Multi-Dimensional Chess Sino-Russian Relations in Central Asia

Authors: Goos Hofstee Noor Broeders

NOVEMBER 2020 Multi-dimensional chess Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia

Key takeaways

f Russia and China both see Central Asia as their rightful “backyard”, and both countries strive to maximise their sway over the region, albeit so far mostly in complementary rather than overlapping “spheres of influence”. f However, as the power asymmetry between China and Russia grows, China allows itself to be more assertive in the military sphere, which so far has been the prerogative of the Russians. f Based on this increasingly assertive behaviour on China’s part, and Moscow’s insistence on being the sole security provider in Central Asia, the military sphere is where we see the biggest risk of escalation in the region. f Another consequence of this growing power asymmetry is that Russia increasingly feels like the “junior partner” in the relationship. While Putin has so far accepted this position, changing geopolitical circumstances might induce him to once again look to the West (or elsewhere) to “hedge his bets”. f While China and Russia both consider Central Asia as one of the “chessboards” on which to play out their game of competition and cooperation, they are not the only players. Central Asian countries are increasingly asserting their strategic political agency. f In view of the above, the EU should look to become a part of the dynamic by investing strongly in the effective implementation of the 2019 Central Asia Strategy. Through closer relationships with individual Central Asian countries, the EU can become a “player” on the Central Asian chessboard. f Rather than trying to influence the Sino-Russian dynamic in Central Asia through direct engagement with either Russia or China, strong diplomatic ties with the Central Asia countries themselves might provide an alternative route to affect the future trajectory. f Additionally, the EU should try to tie in the initiatives within the Central Asia strategy with those initiated in the EU Connectivity Strategy. Both strategies should work to complement each other in enhancing the EU’s diplomatic leverage in the region, focus on engagement with Central Asian countries and provide them with an alternative to China (and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Strategic Alert Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

Introduction and cultural dimensions of the relationship in Central Asia. Finally, the alert will conclude In June 2019, in celebration of the 70th anni- with an analysis and summary as well as versary of the establishment of diplomatic several key takeaways from the case study. relations between Russia and China, Xi Jin- In view of the limited scope of this study, and ping visited Vladimir Putin in Moscow. During the extensive existing writing on EU policy in the meeting, the two presidents made a ‘Joint Central Asia, this Strategic Alert will not com- Statement on the development of a compre- prehensively address the role of the EU in hensive strategic partnership for collaboration the region. However, building on the current in the new era’, which emphasized their com- power-dynamics that we analyse in this paper, mitment to peaceful development and mutually we will include three key takeaways with sug- beneficial cooperation1. In September this gestions for optimizing future EU involvement. year, Foreign Ministers Wang and Lavrov publicly stated that as the two countries hold common positions on “all key international Chinese-Russian relations issues”, Moscow-Beijing foreign policy coordi- on the global stage nation “plays a special role in upholding global strategic stability”2. Wang Yi later even added that “the two countries’ friendship is unbreak- Russian-Chinese interactions span much able, and their strategic cooperation will not of the globe, with several areas where both change due to the influences of the external players have significant stakes environment”3. and intersecting interests. These recent diplomatic remarks seem to China and Russia “meet”, RUSSIAN-CHINESE indicate that Sino- Russian relations have among others, in East Asia, INTERACTIONS SPAN reached an unprecedented high. However, Central Asia, and the Arctic. MUCH OF THE GLOBE, are Sino-Russian relations as robust as they The way these interactions play WITH SEVERAL are claimed to be? Is it really a stable ‘strate- out vary by region and are of AREAS WHERE BOTH gic partnership’ or might there also be critical course subject to change over underlying tensions at play that could poten- time. Over the past decades, PLAYERS HAVE tially spell “trouble in paradise”? the Sino-Russian relationship SIGNIFICANT STAKES has been characterized as AND INTERSECTING Globally, there are currently three prominent respectively “a robust partner- INTERESTS regions – East Asia, the Arctic and Central ship”, “an axis of convenience”, Asia, – where Chinese and Russian geopo- “a strategic alliance”, “a pragmatic relation- litical interests intersect, leading to coopera- ship” and even a “troubled marriage”. tion and the establishment of ‘strategic part- Where some scholars indeed point towards nerships’ but also creating the potential for a growing divergence in interests and poten- competition and conflict. Of those prominent tial subsequent cracks in the partnership, regions, both actors consider Central Asia to others argue that for the foreseeable future, be their strategic backyard. It was here that the Chinese-Russian strategic interests on the Sino- Russian partnership was first formed, geopolitical stage remain mostly complemen- and Central Asia may well be regarded as a tary, and that there is therefore little chance microcosm of the multipolar world, demon- of “trouble in paradise”. However, in order to strating how it may unfold globally4. be able to thoroughly analyse and explain its current, and possible future trajectory, it is Given the above, it is relevant to assess the useful to take a brief look at CH-RU relations different dimensions of their relationship in the over the past three decades. region. Looking at Central Asia could potentially tell us something about the trajectory Development of the Russian of the Sino-Russian relationship at a global position level. This strategic alert will first take a look After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in Decem- at the global Sino-Russian relationship in both ber 1991, the Russian government’s main a historical and contemporary context. The goal was survival, and the implementation second part consists of a case study, which of Western-style reforms. In pursuit of these delves into the political-, economic-, military- goals, in the early 1990s, the Kremlin initially

