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1 Consolidation and of Power: The Role and Use of Fear in 2 the Political Leadership of Idi Amin Dada and Saloth Sar/ 3 4 It is popularly acknowledged from the speeches of John Dalberg-Acton, John 5 Adams, and from the streets that power leads to corruption [power 6 corrupts], and absolute power corrupts absolutely. To some extent, power 7 can corrupt the individual, and to some extent, the fear of loss of power, the 8 personality, attitude, behaviour, the [political] philosophy, etc. of a leader 9 can equally corrupt the power, authority or position that one holds just as 10 John Steinbeck reiterated: “Power does not corrupt. Fear corrupts… perhaps 11 the fear of loss of power”. It is with this reason that this article seeks to 12 establish that although power can corrupt the individual, however, fear of 13 loss of power, the lust for consolidating position, over-ambition, etc. are most 14 prominent forces that make the idea of “power” or “authority” seem 15 corrupted. Thus, it is the desire to consolidate power and the fear of loss of 16 power that corrupts the authority, power, or position that one holds. To 17 address the issue and justify the hypothesis, the leadership/regimes of Idi 18 Amin Dada and Saloth Sar/Pol Pot have been used as a case study. 19 Keywords: Consolidation and Corruption of Power, Fear, Political 20 Leadership, Idi Amin Dada, Saloth Sar/Pol Pot 21 22 23 Introduction 24 25 Many are the quotes that suggest that power, authority, or the 26 position of a person tends to corrupt the person. Examples of such 27 suppositions can be found in the speeches of John Dalberg-Acton who 28 believe that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely1; 29 and John Adams who believes that ‚because power corrupts, society’s 30 demands for moral authority and character increase as the importance 31 of the position increases‛2. However, I suppose that power can corrupt 32 the individual, but not always. When a leader does not know the true 33 purpose and concept of leadership in addition to behavioral defects, 34 then the personality, fear, low self-esteem, over-ambition, etc. of the 35 leader would make the leader corrupt but not power corrupting the

1John Dalberg-Acton, John Dalberg-Acton Quotes, https://www.brainyquote.com/quo tes/john _adams_389106 2John Adams, John Adams Quotes, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/john_adams _389106

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1 leader just as John Steinbeck has noted: ‚Power does not corrupt. Fear 2 corrupts< perhaps the fear of loss of power‛.3 3 Concerning leadership, the question we need to regularly ask is 4 ‘why’? ‘Why’ do leaders make certain decisions? ‘Why’ should that 5 decision be taken? ‘Why’ not any other strategy? ‘Why’ must it be this 6 plan and action? The answers to some of these questions are 7 circumstantial, situational, and quite subjective. But when it comes to 8 mass murder and atrocities under a political leader, it becomes baffling 9 to synthesize the cause of action. Could it (massacres) be a punishment 10 to offenders, or one's desire to stay on power, or fear of loss of power 11 that make us witness killings and other draconian measures under 12 some political leaders? I highly presume the acquisition of power and 13 the fear of loss of power as some of the major causes of mass murder 14 witnessed under certain regimes. To re-emphasize and establish this 15 hypothesis, the leadership styles of Idi Amin Dada and Pol Pot have 16 been used as a case study. By this, prominences are given to some of 17 their actions and inactions during their reign. It will, however, suffice to 18 do a brief conceptual review of fear in the context of leadership before 19 the main discussion. 20 21 22 Conceptualization of Fear in Leadership 23 24 According to Westernmayr (1915: 250), ‚fear is the great force that 25 prompts to acts of self-preservation and operates as effectively in the 26 brute as in the human animal.‛4 Since fear can be conceived as a force 27 that stimulates the individual to act in a certain manner, it then follows 28 that there is cause-of-fear which motivates the individual to act either to 29 defend himself or otherwise. It is interesting to know why fear drives 30 some political leaders and managers to act the way they do. Within the 31 framework of leadership, the innate character, personality, mindset, 32 and behavioural issues of the leader can make him corrupt if, 33 especially, there is the fear of being ousted and the urge to satisfy 34 personal interest as against cooperating benefit and the desire to 35 consolidate power.

3John Steinbeck, John Steinbeck Quotes, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/john_ada ms_389106 4Arthur J. Westernmayr, ‚The Psychology of Fear,‛ The Open Court, Iss. 4, 5. (1915), https://open iuc.lib.siu.edu/ocj/vol1915/iss4/5

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1 Whenever leaders become obsessed and over-ambitious with 2 power, the fear of losing it makes him corrupt but not power corrupting 3 the leader since it is people who seek power and occupy state 4 institutions. Leaders who are corrupt fear that the people they lead will 5 demand accurate account, transparency, justice, and fairness during 6 and after the tenure of office. If these become problematic for the leader, 7 then he employs diabolic means, which has nothing to do with the form 8 of government, the rules, or whatsoever, to have his way out. This 9 corrupt power but not power corrupting the leader or the individual. 10 On the contrary, John Adams, who believes that power corrupts, 11 however, goes further to draw a sharp contrast by stating that society’s 12 demands for moral authority and character must increase ‚as the 13 importance of the position increases<‛5 By analysis, although John 14 Adams affirms that power corrupts, he quickly asserted that much 15 focus should be placed on morality and character of state officials or 16 leaders. It is only through these means can corruption of individuals be 17 curtailed. 18 With referencing to power, leadership, and fear, John Adams 19 categorically stated that: 20 21 ‚Fear is the foundation of most governments‛; ‚I have accepted a seat in 22 the House of Representatives, and thereby have consented to my own 23 ruin, to your ruin, and to the ruin of our children. I give you this warning 24 that you may prepare your mind for your fate‛; ‚Remember, 25 never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never 26 was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide‛.6 27 28 By interpretation, we can understand from divergent perspectives 29 that the real issue with leadership is not only about the form of 30 government and the institutions thereof but the underlying motivating 31 factor for which leaders take certain measures and act the way they 32 consider appropriate. Any society or cooperate body can opt for any 33 form of government but the wellbeing of the organization is morality 34 and character. If there are defects in the morals and character of the 35 leader, then the result is ruining other people and the leader himself. 36 According to Gregory Claeys (2017), we can find such behaviorisms

5John Adams, John Adams Quotes, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/john_adams _389106 6Ibid.

