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The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of Russian Foreign Policy

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The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of Russian Foreign Policy Problems of Post-Communism ISSN: 1075-8216 (Print) 1557-783X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mppc20 The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of Russian Foreign Policy Seva Gunitsky & Andrei P. Tsygankov To cite this article: Seva Gunitsky & Andrei P. Tsygankov (2018) The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of Russian Foreign Policy, Problems of Post-Communism, 65:6, 385-393, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2018.1468270 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1468270 Published online: 31 May 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1017 View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=mppc20 Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 65, no. 6, 2018, 385–393 Copyright © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1075-8216 (print)/1557-783X (online) DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1468270 The Wilsonian Bias in the Study of Russian Foreign Policy Seva Gunitsky1 and Andrei P. Tsygankov2 1Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 2Departments of International Relations and Political Science, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California, USA We examine some problematic narratives in the American international relations scholarship on Russia, focusing on some implicit assumptions about the drivers of Russian foreign policy. Most prominently, this includes the idea that Russian foreign policy is driven primarily by the qualities of its internal regime. While domestic institutions undoubtedly matter, we argue that two other factors are key for understanding Russia’s foreign policy: the pursuit of primacy in its immediate neighborhood, and the pursuit of peer recognition with major Western powers. These imperatives are key for understanding Russian behavior abroad, transcend particular leaders and domestic institutions, and can help explain “unexpected” shifts in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy that domestic explanations tend to miss. INTRODUCTION As a perennial rival, Russia occupies a unique place in ideology, and the qualities of its leader. The first driver is the American international relations (IR) scholarship. However, quest for primacy in its foreign relations with smaller states in academic lenses sometimes distort as much as they clarify. its geographic neighborhood. This primacy has often taken the Here we outline some problematic nar`ratives in the American explicit form of empire, although its ultimate goal is not IR scholarship on Russia, focusing on some implicit assump- necessarily direct control so much as acquiescence to tions about the drivers of Russian foreign policy. Most promi- Russia’sinfluence in the region. This centuries-long geopoli- nently, this includes the assumption that Russian foreign policy tical pursuit, mirroring America’s own long-term quest for a is closely linked to—perhaps even determined by—the qualities sphere of influence, transcends domestic institutions and offers of its internal regime. Thus a democratic (or democratizing) a fundamental source of continuity that links Tsarist, Russia, under late-era Mikhail Gorbachev or Boris Yeltsin, is Communist, and post-Communist foreign policy. assumed to be inherently peaceful and cooperative toward the A second fundamental driver is the pursuit of derzhavnost’ West. On the other hand, an autocratic (or de-democratizing) in Russia’s relations with major powers outside its neighbor- Russia is assumed to be inherentlybelligerent,revanchist,and hood. The term is difficult to render into English, but derz- aggressively anti-Western, as has been the case under Putin. havnost’ refers to the state of possessing—and being While domestic institutions inevitably shape foreign policy, recognized by others to possess—clear status as a great we argue that focusing on the peculiarities of Putin’srule power. It therefore includes elements of prestige, peer recog- misses two key drivers of Russian policies abroad. Both of nition, and a seat at the table in managing the global order. these are independent of (though never completely discon- Putin’s attempts at rapprochement with the West are moti- nected from) the regime’s domestic institutions, its governing vated in part by a quest to present Russia as an active and responsible partner in the modern community of nations. Likewise, Putin’s stances against the West (e.g., over Iraq or Address correspondence to Andrei P. Tsygankov, Department of Ukraine) are part of a desire to project an image of a sovereign International Relations and Political Science, 1600 Holloway Ave. HSS, and independent regional power, not subject to what it sees as San Francisco, CA 94132, USA. E-mail:[email protected] the whims of a capricious and hypocritical U.S.-led order. 386 GUNITSKY AND TSYGANKOV Like primacy, the quest for derzhavnost’ is, in key respects, behavior, but it does point toward essential motivations divorced from the ideological basis of Russia’sdomesticregime. behind its foreign policy that domestic or leader-oriented It is concerned with power and status above all, and lends explanations tend to miss. Russian foreign policy a flexibility that domestically focused The remainder of this paper traces American scholarly explanations tend to miss, which leaves them unable to predict or analyses of Russian behavior through several key turning explain pro-Western initiatives undertaken by Putin. Since these points in the U.S.–Russian relationship since the 1990s. The attempts at finding common ground occur in the context of analysis suggests that assessments of Russian behavior that growing Russian authoritarianism, the “domestic sources” are based primarily on the country’s domestic regime have approach has trouble accounting for their sources. Putin’s limited ability to understand sudden shifts in foreign policy. attempts at cooperation with the West (such as after 9/11, or over Iran’snuclearprogram)areerroneouslyviewedassurpris- ing or uncharacteristic, and dismissed as cynical distractions, AMERICAN IR AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT RUSSIA incoherent lurches, or signs of Russian weakness. Divining the foreign policies of other states from their Scholars of international relations recognize that their discipline domestic institutions is a long-standing element of both often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases policymaking and IR scholarship in the United States. It of Western or American culture. Different traditions of Western comprises an essential part of the Wilsonian tradition, and IR, including realism, liberalism, critical theory, and feminism, shapes widely accepted IR approaches such as democratic have been criticized as ethnocentric and insufficiently open to peace theory. We call this tendency the “Wilsonian bias” in voices and arguments outside the West (Oyewumi 1997; American IR: the tendency to overestimate the extent to Inayatullah and Blaney 2004;Shani2008;Hobson2012; which domestic regime type influences a country’s foreign Tickner 2013;Acharya2014). Implicit in the argument is the policy, especially within non-democratic regimes. As we importance of ideology, especially national ideology, in shaping argue, the tight coupling of domestic ideology with for- the foundations of social science (Tsygankov and Tsygankov eign-policy behavior ignores some key elements in the 2010). In Stanley Hoffmann’swords,“Scholars do not like to long-term determinants of Russian foreign policy. think about their intellectual dependence on the status of their Our survey of academic and policy perspectives on country, and on the ambitions of its political elites; it disturbs Russia is not meant to be a systematic overview of the their sense of belonging to a cosmopolitan, free-floating com- literature, which is diverse in its approaches and conclu- munity of science” (Hoffmann 1995,225).Inthecaseofthe sions. Rather, our goal here is to highlight some recurring United States, an essentially national ideology claims to have motifs in the policy-relevant scholarship, expert pronounce- universal status, and the positivist methodology then serves to ments, and official statements dealing with Russia. While a shape knowledge in accordance with the standards of the parti- number of arguments assessing Russian foreign policy con- cular local community—in part, for the purpose of shaping the form with the assumptions we have described, there are world politically. As E.H. Carr observed in 1977, the “study of nevertheless important exceptions. Below we provide exam- international relations in English-speaking countries is simply a ples of approaches that embrace the Wilsonian biases uncri- study of the best way to run the world from positions of tically, but also ones that take a more measured view. strength” (Carr 2001,xiii). Partly as a result of the above-identified Wilsonian With respect to scholarship that seeks to generate ideas assumptions, Russian foreign policy is sometimes conflated for policymakers, several assumptions and propositions with Putin’s foreign policy. This obscures the fact that make up what may be viewed as the core of policy-relevant Russia’s drive for regional hegemony and major power American IR. A blend of realism and liberal institutional- recognition transcends individual leader motivations and ism, these assumptions and propositions are centered on the will likely continue regardless of who becomes Putin’s idea of the United States’ global leadership. American lea- successor. This pursuit can also help explain Russian belli-
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