2 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

sought close relations with the United States These developments, and the end of the and the European Union.5 Moscow wanted Cold War, changed China’s basic perception the West to accept Russia as an equal partner of world politics and national security. In the of the “global North” and perceived positive Cold War era, it had been in Beijing’s interest relations with the United States and Europe to maintain a strategic triangular relationship as the best way to achieve that goal.6 with the Soviet Union and the United States.12 As the 1990s went on, Moscow’s strate- When the Soviet Empire collapsed, the old gic objectives shifted to creating a stronger parameters for China’s security strategy dis- economy and reestablishing Russia as a appeared, and Beijing needed to reorient its great power. The Kremlin was disappointed security strategy on a new strategic axis. when the West did not welcome Russia into At the same time, Beijing’s economic ambi- the Western economic and security structures tions started to take shape, as did its efforts to and it allowed NATO to expand significantly in speed up reforms towards a market economy. 1999 and 2004 despite earlier indications that From these developments emerged an under- it would not.7 standing of security politics as intrinsically After the 2008 financial crisis, which affected connected to political, economic and societal China less than the West, China emerged factors in international relations. As such, as the world’s second-largest economy, and Beijing started to increasingly integrate its tra- Chinese diplomacy became more assertive. ditional military defence strategy with its eco- In view of its unsatisfactory relations with the nomic, and public diplomacy agenda. West, as well as Asia’s growing economic importance, the Kremlin realized that it had more to gain with a multipolar world, in which Current relationship Russia could seek to play a role as a great power. To this end, Moscow started to pursue During the last decade, the Sino-Russian a multi-vectored foreign policy, in which relationship can be best described as a Sino-Russian relations would feature more ‘quasi-alliance, a great power entente’13, ‘fall- prominently.8 ing short of a formal alliance but having grown When, as a result of the Russian annexation much closer than the ‘strategic partnership’ of the Crimea, the US imposed far-reaching the two countries established in the 1990s’.14 economic sanctions on Russia, relations with On the international stage, Russia the West deteriorated further. The sanctions and China have been engaged in ON THE induced the Kremlin to strengthen Russia- a balancing act of cooperation and INTERNATIONAL China relations even more. competition against the backdrop of a rapidly changing international STAGE, RUSSIA Development of the Chinese world order. However, despite AND CHINA HAVE position their competition in some areas, BEEN ENGAGED IN After the Sino-Soviet split9 of the Khrushchev their shared interests and threat A BALANCING ACT era had more or less been “repaired” in the perceptions have created a rela- OF COOPERATION second half of the 1960s, and Mao died in tively strong mutual understand- 1976, relations between Beijing and Moscow ing between Moscow and Beijing. AND COMPETITION normalised during the 1980s. The rapproche- In the current geopolitical landscape, both ment between the Soviet Union and China powers have little to gain from conflict. The concluded with an official reconciliation in current Sino-Russian partnership, based on a 1989, when Gorbachev visited Beijing and the combination of reassurance and flexibility, is two countries declared a “peaceful coexist- therefore a product of both systemic evalua- ence”10. However, Chinese-Russian relations tions, such as both states’ resistance to US had still not improved greatly at that point. hegemony, and pragmatic considerations.15 Both sides wanted peaceful relations but not As an example of such pragmatic calcula- much more than that. As the Cold War drew tions, the Western sanctions following Rus- to an end, Russia emerged as looking more sia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have to the West, which Yeltsin saw as its “natu- accelerated Russia’s turn to China, as Russia ral” ally.11 has sought to reduce its economic depend-

3 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

ence on the West.16 This acceleration has power asymmetry continues to grow at the manifested itself in growing bilateral trade expense of Russia, despite the latter’s dom- and an expanding energy relationship. At the inance in the nuclear arena. Being Russia’s same time, military and high-tech cooperation number one trading partner as well as the between the two countries has grown exten- second-largest purchaser of Russian military sively, as evidenced by the joint military exer- hardware, China is economically more impor- cises and air patrols, as well as collaborations tant to Russia than the other way around.22 in the realms of artificial intelligence and bio- Because of this undeniable economic asym- technology.17 metry, Russia so far appears to have grudg- Since 2018, when President Donald Trump ingly accepted its relegation to being China’s began imposing tariffs and trade barriers, (economic) junior partner. the trade war between the US and China has pushed China and Russia even closer together. In terms of “worldview”, Russia and Global chessboards China could already be characterised as “revi- sionist” because of their commitment to estab- Internationally, there are several “chess- lish a “post-West” global order.18 They have boards” on which China and Russia play out shared a desire to contest American leader- their game of competition and cooperation. ship, which inhibits both countries’ aspirations Chinese and Russian interests intersect in for increased global power. Additionally, Putin -among others- East Asia, the Arctic and Cen- and Xi’s autocratic regimes share an interest tral Asia. These intersecting interests create in limiting any international criticism of their a potential for competition and conflict. How- repressive politics. Both leaders therefore ever, as long as they are managed wisely, support each other’s narrative and message overlapping interests and stakes have also of sovereignty and non-interference. proven to generate opportunities for collabo- However, as a result of the sanctions on the ration.23 Russian economy and the trade war with China, the current de-facto alliance is as East Asia much dictated by strategic pragmatism and In most issues of East Asian geopolitics economic necessity as by a shared vision for Moscow has tended to support Beijing or a global order. Due to its increasing demand displayed friendly neutrality, as it does not for natural resources, China is to a large regard China as a major threat to its interests extent dependent on Russian supply, which in this region.24 China and Russia both wish to means that an increasingly close Chinese- reduce American influence in East Asia and Russian trade relationship is all but inevita- strive to undermine the US-centric alliances ble.19 Sino-Russian cooperation allows both in the region. 25 To this end, China is increasing countries to simultaneously augment their its military strength with the help of Russian capabilities and offset vulnerabilities in their weapon sales. While one could imagine that relations with the US.20 this might concern Russia, the fact is that However, while the mutual benefits of the stra- Russia has limited military, political or cul- tegic partnership so far seem to outweigh the tural interests in East Asia, and considers drawbacks, the relationship is not without its other “chessboards” as more important. So strains. There is a significant asymmetry in far, Russia seems to be prepared to “choose various aspects of the relationship, some key its battles” for the sake of not endangering its elements of the respective strategic agendas strategic relationship with China, and to settle are inherently oppositional and mutual mis- for second-place in East Asia.26 trust remains. A major and CHINA HOLDS THE UPPER ever growing source of frus- The Arctic tration on the Russian side As opposed to East Asia, the Arctic is an area HAND IN THE ECONOMIC is what it considers to be its where Russia and China’s competing inter- RELATIONSHIP AND THIS inferior junior status.21 ests could potentially create real problems. POWER ASYMMETRY It is indeed certainly a Russia has laid claim to a significant part of CONTINUES TO GROW AT fact that China holds the the Arctic Ocean and views the region as vital THE EXPENSE OF RUSSIA upper hand in the eco- to the country’s security and economic inter- nomic relationship and this ests.27 China too, has involved itself in the

4 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

ussia Monolia

stana

aahstan

ishe eistan stan Caspian Sea ashent e- aian hina au umenistan aiistan

shaat ushane

aistan ehan an hanistan aul ndia

region, calling itself a ‘Near-Arctic state’ and Balancing Act: seeking to gain access to the Arctic’s resour Sino-Russian Relations ces.28 For a long time Russia did not want China to involve itself in the region, but this has in Central Asia recently changed, with the Kremlin announc- ing that it wants more collaboration with the In this Alert, Central Asia refers to a region Chinese.29 Russia needs Chinese investment that incorporates the countries of Kazakhstan; to fund the costly extraction of raw materials Uzbekistan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; and Turk- from the region, and the two countries have menistan. The region is much more than just signed several agreements on Arctic projects. one bloc within Eurasia; it is of vital strategic So far, it seems that the Kremlin believes that importance31 Already long before the collapse it can manage China’s rising presence in the of the Soviet Union, the territory of Central Arctic without it undermining Russian domi- Asia was the strategic arena for the “Great nance.30 Game” (1830-1907), an intense imperial rivalry between the British and the Russian Empires. Central Asia Since then, Central Asia has experienced a East Asia and the Arctic, along with other turbulent age of annexation, migration, and regions such as the Balkans and the South independence. Nowadays, the region is still Caucasus, all serve as theatres for the great central to many complex geopolitical issues balancing act of cooperation and competi- such as energy and trade politics; religious tion between Russia and China. However, extremism and foreign security ambitions. no “chessboard” is more relevant – and Against an increasingly crowded geopolitical potentially more problematic – for both play- backdrop, the region is caught between resur- ers than Central Asia. When it comes to the gent Russian interests and China’s ambitious Sino-Russian relationship, and the politics of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the past dec- mutual accommodation, Central Asia, as the ade, the geostrategic relevance of the region backyard to both Russia and China, deserves has prompted both powers to reassert influ- a closer look. ence and control over Central Asia.

