The Impact of Authoritarian Systems on the Rise of Transnational Islamist Movements

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Impact of Authoritarian Systems on the Rise of Transnational Islamist Movements The American University in Cairo School of Humanities and Social Sciences The Impact of Authoritarian Systems on the Rise of Transnational Islamist Movements: Egypt, Saudi Arabia & the Path to Al Qaeda A Thesis submitted to the Political Science Department in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN Political Science By Réhab El-Bakry Dr. Maye Kassem, Adviser May 2010 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO THE IMPACT OF AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEMS ON THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: EGYPT, SAUDIA ARABIA AND THE PATH TO AL QAEDA A THESIS SUBMITTED BY: REHAB EL-BAKRY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MAY/2010 IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY Dr. Maye Kassem Thesis Committee Advisor-------------------------------------------------------------------- Affiliation---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Dan Tschirgi) Thesis Committee Reader ------------------------------------------------------------------- Affiliation---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Holger Albrecht Thesis Committee Reader -------------------------------------------------------------------- Affiliation---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- -------------- -------------------- -------------- Department Chair Date Dean of HUSS Date 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work has been a long time in the making. Throughout this time I have been blessed with the help and support of so many people who enriched my life with their encouragement. They always believed in my ability to finish this. I feel very fortunate to have come up with such an interesting area of study that helped me better understand the nature of human beings, including myself. This work was born out of the true desire to understand those who misrepresent my faith. More importantly, my desire to find ways to combat them without the use of violence. Despite what I found out in the course of my study, I am still a firm believer in the goodness of people and that good will prevail. I would first like to thank God for helping me get through this. I hope I have learned the lessons I was supposed to learn in His plan for me – I am not invincible, I make bad decisions and can fall off the path be that in my education or in life. I would like to thank all my professors at the University of King‟s College and Dalhousie University in Canada who have nurtured my inquisitiveness and gave me the tools to channel it to do good for others. I would like to thank my professors at The American University in Cairo, who have taught me everything I know about this area and pushed me to ask questions until I find the answers. Dr. Maye Kassem, my advisor and mentor, who had faith in my abilities as a student, but more importantly as a person, than I ever thought I deserved. I would also like to thank my family. Mom and Dad (Mona & Hussein) you gave me the tools to be a good journalist, a good thinker but most importantly, a good human being. Rania, my only sister, thank you for the patience you had as I spent years talking about this thesis while taking forever to write it. And thank you for reading it over and over again. You three anchored me through it all. Your love and support is the most important thing I have. My grandparents, I love you and wished you were here with me right now. I hope you are proud. Hedi, my best friend, you are truly a treasure and I am lucky to have you. Last but not least, thanks to all my friends who stressed over this as much as I did, the Second Cup gang and the staff of Second Cup (Mohandeseen) for taking care of me with endless cups of coffee. Thank you all so very much….. 