Its History and Future Role

Fritz W. Schmidt

THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE: ITS HISTORY AND FUTURE ROLE

by Fritz W. Schmidt

Dr. Fritz W. Schmidt is the current Chairman of the Zangger Committee and Director for Nuclear Nonproliferation in the Austrian Federal Chancellery. He has dealt with nonproliferation matters since 1971 and has participated in every NPT review conference to date. This article is partly based on a paper he presented with William Dickson, the former Secretary of the Zangger Committee, to a workshop on “universal reporting” in September 1993 at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

he following article is in- and the linkage between its para- states party to the NPT. The text of tended to provide some in- graphs 1 and 2. this model agreement was published T sight into the development of as IAEA Document Information international nuclear export controls HISTORY OF THE ZAC Circular 153 (hereafter “INFCIRC/ under the Treaty on the Non-Prolif- 153”). eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The text of Article III of the NPT Immediately after the committee It deals with the history of the formulated the twin obligations for finished its work, a number of ma- Zangger Committee (ZAC), the safeguards and export control rather jor supplier countries—some already Trigger List, the ZAC’s practices generally. Thus, there was a need to party to the NPT, some only intend- and procedures, and its future work. interpret this language into concrete ing to become members—met in In the history section, the article also details and further clarify the respec- March 1971 under the chairmanship touches upon parallel nonprolifera- tive requirements. of Swiss Professor Claude Zangger tion developments in order to set the In 1970, the IAEA (being en- on a very informal and confidential ZAC in context, and refers to the trusted by the NPT with the safe- basis in Vienna to discuss how to relations of the ZAC to the Nuclear guards task) set up a committee to implement Article III.2 and fulfill Suppliers Group (NSG) and to the develop a model safeguards agree- its obligations. This group, which International Atomic Energy Agency ment that would satisfy the obliga- became known as the “Zangger (IAEA). The concluding section, tions of Article III.1. The Safeguards Committee,” agreed that its decisions which proposes the return of full- Committee formed in 1970 fulfilled would not be legally binding upon scope safeguards into Article III.2, its task in a rather short period of its members but would serve as a reflects the personal views of the au- intense activity and drafted a model basis for harmonized unilateral thor. The proposal is intended to cre- that—after approval by the Board of policy declarations. ate an awareness among experts that Governors and the General Confer- The group defined its objectives eventually could lead to a reconfir- ence of the IAEA—became the basis as: mation of the understanding of the for all bilateral safeguards agree- 1. to reach a common understand- wording of Article III of the NPT ments between the IAEA and the ing on what constituted nuclear ma- individual non-nuclear weapon

