Vicarious Liability
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Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age
Tulsa Law Review Volume 44 Issue 4 The Scholarship of Richard A. Epstein Summer 2009 Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age Catherine M. Sharkey Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Catherine M. Sharkey, Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 677 (2013). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol44/iss4/2 This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Sharkey: Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age TRESPASS TORTS AND SELF-HELP FOR AN ELECTRONIC AGE Catherine M. Sharkey* INTRODU CTION ................................................................................................................ 678 1. SELF-HELP: THE MISSING THIRD REMEDY .......................................................... 679 II. CONCEPTUALIZING SELF-HELP IN CYBERTRESPASS DOCTRINE ........................... 684 A. Self-Help in Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case ................................................... 684 1. Threshold Prerequisite to Invoke Legal Process ................................... 684 2. Liability for Evasion of Self-Help ........................................................ 687 B. Self-Help "Opt-Out" as Affirmative Defense ............................................ -
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT Lori Torres, Inspector General
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT Lori Torres, Inspector General OFFICE: INDIANA BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES TITLE: FORGERY; PERJURY; THEFT CASE ID: 2017-12-0293 DATE: August 30, 2018 Inspector General Staff Attorney Kelly Elliott, after an investigation by Special Agent Mark Mitchell, reports as follows: The Indiana General Assembly charged the Office of Inspector General (OIG) with addressing fraud, waste, abuse, and wrongdoing in the executive branch of state government. IC 4-2-7-2(b). The OIG also investigates criminal activity and ethics violations by state workers. IC 4-2-7-3. The OIG may recommend policies and carry out other activities designed to deter, detect, and eradicate fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and misconduct in state government. IC 4-2- 7-3(2). On March 23, 2017, the OIG received a complaint from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) that alleged a former BMV employee, Richard Pringle, submitted false information to the BMV on personal certificate of title applications. OIG Special Agent Mark Mitchell conducted an investigation into this matter. Through the course of his investigation, Special Agent Mitchell interviewed Pringle and reviewed documentation received from BMV, including their internal investigation report on this matter. According to BMV’s investigative report of the allegations against Pringle, BMV found that Pringle submitted an application for a 1997 GMC Yukon in October 2016 that listed a sale price 1 that was different from the price the seller of the vehicle stated they sold it. At the conclusion of their investigation, BMV terminated Pringle’s employment in or around March 2017. Special Agent Mitchell reviewed the BMV certificate of title application for the 1997 GMC Yukon. -
OSLIN, DEBORAH JOYCE, ) ) Case No. 17-11214-R Debtor. ) Chapter 7 ______
Case 17-01034-R Document 14 Filed in USBC ND/OK on 01/24/18 Page 1 of 21 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA IN RE: ) Filed/Docketed ) Jan 24, 2018 OSLIN, DEBORAH JOYCE, ) ) Case No. 17-11214-R Debtor. ) Chapter 7 ________________________________________________________________________ MAXINE ARMSTRONG, as ) Guardian of the Person and Estate ) of Adrian Armstrong, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Adv. No. 17-1034-R ) DEBORAH OSLIN, ) ) Defendant. ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIMS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) AND § 523(a)(9) Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Claims Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and § 523(a)(9) (Adv. Doc. 5) (“Motion to Dismiss”) filed on November 6, 2017, by Defendant/Debtor Deborah Oslin (“Oslin”), and the response and brief in support (Adv. Doc. 9) (“Response”) filed on November 20, 2017, by Plaintiff Maxine Armstrong, as Guardian of the Person and Estate of Adrian Armstrong (“Armstrong”). On October 11, 2017, Armstrong filed a Complaint . for Determination of: 1) Non- Dischargeability; and 2) Objections to Debtor’s Discharge, Pursuant to Sections 523 and 727, Respectively, of the Bankruptcy Code (Adv. Doc. 1) (“Complaint”). Oslin seeks dismissal only of the claims asserted under 11 U.S.C. § 523. Case 17-01034-R Document 14 Filed in USBC ND/OK on 01/24/18 Page 2 of 21 I. Jurisdiction The Court has jurisdiction of this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 157(a), and 157(b)(1) and (2)(I) and (J), and Local Civil Rule 84.1(a) of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. -
