief of the Basubia ... " historical grounds which can be cited 7 By Government Notice No 2429 of 1972 n e Fifthly, as far as the relative status to support a claim that the present described as that part of the Caprivi c i l of the Fwe and Subia before the period Eastern Caprivi as a whole "belonged" Zipfel which lies east of length meridan r of German control is concerned, it ap to the Subia and that the Subia chief 23° 18'00. e d pears as if the Fwe enjoyed a higher is - or should be - the only chief (or 8 Republic of South Africa, Government n u rather than lower status than the Subia, paramount chief) of the area. No Gazette, 3 December 1971. y because: "As for the Basubia, they were grounds for a claim on "indigenous 9 Data used here are partly derived from a field research done by the writer in 1984, w under the regional supervision of Letia, ness" on the side of the Subia viz-a e 1985, 1986 and 1987 in the Eastern t later named Yeta (the representative of viz the Fwe could be found. That the a matter needs mediation though with a Caprivi and published in a monograph G the Lozi paramount chief) at Sesheke entitled Chris Maritz, Etniese Fusie by die t (now called Mwandi), with Malozi In view to a solution, is also clear. And e Mafwe van Caprivi (Ethnic Fusion of the n i dunas at strategic places. Mamili (of the in this context, negotiations which Mafwe of Caprivi), Potchefstroom: De b could lead to the accommodation of a Fwe) , Siluka and Mwanota would also partment Central Publications, PU for S have recognised Letia as their superior both groups and the demarcation of a CHE, 1988. In June/July 1994 a follow-up y b but were not directly within his region boundary between the Fwe and Subia, visit was made to the area. d al control but rather under the Para appears to be the only way out of the 10 See A Jalla, "History of the Malozi", (a e c mount Chief Lewanika".72 It corre- present impasse. translation of the writer's work Litaba za u d o r p e R I 184 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 THE SUBIA AND FWE OF CAPRIVI Sicaba sa Malozi, Cape Town: Oxford hand that they were equals. In Linyanti, The elites of Barotseland, Berkeley: Uni University Press, 1921), p 4; M Gluck seat of Simataa, Streitwolf learned in versity of California Press, 1970, p 11. man, "The Lozi of Barotseland in North 1909 that "Ihre Oberindunas Seluka und 44 Ibid, P 42. western Rhodesia", in E Colson and M Sianga (bei Letia njana) hatten sie in 45 C E Kruger, A bistory of tbe Caprivi, un Gluckman (eds) Seven tribes of Britisb Ruhe gelasse" (op cit), p 126. At the same published manuscript, chapter 12, p 24. Central Africa, Manchester: Manchester time though, we know that not Seluka, Copies of this are available at the Depart University Press, 1959, p 2; M Mainga, but the Lozi king, Sipopa, appointed ment of Land Affairs, Pretoria. Bulozi under tbe Luyana kings, London: Simataa. On the other hand, Fwe sources 46 See C J Maritz, "Politieke verandering Longman, 1973, p 24. inform us that a representative at the (ontwikkeling?) in Caprivi", Politikon, 11 Op cit, p 26. Kwando River, namely Mayuni, was ap vol 13, no 1, 1986. 12 A reference to the rapids in the Zambezi pointed by Seluka. 47 D M Shamunkuni, "The Basubia", Bo close to the present-day regional capital 28 M Mainga, op cit, pp 135-136. Wamu tswana notes and records, vol 4, 1972, of Caprivi. Here Mwanambinyi appar nungo was killed during the rebellion of pp 161-183. ently had the drums (maoma) of the 1884. Other sources (F Seiner, "Ergeb 48 Ibid, P 161. See also A Sillery, Tbe Mbukushu taken from them. nisse einer Bereisung des Gebietes zwis Becbuanaland Protectorate, Cape Town: 13 A Jalla, op cit, p 8. chen Kawango und Sambezi, in den OUP, 1952, P 190 for a different inter 14 Ibid. M Mainga, op cit, p 28. Jahren 1905 und 1906", Mitteilungen aus pretation, namely that the Subia origi 15 Fwe kuta, interview 2 April 1984. den Deutscbe Scbutsgebieten, vol 22, no nated during the rise of the Lozi king 16 J Pretorius, Tbe Fwe of tbe Eastern 1,1909, P 11; and Anonymous "Deutsch dom and as product of the Mbukushu Caprivi Zipfel: A study of tbeir bistoriuJI Siidwestafrika. Die Expedition Streitwolfs and (possibly) Totela. and geograpbical background, tribal nach dem Caprivi-Zipfel", Deutscbes 49 Shamukuni, op cit, p 163. structure and legal system, witb special Kolonialblatt, vol 21, 1910, p 55) state 50 Ibid. reference to tbe Fwe family law and law that Litianyana was a son of Lewanika. 51 Ibid, P 163. ofsuccession, MA dissertation, University 29 E L P Stals, Kurt Streitwolf Sy werk in 52 Ibid, P 164. See M Gluckman, op cit, p 2. of Stellenbosch, 1975, p 26. Suidwes-Afrika, 189~1914, Johannes 53 17 Ibid, p 10; M Mainga, op cit, p 59. burg: Perskor, 1988, pp 70-71. 54 Op cit, P 191. 18 Ibid, p 26. Apparently the river (Mashi/ 30 The Fwe referred to him as "Katara 55 Op cit, P 165. Kwando) became known by the name matunga" - he who measures/counts the 56 Because it was within the kingdom of the Lozi, it thus would have been, at "Linyanti" as a result of the name of the land - probably on account of his de best, as subject of Robosi. representative of the Luyi authority, marcation of borders. For the Subia he 57 Shamukuni, op cit, p 167. namely Linyanti. was "Kambungu". 58 Ibid, footnote 14, p 21. 19 A J alia, op cit, p 10; J Pretorius, op cit, p 31 J Pretorius, op cit, p 42. Streitwolf re 59 Ibid, pp 21-2i. 26 also refers to Ingenda, Imusho and ferred to him as "Induna Mamili". See ) 60 Ibid, footnote 14, p 21. 0 others who were appointed as man Anonymous, op cit, 1910, p 56. 1 61 Ibid, pp 21-22. 0 duna/representatives at the Kwando/ 32 See Hauptmann Streitwolf, op cit, p 57. 62 Ibid, p 26. 2 Mashi. The choice to move or to Jive under the d 63 Ibid, p 59. Mainga also makes this mean 20e See M Mainga, op cit, pp 59--60. authority of Mamili was confirmed by t ingful remark in a footnote (p 11), "For 21a See Hauptmann Streitwolf, Der Caprivi Side Mabata (Sikonsinyana). Silalo: Ngombala's (K6) conquests in Sesheke, d Sebinda, interview on 11 May 1987. ( Zipfel, Berlin: Wilhelm Susserot, 1911, Batoka and Linyanti areas, see Box 356 r P 118. 33 Ibid, P 24. e 8/2/3 (NAZ)". 22h E W Smith, "Sebetwane and the 34 C E Kruger, letter to the writer, dated 7 s 64 M Gluckman, op cit, p 2. i l Makololo", African Studies, vol 15, 1956, January 1987. 65 I Schapera (ed), Livingstone's private b p 49 et seq; D F Ellenberger and J C 35 See Chris Maritz, op cit, pp 27-28. u journals, 1851-1853, London: Chatto P MacGregor, History of tbe Basuto, 36 W V Brelsford, Tbe tribes of Nortbern and Windus, 1960, p 26. e London: Caxton, 1912 (reprinted New Rbodesia, Lusaka: Government Printer, h 66 M Mainga, op cit, p 69, after A St H t York: Negro University Press, 1969), p 1956, p 14. Gibbons, "Marotseland and the tribes of y 305 et seq; D L Livingstone, Missionary 37 See Chris Maritz, op cit, 1988, p 26. b the Upper Zambezi", Journal of tbe Royal d travels and researcbes in Soutb Africa, 38 A Jalla, op cit, p 8. Colonial Institute, 1898, p 260 et seq. e t London: John Murray, 1857; I Schapera 39 Ibid, P 119. 67 Ibid,pl12. n (ed), liVingstone's private journals, 40 Fwe-kuta, Katima Mulilo, interview on 3 a 68 Ibid. r 1851-]853, London: Chatto and Windus, April 1984. Also see J Pretorius, op cit, p g 69 Ibid, p 76. e 1960, pp 16-28; M Mainga, op cit, p 65 et 30. 70 C E Kruger, "The eastern Caprivi Zipfel", c seq. 41 Doubt exists over the rank given to him. n Memorandum dated 4.1.1963, p 4, e Fwe sources have it as "chief of the 23c M Mainga, op cit, pp 93, 102-103. Department of Land Affairs, Pretoria, i l 24 E Holub, Seven years in Soutb Africa, Fwe". F Westbeech, in Trade and travel F54/11 07/3. r e London: Sampson, Marston, Searle and in early Barotseland, London: Chatto 71 See Shamukuni, op cit, p 177. d Remington, 1881, vol 11, p 143; M and Windus, 1963, p 63 refers to him as 71 Department of Land Affairs, F54/117/3, n u Mainga, op cit, p 96. "chief of Linyanti", while C E Kruger, un Memorandum by C E Kruger, 13/5/1976. 25y M Mainga, op cit, pp 103, 111-112. published report, 1 April 1940, p 10 73 Ibid, p 77. 