NPT/CONF.2000/17 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 18 April 2000 of Nuclear Weapons Original: English

New York, 24 April-19 May 2000

Multilateral nuclear supply principles of the Zangger Committee

Working paper submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America as members of the Zangger Committee

Introduction proliferation and disarmament” stated that “transparency in nuclear export controls should be 1. Previous Review Conferences of the Parties to the promoted within the framework of dialogue and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons cooperation among all interested States party to the (NPT), when reviewing the implementation of the Treaty.” Treaty in the area of export controls, have repeatedly 3. Attached to this working paper are the statements noted the role of the Zangger Committee. The of previous NPT Review Conferences referring to the Committee, also known as the “NPT Exporters Zangger Committee. Committee”, essentially contributes to the interpretation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and thereby offers guidance to all parties to the Treaty. Zangger Committee The Committee and its work were mentioned in final documents or in Committee reports of Review Article III, paragraph 2 Conferences from 1975, 1985, 1990 and 1995. 2. The purpose of the present working paper is to 4. Article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT performs a describe the work of the Zangger Committee in order vital function in helping to ensure the peaceful use of to provide better insight into the Committee’s nuclear material and equipment. Specifically, it objectives. Furthermore, it is consistent with one of the provides: calls of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes the Parties to the Treaty which in paragraph 17 of its not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non- material, or (b) equipment or material especially

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designed or prepared for the processing, use, or informal and that its decisions would not be legally production of special fissionable material, to any binding upon its members. non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, 9. In 1972, the Committee reached consensus on unless the source or special fissionable material basic “understandings” contained in two separate shall be subject to the safeguards required by this memoranda. Together, these memoranda form the article (IAEA safeguards).” guidelines of the Zangger Committee today. Each 5. The main significance of this paragraph is that memorandum defines and provides for procedures for parties to the Treaty should not export, directly or the export of materials and equipment described in indirectly, nuclear material and equipment to non- article III, paragraph 2; the first memorandum concerns nuclear weapon States not parties to the NPT unless the source and special fissionable material (article III, export is subject to International Atomic Energy para. 2 (a)), the second, equipment and material Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This is an important especially designed or prepared for the processing, use provision because recipient countries not parties to the or production of special fissionable material (article III, Treaty may not have accepted any other nuclear non- para. 2 (b)). proliferation obligations. By interpreting and 10. The consensus that formed the basis of the implementing article III, paragraph 2, the Zangger Committee’s understandings was formally accepted by Committee helps to prevent the diversion of exported individual States members of the Committee by an nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear exchange of notes among themselves. These amounted weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and this to unilateral declarations that the understandings would furthers the objectives of the Treaty and enhances the be given effect through respective domestic export security of all States. control legislation. 6. The Zangger Committee understandings also 11. Memorandum A defines the following categories relate to exports to non-nuclear-weapon States parties of nuclear material: to the Treaty insofar as the recipient should recognize the items on the trigger list as a basis for its export (a) Source material: natural or depleted control decisions in the case of re-exports. uranium and thorium; (b) Special fissionable material: plutonium-239, Zangger Committee understandings uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233. 7. Between 1971 and 1974, a group of 15 States — 12. Memorandum B, as clarified since 1974 (see some already parties to the Treaty, others prospective below), contains plants, equipment and, as appropriate, parties — held a series of informal meetings in Vienna material in the following categories: nuclear reactors, chaired by Professor Claude Zangger of Switzerland. non-nuclear materials for reactors, reprocessing, fuel As suppliers or potential suppliers of nuclear material fabrication, uranium enrichment, heavy-water and equipment, their objective was to reach a common production, and conversion. understanding on: 13. To fulfil the requirements of article III, paragraph (a) The definition of what constituted 2, the Zangger Committee “understandings” contain “equipment or material especially designed or prepared three basic conditions of supply for these items: for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material” (as it was not defined anywhere in (a) For exports to a non-nuclear-weapon State the Treaty); not party to the Treaty, source or special fissionable material either directly transferred, or produced, (b) The conditions and procedures that would processed, or used in the facility for which the govern exports of such equipment or material in order transferred item is intended, shall not be diverted to to meet the obligations of article III, paragraph 2, on a nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; basis of fair commercial competition. (b) For exports to a non-nuclear-weapon State 8. The group, which came to be known as the not party to the Treaty, such source or special Zangger Committee, decided that its status was fissionable material, as well as transferred equipment

