Chapter 7 Russia and Northeast Asia

Chapter 7 Russia and Northeast Asia: Unrealized Potential By Wade Turvold, Michael B. Dorschner, and Michael Burgoyne Introduction Russia’s global interests include sustaining the current regime, developing its economy, and resisting and reforming the U.S.-led international system to establish Russia as one of several global powers. Russia’s objectives in Northeast Asia that nest within its global ambitions primarily include expansion of economic relationships as part of its “Turn to the East” policy. Russia’s economic relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) currently dwarfs those with the rest of Northeast Asia, and the “Turn to the East” policy would optimally enhance these relationships in an effort to meaningfully diversify its economic ties. Russia’s strategy in Northeast Asia is therefore coherent with its international goals, but more nuanced because of Russia’s strategic partnership with the PRC, and because of the unique economic potential of the region. This chapter will address Russia’s interactions with the Republic of Korea (Korea), Taiwan, Mongolia, and Japan. It will also complement the Russia-PRC chapter in this book by showing how the Russia-PRC relationship enables and constrains Russia’s role in Northeast Asia. The impetus for Russia’s “Turn to the East” policy was to seek new markets before, and especially after, economic sanctions resulting from its unlawful annexation of Crimea reduced the viability of Western economic relationships. Russia also seeks to develop the Russia Far East (RFE) region, which is proximate to many of the larger Asian economies including the PRC, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Russia hopes that increased economic activity will result in more foreign direct investment, increased trade volume, and a generally better standard of living for its citizens in the region. Russia’s strategic approach to Korea includes the possibility that better economic relations with Korea could also include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which would ideally lead to a more stable and peaceful Eastern border. Similarly, potential Russian engagement with Taiwan would not be straightforward, and would be influenced by Russia’s relationship with the PRC and its “One China” Principle. Russia’s relationship with Mongolia follows a slightly different pattern than its engagement with the rest of Northeast Asia, and encompasses more than economic ties. An early ally of the Soviet Union with cultural and geographic links to the Asian heartland, Mongolia in many ways has closer resemblance to the former Soviet Central Asia republics than to other Northeast Asian states. Mongolia’s relationship with Russia today reflects these historical and cultural ties. Despite Mongolia’s standing as a vibrant and free democracy, its challenging geography limits its strategic options. Completely surrounded by Russia and the PRC with no land bridge or ports to guarantee third country border or market access, Mongolia has an incentive to maintain good relations with both big neighbors, which remains the principle pillar 53 of Mongolian foreign policy. Russia’s interest in Mongolia is therefore primarily one of preserving influence in Russia’s near abroad and maintaining Great Power status in the face of expanding Chinese economic and political influence. Russia pursues economic ties with Japan, but its relationship is also tinged with historical underpinnings. Russia’s experience with Japan dates back to encounters during Russian expansion into East Asia in the mid-19th Century, ultimately clashing in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Japan’s convincing defeat of Russia in that war shocked most of the world and announced Japan’s coming of age as a modern Great Power. Following World War II, however, the tables were turned. The Soviet Union, then part of the Allied powers, declared war on Japan in August 1945, and upon conclusion of the war annexed the Southern Kuril Islands. Japan considers the southern four islands of the chain as its own Northern Territories. Multiple Japanese attempts to recover these islands since then have been unsuccessful. Current efforts by Japan to negotiate a settlement in this dispute will not succeed because Japan and Russia currently have divergent core interests. Japan wants to settle its lingering World War II era conflicts and so settle the dispute, and Russia wants to sustain legitimacy as a Great Power which makes it reluctant to cede any territory under its control. Russian Ways and Means Russia pursues its objectives in this region primarily through economic means, though also in limited ways through governance and providing security. Mongolia, is, in fact, the only nation in Northeast Asia where Russia provides security as a means of influence. However, while Russia has historically been Mongolia’s security guarantor, Mongolia carefully maintains an independent foreign policy through a “Third Neighbor Policy” that emphasizes cooperation with international democratic partners in addition to its two large neighbors.1 Manifested through robust security contributions to UN Peacekeeping and to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mongolia establishes diplomatic flexibility through international relations. Those troop contributions to Iraq and Afghanistan as a NATO partner have generated occasional Russian concern as they threaten Russia’s traditional security role with Mongolia. Russia seeks to protect this role using myriad other security cooperation means. For instance, Russia hosts an annual bilateral military exercise with Mongolia and requested Mongolian participation with the PRC in the massive Vostok war games in 2018, adding international legitimacy to Russia’s security arrangements in the Far East. Russia has also encouraged Mongolia to upgrade from observer status to full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and remains the principle supplier of military equipment to the Mongolian military, maintaining de facto veto power over Mongolian defense acquisitions, guaranteeing continued economic advantage and security influence. Russia’s role as security guarantor notwithstanding, its strongest influence in Mongolia is actually best exercised through lingering cultural soft power. Fiercely proud and independent, Mongolians credit the Soviet Union with protecting their independent state from the PRC in the early 20th century and owe much of the major infrastructure to Soviet investments. Russia enjoys goodwill from the Mongolian people, and public opinion overwhelmingly ranks Russia as its most popular partner.2 Russia maintains a massive embassy in Ulaanbaatar, supports study and cultural programs, and enjoys support from the older generations that ubiquitously speak 1 Mongolia National Security Council, “National Security Concept of Mongolia,” https://nsc.gov.mn/mn. 2 International Republican Institute Center for Insights in Survey Research with Government of Canada, National Survey of Mongolian Public Opinion, March 2016, 53. 54 Russian as a second language. Russian goodwill is of course only half the story; with two neighbors, each has an impact. Historically, China has always been Mongolia’s primary security threat, and though economic ties have dramatically increased, resulting in an overwhelming economic dependency, Mongolian leaders quietly question Chinese intentions, reinforcing the need for strong security relations with Russia. Russia’s potential relationship with Japan is limited by the Kuril Islands dispute, where it administers and exercises sovereignty over islands Japan refers to as the Northern Territories. Japan and the Soviet Union first addressed this disagreement together in 1956, when the Soviet Union offered to return control of the southernmost two islands to Japan in exchange for it renouncing its claim to the northernmost two islands as part of a peace treaty ending World War II. Japan refused the offer, and the dispute over the islands remains, despite numerous failed attempts to rectify the situation. An attendant consequence of this impasse is that World War II remains officially unresolved between Japan and Russia. The world situation has also changed dramatically in the intervening years, and currently Russia is becoming more closely aligned with the PRC, as noted in another chapter of this book. Settling this dispute is important for Japan on many levels, including finally concluding World War II, the historical memory of which still generates much regional animosity toward Japan. Aside from the obvious fact that Russia has the dominant position in this dispute because it currently administers the islands, Russia’s interests are best served by retaining control of its possessions. The islands’ Exclusive Economic Zone provides Russia access to rich fisheries, as well as possible oil and gas deposits.3 Russian military bases on the islands enable it to project power into the North Pacific Ocean. The islands enclose the Sea of Okhotsk, a bastion for Russia’s Pacific Fleet ballistic missile submarines, and give Russian vessels unimpeded access to the Pacific Ocean.4 Russia’s sovereignty and security are therefore enhanced by refusing to negotiate these territories away. Russia retains influence in the SCO, which really only affects Mongolia in Northeast Asia, and in recent years both Russia and the PRC have exerted considerable pressure on Mongolia to upgrade its membership, suggesting that future One Belt One Road and Eurasian Economic Union development projects could be prioritized to SCO full members.

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