38 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994 Fritz W. Schmidt terial, and equipment or material not party to the NPT, it was decided ditions of supply should be added especially designed or prepared for to require safeguards by the IAEA to those in the NPT and the Zangger the processing, use, or production on the nuclear material “in accor- Committee memoranda (which re- of special fissionable material; and dance with its [IAEA’s] safeguards quired non-explosive use assurances, 2. to consider procedures in rela- system,” leaving open whether this safeguards, and retransfer approval tion to exports of nuclear materials meant the “old” (facility-related) rights). In 1976, these countries es- and certain categories of equipment (INFCIRC 66/Rev.2) or the “new” tablished a set of guidelines and cri- and material in the light of the com- NPT-type “full-scope safeguards” teria known as the “London Suppli- mitment of states pursuant to Ar- system (INFCIRC/153).1 Initially, ers Guidelines” that identified two ticle III.2 of the NPT with a view to only a very few countries adopted a further conditions of supply: establishing a common understand- governmental policy of requiring 1. to apply physical protection ing as to the way in which each state full-scope safeguards for such ex- measures on nuclear material on the would interpret and implement this ports. Thus, INFCIRC/66 safe- basis of the recommendations in commitment. guards became the standard to be IAEA document INFCIRC/225; and In particular, the objective was to applied in recipient non-nuclear 2. to agree that any facility that draw up a list of commodities that weapon states not party to the NPT. was built on the basis of the know- should be subject to export control Why this solution was adopted, how of supplied technology (“know- on a common international basis. and what implications it had will be how clause”) would be put under One guiding principle of the group dealt with later. safeguards. was that these self-imposed restric- The Committee further agreed to In addition, the guidelines of the tions should not disturb fair inter- exchange information about actual London Group introduced the term national commercial competition. It exports or the issuance of licenses “sensitive facilities,” for which a was also agreed that each item on for exports to any non-nuclear transfer of technology should be the list should have a specific nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT handled particularly cautiously. Two end-use rather than a “dual-use” suit- through its system of annual returns, categories in the Trigger List (re- able for other conventional indus- which are circulated on a confiden- processing facilities and isotope trial uses. tial basis among the membership separation facilities) were under- In 1972, a consensus on the ba- each year in April. stood to fall within this category. sic understandings (“Expurgated The London Group adopted the ba- Version” of 9/27/72) was reached. Early Shock to the NPT’s sic “Trigger List” of the ZAC, but However, due to delays in securing System added a few new items—such as heavy the participation of the Soviet water production plants—and clarified Union, the Committee waited two India’s detonation of a nuclear the entries for zirconium tubes and years before making the under- device in May 1974 not only caused isotope separation equipment.2 standings public in two separate a tremor in the earth but also in the memoranda both dated August 14, foundations of the nonproliferation THE TRIGGER LIST 1974. The first memorandum cov- regime. Was the NPT inappropriate, ered exports of “source and special inadequate, or even a failure? The term “Trigger List” was cho- fissionable material” (Article III.2a), India was not an NPT party, and sen because the export of items listed and the second covered exports of the Treaty was still too young to be on it “trigger” IAEA safeguards on “equipment or material especially blamed for being unable to prevent the source or special fissionable designed or prepared for the technology transfer from a NPT material produced, processed, or processing, use or production of party. But the explosion led to in- used in the equipment or material special fissionable material” (Article creased concern about the conditions in question. The ZAC Trigger List, III.2b). Both are referred to collec- for permitting nuclear exports. Fol- as first issued in 1974, referred tively as the “Trigger List.” lowing preliminary consultations in mainly to complete facilities in the As to the question of which safe- 1974, seven major supplier coun- nuclear fuel cycle, with the excep- guards should be triggered by ex- tries met in 1975 with the goal of tion of reactors, where several typi- ports to non-nuclear weapon states defining what, if any, additional con- cal components were explicitly men-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994 39 Fritz W. Schmidt