3 ABSTRACT The events of September 11, 2001 have had a profound impact on the world we live in today. Not only have they changed the perception of rights and freedoms in both the developed and developing worlds, but these events brought violent political Islamist movements from the fringes of international politics to the forefront of world politics. Suddenly movements that were once seen as an issue for the Muslim world became a concern for countries worldwide as they struggled to understand the causes behind the rise of Islamist violence and figure out ways to address it. By and large, Islamist movements, violent and non-violent, find roots in the Arab world. The authoritarian nature of these systems, which prioritizes stability of the system and the ability of regimes to remain in power over inclusion of the public and various opposition groups, have often dealt with these movements through attempts of cooption into the system or isolation, which ranges from preventing them from participating in the legitimate system to full repression through incarceration and torture. It is largely due to isolation by these systems that many Islamist movements have not only turned to violence but adopted transnational modes of operation whereby a movement based in one country will carry out violent activities in a second to bring about change in a third. This study trances the dealings of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian governments with their respective Islamist movements with particular emphasis on tactics of cooption and isolation adopted by these governments. It also argues that these tactics played a fundamental role in driving these movements to alter their mode of operation from limiting their activities within the confines of the political system of individual countries to adopting global jihad against the states that help maintain these authoritarian systems in place. The end result Al Qaeda is hoping to achieve is the recreation of the Islamic Ummah, through the declaration of global jihad. Based on the study, a series of actions are recommended for several players including political analysts, the media, and political players both on the international and regional levels. These actions include the need for expanding authoritarian political theory to allow for the analysis of these new movements and to predict their future activities. Efforts need to be made to distinguish between Islam as a religion and political movements derived from it. There is also a need for limiting the demonization of Islam by the media in order to reduce the feeling that the religion is under attack, which would reduce the attraction of radical ideologies to young Muslims. 4 Table of Content: Chapter 1: Introduction & Theoretical Framework ------------------------------------ Page 6 1.1 Theoretical Framework of the Study ------------------------------------------------ Page 10 1.2 Authoritarian Theory-------------------------------------------------------------------Page 16 Chapter 2: Egypt &Islamist Movements -------------------------------------------------- Page 28 2.1 The Roots of Contemporary Islamist Political Ideology --------------------------Page 29 2.2 Islamist Movements & the Nasser Government ------------------------------------Page 36 2.3 Islamist Movements & the Sadat Government --------------------------------------Page 44 2.4 Islamist Movements & the Mubarak Government ----------------------------------Page 58 2.4.1 Period from 1981 to 1990 -------------------------------------------------------Page 58 2.4.2 Period from 1990 to 2000 -------------------------------------------------------Page 68 2.4.3 Period from 2000 to Present ----------------------------------------------------Page 81 2.4.4 The Impact of 9/11----------------------------------------------------------------Page 84 Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia & Islamist Movements -----------------------------------------Page 90 3.1 Saudi Arabia & the Rise of Wahhabi Islam------------------------------------------ Page 91 3.2 The Modern Saudi State & Islamism ------------------------------------------------- Page 102 3.3 The Saudi Government & the Rise of Al Qaeda -------------------------------------Page 111 Chapter 4: The Making of Al Qaeda ------------------------------------------------------- Page 126 4.1 Afghanistan: The first Meeting Ground---------------------------------------------- Page 127 4.2 Moving to Sudan: Laying the Foundation------------------------------------------- Page 136 4.3 Afghanistan: The Promised Land of Jihad-------------------------------------------Page 143 4.4 The Aftermath of 9/11 ------------------------------------------------------------------Page 151 Chapter 5: Conclusion -------------------------------------------------------------------------Page 155 Bibliography --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Page 173 5 1. INTRODUCTION & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK For much of the past decade, the international community has been preoccupied with trying to address the issue of violent Islamist movements. Although these movements have existed for much of the twentieth century, the rise of Al Qaeda as the first transnational Islamist movements that declared global jihad on the Western world as well as countries of the Islamic world marked a shift in the mode of operation for these movements. Previously characterized as domestic movements of the Arab and Muslim worlds seeking to bring about regime changes either through the use of the legitimate political system or through the use of violence, the drastic shift adopted by these movements propelled them to the top of the list of issues that need to be dealt with in a global setting. Suddenly these movements
Recommended publications
  • Full Bibliography (From Sheikhs to Sultanism)
    FULL BIBLIOGRAPHY (FROM SHEIKHS TO SULTANISM) Academic sources (books, chapters, and journal articles) P. Aarts and C. Roelants, Saudi Arabia: A Kingdom in Peril (London: Hurst & Co., 2015) A. Abdulla, The Gulf Moment in Contemporary Arab History (Beirut: Dar Al-Farabi, 2018) [in Arabic] I. Abed and P. Hellyer (eds.), United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective (Dubai: Trident, 2001) P. Abel and S. Horák, ‘A tale of two presidents: personality cult and symbolic nation-building in Turkmenistan’ in Nationalities Papers, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2015 A. Abrahams and A. Leber, ‘Framing a murder: Twitter influencers and the Jamal Khashoggi incident' in Mediterranean Politics [April 2020 online first view] D. Acemoglu, T. Verdier, and J. Robinson, ‘Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule’ in Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 2, Nos. 2-3, 2004 G. Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (London: Saqi, 2013) A. Adib-Moghaddam (ed.), A Critical Introduction to Khomeini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) I. Ahyat, ‘Politics and Economy of Banjarmasin Sultanate in the Period of Expansion of the Netherlands East Indies Government in Indonesia, 1826-1860’ in Tawarikh: International Journal for Historical Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012 A. Al-Affendi, ‘A Trans-Islamic Revolution?’, Critical Muslim, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012 M. Al-Atawneh, ‘Is Saudi Arabia a Theocracy? Religion and Governance in Contemporary Saudi Arabia’ in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, 2009 H. Albrecht and O. Schlumberger, ‘Waiting for Godot: Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle East’ in International Political Science Review, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
    Case: 11-3490 Document: 145 Page: 1 04/16/2013 908530 32 11-3294-cv(L), et al. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Asat Trust Reg., et al.) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2012 (Argued On: December 4, 2012 Decided: April 16, 2013) Docket Nos. 11-3294-cv(L), 11-3407-cv, 11-3490-cv, 11-3494-cv, 11-3495-cv, 11-3496-cv, 11-3500-cv, 11-3501- cv, 11-3502-cv, 11-3503-cv, 11-3505-cv, 11-3506-cv, 11-3507-cv, 11-3508-cv, 11-3509-cv, 11-3510- cv, 11-3511-cv, 12-949-cv, 12-1457-cv, 12-1458-cv, 12-1459-cv. _______________________________________________________________ IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (ASAT TRUST REG., et al.) JOHN PATRICK O’NEILL, JR., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASAT TRUST REG., AL SHAMAL ISLAMIC BANK, also known as SHAMEL BANK also known as BANK EL SHAMAR, SCHREIBER & ZINDEL, FRANK ZINDEL, ENGELBERT SCHREIBER, SR., ENGELBERT SCHREIBER, JR., MARTIN WATCHER, ERWIN WATCHER, SERCOR TREUHAND ANSTALT, YASSIN ABDULLAH AL KADI, KHALED BIN MAHFOUZ, NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK, FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK, SULAIMAN AL-ALI, AQEEL AL-AQEEL, SOLIMAN H.S. AL-BUTHE, ABDULLAH BIN LADEN, ABDULRAHMAN BIN MAHFOUZ, SULAIMAN BIN ABDUL AZIZ AL RAJHI, SALEH ABDUL AZIZ AL RAJHI, ABDULLAH SALAIMAN AL RAJHI, ABDULLAH OMAR NASEEF, TADAMON ISLAMIC BANK, ABDULLAH MUHSEN AL TURKI, ADNAN BASHA, MOHAMAD JAMAL KHALIFA, BAKR M. BIN LADEN, TAREK M. BIN LADEN, OMAR M. BIN LADEN, DALLAH AVCO TRANS ARABIA CO. LTD., DMI ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES S.A., ABDULLAH BIN SALEH AL OBAID, ABDUL RAHMAN AL SWAILEM, SALEH AL-HUSSAYEN, YESLAM M.
