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Home , Chen Quanguo, Guo Jinlong, Zhang Yunchuan

A Pre-Congress Miscellany

Alice Miller

Beijing has begun setting the stage for the 18th Party Congress, which is expected to see the largest turnover in the top leadership since the sweeping generational transition a decade ago. This article offers several observations on leadership politics and processes heading into the congress. Taken separately, the meaning of these observations is not clear. But taken together, they intimate a troubled and likely contention- ridden push to convene the party congress.

What’s Ahead

The dates of the 18th Party Congress have yet to be announced.* If follows the procedure it followed in announcing the dates of the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the will report a decision of a Politburo meeting to convene the 17th Central Committee’s Seventh Plenum. It will also propose to the plenum the month the 18th Congress is to convene. The meeting will also forward to the plenum a draft of the work of the Central Committee that General Secretary will present at the 18th Congress, as well as a list of nominations for the 18th Central Committee to be presented to the congress. The Seventh Plenum will in turn announce the precise dates of the party congress and approve the work report for presentation at the congress, together with the lists of nominations for the new Central Committee.

In the meantime, PRC media on 14 August reported the conclusion of the election of the 2,270 delegates to the party congress. Delegates were elected from 40 electoral blocs representing central party and state institutions, the PLA, ’s 32 province-level units (including Taiwan, though still under other management), and other constituencies. A first wave of provincial party congresses to elect provincial delegates and new provincial party leaderships began in October 2011 and was completed on schedule the following December. But a second wave began in April and concluded in July—slightly later than earlier media predictions of a wrapup by the end of June.

Bo Xilai Investigation If the leadership follows the procedures it followed in the removal and prosecution of Politburo leaders Xitong in 1995 and Chen Liangyu in 2006, it seems likely that the Xinhua account of the Politburo meeting calling for the convocation of the Seventh

*Update: On 28 September, Xinhua announced that the Seventh Plenum of the 17th Central Committee will meet on 1 November and the 18th CCP Congress will open on 8 November. Xinhua also announced that the Politburo has decided to expel Bo Xilai from the party and turn him over to state authorities for legal prosecution.

Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39

Plenum will also report the meeting’s review of the case of Bo Xilai, who was replaced as party chief in in March and whose Politburo membership was “suspended” in April. This Politburo review would include hearing an investigation report by the Central Discipline Inspection Commission on Bo and decisions on whether to expel him from the party and turn him over for prosecution by state authorities. Although PRC media have had relatively little to say about the Bo Xilai investigation since his suspension from the Politburo, limited commentary attending the trial of Bo’s wife Gu Kailai in Hefei on 20 August for murder of a British businessman and then the formal charging of Bo’s Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun has suggested that Bo will be turned over for legal prosecution. A report on the Gu trial by the PRC-owned press agency Zhongguo Tongxunshe on 20 August brushed aside “media speculation” that Bo would not be charged with “economic crime” (corruption) because thus far he has been accused only of “serious disciplinary violations.” The report cited a law school professor suggesting that Bo “could be suspected of the crime of concealing the murder and the crime of bending the law for selfish gain.” It cited the judgment of another legal expert that “at present no decision has been made within the party on how to deal with Bo Xilai.” “According to standard practice,” he went on, “the party will make a decision on Bo before it considers whether to turn the case over to judicial authorities and what charges to file against him” and so “the possibility of additional economic crimes cannot be ruled out.”

Beidaihe Meeting?

A significant portion of the Politburo leadership appears to have held an informal retreat at the seaside resort Beidaihe in the first half of August. Table 1 charts public appearances (as reported in PRC media) from late July through mid-August by members of the Politburo Standing Committee and two of five province-based Politburo members— party chief and party boss . The retreat may have begun on 1 August, when most Standing Committee members stopped appearing, and ended around 15 August. The entire Standing Committee membership assembled in Beijing on the 17th to greet the PRC’s Olympic team.

