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Approved 1540 Committee Matrix

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Approved 1540 Committee Matrix APPROVED 1540 COMMITTEE MATRIX The information in the matrices originates primarily from national reports and is complemented by official government information, including that made available to inter-governmental organizations. The matrices are prepared under the direction of the 1540 Committee. The 1540 Committee intends to use the matrices as a reference tool for facilitating technical assistance and to enable the Committee to continue to enhance its dialogue with States on their implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540. The matrices are not a tool for measuring compliance of States in their non-proliferation obligations but for facilitating the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), 1977 (2011), 2055 (2012) and 2325 (2016). They do not reflect or prejudice any ongoing discussions outside of the Committee, in the Security Council or any of its organs, of a State's compliance with its non-proliferation or any other obligations. Information on voluntary commitments is for reporting purpose only and does not constitute in any way a legal obligation arising from resolution 1540 or its successive resolutions. Matrix entries are only indicators of fact and not indicators of the degree of compliance under resolution 1540 (2004) and its successor resolutions. Thus: An “X” in any data field signifies only that the 1540 Committee considers that a State has taken the steps required, and/or has provided specific references to the applicable legal basis or executive behaviour as evidence of such steps. An “X” against any data field does not necessarily signify that a State has met in full its 1540 obligations for that data field. A “?” in any data field signifies that the references to legislative or other measures may not be directly relevant or are incomplete. A “NA” (Not Applicable) in any data field signifies that the data field is not applicable to that State where through legally binding instruments States specified that they do not possess related materials or facilities. A blank in any data field signifies that there is insufficient information available to enter an “X” or “?” against a particular data field. State: Czech Republic Date of Report: 25 October 2004 Dates of Additional Reports: 27 October 2004 23 January 2006 10 July 2014 29 November 2019 Date of Approval: 9 December 2020 1 I. OP 1 and related matters from OP 5, OP 8 (a), (b), (c) and OP10 Remarks (information Adherence to legally binding refers to the instruments, membership of page of the organisations, participation Relevant information (i.e. signing, deposit of instrument of accession, ratification, etc) English version of in arrangements and the national statements made. report or an official web site) Nuclear Non- 1 Proliferation Treaty Deposit 1 January 1993 (NPT) Nuclear Weapons Free 2 Zone/ Protocol(s) Convention for the 3 Suppression of Acts of Deposit 25 July 2006 Nuclear Terrorism Convention on Physical 4 Protection of Nuclear Deposit 24 March 1993 Material (CPPNM) 2005 Amendment to the 5 Deposit 30 December 2010 CPPNM Comprehensive Nuclear- 6 Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Deposit 11 September 1997 (not in force) Chemical Weapons 7 Deposit 6 March 1996 Convention (CWC) Biological Weapons 8 Deposit 5 April 1993 Convention (BWC) 9 Geneva Protocol of 1925 Deposit 17 September 1993 1997 International Convention for the 10 Deposit 6 September 2000 Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1999 International Convention for the 11 Deposit 27 December 2005 Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 2 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the 12 suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation 2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the suppression of unlawful 13 acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful 14 Acts Relating to Deposit 2 July 2013 International Civil Aviation Other relevant regional 15 legally binding EURATOM Treaty instruments International Atomic 16 Since 27 September 1993 Energy Agency (IAEA) 1. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 2. Australia Group (AG) 3. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 4. Zangger Committee (ZC) 5. Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) 17 Directly relevant 6. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Arrangements 7. Global Threat Reduction Initiative 8. Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 9. International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons 10. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Statement on non- provision of WMD and State reports that it does not provide any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, 18 related materials to possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. non-State actors Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) European Union (EU) Membership in relevant Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of international, regional 19 Terrorism (MONEYVAL) or sub-regional INTERPOL organisations World Health Organization (WHO) World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 3 World Customs Organization (WCO), and signed WCO Declaration on implementation of Framework of Standards to secure and facilitate global trade (SAFE Framework of Standards) Egmont Group 4 II. OP 2 - Nuclear Weapons (NW), Chemical Weapons (CW) and Biological Weapons (BW) National legislation which National legal framework Enforcement and civil/criminal penalties prohibits persons or entities to engage in one of the X/? X/? Remarks Source document of national implementation following activities and its N C B N C B Source document law enforcement W W W W W W NW/CW/BW: Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 280, 281 and 282 NW: NW: Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 7 Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 188 (manufacture nuclear weapons or other (offences) nuclear explosive devices) 1 manufacture X X X X X X CW: CW: Act No. 19/1997 on certain measures Act No. 19/1997, section 33 concerning CW prohibition BW: BW: Act No. 281/2002 on certain measures related Act No. 281/2002, section 21 to the ban of BW NW/CW/BW: Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 280 and 281 NW: NW: Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 7 Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 188 (acquire, import) 2 acquire X X X CW: X X X CW: Act No. 19/1997 on certain measures Act No. 19/1997 concerning CW prohibition BW: BW: Act No. 281/2002 on certain measures related Act No. 281/2002 to the ban of BW 5 NW/CW/BW: Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 280 and 281 NW: NW: Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 7 Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 188 (acquire any control over) 3 possess X X X CW: X X X CW: Act No. 19/1997 on certain measures Act No. 19/1997 concerning CW prohibition BW: BW: Act No. 281/2002 on certain measures related Act No. 281/2002 to the ban of BW NW/CW/BW: Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 280 and 281 NW: NW: Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 7 Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 188 (provide or seek assistance in the development) 4 develop X X X X X X CW: CW: Act No. 19/1997 on certain measures Act No. 19/1997 concerning CW prohibition BW: BW: Act No. 281/2002 on certain measures related Act No. 281/2002 to the ban of BW NW/CW/BW: NW/CW/BW: Criminal Act No. 40/2009, section 281 Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 280 and 281 (transport radioactive or hazardous substances without authorisation) NW: 5 transport X X X Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 7 X X X (transport radioactive waste) CW: CW: Act No. 19/1997 on certain measures Act No. 19/1997 concerning CW prohibition 6 BW: Act No. 281/2002 on certain measures related to the ban of BW NW/CW/BW: NW/CW/BW: Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 280 Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 280 and 281 (imports, exports, transits weapons prohibited by law/international treaty) and 281 (import, export, obtains radioactive or hazardous substances without authorisation) NW: Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), section 7(6) (transfer nuclear item in contradiction with 6 transfer X X X X X X international commitments) CW: CW: Act No. 19/1997 on certain measures Act No. 19/1997 concerning CW prohibition BW: Act No. 281/2002 on certain measures related to the ban of BW NW: NW/CW/BW: Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act), sections 6 (only Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 280 and 281 peaceful use) and 7 (carry out nuclear test explosion or other nuclear explosion) CW: CW: 7 use X X X Act No. 19/1997 on certain measures X X X Act No. 19/1997 concerning CW prohibition BW: BW: Act No. 281/2002 on certain measures related Act No. 281/2002, section 21 (fines) to the ban of BW attempt to engage in NW/CW/BW: NW/CW/BW: 8 abovementioned X X X Criminal Act No. 40/2009, section 21 X X X Criminal Act No. 40/2009, section 21 activities participate as an NW/CW/BW: NW/CW/BW: accomplice in Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 23 Criminal Act No. 40/2009, sections 23 and 24 9 X X X X X X abovementioned (accomplice) and 24 (participant) activities 7 NW: Act No. 263/2016 (Atomic Act) as amended, section 7 (provide/seek assistance in development) NW/CW/BW: NW/CW/BW: Criminal Act No. 40/2009, section 24 Criminal Act No. 40/2009, section 24 assist in 10 abovementioned X X X NW: X X X activities Act No.
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