DOCSLIB.ORG

Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism by Sylvia G

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism by Sylvia G ISLAM AND THE THEORY OF ARAB NATIONALISM BY SYLVIA G. HAIM London It is often argued that Islam and nationalism, being systems . different in origin and inspiration are contradictory almost by definition, and that no useful purpose can be served in discussing them in connexion with each other. In this essay, I will, however, try to examine Islam and Arab nationalism as systems of belief, and to discover the point of contact between them, and whether a reconciliation between the two creeds is possible or not. 1 It will be necessary to study the literature of the Arab nationalist move- ment, to trace any Islamic elements that it may contain, and to . endeavour to relate these elements to the traditional system of Islamic belief. Such a study will involve the discussion of the changes that have come over certain terms, Islamic in origin and character, as a result of the infiltration of Western ideas into Arabic thought. Nationalist doctrines in Europe have usually encouraged xeno- phobia, an exaggerated pride in race and language, and a desire to seek inspiration in a pre-Christian past; Eastern nationalisms naturally followed suit in these as in other, perhaps less aggressive, tendencies of nationalism, since it was from Europe that nationalist theories were learnt in modern times. The literature of Arab nationalism does not lack illustrations of these tendencies. To take an example, S ami i Shawkat, a Director General of Education in Iraq in the loses, spoke as follows to the teachers of private and foreign schools in Baghdad in 1939 : "We have up to now neglected a most vital aspect of our glorious history; we have made it start at the prophetic message,and this is a period of less than fourteen centuries. 1 See also "Islam and Arab Nationalism" in WI , N. S., III 201. Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 06:20:03AM via free access 125 In reality, however, the history of our illustrious Arab nation extends over thousands of years, and goes back to the time when the peoples of Europe lived in forests and over marshes, in caves and in the interstices of the rock; at that time our own ancestors used to set up banks, sculpt statues, and lay down canons and codesof law; they invented then the first principles of medicine, geometry, astromony, the alphabet and the numerals. On the stela of Hammurabi in the Louvre, we find inscribed the basic law given by one of our ancestors, Hammurabi; one of its clauses concerns the legal punishment of an eye . for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; this took place before the Torah, the Gospelsor the Qurlan. In the same way we find that everything makes us lift our heads high when we considerthe historiesof the Semiticempires formed in the Fertile Crescent-the Chaldean, the Assyrian,the African,the Pharaonicor the Carthaginian;all these things must persuade us that the civilisationof the world at the present time is based on foundationslaid by our ancestors. These empires and their dependenciesare all our property; they are of us and for us; we have the right to glory in them and to honour their exploits, just as we have the right to cherish and exalt the glories of Nabuchadnezzar,Hammurabi, Sargon, Ramses,Tutankhamen, in the same way that we glory and take pride in 'Abd ar-Rahman ad-Dakhil, 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwan, Harun ar-Rashid and al-Ma'mun." 1 Sami Shawkat went on to say that this pride in the Arab past had to be systematically inculcated: "No other history", he ended his address by saying, "is to be taught in an attractive and sym- pathetic manner except the history of the Arab nation (al-umma al-Carabiyya), and when I say the Arab nation, I mean the history of all the Semitic waves." 