    [Show full text]
  • United States District Court Southern District of New York
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 03 MDL 1570 (RCC) In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 ECF Case RICO STATEMENT applicable to SAUDI BIN LADEN GROUP, ABDULLAH BIN LADEN, BAKR BIN LADEN, TAREK BIN LADEN, OMAR BIN LADEN AND THE MOHAMMED BIN LADEN ORGANIZATION This document relates to: Federal Insurance Co. v. al Qaida 03 CV 06978 (RCC) RICO STATEMENT APPLICABLE TO SAUDI BIN LADEN GROUP, ABDULLAH BIN LADEN, BAKR BIN LADEN, TAREK BIN LADEN, OMAR BIN LADEN AND THE MOHAMMED BIN LADEN ORGANIZATION Based on information currently available, and pursuant to the Case Management Order dated June 15, 2004, plaintiffs submit this RICO statement for defendants Saudi Bin Laden Group, Abdullah bin Laden, Bakr bin Laden, Tarek bin Laden, Omar bin Laden and the Mohammed Bin Laden Organization. Given the vastly complicated nature of the conspiracy and other wrongdoing that led to the events of September 11, 2001, much information is presently unavailable to plaintiffs, absent discovery. Plaintiffs therefore reserve the right to amend this RICO statement as information is learned and verified and after discovery is obtained. 1. The unlawful conduct is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (c) and/or (d). 2. The names of the defendants to whom this RICO statement pertains are Saudi Bin Laden Group, Abdullah bin Laden, Bakr bin Laden, Tarek bin Laden, Omar bin Laden and the Mohammed Bin Laden Organization. The alleged misconduct and basis for liability is set forth in Exhibit “A”. 3. Not applicable. All known wrongdoers are named as defendants in this action.
    [Show full text]
  • P13:Layout 1
    Friday 13 International Friday, September 28, 2018 Bin Laden business grew from humble beginnings Family came under scrutiny at home and abroad after 9/11 JEDDAH: In Saudi Arabia, the Bin Ladens are known as the went on a spending spree. Saudi Binladin Group snared contracts Kennedys of Jeddah for their wealth and tragedies. They built to manage construction of new projects worth tens of billions of Saudi Arabia’s roads, mosques and palaces. Family patriarch Mo- dollars, including a Riyadh financial district, a new airport in Jed- hammed died in a plane crash, as did the son who succeeded him. dah and an economic city on the Red Sea coast meant to house 2 Younger son Osama plotted the 9/11 attacks on the United States. million people. New deal allows Mohammed arrived in Saudi Arabia from Yemen during the The company handled the kingdom’s most sensitive projects, 1920s as an impoverished teenager, blind in one eye. He sought including expansions of the two holy mosques in Mecca and Israel natural gas his fortune amongst the pilgrims and hustlers of the Red Sea port Medina. For such deals, senior Bin Laden brothers, often Bakr, of Jeddah. After founding a small construction firm in 1931, he won Saleh and Saad, held negotiations directly with King Abdullah and exports to Egypt the favor of then King Abdulaziz by completing a palace for him a special unit within government the monarch created for them, within 20 days, according to a biography by former Saudi Binladin according to one Jeddah businessman who has known the family JERUSALEM: A US-Israeli consortium leading the development Group executive Khalaf Al Sibea.
    [Show full text]
  • AL QAIDA's SPONSORS and PARTNERS in the BUSINESS COMMUNITY 376. Al Qaida Has Established Numerous For-Profit Businesses Throug
    AL QAIDA’S SPONSORS AND PARTNERS IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY 376. Al Qaida has established numerous for-profit businesses throughout the world, to augment the funding it receives from its State sponsors, wealthy donors and the charities and banks operating within its infrastructure. 377. Like al Qaida’s charity and banking partners, these businesses operate as fully integrated components of al Qaida’s financial and logistical infrastructure. 378. While in Sudan, Osama bin Laden established numerous businesses to provide income for al Qaida’s operations. These business ventures included: Wadi al- Aqiq Company, Ltd, a holding firm; Ladin International Company, an import/export concern; Taba Investment Company, Ltd., a currency trading firm; al-Hijrah for Construction and Development, a construction enterprise which performed several significant infrastructure projects on behalf of the ruling National Islamic Front; and the Themar al Mubaraka Company, an agricultural concern. 379. Among the projects bin Laden’s al-Hijrah Construction firm performed for the Sudanese Government were the construction of the Tahaddi Road linking Khartoum with Port Sudan, and the construction of a modern international airport near Port Sudan. 380. Osama bin Laden’s al-Hijrah Construction firm received significant support in relation to the projects it performed in Sudan from the Saudi Binladin Group, a Saudi Arabia conglomerate established by bin Laden’s father, Mohamed bin Laden, and owned to this date by members of the bin Laden family, including Osama bin Laden. 381. Saudi Binladin Group is run by Osama bin Laden’s brother, Bakr bin Laden, and the board of directors includes Saleh Gazaz, Mohammed Baharuth, Abdullah bin Said, Mohammed Nur Rahimi, Tarek bin Laden, and Omar bin Laden.
