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Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019

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Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019 Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019 Beyond the Camps: Beijing's Grand Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang Adrian Zenz Senior Fellow in China Studies Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C. Written Testimony for the Hearing of the Congressional Executive Commission on China 1. Introduction After recruiting a hundred or more thousand police forces, installing massive surveillance systems, and interning vast numbers of predominantly Turkic minority population members, many have been wondering about Beijing's next step in its so- called "war on Terror" in Xinjiang. Since the second half of 2018, limited but apparently growing numbers of detainees have been released into different forms of forced labor. In this report it is argued based on government documents that the state's long-term stability maintenance strategy in Xinjiang is predicated upon a perverse and extremely intrusive combination of forced or at least involuntary training and labor, intergenerational separation and social control over family units. Much of this is being implemented under the heading and guise of "poverty alleviation". Below, the author identifies three distinct flow schemes by which the state seeks to place the vast majority of adult Uyghurs and other minority populations, both men and women, into different forms of coercive or at least involuntary, labor-intensive factory work. This is achieved through a combination of internment camp workshops, large industrial parks, and village-based satellite factories. While the parents are being herded into full-time work, their children are put into full-time (at least full day-time) education and training settings. This includes children below preschool age (infants and toddlers), so that ethnic minority women are being "liberated" and "freed" to engage in full-time wage labor. Notably, both factory and educational settings are essentially state- controlled environments that facilitate ongoing political indoctrination while barring religious practices. As a result, the dissolution of traditional, religious and family life is only a matter of time. The targeted use of village work teams and village-based satellite factories means that this grand "poverty alleviation" and social re-engineering scheme penetrates into every corner of ethnic minority society with unprecedented pervasiveness. Consequently, it is argued that Beijing's grand scheme of forced education, training and labor in Xinjiang simultaneously achieves at least five main goals in this core region of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): maintain the minority population in state-controlled environments, inhibit intergenerational cultural transmission, achieve national poverty reduction goals, promote economic growth along the BRI, and bring glory to the Party by achieving all of these four aims an a way that is ideologically consistent with the core tenets of Communist thought - using labor to transform religious minority groups towards a predominantly materialist worldview, akin to the Reform Through Labor (劳 改) program. Government documents outline that the transformation of rural populations from farming to wage labor should involve not just the acquisition of new 1 Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019 skills, but also a thorough identity and worldview change in line with Party ideology. In this context, labor is hailed as a strategic means to eradicate "extremist" ideologies. The domestic and global implications of this grand scheme, where internment camps form only one component of a society-wide coercive social re-engineering strategy, are dramatic. Through the mutual pairing assistance program, 19 cities and provinces from the nation's most developed regions are pouring billions of Chinese Yuan (RMB) into the establishment of factories in minority regions. Some of them directly involve the use of internment camp labor, while others are used to make Uyghur women leave their children in educational or day care facilities in order to engage in full time factory labor. Soon, many or most products made in China that rely at least in part on low-skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing, could contain elements of involuntary ethnic minority labor from Xinjiang. Government documents blatantly boast about the fact that the labor supply from the vast internment camp network has been attracting many Chinese companies to set up production in Xinjiang, supporting the economic growth goals of the BRI. The findings presented below call for nothing less than a global investigation of supply chains involving Chinese products or product components, and for a greatly increased scrutiny of trade flows along China's Belt and Road. They also warrant a strong response from the international community in regards to China's intrusive coerced social re- engineering practices among Turkic minorities. 