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1 under absolute leaders or totalitarian regimes.7 For Claeys (2017), 2 absolute leaders like Pol Pot and Idi Amin use fear as a force and a 3 motion to do the absurd. In this type of regime, political leaders use fear 4 to create and maintain their power, and through fear, they go to the 5 extreme and become so destructive as we witness the mass destruction 6 that occurred under the regimes of Stalinism, the Nazi death camp at 7 Auschwitz, Idi Amin in , and Pol Pot’s rule in Cambodia 8 between 1975 and 1979.8 9 Regimes like Idi Amin and Pol Pot mostly lack attitude, the true 10 purpose of leadership, and low self-esteem motivated by fear. When 11 this happens, fear begins to control the leader thereby making him 12 corrupt especially when the person is much preoccupied about holding 13 onto position forever. These are some basic root causes of ‘corrupted 14 leadership’ just as John Steinbeck reiterated: ‚Power does not corrupt. 15 Fear corrupts< perhaps the fear of loss of power‛.9 16 The presence of fear of loss of power plays a mental threat to many 17 leaders. According to Myles Munroe (2005), leadership demands 18 mental reconditioning and attitude.10 In the view of Munroe, the key to 19 the purposeful and true leadership is an attitude rather than aptitude. 20 In other words, it’s not ability — it’s mentality. What you think is even 21 more important than what you do.11 Thus, when a leader fears of losing 22 his power and position, and in his mind thinks of consolidating his 23 power eternally, then every possible means, by fair or foul means, 24 would be employed to the leader’s satisfaction. This is the more reason 25 why a leader has to have an incorporation of positive attitudes toward 26 governing better. Incorporation of positive attitudes is also the more 27 reason why Munroe stated that a leader can’t have vision without 28 courage, a leader can’t have courage without compassion (sympathy, 29 empathy, concern, kind-heartedness, care, consideration, etc.), and a 30 leader can’t have compassion without strategy or policy if the said

7Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions (: Oxford University Press, 2017), 113ff. 8Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 192ff. 9John Steinbeck, John Steinbeck Quotes, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/john_ada ms_389106 10Myles Munroe, The Spirit of Leadership (USA: Whitaker House, 2005), 210. 11Ibid, 211.

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1 leader wants to be an effective leader.12 However, when the fear of 2 losing power and entrenchment of position dominates the mind of the 3 leader, then one thing becomes obvious – corruption of power. 4 To make sure leaders do not make fear pollute the position they 5 occupy, then they need to have different and a new psychological 6 orientation such as us learning new attitudinal behaviors. According to 7 Munroe (2005), ‘attitude is a learned behavior, created by our beliefs, 8 which are produced by our thoughts.’ In this case, the leader is his 9 attitude and behaviors and the position he occupies. For this reason, 10 Munroe, arguing in the same line with Ralph Waldo Emerson, put forth 11 that we can change our attitudes by changing our beliefs, by changing 12 our thoughts about everything in life – including ourselves. This is also 13 the reason why Ralph W. Emerson said, ‚What lies behind us and what 14 lies before us are tiny matters compared to what lies within us‛.13 Until 15 we (leaders, and everybody) change our attitude, were are mere leaders 16 engulfed by fear – leadership by name without being matured leaders.14 17 18 19 Hypothesis 20 21 Effective institutions and rules indeed augment good governance, 22 but the institution or the form of governance alone cannot produce 23 effective and good leadership. The fact is that it is humans who make 24 up institutions. Each individual has his own psychological makeup. 25 Whatever the person is made up of, his thinking; his [political] 26 philosophy; and his understanding of nature, human life, the purpose 27 of life are all the individuals’ but not the institutions. If the institutions 28 are made of people with and without attitude, then it is (un)polluted 29 individuals whose behaviors affect policy implementations, institutions, 30 and power or authority. 31 Similarly, if the leader does not know the true purpose of 32 leadership as reiterated by Munroe (2005) into consideration, the 33 institution is a mere name the use of fear as a motivation becomes the 34 norm of the day just as Westernmayr (1915) suggests.15 According to

12Myles Munroe, The Spirit of Leadership (USA: Whitaker House, 2005), 211. 13Ibid, 211-212. 14Ibid, 212. 15Arthur J. Westernmayr, ‚The Psychology of Fear,‛ The Open Court, Iss. 4, 5. (1915), https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ocj/vol1915/iss4/5

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1 van Wyk (2007), formal institutions shall exist but are merely symbolic 2 rather than democratic tenets if power is centralized and dominated by 3 one man.16 4 So the question is: is it power that corrupts the individual? Or the 5 desire to consolidate power, the fear of losing power, and the lack of 6 attitude on the part of the leader that makes the leader corrupt and in 7 the long run affect the institution? My assumption is that power does 8 not corrupt but rather the fear of losing power, the desire to entrench 9 one’s position, and lack of attitude corrupt the leader who has the 10 power to lead. For this reason, I am in support of Myles Munroe (2005) 11 that attitude determines everything. It is worthy to know the principles, 12 precepts, and skills of leadership. Nonetheless, without mental 13 reorientation, attitude, the purpose of leadership, etc., the learned ideas 14 on leadership become redundant. If this happens, the institutions that 15 are manned by people, and the idea of power seem to be corrupted.17 16 17 18 Consolidation and Corruption of Power: The Role and Use of Fear in 19 the Political Leadership of Idi Amin Dada 20 21 Sources have it that Idi Amin Dada Oumee was born sometime 22 between 1925 and 1927 in , West Nile Province, in Uganda.18 His 23 father was a Kakwa, a tribe that exists in Uganda, (now Congo), 24 and Sudan.19 As a boy, Amin spent much time tending goats and 25 working in the fields. He embraced and attained a fourth-grade 26 education. He was brought up in Lugazi, Uganda, by his mother.20 As 27 Amin grew he matched the qualifications for military service desired by

16Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, ‚Political Leaders in : Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers?‛ Occasional Paper Series: Vol 2, no 1 (2007): 12ff. 17 Myles Munroe, The Spirit of Leadership (USA: Whitaker House, 2005), 212-213. 18 Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); Encyclopedia of World Biography. Idi Amin Biography, https://www.notablebiograp hies.com/amp/A-An/Amin-Idi.html; Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 20. 19Encyclopedia of World Biography. Idi Amin Biography, https://www.notablebiogra phies.com/amp/A-An/Amin-Idi.html 20Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 20-21; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011).

