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5. Evolution of the Brotherhood's Political Discourse

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5. Evolution of the Brotherhood's Political Discourse The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing ‘Political Setback’ or Diminished Popularity? Mohammad Suliman Abu Rumman November 2007 Published in 2007 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Amman Office / Michael Bröning P.O. Box 926238, Amman 11110 - Jordan www.fes-jordan.com, [email protected] © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the publishers. Printing: Economic Printing Press, Amman, Jordan Translation: Issam Daoud Khoury, Amman Jordan Design and layout: Maya Chami, Beirut, Lebanon Editing and proofing: Mona Abu Rayyan, Beirut, Lebanon ISBN: 978-9957-484-03-3 Preface What role does ‘Political Islam’ play in contemporary Jordan? How does Islam define politics in the Hashemite Kingdom? And how have relations changed between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood in the period subsequent to the 2007 parliamentary elections? These and other pressing questions are discussed in the following analysis by Mohammad Abu Rumman, one of the most distinguished experts on the Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. In his essay, the author discusses the reasons for the electoral defeat of the Islamist movement in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Far from offering simplistic or mono-causal explanations, the author demonstrates that this defeat is based on several factors including causes deeply rooted within the Islamic movement itself. However, the study does not stop at an analysis of what happened in the last months of 2007. Rather, it delves further to discuss the different scenarios that might affect the Islamic movement’s future in Jordan. While it is difficult to ascertain whether the current defeat of the Islamic movement’s political wing will prove permanent, it is safe to say that the Muslim Brotherhood, as a socio-cultural movement, will not disappear from the Jordanian political landscape anytime soon. Political Islam is here to stay. Questions that also need to be raised within this context include: How can the integration of Political Islam into the political system of Jordan be guaranteed in view of recent developments? Is it to be taken for granted that a representation of Islam in the political sphere in Jordan is not only in the best interest of the Islamic movement itself, but also in the interest of the Jordanian public, in general? These issues add to the challenging and intriguing questions that need to be examined with great care and deliberation. In view of the importance of these questions, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Amman will issue a series of studies of which the following analysis represents the first volume. If the study contributes to fostering a thorough debate on these questions, we will have achieved our aim. Dr. Michael Bröning Resident Representative FES – Jordan 15-12-2007 Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................ 9 1. Islamic Movements and the Political Game ........................................ 11 2. The Brotherhood and the Regime: From Alliance to Crisis ................. 18 3. Dynamics and Dimensions of the Crisis ............................................. 27 4. The Brotherhood’s Internal Debate .................................................... 33 5. Evolution of the Brotherhood’s Political Discourse ............................. 44 6. The Storm Within .............................................................................. 56 7. The 2007 Electoral Campaign ........................................................... 61 8. The Brotherhood’s Setback: the 2007 Elections Earthquake ............. 64 9. The Future Horizons .......................................................................... 73 References ............................................................................................ 82 7 Introduction The humble electoral results achieved by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian parliamentarian elections of November 20, 2007 shocked most observers and analysts. The extent of the poor results was a surprise even to those who had predicted that the popularity of the Brotherhood was retreating. Even the most pessimistic estimates did not expect the limited amount of parliamentary seats gained by the Brotherhood, 6 out of 110 seats. Directly after the announcement of the results, the retreat of the Brotherhood became a major subject of media debate and political analyses among researchers, journalists and politicians. The debate not only took place on the level of the election’s local implications, but also on the level of its implications on Islamic political movements in general. Compounding a regional situation, the Jordanian elections took place only a few weeks after the Islamic Justice and Development Party also failed to achieve expected results in the Moroccan legislative elections. Furthermore, the dismal electoral results of the Jordanian Brotherhood came at a time when their ‘brothers’ in the Hamas Movement took over full control of the Gaza Strip; and as a result, are facing a precarious period, negative media coverage and political commentaries and analyses also projecting a retreat in popularity for this movement. In analyzing the variables leading to these results, as well as the extent of the repercussions and questions raised by these results, this study will attempt to answer the following: To what extent does this result reflect a retreat in the Brotherhood’s popularity, political stature and standing with the masses? Does this result reflect the influence of new policies taken by the state institution towards the Brotherhood, or does it also reflect an internal crisis within the party? In the case that these results are indicative of a definite retreat in the party’s political presence, is it an exceptional retreat or a ‘surprise upset’ outside the norm? Or is it the result of a series of historical accumulations and several significant catalysts? 9 To answer these questions and to be able to extract the full dimension of the Brotherhood’s defeat and the transformation of their political stature requires going beyond merely analyzing the electoral results. The major variables and elements that explain the transformations and changes which the Brotherhood has passed through must be discussed. The first is the relationship of the party with the state since the establishment of the Kingdom in 1946 up to 2007. The second variable is the relationship of the party with society, its social ‘welfare’ role and the tools it used in its popular and mass communication strategy. The third is the evolution that took place on the level of the Brotherhood’s discourse, its prevailing practices and active movements or rising trends within the party. In order to discuss the above, the study will deal with the results of the 2007 parliamentary elections within a general context by analyzing the following points: . The position of the Muslim Brotherhood within the map of political Islam and among other political Islamic movements in Jordan, along with the Brotherhood’s main political stands; . The evolution of the relationship between the state and the Brotherhood from alliance to crisis; . The dynamics between the state and the Brotherhood, an explanation of these dynamics and the factors influencing the relationship between the two; . A reading and an analysis of the political and intellectual debates which have influenced and reflected polarizations within the Brotherhood’s organization; . Reviewing features of the Brotherhood’s political discourse, its perspective on democracy and the extent of its political reality; as well as, discussing to what extent the Brotherhood’s discourse has served and assisted its integration into the political system? Finally, what are the limits of the conflict between the Brotherhood’s discourse, its political stands and state policy? . The factors that led to the acute internal crisis in the Brotherhood on the eve of the parliamentary elections. What is the extent of this crisis, and its consequences? . The Brotherhood’s electoral platform; and, to what extent did this platform include a new and realistic vision? . The causes and factors explaining the Brotherhood’s defeat in the 2007 parliamentary elections; . Projections on the future scope of the Brotherhood’s political role and its relationship with the state. 10 1. Islamic Movements and the Political Game The Muslim Brotherhood (and the Islamic Action Front Party) represent(s) the Greater Islamic Movement, which openly and systematically participates in Jordanian political and civil life through parliamentary and municipal elections, and in trade unions and other forms of public life. However, this presence does not negate the fact that other Islamic movements actively compete with the Brotherhood for their share in the popular support base, and rival their standing as the ‘authoritative’ Islamic political representatives in public life. These Islamic movements and groups represent several different positions, many times contradictory in political vision and official stands on internal and external issues. Therefore, a main challenge lies in the power-mapping of these Islamic movements and in classifying them politically. The next challenge will be to delineate where the Muslim Brotherhood exists within this political mapping in relation to other powers, and with regard to its political ideas and stands and
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