2 NPT/CONF.2000/17 and non-nuclear material, shall be subject to safeguards and a few specific items of isotope separation under an agreement with IAEA; equipment for uranium enrichment; (c) Source or special fissionable material, and (b) In February 1984, further detail was added equipment and non-nuclear material shall not be re- to the annex to take account of technological exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the developments during the preceding decade in the area Treaty unless the recipient State accepts safeguards on of uranium enrichment by the gas centrifuge process; the re-exported item. (c) In August 1985, a similar clarification was 14. The understandings were formally accepted by made to the annex section on irradiated fuel individual States members of the Committee in an reprocessing; exchange of notes among themselves. In parallel with (d) In February 1990, the uranium enrichment this procedure, most member States wrote identical section was further elaborated by the identification of letters to the Director General of IAEA informing him items of equipment used for isotope separation by the of their decision to act in conformity with the gaseous diffusion method; conditions set out in the understandings. These letters also asked the Director General to communicate their (e) In May 1992, specific items of equipment decision to all States members of the Agency, which he were added to the section on heavy-water production; did in INFCIRC/209, dated 3 September 1974. (f) In April 1994, the enrichment section of the annex was subject to its most significant expansion yet. “Trigger list” and its clarification Existing portions of the section were updated, and detailed lists of equipment were added for the 15. The two memoranda became known as the enrichment processes of aerodynamic, chemical and “trigger list”, since the export of listed items “triggers” ion exchange, laser-based plasma, and electromagnetic IAEA safeguards. In other words, as described above, separation. A significant modification was also made to they will be exported only if (a) the transferred the entry for primary coolant pumps; equipment or source or special fissionable material or (g) In May 1996, the sections on reactors and (b) the material produced, processed or used in the reactor equipment, on non-nuclear materials, on the facility for which the item is supplied, is subject to fabrication of fuel elements as well as on heavy water safeguards under an agreement with IAEA. production were reviewed. Parts of these sections were 16. Attached to the trigger list is an annex updated and new, detailed equipment was added; “clarifying”, or defining, the equipment and material of (h) In March 2000, a new section on uranium memorandum B in some detail. The passage of time conversion was added. This section also contains and successive developments in technology have meant elements transferred from section 3 (reprocessing). that the Committee is periodically engaged in considering possible revisions to the trigger list, and All these changes of the list are included in the recently the original annex has thus become increasingly published new version of the Zangger Committee detailed. To date, eight clarification exercises have understandings as IAEA document taken place. Clarifications are conducted on the basis INFCIRC/209/Rev.2. of consensus, using the same procedure followed in the adoption of the original understandings. Membership 17. A summary of these clarifications reflects both some detail on the contents of the trigger list and an 18. All Zangger Committee members are parties to idea of the work of the Zangger Committee (dates are the Treaty that are capable of supplying trigger list for publication of modifications and revisions of items. Currently there are 35 members (Argentina, INFCIRC/209): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, (a) In December 1978, the annex was updated Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, to add heavy-water production plants and equipment, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia,

