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PLA Attempts to Attract Higher-Quality Recruits

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PLA Attempts to Attract Higher-Quality Recruits Volume 17, Issue 12 September 21, 2017 In a Fortnight: PLA Attempts to Attract Higher-Quality Recruits What is Xi Jinping Thought? By Willy Lam Himalayan Impasse: How China Would Fight an Indian Border Conflict By Kevin McCauley Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang By Adrian Zenz, James Leibold Assessing the Sino-Russian Baltic Sea Drill By Richard Weitz PLA Attempts to Attract Conscription, which began in early May, accepts young men and women between the ages of 18– Higher-Quality Recruits 22 and forms the bulk of the PLA. Conscripts By Peter Wood serve for two years, before leaving the PLA or advancing to become Non-Commissioned Of- ficers. Recruits for the PLA’s officer track are In late August, China’s annual conscription (征 brought in at the same time. According to the 兵) period ended. This years’ newest group of Chinese Ministry of Education, over 1,070,000 PLA recruits was reportedly among the worst in college students joined the PLA in 2017, an in- recent memory, with widespread reportage crease of 5.6 percent over last year (Ministry of across Chinese and international media about Education, August 30). the recruits’ health issues. As an article in the Chinese military’s official newspaper put it, “One China’s changing demographics and transition- [unnamed] cities’ physical exam washout rate for ing economy are having an impact on its ability conscripts was 56.9 percent—enough to leave to attract high-quality recruits. The PLA has tra- one speechless” (PLA Daily, October 28). Recruits ditionally had a social and economic function as were overweight, inactive or psychologically un- well as its military purpose—the bulk of recruits fit. have been from rural areas, and the PLA pro- vided them with skills to help move up the labor ChinaBrief September 21, 2017 value chain. As China’s level of urbanization ing in the PLA is small (only 115,000 of 1.6 mil- reaches higher levels (57.35 percent as of 2016), lion in 2016), they have increasingly been given recruits will increasingly need to be drawn from higher profile roles, including combat positions, urban areas (China Economic Net, January 20). in recent years (see China Brief, October 4; Oc- tober 26). Although China’s One Child Policy was ended in 2015, it will continue to have a lingering effect In addition to financial incentives, the PLA has on the PLA—most recruits for the next 15 years borrowed from the Pentagon’s Hollywood play- will likely not have siblings. [1] The policy also book and invested in TV series and movies tar- contributed to China’s dramatic population ag- geted directly at encouraging young people to ing (老龄化), which according to some estimates sign up. In late July CCTV premiered the PLA will lead to there being two retired people for Navy-focused Sharp Sword of the Deep 《深海利 every working class person by 2050 (China Brief, 剑》, a 34-episode series following a group of November 2, 2015). Population aging could young college students from their recruitment have a chilling effect on recruitment, as more into the Submarine Force through training and young people are needed in the work force, with eventually to performing missions escorting higher paying jobs, to support their parents. PLAN surface ships on anti-piracy missions. The series, which received direct support from As the PLA modernizes and adopts more sophis- China’s South Sea Fleet and the Submarine ticated equipment, higher levels of education Academy in Qingdao, directly addresses issues among recruits are necessary. To attract more such as China’s changing class structure and at- highly educated students the PLA has created a tempts to make the navy life appealing to a number of incentives. One of the pathways for broad audience. [2] Though widely panned on college students, “National Defense Students” Chinese review sites such as Douban.com, the (Guofangsheng; 国防生)—somewhat similar to series is at least indicative of the PLA’s willing- Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in the ness to spend significant amounts to reach United States—are an increasingly important young Chinese through popular television. proportion of PLA recruits. In Beijing, undergraduate students receive $31,680 per Not to be left out, the Chinese Air Force is in- year. Recruits from trade schools recieve volved in the production of the big-budget Sky $31,278 (China Daily, July 27). As the program continues to attract greater numbers of stu- Hunter 《空天猎》, a blockbuster film featuring dents, the PLA is increasing its standards. In May, major stars such as Fan Bingbing planned for re- the Central Military Commission (CMC) an- lease on September 30. In an interview with the nounced that the PLA would begin to focus Global Times, one of the producers of the film, a more on direct recruitment of college