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1 the British at that time. Joining the army as a private in 1946, Amin 2 impressed his superiors by being a good swimmer, rugby player, and 3 boxer. He won the Uganda heavyweight boxing championship in 4 1951, a title he held for nine years. He was promoted to corporal in 5 1949.21 6 It is recounted that there existed terrors and mayhems during the 7 leadership of Idi Amin which made the world watched in disgust and 8 without the ability to act against the growing insanity and 9 destructiveness of Amin’s regime.22 As things became as they were in 10 Uganda at the time, Amin could not think of anything than the fear of 11 losing his power as a . It should not be surprising that since 12 issues under Amin’s regime became sensitive to many Ugandans and 13 the rest of the world, he feared being ousted, arrested, and prosecuted. 14 For him to deal with his own fears was to eliminate and neutralize any 15 suspected enemy. Idi Amin’s fear of being ousted – losing power – led 16 him to act in such a way that, he used his own demise (fear) to put fear 17 into the citizens, foreigners, and embassies such as the United States of 18 America so that he can consolidate his position. Gordon Kerr (2011) has 19 recounted that: ‚Closing the American Embassy in Uganda due to 20 concern about Amin’s increasingly erratic behaviour, US Ambassador 21 Thomas Melady did not mince his words when he described the 22 dictator as ‘racist, erratic and unpredictable, brutal, inept, bellicose, 23 irrational, ridiculous, and militaristic’.‛ 24 After climbing the ladder from bottom-up – serving as a private in 25 the King’s African Rifles, part of the British Colonial Army,23 in 26 from 1947 until 1949 when his unit was deployed in Somali to fight 27 Somali Shifta rebels who were engaged in violence there; fighting in 28 1952 against the Mau Mau rebels in Kenya as a newly promoted 29 corporal; a sergeant in 1953; warrant officer in the British Colonial 30 Army in 1954; a lieutenant in 1961; a captain by the following year and

21Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of Peo8ple of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 21-23; J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of , (New York & : Encounter Books, 2015) chapter 18. 22Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015). 23 J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015).

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1 then as a major the year after that; and as a Deputy Commander of the 2 Ugandan Army in 1964 – Idi Amin Dada gained a lot of experience in 3 the battlefield. In addition to these achievements chalked, it is 4 evidenced that Idi Amin Dada’s rise to power came through his 5 association with the then Prime Minister, .24 6 It seemed to appear that the two political figures had the same goal 7 and vision. It became public suspicion that both the Prime Minister and 8 the Deputy Commander of the Ugandan Army planned together and 9 behind closed doors supplied Congolese rebels with arms in exchange 10 for gold and ivory.25 The actions of these two leaders became doubtful 11 by the Ugandan Parliament. For this reason, in 1966, the Ugandan 12 Parliament demanded an investigation. Although their action was a 13 suspicious nature, the next move of action made it clear that the two 14 have been working behind closed doors for their own interest. Both 15 Obote and Amin may have forecasted that their actions will lead them 16 into trouble. For the fear losing power and being prosecuted if found 17 guilty, Milton Obote hurriedly seized power and went ahead to abolish 18 the purely ceremonial presidency held by the Kabaka – or King – 19 Edward Mutesa II of .26 With this done, Prime Minister Milton 20 Obote became President while his partner, Amin Dada (who led an 21 attack on the Kabaka’s palace), was promoted to Colonel and given 22 command of the Ugandan Army and Air Force27. 23 It can be deduced that the fear (of being prosecuted and losing 24 position) became the motivation for their subsequent actions after the 25 Ugandan Parliament wanted to investigate Obote and Amin as John

24Encyclopedia of World Biography. Idi Amin Biography, https://www.notablebiogra phies.com/amp/A-An/Amin-Idi.html; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011) 25Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie, D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 21-23; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011). 26Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 20. 27Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 21ff.

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1 Steinbeck believes28. They could have responded to the call of the 2 parliament and defend themselves to the suspected charges leveled 3 against them if they knew that they were innocent. Their failure to 4 appear before the parliament, and the fear of losing whatever benefits 5 they were enjoying curtesy the position they occupied, led them to act 6 against the state’s interest. The result was the two becoming the giant 7 rulers of Uganda. Nonetheless, the two associates became enemies since 8 each equally feared that the other may betray the other. This action of 9 theirs has nothing to do with the institution but character, attitude, and 10 mindset. According to Kerr (2011), in October 1970, Obote demoted 11 Amin, and when Amin heard that he was about to be arrested for 12 misappropriating army funds – a similar incidence for which the two 13 were to appear before the parliament – Amin became afraid and 14 manipulated and used the army against Obote. As the army 15 commander, Amin Dada, with the help of the army, staged a military 16 coup and seized power while Obote was at a Commonwealth summit 17 meeting in .29 18 Henceforth, Uganda came under Amin’s leadership. As usual for 19 many leaders who seize power unconstitutionally, Idi Amin’s initial 20 plan was to cleanse the system of corruption until the next election is 21 held. For Amin, he did not want the office of the presidency or become 22 a politician but as a cleanser, savior, and be a personification of virtue 23 and principle. This was a mere excuse since both Obote and Amin had 24 shown fear of the other. For Amin, the best way to gain eternal 25 prominence and control was to do away with his president, Obote. To 26 act in a way that people would trust his course of action, Idi Amin 27 initially appeared neutral by releasing political prisoners and allowed 28 the remains of the late Kabaka, who had died in exile in London, to be 29 brought back to Uganda for burial. A brilliant move exhibited by Amin 30 Dada. As Kerr (2011) reiterated, this move was ‚cleverly appeasing the 31 former regime’s supporters‛. His initial actions appeared benevolent 32 which gained popularity amongst foreign powers. As a result, Kerr 33 stated that ‚the British Foreign Office labeling him ‘a splendid type and 34 a good football player’.‛ However, intrinsically, the fear of giving out

28John Steinbeck, John Steinbeck Quotes, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/john_ada ms_389106 29J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015).Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011).