26a Ibid, p 128. refers to him as "headman or sub-chief 74 J Pretorius, op cit, p 22. w 27e Conflicting information was received on ... to control the area". t 75 For a more comprehensive version, see a this: on the one hand that Simataa Ka 42 Anonymous, op cit, pp 55-56. Chris Maritz, op cit, 1988, opposite p 60. G bende was "under" Seluka, on the other 43 See M Mainga, op cit, p 103. G L Caplan, 76 See Levy Report, op cit, pp 15-16. t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 185 I AFRICA FOCUS hough elec(ions may be o ne of (he What is novel is the deliberate way vital signs of democratic, or at leasl in which self-demobilized generals now accountable, government. they are seek to acquire democratic credentials to by no means the only one. A free continue (heir hold on power in the face tpress ;md independent judiciary, tolerance of internalional pressure. II seems likely of polilical debate and criticism are also that Gambia's soldiers will soon allempt imporrant indicators of (he health of the this route, and speculation is already rife body politic. One may (hink of any num that Nigeria's General Abacha w:L ,i :50 ber of elections held in independent Africa decide that the safest way forward for his that do nothing to demonstrate either that regime is as a junta in mufti. a country is democratic in anything but its claim to be so, 01' Ihal its government en Benin - not nice for Soglo joys the surporr of [he bulk of the na [ional ropuialion. One of the most remarkable evenlS in Ihe Several elections have been held in recent political hislOry of Africa has been Africa this year, and more are due ovel' the legitimare return 10 power of an erst the neXI few months. Their conduct as while military dictator, who returned from much as Iheir outcomes have much to tell five years of obscurity to defeat lhe man us aboul the democratic project in Africa, who had ousted him in the country's pre a project being rromoted in difficult eco ViOllS elections. Aparl fro m anything else, Richard Cornwell, lhis rerresents an encouraging sign that ) nomic circumstances and in an environ 0 Head of Current Affairs democratic systems lllay be taking rOOI in 1 ment made even less secure by lhe end of 0 some ot~('~wise poor and unpromising 2 at the Africa Instttute of the Cold War. d To amicipate: one of the mosl inter soils. The example is all the more signifi e South Africa t canl in Ihat it comes from Benin, which a esting developmenls in recent years has d led the way in the so-called "second ( been the re-invention of military dictaco rs r wave" of democracy 10 cross the conti e as civilian politicians. At the beginning of h nent. This raises the faint hope that Ihe s the 1990s a number of writers who had i l example of a politician losing power at b analysed military rule in Africa had prob the polls only 10 regain ir in a later con u ably concluded Ihat, as with authorities P test will help counter rhe zero-sum nature e on Ihe Soviel bloc, ll:['irs was a speciality h of 50 much polilical rivalry in Africa. t suddenly rendereG :argc;y obsolete. Such Alternatively, the fate of Nicephore Soglo y conclusions wert: premature. In some b may dissuade other African leaders from d countries the so:d;ers have made a dra e taking any chances with the unpredictable t malic reappearance, as we nOled in the n swings of popular opinion. a lil .~1 edilion of Africa foclls. Elsewhere, r By the early 1950s three clear factions g and perhaps more in(el'eslingly, lhey are had emerged in the politiCS of Dahomey, e c re-emerging in the guise of civilian poUli as Benin was then known. Juslin Ahoma n e cians, hoping thus to win the acceptance c deghe was undisputed at Ihe head of the i l of the internarional donors and escape lhe Fon and Adja peoples of the old kingdom r e opprobrium of their suiled peers. of Dahomey, from whose royal house he d There is, of course, nOlhing new in n was descended; Sourou-Migan Apilhy en u Ihis phenomeno n. It is worrh reflecting joyed the sl1pporr of the Goun and Yoruba y a [hat from ils inception in 1910 until 1948 of Pono Novo; and Huberr Maga could call w South Africa had only ex-generals as prime e lIpon the support of the numerous groups t ministers, one of whom, Louis BOlha, ac a populating the north. The successors to G tually commanded a foreign campaign these factions have re-emerged in the mul t e while in o ffice. Nevertheless, we might tiparty system resuscitated by the national n i plead an exceptio n in the cases of Botha, conference of 1989. b a SmUlS and Henzog in that the first was ini General Manhieu Kerekou ruled S y tially a farmer, state official and polilici,ln, Benin from 1972 until 1991. His defeat in b and the laner two practising lawyers be the preSidential election of 1991 and his d e fore ever they donned uniform. departure from power had been sllloother c u d o r p e R F·O·C·U·S than expected. He had campaigned on The second round was held on Uganda is no party his introduction in 1989 of the nation 18 March. Unofficial figures gave Uganda is running an interesting ex al conference which ushered in multi Kerekou 59% of the vote, according to periment in the transition from mili party democracy, and had lost the sec national radio. The early release of tary to democratic rule, albeit of a ond round vote to Nicephore Soglo, these figures incensed Soglo's admin novel sort. On Thursday 9 May, Ugan who returned to the country from the istration, which claimed that their dans went to the polls to elect their World Bank to consolidate most of the leader had won the poll, albeit by a president. While there was broad two southern blocs' support behind his narrow margin. The electoral commis agreement among the 8,5 million reg candidacy. Having been granted in sion then released figures showing that istered voters that the exercise ought demnity, Kerekou left office and went Kerekou had taken 54% to Soglo's to confirm the essence of the past to live quietly in Cotonou, eschewing 46%, and armed men arrested the de decade's transformation in the coun the option of using his support in the puty director of the statistics institute try's political and economic fortunes, army to retain power. responsible for tallying the results. there were stark differences of opinion Soglo soon introduced reforms Amid fears of disorder and the about the constitutional framework that led to a recovery in Benin's shat possibility that the army might inter under which the voting was to take tered macroeconomic structure. The vene to compel Soglo's resignation, place. President Yoweri Museveni's economic and social costs to the urban the intimidation of the constitutional supporters had secured the passage of population and the civil service were court continued. The defence minister, a constitution entrenching a no-party considerable, however, and served as Soglo's brother-in-law Desire Vierya, democratic system for the next five another reminder of the essential con and the president's chief of staff years. In terms bf this novel arrange tradictions between the democrati General Basile Dadele were suddenly ment, which has attracted the interest zation project and the imposition of relieved of their posts, Soglo taking of a number of other African rulers, a structural adjustment programme. over the defence ministry. Moreover, Soglo's gradual adoption of presidential nominees stand as indi Soglo's efforts to reverse the elec viduals, as do candidates for the par an authoritarian style, the prominence torate's decision proved fruitless. On accorded his family and his flamboy liamentary elections. Parties are al 24 March the constitutional court an lowed to exist, but may not campaign ant excesses contrasted with the plight nounced that Kerekou had indeed won of most of the population. or hold rallies. The ruling National the election, with 52,49% of the vote in By the time of the presidential Resistance Movement (NRM) was ap a 77,6% poll. Thousands of people elections in 1996, it had become clear parently exempted from the ban on ) took to the streets of Cotonou to cele that0 the anti-Soglo mood was as per the specious grounds that it is a broad 1 brate the return of the Chameleon. based movement and not a political vasive0 as the anti-Kerekou sentiment 2 Soglo's subsequent appeals were also of 1991. Ironically, there were many of party, though increasingly it has func d rejected and he then concentrated his e tioned as one. thet general's old enemies who agreed a efforts on securing a blanket amnesty According to Museveni, the mul thatd Kerekou was the only candidate ( for himself, his family and his ministers capable of removing Soglo from office. tiparty system advocated by Western r e for any misdeeds in office. He then left The ex-dictator had long renounced democrats is fatally flawed in circum h s with his family for the USA. hisi rather eccentric and unconvinc stances where the population divides l b On 4 April Kerekou took the oath ing commitment to the principles of too easily along religious, ethnic and u of office and four days later named his regional lines. In support of this con Marxism-LeninismP and now emerged, truee to his nickname "Chameleon", cabinet, with Adrien Houngbedji as troversial thesis he cites the Ugandan h t as a born-again Christian and champi prime minister, although the constitu experience. y tion makes no provision for such a b When Uganda came to indepen on of the common citizen. Soglo cam d post. Eight parties are represented in dence in 1962 it was widely regarded paignede on the strength of his eco t the new cabinet. The question now is as one of the most promising of nomicn reforms and played on fears of a how long the anti-Soglo coalition will Africa's new states. Within a few years, ar return to (he oppressive past. g The first round of the presidential preserve its unity, especially in its deal however, political upheaval, civil war e electionc was held on 3 March, with a ings with a fragmented parliament and economic mismanagement had n e whose mandate still has three years to begun a process of apparently irre massivec turnout of almost 870/0, though i l run. A great deal will hinge upon the versible decline. In the period preced 23% of