students former PLAAF officer, clearly expressed the re- (People’s Daily, May 30). cruitment value of the film: The PLA also extends special consideration to a “The original intention of the PLA number of categories, including bilingual ethnic Air Force to produce this movie is minorities. Though the number of women serv- simple. We don’t intend to make money; we want to use it to tell the 2 ChinaBrief September 21, 2017 people, especially the youth, what lem, PLA media periodically reports on local ef- the PLA Air Force is like and what it forts to recruit ‘honest inspectors’ to reduce cor- can do to protect the country in this ruption at the grassroots level (MOD, August era and the future” (Global Times, 21). September 10). To achieve China’s “strong military dream” (强军 These TV series and movies, as with earlier pro- 梦) the PLA is going to have to continue to invest ductions such as Soldiers’ Sortie 《士兵突击》, heavily in its people: providing more financial in- appear to be having an effect and are widely centives, job training, and better living stand- cited as helping inspire young Chinese to join ards. For the majority of people in China, life has the PLA (China Daily, July 27; China Brief, July 26, improved dramatically in the past twenty years, 2013). but prosperity is bringing its own challenges, with associated health problems from richer China’s economic situation is also helping incen- foods, and demographic problems due to the tivize more young people to join the PLA. Since One Child Policy. These longer-term trends have hitting a five-year low in 2014, Chinese youth the potential to undercut the PLA’s strength just unemployment is again rising—has stood at as it makes major strides in improving training, over 10 percent since 2010. [3] With financial in- equipment, and technological development. centives and the chance for specialized training, the PLA remains a decent option for many Chi- Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can nese youths. follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW The primary challenges then remain to attract Notes: high-quality recruits and to decrease corruption 1. The One-Child Policy always had excep- in the recruitment system. tions for people in rural areas, minorities and other categories. The Chinese government is clearly concerned 2. End credits for the Sharp Sword of the about the physical and mental health of recruits. Deep thank the following PLA Units (us- In April, the CCP Central Committee and State ing their Military Unit Cover Designator). Council instituted nationwide A Mid-Long-term Youth Development Plan (2016-2025) to “ur- gently improve the standard of physical health of young people” (Gov.cn, April 13). The PLA has also struggled to rid itself of a cul- ture of corruption. The selling of officer commis- sions reached to the highest levels of command, including former CMC member Xu Caihou. Alt- hough Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan’s anti-cor- ruption campaign has targeted both “tigers” [like Xu] and “flies”, corruption remains a prob- 3 ChinaBrief September 21, 2017 The real unit name is provided where chaired by General Secretary Xi, indicated that possible the Party would abide by and carry out “the es- 3. World Bank, Youth Unemployment Rate sence of General Secretary Xi’s series of im- for China, retrieved from FRED, Federal portant remarks and the new governance con- Reserve Bank of St. Louis; cepts, thoughts and strategies of the central https://fred.stlouisfed.org/se- party authorities (中央党).” On previous occa- ries/SLUEM1524ZSCHN, September 19, sions, Party mouthpieces often attributed “gov- 2017. ernance concepts, thoughts and strategies” to Xi, the “core of the leadership.” By pointing out that these concepts, thoughts and strategies *** were those of the “central party authorities,” the Politburo seemed to endorse collective deci- sion-making rather than the personal contribu- What is Xi Jinping Thought? tions of paramount leader Xi (BBC Chinese, Sep- By Willy Lam tember 1; Apple Daily [Hong Kong], September 1). Ahead of the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), scheduled to begin on It is important to note, however, that changes in October 18, media attention has focused on either personnel or dogma are still possible until top-level personnel changes. While the selection the last one or two weeks before the Congress of China’s new group of leaders is certainly im- opens. Xi Jinping Thought has been cited offi- portant, recent announcement that current CCP cially or unofficially by top-ranked Xi protégés General Secretary Xi Jinping’s political philoso- such as Politburo member and Director of the phies—Xi Jinping Thought (习近平思想)—are to General Office of the Central Committee Li be enshrined in the Party Constitution will have Zhanshu (栗战书) as well as the newly promoted a tremendous impact on the political develop- Beijing party secretary Cai Qi (蔡奇).
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