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Somalia WATCH H U M A N R I G H T S NO PLACE FOR CHILDREN Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia WATCH No Place for Children Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia Copyright © 2012 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-867-8 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org FEBRUARY 2012 1-56432-867-8 No Place for Children Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia Map of Somalia ................................................................................................................... i Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Key Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 7 To the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and Transitional Federal Institutions ......... 7 To al-Shabaab .......................................................................................................................... 7 To Foreign Parties to the Conflict: AMISOM and the African Union, Kenya, and Ethiopia ............ 8 To All States and the Donor Community in Somalia .................................................................. 8 To the UN Security Council and the UN Human Rights Council ................................................... 8 To the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Other Child Protection Agencies in Somalia and Kenya .................................................................................................................. 8 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 9 I. Background .................................................................................................................... 11 Brief Summary of Somalia’s Conflict ....................................................................................... 11 Major Parties to the Conflict .................................................................................................... 13 Drought, Famine, and al-Shabaab’s Restrictions on Humanitarian Access ............................... 15 Children in the Somali Conflict ................................................................................................ 16 II. Recruitment and Use of Children as Soldiers ................................................................. 19 Al-Shabaab ........................................................................................................................... 20 Children in TFG Forces and in TFG Custody .............................................................................. 40 TFG Commitments to End Recruitment and Use of Children ...................................................... 44 III. Forced Marriage and Rape of Girls by al-Shabaab ........................................................ 53 Forced and Early Marriage by al-Shabaab ................................................................................ 54 Rape by al-Shabaab ................................................................................................................ 59 IV. Al-Shabaab Attacks on Schools, Teachers, and Students ............................................. 62 Laws-of-War Violations Involving Schools .............................................................................. 64 Recruitment of Children from Schools ..................................................................................... 70 Abuses against Teachers ........................................................................................................ 72 Control of Curriculum and Restrictions on Girls ....................................................................... 75 Impact of Attacks on Students and Teachers ........................................................................... 79 V. Role of International Actors .......................................................................................... 84 VI. International Legal Standards ..................................................................................... 87 Child Recruitment .................................................................................................................. 88 Treatment of Captured Children ............................................................................................. 90 Forced Marriage and Rape ...................................................................................................... 91 Rape...................................................................................................................................... 92 Right to Education ................................................................................................................. 92 Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 94 To the Transitional Federal Government: ................................................................................ 94 To al-Shabaab ....................................................................................................................... 96 To TFG-Affiliated Militias ......................................................................................................... 97 To Foreign Parties to the Conflict: AMISOM and the African Union, Kenya, and Ethiopia .......... 98 To All States and the Donor Community in Somalia ................................................................ 99 To the UN Security Council and the UN Human Rights Council ................................................ 100 To the Somalia Country Task Team of the UN-led Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia: ............................................................................... 100 To the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Other Child Protection Agencies in Somalia and Kenya ............................................................................................................... 101 To the UN Political Office for Somalia and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ....................................................................................................................... 101 To the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict ... 102 To the EU, UNHCR, and UNICEF in Uganda ............................................................................. 102 To the United States Congress .............................................................................................. 102 To UNHCR, UNICEF, and Other UN Agencies Working in Kenya and Ethiopia ............................ 102 Acknowledgements .........................................................................................................104 Map of Somalia I HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | FEBRUARY 2012 Summary I was with al-Shabaab for three months in 2010…. They wanted to train us to fight and I was afraid. I didn’t want to kill people. I wanted to go back to school and learn. —Amare A. (not his real name), 10-year-old boy from Mogadishu, living in Kenya, June 2, 2011 Children in war-torn Somalia face horrific abuses, including forced recruitment as soldiers, forced marriage and rape, and attacks on their schools by the parties to the conflict. Those responsible are never held to account. Children, defined as anyone under age 18, have suffered disproportionately from the ongoing conflict. Fighting between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and TFG-aligned militias on one hand and al- Shabaab, the Islamist armed group that now controls much of the country, on the other, intensified in the capital, Mogadishu, and other parts of south-central Somalia in mid-2010 and early 2011. In October 2011 the conflict in the southern regions escalated further with the incursion of Kenyan armed forces against al-Shabaab, followed shortly after by the arrival of Ethiopian forces. Children are often the main victims of the indiscriminate artillery and small arms fire that has long characterized the fighting in Mogadishu. They are also the most affected by the ongoing humanitarian crisis, which is underpinned by a UN-declared famine through the south-central region of Somalia as well as the ongoing conflict between al Shabaab and the TFG. This report documents al-Shabaab’s targeting of children for recruitment as soldiers,
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