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1 and losing power became the dominant force and a factor in his next 2 actions. 3 Amin Dada could have handed down power as he claimed after his 4 cleanup exercise in the government of Uganda but he refused. But 5 when was he going to say cleansing is done? The more he acted to 6 cleanse the system, the more he wanted to consolidate his position. 7 Hereafter, the killing began within a few days of him taking office.30 It is 8 estimated by the International Commission of Jurists that, during the 9 leadership of Idi Amin Dada in the , the number of deaths in 10 Uganda was at least 80,000.31 Thus, the death toll under the leadership 11 of Amin Dada was a matter of estimation. In the estimation of the 12 , about 500,000 Ugandans were killed. Per the 13 estimations and the victims of deaths under Amin’s leadership, high 14 official ranking members of the state perished. Among these high 15 profiles of Ugandans were (former Prime 16 Minister), (the Anglican Archbishop), Joseph Mubiru 17 (former Governor of the Central Bank), Frank Kalimuzo (Vice 18 Chancellor of ), Byron Kawadwa (playwright), 19 Erinayo Wilson Oryema and Charles Oboth Ofumbi (cabinet 20 ministers).32 21 What could have accounted for the murder under the regime of 22 Amin Dada? The simplest answer a sympathizer of Amin can give is 23 that those victims were either corrupt or committed treasonable 24 offenses that could have endangered the security and development of 25 Uganda. Nonetheless, by eradicating people suspected to be a threat to 26 the leadership of Idi Amin and the state resulted in fear and panic 27 across almost countrywide. It could be conceived that, probably, for the 28 fear that his position was likely to be threatened by some high profile 29 people of Uganda, especially, from Obote’s camp, who disliked the 30 dictator, Amin Dada decided to use some cruel method as a tool to

30J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015). 31Ibid; Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 23-26. 32Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 23-26; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011)

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1 likewise put fear into his suspects or opponents to secure his position as 2 a sole and absolute ruler of Uganda. 3 It has been recounted that a week after the coup, Amin declared 4 himself both President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 5 After these declarations, Amin Dada feared that the supporters of 6 Milton Obote and the state’s established institutions may plot against 7 him. For this reason, Idi Amin immediately suspended bits of the 8 Ugandan Constitution and replaced courts of law with military 9 tribunals.33 This indicates that Idi Amin was afraid that he may be 10 measured and overthrown in a similar manner he had done to Obote. 11 After all, both had worked closely together to overthrow the Kabaka. So 12 Amin did not want to give any room for the immediate and future 13 overthrow of his regime. 14 What then must be done to consolidate his power? Amin made sure 15 that to do away with any future threat and loss of power, a new re- 16 organization of Uganda was done to his advantage. It is therefore not 17 surprising that Amin renamed the Government House in as 18 ‘The Command Post’ and replacing the previous internal security 19 bureau with the ominous State Research Bureau, gangs of uniformed 20 men who, according to sources, ‚wore dark glasses even at midnight 21 and whose business of death and horrific was fully endorsed by 22 Amin‛, as reiterated by Gordon Kerr, 2011. 23 The fear of Amin losing power became more opened and obvious 24 when about 20,000 Ugandan refugees who had joined Milton Obote in 25 exile in neighbouring failed the attempt to restore the former 26 President Obote to power in 1972. By this time, Amin, whose 27 psychology has been highly dominated by fear of overthrow and losing 28 his newly forcefully acquired position began another military cleansing 29 by eliminating his suspected supporters of Milton Obote from the 30 armed forces, largely those who were of the Acholi or Lango ethnic 31 groups.34 It has been estimated that by early 1972, more than 5,000 of

33Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 21ff; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); Encyclopedia of World Biography. Idi Amin Biography, https://www.notablebiographies.com/amp/A-An/Amin-Idi.html. 34Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 20ff; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011).

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1 these troops had been killed and more than 10,000 civilians had 2 disappeared never to be seen again.35 According to Battiata (1989), the 3 International Commission of Jurists titled the Idi Amin Dada’s rule a 4 ‚reign of terror.‛ In another estimation, the human rights organization 5 Amnesty International projected that between 50,000 and 300,000 6 Ugandans disappeared in 1977, during the reign of Idi Amin Dada.36 7 To consolidate his position, Amin had to furnish the activities of his 8 supporters, especially those who formed the bulk of his army. The idea 9 is that if the soldiers are well taken care of, Amin Dada will forever get 10 their loyalty thereby providing security and spy for him. When this 11 happens, then Amin stands to fear no one else. So, to make sure he 12 deals with his own fears in such a manner, it is reported that much of 13 the money that did come into the country from foreign earnings was 14 spent by the government on tax-free luxuries to keep his soldiers 15 pleased. Moreover, according to Kerr (2011), the Boeing 707 and 16 Hercules C130 that made up the entire fleet of Ugandan Airlines, made 17 a frequent flight to London’s Gatwick Airport where it would load up 18 with radios, whiskey, cars, and other luxury items for about 21,000 19 army officers who were under the leadership of Amin Dada. 20 Not only did fear of losing power and the desire to consolidate 21 power made Amin Dada treat his suspects and opponents in draconian 22 tactics but also turned against some foreigners and diplomats living in 23 Uganda. For example, Amin Dada expelled all the Asians who ran the 24 country’s sugar mills. He decreed the expulsion of about 60,000 Asians 25 in Uganda who held British passports and later changed to the 26 expulsion of the country’s entire Asian population of about 80,000, 27 excluding professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers.37 When 28 Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Uganda in 1977, he retaliated 29 by declaring that he had defeated the British. In celebration, he 30 awarded himself the CBE (Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa

35Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015), 36Mary Battiata, ‚African Nations Cold-Shoulder Exiled Idi Amin,‛ The Washinton Post (January 15, 1989). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/01/15/ 37Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015).

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1 and Uganda in particular).38 His new title, as announced on Ugandan 2 radio, was ‘His Excellency , Al Hadji 3 Doctor Idi Amin Dada, Lord of All the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of 4 the Sea, VC, DSO, MC, CBE.39 5 As Nordlinger (2015) puts it: 6 7 He destroyed a great many of his countrymen. How many? The most 8 commonly accepted death toll is 300,000. Some say higher, some say 9 lower. In any case, he was known as ‚the Butcher of Uganda.‛ Simply 10 giving the titles of some of the books and documentaries about him will 11 convey what Amin and his regime were like: ‚A State of Blood,‛ ‚Ghosts 12 of Kampala,‛ ‚Culture of the Sepulchre,‛ ‚Inside Idi Amin’s Terror 13 Machine,‛ ‚The Man Who Ate His Archbishop’s Liver?,‛ ‚Escape from 14 Idi Amin’s Slaughterhouse,‛ ‚Hitler in Africa,‛ ‚Death-Light in Africa‛ . . 15 . 16 17 Things had eventually begun to conspire against him by 1978. 18 There was increasing anger at his actions within Uganda and a number 19 of his ministers fled into exile.40 Amin thought himself to be invincible 20 by this time. Within the borders of Uganda, Amin successfully 21 consolidated his power. However, the more the fear of loss of power 22 engulfed his thinking, the more brutal he became. He, therefore, 23 decided to turn his attention to border countries. In an attempt at 24 deflecting attention away from the deteriorating situation at home, he 25 sent troops into Tanzania.41 The then Tanzanian President Julius 26 Nyerere mobilized his army and retaliated, supported by Ugandan 27 rebels, opponents of Amin. Despite aid from ’s President Gaddafi, 28 Amin’s army was broken and defeated by Nyerere and his joint forces.42