What's Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort
Do Not Delete 12/15/2010 10:20 PM WHAT’S REASONABLE?: SELF-DEFENSE AND MISTAKE IN CRIMINAL AND TORT LAW by Caroline Forell∗ In this Article, Professor Forell examines the criminal and tort mistake- as-to-self-defense doctrines. She uses the State v. Peairs criminal and Hattori v. Peairs tort mistaken self-defense cases to illustrate why application of the reasonable person standard to the same set of facts in two areas of law can lead to different outcomes. She also uses these cases to highlight how fundamentally different the perception of what is reasonable can be in different cultures. She then questions whether both criminal and tort law should continue to treat a reasonably mistaken belief that deadly force is necessary as justifiable self-defense. Based on the different purposes that tort and criminal law serve, Professor Forell explains why in self-defense cases criminal law should retain the reasonable mistake standard while tort law should move to a strict liability with comparative fault standard. I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1402 II. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE ................................................... 1403 III. THE PEAIRS MISTAKE CASES .................................................. 1406 A. The Peairs Facts ..................................................................... 1408 B. The Criminal Case .................................................................. 1409 1. The Applicable Law ........................................................... 1409 -
Respondeat Superior Principle to Assign Responsibility for Worker Statutory Benefits and Protections Michael Harper Boston University School of Law
Boston University School of Law Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law Faculty Scholarship 11-13-2017 Using the Anglo-American Respondeat Superior Principle to Assign Responsibility for Worker Statutory Benefits and Protections Michael Harper Boston University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael Harper, Using the Anglo-American Respondeat Superior Principle to Assign Responsibility for Worker Statutory Benefits na d Protections, Boston University School of Law, Public Law Research Paper Series (2017). Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/286 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. USING THE ANGLO‐AMERICAN RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORKER STATUTORY BENEFITS AND PROTECTIONS Michael C. Harper* Introduction The common law remains an intellectual battle ground in Anglo‐ American legal systems, even in the current age of statutes. This is true in significant part because the common law provides legitimacy for arguments actually based on policy, ideology, and interest. It also is true because of the common law’s malleability and related susceptibility to significantly varied interpretations. Mere contention over the meaning of the common law to provide legitimacy for modern statutes is usually not productive of sensible policy, however. It generally produces no more than reified doctrine unsuited for problems the common law was not framed to solve. -
In the End, Truth Will out - Or Will It
Missouri Law Review Volume 52 Issue 2 Spring 1987 Article 2 Winter 1987 In the End, Truth Will Out - Or Will It Donald L. Magnetti Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Donald L. Magnetti, In the End, Truth Will Out - Or Will It, 52 MO. L. REV. (1987) Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Magnetti: Magnetti: In the End "IN THE END, TRUTH WILL OUT" ...OR WILL IT? "MERCHANT OF VENICE," ACT II, SCENE 2 Donald L. Magnetti* I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 299 II. Tim COMMON LAW OF DEFAMATION ....................... 300 III. Tim New York Times RULE: PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE MEDIA 307 DEFENDANT ............................................ IV. THE PUBLIC FIGURE PLAINTI=: Gertz v. Robert Welch ...... 311 V. DEVELOPMENTS AFTER Gertz .............................. 318 A. Forum Shopping ................................... 318 B. Post-Gertz Decisions Add to the Confusion ........... 320 C. The Dun and Bradstreet Decision - A "Side-Step"... 326 D. Falsity - The Essence of a Defamation Action ....... 329 The Neutral Reportage Privilege ..................... 329 PriorRestraint Cases ............................... 331 The "False Light" Cases ............................ 332 The "Fictionalization" Cases ........................ 334 The "Libel-ProofPlaintiff" and "Subsidiary Libel" 336 D octrines.......................................... The Issue of Falsity ................................ 339 Sum mary .......................................... 342 VI. PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR IE DEFAMED PLAINT .......... -
2014 ASC Day 2-5 Vicarious Liability.Pdf