2. Winning The "War Against Poverty": Industry-Based Poverty Alleviation 2.1 Industry-Based Poverty Alleviation Through Labor-Intensive Manufacturing In line of Xi Jinping's goal to eradicate poverty and establish a moderately prosperous society (MPS) in the entire nation by 2020, poverty alleviation has become an urgent goal in Xinjiang. According to government documents, the region's "war on poverty" (literally: "fight for poverty-alleviation", tuofu gongjian 脱贫攻坚 ) in 2019 has reached a crucial phase. The urgent aim is to achieve the complete eradication of poverty in time for 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. In all this, the central government is putting special attention to winning the war against poverty in southern Xinjiang.1 Another report states that poverty alleviation is commensurate with a "military command", and that "the southern four regions and prefectures are the main battle field" in the war against poverty. 2 In this relentless "battle", every administrative level is to put pressure on each successive lower level in order to "implement the poverty alleviation responsibility with full pressure".3 Other parts of China are implementing very similar poverty alleviation schemes, and poverty alleviation through higher-income work is at first glance a positive development. The issue in Xinjiang is that this scheme is specifically targeting predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities on a massive scale, and is coupled with penetrating social control, a pervasive surveillance state, an unprecedented extrajudicial 1 http://www.xjrs.com.cn/zwgk/xwdt/xjyw/201903/t8a4ac70d69b93a1c0169be4c80b300c0.html or http://archive.is/MRBYL 2 http://f.china.com.cn/2018-02/07/content_50442241.htm or http://archive.is/oVSbm 3 https://new.qq.com/omn/20190228/20190228A01BNW00 2 Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019 internment campaign, and a deeper social re-engineering intention on the side of the state that effectively amounts to targeted cultural genocide. Poverty alleviation comes in different forms, at times through improved farming. But the main key focus in Xinjiang's ethnic minority regions has recently shifted to so-called "industry-based poverty alleviation" (chanye fupin 产业扶贫 ).4 Since the past few years, this has been involving a systematic training of so-called rural surplus laborers in order to place them in low-skilled factory work. Most recently, this has involved the large- scale construction of so-called "poverty alleviation workshops" (fupin chejian 扶贫车间), which are smaller-scale "satellite factories" (weixing gongchang 卫星工厂). The main purpose of satellite factories is to move as many rural dwellers into factory-based wage labor by "sending work to homes" (gangwei song dao jia 岗位送 到家 ) and "letting villagers take up jobs at their home's doorstep" (rang cunmin jia menkou jiuye 让村民家 ⻔⼝就业 ).5 At least since 2018, Xinjiang's primary poverty alleviation and stability maintenance method has been to promote wage labor among all ethnic minority adults. Every household must have at least one person in stable employment, although numerous local level reports indicate that the trend is very much to also push women into factory work.6 Between 2016 and 2020, Xinjiang was scheduled to lift 2.61 million persons out of poverty.7 Of these, 1.74 million are considered able to work and are expected to "get out of poverty" through different forms of training and employment. Much of this new stable employment is to be provided in the form of labor-intensive manufacturing. The other 0.87 million will be taken care of through social welfare systems and related subsidies. A June 2017 document published by Kashgar Prefecture provides us with a more detailed view of how the state is pursuing the poverty alleviation of every single person. Between 2015-20, this region alone was scheduled to lift 1.21m people out of poverty. 8 Specifically, this was planned be done through five different means: 1. Production development (poverty alleviation for 529,000 persons) 2. Re-training rural surplus laborers for full-time wage employment (poverty alleviation for 217,000 persons) 3. Physical relocation to new housing developments with factory jobs (poverty alleviation for 54,900 persons) 4. Environmental protection programs (poverty alleviation for 37,400 persons) 5. Policy measures, referring to subsidies in monetary form or animals (poverty alleviation for 371,600 persons) Poverty alleviation through job training and employment is further broken down into six different categories:9 1. Move laborers to other parts of Xinjiang (疆内跨地区转移就业) 4 http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/11/09/152523.html or http://archive.is/YnQsw 5 http://www.xj-agri.gov.cn/tpgj/43407.jhtml or http://archive.is/Q3rUz 6 http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/01/29/147312.html or http://archive.is/ri3CP 7 http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2016/0109/c188521-27501414.html 8 http://www.xj.chinanews.com/shehui/20171018/24289.shtml or http://archive.is/KVSDV 9 http://www.xinjiangnet.com.cn/2018/0120/2039961.shtml 3 Beyond the Camps - Adrian Zenz - CECC Hearing Testimony, October 17, 2019 2. Move laborers to other parts of China (转移内地就业) 3. Move laborers to XPCC locations for work (转移兵团就业) 4.
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