From 1953 to 2002, the entire top Beijing leadership was in the habit of taking en-masse retreats—up to three weeks at a time—to Beidaihe and occasionally to Lushan in . In 2003, PRC media reported that the Hu Jintao administration had banned this practice both as a cost-saving measure and because it was seen as being out of step with the “people-centered” policies the new leadership sought to promote.

The Hu leadership appears to have observed the ban in the years since, although it is possible that smaller groups of leaders and their families met there informally. Beginning in 2003, Beidaihe sojourns came to be used as a reward for groups that had provided meritorious service to the regime—for example the medical doctors, nurses and technicians who had worked to suppress the SARS epidemic in the spring of that year.

Preceding the run-up to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the leadership was out of view for much less than three weeks. Although several Standing Committee leaders were out

2 Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39

of sight for several days, there were only three days when the entire Standing Committee membership did not appear. In addition, ordinary members of the Politburo continued to appear in Beijing, and province-based members continued to show up in their home bailiwicks. Meanwhile, articles appeared in central media describing Beidaihe as a favorite vacation spot for the public and noted a relaxed atmosphere in the resort town that contrasted with the heavy security and cordoning-off that had attended major leadership retreats there before 2003. And so, if there was a leadership meeting, it probably included primarily Standing Committee members and it likely convened in Beijing, not Beidaihe.

Table 1 Selected Leadership Appearances, 20 July to 17 August 2012

HJT WBG WJB JQL LCC XJP LKQ HGQ ZYK YZS WY 7/20 x x x x x x x x x x 7/21 x x x 7/22 7/23 x x x x x x x x x x* x* 7/24 x x x x x 7/25 x x x 7/26 x x 7/27 x x x x x x x x x x x 7/28 x* 7/29 x* 7/30 x x x x 7/31 x x x x x x x x x 8/1 x* x x 8/2 x* x x 8/3 x x 8/4 8/5 x* 8/6 x x 8/7 x 8/8 x x 8/9 x 8/10 x 8/11 8/12 x 8/13 8/14 x* 8/15 x* 8/16 x 8/17 x x x x x x x x x

KEY: HJT = Hu Jintao; WBG = Wu Bangguo; WJB = Wen Jiabao; JQL = ; LCC = Li Changchun; XJP = ; LKQ = ; HGQ = He Guoqiang; ZYK = Zhou Yongkang; YZS = Yu Zhengsheng; WY = Wang Yang. *NOTES: Yu Zhengsheng and Wang Yang: all appearances in Shanghai and Guangzhou, respectively, except 23 July, in Beijing for Hu Jintao’s Central Party School speech; Jia Qingling 28–29: in Harbin; Wen Jiabao 1–2 August, inspecting flooded areas in and ; Xi Jinping 5 August, in Beidaihe to greet experts rewarded for service to China; and Wen Jiabao 14–15 August, in .

3 Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39

The Beidaihe meeting this year consisted of a significant subset of the full Politburo. Over the 1–15 August period, a few ordinary Politburo members appeared occasionally in Beijing, and conducted an inspection tour in on the 8th and 9th. In addition, as table 1 suggests, province-based Politburo members continued to appear in their home capitals. Wang Yang appeared nearly every day in Guangzhou during this period, and Yu Zhengsheng appeared nearly half the time in Shanghai. party chief Gaoli appeared five days in his home capital and Chongqing party boss only occasionally in his. Finally, Premier Wen Jiabao came late to Beidaihe, and left early, inspecting flood damage in Henan and Hubei on 1–2 August and appearing in Zhejiang on the 14th and 15th.

The only Politburo Standing Committee member reported by Xinhua to have appeared in Beidaihe in this period was Xi Jinping, who was joined there by Politburo members and , along with several lower-ranking party and united front leaders. This group greeted experts vacationing in Beidaihe as a reward for meritorious service, a practice consistent with similar top leader receptions of such groups every year since 2003. In contrast, during the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin eras before the Hu- era ban, Xinhua routinely confirmed ongoing retreats at Beidaihe by routinely reporting leader meetings with foreign visitors and others in dispatches datelined Beidaihe, sometimes noting that the leadership was vacationing there.