    [Show full text]
  • 500 Most Influential Muslims of 2009
    THE 500 MOST INFLUENTIAL MUSLIMS = 2009 first edition - 2009 THE 500 MOST INFLUENTIAL MUSLIMS IN THE WORLD = 2009 first edition (1M) - 2009 Chief Editors Prof John Esposito and Prof Ibrahim Kalin Edited and Prepared by Ed Marques, Usra Ghazi Designed by Salam Almoghraby Consultants Dr Hamza Abed al Karim Hammad, Siti Sarah Muwahidah With thanks to Omar Edaibat, Usma Farman, Dalal Hisham Jebril, Hamza Jilani, Szonja Ludvig, Adel Rayan, Mohammad Husni Naghawi and Mosaic Network, UK. all photos copyright of reuters except where stated All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner without the prior consent of the publisher. © the royal islamic strategic studies centre, 2009 أ �� ة � � ن ة � �ش� ة الم�م��لك�� ا �ل� ر د ��ة�� ا ل�ها �مة�� ة � � � أ ة � ة ة � � ن ة �� ا �ل� ���د ا �ل�د �ى د ا � � ال�مك� �� ا �ل� ل�ط� �� ر م أ ة ع ر ن و ة (2009/9/4068) ة � � ن � � � ة �ة ن ن ة � ن ن � � ّ ن � ن ن ة�����ح�م� ال�م�أ ��ل� كل� �م� ال�م��س�أ � ���� ا ��لها �ل� ���� �ع ن م�حة� � �م�ط��ه�� � �ل� ���ه�� �ه�� ا ال�م�ط��� �ل و أ �ل و وة وة � أ أوى و ة نأر ن � أ ة ���ة ة � � ن ة � ة � ة ن � . �ع� ر ا �ةى د ا �ر � الم ك��ن �� ا �ل�و ل�ط�ة�� ا �و ا �ةى ن��ه�� �ح �ل�و�مة�� ا �ر�ى ISBN 978-9957-428-37-2 املركز امللكي للبحوث والدراسات اﻹسﻻمية )مبدأ( the royal islamic strategic studies centre The Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding Edmund A.
    [Show full text]
  • Case 1:17-Cv-02651-UA Document 1 Filed 04/12/17 Page 1 of 157
    Case 1:17-cv-02651-UA Document 1 Filed 04/12/17 Page 1 of 157 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X THE CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, FIRST FLORIDIAN AUTO AND HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. THE PREMIER INSURANCE COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS, _____________ THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, FARMINGTON CASUALTY COMPANY, FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPLAINT INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS, INC., FIDELITY AND GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY, UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICES, LLC, ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE JURY TRIAL COMPANY, ST. PAUL PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, DEMANDED ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, ST. PAUL GUARDIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS This Action INDEMNITY COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY Relates to: COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, TRAVELERS PROPERTY In re: Terrorist CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA, TRAVELERS CASUALTY Attacks on AND SURETY COMPANY, TRAVELERS LLOYDS OF TEXAS September 11, INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVELERS PERSONAL INSURANCE 2001 COMPANY, TRAVELERS PERSONAL SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVCO INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, TRAVELERS (03-MD-1570- CASUALTY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, and TRAVELERS GBD-SN) CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs, v. AL RAJHI BANK, NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK, SAUDI
    [Show full text]
  • FAB Morning News Summary
    FAB morning news summary Global News • US producer prices fall for first time in nearly 1½ years; jobless claims up for fourth straight week: US producer prices fell for the first time in nearly 1-1/2 years in December amid declining costs for services, which could temper expectations that inflation will accelerate in 2018. The Labor Department said its producer price index for final demand slipped 0.1% last month. That was the first drop in the PPI since August 2016 and followed two straight monthly increases of 0.4%. In the 12 months through December, the PPI rose 2.6% after accelerating 3.1% in November. Economists polled by Reuters had forecast the PPI rising 0.2% last month and increasing 3.0% from a year ago. A key gauge of underlying producer price pressures that excludes food, energy and trade services edged up 0.1% last month. The so-called core PPI increased 0.4% in November. It rose 2.3% in the 12 months through December after increasing 2.4% in November. Weak wholesale prices could stoke fears that the causes of weak inflation will become more persistent and prompt the Federal Reserve to be more cautious about raising interest rates this year. The PPI data came on the heels of a report on Wednesday showing a sharp moderation in import prices in December. In a second report on Thursday, the Labor Department said initial claims for state unemployment benefits increased 11,000 to a seasonally adjusted 261,000 for the week ended Jan. 6, the highest level since late September.