5 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

‘Greater Eurasia’ ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ Russia’s strategy for a ‘Greater Eur- Proceeding from the premise that the first asia’, formulated by Vladimir Putin in steps towards a ‘Greater Eurasia’ should 2016, is a replacement of its former be taken in the economic architecture of ‘Greater Europe initiative’, “a harmo- the Eurasian continent, Russia aspires nious economic community stretching to create a ‘Greater Eurasian Partner- from Lisbon to Vladivostok”. ‘Greater ship’. This ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ Eurasia’ is more significant than a envisions the formation of a multi-level technocratic project of increased con- network of free trade areas and inte- nectivity, trade, and investment as it gration initiatives throughout the vast entails a “geopolitical imaginary” that Eurasian space (with the participation of enables Russian policy makers to the EAEU and Commonwealth of Inde- articulate an international identity for pendent States (CIS) countries, in addition Russia and extends its constant vision to China, India, Pakistan and Iran). The for a multipolar global order. Its main partnership’s primary objective is aligning objective is “to remove Russia from the the EAEU with the BRI, which can col- dual periphery of Europe and East Asia lectively create “a gravitational pull that and reposition itself within the center allows them to capture the geo-economic of a broader Eurasian geo-economic levers of power by creating an alternative constellation”.32 to the Western-centric model”. Russia has stated that this new partnership model is open to every state or organization (including the EU) yet, in reality, it tends to dominantly pivot to the East.33

For Russia, as part of its quest to interna- to Chinese foreign interests37. Given the tionally reclaim its status as a global power, above, Central Asia currently represents an the post- Soviet sphere of influence repre- important region for both Russia and China. sents an obvious playing field. Firstly, with an Since Russian and Chinese interests seem to eye on retaining and strengthening Russia’s overlap but, to some extent, also diverge, one economic power, the logistical Soviet legacy might expect rivalry and friction between the throughout Central Asia’s oil and gas infra- two external powers in Central Asia. However, structure is very valuable.34 Secondly, Rus- so far this seems to be limited. Putin seeks to sia’s political-cultural heritage in the region minimize the influence of other external is crucial in its aim to consolidate its political powers on the region, in order to protect Rus- power.35 In 2015, the ‘ Valdai club’, an influential sia’s deep-rooted position in the region.38 Russian think-tank, even spoke of a “Central For his part, Xi is careful not to interfere in Eurasian Moment” as a unique momentum of Russia’s regional cultural relations and mostly international political and economic circum- limits Chinese aspirations to the stances that called for the resurgent Russian economic sphere, without becom- CENTRAL ASIA potential for regional cooperation and joint ing too much involved in the development. These ideas contributed to region’s political affairs39. At the IS NOT JUST A Putin’s subsequent “Greater Eurasia” project same time, it is important to note PLAYING FIELD. in 201636. that Central Asia is not just a INSTEAD, CENTRAL For China, it is the lack of common political playing field. Instead, Central ASIAN COUNTRIES and economic unity among the Central Asian Asian countries are becoming ARE BECOMING countries that makes the region of special increasingly assertive, and cer- interest, since this makes it fertile ground for tainly have agency in their own INCREASINGLY the successful implementation of its BRI. foreign policy with regard to the ASSERTIVE Moreover, the region’s abundance of natural two external powers. Through resources, its strategic position as a critical shared commitments within, for example, the transportation hub, as well as the threats to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Chinese national security that emanate from and mutual promises regarding future eco- the region make it of key strategic importance nomic alignment, the main focus of the

6 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

Chinese-Russian “strategic partnership” is on SCO as a “balancing force” against China in trade in natural resources, which is where 201746. As a direct response, Beijing decided Chinese and Russian interests most strongly to strategically bring in Pakistan as a member overlap40. This pragmatic approach so far in order to counter this new ‘front’. seems to ensure that the frictions within the Sino-Russian relationship remain latent and managed41. Nevertheless, given the underlying power asymmetries described earlier, it begs the question whether this Sino- Russian “division of labor” will remain THE QUESTION IS unproblematic and sustainable. WHETHER THIS Are there any growing trends or developments that could upset SINO‑RUSSIAN the Central Asian equilibrium? “DIVISION OF LABOR” Could a “New Great Game” be WILL REMAIN in the making?42 In order to UNPROBLEMATIC assess if, how and where fric- Shanghai Cooperation Organiza- tion (SCO) AND SUSTAINABLE tions could emerge, we need to take a deeper look at the politi- A permanent multilateral political, eco- cal-, economic-, military- and cultural dimen- nomic and security alliance that was sions of the Chinese-Russian relationship in established in 2001 between Rus- Central Asia. sia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. With the Politics exclusion of Uzbekistan, it built further In Central Asia, diplomatic relations between on the Shanghai Five arrangement Russia and China are rooted in the Shanghai of 1996. In 2017, India and Pakistan Cooperation Organization (SCO). When the joined as full members. The SCO SCO was established in 2001, both Russia counts four observer states: Mongo- and China planned for a mutually beneficial lia, Iran, Belarus and Afghanistan. The partnership that excluded the West, in which organization’s main objectives are “to Russia would preserve a stable political cli- ensure security and maintain stability mate and keep an eye on regional military across the vast Eurasian region, join affairs, while China would provide regional forces to counteract emerging chal- economic investment and prosperity.43 This lenges and threats, and enhance trade, organic entente was possible due to the differ- as well as cultural and humanitarian ent regional priorities of both powers: Russia cooperation”.47 wanted to consolidate itself as the cultural ally and regional security provider, and sought to keep out the West as much as possible; China On the surface, this symbolic ‘balancing act’ was looking to maximize its strategic flexibility, seems to have re-stabilised Sino-Russian by independently managing affairs with Rus- political dynamics in Central Asia. However, sia and circumventing any US interference while Vladimir Putin continues to stress the on the geopolitical stage.44 In recent years, “unprecedentedly high level of trust and coop- however, historical grievances and growing eration [throughout its] multifaceted strategic power asymmetries have fueled increasing partnership [with Xi Jinping]”48, he is very mistrust between Moscow and Beijing. China aware of Russia’s growing regional eco- has started to expand its regional influence nomic reliance on China, which forces it to outside the economic sphere, and Russia is be increasingly mindful of China’s aspirations. concerned that this could potentially weaken Meanwhile, the tensions in the relationship its own political clout in Central Asia45 This with Moscow do not allow China to be reck- mistrust has hampered the regional advance- less, as it realizes that it is moving in a hostile ment of the Kremlin’s agenda for a “Greater environment and needs Russia’s deep-rooted Eurasia”, a ‘non-Western’ multipolarity with political relations with the Central Asian coun- Russian political leadership and, in this case, tries to further advance the BRI.49 China is the economic guidance of the Chinese. There- therefore currently careful not to cross any fore, Russia decided to welcome India into the Russian ‘political’ boundaries and seems to