the votes were subsequently r disallowede by the constitutional court political succession to the south-west ing Museveni's seizure of power in d region now that Soglo has gone. This 1986 at the head of the National becausen of irregularities. Of the valid u ballots, Soglo managed to win 36% area is under-represented in the cabi Resistance Army (NRA) more than half y net. It also remains to be seen how far anda Kerekou 34%. Adrien Houngbedji a million Ugandans lost their lives in ranw third with 20% and Bruno Amous Kerekou will be able to depart from ethnically-defined political massacres. e t the unpopular economic policies of his Museveni's presidential candidacy soua fourth with 8%, followed by a G predecessor, given Benin's continued rested firmly upon his record since cluster of candidates who shared the t remaindere of the vote. Houngbedji and dependence upon foreign aid. 1986 - a fine one in comparison with n Amoussoui pledged their support to An encouraging aspect of the that of any of his predecessors. His slo b Kerekoua for the second round, signi Benin experience, however, is the ex gan was "peace, unity and moderniza S fyingy an alliance between the Porto ample of a constitutional court that re tion", and after the horrors of the Obote b Novo and northern factions against fused to be cowed by threats or con and Amin years, it was widely accept d Soglo'se Cotonou-based party. vinced by blandishments. ed that the majority of Ugandans c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 187 I '" -'" '"C ..,:l I 0 '" -1:: 0 >. u ! t'! ) 0 ~ 1 0 2 E d e t a d '0 ( '" r e ~ h s i l b u 'E P e h t • y ~ b d 0 e w t n a r g C e c 0 n e c .w- i l r ~ e .- d n c u y a ..~ w w e t a G C t e n .- i b III a S U y b .-~ d e c u :1( d o r p e R i t '" - '" i ) ~HH¥H~H!HHHhH~ II IllllHWlillllhhh ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R F·O,·C·U·S would endorse this programme, for all model pupil of World Bank and IMF question the timing of Chad's transi the limitations that have been placed prescriptions. He has liberalized the tion to democratic rule as a plethora of on the democratic process. The insur economy and created as friendly an political parties and rebel groups all gency of the Lord's Resistance Army environment for foreign capital as cir continued to manoeuvre against a (LRA) and of the West Nile Bank Front cumstances allow. As a result, Uganda background in which northerners and (WNBF) in the sparsely settled northern boasts one of the best economic southerners regard each other with districts acted as a reminder of what gro~th rates in Africa, averaging 6% profound apprehension. could happen should Museveni's pro since 1986. Inflation has been slashed Deby, however, used the break tective embrace be withdrawn from the from 300 to 10% per annum. Macro down in Franceville to divide his op rest of the country. economic indicators and long-term ponents, coming to an agreement with Standing in opposition to Muse structural reforms do not always trans those parties ready to renounce vio veni were Dr Paul Ssemogerere, the late into tangible benefits for the or lence. This cleared the way for the leader of the Democratic Party since dinary citizen, ·however. The rational holding of a constitutional referendum 1980, who resigned from cabinet in the ization of the civil service and the pri on 31 March. Despite some adminis middle of last year, and a Muslim vatization of state enterprises has trative confusion, and with the assis teacher, Muhammed Mayanja Kibirigge, eroded the effectiveness of the health tance of the French garrison, the op who sought to mobilize the votes of his and education sectors, besides cost eration was carried out successfully, co-religionists, some 10% of the popu ing some 170 000 jobs. and 63,5% of voters approved the new lation. Ssemogerere's candidacy was In the event, Museveni won a constitution in a 71% turnout of regis endorsed by most of the parties outside massive majority in the 9 May polls, tered voters. This provides for an ex of the NRM. Central to the opposition securing 76% of the vote in a 73% ecutive presidency with substantial platform was the promise to reform the turnout. Ssemogerere took 22% and powers, to be elected for a maximum constitution to restore democratic party Mayanja 2%. Despite opposition pro of two five-year terms. Government politics. Ssemogerere also undertook to tests, international observers pro insistence that the new dispensation reintroduce federalism, a proposal nounced their satisfaction with [he provid~d for a good deal of regional favoured by the recently restored king conduct of the elections. Almost all decentralization failed to win the sup doms of southern Uganda: Buganda, opposition politicians subsequently port of many southerners, who voted Toro, Ankole and Bunyoio. boycotted the parliamentary contest against the measure. The opposition coalition proved on 27 June, leaving the NRM to con Attention now refocused on the ) more cohesive than historical experi solidate its victory. organization of the much-postponed 0 1 ence would have suggested, and Museveni's next challenge will presidential elections, which were 0 Museveni seemed at one stage to face be to restore order in the north of the 2 eventually scheduled for 3 June. There d a sterner electoral test than he would country, while keeping a watchful eye were fourteen candidates besides e t have predicted six months earlier. on his southern borders, which would Deby, which proved a great advan a d That said, the incumbent enjoyed sev be severely th'reatened by any major tage to the incumbent, who took near ( r eral telling advantages over his prin outbreak of violence on the Za'ire ly 44% of the vote in the first round. e h cipal opponent. His supporters con Rwanda border. He was therefore the clear favourite s i l trolled most of the media and were to win the second round against the b u able to deny Ssemogerere a great deal second-placed contender, Abdelkader P Chad - Deby comes home of publicity while continuing to cover Wadal Kamougue, who had taken 12%. e h the daily activities of the head of state. By the end of last year, French pres Turnout was reported as 76%. t y Opposition rallies were interrupted by sure on President Idriss Deby to com Opposition protests about irregu b young NRM supporters, with the ap plete the promised transition to legit larities, and calls for a boycott delayed d e parent connivance of the local au imate civilian government had be the holding of the second round until t n thorities, and in the face of police ap come irresistible. Of all the countries 3 July, by which time Deby had con a r athy. Scarcely veiled rumours were comprising the Franc Zone, only Chad cluded an agreemenr with the third g e also circulated that no alternative to had not held multiparty elections. placed candidate, Saleh Kebzaboh. The c n Musevenj's presidency was tolerable French assistance had been vital to absence of most of the regionally e c to the security forces, which would in Deby's seizure of power five years based candidates and the very nature i l tervene in the case of his electoral de earlier, and now pushed the Chadian of so lop-sided a contest contributed to r e feat, thus threatening a resuscitation government towards holding a round voter apathy, for the turnout was far d n of Uganda's old cycle of political frag table conference with all the rebel and lower than the first round. Deby u mentation and intolerance. opposed political groups that had en claimed a comfortable victory, with y a Despite early misgivings about meshed Chad in a series of overlap 68% of the vote. His rival Kamougue w e the democratic limitations of Uganda's ping civil wars for the last thirty years. secured a creditable 32%. t a new constitution, the international The conference eventually took Legislative polls are to be held G donor community, whose generosity place in January in Franceville, Gabon, before the end of the year, in the next t e provides Uganda's government with but soon foundered on procedural phase of the democratization process, n i b some 40% of its income and underpins points and questions of representation. but it seems improbable that this will a S the structural reforms central to Since Chad has 58 legal political parties signify the end of Chad's inherent po y Uganda's macro-economic recovery, and some 15 external armed groupings litical conflicts, despite relations with b also apparently supported the candi perhaps this was not altogether sur the neighbouring states of Sudan and d e c dacy of Museveni, who had proved a prising, though it again brought into Libya being happier than in years past. u d o r p e R I 190 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 F·O·C·U·S Niger - IBM's programme al chiefs and the youth movement. He The US and French governments' stalls also organized the distribution of initial reaction has been one of angry famine relief and found the money to As noted in the last Africa focus, on 27 disappointment and it will be inter pay civil servants their three months' January this year the Nigerien army esting to see how the latest of Africa's seized