2 A more detailed exposition of his views on the role of the teaching of history in fostering nationalist pride occurs in another address to teachers of history: "You see how history is made up accordingto the needs of the moment: this is formative history. History for history's sake, on the other hand, has no place in our present society; it is a matter for the specialist and for those who devote themselvesto learning alone. The histories which are written with this aim in view are buried and nobody reads them. I believe that the Arab masses which are instinct with deep national feeling and with sentiments of pride and glory, must desecrate the tomb of Ibn Khaldun for his saying 'The Arabs are a people who cannot unite, and a people without political capacity', and just for his blasphemingin such a manner. ' Scienceis called sciencebecause emotion plays no part in it; but emotion has a share in the arts such as poetry, painting, music and acting, and he who has no strong emotions cannot sense the meaning of pictures or of acting. I believethat the teacher of history, if 1 Sami Shawkat, H�dhihiahd �funa,man dmana biha fa huwa minna, Baghdad 1939, p. 11. See also MuhammadJamil Baiham, Al-�Arabqabl al-Isl�amwa ba�duhuf� Filast �n, in AL-�Îrf�Sidon,n, 1952,pp. 440-I. The author there maintains that the Arab nationality (qaumiyya) and language precede Islam in Syria. 2 Shawkat, p. 14. S�miShawkat is not the only one to make the Arabs the ancestors of all known civilisationsin the Middle East; �Al�N ��irad-D �n, an ideologue of Arab nationalism, does the same, and affirms that what are commonly called peoples (shu¸�b),such as the Assyrians or the Chaldeans, are Arab tribes and not nations or peoples.He considersthat Islam, although important as an event becauseof the expansion it made possible, is but an accident in the larger and older being of Arabism. See his Qadiyyat al-�Arab,Beirut 1946,pp. 30 n. I, 55 n. 2, 57 n., 104ff. Edmond Rabbath, a Syrian Christian, at one time Deputy in the Syrian Parliament, elaborates the same point of view with greater precision and a show of scientific method. See his "Unité Syrienne et Devenir Arabe", Paris 1937. Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 06:20:03AM via free access 126 he has no feelingof love for his nation and of adoration for its great men, will not be able to teach history. In this respect therefore, history is in the category of the arts." 1 It is clear that sentiments such as those expressed by Sami Shawkat owe much to the European doctrine of nationalism. The question is how and by what stages such a doctrine came to be acclimatised in the Muslim Arab East and what elements in the indigenous political tradition facilitated its reception. The nature of the change in Muslim political theory may be grasped through a consideration of the gradual and successive attempts to invest with meaning and content the conception of an Arab "nation". And it is perhaps worth while to start with the case of a person ( like Sati ` al-Husri. Säti a native of Aleppo and an official of the Ottoman Government, became a follower of Faisal and an ardent Arab nationalist. He has occupied various high educational posts in Iraq and Syria, having been at one time Director General of Education in Iraq and later Educati- onal Adviser to the Arab League. In his book, Sa f ahat min al- rnadi al-qayib, he defines in Hegelian terms the concepts of freedom, of order and of the state; this definition, he claims to be that which the West universally understands. He recalls a scene from a play he had seen in Paris and in which the European officer tells his mistress, the Moroccan dancer, who tries to turn him away from his military duties by appealing to his sense of freedom: "Liberty for us Westerners," the officeris made to say, "is not as you Easterners under- stand and desire it. You understand by freedom that a person should put on his burnous, mount his horse and ride straight into the desert whereverhe may wish to go ... As for us, we do not demand this kind of freedom;every oneof us carries round his neck ties and chains ... tics and chains made of spiritual gold ... of the gold of tradition, of history and of duty ... We love those chains with all our hearts, and we carry them with great joy ... We venerate those ties and chains and we indeed hold them sacred ...." The author comments: "The generation which spoke in these terms carried France to glory and to victory, but the generation which forsookthe sanctity of the social ties, and adopted the notion of absolutefreedom ... the generationwhich set asidesocial solidarity and sanctified individualism ... this generation ... has carried France to these calamities... [of 1940]. I believe that this outcomemust be a preciouslesson to all Arab youth ... 