tioned (for the contents of the first Mod. 2, February 1984). While, in the past, several coun- list see Appendix). Attached to the 3. In 1985, amendments were tries held the view that conversion Trigger List was an annex clarify- made in the annex to clarify the cov- facilities would not fall under the ing and defining the items in some erage of fuel reprocessing plants definition of Article III.2 (as they detail. (INFCIRC/209/Mod. 3, August do not deal with special fissionable In line with technological devel- 1985). material but only with source mate- opments, the Trigger List has un- 4. In 1990, clarifying amend- rial—natural uranium), a technical dergone several changes since 1974. ments were adopted for isotope sepa- working group set up by the NSG These changes strengthened the cov- ration plant equipment at gaseous showed that most of the components erage over certain areas that were diffusion enrichment plants of conversion facilities are consid- initially only roughly structured or (INFCIRC/209/Mod. 4, February ered to be dual-use items and that referred to only “complete” facilities. 1990). only a few would warrant entry on At the time of the development of 5. In 1992, an amendment was the ZAC Trigger List. the initial list, it was understood that introduced to further clarify plants It is also worthwhile to consider this would be enough to hinder clan- for the production of heavy water, whether these components are only destine developments in most coun- deuterium and deuterium com- to be used in the front end or also tries. With the further advance of pounds, and associated equipment in the back end of the conversion technology development worldwide (INFCIRC 209/Rev.1/Mod.1, May process, where gaseous-enriched and with further experience in the 1992). uranium is being reconverted. Inso- implementation of technology trans- 6. The latest amendment, in 1994, far as these latter components are fer controls, the ZAC has constantly adopts further clarifications to the specially designed or prepared, they been engaged in monitoring the need enrichment section and a modifica- would undoubtedly be covered by for revisions or further clarifications tion of the entry on “Primary Cool- Article III.2 and should therefore be- of the Trigger List items. As a re- ant Pumps” (to include “Water come a part of the ZAC’s Trigger sult, the original annex has grown Pumps”) (INFCIRC/209/Rev.1/ List. considerably. Since 1974 there have Mod. 2, April 1994). been seven phases of development: 7. Finally, agreement has been Parallel Activities by the NSG 1. In November 1977, following reached recently to amend paragraph the initiative of the London Suppli- 6 of Memorandum A attached to For many years, following the ers Group, the Trigger List was INFCIRC 209/Rev.1, to prevent the initial publication of its guidelines amended to include heavy water pro- unsafeguarded export of bulk quan- in 1977, the London Group did not duction plants. While a few mem- tities of source material for non- see a reason to meet. Instead, it re- bers of the Committee believed that nuclear use. Member state letters to lied on the periodic amendments of these plants did not fall within the the IAEA have been sent, but the the Trigger List as carried out by scope of Article III.2, most of the IAEA has not yet published the for- the ZAC. However, one of the early members were positive. They argued mal notification document. priorities of the newly created NSG that if the export of heavy water were In summary, it is fair to say that in 1991 was to formally harmonize included, it was only logical that the Zangger Committee has devoted the old London Group trigger list production plants for this material extensive efforts to adding structure with the ZAC Trigger List. should also be subject to controls. and detail to the original Trigger The NSG also focused on a sec- This first amendment to the list was List. ond area of interest to the nonpro- published as INFCIRC/209/Mod.1, liferation regime, namely dual-use issued on December 1, 1978 (and One Area of Dispute items. While ZAC and the London later further clarified in May 1992; Group only dealt with nuclear items see point 5 below). There has only been one major “with a major nuclear use,” the NSG 2. In 1984, Trigger List clarifi- element of the nuclear fuel cycle elaborated a list of “dual-use” com- cations were made to the entries cov- where diverging views existed modities characterized by their ering isotope separation by the gas within the Committee. This was the legitimate conventional end-uses, centrifuge process (INFCIRC/209/ area of conversion facilities. but also with a special utility for