power in what appeared to be pay arrears, in a demonstration of ef soldier presidents manages to cope fectiveness that contrasted markedly with an exercise in legitimation that one of the most popular coups in with the paralysis that characterized has gone so horribly wrong. Africa's recent history. Donor response the old regime. He also placed himself followed France's lead in immediately on the Reserve, since the constitution suspending aid, then restored it equal prohibits serving officers from running Equatorial Guinea - a miracle ly quickly once the deposed rulers had for president. too many admitted the error of their ways and The National Independent Elec Equatorial Guinea's recent electoral reassurances had been given that the toral Commission announced on 13 history is included here as an exemplar military intended to accelerate the re June that it was postponing the polls of how deformed an ostensibly demo turn to civilian rule. for three weeks because of problems cratic process can become. It may also In a certain sense the soldiers with the electoral register, a delay wel suggest that the analysis of this coun were, indeed, better than their word. comed by Ma'inassara's opponents. try's political economy would be best On 7 April the consultative forum on Their relief was short-lived, however, captured by the mordant wit of a democratic renewal approved a new for the National Salvation Council Graham Greene or even an Evelyn draft constitution and electoral code, overruled the commission and insist Waugh. providing for a presidential system to ed on 7 July as polling day, an early Colonel Teodoro Obiang Nguema replace the French-style semi-presiden sign that their were limits to the junta's Mbasogo, who has ruled Equatorial tial system which proved so disastrous tolerance of opposition. There was Guinea since 1979, when he overthrew over the past year. Under the new con also a row over the exclusion of and executed his uncle, the murderous stitution the president appoints a prime Nigerien citizens living abroad, which "Unique Miracle" Francisco Macias minister to run the government. Dele the Commission declared a violation Nguema, was compelled by donor gates also recommended the formation of their civil rights. pressure to concede to multiparty com of a second chamber, and the intro Worse was to come, for voting, petition. He decided to test the politicql duction of question time in the nation extended to two days proved as chaot waters in local elections, which weFe al assembly, when ministers may be re ic as the short period of preparation held in September 1995. By way of in quired) to answer questions. 0 would have suggested. Opposition surance his government arrested the 1 A referendum on 12 May over 0 complaints of gross irregularities were leader of the opposition Progress Party, 2 whelmingly approved the newarrange shrugged off, and before the polls had Severo Moto, on charges of plotting to d ments,e though turnout was low, at closed the junta announced that the kidnap the head of state. He was sub t abouta 35% of registered voters - per Independent Electoral Commission sequently sentenced to death, a pun d haps( on account of popular expecta was abolished and replaced by a new ishment commuted to 28 years impris r tionse that the measure would pass vir National Commission for Elections. onment following foreign pressure. h tuallys unopposed. Attention now shift i Observers disagreed about the reasons Further direct pressure from France's l edb to the possible presidential ambi for the sudden decision. Some agreed President Chirac regained the "plotters" tionsu of the leader of the' coup Briga P that the old commission was riddled their freedom, though Moto prudently dier-Generale Ibrahim Bare Ma'inassara with corruption and represented the went into exile in Spain. h t (known popularly as IBM), who sud interests of a political class resentful of In September's local elections, denlyy emerged as a candidate in the b . the emergence of an outsider as lead the ruling party eventually took some forthcomingd elections. ing candidate. Others were of the opin two-thirds of the seats contested, and e t When it came on 24 May, Ma'ina ion that the move demonstrated un although the opposition took some n ssara'sa annOllncement that he would certainty that Ma'inassara would win an urban centres, including the capital r g campaign as an independent in the outright victory in a poll describe as Malabo, neither they nor Madrid be e presidentialc elections due for early shambolic. lieve that the results reflect the ballots n Julye still came as a surprise to the old In one stroke the goodwill recre cast. Indeed, the opposition had c i politicall class. As the two major parties claimed some 62% of the vote prior to ated with the international communi r begane to work out a united strategy ty was dispelled. MaYnassara had to the announcement of the official tod oppose the general, he was busy deny that the independent commis count, and the Spanish foreign min n u securing the support of a number of sion's abolition, the cutting of inter istry remarked upon the stark contrast prominenty and popular Nigeriens, in a national communications links and the between the final tally and the provi cludingw General Ali Sa'ibou, the head alleged house arrest of his presidential sional results. e oft state from 1987 to 1993. He soon opponents amounted to a The near-disastrous experience a coup d'etat. emergedG as clear favourite to win Shortly afterwards the results were an of the local elections evidently per t againste ex-president Mahamane Ous nounced giving MaYnassara a 52% vic suaded President Obiang that more ex n mane,i Mamadou Tanja, Moumouni tory in the first round of the voting, treme measures were called for. In b Djermakoyea Adamou and Mahamadou thus sparing him the possible conse prospect was a tenfold increase in the S quences of a second round in which country's oil production by the middle Issoufou.y b Ma'inassara shrewdly broadened the ousted politicians might have ex of 1996, after Mobil's offshore Zafiro d hise appeal by rehabilitating tradition- tracted a united revenge. field comes on stream. Some 40 000 c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 191 I F·O·C·U·S barrels a day could become 160 000 of the sort has happened, but 2003 benefited only modestly from econom by the end of 1998. This would pro must seem a long way off to politi ic refonn. The government has tended vide both the wherewithal and the in cians identified as enemies by presi to neglect its traditional support base in centive for the President to extend his dent with a vivid imagination. the Volta Region in recent years, and its term of office regardless of the popu A few years ago, Robert Klit indecisive handling of severe ethnic lar will, and was a prize too valuable gaard wrote an excellent book on conflict in the north will cost the NDC to be risked in a free election. Not Equatorial Guinea, based on his own votes there. least, the flow of oil money could re experiences there as an aid consul The attempt to introduce VAT last lieve Equatorial Guinea's rulers of their tant. He called it Tropical gangsters. year led to widespread public protest embarrassing dependence upon donor The gangsters of the title were not the and street violence in which five peo .funding, with its attendant conditions. corrupt politicians and officials of this ple were killed by Rawlings's support On 12 January, Obiang sudden internationally insignificant state, but ers. Shortly afterwards Rawlings lost ly announced that he was calling early the foreign businessmen and consul the services of his key technocrat, presidential elections for 25 February. tants who connived at their antics in Kwesi Botchwey, the widely-respected This effectively seized the· political ini the pursuit of profit. finance ministe'r, who resigned after tiative from his opponents, and was failing to curb the free-spending Ghana unconstitutional, in that elections may National Petroleum Corporation, which be held only within the two-month Ghana - JJ's last stand is run by one of the president's closest period prior to the expiry of the pres This year will provide a number of in associates. Botchwey's replacement, ident's mandate in June. He also de dicators as to the general direction of Richard Kwame Peprah, is relatively cided that the voters' roll drawn up Ghana's political and economic sys untried, although he served previous with donor assistance in 1995 would tem. All observers agree that the out ly as minister of mines and is chairman be ignored in favour of one prepared comes of the presidential and parlia of Ashanti Goldfields. by the government. This roll alleged mentary elections due in November Peprah's budget, announced in ly excluded huge blocks of names this year are less certain than in 1992. February, seeks to achieve real GDP from areas where the opposition had In those elections President Rawlings growth of 5%, and to reduce inflation fared well in September. Detentions secured a victory, winning 58% of the to 20%. It posits a balance of payments and harassment of known opposition votes to