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The Zangger Committee: Its History and Future Role

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The Zangger Committee: Its History and Future Role Fritz W. Schmidt THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE: ITS HISTORY AND FUTURE ROLE by Fritz W. Schmidt Dr. Fritz W. Schmidt is the current Chairman of the Zangger Committee and Director for Nuclear Nonproliferation in the Austrian Federal Chancellery. He has dealt with nonproliferation matters since 1971 and has participated in every NPT review conference to date. This article is partly based on a paper he presented with William Dickson, the former Secretary of the Zangger Committee, to a workshop on “universal reporting” in September 1993 at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. he following article is in- and the linkage between its para- states party to the NPT. The text of tended to provide some in- graphs 1 and 2. this model agreement was published T sight into the development of as IAEA Document Information international nuclear export controls HISTORY OF THE ZAC Circular 153 (hereafter “INFCIRC/ under the Treaty on the Non-Prolif- 153”). eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The text of Article III of the NPT Immediately after the committee It deals with the history of the formulated the twin obligations for finished its work, a number of ma- Zangger Committee (ZAC), the safeguards and export control rather jor supplier countries—some already Trigger List, the ZAC’s practices generally. Thus, there was a need to party to the NPT, some only intend- and procedures, and its future work. interpret this language into concrete ing to become members—met in In the history section, the article also details and further clarify the respec- March 1971 under the chairmanship touches upon parallel nonprolifera- tive requirements. of Swiss Professor Claude Zangger tion developments in order to set the In 1970, the IAEA (being en- on a very informal and confidential ZAC in context, and refers to the trusted by the NPT with the safe- basis in Vienna to discuss how to relations of the ZAC to the Nuclear guards task) set up a committee to implement Article III.2 and fulfill Suppliers Group (NSG) and to the develop a model safeguards agree- its obligations. This group, which International Atomic Energy Agency ment that would satisfy the obliga- became known as the “Zangger (IAEA). The concluding section, tions of Article III.1. The Safeguards Committee,” agreed that its decisions which proposes the return of full- Committee formed in 1970 fulfilled would not be legally binding upon scope safeguards into Article III.2, its task in a rather short period of its members but would serve as a reflects the personal views of the au- intense activity and drafted a model basis for harmonized unilateral thor. The proposal is intended to cre- that—after approval by the Board of policy declarations. ate an awareness among experts that Governors and the General Confer- The group defined its objectives eventually could lead to a reconfir- ence of the IAEA—became the basis as: mation of the understanding of the for all bilateral safeguards agree- 1. to reach a common understand- wording of Article III of the NPT ments between the IAEA and the ing on what constituted nuclear ma- individual non-nuclear weapon 38 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994 Fritz W. Schmidt terial, and equipment or material not party to the NPT, it was decided ditions of supply should be added especially designed or prepared for to require safeguards by the IAEA to those in the NPT and the Zangger the processing, use, or production on the nuclear material “in accor- Committee memoranda (which re- of special fissionable material; and dance with its [IAEA’s] safeguards quired non-explosive use assurances, 2. to consider procedures in rela- system,” leaving open whether this safeguards, and retransfer approval tion to exports of nuclear materials meant the “old” (facility-related) rights). In 1976, these countries es- and certain categories of equipment (INFCIRC 66/Rev.2) or the “new” tablished a set of guidelines and cri- and material in the light of the com- NPT-type “full-scope safeguards” teria known as the “London Suppli- mitment of states pursuant to Ar- system (INFCIRC/153).1 Initially, ers Guidelines” that identified two ticle III.2 of the NPT with a view to only a very few countries adopted a further conditions of supply: establishing a common understand- governmental policy of requiring 1. to apply physical protection ing as to the way in which each state full-scope safeguards for such ex- measures on nuclear material on the would interpret and implement this ports. Thus, INFCIRC/66 safe- basis of the recommendations in commitment. guards became the standard to be IAEA document INFCIRC/225; and In particular, the objective was to applied in recipient non-nuclear 2. to agree that any facility that draw up a list of commodities that weapon states not party to the NPT. was built on the basis of