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A Pre-Congress Miscellany

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A Pre-Congress Miscellany A Pre-Congress Miscellany Alice Miller Beijing has begun setting the stage for the 18th Party Congress, which is expected to see the largest turnover in the top leadership since the sweeping generational transition a decade ago. This article offers several observations on leadership politics and processes heading into the congress. Taken separately, the meaning of these observations is not clear. But taken together, they intimate a troubled and likely contention- ridden push to convene the party congress. What’s Ahead The dates of the 18th Party Congress have yet to be announced.* If Beijing follows the procedure it followed in announcing the dates of the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the Xinhua News Agency will report a decision of a Politburo meeting to convene the 17th Central Committee’s Seventh Plenum. It will also propose to the plenum the month the 18th Congress is to convene. The meeting will also forward to the plenum a draft of the work of the Central Committee that General Secretary Hu Jintao will present at the 18th Congress, as well as a list of nominations for the 18th Central Committee to be presented to the congress. The Seventh Plenum will in turn announce the precise dates of the party congress and approve the work report for presentation at the congress, together with the lists of nominations for the new Central Committee. In the meantime, PRC media on 14 August reported the conclusion of the election of the 2,270 delegates to the party congress. Delegates were elected from 40 electoral blocs representing central party and state institutions, the PLA, China’s 32 province-level units (including Taiwan, though still under other management), and other constituencies. A first wave of provincial party congresses to elect provincial delegates and new provincial party leaderships began in October 2011 and was completed on schedule the following December. But a second wave began in April and concluded in July—slightly later than earlier media predictions of a wrapup by the end of June. Bo Xilai Investigation If the leadership follows the procedures it followed in the removal and prosecution of Politburo leaders Chen Xitong in 1995 and Chen Liangyu in 2006, it seems likely that the Xinhua account of the Politburo meeting calling for the convocation of the Seventh *Update: On 28 September, Xinhua announced that the Seventh Plenum of the 17th Central Committee will meet on 1 November and the 18th CCP Congress will open on 8 November. Xinhua also announced that the Politburo has decided to expel Bo Xilai from the party and turn him over to state authorities for legal prosecution. Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39 Plenum will also report the meeting’s review of the case of Bo Xilai, who was replaced as party chief in Chongqing in March and whose Politburo membership was “suspended” in April. This Politburo review would include hearing an investigation report by the Central Discipline Inspection Commission on Bo and decisions on whether to expel him from the party and turn him over for prosecution by state authorities. Although PRC media have had relatively little to say about the Bo Xilai investigation since his suspension from the Politburo, limited commentary attending the trial of Bo’s wife Gu Kailai in Hefei on 20 August for murder of a British businessman and then the formal charging of Bo’s Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun has suggested that Bo will be turned over for legal prosecution. A report on the Gu trial by the PRC-owned press agency Zhongguo Tongxunshe on 20 August brushed aside “media speculation” that Bo would not be charged with “economic crime” (corruption) because thus far he has been accused only of “serious disciplinary violations.” The report cited a law school professor suggesting that Bo “could be suspected of the crime of concealing the murder and the crime of bending the law for selfish gain.” It cited the judgment of another legal expert that “at present no decision has been made within the party on how to deal with Bo Xilai.” “According to standard practice,” he went on, “the party will make a decision on Bo before it considers whether to turn the case over to judicial authorities and what charges to file against him” and so “the possibility of additional economic crimes cannot be ruled out.” Beidaihe Meeting? A significant portion of the Politburo leadership appears to have held an informal retreat at the seaside resort Beidaihe in the first half