7 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

avoid (openly) including a political agenda as arms, mining and energy supply, technol- within its Central Asian strategy.50 For now, ogy and infrastructure), the alignment of the as long as both powers continue to recog- BRI and the EAEU seems less crucial57 While nise the economic- and security benefits of Russia’s repeated suggestions for a unified their careful ‘relationship of convenience’, the EAEU trade bloc, which would prohibit its strategic management of sensitivities could member states from having third-party agree- restore any “opening cracks in the Russia- ments, have sparked strong opposition among China relationship”51, and probably prevent Central Asian governments58, China has stra- any escalation of political friction between tegically anticipated this resistance by offering Beijing and Moscow. the countries bilateral trade deals. Moreover, Beijing is sceptical about the development Economics potential of the protectionist EAEU. There- As is often emphasised by both Putin and fore, it regards multilateral regional economic Xi, the Sino-Russian partnership in Central cooperation through the SCO as more benefi- Asia “puts economics at its center”.52 At first cial than connecting the BRI and the EAEU as glance, the economic visions that are pro- part of a Greater Eurasian Partnership. jected in the Russian- led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the THE SINO-RUSSIAN Chinese Belt and Road Initiative PARTNERSHIP IN (BRI) in Central Asia might appear CENTRAL ASIA complementary in, for example, “PUTS ECONOMICS their aim to promote the develop- AT ITS CENTER ment of a Eurasian transportation corridor, leading to greater integration via infrastructure and trade53. In fact, the mutual promise of regionally aligning the EAEU and the BRI was officially announced in a joint declaration by the two leaders in 2015. Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Nevertheless, in reality, this ‘economic alli- An international organization of ance’ turns out to be far less straightforward. regional economic integration, estab- For Russia, its goal of the alignment (sopry- lished in 2015, which brings together azhenie) between the BRI and the EAEU fits Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan well with its aspirations for creating a Greater and Kyrgyzstan. It takes the EU as its Eurasian Partnership which, at a deeper model and aims to fully implement the level, reflects Russia’s desire for a “Greater free movement of goods, capital, ser- Eurasia” that inherently links its foreign vices, and labor within its boundaries geo-economic strategy to its political quest and develop deeper economic inte- for international status. Connecting the EAEU gration between its members. Despite to the BRI would place Russia at the heart multiple enlargement efforts, so far, no of the BRI, which would in turn generate the other states have begun the path of funds for Russia’s infrastructure investment obtaining full membership. The EAEU objectives (e.g. an Eurasian transportation does not share a common currency.59 corridor) in the region54. Another important advantage of the Partnership would be that it would enable Russia to have a little more This ambivalence might also explain why, “grip” on China, and the BRI, in order to coun- over the last five years, practical economic terbalance China’s increasing economic influ- cooperation through integration projects ence in Central Asia.55 The Russian idea of a or joint investments have not materialised. regional economic partnership with China is After a close look, it appears that Russia and therefore based on a positive-sum considera- China’s ambitions in Central Asia diverge as tion, strategically preferring cooperation over a result of their unequal economic capacity. (asymmetrical) competition.56 In contrast, for Over the last decade, China has become an China, which through its BRI seeks to max- essential trade and investment partner for imally expand its regional power and con- Turkmenistan60, Tajikistan61, Uzbekistan62 and nectivity across a whole range of industries Kyrgyzstan63. With respect to Kazakhstan, that do not necessarily rely on Russia (such which is Central Asia’s main land corridor and

8 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

a keystone of China’s BRI, bilateral billion- Military dollar trade and investment projects between After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the two countries are still rapidly increasing64. 1991, Russia, as the primary ‘security pro- On the contrary, apart from Russia’s growing vider’ of the region, wanted to retain a leading economic influence over Kyrgyzstan’s gas role in the region’s security affairs, aside supply network and its renewed economic from its influence in the political and cultural closeness with ‘multi-vector’ Kazakhstan in sphere. In order to maintain its hegemonic the fuel- and energy sector, recent regional military position within the region, Russia Russian investment and trade pales in com- established a regional intergovernmental mil- parison to Chinese economic engagement itary alliance, the Collective Security Treaty in Central Asia. Given Russia’s current eco- Organization (CSTO), in 2002. Although the nomic internal- and external weaknesses, CSTO was initially mostly dormant, since this inequality leaves the country with no 2012 it has become more active and has other option than to pivot to the econom- increasingly been organising cooperative mil- ically dominant Chinese.65 At the time of itary exercises throughout the region. Still, writing, there are, however, careful indications even now the Moscow-dominated CSTO that as Russia’s junior status could become mostly remains a symbolic network of military more of a liability, Russian officials could be bases and radar installations across Central incentivised to reduce the risk of greater reli- Asia, and does not automatically contribute ance on China and could eventually compel to regional stability.69 This is not necessarily Russia to look again to the West, where most problematic for Russia, since the status-quo of its trade remains despite its growing ties of low- level instability does guarantee a last- with China”66. At the same time, even as the ing demand for Russian- provided regional balance of regional economic power currently security and thereby strategically allows Rus- appears to be in China’s favor, the economic sia to strengthen its military- political influence Sino- Russian dynamics are expected to be over the Central Asian countries70. However, increasingly shaped by the regional govern- as the CSTO, compared to the SCO, imposes ments, the growing voice of the Central Asian more military restrictions on its members public and the growing economic ambitions of whilst many Central Asian states increas- other powerful actors (e.g. the EU).67 ingly aim to pursue their own national military interests, Uzbekistan, for example, refuses to participate in the Russian-controlled CSTO Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) organization71. A transcontinental policy and investment strategy, formerly known as Given Moscow’s role as a ‘security guarantor’ One Belt One Road (OBOR), adopted within the Sino-Russian ‘division of labour’ in by the Chinese government in 2013, the region, it would be expected that Beijing’s which aims at infrastructure develop- regional policy would not interfere in the ment, efficient allocation of resources pre-existing military dynamics. Throughout and acceleration of the economic inte- the first years of the SCO, the Chinese gration of countries along the proposed authorities indeed seemed to accept Russia’s Belt and Road routes. The BRI com- ‘special role’ in the region, and Chinese secu- prises multiple different (land-based rity engagement remained largely comple- (belt) and maritime (road)) initiatives mentary to- or at times even cooperative with, yet within this alert it refers to the over- Russian activities. Clear examples of these land Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), conflating interests are their extensive mili- which entails a long-term vision for tary cooperation in combating the ‘three evils’ the infrastructural development, con- (terrorism; separatism; extremism) and their nectivity and economic cooperation of common desire of limiting U.S. military influ- Eurasia along six main economic cor- ence in Central Asia.72 These days, as Russia ridors that link China with the Eurasian and China regularly conduct joint exercises continent, Africa and the Middle East. and even engage in shared military educa- In 2013, the BRI was officially launched tional projects, bilateral security cooperation by Xi Jinping in Astana, Kazakhstan.68 between the two powers in the region seems to increase further. This increased exchange