Vicarious Liability Definition: liability based not on a person’s own wrongdoing, but rather on that person’s relationship to the wrongdoer. What Relationships Are We Talking About? Parent may be responsible for acts of children. Employers (including corporations) may be responsible for acts of employees. Employers are responsible for acts of independent contractors in case of “non- delegable duties.” Principals may be responsible for acts of agents. One partner may be responsible for acts of another partner. One person engaged in a joint enterprise may be responsible for the acts of another. The owner of a car may be responsible for the acts of the driver. NOTE: All of these individuals are responsible for their own negligent actions, but that is not the subject of this handout. In these cases, we’re discussing holding a person liable for another’s injury, even though the person has not behaved negligently or otherwise done anything wrong. Parent May Be Responsible for Acts of Children Essential Elements Defendant’s child was under 18. Child maliciously or willfully injured plaintiff or destroyed plaintiff’s property. Amount of actual damages. Limitations Total recovery may not exceed $2,000. Fact that parent no longer has custody and control (whether by court order or agreement) is complete defense. Employer May Be Responsible for Acts of Employees Essential Elements: Negligent person was employed by defendant. Negligent person was acting within scope of employment, or employer authorized the employee to act tortiously or employer later ratified employee’s tortious acts. Amount of actual damages. DGL/SOG/2014 The courts have said that an employee acts within the scope of his employment if his actions were for the purpose of in some way furthering the business of the employer. -
Competing Theories of Blackmail: an Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory
Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory Paul H. Robinson,* Michael T. Cahill** & Daniel M. Bartels*** The crime of blackmail has risen to national media attention because of the David Letterman case, but this wonderfully curious offense has long been the favorite of clever criminal law theorists. It criminalizes the threat to do something that would not be criminal if one did it. There exists a rich liter- ature on the issue, with many prominent legal scholars offering their accounts. Each theorist has his own explanation as to why the blackmail offense exists. Most theories seek to justify the position that blackmail is a moral wrong and claim to offer an account that reflects widely shared moral intuitions. But the theories make widely varying assertions about what those shared intuitions are, while also lacking any evidence to support the assertions. This Article summarizes the results of an empirical study designed to test the competing theories of blackmail to see which best accords with pre- vailing sentiment. Using a variety of scenarios designed to isolate and test the various criteria different theorists have put forth as “the” key to blackmail, this study reveals which (if any) of the various theories of blackmail proposed to date truly reflects laypeople’s moral judgment. Blackmail is not only a common subject of scholarly theorizing but also a common object of criminal prohibition. Every American jurisdiction criminalizes blackmail, although there is considerable variation in its formulation. The Article reviews the American statutes and describes the three general approaches these provisions reflect. -
The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: an Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1987 The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines Alan O. Sykes Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Alan O. Sykes, "The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines," 101 Harvard Law Review 563 (1987). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VOLUME 101 JANUARY 1988 NUMBER 3 HARVARD LAW REVIEW1 ARTICLES THE BOUNDARIES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT RULE AND RELATED LEGAL DOCTRINES Alan 0. Sykes* 441TICARIOUS liability" may be defined as the imposition of lia- V bility upon one party for a wrong committed by another party.1 One of its most common forms is the imposition of liability on an employer for the wrong of an employee or agent. The imposition of vicarious liability usually depends in part upon the nature of the activity in which the wrong arises. For example, if an employee (or "servant") commits a tort within the ordinary course of business, the employer (or "master") normally incurs vicarious lia- bility under principles of respondeat superior. If the tort arises outside the "scope of employment," however, the employer does not incur liability, absent special circumstances. -
Guide to Social Media: Risks and Opportunities for Business