Hu Party School Speech

Following a tradition well established in the run-up to previous party congresses, Hu Jintao delivered a speech at the Central Party School on 23 July that previewed the major themes of the report on the work of the 17th Central Committee at the 18th Party Congress. As in the past, the speech was attended by the entire Politburo leadership, including the five province-based members.

The speech, only excerpts of which have been publicized by PRC media, sketched three political themes—dubbed the “three unswervings” in subsequent media commentary— that will serve as the ideological framework for Hu’s congress report. These are, first, that the party must adhere to the sinicized interpretation of Marxism-Leninism of the reform era by “unswervingly taking Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thinking of the ‘three represents’ as guidance, deeply implementing the scientific development concept, and upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Second, the party should continue to resist pressures from both right and left by “unswervingly taking the correct road . . . and not be intimidated by risks or confused by interference.” Third and last, the party must “unswervingly push reform and opening up forward, stay away from rigidity and stagnation . . . and overcome all difficulties and risks in the way of advance with redoubled confidence.” (Xinhua, 23 July 2012) Three authoritative Commentator Articles in the party newspaper People’s Daily on 30 and 31 July and on 2 August elaborated on these themes.

The Hu party school speech was most notable because it was very late—almost a month later than any previous speech on this occasion. Jiang Zemin’s party school speech

4 Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39 previewing his report to the 14th Congress in 1992 was delivered on 9 June 1992. His speech preceding the 15th Congress was delivered on 29 May 1997; and his speech before the 16th Congress was made on 31 May 2002. Hu delivered his party school speech preceding the 17th Congress on 25 June 2007. Whether this delay reflects ongoing leadership disagreement on the draft congress report or some other factor is not clear.

Leadership Changes

A survey of leadership appointments to party Central Committee organs and bodies subordinate to the State Council over the past year shows relatively few changes and, with the exception of Ling Jihua’s replacement as General Office director, none that tips upcoming changes in the top leadership at the party congress. The two waves of provincial party congresses in October–December 2011 and April–July 2012 produced new party chiefs in nine provinces, leaving aside Bo Xilai’s replacement by Zhang Dejiang in April. In eight of the nine cases, the changes were mandated by retirement of the outgoing party chief because of age, according to the rule that provincial party chiefs retire at age 65.

Among these changes, the promotion of Beijing mayor to the post of Beijing party chief in July. Born in 1947, Guo should retire this year, having reached the age of 65. His appointment as Beijing party chief, however, almost certainly brings with it concurrent appointment as a Politburo member, the retirement norm for which is 68. And so perhaps some exception has been made for his continued service. Guo is widely seen as a crony of Hu Jintao’s, but there is no clear evidence for this in his past, apart from his taking the post of deputy party chief in in 1993, immediately after Hu left the post of party chief in the region in 1992.

The ninth case was the replacement of Tibet party boss by in November 2011, in which Zhang was rotated to replace retiring party chief the same month. Zhang has Communist Youth league association from the early 1980s, when Hu Jintao presided over the body, and so Zhang’s move to Shi Jiazhuang brings a presumed Hu crony close to Beijing.

The other interesting change in provincial leaders was in , where was reelected provincial party chief in April 2012. In July, however, Beijing moved to replace Li with Guizhou governor . The meaning of this change was not clear until 1 September, when PRC media reported Li taking up the sensitive post of director of the Central Committee General Office, replacing Ling Jihua, who moved laterally to assume the post of the Central Committee’s United Front Work Department.