9 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

and collaboration might on the surface start to look like a proto military alliance, whereby regional religious terrorism is the common threat that brings the two parties together.73 However, beneath that surface, Sino-Russian military dynamics are more complicated. In recent years, there have been multiple examples of Chinese military activities without (in) direct Russian participation.74 These activities range from China’s significantly increased regional arms trade since 201475, to the con- struction of its own military basis in Tajikistan Collective Security Treaty Organi- and the projection of its operational military zation (CSTO) capabilities across the region76. Putin’s recent A Eurasian multilateral military alliance, public statements regarding Sino-Russian established in 2002, which extended military cooperation could indicate that he the regional security integration of its might -for now- have tacitly predecessor: the CIS Collective Secu- agreed to Beijing’s growing mil- rity Treaty (CST) of 1992, after the 2001 BEIJING’S GROWING itary presence in the region.77 intervention in Afghanistan. In 2002, six MILITARY PRESENCE Yet, even though diplomacy of nine CST members: Armenia, Bela- IN THE REGION can, in the short-term, possibly rus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia COULD POTENTIALLY prevent escalating tensions, and Tajikistan, agreed to create the the increased Chinese regional CSTO. The military alliance was tem- LEAD TO ESCALATING military engagement could in porarily (re)joined by Uzbekistan from TENSIONS the long term upset the Sino- 2006 to 2012, while in 2013 Serbia and Russian regional equilibrium of Afghanistan joined the organization as the last couple of decades.78 This increased observer States. Its main objectives engagement is made possible by rapid tech- are the collective defense against com- nological advances in military technology, mon threats, both external and internal, which China, much more than Russia, is able in particular the joint cooperation and to take advantage of. This growing technolog- coordination against “international ter- ical asymmetry between Russia and China rorism and extremism, illicit trafficking might also mean that in the long run Russia’s of drugs and weapons, organized trans- regional military dominance-which so far has national crime, illegal migration and been more or less undisputed, will be chal- other menaces to safety of the Mem- lenged by the Chinese.79 ber States”. Art. 4 of the CSTO treaty Moreover, the regional security interests and includes provisions for a joint military -strategies of the two powers could in the command that would act to defend its long run prove to be incompatible. With an members from external aggression, yet eye on its economic aspirations, Beijing is this command structure has, so far, not striving for regional (authoritarian) stability, been activated.82 while Moscow, aiming to maintain its hegemonic military position in the region, benefits from ‘controlled instability’, as it prefers Culture security issues not to be definitively ‘solved’ Over the years, both Russia and China seem but continuously ‘managed’80. These devel- to have realized that in order to wield influ- opments indicate that the military dimension ence in either of the aforementioned spheres, could over time become ‘the most dynamic positive public perceptions across the Central source of great power competition for regional Asian countries can be of great importance. influence’.81 When examining Moscow’s as well as Bei-

10 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

jing’s cultural weight in the region, it is relevant to mention that Central Asian societies are not passive pawns with regard to the external pressures of both powers, and that their voices and agency have influence on the policies of the two great powers.83 Across the different Central Asian countries, public opinion concerning the Russian and Chinese regional presence vary, depending on the country’s geographical proximity and individual connections to either state. Moreover, official ties through political, economic or military institutions (e.g. resulting in freedom of movement between countries), also tend to influence public opinion regarding Russia and China84. Historically, Russia’s soft power over the countries in its periphery has been significant and, in later stages has been amplified by its language politics and widespread labor migration streams85. Today, Russia is culturally most closely linked with the and the Central Asian states. It remains to ALTHOUGH NATIONALIST former Soviet states of be seen whether these issues might subse- Kazakhstan (CSTO; EAEU); quently significantly alter the relationship and SENTIMENTS IN THE Kyrgyzstan (CSTO; EAEU) the power dynamics between these players. POST-SOVIET SOCIETIES and Tajikistan (CSTO) and Recent Chinese attempts to counter these ARE GROWING, RUSSIA to a slightly lesser extent anti- Chinese sentiments with public diplo- STILL HAS SIGNIFICANT with Uzbekistan and Turk- macy and soft power campaigns do not so far 86 PUBLIC SUPPORT IN menistan . Even though seem to have been able to prevent negative nationalist sentiments in public perceptions, especially regarding the CENTRAL ASIA these maturing post-Soviet closer economic relations with Beijing.90 The societies are growing, a recent Wilson Centre Wilson Centre survey demonstrates that, only survey demonstrates that due to the extensive in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, two coun- bilateral people-to-people relationships and tries that incidentally do not happen to share Russia’s overwhelming media presence in the borders with China, does Beijing’s presence region, Russia still has significant public enjoy a relatively positive domestic opinion91. support in Central Asia.87 For China, on the other hand, public support In this context it is relevant to note that, these in the region is a completely different story. public opinions at times seem to stand in stark Despite its prominence in other spheres of contrast to the officially proclaimed foreign influence, for most Central Asians China policies of Central Asian governments on the remains poorly understood. In certain coun- presence of the two external powers in their tries it even faces a serious lack of public countries. Especially with regard to China, trust88. Especially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan public and official opinions seem to diverge, and Tajikistan concerns regarding national as all Central Asian governments tend to sovereignty, overwhelming economic influ- welcome Beijing as an important regional ence, corruption and revelations about Xin- partner; support the Chinese BRI project; jiang’s massive Muslim re-education camps condemn US pressure on human rights; and contribute to ethnic tensions and negative (almost) never speak ill of China.92 This official public perceptions.89 This negative public attitude fits within the governments’ overar- opinion has triggered mass protests and, in ching strategy to choose economic prosper- some cases, even lead to Sinophobia. Espe- ity over public concerns. Growing societal cially the ethnic tensions and the human rights Sinophobia is therefore unlikely to jeopard- issues might in the future prove to become ize China’s strong regional economic rela- an increasing source of strife between China tions anytime soon.93 Yet, as public opinion