40 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994 Fritz W. Schmidt use in nuclear applications. This list, sions would remain confidential. It duces a full and accurate record of which was established by the NSG, is also generally recognized that the the meetings, which is then individu- hence became known as the “nuclear May meeting is the main event, and ally confirmed by each member del- related dual use list.” This new dual- that a second meeting would take egation. This provides Committee use regime can be seen as the main place in October if business justified members with a clear statement of reason for the revitalization of the it. In practice, the October meeting the arguments, agreements reached, former “London Group” in 1991 as has become a permanent feature. and the subsequent steps to be taken the “Nuclear Suppliers Group,” The chairman is elected by em- on any particular issue. which from its very beginning aimed ploying much the same sort of quiet at attracting all supplier countries backstage consultative procedure Procedures for Work on the whether or not they are members of that elects the Pope. The term of Trigger List the NPT.3 office is indefinite, which is perhaps an unusual arrangement, but one Taking into account the Zangger ZAC BUSINESS PRACTICES which works well. There have been Committee’s mandate, it is the task AND PROCEDURES three chairmen so far: Professor of the Committee to create a level Claude Zangger, from the safeguards playing field (within the Contrary to rumors (or allega- Committee’s inception in 1971 to terms laid down by the NPT) by tions) spread in the 1970s, Zangger 1989; Mr. Ilkka Mäkipentti of Fin- agreeing to the rules under which Committee members never at- land from 1989 to 1993, and, since its members will make nuclear ex- tempted to deprive less developed May 1993, the author of this article. ports to non-nuclear weapon states countries of the peaceful benefits of The United Kingdom’s Mission in not party to the NPT. nuclear energy. Quite the opposite Vienna has traditionally provided the This is done in a perpetual pro- is true. It cannot, in my opinion, be secretary, because, so the story goes, cess of review, which tends to be said too often that membership in the only record of the very first activated by the initiative of the the Zangger Committee imposes no meeting was in the form of a few major technology holders. It usually obligations that have not already notes scribbled on the back of an begins with a draft proposal tabled been undertaken by parties to the old envelope by the U.K. delegate, by one or more holders of the par- NPT. In fact, it is correct to say that which he humbly shared with all ticular technology, which asks for the Zangger commitments, as they who asked. other capitals’ comments within a are directly derived from Article certain time frame. Thereafter, the III.2 of the NPT, are shared by all The Committee’s Work Routine technology holders might meet as a members of the Treaty. separate group, and usually not as At present, membership in the The meetings themselves are truly members of the Zangger Commit- Committee is identical to that of the informal. Delegations do not sit tee, to prepare a revised version of NSG, except for Argentina—which is behind nameplates and microphones the proposal, incorporating com- only in the NSG— and South Korea— are deliberately not used. (This may ments received. The revision is then which is an observer in the ZAC. change in the future if the Commit- circulated to all Committee mem- There are currently 29 members in tee continues to grow at its present bers by the secretary, inviting fur- the ZAC. Since 1992, France, Spain, rate.) Meetings almost never last ther comments by a specific date. Bulgaria, Portugal, and South Af- more than a morning. This may be At this point, the secretary will also rica have all become members. Oth- largely because the Committee could attach a draft note verbale that mem- ers are under consideration. be said to be more or less perma- bers will exchange with each other The Committee meets twice a nently in session; the coordination when the exercise reaches the final year, always in Vienna, in premises between meetings is conducted stage of adoption. These notes, made available by the Austrian Fed- through the secretary. In that way, known as “Internal Notes,” take the eral Chancellery. From the very be- issues can be brought to an advanced form of identically-worded unilat- ginning, it has always been under- state of maturity in time for the eral declarations to the effect that stood that the Committee would be meetings. Another contributing fac- the export of the items in question an informal body and that its discus- tor may be that the secretary pro- will be controlled through domes- tic legislation.