1 Shawkat pp. 43-4. The expressionused about Ibn Khald�nis yanbush qabr, no equi- valent of which in English can fully convey the primitive violenceof the action described by the Arabic expression. S�ti�al-Husri supplies the rational basis for S�mi Shawkat's pedagogy. In his essay A�al-�ilm'L- li� ilm,am al-�ilm li'l-watan?, �r�wa, ah�d�f�th'l- wataniyyawa 'l-qaumiyya,Cairo 1944,pp. 135-144,al-Husri argues that though knowledge is for the sake of knowledge,teaching is not for the sake of teaching. It is a means towards an end, namely, education. Therefore it implies selectiveness,and selectivenessin the teaching of history should be inspired by the desire to inculcate the spirit of patriotism and nationalism.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Khashoggi's Death and Its Repercussions on the Saudi Position with Turkey
    ORSAM Analysis No: 224 / January 2019 KHASHOGGI’S DEATH AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS ON THE SAUDI POSITION WITH TURKEY IHAB OMAR ORSAM Copyright Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2019 Content of this publication is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views ex- pressed in this publication reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institu- tional opinion of ORSAM. ISBN:978-605-80419-3-6 Center for Middle Eastern Studies Adress : Mustafa Kemal Mah. 2128 Sk. No: 3 Çankaya, ANKARA Phone: +90 (312) 430 26 09 Faks: +90 (312) 430 39 48 Email: [email protected] Photos: Associated Press Analiz No:224 ORSAM ANALYSIS KHASHOGGI 'S DEATH AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS ON THE SAUDI POSITION WITH TURKEY About the Author Ihab Omar Ihab Omar is an Egyptian journalist and researcher specializing in Arab affairs. He holds a Bachelor of Media degree and General Diploma in Education. He covered the Arab events of many Arab newspapers and international sites. He covered closely the events of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. January 2019 orsam.org.tr 2 Khashoggi's Death and its Repercussions on the Saudi Position With Turkey Contents Introduction ......................................................................................................................................3 Who was Jamal Khashoggi? ..........................................................................................................3
    [Show full text]
  • Appendix 2: Evidence Submitted to the FFP
    Appendix 2: Evidence submitted to the FFP Human Rights Watch Page 1. HRW's written submission 1 2. The High Cost of Change 13 3. Prominent detainees held incommunicado 35 4. Saudi Arabia allow access to detained women 39 activists 5. Saudi Arabia free adult children of ex- official 43 Freedom Now submissions in relation to Loujain al-Hathloul Page 6. An English translation of the charges against Loujain 46 al-Hathloul 7. Freedom Now’s petition to the UN Working Group on 51 Arbitrary Detention on behalf of Loujain al-Hathloul 8. Saudi Arabia's response to Freedom Now’s petition 83 (provided by the Saudi government to the UN Working Group) 9. Freedom Now's comments on Saudi Arabia's response 95 10. The opinion of the UN Working Group – 12 June 2020 111 Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) Page 11. Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN) 127 submission Grant Liberty report- December 2020 Page 12. Grant Liberty report- December 2020 130 MENA Rights Group Page 13. MENA Rights Group submission on Messrs Salman Al 171 Saud and Abdulaziz Al Saud Human Rights Watch Page 1 of 174 Human Rights Watch Memo for Fact Finding Panel – Investigation in the Detention of Former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef and Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz I. Summary of Repression Under the De Facto Rule of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman In the summer of 2017, Mohammed bin Salman ousted his cousin Mohammed bin Nayef from power and became crown prince. Almost immediately the authorities began to purge former security and intelligence officials and quietly reorganized the country’s prosecution service and security apparatus, the primary tools of Saudi repression, and placed them directly under the royal court’s oversight.