11 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

could still increasingly shape official gov- iour of both states in the Central Asian arena ernment opinion regarding the two powers illustrates, so far China and Russia remain in the long run, the Sino-Russian quest for careful not to push the envelope too far. While a positive public image will remain essential it continues to slowly expand its influence in their competition for regional influence in and activities in the region, China realises Central Asia94. very well that it cannot afford to antagonise Moscow too much. Beijing therefore walks a fine line, constantly reassuring Putin about Conclusion its ambitions, but at the same time exploiting Russia’s isolated position on the world stage In Central Asia, Russia and China, as the two and its need for China as a strategic partner. major power players, are pushed together by This current balance of power in the region the most elementary law of international poli- is therefore fragile, since it is based on the tics: that of the balance of power. From the premise that, in one way or another, both perspective of this balancing act, the Chi- parties need each other to more or less the nese-Russian rapprochement is unsurprising; same degree. While this is so far the case, the in order to be able to off- increasing power asymmetry within the rela- IT IS THIS QUEST TO set the influence of what tionship has proven to embolden China, which they perceive as the dom- has resulted in it violating the unofficial “divi- EXCLUDE THE COMMON inant player, the US, the sion of labour”, by getting itself more involved FOE, ALONGSIDE two “lesser powers” join in Central Asian security (and political) affairs. COMPLEMENTARY forces. In the current geo- As Russia is more and more relegated to the POLITICAL AND political climate, this status of junior partner, this changing dynamic ECONOMIC INTERESTS, dynamic is unlikely to might induce Putin to reconsider his options, change very soon. The or China to overpower Russian concerns and THAT MOST DRAWS fierce trade war with the force its own way. MOSCOW AND BEIJING US means that Beijing, The risk of China overpowering Russia is TOGETHER IN THE REGION even though it is the dom- becoming more realistic as the economic inant player in the power-asymmetry between the two countries Sino-Russian relationship, will need Russia keeps growing. While Russia is currently still economically more than before. Meanwhile, the dominant military power, the technological Moscow, plagued by economic sanctions, advances in China could change this dynamic estimates that China, and its continued in the long run. It is therefore the military rela- demand for Russian energy and commodi- tionship in the region that is the most con- ties, continues to be Russia’s best economic tested part of the “division of labour”, and that bet. The Central Asian case study reveals that presents the greatest risk of escalation. it is this quest to exclude the common foe, However, even though there is a risk that alongside complementary political and eco- China’s increasing military assertiveness nomic interests, that most draws Moscow and might irk Moscow into reacting in a similar Beijing together in the region. manner, it is more likely that Putin will eventu- In addition to these systemic balance-of- ally cut his losses and accept the new status power considerations, both Moscow and quo. Both countries still have more to gain Beijing see the US (and the West in general), from cooperation than from competition, or as an existential threat to their autocratic worse- conflict. The geopolitical regimes. The nature of their political rule, and balancing act and the common BOTH COUNTRIES the struggle for regime survival inherent in American adversary, the shared STILL HAVE MORE undemocratic regimes means that it is in both resistance to outside interference countries’ interest to counter outside interfer- in their sovereign politics, and the TO GAIN FROM ence. Moscow and Beijing therefore support benefits of the “organic division of COOPERATION each other’s public narrative of sovereignty labour so far continue to dictate the THAN FROM and non-interference. Sino-Russian partnership. As long COMPETITION, OR However, despite all the rhetoric of an unbreak- as nothing changes in that delicate WORSE- CONFLICT able partnership and cooperation, both coun- web of interests and rivalry, it tries certainly also have their own individual seems unlikely that the strategic Sino-Russian agendas, which they pursue, sometimes to axis will disappear from the region any the detriment of the relationship. As the behav- time soon.

12 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

Endnotes

1 Xinhua, ‘Joint statement of the People’s Republic of 21 Samuel Bendett & Elsa B. Kania, ‘A new Sino-Russian China and the Russian Federation on the development of high-tech partnership’, Australian Strategic Policy a comprehensive strategic partnership for collaboration Institute/International Cyber Policy Centre, 2019. in the new era (full text)’, Bilaterals, 6 June 2019. 22 Angela Stent, ‘Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists’, 2 Cao Desheng, ‘Sino- Russian ties vital amid turbulence, Brookings Institute, February 2020, p. 1-2. FM stresses’, China Daily, 18 September 2020; Ministry 23 Ibid., p. 10. of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Acting‘ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers 24 Ibid., p. 10. to media questions at a news conference on Russia’s 25 Ibid., p. 10. diplomatic performance in 2019’, 17 January 2020. 26 Ibid., p. 10. 3 Cao Desheng, ‘Sino- Russian ties vital amid turbulence, 27 Artyom Lukin, ‘The Russia–China entente and its future’, FM stresses’, China Daily, 18 September 2020. International Politics, 13 June 2020, p. 11. 4 Marlene Laruelle & Dylan Royce, ‘No Great Game: 28 Ibid. 12. Central Asia’s Public Opinions on Russia, China, and the Ibid. U.S.’ Kennan Cable 56, August 2020. 29 30 Ibid. 5 Ryan Nabil, ‘Evaluating Russia’s Pivot to Asia’, Yale Journal of International Affairs 15, Spring 2020. 31 Philip Caruso, ‘COVID-19 Heats Up the New Great Game in Central Asia’, Foreign Policy, 3 August 2020. 6 Ibid. 32 Vladimir Putin, ‘Putin Envisions a Russia- EU Free 7 Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Operation Allied Force: Lessons Trade Zone’, Spiegel International, 25 November 2010.; for the Future,’ RAND Research Brief, 2001 p. 1-4; David G. Lewis, ‘Geopolitical Imaginaries in Russian Denis Corboy, William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz, Foreign Policy: The Evolution of ‘Greater Eurasia’, ‘Russia’s Veto Diplomacy,’ The New York Times, Europe- Asia Studies 70(10), 2018, p. 1612-1637.; 14 August 2012. Seçkin Köstem, ‘Russia’s Search for a Greater Eurasia: 8 Dimitry Suslov, ‘The Russian Perception of the Post- Orgins, Promises, and Prospects’, Kennan Cable 40, Cold War Era and Relations with the West’, Harriman February 2019.; Glenn Diesen, ‘How Russia’s Greater Institute, Columbia University, 9 November 2016, p. 3. Eurasian Plan May Spell the End of EU- Centric Model’, 9 The Sino-Soviet split (1956–1966) was the breaking Russia in Global Affairs, 2 November 2018. of political relations between the People's Republic of 33 Glenn Diesen, ‘How Russia’s Greater Eurasian Plan China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics May Spell the End of EU- Centric Model’, Russia in (USSR), caused by doctrinal divergences that arose from Global Affairs, 2 November 2018. their different interpretations and practical applications (e.g. roads, railroads and pipelines that are oriented of Marxism–Leninism, as influenced by their respective 34 towards Russia and away from other regional neighbors); geopolitics during the Cold War. Sinikukka Saari, ‘Connecting the Dots: Challenges to EU 10 Akihiro Iwashita, ‘Russo-Chinese Relations in the post- Connectivity in Central Asia’, European Union Insitute for Cold War period’, Slavic Research Center, 1996. Security Studies, 3 June 2019.; Azad Garibov, ‘Russia 11 Ibid. Moves to Strengthen its Profile in Central Asian Gas Politics, Threatens Trans-Caspian’, The CACI Analyst, 12 Weixing Hu, ‘China’s security agenda after the Cold War’, The Pacific Review 8(1), 1995, p.117-135. 24 October 2019. Roger Kangas, ‘Understanding Russia and China in 13 An entente can be characterized as a harmonious 35 association of two major powers based on the Central Asia’. AFPC Defense Dossier 27, 31 May 2020, commonality of some key interests; the perception of p. 7. common threats; a measure of foreign and security 36 Valdai Club, ‘Toward the Great Ocean-3. Creating policy coordination; and a degree of empathy between Central Eurasia’, Report of the Valdai International their leaders. Discussion Club, 4 June 2015.; Fabienne Bossuyt & Dmitri Trenin, ‘From greater Europe to greater Asia? Irina Bolgova, ‘Connecting Eurasia: Is Cooperation The Sino–Russian entente’. Carnegie Moscow Center, between Russia, China, and the EU in Central April 2015. Asia Possible?’ In: Regional integration and future cooperation initiatives in the Eurasian Economic Union, 14 Artyom Lukin, ‘The Russia–China entente and its future’, April 2020, p. 238. International Politics, 13 June 2020, p. 9. 37 Sergey Sukhankin, ‘The Security Component of the 15 Andrea Kendall Taylor and Jeffrey Edmonds, Addressing‘ BRI in Central Asia, Part One: Chinese and Regional Deepening Russia-China Relations’, Center for a New Perspectives on Security in Central Asia’, Jamestown, American Security, 31 August 2020. 15 July 2020. 16 Ryan Nabil, ‘Evaluating Russia’s Pivot to Asia’, 38 Roger Kangas, ‘Understanding Russia and China in Yale Journal of International Affairs 15, Spring 2020. Central Asia’, Defense Dossier 27, 31 May 2020, p. 7. 17 Angela Stent, ‘Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists’, 39 Varshini Sridhar, ‘Sino-Russian Economic Coopera Brookings Institute, February 2020, p. 1-2. tion in Central Asia is Not What It Seems to Be’, 18 Angela Stent, ‘Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists’, The Diplomat, 23 September 2020. Brookings Institute, February 2020, p. 1-2. 40 Jonathan E. Hillman, ‘China and Russia: Economic 19 Artyom Lukin, ‘The Russia–China entente and its future’, Unequals’, Center for Strategic & International Studies International Politics, 13 June 2020. (CSIS), 15 July 2020. 20 Andrea Kendall Taylor and Jeffrey Edmonds, Addressing‘ 41 Jacopo Maria Pepe, ‘Eurasia: Playing Field Or Battle Deepening Russia-China Relations’, Center for a New Field?’ DGAPanalyse 4, July 2019, p. 12. American Security, 31 August 2020.

