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2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2000/17 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 18 April 2000 of Nuclear Weapons Original: English New York, 24 April-19 May 2000 Multilateral nuclear supply principles of the Zangger Committee Working paper submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America as members of the Zangger Committee Introduction proliferation and disarmament” stated that “transparency in nuclear export controls should be 1. Previous Review Conferences of the Parties to the promoted within the framework of dialogue and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons cooperation among all interested States party to the (NPT), when reviewing the implementation of the Treaty.” Treaty in the area of export controls, have repeatedly 3. Attached to this working paper are the statements noted the role of the Zangger Committee. The of previous NPT Review Conferences referring to the Committee, also known as the “NPT Exporters Zangger Committee. Committee”, essentially contributes to the interpretation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and thereby offers guidance to all parties to the Treaty. Zangger Committee The Committee and its work were mentioned in final documents or in Committee reports of Review Article III, paragraph 2 Conferences from 1975, 1985, 1990 and 1995. 2. The purpose of the present working paper is to 4. Article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT performs a describe the work of the Zangger Committee in order vital function in helping to ensure the peaceful use of to provide better insight into the Committee’s nuclear material and equipment. Specifically, it objectives. Furthermore, it is consistent with one of the provides: calls of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes the Parties to the Treaty which in paragraph 17 of its not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non- material, or (b) equipment or material especially 00-39577 (E) 250400 ````````` NPT/CONF.2000/17 designed or prepared for the processing, use, or informal and that its decisions would not be legally production of special fissionable material, to any binding upon its members. non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, 9. In 1972, the Committee reached consensus on unless the source or special fissionable material basic “understandings” contained in two separate shall be subject to the safeguards required by this memoranda. Together, these memoranda form the article (IAEA safeguards).” guidelines of the Zangger Committee today. Each 5. The main significance of this paragraph is that memorandum defines and provides for procedures for parties to the Treaty should not export, directly or the export of materials and equipment described in indirectly, nuclear material and equipment to non- article III, paragraph 2; the first memorandum concerns nuclear weapon States not parties to the NPT unless the source and special fissionable material (article III, export is subject to International Atomic Energy para. 2 (a)), the second, equipment and material Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This is an important especially designed or prepared for the processing, use provision because recipient countries not parties to the or production of special fissionable material (article III, Treaty may not have accepted any other nuclear non- para. 2 (b)). proliferation obligations. By interpreting and 10. The consensus that formed the basis of the implementing article III, paragraph 2, the Zangger Committee’s understandings was formally accepted by Committee helps to prevent the diversion of exported individual States members of the Committee by an nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear exchange of notes among themselves. These amounted weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and this to unilateral declarations that the understandings would furthers the objectives of the Treaty and enhances the be given effect through respective domestic export security of all States. control legislation. 6. The Zangger Committee understandings also 11. Memorandum A defines the following categories relate to exports to non-nuclear-weapon States parties of nuclear material: to the Treaty insofar as the recipient should recognize the items on the trigger list as a basis for its export (a) Source material: natural or depleted control decisions in the case of re-exports. uranium and thorium; (b) Special fissionable material: plutonium-239, Zangger Committee understandings uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233. 7. Between 1971 and 1974, a group of 15 States — 12. Memorandum B, as clarified since 1974 (see some already parties to the Treaty, others prospective below), contains plants, equipment and, as appropriate, parties — held a series of informal meetings in Vienna material in the following categories: nuclear reactors, chaired by Professor Claude Zangger of Switzerland. non-nuclear materials for reactors, reprocessing, fuel As suppliers or potential suppliers of nuclear material fabrication, uranium enrichment, heavy-water and equipment, their objective was to reach a common production, and conversion. understanding on: 13. To fulfil the requirements of article III, paragraph (a) The definition of what constituted 2, the Zangger Committee “understandings” contain “equipment or material especially designed or prepared three basic conditions of supply for these items: for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material” (as it was not defined anywhere in (a) For exports to a non-nuclear-weapon State the Treaty); not party to the Treaty, source or special fissionable material either directly transferred, or produced, (b) The conditions and procedures that would processed, or used in the facility for which the govern exports of such equipment or material in order transferred item is intended, shall not be diverted to to meet the obligations of article III, paragraph 2, on a nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; basis of fair commercial competition. (b) For exports to a non-nuclear-weapon State 8. The group, which came to be known as the not party to the Treaty, such source or special Zangger Committee, decided that its status was fissionable material, as well as transferred equipment 2 NPT/CONF.2000/17 and non-nuclear material, shall be subject to safeguards and a few specific items of isotope separation under an agreement with IAEA; equipment for uranium enrichment; (c) Source or special fissionable material, and (b) In February 1984, further detail was added equipment and non-nuclear material shall not be re- to the annex to take account of technological exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the developments during the preceding decade in the area Treaty unless the recipient State accepts safeguards on of uranium enrichment by the gas centrifuge process; the re-exported item. (c) In August 1985, a similar clarification was 14. The understandings were formally accepted by made to the annex section on irradiated fuel individual States members of the Committee in an reprocessing; exchange of notes among themselves. In parallel with (d) In February 1990, the uranium enrichment this procedure, most member States wrote identical section was further elaborated by the identification of letters to the Director General of IAEA informing him items of equipment used for isotope separation by the of their decision to act in conformity with the gaseous diffusion method; conditions set out in the understandings. These letters also asked the Director General to communicate their (e) In May 1992, specific items of equipment decision to all States members of the Agency, which he were added to the section on heavy-water production; did in INFCIRC/209, dated 3 September 1974. (f) In April 1994, the enrichment section of the annex was subject to its most significant expansion yet. “Trigger list” and its clarification Existing portions of the section were updated, and detailed lists of equipment were added for the 15. The two memoranda became known as the enrichment processes of aerodynamic, chemical and “trigger list”, since the export of listed items “triggers” ion exchange, laser-based plasma, and electromagnetic IAEA safeguards. In other words, as described above, separation. A significant modification was also made to they will be exported only if (a) the transferred the entry for primary coolant pumps; equipment or source or special fissionable material or (g) In May 1996, the sections on reactors and (b) the material produced, processed or used in the reactor equipment, on non-nuclear materials, on the facility for which the item is supplied, is subject to fabrication of fuel elements as well as on heavy water safeguards under an agreement with IAEA. production were reviewed. Parts of these sections were 16. Attached to the trigger list is an annex updated and new, detailed equipment was added; “clarifying”, or defining, the equipment and material of (h) In March 2000, a new section on uranium memorandum B in some detail. The passage of time conversion was added. This section also contains and successive
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