his nearest rival's 30%, but this surplus of $83 mn. There can be few supporters followed, and Obiang un followed considerable manipulation of people who believe these targets to be derscored his view of the democratic the voter registration process. In realistic. Economic forecasting is diffi ) 0 process by declaring publicly that any protest at this blatant rigging, the op cult, not only because of the paucity of 1 0 one who did not vote for him was a position parties boycotted the parlia reliable statistics, but because there 2 bastard. It was also decided that vot mentary elections, leaving Rawlings's appears to be no effective check on d e t ing should be transparent in the 'sense National Democratic Congress (NDC) government expenditure or the print a that voters had to mark their ballots in and its partners in the Progressive ing of money to cover this (money d ( full view of officials. A South African Alliance to make a clean sweep. supply growth currently exceeds 50% r e consultancy, previously associated This time the registration process per annum). The public sector unions h s i with Jonas Savimbi's Unita, provided appears to have been conducted far are also aware that an election year l b the logistics and technical assistance more impartially, leading the ruling provides the ideal opportunity to press u P to manage this charade. party to request an extension, which wage demands. In the run-up to the e The opposition dithered, failed was refused by the Electoral Commis 1992 election, they won pay awards of h t to agree on a strategy or a candidate, sion, though late registration and al 80%, throwing money supply targets y b and entered the election in total dis ternative means of voter identification well off track, and leaving a structural d array. Their five candidates eventual will be allowed after the rolls have legacy that has yet to be corrected. e t ly withdrew from the contest on 21 been opened for public scrutiny. n The maintenance of macro-eco a r February and called for a boycott, Rawlings's problems as he seeks a nomic stability is far from assured. The g though their names remained on the second (and final) four-year mandate inflation rate now exceeds 70% annu e c ballots. The results showed a landslide are manifold. The opposition will not ally, and 1995 saw the cedi devalued n e for Obiang, who was finally credited hand him victory by default, and there by more than 27% against the dollar. c i l with almost 98% of the vote in a na is growing public anger that after 13 Unemployment is rising and subsidies r e tional turnout of more than 82%. years of austerity and structural adjust for essential social services have been d n The international community ex ment, there is little sign of the promised withdrawn. The receipts from the di u pressed contempt and outrage, and economic take-off to compensate for vestiture of part of the state's share y a even the oil companies were probably the deteriorating living-standards of holding in Ashanti Goldfields cush w e embarrassed by so crass an exercise, most urbanites. Job losses following the ioned the shortfall in donor aid in t a though their contracts are so lucrative rationalization of the state sector, and 1994, but this will hardly be repeated G that they will be easily mollified. the failure to pay promised severance even if government earns $100 mn by t e Obiang also hopes to ease tensions, settlements on time have also alienated further reducing its stake in Ashanti n i and on 18 March met with a number b voters. The free press is almost entirely from 28,6% to 20%, and by privatizing a of opposition leaders, including Moto, anti-NDC, which will also have an im more of the almost 200 companies in S y prompting speculation that he would pact in the towns. Even in the rural which it still holds the major share. b inveigle some of them into accepting areas, whence the NDC draws most of Despite concerted efforts to at d e cabinet appointments. As yet, nothing its support, the farmers appear to have c tract further foreign investment to u d o r p e R 192 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 F·O·C·U·S Ghana, including modifications to the litical romantics, including students, sltlon. Rawlings's campaign will con investment code, there seems little in unionists and academics. Their agenda centrate on the inability of the opposi terest outside of the lucrative mining appears to favour urbanites adversely tion to put forward coherent policy al sector. For all the praise heaped upon affected by structural adjustment, and ternatives, particularly in an environ Ghana by the IMF and World Bank, for emphasizes higher spending on educa ment in which it is imperative to retain whom the country was once a model tion and health and a relaxation of fis the support and sympathy of the IMF student, economic take-off seems as cal discipline. Prior to the 1992 elec and World Bank. The opposition con distant as ever, with a distinct move tion, Rawlings encouraged the divi cedes it has no clear economic policy, back to traditional primary products - sions in Nkrumahist ranks by having but suggests one alternative to struc gold, cocoa and timber - clearly dis some of his confederates launch the tural adjustment - greater fiscal disci cernable. Ghana's economic reforms National Convention Party (NCP), pline and the ending of corruption. have failed to broader the country's which subsequently joined the NDC in The presidential and parliamen economic base and create jobs, and the the Progressive Alliance government. tary contests must be seen separately. country's economic health appears to In May 1995, however, the NCP left the Voters do not necessarily follow the be predicated upon continued annual Alliance following bitter arguments party ticket when selecting the head of foreign aid flows of around $300 mn. over the introduction of VAT. The state. Rawlings should still win even if It is little wonder, then, that the NCP's leader, Kow Arkaah, insisted on his party fails to obtain a parliamentary ruling NDC's morale is wavering. Re retaining his position as vice-president, majority, not least because he has en cent corruption allegations against but relations between himself and hanced his reputation as an interna some of Rawlings's closest advisers will Rawlings deteriorated steadily, culmi tional player during his chairmanship aggravate grassroots' resentments that nating in allegations that the President of the Economic Community of West senior party men are enriching them had actually assaulted Arkaah in a cab African States. Unless a presidential selves, and there are signs that incum inet meeting. Quite apart from the candidate receives more than 50% of bent MPs may face nomination chal damage this incident has done to the vote, there has to be a run-off be lenges from local party officials who Rawlings's image, it obviates any hope tween the leading two contenders want their share of the spoils of office. of using the same tactics to split the within 21 days, and a second round of The opposition remains fragment Nkrumahist vote in 1996. voting could place him at risk. ed, and prone to internal faction-fights, The NCP and PCP are now look There are also those who believe though efforts are being made to pre ing to form an Nkrumahist alliance to that Rawlings will not permit defeat at sent a united front to prevent Raw fight the elections. There are also signs the polls, through gerrymandering of ) lings's0 re-election. The principal party is that a broader opposition front, in some sort. Such manipulation will be 1 the0 New Patriotic Party (NPP), which cluding the NPP, could be patched to much more difficult in the parliamen 2 has finally agreed upon J A Kuffour as gether. In 1995 the opposition man tary contest, and some predict that the d e itst presidential hope. The NPP has tra aged to cooperate in organizing suc NDC's parliamentary representation ditionallya been the party of Ashanti cessful demonstrations against VAT could be cut back from 189 to 110- d ( business, advocating laissez{"aire eco and in mobilizing voters for registra 130 seats out of 200. r nomice policies. Having boycotted the tion, but whether the NPP and the Should the NDC fail to secure an h s 1992i parliamentary elections the NPP Nkrumahists can solve their own inter overall majority, Ghana would face the l hasb been able to adopt opportunistic nal differences and then unite behind awkward prospect of a personally u positionsP olltside the usual party line. It a single presidential candidate remains volatile president ruling with a parlia campaignede successfully against the uncertain, for this would require a ment dominated by an opposition de h t introduction of VAT, has called for pay number of sizeable political egos to be termined to root out Rawlings's corrupt y risesb and won over some union sup submerged for the common good. courtiers - a recipe for paralysis and portd as a consequence. It has also Some observers talk of the rise of confrontation. Should such a situation e t playedn upon nationalist sentiment to a new opposition grouping under the arise, even a military politically neutral a