13 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

42 Philip Caruso, ‘COVID-19 Heats Up the New Great 61 With China holding roughly 50% of its $2.8 billion Game in Central Asia’, Foreign Policy, 3 August 2020. foreign debt. 43 Varshini Sridhar, ‘Sino-Russian Economic Coopera Agence France Presse, ‘Kyrgyzstan Says Negotiating tion in Central Asia is Not What It Seems to Be’, Debt Restructuring With China’, Barron’s, 29 April 2020. The Diplomat, 23 September 2020. 62 With China being its largest investor with a total of $8 44 Jacopo Maria Pepe, ‘Eurasia: Playing Field Or Battle billion between 1992-2017. Field?’ DGAPanalyse 4, July 2019, p. 13. Varshini Sridhar, ‘Sino-Russian Economic Coopera tion in Central Asia is Not What It Seems to Be’, 45 Varshini Sridhar, ‘Sino-Russian Economic Coopera The Diplomat, 23 September 2020. tion in Central Asia is Not What It Seems to Be’, The Diplomat, 23 September 2020. 63 With China being its main bilateral investment partner holding $1.7 billion of its $4 billion foreign debt and the 46 Abhijnan Rej, ‘What Good Is the Russia- India- China country immediately turning to Beijing, and not Moscow, Triangle for Moscow?’, The Diplomat, 1 September 2020. for debt relief as the coronavirus hit their economy. 47 Rashid Alimov, ‘The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Paul Stronski, ‘There Goes the Neighborhood: The Organization in Counteracting Threats to Peace and Limits of Russian Integration in Eurasia’, Carnegie Security’, UN Chronicle, 2002.; 2015-2020: Editor, Endowment for International Peace, September 2020, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’, The Shanghai p. 10. Cooperation Organization Secretariat, 2020. 64 Fabienne Bossuyt & Irina Bolgova, ‘Connecting Eurasia: 48 Valdimir Putin, ‘Valdai Discussion Club Session’, Is Cooperation between Russia, China and the EU in President of Russia, 3 October 2019. Central Asia Possible?’, Regional integration and future 49 Reid Standish, ‘China’s Central Asian Plans Are cooperation initiatives in the Eurasian Economic Union, Unnerving Moscow’, Foreign Policy, 23 December 2019. April 2020, p. 238. 50 Varshini Sridhar, ‘Sino-Russian Economic Coopera 65 Jacopo Maria Pepe, ‘Eurasia: Playing Field Or Battle tion in Central Asia is Not What It Seems to Be’, Field?’ DGAPanalyse 4, July 2019. The Diplomat, 23 September 2020. 66 Jonathan E. Hillman, ‘China and Russia: Economic 51 Maria Siow, ‘Could Russia side with the US and Unequals’, Center for Strategic & International Studies India against China?’ South China Morning Post, (CSIS), 15 July 2020, p. 2. 22 August 2020. 67 Varshini Sridhar, ‘Sino-Russian Economic Coopera 52 Valdimir Putin, ‘Valdai Discussion Club Session’, tion in Central Asia is Not What It Seems to Be’, President of Russia, 3 October 2019.; Neil MacFarquhar, The Diplomat, 23 September 2020. ‘Xi Jinping’s Visit to Russia Accents Ties in Face of 68 Sebastian Ibold, ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, Belt and Road Tensions with U.S.’, New York Times, 5 June 2019. Initiative (BRI), 2020.; Editor, ‘Plan on Belt and Road 53 Jonathan E. Hillman, ‘China and Russia: Economic Initiative’, Belt & Road News, 2015 (original source).; Unequals’, Center for Strategic & International Studies Bolat Nurgaliyev, ‘China’s Belt and Road Inititiave: (CSIS), 15 July 2020.; Nadège Rolland, ‘A China–Russia Kazakhstan and Geopolitics’, The Astana Times, Condominium over Eurasia’, Survival: Global Politics and 3 June 2020. Strategy 61(1), 2019, p. 7-22. 69 Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘Russia and Collective Security: Why 54 Jacopo Maria Pepe, ‘Eurasia: Playing Field Or Battle CSTO Is No Match for Warsaw Pact’, Russia Matters, Field?’ DGAPanalyse 4, July 2019.; Seçkin Köstem, 27 May 2020.; Ian J. Lynch, ‘What Are the Implications Kennan Cable 40, February 2019, p. 2. of China’s Growing Security Role in Central Asia?’, The Diplomat, 3 June 2020. 55 Fabienne Bossuyt & Irina Bolgova, ‘Connecting Eurasia: Is Cooperation between Russia, China and the EU in 70 Jacopo Maria Pepe, ‘Eurasia: Playing Field Or Battle Central Asia Possible?’, Regional integration and future Field?’ DGAPanalyse 4, July 2019, p. 13.; Kseniya cooperation initiatives in the Eurasian Economic Union, Kirillova, ‘Russian Influence Grows in Central Asia’, April 2020, p. 238.; Seçkin Köstem, Kennan Cable 40, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 29 May 2020. February 2019, p. 2. 71 Polina Tikhonova, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation 56 Ibid., p. 238. Organization And The Strategic Prospect of Central Asia’, Insider Paper, 11 September 2020. 57 Ibid., p. 239; Jacopo Maria Pepe, ‘Eurasia: Playing Field Or Battle Field?’ DGAPanalyse 4, July 2019. 72 Ian J. Lynch, ‘What Are the Implications of China’s Growing Security Role in Central Asia?’ The Diplomat, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is a strong 58 3 June 2020. opponent of this Russian initiative, calling it a “restriction of sovereign rights”. 73 Nurlan Aliyev, ‘Military Cooperation Between Russia and ‘The EAEU Presidents did not adopt the strategy. China: The Military Alliance Without an Agreement?’, Tokayev saw in it a “restriction of sovereign rights”’, RKK International Centre for Defence and Security, Azattyq, 19 May 2020. 1 July 2020. 59 Eurasian Economic Commission, ‘The Eurasian 74 Ibid. Economic Union: Facts and Figures: Library of 75 China provided 18 percent of the region’s arms over the Eurasian Integration’, Facts and Figures 2018, 2018, past five years in contrast to the 1.5 percent of Central p. 32.; Tony van der Togt, ‘EU & Eurasian Economic Asian arms imports that it provided between 2010 and Union: A Common Chinese Challenge’, Institute für 2014. Sicherheitspolitik, 30 April 2020. 76 e.g. through the launch of ‘Cooperation 2019’, a series 60 With at least $8 billion in loans and 94% of the country’s of joint military counter-terrorism drills with Kyrgyzstan, gas going to China. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan Jakub Jakóbowski and Mariusz Marszewski, ‘Crisis in Bradley Jardine & Edward Lemon, ‘In Russia’s Shadow: Turkmenistan. A test for China’s policy in the region’, China’s Rising Security Presence in Central Asia’, OSW Commentary 31 August 2018. Kennan Cable 52, May 2020.