    [Show full text]
  • Saudi Arabia
    FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017 Saudi Arabia 2016 2017 Population: 32.3 million Not Not Internet Freedom Status Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 73.8 percent Free Free Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes Obstacles to Access (0-25) 14 14 Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes Limits on Content (0-35) 24 24 Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes Violations of User Rights (0-40) 34 34 TOTAL* (0-100) 72 72 Press Freedom 2017 Status: Not Free * 0=most free, 100=least free Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017 • The government outlined plans to significantly increase broadband penetration by 2020 (see Availability and Ease of Access). • An online campaign to end male guardianship caught the attention of the royal court and resulted in gradual reforms (see Digital Activism). • A court increased an activist’s prison sentence for advocating for human rights online from 9 to 11 years on appeal; others were newly detained (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities). • Public institutions lost critical data in major cyberattacks, including the civil aviation authority, a chemical company, and the labor ministry (see Technical Attacks). 1 www.freedomonthenet.org Introduction FREEDOM SAUDI ARABIA ON THE NET Obstacles to Access 2017 Introduction Availability and Ease of Access Saudi internet freedom remained restricted in 2017, despite effective digital activism for women’s Restrictions on Connectivity rights. Several human rights defenders were jailed for social media posts. Saudi Arabia unveiled its monumental “Vision 2030” reform and development targets in April 2016. ICT Market The plan included measures to increase competitiveness, foreign direct investment, and non-oil government revenue by 2030.1 The government also announced a National Transformation Program in June 2016 which included several ICT specific targets to be achieved by 2020, including increasing Regulatory Bodies fixed-line broadband penetration in densely populated areas from 44 to 80 percent, and increasing wireless broadband penetration in rural areas from 12 to 70 percent.
    [Show full text]
  • Press Tour for Journalists from MD & ICI Countries
    HEAD MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE AND ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE COUNTRIES SECTION PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DIVISION DIVISION DIPLOMATIE PUBLIQUE Press Tour for Journalists from MD & ICI countries 1-3 December 2008 List of Participants ALGERIA: 1. Ms. Ghania OUKAZI Le Quotidien d’Oran newspaper Algeria 2. Mr. Majid TAREB Al-Moudjahid newspaper Algeria BAHRAIN: 3. Mr. Hafedh ABDULGHAFFAR Al Watan newspaper Bahrain 4. Mr. Habib TOUMI Al Ayam newspaper Bahrain EGYPT: 5. Mrs. Aicha ABDELGHAFFAR Al Ahram newspaper Egypt 6. Mr. Mustafa SAMIH Middle East News Agency (MENA) Egypt ISRAEL: 7. Mr. Amir OREN Haaretz newspaper Israel 8. Mr Eldad BECK Yediot Ahronot newspaper Israel JORDAN: 9. Ms. Alia SHUKRI HAMZEH The Jordan Times newspaper Jordan 10. Ms. Reem RAWASHDEH Al Rai newspaper Jordan KUWAIT: 11. Mr Zaar AL RASHEDI Al-Anbaa newspaper Kuwait 12. Mr Ahmed Zakria ABDELRAHMAN Al-Watan newspaper Kuwait MAURITANIA: 13. Mr. Mohamed Saleh OULD CHIGHALI L’Horizon newspaper Mauritania 14. Mr. Ahmed Salem OULD MOCTAR SALEM Agence Mauritanienne d’Information (AMI) Mauritania MOROCCO: 15. Ms. Bouchra NAJI Maghreb Arabe Press (MAP) Morocco 16. Mr. Jamal EDDINE HERRADI L’Economiste newspaper Morocco OMAN: 17. Mr. Mohamed Ali ABDEL KHALEK Al-Watan newspaper Oman 18. Mr. Ibrahim AL-HAMADANI Oman Observer newspaper Oman -2- QATAR: 19. Mr. Khalid Abdullah ZEYARA Qatar News Agency / Al-Sharq newspaper Qatar 20. Mr. Ahmed Ali AL ABDULLAH Al-Watan Newspaper Qatar 21. Mr. Louay AL ABBOUSHI Al-Watan Newspaper Qatar SAUDI ARABIA: 22. Mr. Hani Fared WAFA Al-Riyadh newspaper Saudi Arabia 23. Ms. Mina AL-ORAIBI Al-Sharq Alawsat newspaper Saudi Arabia (London-based) TUNISIA: 24.