opposer the massive inroads made by banner of the Alliance for Change ized for the past decade might feel itself g foreign capital with the flotation of the (AFC) , comprising a generation of compelled to intervene, as in other e Ashantic Goldfields Company. (It is in young politicians drawn from the NPP, states in the region, though this remains n terestinge to note the very different - PNC, PCP and People's Party for a remote possibility. The likelihood of c i l and often emotional - line taken by Democracy and Development (PPDD). this happening, however, would be in r somee indigenous capitalists where ex This coalition initially emerged be creased as forces' pay falls further be d pendablen natural resources are con tween March and June 1995, and held hind the inflation rate. Such an inter u cerned.) The NPP is tipped to make in its first rally on 10 August. The AFC vention might be deterred by the real y roadsa into the NDC's parliamentary ma has stressed the need for a national ization that it would invite immediate jorityw in Ashanti, Accra Central, and the consensus to address the national cri condemnation from the donor commu e t Eastern,a Brong Ahafo and Central re sis, and has called for the blending of nity and could hardly be sustained eco G gions. past traditions and the burying of per nomically, though soldiers have been t e There are various other parties sonality differences. The divergent ide known to overlook such considerations. n withi an Nkrumahist orientation follow ological orientations of the various par In the event of victory, this must b inga a broadly populist tradition. Chief ties raises unanswered questions re be Rawlings final presidential candi S amongy these is the People's Con garding a common policy agenda, dacy, which also heralds a time of di b vention Party (PCP) composed princi though this would have to be based vision as the ruling party falls. prey to d pallye of left-leaning nostalgics and po- largely upon the NPP's pro-market po- disputes about the succession. c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 193 I Africa's choices: After thirty years rebuilcling institutions of state that of the World Bank by Michael were destroyed during the years of • It Barratt Brown. London: Penguin, political turmoil. studies the econ 1995. 433 pp. ISBN 0 14 024771 8 omy, civil service, constitution mak ing, the politics of decentralization For thirty years, the World Bank has and other policies that have formed proposed policies which have pro the foundation of the new Uganda. duced few economic benefits but eroded the traditional strengths of A history of Africa C3rd ed) by African society - even the Bank itself J D Fage. London: Routledge, 1995. now admits this. But, while African • 595 pp. [SBN 0 415 12721 1 leaders, many propped up by the West, are often corrupt or incompe This long-established history of Africa tent, an impressive range of regional has now been updated by J D Fage to initiatives and small-scale coopera include: tives, t1edgling industrial projects, • the effect on Africa of the collapse ) women's organizations and peasant of the Soviet Union and the ending 0 1 associations all represent major signs of the Cold War 0 2 of hope. These countless initiatives, • the rise of Islamic fundamentalism d now springing from the grassroots of e t African life, embody the realities of • the continuing problems of famine, a d foreign debt and warfare through ( an African road to development. r They speak for good sense and great out the continent e h s courage against the failed miseries of • the tumultuous changes in South i l today: against the World Bank dog Africa leading up to the 1994 elec b u mas left over from the Thatcher/ tions P Reagan era, against pricing abuses, e h Africans: The history of a conti t against uncancelled debts owed to y the rich by the world's poorest coun nent by John Iliffe. Cambridge: b • tries, all of which have led to eco Cambridge University Press, 1995. d e t nomic breakdown and war; and they 232 pp. ISBN 0 521 48422 7 n challenge the North's failure to open a r In this study of Africa, from the ori g up its markets to African exports and gins of humankind to the South e its minds to African expertise. c African general election of 1994, John n This book examines that which e Iliffe refocuses its history on the peo c i Africans themselves are saying and l pling of an environmentally hostile r doing and shows that it can serve as e continent. Africans have been pio d the basis for this continent's selt~trans n neers struggling against disease and formation and an agenda for the kind u nature, and their social, economic y of support that Africa needs. a and political institutions have been w e designed to ensure their survi~al. t Uganda: Landmarks in rebuilding a In the context of medical progress a nation edited by P Langseth, G and other twentieth-century innova t • J Katorobo, E Brett and J Munene. e tions, however, the same institutions n Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995. i have bred the most rapid population b 354pp. ISBN 9970 02 070 6 a growth the world has ever seen. The S y This book examines the steps taken history of the continent is thus a sin b by the Ugandan government under gle story binding living Africans to d e the National Resistance Movement in their earliest human ancestors. c u d o r p e R 194 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 B·O·O·K·S The radical motherhood: Namibian three countries. In this, therefore, Pierre • women's independence struggle by du Toit has managed to combine the best lina Soiri. Research report no 99. of North American political science with a Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, shrewd sense that in the understanding 1996. of real polities, one must conceptualize historically. The study analyses the participation As outlined by the author himself: of the northern Namibian Ovambo "The study examines two related propo women in the Namibian indepen sitions: that democratic institutions are dence stuggle. It aims to present why embedded in the wide-ranging institu and how women in the northern tional network of state and societal insti areas participated in the stuggle tutions; and that the institutions that make which led to the indendent Namibia. up this network must be robust and re Women were esential support silient if effective democracy is to be ers of the liberation struggle in spite achieved" (p xii). The focus of the book of their multiple burden as single is, then, squarely on the strength and ef mothers and main food producers in ficiency of the institutions which form the agriculture while the men had left the state - that is, how effectively the state area as migrant labour~ for the army manages to control society and to dis or for Swapo. charge its duties. This is a welcome, and The study also examines the eminently sensible, move away from what changes in women's lives caused by has recently been a tendency (particular the arrival of Christianity, colonialism, ly in North America) to focus on the po the cash economy and modern val litical vitality of civil society, as though ues. Using the life story method it al democracy could be achieved without the lows women to tell their stories them kind of modern state with which civil so selves and present their own under ciety can engage politically. standing of their situation. The study The book concludes that "a particu also tries to outline women's position lar kind of strong autonomous state is a in the independent Namibia where necessary, but still insufficient condition ) gender equality is guaranteed by the 0 for sustaining democracy" (p xii) - a 1 constitution but not in practice. 0 conclusion which may appear obvious 2 d enough to historians of democracy but e t which will instil some realism into the a d sometimes exceedingly jejune political ( r analysis of contemporary Africa. What the e h author is saying, quite simply but also Books review i l quite to the point, is that democracy is Stateb building and democracy in impossible where the state is not both u SouthernP Africa: Botswana, Zimbabwe strong and reasonably effective. By strong ande South Africa by Pierre du Toit. h and effective, he means that the state is t Washington, DC: United States Institute of y able to ensure that laws and regulations b Peace Press, 1995. ISBN 1-878379-50-X are enforced fairly and efficiently across d e society regardless of social pressure on t Staten building and democracy in Southern the holders of state power. a Africar asks a simple, yet crucial, ques The interest of this book, however, g tion:e is it possible "to construct" democ lies more in the actual case studies of the c racyn in Africa? The book is in the line of three Southern African countries than with e manyc studies recently undertaken by the conceptual framework which it em i l North American scholars (most notably ploys. Indeed, it is in the analysis of the r Lanye Diamond) about the pre-conditions political evolution of these three vastly d to,n and the conditions for, the viability of different nations that Pierre du Toit shows u democracy in what are