Rumors in China and reporting in Hong Kong and foreign media have widely attributed Ling’s removal as General Office director to leadership displeasure with the implications of scandal stemming from Ling’s son crashing a Ferrari on Beijing’s fourth ring road in March, killing at least two people, if not himself. Ling is a close crony of Hu Jintao’s, having served as Hu’s secretary before taking the General Office post in 2007. The General Office manages logistics of the top leadership—including their communications,

5 Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39 personal security, housing and office space, and travel arrangements—and so the post of director is extremely sensitive. Ling’s appointment to the post in 2007 was an important step in Hu’s consolidation of power heading into his second term as general secretary.

The implications of Ling’s replacement by Li are not immediately clear. Speculation in China and among the foreign media has suggested that Li is an associate of Xi Jinping, based largely on their concurrent service in different counties in Hebei in the late 1970s and early 1980s. If this is true, then Xi’s managing to appoint his own man as head of the General Office even before assuming the post of party general secretary signals a very early achievement in consolidating his power. Hu Jintao put Ling in as General Office director only at the beginning of his second term as general secretary, and before Hu, Jiang Zemin was well into his first term as general secretary when he appointed his crony Zeng Qinghong to the post. But the evidence for this line of interpretation is very thin.

Ling Jihua’s lateral move to the United Front Work Department does not necessarily remove him from consideration for Politburo appointment. In any case, contrary to some speculation, he was not a likely candidate for the Politburo Standing Committee.

Pace of Politburo Meetings

Fewer Politburo meetings were held in the past 13 months than in any 12-month period since 2002. From 1 August 2011 to 1 September 2012, Xinhua reported only six meetings of the full Politburo. And study sessions—a hallmark feature of Hu Jintao’s tenure as party chief—have been held only three times. As table 2 shows, the Politburo has met in full session roughly 10 times a year, and it has held study sessions at only a slightly lower rate.

Table 2 Politburo Meetings and Study Sessions, 16 November 2002 to 1 September 2012

16th CC Politburo Year Meetings Study sessions 2002 3 1 2003 10 8 2004 10 9 2005 9 9 2006 10 10 2007 9 7 Total: 51 44 (continues on following page)

6 Miller, China Leadership Monitor, no. 39

Table 2 (continued) 17th CC Politburo Year Meetings Study sessions 2007 3 2 2008 11 8 2009 9 7 2010 12 8 2011 8 6 2012 3 2 Total: 46 33

Xinhua has reported the Politburo’s meeting so far in 2012 only three times—on 20 February, 28 May, and 31 July. Each of these meetings was devoted to a major piece of Politburo business—review of Wen Jiabao’s report on the work of the State Council to the March National People’s Congress session; review of reform on China’s science and technology system in May, preceding a major technology innovation conference in early July; and the semiannual review of China’s economic trends at the end of July. No meeting has been reported dealing with more-routine business, in contrast to previous years.

What explains this lapse is not clear. In the nearly 10 months preceding the 17th Party Congress in 2007, Xinhua reported the Politburo meeting nine times, as well as holding seven study sessions. That congress, however, saw what might be considered a mid-term transition in the leadership, involving a significantly smaller turnover of leaders. The upcoming party congress promises a major generational transition in the leadership. In addition, as was apparent in the leadership’s midyear review of economic trends at the 31 July Politburo meeting, Beijing is wrestling with a downshifting economy and the social and political tensions that naturally follow. And so perhaps contention over who gains and who loses at the party congress—both in terms of leadership posts and of the broad direction of policy under the new Xi leadership—is complicating the effort of the Hu- Wen leadership to deliver a smooth transition.

In that regard, it may be notable that Hu Jintao has maintained a low public profile since emerging from the Beidaihe retreat on 16 August. Apart from meeting with a half a dozen foreign guests and traveling to the APEC informal summit in Vladivostok in early September, Hu has not sustained his usually busy pattern of presiding over meetings, delivering speeches, inspecting provinces, and other domestic activities. This could indicate that his hands are full with the problem of establishing sufficient consensus to pull off the congress.

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