38J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015). 39Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015). 40Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 24-26. 41J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015). 42 Claude Kabemba, The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Independence to Africa’s First World War. Writenet Paper No. 16/2000, (UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, June 2001), 10; Abel Escrib`a-Folch, and D. Krcmaric, ‚Dictators in Exile:

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1 What Amin feared has come to pass as he attacked Tanzania. The 2 anticipated loss of power from the camp of Obote was easily squashed 3 by Amin but not . Amin’s fear of opposition and defeat 4 from border countries indeed has come to pass as Kampala, Uganda, 5 came under the control of Julius Nyerere.43 ‚The Conqueror of the 6 British Empire‛ is himself conquered. Of course, Amin would not stay 7 to be captured and tried. On 11 , Amin fled from Kampala to 8 Gaddafi’s Libya for an asylum.44 He later left Libya for . 9 Upon all the attempts made to come back, Amin could not succeed. For 10 example, in 1989, he tried to come back to Uganda for a possible attack 11 but he was driven away by the then Zairian President Mobutu Sese 12 Seko when Idi Amin Dada reached Kinshasa at the head of an armed 13 group.45 Amin retreated and went back into exile, in Saudi Arabia, 14 where he died on 16 August 2003.46 He was never to be held 15 accountable for events under his leadership. 16 17 18 Consolidation and Corruption of Power: 19 The Role and Use of Fear in the Leadership of Saloth Sar/Pol Pot 20 21 Saloth Sar, aka Pol Pot, born on 19 May 1925 [Erken, 2006: 118, puts 22 the day and month at 25 May] in Prek Sbauv, in the Cambodian 23 province of Kampong Thom, was a leader of the communist Khmer 24 Rouge which captured Phnom Pen, the Cambodian capital, on 17 April

Explaining the Destinations of Ex-Rulers‛. Forthcoming in the Journal of Politics. n.d., 1, https://www.resea rchgate.net/publication/281743214 43J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015); Claude Kabemba, The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Independence to Africa’s First World War. Writenet Paper No. 16/2000, (UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, June 2001), 10. 44Mary Battiata, ‚African Nations Cold-Shoulder Exiled Idi Amin,‛ The Washinton Post (January 15, 1989). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/01/15/ 45 Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 26; Abel Escrib`a-Folch, and D. Krcmaric, ‚Dictators in Exile: Explaining the Destinations of Ex-Rulers‛. Forthcoming in the Journal of Politics. n.d., 1, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281743214 46Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, ‚Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers?‛ Occasional Paper Series: Vol 2, no 1 (2007): 21; Lanzen Laurie H., and Cherie D. A., eds. Biography Today: Profiles of People of Interest to Young Readers. World Leaders Series: Modern African Leaders, Vol. 2, (Detroit, United States: Omnigraphics, Inc., 1997), 23ff.

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1 1975.47 Unlike Idi Amin who had a somewhat rough beginning, Pol Pot 2 belonged to a member of the landowning class, to a fairly well-off 3 family of Chinese-Khmer origins.48 4 As a student of a Catholic high-school in Phnom Penh, Pol Pot used 5 the opportunity to regularly visit the royal palace in Phnom Penh 6 where his sister was a concubine of the king, Sisowath Monivong.49 Pol 7 Pot later moved out of the capital, Phnom Penh, to a technical school 8 where he earned a scholarship that sent him to France to study radio 9 electricity in .50 Whiles still in France, between 1949 and 1953, Pol 10 Pot associated himself with the French Communist Party (FPC), and a 11 member of a secret Marxist cell that had taken control of the Khmer 12 Student’s Association.51 In 1959 Pol Pot returned to Cambodia and 13 began working for the young and inexperienced Cambodian 14 Communist group, evaluating groups in Southeast Asia that engaged in 15 rebellion against their governments.52

47Philip Short, Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare (London: John Murray Publishers, 2004), 15; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016):118; TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https:// trialinternational.org/ latest-post/saloth-sar/ 48Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 220; Yvonne. A. Guillou, ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979): Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: A Symposium, (Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York, United States, July, 2004), 2, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00327711; TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https://trialinternational. org/latest-post/saloth-sar/ 49Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011) 50Ian Harris, Cambodian Buddhism: History and Practice, (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 160. 51TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/saloth-sar/; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016):119ff. 52Philip Short, Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare (London: John Murray Publishers, 2004); Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); Yvonne A. Guillou, ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975- 1979): Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: A Symposium, (Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York, United

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1 When Cambodia was given independence by the 1954 Geneva 2 Conference, and the monarchy was restored after the French departure 3 from the country,53 the Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk began 4 playing the different parties off against each other, suppressing what he 5 believed to be extremist groups with force.54 This attempt made the 6 monarch quite unpopular and the political scene of Cambodia began to 7 change as interested individuals in the state’s affair and opposition to 8 the government started propagating their political philosophies in the 9 background. Sooner than expected, Pol Pot seized the opportunity to 10 march against the government. 11 It is recorded that while teaching French history and literature at a 12 private college, Saloth worked closely with the parties of the left. In 13 1963, he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee and was forced 14 into hiding. He hid on the Vietnamese border, making contact with 15 North Vietnamese units who were fighting the war against South 16 Vietnam.55 The Vietnamese helped Saloth establish a base camp where 17 he worked with his lieutenants on devising an ideology for the Khmer 18 Rouge, as he called his party. In January 1968, Saloth launched a 19 national uprising, attacking an army base at Battambang.56 The 20 Cambodian army was able to keep the attack under control but Saloth’s 21 men were able to capture several weapons. Hereafter, Saloth Sar’s 22 leadership style began to change. Decisions were no longer made on a

States, July, 2004), 2, https://ha lshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00327711; M Ezra, ‚Malcolm Caldwell: Pol Pot’s Apologist.‛ Democratiya, 16 (Spring-Summer 2009): n.p. 53R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016):115-117; TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https://trialinternation nal.org/latest-post/saloth-sar/ 54M. Haas, Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: the Faustian pact, (New York, USA: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 4ff; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); Yvonne A. Guillou, ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979): Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: A Symposium, (Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York, United States, July, 2004), 2-3, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-0032 7711. 55N. Chomsky, and E. S. Herman, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology. The Political Economy of Human Rights – Volume II, (Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2014); R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 120-122. 56R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 119 & 121.