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994 41 Fritz W. Schmidt

The secretary will also provide a FUTURE WORK OF THE ZAC matter of Article III.2 will loom model letter to be sent to the Direc- large in its considerations. I firmly tor-General of the IAEA at the end believe that the Committee can bring of the exercise, asking him to in- The ZAC and the NSG significant influence to bear in form all member states of the bridging diverging group interests The reemergence of the NSG has changes to the Trigger List through to the ultimate benefit of our com- given rise to questions about the the publication of a new INFCIRC mon objective of nuclear nonprolif- need to retain the ZAC. The usual in the 209 series. This refinement eration. The ZAC is recognized by argument for merging the two procedure is repeated, with appro- the membership of the NPT as the groups was that the ZAC's mandate priate variations, until consensus is responsible body in charge of Ar- is firmly circumscribed by the NPT reached in the Committee. The con- ticle III.2. This was confirmed by (and therefore narrow), while the sensus, expressed by the exchange the last NPT Review Conference in NSG has no such self-imposed limi- of the Internal Notes, then becomes 1990 when the Main Committee II tations on its activities. It was, of part of the Committee’s “understand- stated: course, an attractive and logical ings.” point of view, at first. But there The Conference notes that The initiative by the technology were sound counter arguments for a number of States Parties holders to improve or further clarify engaged in the supply of continuing the Committee, which the Trigger List and the procedure nuclear material and equip- have been well-rehearsed over the ment have met regularly as to work outside the formal frame- last year or so: the fact that ZAC an informal group which work of the Committee have an addi- has become known as the derives its existence directly from tional advantage. They make it pos- Zangger Committee in or- the NPT (i.e., not just from Article der to coordinate their sible to harmonize the work inside III.2), that it is accepted by all mem- implementation of Article the Committee with countries out- III.2. To this end these bers of the NPT, and that there is side. For example, this made it pos- States have adopted certain still flexibility for further elabo- requirements, including a sible to achieve and implement a rations within Article III.2 itself (as list of items triggering Trigger List clarification when such IAEA safeguards, for their will be discussed below). a significant technology holder as export to non-nuclear- The ZAC will therefore continue weapon states not party to France remained a non-member of to do what it was created for and the Treaty, as set forth in the ZAC. While remaining a non- the IAEA document what it does best: to provide a fo- party to the NPT, France had un- INFCIRC/209 as revised. rum for interpreting supplier com- The Conference urges all dertaken to act as if it were a party. mitments under Article III.2 of the states to adopt these require- Consequently, France became ac- NPT (a view endorsed by the Com- ments in connection with tively engaged in meetings of tech- any nuclear cooperation mittee at its meeting in October with non-nuclear-weapon nology holders, who usually met as 1992). In the meantime, the NSG states not party to the a separate group outside the frame- should take advantage of the Treaty. The Conference rec- work of the Zangger Committee. At ommends that the list of Committee’s work and relate its ef- the final stage in the process, France items triggering IAEA safe- forts mainly to the dual-use regime. guards and the procedures adopted the same export control ar- Unnecessary duplication of work for implementation be re- rangements as the United Kingdom, viewed from time to time to should be avoided. It is also essen- through arrangements agreed to in take into account advances tial to have close cooperation be- in technology and changes Vienna, London, and Paris. How- tween the two bodies (through their in procurement practices. ever, this “special procedure” is now The Conference recom- chairmen). part of history, France having joined mends the States Parties to consider further ways to the NPT and the Zangger Committee The 1995 NPT Conference improve the measures to in 1992. prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear The 1995 NPT Review and Ex- weapons, other nuclear ex- tension Conference features promi- plosive purposes or nuclear nently in the Committee’s agenda. weapon capabilities. While There is no doubt that the subject recognizing the efforts of