    [Show full text]
  • 7 © C. Hurst and Company Publishers
    7 SAUDI ARABIA’S WAR ON TERRORISM COMBATTING PASSIONS, IGNORANCE AND DEVIATION Roel Meijer © C. Hurst and Company Publishers This chapter will analyse the history and background of the Saudi counterter- rorism discourse as a religious discourse on extremism (ghuluw). Too often the focus on jihadi discourse has ignored its status as a counter-narrative that can only be understood against and contextualised within the framework of a dom- inant narrative. Looking at the official, normative narrative is important for four reasons. First, examining the dominant discourse throws historical light on the long struggle against ‘extremism’ within Wahhabism (and Islam) and the arguments that have been used against not just violence but also against political demands and any opposition to the state. As Wahhabism is originally a rather strict inter- pretation of Islam, which regards itself as the only road to salvation and con- demns other Muslims if they do not adhere to its strict rules, the distinction between radical and normative forms of Wahhabism is not always clear. Attempts to contain the radical strain within Wahhabism that challenges the current official quietist apolitical religious discourse of the Saudi state provide an insight into the nature of Wahhabism itself. Second, an analysis of the general discourse on extremism provides a means of putting the Saudi rehabilitation programmes that have been launched since 165 contextualising jihadi thought 2003 into perspective. The confrontation with the more radical strain in Wah- habism is not ‘a battle of ideas’ but instead a religious reconversion programme that essentially focuses on the few items on which ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’ dif- fer.
    [Show full text]
  • Saudi Arabia
    FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016 Saudi Arabia 2015 2016 Population: 31.5 million Not Not Internet Freedom Status Internet Penetration 2015 (ITU): 70 percent Free Free Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes Obstacles to Access (0-25) 15 14 Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes Limits on Content (0-35) 24 24 Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes Violations of User Rights (0-40) 34 34 TOTAL* (0-100) 73 72 Press Freedom 2016 Status: Not Free * 0=most free, 100=least free Key Developments: June 2015 – May 2016 • Internet penetration has risen on the back higher mobile broadband subscriptions (see Availability and Ease of Access). • Authorities throttled Telegram starting in January 2016 in order to prevent users from sharing images and files over the popular messaging app (seeBlocking and Filtering). • The head of Riyadh’s Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was dismissed after public outrage over a video of committee members harassing a girl outside of a mall (see Digital Activism). • Abdulkareem al-Khadar, Abdelrahman al-Hamid, and Abdulaziz al-Sinedi were respec- tively sentenced to 10, 9 and 8 years in prison for online advocacy against human rights violations. Saudi’s Supreme Court upheld a harsh verdict against liberal blogger Raif Bad- awi in June 2015, who had earlier been sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 public lashes (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities). • Mobile phone operators are now required to fingerprint customers when selling new SIM cards, limiting the ability of Saudis to use their phones anonymously (see Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity).
    [Show full text]
  • Mohammed Bin Salman's Saudi Arabia
    Jamal Khashoggi in the European Parliament: Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia: Reforms, Alliances, Regional Role Public debate held at the European Parliament, June 27, 2018 Jointly organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, AJC Transatlantic Institute and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Three months before his murder in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Jamal Khashoggi joined EU policymakers in a public debate in the European Parliament in Brussels to discuss the reform process initiated by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and how it would affect Saudi Arabia’s position as a key player in Middle Eastern geopolitics. In the light of the events that have unfolded in late 2018, and in view of the lasting impact of Khashoggi’s legacy on the global standing of Saudi Arabia, we decided to release this transcript of the June debate. It shows that he was neither a revolutionary nor a Republican. He did not view himself as a dissident but emphasized the opportunity in Mohammed bin Salman’s reform agenda, and his deep wish to contribute to those reforms becoming a success. This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity. Welcome Cristian Dan Preda, Member, European Parliament (European People's Party, Romania) Johannes Huegel, Research Associate, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Kristina Kausch, Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund Discussants Jamal Khashoggi, Columnist, The Washington Post and Raseef 22 The Hon. Mary Beth Long, Principal, Global Alliance Advisors, and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Cristian Dan Preda: I am very happy to host today’s conference.