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1 collective basis. He began to act like an absolutist ruler of his party and 2 had his own compound and private staff.57 3 Two years after Saloth’s launch of the national attack on Cambodia, 4 civil crises arose which placed Saloth in a comfortable position as the 5 monarch seek his support. In 1970, a civil war broke out in Cambodia 6 following the coup d’état of Lon Nol. Power was now switched to Lon 7 Nol who formed the new government. As a consequence, the former, 8 King Norodom Sihanouk and his supporters, then joined up with the 9 Khmer Rouge as a united front in opposition to the new government.58 10 Per the account, due to the incompetence and corruption of the new 11 government, the popularity of the Khmer Rouge rose with the result 12 that they came out of their clandestine operations to wage war openly 13 against the government.59 By early 1972, he had an army of 35,000 14 troops that could be supplemented by 100,000 irregulars, funded with 15 $5 million a year provided by the Chinese in addition to other medical 16 supplies.60 17 As the Vietnamese began to withdraw, the Khmer Rouge began to 18 make progress. Many lives were lost during efforts to capture Phnom 19 Penh in 1973 but by the middle of the year, he controlled two-thirds of 20 the country. He besieged the city and launched a series of purges of 21 government officials and educated people, just as Idi Amin of Uganda.61

57 TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/saloth-sar/; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011). 58R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 122; Yvonne A. Guillou, ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979): Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: A Symposium, (Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York, United States, July, 2004), 1, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00327711; TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https://trialinter national.org/latest-post/saloth-sar/ 59TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/saloth-sar/ 60Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); Yvonne A. Guillou, ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979): Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: A Symposium, (Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York, United States, July, 2004), 1, https://halshs. archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00327711 61D. P. Chandler, B. Kiernan, and Boua, C., eds. & trans. Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), 2.TRIAL International,

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1 An uprising by the Cham minority in regions the Khmer Rouge 2 controlled was followed by Saloth’s orders to torture rebels, including 3 the innocent.62 It was an experiment that would later be extended to the 4 entire population of the country.63 5 On 17 April 1975, Phnom Penh fell into the hands of the Khmer 6 Rouge.64 Saloth Sar then assumed the name of ‚Brother Number One‛65 7 or Pol Pot, a designation assigned to him by the Chinese authorities 8 which stands for ‚Politique potentielle‛ (or someone with political 9 potential). From this point, 1975 was designated Year Zero by the 10 Khmer Rouge.66 According to Kerr, between 1975 and 1979, Pol Pot 11 imposed a kind of collective national ‚psychopathic behaviour on his 12 country in pursuit of political ideals.‛ Polin (1980) titles Pol Pot’s 13 regime as ‚diabolic sweetness‛. It was a programme of extermination, 14 torture, and that resulted in the deaths between 750,000 15 and 1.7 million people, representing about twenty-six percent of the 16 total Cambodian population.67 17 Once ethnic cleansing has begun, Saloth will do no better than what 18 was considered as a corrupt government that was associated with the 19 previous regimes. The idea is that, once the previous regimes were

Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https:// trialinter national.org/latest-post/saloth-sar/ 62M. Ezra, ‚Malcolm Caldwell: Pol Pot’s Apologist.‛ Democratiya, 16 (Spring-Summer 2009): 156; Loung Ung, First they killed my father: a daughter of Cambodia remembers (1st Ed.), (Australia: Harper Collins Publishers Pty. Ltd., 2000 & July, 2010). 63Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011) 64R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 123. 65Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 219; J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015). 66TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/saloth-sar/ 67Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 219; J. Nordlinger, Children of Monsters: An Inquiry into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators, (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2015); R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 107; Yvonne A. Guillou, ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979): Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: A Symposium, (Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York, United States, July, 2004), 1, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes. fr/halshs-00327711

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1 suspected of corruptible tendencies and behaviours, Saloth’s takeover 2 will be quite different from the so-called corrupt government in the past 3 few years. Ironically, Saloth’s uprising and control of state affairs was 4 an absolute power control. This brings us to the hypothesis carved for 5 this write-up. Why should Pol Pot behave act as an absolute ruler? Did 6 he entertain any fear of being ousted as he has done to the previous 7 regime? Or he, like Idi Amin, just decided to use cleansing, murder, and 8 torture as a tool to entrench his newly acquired position? 9 According to Kerr (2011), the first signs of his need for absolute 10 control became evident around this time when he forced minorities to 11 abandon their traditional styles of dress and adornment in favour of 12 Cambodian styles. Not only did he regulated dress code but also 13 endorsed a programme of making all land holdings the same size, a 14 similar technique employed by Gaius Julius Caesar in the last century 15 of the Roman Republic when he defeated Pompey and became a 16 dictator as recounted by Appian (I: 4ff), Caesar (1951), Plutarch (1914 & 17 1919: 523-577), Suetonius (I: 30-40), Scullard (1982:112), and Chrissanthos 18 (2001: 63). All means of public transport were banned, such as bicycles 19 and mopeds. They were policies designed to please the peasants who 20 had none of these things anyway and to disenfranchise the wealthier 21 town and city dwellers.68 22 Like Idi Amin, Pol Pot envisages entrenchment of power and the 23 fear of losing power. He had taken control of Cambodia by brute and 24 realized that the means by which he has come to power can be 25 employed by his opponents to remove him from office. As a result, he 26 became incredible than the preceding regimes. He did not want to have 27 any relation with some foreigners living in the city.69 Like Idi Amin, 28 Saloth Sar immediately expelled foreigners from the country, embassies 29 closed, religion banned, and all foreign medical and economic aid was 30 prohibited.70 It is also stated that about fifty percent of the estimated 31 number of 450,000 people of Chinese origin living in Cambodia at the

68The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-3; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011). 69The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-3. 70Yvonne A. Guillou, ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979): Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: A Symposium, (Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York, United States, July, 2004), 1, https://halshs. archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00327711

