Operaciones Panzer General E
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1940 Commandés À Plusieurs Chantiers Navals Néerlandais, Seuls Quatre Exemplaires (T-61 À T-64) Doivent Être Poursuivis, Les Autres Seront Annulés
Appendice 1 Ordre de bataille de l’Armée Rouge sur le front au 1er juin 1943 (forces principales) (pour les deux Fronts Baltes – les indications pour les autres Fronts ne sont entièrement valables qu’à partir du 1er juillet) 1er Front de la Baltique (M.M. Popov) Du sud de Parnu (Estonie) au sud de Võru (Estonie). – 1ère Armée (A.V. Kourkine) – 4e Armée (N.I. Gusev) – 7e Armée (A.N. Krutikov) – 42e Armée (V.I. Morozov) – 12e Corps Blindé (V.V. Butkov) – 15e Corps Blindé (F.N. Rudkin) Aviation subordonnée : 13e Armée Aérienne (S.D. Rybalchenko) 2e Front de la Baltique (K.A. Meretskov) Du sud de Pskov (Russie) au nord de Vitebsk (Biélorussie). – 27e Armée (N.E. Berzarine) – 34e Armée (A.I. Lopatine) – 39e Armée (A.I. Zigin) – 55e Armée (V.P. Smiridov) – 13e Corps Blindé (B.S. Bakharov) – 14e Corps Blindé (I.F. Kirichenko) – 101e Brigade Blindée lourde Aviation subordonnée : 14e Armée Aérienne (I.P. Zhuravlev) 1er Front de Biélorussie (A.I. Eremenko) De Vitebsk (Biélorussie) à Orsha (Biélorussie) – 20e Armée (P.A. Kourouchkine) – 1ère Armée de la Garde (I.M. Chistiakov) – 3e Armée de la Garde (I.G. Zakharkine) – 63e Armée (V.I. Kuznetsov) – 18e Corps Blindé (A.S. Burdeiny) Aviation subordonnée : 2e Armée Aérienne (N.F. Naumenko) 2e Front de Biélorussie (I.S. Koniev) D’Orsha (Biélorussie) à Gomel (Biélorussie). – 2e Armée de la Garde (L.A. Govorov) – 29e Armée (I.M. Managrov) – 15e Armée (I.I. Fediouninski) – 54e Armée (S.V. Roginski) – 3e Armée de Choc (M.A. Purkayev) – 7e Corps Blindé (A.G. -
A War of Reputation and Pride
A War of reputation and pride - An examination of the memoirs of German generals after the Second World War. HIS 4090 Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History University of Oslo Spring 2019 1 “For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.” – John F. Kennedy, 19621 1John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm, [01.05.2019]. 2 Acknowledgments This master would not have been written without the help and support of my mother, father, friends and my better half, thank you all for your support. I would like to thank the University Library of Oslo and the British Library in London for providing me with abundant books and articles. I also want to give huge thanks to the Military Archive in Freiburg and their employees, who helped me find the relevant materials for this master. Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Professor Kim Christian Priemel, who has guided me through the entire writing process from Autumn 2017. Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse, Oslo, 01.05.2019 3 Contents: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...………... 7 Chapter 1, Theory and background………………………………………………..………17 1.1 German Military Tactics…………………………………………………..………. 17 1.1.1 Blitzkrieg, Kesselschlacht and Schwerpunkt…………………………………..……. 17 1.1.2 Examples from early campaigns……………………………………………..……… 20 1.2 The German attack on the USSR (1941)……………………………..…………… 24 1.2.1 ‘Vernichtungskrieg’, war of annihilation………………………………...………….. 24 1.2.2 Operation Barbarossa………………………………………………..……………… 28 1.2.3 Operation Typhoon…………………………………………………..………………. 35 1.2.4 The strategic situation, December 1941…………………………….………………. -
Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East
Kiev 1941 In just four weeks in the summer of 1941 the German Wehrmacht wrought unprecedented destruction on four Soviet armies, conquering central Ukraine and killing or capturing three-quarters of a million men. This was the battle of Kiev – one of the largest and most decisive battles of World War II and, for Hitler and Stalin, a battle of crucial importance. For the first time, David Stahel charts the battle’s dramatic course and after- math, uncovering the irreplaceable losses suffered by Germany’s ‘panzer groups’ despite their battlefield gains, and the implications of these losses for the German war effort. He illuminates the inner workings of the German army as well as the experiences of ordinary soldiers, showing that with the Russian winter looming and Soviet resistance still unbroken, victory came at huge cost and confirmed the turning point in Germany’s war in the east. David Stahel is an independent researcher based in Berlin. His previous publications include Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009). Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 210.212.129.125 on Sat Dec 22 18:00:30 WET 2012. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139034449 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 Kiev 1941 Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East David Stahel Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 210.212.129.125 on Sat Dec 22 18:00:30 WET 2012. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139034449 Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012 cambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao˜ Paulo, Delhi, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 8ru,UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107014596 c David Stahel 2012 This publication is in copyright. -
The Third Winter
GAME SPECIFIC RULES The Third Winter ©2021 Multi-Man Publishing, LLC. All Rights Reserved. Updated 12 August 2021 late September 1943. By the campaign’s converted to Soviet gauge (ignore units Game Design: Antony Birkett end in late April 1944, four Axis armies being supplied by a Kessel HQ.) Development: Chip Saltsman will have faced four Soviet fronts in a titanic struggle. Several scenarios Design Note: By this point in the Series Design: Dean Essig supplement the main campaign, as the war, the Soviets had immense logistical Research Help: Stéphane Acquaviva, German army fights its “Third Winter” in activities that are not represented by units. Carl Fung, Hans Kishel, Roland LeBlanc Russia. 1.2a Off-Map Rail. Either player can use Mapping Research & Playtest their Rail Capacity to rail cargo off and Graphics: Hans Kishel back on any of their map-edges (as long as Graphics: Curtis Baer, Dean Essig the cargo does not cross the Black Sea). 1.0 General Special The only hexes that can be used for this Playtesting Honcho: Marcus Randall Rules purpose are those capable of normal rail Playtesting and Proofreading: Perry movement for that player. No ground unit Andrus, Stéphane Acquaviva, Curtis Baer, can ever end its movement off map. Daniel Broh-Kahn, Dave Barsness, Allen 1.1 Map & Terrain 1.2b Extra Detrainable Hexes. Point of Beach, John Bowen, Art Brochet, Eric Interest hexes on the map are detrainable. Brosius, Thomas Buettner, Malcolm There are four maps labeled A through D. Cameron, Stephen Campbell, Jeff Coyle, Hexes are identified by a map letter and Houndog Cross, Paolo De Francesco, number, e.g., hex B60.10 is a Kharkov city 1.3 Rumania Air Box Myk Deans, Mark Fazakarley, Mark hex. -
Stalingrad 1942 Pdf, Epub, Ebook
STALINGRAD 1942 PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Peter D. Antill,Peter Dennis | 96 pages | 19 Jun 2007 | Bloomsbury Publishing PLC | 9781846030284 | English | Oxford, England, United Kingdom Stalingrad 1942 PDF Book The Germans failed to achieve victory over the Soviet Union because of its vast manpower and industrial resources as well as its ability to force the Germans into fighting an attritional battle over a particular objective, first at Moscow and then at Stalingrad. The Second World War and its Aftermath. Namespaces Article Talk. Note: this reference still does not directly support the claim that there were 40, Hiwi. In the early parts of the operation, fuel was shipped at a higher priority than food and ammunition because of a belief that there would be a breakout from the city. The Red Army gradually adopted a strategy to hold for as long as possible all the ground in the city. Scholars have produced different estimates depending on their definition of the scope of the battle. Prelude Africa Asia Europe. Pen and Sword Books Ltd. Major battle of World War II. Retrieved 23 August Nobody knows exactly how many people died at Stalingrad. Fighting raged inside the Barrikady Factory until the end of October. Shirer, William L. Uranus Little Saturn Koltso. Sign In or Create an Account. Translated by Tony Le Tissier. Marines stormed the beaches of the strategically significant Japanese island of Saipan, with a goal of gaining a crucial air base from which the U. Pennington, Reina These forces had played a key role in manning quieter sections of the front and released German units to undertake offensive operations. -