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Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Committee II agreed on language pertaining to a Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and number of ideas and proposals concerning the Northern Ireland and United States of America). Six implementation of the Treaty in the areas of the non- States (Argentina, China, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguards. Main Turkey and Ukraine) have joined the Committee since Committee II observed that Zangger Committee the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The members had met regularly to coordinate the Commission of the European Union attends the implementation of article III, paragraph 2, and had meetings as permanent observer. Any party that is an adopted nuclear supply requirements and a trigger list. actual or potential nuclear supplier and is prepared to It recommended that this list be reviewed periodically implement the Committee’s understandings is eligible to take into account advances in technology and for membership. Decisions to invite new members of changes in procurement practices, a recommendation the Committee are taken by consensus of existing that the Zangger Committee has continued to pursue. members. In the interest of strengthening the Treaty Main Committee II also urged all States to adopt the and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, Zangger Committee’s requirements for any nuclear Zangger Committee members have urged parties to the cooperation with a non-nuclear-weapon State not party Treaty that are nuclear suppliers to consider seeking to the Treaty. membership. NPT parties interested in doing so may 22. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension contact the Chairman of the Committee (Dr. F. W. Conference, the work of the Zangger Committee was Schmidt of Austria), the secretariat (the United also referenced in Main Committee II and, more Kingdom Mission in Vienna) or any State member of specifically, in the working group established by Main the Committee. Committee II to consider export control issues. While the Conference did not adopt a final declaration similar Zangger Committee and NPT to those of previous conferences, a consensus text on conferences the Zangger Committee was attained. (The unofficial text emerging from this exercise was subsequently 19. At the first NPT Review Conference in 1975, a published in the IAEA document INFCIRC/482 for brief paragraph in the final document referenced the information purposes.) The working group noted that a work of the Zangger Committee without naming it. number of States suppliers had formed an informal Paraphrasing, this paragraph stated that, with regard to group known as the Zangger Committee and had implementation of article III, paragraph 2, the adopted certain understandings. It invited States to Conference noted that a number of nuclear suppliers consider applying these understandings and had adopted certain minimum requirements for IAEA recommended that the list of items and the procedures safeguards in connection with their nuclear exports to for implementation be reviewed from time to time. The non-NPT non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference working group further noted that the application by all went on to attach particular importance to the fact that States of the understandings of the Zangger Committee those suppliers had established as a supply condition an would contribute to the strengthening of the non- undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons. proliferation regime. At the same time, it called for international consultations among all interested States. 20. In 1980, the Review Conference produced no consensus final document. However, in 1985, the Final 23. The Conference approved, inter alia, decision 2, Document contained a short reference to the which contains a set of “Principles and objectives for Committee’s activities, again without naming it. This Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and time the Conference in effect endorsed the main decision 1, which provides the basis for the adopted activity of the Zangger Committee by indicating that “Strengthening of the Review Process for the Treaty” further improvement of the trigger list should take of the implementation of the Treaty. account of advances in technology. 24. Decision 2 contains several principles of 21. In 1990, the Zangger Committee was mentioned particular relevance to the work of the Zangger by name and the conference provided a brief Committee, in the fields of safeguards and export description of its aims and practices. While the controls (see annex, principles 9 to 13). In particular, Conference did not adopt a final document, Main principle 17 calls upon all States to promote

4 NPT/CONF.2000/17 transparency in nuclear-related export controls through cooperation and dialogue. Members of the Committee have worked to promote transparency through international seminars and other forms of dialogue. 25. The statements of review conferences on the Zangger Committee are annexed to this working paper.

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Annex References to Zangger Committee activities in NPT Review Conference documents