14 Strategic Alert – Multi-dimensional chess

77 Vladimir Putin, ‘Valdai Discussion Club session’, 86 Marlene Laruelle & Dylan Royce, ‘No Great Game: President of the Russia, 3 October 2019. Central Asia’s Public Opinions on Russia, China, and 78 Catherine Putz, ‘Why Did Tajikistan Make an the U.S.’, Kennan Cable 56, August 2020, p. 10. Appearance in the China Military Power Report?’, 87 Ibid., p. 10.; Paul Stronski, ‘There Goes the The Diplomat, 3 September 2020.; Ian J. Lynch, Neighborhood: The Limits of Russian Integration in ‘What Are the Implications of China’s Growing Security Eurasia’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Role in Central Asia?’,The Diplomat, 3 June 2020. September 2020, p. 14-16. 79 Artyom Lukin, ‘The Russia–China entente and its future’, 88 Sebastien Peyrouse, ‘Understanding Sinophobia in International Politics, 13 June 2020, p. 12. Central Asia’, The Diplomat, 1 May 2020.; Varshini 80 Jacopo Maria Pepe, ‘Eurasia: Playing Field Or Battle Sridhar, 'Sino-Russian Economic Cooperation in Field?’ DGAPanalyse 4, July 2019, p. 13.; Kseniya Central Asia is Not What It Seems to Be’, The Diplomat, Kirillova, ‘Russian Influence Grows in Central Asia’, 23 September 2020. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 29 May 2020. 89 Sergey Sukhankin, ‘The Security Component of the 81 Ian J. Lynch, ‘What Are the Implications of China’s BRI in Central Asia, Part One: Chinese and Regional Growing Security Role in Central Asia?’, The Diplomat, Perspectives on Security in Central Asia’, Jamestown, 3 June 2020. 15 July 2020. 82 Elia Bescotti, ‘The Collective Security Treaty 90 Sebastien Peyrouse, ‘Understanding Sinophobia in Organisation and its limits on integration’, Analytical Central Asia’, The Diplomat, 1 May 2020. Media Eurasian Studies, 2 January 2018.; Dmitry 91 Marlene Laruelle & Dylan Royce, ‘No Great Game: Gorenburg, ‘Russia and Collective Security: Why Central Asia’s Public Opinions on Russia, China, and the CSTO is No Match for Warsaw Pact’, Russia Matters, U.S.’, Kennan Cable 56, August 2020. 27 May 2020. 92 Ibid. 83 Marlene Laruelle & Dylan Royce, ‘No Great Game: 93 Sebastien Peyrouse, ‘Understanding Sinophobia in Central Asia’s Public Opinions on Russia, China, and Central Asia’, The Diplomat, 1 May 2020. the U.S.’, Kennan Cable 56, August 2020, p. 2. 94 Marlene Laruelle & Dylan Royce, ‘No Great Game: 84 Ibid., p. 10. Central Asia’s Public Opinions on Russia, China, and 85 Russia hosts an estimated 2.7 to 4 million Central Asian the U.S.’, Kennan Cable 56, August 2020. labour migrants, which grants unique leverage in the region: remittances sent from Russia are particularly important. Sinikukka Saari, ‘Connecting the Dots: Challenges to EU Connectivity in Central Asia’, European Union Insitute for Security Studies, 3 June 2019, p. 6.

15 HCSS The Clingendael Institute Lange Voorhout 1 P.O. Box 93080 2514 EA The Hague 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands The Netherlands

Follow us on social media Follow us on social media  @hcssnl  @clingendaelorg  The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies  The Clingendael Institute  The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies  The Clingendael Institute  clingendael_institute

Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Website: www.hcss.nl Website: www.clingendael.org

About the authors Goos Hofstee is a Research Fellow at the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute. Her work focuses on Strategic Foresight and (inter)national security, with a special interest in Middle East politics and security.

Noor Broeders is a Research Intern at the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute. Her internship is focused on Strategic Foresight and international security.

DISCLAIMER: The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.