The War Hitler Won: the Battle for Europe, 1939-1941
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies The War Hitler Won: The Battle for Europe, 1939-1941 Robert Citino "A Distinctive Language": The German Operational Pattern In the fall of 1939, the German army (Wehrmacht) began a run of decisive victories that was quite unlike anything in living military memory. With their fearsome tank (Panzer) formations operating as an apparently irresistible spearhead, and with a powerful air force (Luftwaffe) circling overhead, the Wehrmacht ran through or around every defensive position thrown in its path. The opening campaign in Poland (Case White) smashed the Polish army in 18 days, although a bit more fighting was necessary to reduce the capital, Warsaw.1 Equally 1 For Case White, begin with the belated "official history" commissioned by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Das Deutsche Reich und Der Zweite Weltkrieg, volume 2, Die Errichtung der hegemonie auf dem Europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), especially "Hitler's Erster 'Blitzkrieg' und seine Auswirkungen auf Nordosteuropa," pp. 79-156. Labeling this "official history" is misleading--it is far more a meticulously researched critical history by a team of crack scholars. Robert M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland, 1939, Department of the Army Pamphlet no. 20-255 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1956) continues to dominate the field, and Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945 (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough House, 1978), pp. 169-176, is still useful. Both Pat McTaggart, "Poland '39," Command 17 (July-August 1992), p. 57, and David T. Zabecki, "Invasion of Poland: Campaign that Launched a War," World War II 14, no. -
Die Entsatzschlacht Bei Stalingrad 1942
Diplomarbeit Titel der Diplomarbeit „Ein ‚Wintergewitter‘ ohne ‚Donnerschlag‘“ Die Entsatzschlacht bei Stalingrad 1942 – Ein Unternehmen mit Aussicht auf Erfolg? UND Prüfung von Feldpostquellen aus Stalingrad für den Einsatz in der neuen kompetenzorientierten Reifeprüfung Verfasser Dominik Ender angestrebter akademischer Grad Magister der Philosophie aus der Studienrichtung Geschichte, Sozialkunde/Politische Bildung (Mag. phil.) Innsbruck, 2014 Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: C 190 313 344 Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Unterrichtsfach Geschichte, Sozialkunde/Politische Bildung Unterrichtsfach Englisch Betreuer: Ao. Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Thomas Albrich BArch, Bild 101I-090-3914-29 A Eigene Darstellung 2 „Wir hatten Wind gesät, jetzt mußten wir Sturm ernten.“1 [Joachim Wieder, Offizier in Stalingrad] 1 Joachim Wieder/Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Stalingrad und die Verantwortung des Soldaten, München 19932, S. 141. 3 Inhaltsverzeichnis Teil I Einleitung …………………………………………………………………………………….. 7 1. Der Beginn von „Barbarossa“ ……………………………………………………………... 8 1.1 Angriff ohne Kriegserklärung …………………………………………………..... 9 1.2 Vernichtungskrieg im „Operationsgebiet“ ………………………………………. 10 2. Stationen des deutschen Vormarsches 1941-42 ………………………………………….. 13 2.1 „Führer befiehl, wir folgen dir!“ ………………………………………………... 15 2.2 Der Vorstoß nach Smolensk …………………………………………………….. 16 2.3 Weisung Nr. 33 und 34 ………………………………………………………….. 18 2.3.1 Die Eroberung der Ukraine …………………………………………… 20 2.3.2 Der Marsch auf Leningrad …………………………………………….. 22 2.3.3 900 Tage Belagerung ………………………………………………….. 23 2.3.4 Der Weg nach Moskau ………………………………………………… 24 2.3.5 Die Niederlage im Winter 1941 ……………………………………….. 25 2.3.6 Der Kessel von Demjansk …………………………………………….. 29 2.3.7 Der Status Quo an der Ostfront ……………………………………….. 30 2.4 Der „Fall Blau“ …………………………………………………………………. 31 2.4.1 Von Charkow bis Woronesch ………………………………………….. 32 2.4.2 „Mit der einen Faust nach Stalingrad, mit der anderen nach‘m Kaukasus“ …………………………………………………………….. -
Barbarossa Revisited: a Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941)