generally labelled how effective a well set up and adroitly y Thirda World countries. However, this handled comparative framework can w booke is noteworthy for two sets of rea serve to illuminate an issue as slippery as t sons.a The first is that it is resolutely com that of democracy. In each case study, the G parative, seeking here to bring together author seeks to understand the emer t thee experience of three vastly different gence of the modern state and society in n i Southernb African countries: Botswana, historical context. The value of the book Zimbabwea and South Africa. The second consists in showing how important to the S isy that, unlike much North American po quality of democracy is the relationship b litical science, it is firmly grounded in between a capable state and a vigorous d e thec understanding of the history of these but cohesive society. u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 195 B·O·O·K·S In the case of Botswana, one of the First, the analysis of the development few democratic success stories on the of South African society - and its associat African continent, du Toit concludes: "The ed discussion on the extent to which eth strong society was created by historical nic or class factors are decisive - is ad and geographical good fortune as well as mirably managed. The author's ability to sound public choices. It maintains rules of present a clear and concise summary of social control that embody the norm of what appears like an exceedingly complex consensus, which is sought through pub pattern of social change enables him to lic debate and participation; communica focus attention on the key question of the tion and consultation; and tolerance for extent to which the South African state's diverse opinion. These rules of social con efforts to control society have created di trol strengthen the democratic process visions fatally inimical to the flourishing of and emphasize respect for public author democracy. He shows clearly that the con ity, deference to hierarchy, and restraint test for hegemony between the apartheid in demanding public goods" (p 73). state and its enemies has resulted in an In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, the explosive situation. Writing as he does at author points out that crucial political and the time of the first democratic elections, policy mistakes by the Zanu-PF leadership he cannot say much about the transitional led to the gradual weakening of the state's period which has followed. power and health, thus undermining the His conclusion, however, is sensi prospect for democracy. He writes: "The ble: "The study thus far supports the effects of these miscalculations has been proposition that the superior democratic the state's gradual but cumulative inabili character of democracy in Botswana over ty to muster the resources it needs to sus that of Zimbabwe can be accounted for in tain its goal of socialism for the blacks. By part by the strength of Botswana's state drawing more resources from the econo and society. The analysis ... has shown my than could be sustained in the long that in the contest for hegemony that re term, it's progressively undermined the sulted from the revolt against the basis of its own solvency .... By the end apartheid state, both society and state ) of the first decade of independence, both have been substantially weakened ... [Tlo 0 1 the economy and the state had been secure democratic stability and viability, 0 weakened by the inability to generate both the state and the society of post 2 d wealth" (p 146) .... "The political cost of apartheid South Africa will have to be e t these combative economic policies has strengthened" (p 213). a d been a decline in legitimacy, that vital The reader will turn with profit to ( r component of social control and indicator chapter 4 (Toward sustainable democra e h of state strength" (p 147). Within this con cy) to see how du Toit brings together s i l text, the move to an ever tightening one the strands of his analysis and how rele b u party political system is merely an indica vant his analysis indeed is to the under P tion of political weakness. standing of the potential for democracy in e h But it is the section on South Africa South Africa. This reviewer will merely t y which readers will quite naturally consid note here that State building and democ b er the linchpin of the book - the test, as racy in Southern Africa is to be recom d e it were, of the analytical sharpness of mended not only because it provides a t n State building and democracy in Southern clear and convincing inquiry into the na a r Africa. Many will want to argue that South ture of "democracy" in the three neigh g e Africa is simply too historically different bouring Southern African countries but c n from its two neighbours to make for a also because it shows how the use of a e c meaningful comparison. Others will point suitably modest and efficiently managed i l to the disparity in wealth and population conceptual framework of the type pre r e to deny the possibility of learning lessons sented here can be a help to the under d n about democracy in Botswana and standing of complex contemporary polit u y Zimbabwe. Be that as it may, du Toit has ical issues. The author is also to be ap a set up an intriguing conceptual frame plauded for having provided an historical w e work with which he is perfectly entitled to and analytical link between the study of t a draw up such comparisons. And the com "black" Africa and South Africa. G t parisons are more revealing than might e n reasonably have been anticipated. P{ltrick Chabal, King's College London i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R 196 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 Africa Institute + + + African Studies ...... : ",-.. ~ Africa Institute ....."_ c...-_ {"'OC~ ...... , .... ~ ""'" '''''''''' .....""...... 0/ ...... __ -, ...... ",.....,no', $emlr18 rs and "'Slh''Ig scholars ~I"" ".. "... ,,, ' - ~"" .. ,, ~ ..-" ,.' ...... 2 , (- "." ... "'""'" """...... l" Of/ ""'''''''', A/"ca d ...-..,_ " ...... e _ ..."- ••' ..w...... _". 1 <>J"'w '~ of Aft*" t ...... ,...... " , 01 Sou,,, _i ...... , .. -us .... __ c. ,co'" .,-..., l -.-, ...... b _,"" AI"", "" II' !"'" ' ... u of." ",.....' ...... """ ... u,-b, P ,_ ...... , ond " .....'" {I , .. 0< """"",,, h" br< ...""'''''' "' .... n.,..e ,_ 01 "","" __. .. ,"" h _ , "'"" ~ ...... 'co, t ...... , of T_. ""'" ~"'" "" y .,.....,.". "..... b '" .... _,,>00 "..... _.....-. -, _Ok...... ' ...... d -- ...... _ on .... -'"' -. 01 e t ~._ 'wd~_ • _n ...... '""t ...a _ .... A __ " .. o il r g , _·S .... _,- ,-e ...... _"".,..... "' ""'- c ...... JoJ,., .... ' ""' ..... " ... Cold ...., ,,,. n ..._ e ..-""""'" ""--"""""'- c AI", ...... ADaho .....",.., _ ...... on _"i "" _"'_ """""'<><, l ...... "ft..... <~ ~ """ "'" G.,...... " I)O_~ r ...e • • "..." ,,""~ Af, ~ ~" ' W'II __ .. L'-.-y '" , .. d "'_ 01 ""->...... ...n ... ,""", ..- ...... eo ...... , ...... , u . _ _y -_H_rOt, _ __ h«n .... _. "'"""""' a ...... w ~er.., ---"""" "'_...... _ e - V",,"....- _ ...... t 0I000Ja ... -...... - ...... -".,.....01 ... '_ .!IouG ...... "no _"oIq<_ ... t L), ,.....,.e .. on 17 __ 19105 1...m",.;,. n i StaN hooo ..y l-.,.,. 01 ...... ~ ...... , b P*l'-d ...... ___~ e .. "''''-'' __ " '" ""'""'"-00. "'_ L",,,,-, ...... --_c .- ...... u d o r p e R i I dissertation on "Soviet development Cultures, societies, languages", jointly Armed Forcesjournal, April 1996; theory in the national liberation organized by the Department of and "Death-blow to the arms movement". The degree will be African Studies, St Petersburg State industry?", in Pointer (Special awarded at a graduation ceremony in University, and the Scientific Council Supplement to jane's Intelligence September 1996. for the Problems of the Economic, Review), and in jane's Sentinel, Social, Political and Cultural Develop vol 3, no 6, June 1996. Staff movement ment of African Countries, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Again, Dr Denis Venter published book Dr Simon Baynham (Research the topic of his address was "Regional cha pters on "Regional security in Specialist) decided to return to the security in sub-Saharan Africa: What Southern Africa in the post-cold war United Kingdom, after having spent a role for South Africa?" era", in Edmond J Keller and Donald period of six years with the Institute. In London, he participated on Rothchild (eels), Africa in the New He left South Africa on 12 July 1996. 16 and 17 May 1996 in the Annual International Order: Rethinking state Council Meeting of the International sovereignty and regional security, Conferences, study/liaison African Institute, of which he is vice Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner chairman; and attended a talk on 15 Publishers, 1996; and "South Africa visits abroad, lectures May 1996 by Dr Christopher Hill, and the Indian Ocean region: The Dr Simon Baynham attended a con Emeritus Professor of Political emergence of a new relationship", in ference on "Conflict and violence", Studies, University of York on "South L 'Afrique Politique 1996, Centre organized by the Institute for Strate Africa's reintegration into world d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, Bordeaux, gic Studies, University of Pretoria, on sport", held at Chatham House under 1996. 