GUIDE TO SOCIAL MEDIA RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUSINESS Contents Introduction 1 Monitoring third-party social media sites for content 11 What do we mean by “social media”? 2 What are your options for defending yourself? 11 What do you need to consider? 2 Who’s liable for content? 11 Social media providers’ terms of use 2 Self-help mechanisms 11 The standard terms 3 Taking down fake sites 12 Creating and maintaining a social media presence 4 Defamation and corporations 12 Misleading and deceptive conduct 13 Planning and establishing a social media presence 4 Injurious falsehood 13 Establishing social media communication responsibility 4 Discrimination 13 Social media governance strategy 4 Criminal sanctions for trolling 13 Promotional activity and advertising issues 5 Practical steps and matters to consider 14 Continuous disclosure obligations and social media 5 Litigate or engage? 14 Discrimination 6 Developing a crisis management plan 14 Why you should monitor your own social media Assessing the risk in user-generated content sites for objectionable content 6 on third-party sites 15 What should you do when you find How will you respond? 15 objectionable content? 7 Steps to take to get material removed from Responding to negative comments 8 third-party sites 15 Should you remove content? Where is something “published”? 16 Recordkeeping 8 Obtaining social media content for use in litigation 16 Protecting your reputation from attacks Issuing subpoenas on social media opertors 16 by others on social media 9 Employee use of social media -
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)
Law 580: Torts Thursday, November 12, 2015 November 10, 11, 12: • Casebook pages 813-843, 866-884 • Oral Argument #4 on Tuesday November 10 Chapter 11: Property Torts and Ultrahazardous Activities II. Property Torts D. Consent III. Ultrahazardous (Abnormally Dangerous) Activites Trespass to Land Prima Facie Case 1. Volitional Act 2. Intent to cause entry onto land 3. Entry onto plaintiff’s land Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 158. Liability for Intentional Intrusions on Land. One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove. Affirmative Defenses: 1. Consent 2. Self Defense 3. Defense of Others 4. Defense of Property 5. Recapture of Property 6. Necessity Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation (Minn 1910) p. 824 1. Who sued whom? 2. What happened? 3. What’s the procedural history? 4. What question(s) is/are before this court? 5. What does plaintiff argue? 6. What does defendant argue? 7. What does the court decide? 8. Why? “We are satisfied that the character of the storm was such that it would have been highly imprudent for the master of the Reynolds to have attempted to leave the dock or to have permitted his vessel to drift a way from it. …Nothing more was demanded of them than ordinary prudence and care, and the record in this case fully sustains the contention of the appellant that, in holding the vessel fast to the dock, those in charge of her exercised good judgment and prudent seamanship. -
Chapter 8 Liability Based on Agency and Respondeat Superior A. Definitions
CHAPTER 8 LIABILITY BASED ON AGENCY AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR A. DEFINITIONS 8:1 Agency Relationship — Defined 8:2 Disclosed or Unidentified Principal — Defined 8:3 Undisclosed Principal — Defined 8:4 Employer and Employee — Defined 8:5 Independent Contractor — Definition 8:6 Loaned Employee 8:7 Loaned Employee ― Determination 8:8 Scope of Employment of Employee — Defined 8:9 Scope of Authority of Agent — Defined 8:9A Actual Authority 8:9B Express Authority 8:10 Incidental Authority — Defined 8:11 Implied Authority — Defined 8:12 Apparent Authority (Agency by Estoppel) — Definition and Effect 8:13 Scope of Authority or Employment — Departure 8:14 Ratification — Definition and Effect 8:15 Knowledge of Agent Imputable to Principal 8:16 Termination of Agent’s Authority 8:17 Termination of Agent’s Authority — Notice to Third Parties B. LIABILITY ARISING FROM AGENCY AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 8:18 Principal and Agent or Employer and Employee — Both Parties Sued — Issue as to Relationship and Scope of Authority or Employment — Acts of Agent or Employee as Acts of Principal or Employer 8:19 Principal and Agent or Employer and Employee — Only Principal or Employer Sued — No Issue as to Relationship — Acts of Agent or Employee as Acts of Principal or Employer 8:20 Principal and Agent or Employer and Employee — Only Principal or Employer Sued — Issue as to Relationship and/or Scope of Authority or Employment — Acts of Agent or Employee as Acts of Principal or Employer 8:21 Principal and Agent or Employer and Employee — Both Parties Sued — Liability of Principal or Employer When No Issue as to Relationship or Scope of Authority or Employment 8:22 Principal and Agent or Employer and Employee — Both Parties Sued — Liability When Issue as to Relationship and/or Scope of Authority or Employment 8:23 Act of Corporate Officer or Employee as Act of Corporation 2 A.