Law 580: Torts Thursday, November 12, 2015

November 10, 11, 12: • Casebook pages 813-843, 866-884 • Oral Argument #4 on Tuesday November 10

Chapter 11: Property Torts and Ultrahazardous Activities II. Property Torts D. Consent III. Ultrahazardous (Abnormally Dangerous) Activites Trespass to Land Prima Facie Case

1. Volitional Act

2. Intent to cause entry onto land

3. Entry onto plaintiff’s land Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)

§ 158. Liability for Intentional Intrusions on Land.

One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove. Affirmative Defenses:

1. Consent

2. Self Defense

3. Defense of Others

4. Defense of Property

5. Recapture of Property

6. Necessity Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation (Minn 1910) p. 824

1. Who sued whom? 2. What happened? 3. What’s the procedural history? 4. What question(s) is/are before this court? 5. What does plaintiff argue? 6. What does defendant argue? 7. What does the court decide? 8. Why? “We are satisfied that the character of the storm was such that it would have been highly imprudent for the master of the Reynolds to have attempted to leave the dock or to have permitted his vessel to drift a way from it. …Nothing more was demanded of them than ordinary prudence and care, and the record in this case fully sustains the contention of the appellant that, in holding the vessel fast to the dock, those in charge of her exercised good judgment and prudent seamanship. . . . “…But here those in charge of the vessel deliberately and by their direct efforts held her in such a position that the damage to the dock resulted, and, having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the dock, it seems to us that her owners are responsible to the dock owners to the extent of the injury inflicted.”

— Vincent v. Lake Erie (p. 825) “This is not a case where life or property was menaced by any object or thing belonging to the plaintiff, the destruction of which became necessary to prevent the threatened disaster. Nor is it a case where, because of the act of God, or unavoidable accident, the infliction of the injury was beyond the control of the defendant, but is one where the defendant prudently and advisedly availed itself of the plaintiffs’ property for the purpose of preserving its own more valuable property, and the plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the injury done.”

— Vincent v. Lake Erie (p. 826) “In my judgment, if the boat was lawfully in position at the time the storm broke, and the master could not, in the exercise of due care, have left that position without subjecting his vessel to the hazards of the storm, then the damage to the dock, caused by the pounding of the boat, was the result of an inevitable accident. If the master was in the exercise of due care, he was not at fault.”

— Vincent v. Lake Erie, Lewis, J., dissenting (p. 826) Conversion Prima Facie Case

1. Volitional Act

2. Intent to exercise control over personal property

3. Major interference with property owner’s possession or control of personal property Thyroff v. Nationwide Insurance (NY 2007) p. 831

1. Who sued whom? 2. What happened? 3. What’s the procedural history? 4. What question(s) is/are before this court? 5. What does plaintiff argue? 6. What does defendant argue? 7. What does the court decide? 8. Why? Restatement (Second) of Torts(1965)

§ 222A What Constitutes Conversion

(1) Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.

(2) In determining the seriousness of the interference and the justice of requiring the actor to pay the full value, the following factors are important: (a) the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control; (b) the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other's right of control; (c) the actor's good faith; (d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the other's right of control; (e) the harm done to the chattel; (f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other. Trespass to Chattels Prima Facie Case

1. Volitional Act

2. Intent to interfere with personal property [“chattel”]

3. Damage to the personal property or interference with the owner’s use of it Restatement (Second) of Torts(1965)

§ 217 Ways of Committing Trespass to Chattel

A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.

§ 218 Liability to Person in Possession

One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor of the chattel if, but only if, (a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or (b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.

§ 222 Liability for Dispossession

One who dispossesses another of a chattel is subject to liability in trespass for the damage done. If the dispossession seriously interferes with the right of the other to control the chattel, the actor may also be subject to liability for conversion. Restatement (Second) of Torts(1965)

§ 222A What Constitutes Conversion

….

Comment c. Recovery of full value of chattel. The importance of the distinction between trespass to chattels and conversion … lies in the measure of damages. In trespass the plaintiff may recover for the diminished value of his chattel because of any damage to it, or for the damage to his interest in its possession or use. Usually, although not necessarily, such damages are less than the full value of the chattel itself. In conversion the measure of damages is the full value of the chattel, at the time and place of the tort. When the defendant satisfies the judgment in the action for conversion, title to the chattel passes to him, so that he is in effect required to buy it at a forced judicial sale. Conversion is therefore properly limited, and has been limited by the courts, to those serious, major, and important interferences with the right to control the chattel which justify requiring the defendant to pay its full value. Trespass to Land Trespass to Chattels Prima Facie Case Prima Facie Case

1. Volitional Act 1. Volitional Act

2. Intent to cause entry onto land 2. Intent to interfere with personal property [“chattel”] 3. Entry onto plaintiff’s land 3. Damage to the personal property or interference with the owner’s use of it

Conversion Prima Facie Case

1. Volitional Act

2. Intent to exercise control over personal property

3. Major interference with property owner’s possession or control of personal property Affirmative Defenses:

1. Consent

2. Self Defense

3. Defense of Others

4. Defense of Property

5. Recapture of Property

6. Necessity Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) p. 840

1. Who sued whom? 2. What happened? 3. What’s the procedural history? 4. What question(s) is/are before this court? 5. What does plaintiff argue? 6. What does defendant argue? 7. What does the court decide? 8. Why? “Minnesota case law establishes that an entrant may become a trespasser by moving beyond the possessor’s invitation or permission. See State v. Brooks- Scanlon Lumber Co., 128 Minn. 300, 302 (1915) (when consent given to cut mature trees, cutting of immature trees exceeded scope of consent and constituted trespass).… Although trespass in Brooks-Scanlon related to tangible objects, the decision nonetheless demonstrates that the scope of consent can be exceeded even though the entrant remains within the geographic limits of the consent. . . . …. “Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized trespass as a remedy when broadcasters use secret cameras for newsgathering. Newsgathering does not create a license to trespass or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another’s home or office.”

— Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting (p. 841)