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications 1982-03 Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941) Stolfi, Russel H.S. Journal of Modern History, Volume 54, (March 1982), pp. 027-046 http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44218 Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941) Russel H. S. Stolfi Naval Postgraduate School In the Soviet Union in 1941, a complex, ill-understood play of events projected the German field armies in the east close to Moscow in the late autumn of the year, but ended with their ultimate defeat. The reigning Soviet interpretation of the campaign remains the one in which the natural strengths of the Russian motherland and the inspired leadership of the Communists predetermined a Soviet Russian triumph over the invading Germans. Western historians and writers also gener ally agree that Hitler subjected himself and the Germans to inevitable defeat by the invasion of the Soviet Union. However, critical reapprais al of the opening stages of the Russo-German campaign fails to sup port the present Soviet and western views of the war, showing rather that the German successes of the first four weeks virtually assured the seizure of Moscow-the rail, road, political, psychological, and demo graphic plexus of the USSR-in the late summer of 1941. -
Das Steinlager Allendorf
Das Steinlager Allendorf Zur Geschichte der Kriegsgefangenenlager deutscher Generäle nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg von Chern Chen Der Beginn der Entwicklung des Städtchens Allendorf in Oberhessen, das bis zum Ende der 1930er-Jahre eine kleinbäuerlich geprägte Landgemeinde mit etwa 1500 Einwohnern war, zur heutigen Stadt geht einher mit dem Baubeginn der zwei größten Sprengstofffabriken Deutschlands im Jahr 1938. Von den beiden Rüstungsfirmen, der Westfälisch-Anhaltischen Sprengstoff-Actien-Gesellschaft (WASAG) und der Dynamit Nobel AG (DAG), wurde in Allendorf während des Krieges unter großer Geheimhaltung Sprengstoff produziert und vor Ort in Bomben und Granaten verfüllt.1 Die Entscheidung für den Bau der Munitions- fabriken in Allendorf als Rüstungsmetropole markiert die wichtigste Zäsur in der neuesten Geschichte der Stadt. Aus der agrarwirtschaftlich orientierten katholischen Landgemeinde wurde ein Schwerpunkt für die Versorgung der deutschen Streitkräfte mit Sprengstoff. Die massive Aufrüstung durch die Nationalsozialisten und die Schaffung weiterer Pro- duktionskapazitäten für Rüstungsgüter ließen in Allendorf Dutzende von Lagern und Sied- lungen entstehen. Wenn im Zusammenhang mit dem Bau und dem Betrieb der Sprengstoff- werke in Allendorf der Begriff »Lager« verwendet wird, können damit sehr unterschiedliche Unterbringungsmöglichkeiten gemeint sein.2 Während des Krieges hat das »Steinlager« als Lager für die Unterbringung von ausländischen Zivilarbeitern und von Kriegsgefangenen keine große Rolle gespielt. Bei den 40 massiven Wohnhäusern mit zentralen Wirtschafts- gebäuden handelte es sich hauptsächlich um Unterkünfte für deutsche Angestellte und Arbeiter der DAG-Werke.3 Nach dem Krieg wurde das Lager von den Amerikanern zuerst für humanitäre Zwecke der Vereinten Nationen in Anspruch genommen und dann in ein Kriegsgefangenenlager umgewandelt, in dem mehrere hundert deutsche Generäle und Ge- neralstabsoffiziere interniert wurden. -
III. Die Kriegsgeschichtliche Kooperation Im Spannungsfeld Des Kalten Krieges
III. Die kriegsgeschichtliche Kooperation im Spannungsfeld des Kalten Krieges Nachdem bislang die Entstehung und Entwicklung der kriegsgeschichtlichen Ko- operation weitestgehend chronologisch dargestellt wurde, soll im Folgenden auf drei Aspekte der Zusammenarbeit vertiefend eingegangen werden: den Umgang der Historical Division mit Kriegsverbrechern; die Verbreitung und Verwendung der deutschen Studien innerhalb der U.S. Armee; und die Bedeutung der kriegs- geschichtlichen Kooperation für die geschichtspolitischen Aktivitäten der ehema- ligen Wehrmachtselite. Dass sich die amerikanischen Offiziere der Historical Division kaum dafür inter- essierten, ob und in welchem Umfang die für sie tätigen Deutschen während des Zweiten Weltkrieges für Kriegsverbrechen und Völkermord verantwortlich waren, wurde bereits angedeutet. Im ersten der folgenden Kapitel soll diese Frage nach dem Umgang der Historical Division mit mutmaßlichen, aber auch verurteilten Kriegsverbrechern näher betrachtet werden. Dabei geht es zum einen um das Ver- hältnis der Historical Division zu den amerikanischen