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1 time were killed. What at all did Saloth want to achieve apart from 2 consolidating his position and the fear of any internal and external 3 attacks from those who disliked his leadership? 4 To be that absolute ruler he wanted, newspapers, radio, and 5 television stations were closed, and also limiting the use of mail and 6 telephone. Money was withdrawn from circulation and businesses were 7 wound up, education halted, health care banned and parental authority 8 was done away with.71 Once these are done, he stands to fear no one 9 since he has used his own fears to exert fear into the populace. Once he 10 feared being overthrown, captured, tried, or assassinated, the more 11 draconian or harsh measures he took to control Cambodia.72 The silence 12 of culture became the topic in the reign of Pol Pot. 13 As he had been taking measures to consolidate his power over the 14 country, Pol Pot had discovered that it had been difficult to force the 15 inhabitants of towns and cities to adhere to his political philosophy 16 (socialist tenets). For this reason, Saloth Sar concluded that the only 17 answer was to send the entire population of the country’s metropolises 18 into the countryside to work as itinerants. He made sure all of 19 Cambodia’s towns and cities were evacuated against their will.73 20 According to Kerr (2011), the 2,000,000 inhabitants of Phnom Penh were 21 sent into the countryside on foot and at gunpoint. Undoubtedly there 22 was an American occupation of Vietnam,74 but to appear genuine with

71The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-3; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011). 72R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 123; D. P. Chandler, B. Kiernan, and Boua, C., eds. & trans. Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), xii-xiii. 73R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 123; The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-3. 74 R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 113-114; N. Chomsky, and E. S. Herman, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology. The Political Economy of Human Rights – Volume II, (Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2014).

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1 his policy of evacuation, Pol Pot justified his action by saying there is ‚a 2 threat of American bombing raids‛.75 3 Nonetheless, it is thought that in this action of his, Pol Pot became 4 responsible for about 20,000 individuals who perished during the 5 forced evacuation.76 Those who made it to the field had to work 6 unceasingly under harsh conditions. According to Claeys (2017), 7 ‚nearly 1,500 a day, died of famine, neglect, overwork, or murder by 8 the Khmer Rouge‛.77 Freeborn citizens became slaves.78 The least 9 mistake committed could lead to murder by shooting or severe 10 flogging.79 He was, during, and after his reign, accused of a series of 11 crimes against humanity.80 12 To be more protected and entrench his position, Pol Pot, like Idi 13 Ami, made sure life was simple and easy-going for his fighting men or 14 bodyguards within the Khmer Rouge. If the fighting men are well fed, 15 Pol Pot can use them to carry out his callous activities. According to 16 reports, there was a list of names that needed to be taken care of. 17 According to sources, Saloth Sar launched a series of purges to

75Yvonne A. Guillou, ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979): Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: A Symposium, (Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York, United States, July, 2004), 2-3, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00327711; The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-2. 76Loung Ung, First they killed my father: a daughter of Cambodia remembers (1st Ed.), (Australia: Harper Collins Publishers Pty. Ltd., 2000 & July, 2010); Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 117. 77 regory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 117. 78S. Polin, Pol Pot’s Diabolical Sweetness, (Le Monde Dimanche, 1980), 43-45; D. P. Chandler, B. Kiernan, and Boua, C., eds. & trans. Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), xix-xv. 79 R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 9 & 123ff.; The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-3. 80Ian Harris, Cambodian Buddhism: History and Practice, (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 161.

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1 exterminate remnants of the society that had existed before the 2 declaration ‚Year Zero‛.81 3 He had compiled a list of people to be killed following a Khmer 4 Rouge victory. The list included the wealthy, the educated, Buddhist, 5 monks, teachers, doctors, lawyers, and government officials.82 All these 6 categories of people were murdered alongside their families. Some 7 sources disclosed that, like Idi Amin, Saloth had many of his own 8 colleagues who had fought alongside him shot or axed to death.83 Why 9 would he engineer such acts if not for fear of losing power and 10 entrenching his authority? It was also forbidden for people to gather in 11 groups of more than two. Thus, Pol Pot tried all possible measures to 12 instill fear in the people to deal with his own fears of being ousted.84 If 13 not so, what was the rationale behind Pol Pot’s behaviour and the 14 killings? 15 As the saying goes: whatever has a beginning has an end. As the 16 reign of Idi Amin, things began to deteriorate for Pol Pot too. By 1977, 17 Saloth Sar’s relationship with Vietnamese who supported him in the 18 initial stage begun to deteriorate. In the long run, it led to clashes along 19 the two countries’ border.85 In May 1977, Vietnamese planes attacked 20 Cambodia, and in the autumn of the same year, Saloth and his troops 21 counteracted by raiding into Vietnamese territory. Saloth managed to

81 The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-3; Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011). 82 S. Polin, Pol Pot’s Diabolical Sweetness, (Le Monde Dimanche, 1980), 43-45; R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 123; D. P. Chandler, B. Kiernan, and Boua, C., eds. & trans. Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), 79; M. S. Shivakumar, ‚Pol Pot: Death Deprives Justice,‛ Economic and Political Weekly, 33, no.17 (Apr. 25 - May 1, 1998): 952-953, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/4406690 83Philip Short, Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare (London: John Murray Publishers, 2004); The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-2; Loung Ung, First they killed my father: a daughter of Cambodia remembers (1st Ed.), (Australia: Harper Collins Publishers Pty. Ltd., 2000 & July, 2010). 84Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017), 113ff. 85The Workers Vanguard. ‚Defend Vietnam/USSR Against U.S. War Drive! Oust Genocidal Pol Pot Gang from UN!‛ The Workers Vanguard, no. 338, (1983, Sept. 23): 1-3.