    [Show full text]
  • The "Golden Chain" Or a List Purported Sponsors of Al Qaeda That Was
    The "Golden Chain" or a list purported sponsors of al Qaeda that was seized in March of 2002 raid by Bosnian police authorities of the premises of the Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo. The list includes at least 20 top Saudi and Gulf State financial sponsors including bankers, businessmen, and former ministers. Part of the list included computer file titles "Tarekh Osama" or "Osama History", but the appellation "Golden Chain" itself is due to al Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, who vouched for its authenticity; the FBI later also pronounced the document as genuine. Most accounts are vague on what year the Golden Chain document was written; some say 1988. but US government counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke says it dates from 1989. The "Golden Chain" was presented by the United States Government case USA v. Arnaout filed on January 29, 2003 and in other legal filings, which would cause its veracity and meaning to be brought under further scrutiny. The Rest @ Wikipedia From a recent post at the Shimron Letters: While the Golden Chain List been set aside in several court cases where it has been used as evidence of al Qaeda connections, even as last as 2006, this does not mean that the names and companies found on the list are not of interest in on going investigations into al Qaeda funding.-Shimron Issachar Shimron goes on to quote an article from Free Press, but a distillation of the company and people names follow: Saleh Abdullah Kamel. Confirmation that the Bin Laden family has been a major contributor to Usama, despite its statements denying such support Involvement of bankers representing the three largest Saudi banks (National Commercial Bank, Riyad Bank, Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp) Involvement of former oil ministers Sheikh Yamani and Taher-Involvement of most of them in charity organizations as founders or board members AL QAIDA DONORSSULEIMAN AL-RASHIDAl-Rashid Trading & Contracting (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) ABDEL QADER BAKRI (ABDULKADER [AL] BAKRI)CEO, Bakri Group of CosCEO, Al Bakri International Power Co.
    [Show full text]
  • Osama Bin Laden
    OSAMA BIN LADEN Recent Titles in Greenwood Biographies Beyonce Knowles: A Biography Janice Arenofsky Jerry Garcia: A Biography Jacqueline Edmondson Coretta Scott King: A Biography Laura T. McCarty Kanye West: A Biography Bob Schaller Peyton Manning: A Biography Lew Freedman Miley Cyrus: A Biography Kimberly Dillon Summers Ted Turner: A Biography Michael O’Connor W.E.B. Du Bois: A Biography Gerald Horne George Clooney: A Biography Joni Hirsch Blackman Will Smith: A Biography Lisa M. Iannucci Toni Morrison: A Biography Stephanie S. Li Halle Berry: A Biography Melissa Ewey Johnson OSAMA BIN LADEN A Biography Thomas R. Mockaitis GREENWOOD BIOGRAPHIES Copyright © 2010 by Thomas R. Mockaitis All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mockaitis, Thomas R., 1955– Osama bin Laden : a biography / Thomas R. Mockaitis. p. cm. — (Greenwood biographies) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-35374-1 (print : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-313-35375-8 (ebook) 1. Bin Laden, Osama, 1957—Juvenile literature. 2. Terrorists — Saudi Arabia—Biography—Juvenile literature. I. Title. HV6430.B55M63 2010 958.104'6092—dc22 2009043355 [B] ISBN: 978-0-313-35374-1 EISBN: 978-0-313-35375-8 14 13 12 11 10 1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook.