    [Show full text]
  • Saudi Arabia 2020 International Religious Freedom Report
    SAUDI ARABIA 2020 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary According to the 1992 Basic Law of Governance, the country’s official religion is Islam and the constitution is the Quran and Sunna (traditions and practices based on the life of the Prophet Mohammed). The legal system is based largely on sharia as interpreted by the Hanbali school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. Freedom of religion is not provided under the law. The law criminalizes “anyone who challenges, either directly or indirectly, the religion or justice of the King or Crown Prince.” The law criminalizes “the promotion of atheistic ideologies in any form,” “any attempt to cast doubt on the fundamentals of Islam,” publications that “contradict the provisions of Islamic law,” and other acts including non-Islamic public worship, public display of non-Islamic religious symbols, conversion by a Muslim to another religion, and proselytizing by a non-Muslim. In practice, there is some limited tolerance of private, non-Islamic religious exercise, but religious practices at variance with the government-promoted form of Sunni Islam remained vulnerable to detention, harassment, and, for noncitizens, deportation. According to Shia community members, processions and gatherings continued due to decreased political tensions and greater coordination between the Shia community and authorities, and Ashura commemorations (of the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed) were marked by improved sectarian relations and public calls for mutual tolerance. Shia activists stated, however, that authorities continued to target members of their community on a religious basis with security operations and legal proceedings. In July, Shia Rights Watch (SRW) reported that security forces raided the largely Shia town of Safwa, resulting in several arrests and one injury.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Contemporary Wahhabism Rebranded As Salafism
    FIl se peut q ue quelqu ’un d ise : FIl se peut q ue quelqu ’un d ise : Contemporary Wahhabism rebranded as Salafism: the issue of interpreting the Qur’anic verses and hadith on the Attributes of God and its significance Submitted by Namira NAHOUZA to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arab and Islamic Studies, April 2009. This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. (signature) ......................................................................................... 1 ABSTRACT This research studies the theology of those Wahhabis who have now named themselves Salafis. For the purpose of the study, they are referred to as the ‘Wahhabis-self-named- Salafis’ (WSNS). The thesis starts with the observation that the WSNS are usually studied from a political perspective, much less frequently a theological one. Recent research has identified that the theological background of all the different factions of the WSNS is one and the same. This is true for the WSNS who advocate a peaceful way to achieve their goals, as well as those who do not. This thesis aims to explore some of the theological issues that unify these factions. This research demonstrates that, because the WSNS are opposed to the very concept of interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith, especially when these texts deal with important theological issues such as the Attributes of God, they have developed a vision of Islamic history which is entirely different from the one which had traditionally been accepted by most Muslim scholars and Western academics.
    [Show full text]
  • Trade Information of Country Saudi Arab
    List of Saudi importers of food products Sl. No.Name of Importer Address Phone/ Fax E-mail/ website 01 A.H. AL Muhanna PO Box: 1945, Tel. 00966-13- Trading & Contracting Dammam 31441 8422969/ 8422454 Est. Fax: 00966-13- 8423221 02 A.K. Almuhaidib & PO Box:30, Tel. 00966-13- [email protected] Sons Dammam 31411 8328888/ 8322033 a Fax: 8336082 03 Abdullehah Ali Athawi PO Box: 4221, Tel. 00966-12- Jeddah 21491 6440219/ 6424508 Fax: 6479398 04 Abdulkarim ElkhreijiPO Box: 276, Tel. 00966-13- ictcs@ace- Group Dammam 31411 8324441 / 8329080 dmm.khereiji.com /8342326 Fax: 8349389 05 Abdullah A. AlPO Box:2395, Tel. 00966-11- [email protected] Munajem Sons Co. Riyadh 11451 4787933 Fax: 4764318 06 Abdullah Abbar &PO Box: 5700, Tel. 00966-12- [email protected] Ahemed Zainy Jeddah -21432 6474000 Fax: 6475542 07 Abdulla Abduljalil Est. PO Box: 5309, Tel. 00966-12- Jeddah -21422 6477092 / 6435175 Fax: 6473375 08 Abdullah AhemdPO Box: 4500, Tel. 00966-12- [email protected] Balubadi Est. Jeddah -21491 6470615/ 6470870 t.sa Fax: 6481728 09 Abdullah Bahkim Est.PO Box: 16538, Tel. 00966-12- bahakim_sat@hotmail for Trade Jeddah -21474 6480993 .com Fax: 6481426 10 Abdullah Balsharaf Est.PO Box: 7748, Tel. 00966-12- [email protected] Jeddah -21472 6482642 Fax: 6479060 11 Abdullah Bin Saeed BinPO Box: 26212 Tel. 00966-11- Shaea Trading &Riyadh 11486 4763138/ 4732231 Contracting Est. Fax: 4763149 12 Abdullah EstablishmentPO Box:7778 Tel. 00966-12- jed.office@messinalin for Trading & Industry Jeddah -21472 6424879/ 6426998/ e.com.sa 6426999 Fax: 6432645 13 Abdulmohsen andPO Box: 884, Tel.