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1 put the situation under control by driving back the Vietnamese 2 attackers. There was a second attack on Saloth’s Cambodia by the 3 Vietnamese in 1978.86 This time, the Vietnamese became victorious and 4 as usual, just like Idi Amin, Saloth Sar fled from Phnom Penh to 5 Thailand to reorganize for a comeback.87 As he could not carry out his 6 plan from exile, he had no option than to allow the coalition 7 government to steer the state’s affair. 8 By 1985, he resigned from the part but maintained a position as the 9 leader of the Khmer Rouge in the background. According to Shivakumar 10 (1998), Pol Pot remained politically active after officially resigning in 11 1989.88 In 1986, Saloth Sar traveled to China for treatment for cancer of 12 the face. Returning to Cambodia, he refused to talk peace and 13 continued the struggle against the coalition government now ruling the 14 country. In 1995, he had a stroke that left him paralyzed down his left 15 side. The government had a policy of encouraging individuals in the 16 Khmer Rouge to defect or make peace. When Son Sen, who Saloth Sar 17 hand-picked to join the coalition, tried to make a settlement with the 18 government in 1997, Pol Pot had him executed89 and also ordered the 19 killing of eleven members of his family.90 20 Eventually, he was arrested in November 1997, presented to the 21 world in a show trial, and sentenced to house arrest for life.91 On 15 22 April 1997, it was announced that the Khmer Rouge had agreed to hand 23 Pol Pot over to an international tribunal. But luckily for him to escape

86D. P. Chandler, B. Kiernan, and Boua, C., eds. & trans. Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), 3. 87Ibid, 2; Documentation Center of Cambodia, Fact Sheet: Pol Pot and His Prisoners at Secret Prison S-21. (Cambodia: The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), 2011). 88 Philip Short, Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare (London: John Murray Publishers, 2004); M. S. Shivakumar, ‚Pol Pot: Death Deprives Justice,‛ Economic and Political Weekly, 33, no.17 (Apr. 25 - May 1, 1998): 953, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4406690 89R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 109ff.; TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https://trialinternational. org/latest-post/saloth-sar/ 90Philip Short, Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare (London: John Murray Publishers, 2004); Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011). 91Gordon Kerr, Evil Psychopaths: Dangerous and Deranged (UK: Canary Press, 2011); R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 122.

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1 possible punishment by the tribunal, he died in bed later in the night of 2 the day his people presented him to the tribunal. Like Idi Amin Dada, 3 Pol Pot was never punished for the atrocities committed.92 4 5 6 Conclusion 7 8 By comparing the regimes of Idi Amin Dada and Pol Pot, their 9 actions and inactions, the atrocities and deaths that happened under 10 their watch, it suffices to conclude that position, authority or power do 11 not corrupt entirely as people like John Dalberg-Acton put it. The 12 regimes of Idi Amin and Pol Pot have demonstrated that the desire to 13 consolidate power and the fear of losing power make some leaders 14 behave the way they do as John Steinbeck claims. The atrocities, the 15 killings, and the silence of culture were all strategies adopted to deal 16 with their own fears of being ousted. Thus, positions that people 17 occupy in whatever form it may take do not make the person corrupt 18 but rather it is the person’s fear of losing power in addition to lack of 19 attitude, lack of true purpose of leadership, and overambition that 20 corrupt the person but not the position/ authority that corrupts. By 21 using Idi Amin Dada and Saloth Sar/Pol Pot as a case study, I conclude 22 and reaffirms John Steinbeck's statement that: ‚Power does not corrupt. 23 Fear corrupts< perhaps the fear of loss of power‛, and that we need to 24 focus and place much emphasis on attitude, morality, and character 25 training of the individual and state officials or leaders. If this is 26 achieved, we would not be pondering on ‚power corrupts‛ but how 27 power is corrupted due to our own attitudes, behaviours, characters, 28 and [political] philosophies of humankind, society, and the world at 29 large. 30 31 32 33 34

92M. S. Shivakumar, ‚Pol Pot: Death Deprives Justice,‛ Economic and Political Weekly, 33, no.17 (Apr. 25 - May 1, 1998): 952-954, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4406690; R. Erken, ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a Totalitarian Communist Regime?,‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016): 122; TRIAL International, Saloth Sar, (Geneva, Switzerland, trialinternational.org: Nov. 2011 & Jun. 2016), https:// trialinternational.org/latest-post/saloth-sar/

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1 Bibliography 2 3 Adams, John. John Adams Quotes BrainyQuote.com., n.d. https://www.brainy 4 quote.com/quotes/john_adams_389106 5 Appian. The Histories of Appian. The Loeb Classical Library, 1913. 6 Battiata, Mary. ‚African Nations Cold-Shoulder Exiled Idi Amin.‛ The Washinton 7 Post, January 15, 1989. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/ 8 1989/ 01/15/ 9 Caesar. Caesar’s Civil War: Book III. Great Britain, University Tutorial Press 10 Ltd., n.d. 11 Caesar. The Conquest of Gaul, trans. S. A. Handford. Great Britain: Richard Clay 12 & Company Ltd., 1951. 13 Chandler, D. P., Kiernan, B., & Boua, C., eds. & trans. Pol Pot Plans the Future: 14 Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977. 15 New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988. 16 Chomsky, N & Herman, E. S. After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the 17 Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology. The Political Economy of Human Rights 18 – Volume II. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2014. 19 Chrissanthos, S. G. ‚Caesar and the Mutiny of 47 B.C.‛ The Journal of Roman 20 Studies, Vol. 91 (2001): 63-75. Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies. 21 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3184770. 22 Claeys, G. Dystopia: A Natural History: A Study of Modern Despotism, Its 23 Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions. United Kingdom: Oxford University 24 Press, 2017. 25 Dalberg-Acton, John. John Dalberg-Acton Quotes. BrainyQuote.com., n.d. 26 https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/john_adams_389106 27 Documentation Center of Cambodia. Fact Sheet: Pol Pot and His Prisoners at 28 Secret Prison S-21. Cambodia: The Documentation Center of Cambodia 29 (DC-Cam), 2011. 30 Encyclopedia of World Biography. Idi Amin Biography. Encyclopedia of World 31 Biography. n.d. https://www.notablebiographies.com/amp/A-An/Amin- 32 Idi.html 33 Erken, R. ‚Cambodia under the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979). An Example of a 34 Totalitarian Communist Regime?‛ RHA, 4, no. 4 (2016):107-130 35 Escrib`a-Folch, A., & Krcmaric, D. ‚Dictators in Exile: Explaining the 36 Destinations of Ex-Rulers‛. Forthcoming in the Journal of Politics. n.d., n.p. 37 Available @ https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/281743214 38 Ezra, M. ‚Malcolm Caldwell: Pol Pot’s Apologist.‛ Democratiya, 16 (Spring- 39 Summer 2009): n.p. 40 Guillou, Y. A. ‚Medicine in Cambodia during the Pol Pot Regime (1975-1979): 41 Foreign and Cambodian Influences.‛ East Asian Medicine under Communism: 42 A Symposium, Graduate Center, City University of New York. New York,

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