5 March 1996; and a conference on the auspices of the Southern Africa "The UN, peace-keeping and devel Study Group of the Royal Institute of Other activities opment", jointly organized by the International Affairs, and a lecture on Norwegian [nstitute of International 16 May 1996 by Dr Thurston Shaw, Dr Simon Baynham was appointed Affairs and the Institute for Defence Emeritus Professor of Archaeology, by the Danish government to Policy, held in Pretoria on 13 and 14 University of Ibadan, Nigeria on "The independently evaluate the 1995/96 March 1996. He also participated in a contemporary plundering of Africa's Defence Management Programme, roundtable workshop on 26 April past", held at the School of Oriental Graduate School of Public and 1996 on the British Military Advisory and African Studies, University of Development Management, ) 0 and Training Team (BMATT), orga London under the auspices of the University of the Witwatersrand, 1 Johannesburg. He was also asked to 0 nized by the Institute for Defence Royal African Society. In Bordeaux, 2 Policy in Midrand. France, he presented a seminar talk assess the executive course in peace d e to the research group on regionalism operations, which took place at the t a Dr Denis Venter (Executive Director at the Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire Technikon RSA. d ( and Head, Academic Programmes) (CEAN) on "South Africa and the r e paid a brief visit to Malawi from 7 to Indian Ocean region: The emergence h s i 12 April 1996 to discuss two book of a new relationship", and conduct l b projects on Malawi with academics at ed preliminary discussions on a African stud ies u P Chancellor College, University of planned cooperative research project e Malawi, Zomba, and to conduct in on "Sustainable democracy in sub h l\Jew journal t terviews in Lilongwe with the World Saharan Africa: A comparative analy y Passages: A Journal of Trans b Bank Mission to Malawi, the United sis of the experiences of select anglo national and Transcultural d Nations Development Programme phone, francophone and lusophone e t (UNDP) Office in Malawi, and the African countries". Studies is a new interdisciplinary n a European Community (EC) Delega He also participated in the journal concerned with the burgeon r g ing literature on transnational phe tion to Mala wi. consultation on "Civil society and e nomena and cross-cultural encoun c On 24 April 1996, he left on a conflict management", jointly n ters. For more information, contact e month-long visit to Ethiopia, Italy, organized by the International Peace c i Mohammed A Bamyeh, Depart l Russia, The Netherlands, the United Academy (IPA) and the OAU, and r ment of Sociology, University of e Kingdom and France. While in Addis held in Somerset West from 29 May d Ababa, he conducted interviews at to 2 June 1996; and he was invited Massachusetts, Lowell MA 01854; n u tel: +1 5089344305; fax: +1 508934 both the United Nations Economic to join a meeting of experts to y 3023; e-mail: bamyeh@woods. a Commission for Africa (UNECA) and consider proposals of the Joint uml.edu. w the Organization of African Unity OAU-IPA Task Force on the e t (OAU), and presented a public lecture operationalization of the OAU a G on April in the Congo Hall at Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 30 1996 Forthcoming conferences/ t e OAU Headquarters on "Regional secu Management and Resolution. n colloquia/symposia i rity in sub-Saharan Africa: What role b a for South Africa?". In St Petersburg, The biennial conference of the S Publications Russia, he presented a keynote African Studies Association of the y b address on 6 May 1996 at an inter Dr Simon Baynham published United Kingdom will take place at d e national conference on "Africa: "Landmines in Africa", in African Wills' Hall, University of Bristol from c u d o r p e R I 198 AFRICA INSIGHT VOL 26 No 2 1996 I~·E·W·S 9 to 11 September 1996. For further Florida, Gainesville from 13 to 15 ment of History, POBox 208324, details, contact Professor Richard November 1996. To submit abstracts, Yale University, New Haven, CT Hodder-Williams, Department of or for further details, contact Grenville 06520; e-mail: plandau@minerva. Politics, 12 Priory Road, Bristol BS8 Barnes, Surveying and Mapping cis.yale.edu. lTU; tel: +44 117 928 7898; fax: +44 Program, Department of Civil Engi A conference on "National 117 973 2133; e-mail: richard. hodder neering, 345 Weil Hall, University of Identity and Democracy", jointly [email protected]. Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611; organized by the Nordic Mrica The biennial conference of the tel: +1 352 392 4998; fax: +1 352 392 Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, and the Development Society of Southern 4957; e-mail: [email protected]. Mayibuye Centre, University of Mrica on "Conflicting challenges in An international symposium on the Western Cape, Bellville, South development" will be held at the "Art and rituals of divination in Central Africa, will be held in Cape Town University of Stell en bosch from 25 to and West Africa", hosted by the from 14 to 16 March 1997. For 27 September 1996. For more Department of Religion, Amherst further details, contact Mai Palmberg, information, contact OSSA 1996 College, will be held in Amherst, Nordic Africa Institute, POBox Conference Organizer; c/o Private Massachusetts from 15 to 17 Novem 1703,75147 Uppsala; fax: +46 18 Bag x7, Goodwood, Cape Town ber 1996. For more information, con 695629; e-mail: mai.palmberg@nai. 7460; fax: +27 21 591 8987. tact John Pemberton III, Department uu.se. The biennial colloquium of the of Religion, Amherst College, Amherst, A conference, sponsored jointly South Mrican Political Studies MA 01002; tel: +1 413 542 2211; fax: by the Drama Department, Uni Association will take place at I +14135422727. versity of Bristol and the Colston Hunter's Rest near Rustenburg on ~10 An international symposium on Research Society, on "New and 11 October 1996. For further "Benin: Its past, present and future", Approaches to Theatre Studies and details, contact The Conference organized by the Great Benin Performance Analysis" will take Organizer, Department of Political Centenary Celebration, will be held place in Bristol from 21 to 23 March Studies, Rand Afrikaans University, in Benin City, Nigeria in February 1997. For more information, contact POBox 524, Aucklandpark, 1997. For further details, contact The GUnther Berghaus, Department of Johannesburg 2006; tel: +27 11 489 Secretary, Symposium Committee, Drama, University of Bristol, Can 2896; fax: +27 1] 489 2797. Great Benin Centenary Organizing tocks Close, Woodland Road, Bristol The 41st Annual Meeting of the Committee, c/o Benin Traditional BS8 1 UP; tel: +44 117 928 7833; fax: Society for Ethnomusicology, joint Council, PMB 1025, Benin City, +44 1179288251; e-mail: mark. ) ly0 with the Canadian Society for Nigeria; or Flora Kaplan, Suite 308, [email protected]. 1 Traditional0 Music, will be held from 19 University Place, New York Uni The 11th biennial congress of 2 30 October to 2 November 1996. For versity, New York, NY 10003-4556; the Mrican Association of d e moret information, contact Beverly tel: +1 212 998 8080; fax: +1 212 995 Political Science on "Peace and Diamond,a Department of Music, York 4185; e-mail: [email protected]. Security in Africa" will be held from d ( University, 4700 Keele Street, North A conference on "Images in 29 May to 1 June 1997 in Mauritius. r York,e Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3; Africa that bear the mark of Empire", For further details, contact Professor h s e-mail:i [email protected]. hosted by the Department of Kwame Ninsin, Administrative l b An international conference on History, Yale University, will take Secretary, AAPS, POBox MP 111, u "LandP tenure and administration" is to place in New Haven, Connecticut in Mount Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe; bee hosted by the Department of mid-February 1997. For more informa fax: +263 4 736 306; e-mail: aapp h t Civil Engineering, University of tion, contact Paul S Landau, Depart- @harare.iafrica.com. y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R VOL 26 No 2 1996 AFRICA INSIGHT 199 I Published by the Africa Institute of South Africa Dem ocratisation and dt:m illtarisation in Lesotho 1... _oJ ok..... of 19.93 ~>O $Qo""....,.,j """" _ .. (<<4) -.,",_,mL ( Africa Wall r e h Ma p and Fact s i l b u Sh eet P e h t y ,.". ..-..- ..... '" """', "",, b . __ ."... M< ,." ..... ' ... ' I ...... -- - d _ w,_ ., ...... _ ._ ""'" ...... e t n ,- a r g ...... - e ..... _-----,..,... .. c _...... ___ ,,".""_-_ .... r", ~- ..... n e c i l ... "' . r --..--..... e ...... --_ "---"'" d "_"'''_''J , -.- n ...... __...... u -do! _. ,...,...... O'!O_. 7aL _ -.: ... y a "'-'""' ... ,.. ' ;00'_"'_""- w e t ) a '., ... '" ,.... "'" w ..o.", G ..., ,"0) "" -""" - t e n i b a S f<" •• f""" y """ .. 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