    [Show full text]
  • Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen January 2018 Contents
    POMEPS STUDIES 29 Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen January 2018 Contents Introduction . .. 3 Collapse of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and the future of Yemen’s war . 9 April Longley Alley, International Crisis Group In Yemen, 2018 looks like it will be another grim year . 15 Peter Salisbury, Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme Popular revolution advances towards state building in Southern Yemen . 17 Susanne Dahlgren, University of Tampere/National University of Singapore Sunni Islamist dynamics in context of war: What happened to al-Islah and the Salafis? . 23 Laurent Bonnefoy, Sciences Po/CERI Impact of the Yemen war on militant jihad . 27 Elisabeth Kendall, Pembroke College, University of Oxford Endgames for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Yemen . 31 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy Yemen’s war as seen from the local level . 34 Marie-Christine Heinze, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) and Hafez Albukari, Yemen Polling Center (YPC) Yemen’s education system at a tipping point: Youth between their future and present survival . 39 Mareike Transfeld, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin Graduate School of Muslim Cultures and Societies Gasping for hope: Yemeni youth struggle for their future . 43 Ala Qasem, Resonate! Yemen Supporting and failing Yemen’s transition: Critical perspectives on development agencies . 46 Ala’a Jarban, Concordia University The rise and fall and necessity of Yemen’s youth movements . 51 Silvana Toska, Davidson College A diaspora denied: Impediments to Yemeni mobilization for relief and reconstruction at home . 55 Dana M. Moss, University of Pittsburgh War and De-Development .
    [Show full text]
  • China in the Eyes of the Saudi Media
    China in the Eyes of the Saudi Media Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi GRC GULF PAPERS February 2013 © Gulf Research Center 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Gulf Research Center. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author alone and do not state or reflect the opinions or position of the Gulf Research Center. China in the Eyes of the Saudi Media GRC PAPER China in the Eyes of the Saudi Media Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi* Introduction China remains this mystery we cannot understand, we cannot love her or even hate her, and all this despite every veto she slaps the face of the Arab World within the Security Council right now1 - Umayma Al-Khamis, Saudi Columnist تظل الصني اللغز التي ﻻنستطيع أن نؤطرها،ﻻنستطيع أن نحبها وحتى نكرهها، على الرغم من كل فيتو تلطم به وجه العالم العربي في مجلس اﻷمن اﻵن. - أميمة اخلميس One of the oft-repeated axioms regarding Chinese soft power in the Middle East is that it unfolds in a largely welcoming space receptive to its overtures on both the state and grassroots level.2 This has been an attractive presupposition to make and certainly corroborated to some extent by the ‘motion’ of ideas and complementarities that have shaped the development of Sino-Arab relations over the past two decades: the ‘Rise of China’ has generated a great deal of excitement among the Arab elite and intellectuals; the Eastern giant’s potential ‘balancing’ role to that of the United States, as well as its unique modernization model have nurtured positive perceptions about the country and its authoritarian political culture.
    [Show full text]