of August. Table 1 charts public appearances (as reported in PRC media) from late July through mid-August by members of the Politburo Standing Committee and two of five province-based Politburo members—Shanghai party chief Yu Zhengsheng and Guangdong party boss Wang Yang. The retreat may have begun on 1 August, when most Standing Committee members stopped appearing, and ended around 15 August. The entire Standing Committee membership assembled in Beijing on the 17th to greet the PRC’s Olympic team. From 1953 to 2002, the entire top Beijing leadership was in the habit of taking en-masse retreats—up to three weeks at a time—to Beidaihe and occasionally to Lushan in Jiangxi. In 2003, PRC media reported that the Hu Jintao administration had banned this practice both as a cost-saving measure and because it was seen as being out of step with the “people-centered” policies the new leadership sought to promote. The Hu leadership appears to have observed the ban in the years since, although it is possible that smaller groups of leaders and their families met there informally. Beginning in 2003, Beidaihe sojourns came to be used as a reward for groups that had provided meritorious service to the regime—for example the medical doctors, nurses and technicians who had worked to suppress the SARS epidemic in the spring of that year. Preceding the run-up to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the leadership was out of view for much less than three weeks. Although several Standing Committee leaders were out 2 Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39 of sight for several days, there were only three days when the entire Standing Committee membership did not appear. In addition, ordinary members of the Politburo continued to appear in Beijing, and province-based members continued to show up in their home bailiwicks. Meanwhile, articles appeared in central media describing Beidaihe as a favorite vacation spot for the public and noted a relaxed atmosphere in the resort town that contrasted with the heavy security and cordoning-off that had attended major leadership retreats there before 2003. And so, if there was a leadership meeting, it probably included primarily Standing Committee members and it likely convened in Beijing, not Beidaihe. Table 1 Selected Leadership Appearances, 20 July to 17 August 2012 HJT WBG WJB JQL LCC XJP LKQ HGQ ZYK YZS WY 7/20 x x x x x x x x x x 7/21 x x x 7/22 7/23 x x x x x x x x x x* x* 7/24 x x x x x 7/25 x x x 7/26 x x 7/27 x x x x x x x x x x x 7/28 x* 7/29 x* 7/30 x x x x 7/31 x x x x x x x x x 8/1 x* x x 8/2 x* x x 8/3 x x 8/4 8/5 x* 8/6 x x 8/7 x 8/8 x x 8/9 x 8/10 x 8/11 8/12 x 8/13 8/14 x* 8/15 x* 8/16 x 8/17 x x x x x x x x x KEY: HJT = Hu Jintao; WBG = Wu Bangguo; WJB = Wen Jiabao; JQL = Jia Qinglin; LCC = Li Changchun; XJP = Xi Jinping; LKQ = Li Keqiang; HGQ = He Guoqiang; ZYK = Zhou Yongkang; YZS = Yu Zhengsheng; WY = Wang Yang. *NOTES: Yu Zhengsheng and Wang Yang: all appearances in Shanghai and Guangzhou, respectively, except 23 July, in Beijing for Hu Jintao’s Central Party School speech; Jia Qingling 28–29: in Harbin; Wen Jiabao 1–2 August, inspecting flooded areas in Henan and Hubei; Xi Jinping 5 August, in Beidaihe to greet experts rewarded for service to China; and Wen Jiabao 14–15 August, in Zhejiang. 3 Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39 The Beidaihe meeting this year consisted of a significant subset of the full Politburo. Over the 1–15 August period, a few ordinary Politburo members appeared occasionally in Beijing, and Wang Lequan conducted an inspection tour in Heilongjiang on the 8th and 9th. In addition, as table 1 suggests, province-based Politburo members continued to appear in their home capitals. Wang Yang appeared nearly every day in Guangzhou during this period, and Yu Zhengsheng appeared nearly half the time in Shanghai. Tianjin party chief Zhang Gaoli appeared five days in his home capital and Chongqing party boss Zhang Dejiang only occasionally in his. Finally, Premier Wen Jiabao came late to Beidaihe, and left early, inspecting flood damage in Henan and Hubei on 1–2 August and appearing in Zhejiang on the 14th and 15th. The only Politburo Standing Committee member reported by Xinhua to have appeared in Beidaihe in this period was Xi Jinping, who was joined there by Politburo members Li Yuanchao and Liu Yandong, along with several lower-ranking party and united front leaders. This group greeted experts vacationing in Beidaihe as a reward for meritorious service, a practice consistent with similar top leader receptions of such groups every year since 2003.
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