First NPT Review Conference (1975) informal group which has become known as the Zangger Committee in order to coordinate their A paragraph in the Final Document referenced implementation of article III, paragraph 2. To this the work of the Zangger Committee without naming it: end, these States have adopted certain requirements, including a list of items triggering “With regard to the implementation of IAEA safeguards, for their export to non-nuclear- article III (2) of the Treaty, the Conference notes weapon States not party to the Treaty, as set forth that a number of States suppliers of material or in the IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as revised. equipment have adopted certain minimum, The Conference urges all States to adopt these standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in requirements in connection with any nuclear connection with their exports of certain such cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon States not items to non-nuclear-weapon States not party to party to the Treaty. The Conference recommends the Treaty (IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards addenda). The Conference attaches particular and the procedures for implementation be importance to the condition, established by those reviewed from time to time to take into account States, of an undertaking of non-diversion to advances in technology and changes in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive procurement practices. The Conference devices, as included in the said requirements” recommends the States parties to consider further (NPT/CONF/35/I, annex I, p. 3). ways to improve the measures to prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear Third NPT Review Conference (1985) weapons, other nuclear explosive purposes or nuclear weapon capabilities. While recognizing The 1980 NPT Review Conference produced no the efforts of the Zangger Committee in the non- final document, but the 1985 Final Document proliferation regime, the Conference also notes contained a reference to the Committee without naming that items included in the ‘trigger list’ are it: essential in the development of nuclear energy programmes for peaceful uses. In this regard, the “The Conference believes that further Conference requests that the Zangger Committee improvement of the list of materials and should continue to take appropriate measures to equipment which, in accordance with article III ensure that the export requirements laid down by (2) of the Treaty, calls for the application of it do not hamper the acquisition of such items by IAEA safeguards should take account of advances States parties for the development of nuclear in technology” (NPT/CONF.III/64/I, annex I, p. 5, energy for peaceful uses” para. 13). (NPT/CONF.IV/DC/1/Add.3 (a), p. 5, para. 27).

Fourth NPT Review Conference (1990) NPT Review and Extension Conference (1995) While the Conference did not adopt a final document, Main Committee II did agree on a number While the conference did not adopt a final of ideas and proposals, including the following declaration similar to those of previous conferences, language on the Zangger Committee: Main Committee II and its subsequent working group “The Conference notes that a number of did agree on a number of ideas and proposals, States parties engaged in the supply of nuclear including the following language on the Zangger material and equipment have met regularly as an Committee, which reached informal consensus in the

6 NPT/CONF.2000/17 working group of Main Committee II and was authority of the International Atomic Energy separately published in IAEA document INFCIRC/482: Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the “The Conference notes that a number of safeguards agreement of the Treaty by the States States Parties engaged in the supply of nuclear parties should direct such concerns, along with material and equipment have met regularly as an supporting evidence and information, to the informal group known as the Zangger Committee. Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions These States have adopted certain and decide on necessary actions in accordance understandings; including a list of items with its mandate. triggering IAEA safeguards, for their export to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the 10. All States parties required by article III of Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document the Treaty to sign and bring into force INFCIRC/209, as amended. The Conference comprehensive safeguards agreements and that invites all States to consider applying these have not yet done so should do so without delay. understandings of the Zangger Committee in 11. International Atomic Energy Agency connection with any nuclear cooperation with safeguards should be regularly assessed and non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Treaty. The Conference recommends that the list Governors aimed at further strengthening the of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be procedures for implementation be reviewed from supported and implemented and the Agency’s time to time to take into account advances in capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities technology and changes in procurement practices. should be increased. Also, States not party to the “The Conference notes that the application Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear by all States of the understandings of the Zangger Weapons should be urged to enter into Committee would contribute to the strengthening comprehensive safeguards agreements with the of the non-proliferation regime. The Conference Agency. calls for wider participation in international 12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of consultations among all interested States parties source or special fissionable material or concerning the formulation and review of such equipment or material especially designed or guidelines, which relate to the implementation of prepared for the processing, use or production of States parties obligations under article III, special fissionable material to non-nuclear- paragraph 2” (INFCIRC/482, attachment, paras. 5 weapon States should require, as a necessary and 7). precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s full- The Conference adopted in decision 2 the scope safeguards and internationally legally following principles related to safeguards and export binding commitments not to acquire nuclear controls: weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from “Safeguards military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, 9. The International Atomic Energy Agency is as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency the competent authority responsible to verify and safeguards in the framework of the voluntary assure, in accordance with the statute of the safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear- Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, weapon States. Safeguards should be universally compliance with its safeguards agreements with applied once the complete elimination of nuclear States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their weapons has been achieved.” obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the

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