    [Show full text]
  • Arabian Gulf Financial Sponsorship of Al-Qaeda
    Testimony of Matthew Epstein with Evan Kohlmann Before the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations "Progress Since 9/11: The Effectiveness of U.S. Anti-Terrorist Financing Efforts” Arabian Gulf Financial Sponsorship of Al-Qaida via U.S.-Based Banks, Corporations and Charities March 11, 2003 Matthew Epstein & Evan Kohlmann Senior Terrorism Analysts The Investigative Project INTRODUCTION The roots of the modern Al-Qaida financial network can be directly traced to lessons learned during the early days of the Soviet-Afghan jihad. As the 1980s drew to a close, thousands of idealistic Islamic fundamentalist volunteers arrived in Central Asia, often with no local guide or requisite accommodations. At the time, several wealthy Arabian Gulf charitable organizations, under the guise of aiding Afghan and Pakistani refugees, stepped forward to help channel the jihadi recruits where they were most needed. These wealthy NGOs, sponsored by a number of prominent Gulf businessmen, provided weapons, guesthouses, and travel papers to needy members of the quickly-coalescing Al-Qaida movement. Medical ambulances belonging to the Saudi Red Crescent and other fundamentalist-run relief groups were even diverted to bring Arab fighters back and forth from combat operations.1 By clothing their militant activity with charitable ideals, Arab-Afghan leaders discovered that they were able to slip below the radar of many international intelligence agencies. Likewise, a well-informed Saudi figure boasted to the Washington Post, “No one can control the flow of money from Saudi Arabia… It is not one person—it is a thousand. We are here. Money comes to us from inside Saudi Arabia.
    [Show full text]
  • United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    Case 3:11-cv-00202-KRG Document 1 Filed 09/08/11 Page 1 of 154 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA THE UNDERWRITING MEMBERS OF CIVIL ACTION NO.: LLOYD’S SYNDICATE 3500 COMPLAINT Plaintiff, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED v. THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE SAUDI HIGH COMMISSION FOR RELIEF OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, SAUDI JOINT RELIEF COMMITTEE FOR KOSOVO AND CHECHNYA, SAUDI RED CRESCENT SOCIETY, NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK, AL RAJHI BANKING AND INVESTMENT COMPANY, PRINCE SALMAN BIN ABDUL AZIZ AL SAUD, SULEIMAN ABDEL AZIZ AL RAJHI, YASSIN AL QADI Defendants. THE PARTIES 1. Plaintiff Underwriting Members of Lloyd’s Syndicate 3500, in its own right and as successor in interest to Lloyd’s Syndicate 271, is a United Kingdom based insurance syndicate with a principal place of business located at 161-163 Preston Road, Brighton, England. 2. Defendant Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a foreign state within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1603(a). Saudi Arabia maintains an Embassy within the United States at 601 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. 3. Defendant Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia & Herzegovina (“Saudi High Commission” or “SHC”) is a controlled agent and alter-ego of the government of Saudi Arabia. Although the Saudi High Commission has its headquarters in the Kingdom, its operations are conducted primarily outside of Saudi Arabia. Case 3:11-cv-00202-KRG Document 1 Filed 09/08/11 Page 2 of 154 4. Defendant Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (“SJRC”) is a controlled agent and alter-ego of the government of Saudi Arabia.
    [Show full text]