Strafverfolgungsbehörden in Nürnberg, insbesondere dem Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes. An ver- schiedenen Beispielen soll hier aufgezeigt werden, wie die Historical Division ganz konkret versuchte, deutsche Offiziere vor Strafverfolgung zu schützen, und wie sie sich im Falle einer Anklage für die Berücksichtigung mildernder Umstände einsetz- te. Zum anderen wird die Entnazifizierung der ehemaligen deutschen Offiziere nä- her betrachtet. Schließlich wird dargestellt werden, wie verurteilte Kriegsverbrecher wie Albert Kesselring, Walter Warlimont und andere von ihren Gefängnissen in Werl und Landsberg aus weiter an der kriegsgeschichtlichen Kooperation beteiligt waren und wie die Historical Division sich für ihre vorzeitige Entlassung einsetzte. Im zweiten Kapitel dieses Teils wird der Frage nach der Verbreitung und Ver- wendung der kriegsgeschichtlichen Studien innerhalb der U.S. -
The Battle of Stalingrad
The Battle of Stalingrad: The Turning Point on the Eastern Front in WWII F. Courtney Lockwood Senior Thesis 1 Contents List of Maps 3 Introduction: Setting The Stage 5 The Battle Part 1: September-November 1942 13 The Battle Part 2: November 1942-late January 1943 21 Surrender and the March into Captivity 42 National Myth: Propaganda, Vergeltung, Total War 50 The Shockwave of Stalingrad: Psychological Shift, German Morale, Shortcomings of German High Command 60 Conclusion: Russian Agency and the Legacy of Stalingrad 74 2 List of Maps German Invasion of Soviet Union 1941-1942 4 Operation Blau 9 German Advance on Stalingrad, Autumn 1942 14 Operation Uranus 21 Manstein’s Breakout Attempt/Operation Winter Storm 31 Operation Ring 38 3 ‘German Invasion of Soviet Union 1941-1942’ Source: after map in Showalter, D. (2009) Hitler’s Panzers, p. 2 4 Introduction: Setting the Stage The rise and fall of the Third Reich continues to fascinate and confuse historians today. In particular the war against Russia not only was a monumental undertaking for the Nazi State in terms of economic and military resources, but also the invasion included an inherent all or nothing attitude for the future of National Socialism. Russia tempted Germany with land, natural resources, and possibly an end to Bolshevism and Judaism. Southern Russia looked particularly ripe for Hitler as he focused on gaining control of the lucrative grain and oilfields in the Caucuses. A total victory in Russia also spelled out the demise of the Jews and Communists, as Hitler believed Judaism and Bolshevism were intertwined and the extermination of both would allow the Aryan race and ethnic Germans to assert their supremacy. -
Stalingrad Pocket
STALINGRAD POCKET THE ADVANCE TO STALINGRAD AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SIXTH ARMY II FOREWORD I first read about the battle of Stalingrad in a Reader's Digest edition when I was maybe 16. Excerpts from the book, Last Letters from Stalingrad, appeared at various parts of the narrative, exemplifying the best human reaction to courage, duty, betrayal and oblivion. But my interest waned over time and became sporadic. It returned after watching Enemy at the Gates (1998) despite the movie's sappy and contrived plot, and 1993's Stalingrad, an emasculating product of the German movie industry. The story is simple enough: crushing defeat for one side and grudging victory for the other. But this general impression misses the finer picture. The real battle contained such a tale of endeavor and inevitability that it makes celluloid grandiosity redundant in the face of genuine human ordeal. I first started on this monograph in 2004, just before going off to college. The bulk of the manuscript was written then, complete with three or four maps, all of them in my opinion, detailed works of art — but maybe that is an exaggeration. Unfortunately, after I left, a hard drive crash wiped out all the information, leaving me with a draft version of the manuscript. This document represents the completion of what I had begun all those years ago. I am not entirely satisfied with my replacement maps but the bright spot is that I have had the benefit of new information and previously untapped sources. My intention is that the reading of this material leave you with the same visceral impact that I felt after reading about the battle all those years ago.