42 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994 Fritz W. Schmidt

the Zangger Committee in The wording clearly requires safe- 2. If full-scope safeguards had the nonproliferation regime, the Conference also notes guards under Article III.1, identi- been a condition of supply accord- that items included in the cal to those which non-nuclear ing to Article III.2, would all the “Trigger List” are essential weapon states parties to the Treaty activities after 1974 to strengthen in the development of nuclear energy progammes have to accept: that is, full-scope conditions of supply in the nuclear for peaceful uses. In this safeguards. However, in 1972 the export control regime have been regard, the Conference re- ZAC reached an understanding that, necessary? quests that the Zangger in cases of exports, the supplier 3. Would the establishment of the Committee should continue to take appropriate mea- “...would satisfy itself that the safe- London Group in 1978 and its ad- sures to ensure that the ex- guards to that end, under an agree- ditional criteria have been necessary, port requirements laid down ment with the IAEA and in accor- or was it just a backup strategy to by it do not hamper the ac- quisition of such items by dance with its safeguards system, rectify the previous “safeguards deci- States parties for the devel- would be applied.” 5 sion”? opment of nuclear energy But the term “its safeguards sys- 4. Couldn’t it be taken as an indi- for peaceful uses.4 tem” was ambiguous, since there cation of this that in the second half As the Committee’s work received were two kinds of safeguards in the of the 1970s several supplier states such wide recognition in 1990, it IAEA system: the “old” facility-re- adopted full-scope safeguards poli- seems appropriate to consider lated safeguards (INFCIRC 66/ cies on a national level, until final- whether information about the Com- Rev.2), and the “new” full-scope ly, in 1993, all NSG members mittee should be provided to the safeguards (INFCIRC/153). As agreed to this additional criterion in NPT Review Conference in 1995, both were equally acceptable, the the guidelines? to give an insight into the ZAC’s “old” safeguards (published in 1968) A deeper exploration of these accomplishments to date and to high- were considered sufficient as a mini- questions would go beyond the light the areas that may require fur- mum. framework of this article. However, ther attention in the future. Such an The question arises, then, why the in the future, it might be useful to educational exercise would help all ZAC members in 1972 accepted compile all the measures that were NPT members to understand the such an understanding? There may taken to cope with the deficiencies Committee’s activities better and have been some good reasons to do caused by not having had full-scope could facilitate the drafting of lan- so. Some ZAC countries were not safeguards as a principal condition guage for the final document. yet members of the Treaty and could of supply. have become reluctant to join. On These remarks are intended to RETURNING FULL-SCOPE the other hand, there were several create an awareness of the issue and SAFEGUARDS TO ARTICLE new cooperative agreements, par- eventually to trigger appropriate III.2 ticularly with developing countries, activities for the coming NPT Re- which should not have been ham- view Conference. The coming 1995 As mentioned above, the question pered unnecessarily. Others argued Review Conference will conclude of safeguards being triggered by the that existing treaties had to be hon- the NPT’s first period in force of 25 supply of certain items was a point ored. (Let us also not forget that this years. It seems useful to clarify un- of discussion in 1972 and has gained was all before the 1974 nuclear ex- resolved points, before we embark new importance in recent years. The plosion in India.) into the next period, which may even text of NPT’s Article III.2 states If we look at those days from the be an indefinite period of time. that NPT members do not export distance of 1994 and the experience To whom should these ideas be source or special fissionable mate- gained over the past 20 years, several addressed? rial, or equipment or material espe- additional issues arise: The 1995 Conference will be a cially designed or prepared “unless 1. If the suppliers had foreseen gathering of the Treaty members. It the source or special fissionable this development, would they have is up to them to consider such a material shall be subject to the safe- stepped down to the lower level of question and make decisions. As guards required by this article.” safeguards? mentioned above, the 29 members of the Treaty, who are also mem-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994 43 Fritz W. Schmidt bers of the NSG, have accepted full- scope safeguards for their exports. Appendix—Contents of the First Trigger List All non-nuclear weapon states parties have committed themselves to 1. Nuclear material full-scope safeguards for their re- 1.1. Source material spective countries. 1.2. Special fissionable material Given that there is such wide sup- port for full-scope safeguards, I 2. Reactors and equipment therefore would argue that it should be possi- 2.1. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines ble, and certainly useful, to promote 2.2. Reactor control rods the “return” of full-scope safeguards 2.3. Reactor pressure tubes into Article III.2 in the course of 2.4. Zirconium tubes the preparation for the 1995 Confer- 2.5. Primary coolant pumps ence. The text of the Article is appropriate as it stands. Therefore no 3. Non-nuclear materials for reactors change of the wording is necessary. 3.1. Deuterium and heavy water An endorsement by the members 3.2. Nuclear grade graphite through a resolution in the “review” part of the final document should 4. Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equip- be sufficient. ment especially designed or prepared therefor

5. Plants for the fabrication of fuel elements 1 Under the system created in INFCIRC 66/Rev. 2 (published in September 1968), safeguards are applied only to those materials or items speci- 6. Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed fied in the particular safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which may include nuclear or other or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information. The scope is usually determined by the particular supplies to the recipient country, and the conclusion of a safeguards agreement for the particular activities is made a condition of supply. Under INFCIRC 153 (“NPT safeguards”), the object of safeguards is nuclear material. The characteristics of facilities and other locations containing this material are important factors in the design and implementation of veri- fication activities. With respect to the scope of those safeguards agreements, document INFCIRC 153 commits a state to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all its peaceful nuclear activities. (See also IAEA Safeguards Glossary 1987 Edition, doc. IAEA/SG/INF/1 (Rev.1) Nr. 3, (Vienna: International Atomic En- ergy Agency, 1987).) 2 These additions, as well as further amendments made in the 1980s, are considered as normal developments in the evolution of the Trigger List and not as new areas which the original Zangger Group overlooked. 3 For further information on this regime see Tadeusz Strulak, “Nuclear Suppliers Group,” The Nonproliferation Review 1 (Fall 1993). 4 NPT Review Conference 1990, “Report of Main Committee II,” doc. NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/1. 5 See paragraph 3(b) of the ZAC-memorandum, document ZC(71)10 Final.

44 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1994