the know- should be subject to export control Why this solution was adopted, how of supplied technology (“know- on a common international basis. and what implications it had will be how clause”) would be put under One guiding principle of the group dealt with later. safeguards. was that these self-imposed restric- The Committee further agreed to In addition, the guidelines of the tions should not disturb fair inter- exchange information about actual London Group introduced the term national commercial competition. It exports or the issuance of licenses “sensitive facilities,” for which a was also agreed that each item on for exports to any non-nuclear transfer of technology should be the list should have a specific nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT handled particularly cautiously. Two end-use rather than a “dual-use” suit- through its system of annual returns, categories in the Trigger List (re- able for other conventional indus- which are circulated on a confiden- processing facilities and isotope trial uses. tial basis among the membership separation facilities) were under- In 1972, a consensus on the ba- each year in April. stood to fall within this category. sic understandings (“Expurgated The London Group adopted the ba- Version” of 9/27/72) was reached. Early Shock to the NPT’s sic “Trigger List” of the ZAC, but However, due to delays in securing System added a few new items—such as heavy the participation of the Soviet water production plants—and clarified Union, the Committee waited two India’s detonation of a nuclear the entries for zirconium tubes and years before making the under- device in May 1974 not only caused isotope separation equipment.2 standings public in two separate a tremor in the earth but also in the memoranda both dated August 14, foundations of the nonproliferation THE TRIGGER LIST 1974. The first memorandum cov- regime. Was the NPT inappropriate, ered exports of “source and special inadequate, or even a failure? The term “Trigger List” was cho- fissionable material” (Article III.2a), India was not an NPT party, and sen because the export of items listed and the second covered exports of the Treaty was still too young to be on it “trigger” IAEA safeguards on “equipment or material especially blamed for being unable to prevent the source or special fissionable designed or prepared for the technology transfer from a NPT material produced, processed, or processing, use or production of party. But the explosion led to in- used in the equipment or material special fissionable material” (Article creased concern about the conditions in question. The ZAC Trigger List, III.2b). Both are referred to collec- for permitting nuclear exports. Fol- as first issued in 1974, referred tively as the “Trigger List.” lowing preliminary consultations in mainly to complete facilities in the As to the question of which safe- 1974, seven major supplier coun- nuclear fuel cycle, with the excep- guards should be triggered by ex- tries met in 1975 with the goal of tion of reactors, where several typi- ports to non-nuclear weapon states defining what, if any, additional con- cal components were explicitly men- The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994 39 Fritz W. Schmidt tioned (for the contents of the first Mod. 2, February 1984). While, in the past, several coun- list see Appendix). Attached to the 3. In 1985, amendments were tries held the view that conversion Trigger List was an annex clarify- made in the annex to clarify the cov- facilities would not fall under the ing and defining the items in some erage of fuel reprocessing plants definition of Article III.2 (as they detail. (INFCIRC/209/Mod. 3, August do not deal with special fissionable In line with technological devel- 1985). material but only with source mate- opments, the Trigger List has un- 4. In 1990, clarifying amend- rial—natural uranium), a technical dergone several changes since 1974. ments were adopted for isotope sepa- working group set up by the NSG These changes strengthened the cov- ration plant equipment at gaseous showed that most of the components erage over certain areas that were diffusion enrichment plants of conversion facilities are consid- initially only roughly structured or (INFCIRC/209/Mod. 4, February ered to be dual-use items and that referred to only “complete” facilities. 1990). only a few would warrant entry on At the time of the development of 5. In 1992, an amendment was the ZAC Trigger List. the initial list, it was understood that introduced to further clarify plants It is also worthwhile to consider this would be enough to hinder clan- for the production of heavy water, whether these components are only destine developments in most coun- deuterium and deuterium com- to be used in the front end or also tries. With the further advance of pounds, and associated equipment in the back end of the conversion technology development worldwide (INFCIRC 209/Rev.1/Mod.1, May process, where gaseous-enriched and with further experience in the 1992).
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